No More Learning

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BISMARCIt
aware ' it was the intention of Germany to open a canal
into the Baltic . . . for the security of which it would be
necessary to give a good and fortified harbour to Heligo-
land. ' The concession was ultimately made by Lord
Salisbury on July I, 1890, as part of the general Anglo-
German agreement of that date.
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Bismarck
threw away a great opportunity between 1883 and 1885,
and threw it away deliberately. Had he frankly and
openly approached the British government in 1883 with
an explanation of the difficult position the German
government was in, placed all the cards loyally on the
table, invited our goodwill while emphasising the neces-
sity of concessions on grounds of policy, and his readiness
in return for such concessions to support us against Ferry
and the French government, whose policy was to em-
barrass Great Britain everywhere by subservience to
Germany, all that Germany subsequently obtained might
have been gained and more, without endangering the good
relations of both countries. Bismarck pursued a very
different course: partly because such methods were not
his idea of diplomacy, partly because he could not resist
this opportunity to utilise the difficulties of Great Britain,
partly because he conceived it necessary to mislead Ger-
many by representing Great Britain as hostile, while
representing that her hostility was only broken down by
the skill and force of an invincible German diplomacy.
Tactically he succeeded. The incompleteness of the
German success was concealed from the German public:
the embittered controversy was left to rankle in the
German mind. Strategically, the campaign failed. There
can be little doubt that Bismarck desired to draw
Great Britain into the German net and the German
system--to establish a general entente which would have
placed the Triple Alliance beyond question and left
Germany completely master of the European situation
and of British policy, and put the British fleet under
German direction, objects all the more desirable when
the fall of the Ferry Ministry (April 1885) freed our policy
from the continuous onslaught of a French premier,
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 429
'determined to stir up trouble for Great Britain in every
quarter of the globe. '1 The whole colonial episode left
a deep impression on the minds of Mr. Gladstone, Lord
Granville, and Lord Derby, and deepened Mr. Gladstone's
distrust of any general understanding with Germany while
her policy was directed by Bismarck and pursued by such
Bismarckian methods.
Lord Fitzmaurice, for whose judgment and knowledge
all who have worked over the same material must have a
profound respect, is of opinion that 'the Berlin Act,' of
February 24, 1885, ' may some day be considered the most
remarkable event in Lord Granville's long tenure of the
Foreign Office. ' That Act finally defined and established
under international guarantees the Congo Free State;
it also defined the relations between Germany and the
new state and the claims of Portugal and France; it pro-
vided for the suppression of slavery and the slave-trade,
and for religious liberty; ana it was the first international
document formally to recognise ' spheres of influence ' as
distinct from territorial acquisitions. In a word, it went
a long way towards solving some of the acuter problems
of the Partition of Africa--and to solve them by a European
Concert.
The Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890, com-
pleted the negotiations begun in 1883, and laid the
foundation of German East Africa. It was concluded
by Bismarck's successor Caprivi. Bismarck criticised
the agreement of 1890 with characteristic bluntness:
'Zanzibar,' he told Busch, ' ought not to have been left to
the English. It would have been better to maintain the
old arrangement. We could then have had it at some later
time when England required our good offices against France
or Russia. In the meantime our merchants, who are
clever, and, like the Jews, are satisfied with smaller profits,
would have kept the upper hand in business. To regard
Heligoland as an equivalent shows more imagination than
1 'Ferry,' wrote Lord Granville,' is certainly no loss to us. He arrived at
the Quai d'Orsay quite ignorant of foreign affairs; and the more he learnt of
them, the more subservient he became to Bismarck, and the more tricky to us. '
--Life, ii. p. 435 ; see also Lord Lyons's Life, passim.
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BISMARCK
sound calculation. In the event of war, it would be
better for us that it should be in the hands of a neutral
Power. '
The criticism contains in a nutshell Bismarck's ideas
and methods. The embarrassments of Great Britain
were to be utilised, as opportunities arose, to extract
concessions which would strengthen the prestige of the
government at home, consolidate Germany's position in
Europe and satisfy powerful sections of public opinion.
German trade would succeed in and for itself, under the
benevolent and careless aegis of the British flag, without
committing the German government to a systematic
colonial policy. Without a fleet adequate to protect the
German colonies, those colonies would simply be exposed
to British attack: and it was a profound mistake to put
Germany in a position in which she might require the good
offices of Great Britain, instead of having her own good
offices to bargain with in a British competition with
France or Russia.
Hence, from the first, Bismarck declined to incur Im-
perial responsibility for the administration or develop-
ment of the territories acquired. His principle was to
adopt the time-honoured British method of development
by chartered companies, with assistance, not readily
granted, of a subsidy to a steamship line. The Imperial
government did not incorporate the acquisitions, a step
which would have raised very difficult constitutional
and financial problems. Were the colonies, for example,
to be Imperial Territories (Reichsliinder)? What were
to be their administrative relations to the Imperial
government and the Reichstag? Who was to be re-
sponsible, and to whom for their government? How
were they to be financed during the long period when
they could not be self-supporting or policed, and so
forth? Technically during the Bismarckian regime they
were simply 'Protectorates' (Schiitz. - Gebiete), i. e. the
Imperial government undertook to 'protect' them from
foreign aggression--a definition of a 'Protectorate' much
narrower than that commonly accepted. But even, in
Bismarck's day, this guarded and limited liability broke
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 431
down. The Arab Revolt in East Africa of 1888 proved
that the German East African Company (Die Deutsche
Ost-Africa Gesellschaft), mainly financed by the German
traders interested in the vast district, was unable to
'protect' the 'Protectorate' from native attacks or re-
bellions. Direct Imperial assistance had to be given.
But even without the coercion of internal danger the
Bismarckian policy was bound to fail. Behind the
colonial movement worked the forces of a public opinion
that demanded the full status of German sovereignty for
the German 'colonies,' and the creation of n Germany
beyond the seas, to become as essentially and integrally a
part of the German Empire as Alsace or Mecklenburg.
But the later development of German colonial policy,
which led in 1907 to the establishment of a Colonial Office
in the central executive, and the gradual transference of
all the colonies to direct imperial administration fall
outside the Bismarckian period. How far the develop-
ment since 1890 has borne out Bismarck's original reluct-
ance to embark on a systematic colonial policy, and how
far it inevitably led to the one result that Bismarck feared
from the first--an irreconcilable antagonism between
Great Britain and Germany, spreading from the Atlantic
and the Pacific to the North Sea and the heart of Europe
--and how far colonial policy has been the main cause of
the creation of a German fleet, sufficiently powerful to
rival that of Great Britain, are questions of the profoundest
significance to all students of the European State system
in the quarter of a century that followed Bismarck's fall
from power. But they can neither be discussed with
advantage, still less adequately answered, by the student
of Bismarck's statecraft alone.
The colonial movement, as a phenomenon in the revo-
lution of the German Empire, does indeed enforce, with
the same clearness that the history of Social Democracy
brings out, one great truth, salutary alike for the pure
historical student and the political researcher into the
springs and causes of national development. The in-
dustrialism of Germany, with its concurrent features of a
rapid increase of wealth and a marvellous expansion of
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BISMARCK
population, was not Bismarck's work, nor did he deliber-
ately at any time in his career make it his task to promote
it, in and for itself. He endeavoured in 1862, and still
more in 1879, to utilise the economic ambitions and ex-
panding material resources of Germany in achieving his
main political object; he checked from time to time its
energies or directed them into channels approved by
himself. His success was certainly very limited even in
this limited programme. The forces were too vast,
too ubiquitous, and too complex to be controlled
within the mould of a policy which had originated
and attained a successful issue in a very different field of
action. And by 1890, when Bismarck departed, the
economic and industrial elements that made the new .
Germany were beyond the power of any statesman to say
--' thus far and no farther; this we will have, but not
that. ' Had Bismarck held his place until 1898 this con-
clusion would be more apparent than it was in 1890.
The Chancellor was, in short, experiencing the lesson that
eighteenth-century British history drives home. Neither
a Chatham, nor a Clive, nor a Warren Hastings could
prevent the ' expansion of England' from taking a form,
a volume, or a direction which their policy had not con-
templated; and when the industrial revolution was
superimposed on the originally narrower colonial and
imperial movement, the government at home was obliged
to follow where the nation, mastered by its own internal
vitality, unconsciously led. England, often reluctantly,
was driven by forces within and without, which were like
the propulsive forces of life within a healthy and growing
human individual. So thin and obscure is the partition
in the lives of individuals and nations between appetites
and ideals. British policy in Europe was gradually
coerced by the colonial expansion into a new orientation
and a re-definition of the ends and methods of British
action in Europe.
So with Bismarck. He had taught his nation the
Bismarckian gospel of power and proved its efficacy. The
industrial revolution in Germany, superimposed on
unification and victory, inspired new concepts and a new
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
and deeper meaning in the principles of power as the end
and justification of organised State action. The colonial
movement in Germany was at once both the expression
of the new interpretation of power--of which the German
nation was becoming more and more conscious--and a
demand for the realisation of that new power by the old
methods by which Bismarck had taught Germany the
gospel of the State that stood for Power. Bismarck
felt, indeed, intuitively, that the German demand could
not be ignored. What he refused to admit was that
the satisfaction of the demand must in the end result in
a re-interpretation of German policy in Europe and re-
sult in a new attitude to the problems of international
relations. And until he fell he was really wrestling
with an insoluble dilemma. He insisted on maintaining
the Bismarckian conception of Central Europe, with its
strategic and political conceptions, its delicate equipoise
of European State relations, derived from the Europe of
1848 to 1870, and its theory of alliances and preventive
combinations, directed chiefly against France. But, as the
next two decades conclusively indicated, the colonial and
industrial movement in the civilised States of Europe, the
'armed peace ' resting on ' nations in arms,' more or less
Prussianised in their military machinery, and the new ideas
of power in conflict with the new ideas of political liberty,
law and right, had produced a deadlock in Europe by
1890. The struggle had been shifted from the chancel-
leries with their obsolescent political conceptions to the
Europe beyond the seas, reacting on the new industrial
basis at home, and in turn influenced by it. Hence in
1890 Europe as the result of forces, at best only indirectly
created by Bismarckian principles, was on the eve of an
effort to readjust the whole European State system and
the international relations of the armed nations to the
new ideas of power, and of empires based on a modern
colonial mercantilism. Colonialism and industrialism
were destined to produce a new Europe and a new world;
and for Germany w particular they were shortly not to
supersede, but to re-write, the meaning and value of the
fundamental conceptions of German hegemony, and to
B. 2 E
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BISMARCK
re-interpret Central Europe in terms that Bismarck re-
garded as a departure, and a blundering departure, from
sound policy.
The Chancellor, however, to the end adhered with im-
pressive tenacity to his fundamental conception, and the
final decade of his career witnessed a resolute effort to fit
Russia into the system embodied in the Triple Alliance.
The new Tsar, Alexander m. , had not the same dynastic
connection with the royal house of Prussia that had so
materially influenced the relations of Alexander n. and the
Emperor William. He was torn between the desire to
represent a powerful Russia in Europe and his fear of
Nihilism, which by the assassination of his father had
brought him to the throne. Liberalism and all its works
were in his eyes only the inclined plane to democracy and
anarchy. Liberal Great Britain and the democratic
French Republic changing its ministries every few months
were a public danger. The solidarity of the Conservative
interest and the monarchical principle demanded the
formation of a 'monarchical international 'to comKat
the Socialist international--so formidable in Germany.
Bismarck could work on this line of thought. Lord
Granville openly recognised from 1881 to 1885 that a
Liberal ministry, because it was a Liberal ministry,
would be harassed, and that Bismarck would enjoy
harassing it, because the German system required that
the destruction of Liberalism in Germany should be
followed by the destruction of it elsewhere. The world
could have peace, but only if it first made a Conservative
solitude. Accordingly Bismarck 'got at' the Tsar in the
autumn of 1881 in Denmark. The Emperor William, so
sincere, straightforward, -and so eminently admirable in
his simplicity, could be persuaded to employ the hypo-
dermic syringe for ' doping ' the Tsar into sanity. That
autumn there was much discussion in exalted circles about
the desirability of saving a perishing world by an inter-
national anti-Nihilist and anti-Socialist league. Great
Britain was the trouble, of course, as Great Britain had
been the trouble under Castlereagh in the earlier form
of the Holy Alliance. Even a Conservative Great Britain
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
was never at any time ready, at the dictation of Berlin,
Vienna, or Petersburg, to wreck the constitutional system
and to abolish its freedom of the press or abandon
the right of asylum to political refugees. Fortunately
for Germany Great Britain was in cruel difficulties and
Alexander in. was amenable to influence. When the
Tsar replaced the anti-German Ignatieff by de Giers
(June 12, 1882), and when Skobeleff died, Katkoff lost
influence, and it was clear the German wind was once
more blowing steadily along the repaired wires from the
Wilhelmstrasse to Gatchina and Tsarkoe Seloe. The
Austrians were restive, for they suspected treachery at
Berlin. They had not learned, even in 1882, that Bismarck
refused alliances or conventions in which he did not sit
on the longer arm of the lever. In the spring of 1884
(March 24) Bismarck could rejoice, for he had made his
first 'reinsurance' (Ruckversicherungs) treaty. In the
autumn of that year, at a meeting of the three Emperors
at Skierniewice, a verbal endorsement was given to the
written compact of March 24. But, unless the evidence
available is absolutely untrustworthy, there was no written
understanding at Skierniewice. The convention in writ-
ing had already been made in the spring, and there was
no adequate reason either for writing it out again or
altering its terms.
The compact apparently was to hold good for three
years: and provided that if one of the three contracting
parties made war on a fourth Power, the other two were to
maintain a benevolent neutrality; that in the problems of
the Balkan peninsula the contracting parties would consult
their own interests, but in cases of disagreement between
two Powers there was to be a casting vote with the third;
Turkey was to come under a kind of joint Protectorate
which would be responsible for the execution of the terms
of the Treaty of Berlin; while the occupation of the Balkan
principalities was forbidden to all the three signatories. 1
For Bismarck the treaty was a triumph. It is very
1 See Appendix B for a further discussion of the Treaty of 1884-87, and the
questions arising out of them. The Treaty of 1884 had been preceded by a
treaty (dealing with the Near East) in 1881.
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BISMARCK
difficult to see, if the terms given above broadly represent
the contents of the convention, why Alexander in. should
have consented to become a party to such an undertaking.
He gained on the face of it nothing, while he lost every-
thing, including his independence of action. It is true
that in the struggle, now approaching a crisis, in the
Middle East between Great Britain and Russia the Tsar
was freed from the fear of German and Austrian attack,
should it come to war with Great Britain, but cool re-
flection should have convinced the Tsar that it was in-
conceivable that Germany or Austria would ever attack
Russia to enable Great Britain to win a victory that
would consolidate British power in the Middle or Near
East. Bismarck was not likely to sacrifice the bones of
Pomeranian grenadiers in the interest of a Liberal Great
Britain. And had he been so inconceivably foolish, he
would at once have brought about an alliance between
France and Great Britain, which he feared even more than
an alliance between France and Russia. A Franco-British
Alliance meant that Italy would at once desert the
Triple Alliance. Russian diplomacy from 1862 to 1890 (to
proceed no further) is indeed a mysterious and fearful
thing--so bristling with patent miscalculations, glaring
blunders, and the inconsistent idiosyncrasies of mediocre
autocrats, that the student is driven to suspect some
rational but hidden explanation, the nature of which has
never been revealed, to account for the mistakes. The
truth, probably, is that in Bismarck's hands Alexander in.
was a hypnotised stripling. Lord Ampthill's last letter
to Lord Granville (August 16, 1884), however, repeats a
familiar theme: 'the progress of democracy in England,'
he wrote, 'is the cause of very serious alarm to the sove-
reigns and governments; and they purpose to meet it by
consolidating the Monarchical League. ' If the Tsar was
so impressed with the danger to his person, throne, and
principles from the progress of democracy, led by a pestilent
Great Britain, as to sacrifice his political independence and
initiative and tie himself up in the meshes of the Compact
of 1884, no sovereign ever made a' more unjustified and
foolish sacrifice to Conservative principles.
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THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
The Tsar interpreted the compact as giving Russia
a free hand in Central Asia; and certainly as the result of
it he was enabled to conduct, under continuous German
inspiration, the negotiations over the Pendjeh affair in a
way that he could not have done, had he not been assured
of German neutrality. But in so doing he was playing
Bismarck's game to perfection. The diversion of Russia
to Central Asia, a continuous and rasping antagonism
with Great Britain, the diversion of Great Britain in
Egypt or the Middle East, the alienation of Russia from
France, and of France from Great Britain, the with-
drawal of Russia from Europe and the Balkans, and the
elimination thereby of a conflict between Austria and
Russia, together with the weakening of Russian and
British influence and the increase of German power at Con-
stantinople, were results that in the glades of Friedrichs-
ruhe and by the cigars smoked in serene reflection by the
Chancellor's hearth seemed to be the gifts of Providence to
the wise. There is every reason to believe that Bismarck
supported (for adequate considerations) Great Britain in
Egypt against France, and urged Russia to increase her
Asiatic Empire. It was Great Britain not Bismarck who
suffered from 'Mervousness,' and it is practically certain
that in 1885 Bismarck used all his unrivalled influence and
skill to keep open the breach between Russia and Great
Britain, while dexterously suggesting to both parties that
Codlin was the friend, not Short. He did not want an
Anglo-Russian war; but he wanted the highest tension
possible short of war, and if both governments in conse-
quence lost prestige, or felt they must secure German
goodwill in a political world in which they had no friend
but Germany, the Wilhelmstrasse more demonstrably
than ever became the central exchange of European
rivalries. The 'honest broker' meanwhile took his com-
mission in West Africa or New Guinea, best of all in
shutting the doors of the Quai D'Orsay to all but the
German Ambassador. A Liberal Great Britain, as the
disturber of the peace of the world and the jealous foe of
every one's prosperity, was an effective theme alike at Paris
and Petersburg, and most effective of all in the Reichstag.
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BISMARCK
'Bizzimarck here, Bizzimarck there, Bizzimarck, Bizzi-
marck everywhere,' said Punch in a famous cartoon--and
it was so true. Moreover, what an appropriate moral
for sovereigns shivering in panic at Socialism--' To what
impotence and embarrassments will not Liberalism bring
deluded nations and ministers! ' Gambetta, Ferry,
and Gladstone compared with de Giers, Taaffe, and
Bismarck.
The entente of 1884 was, as usual, primarily directed
against France. The compact provided for the neutrality
of Russia if any of the three partners came to war with a
fourth Power (France). But it did much more than dis-
solve the possibility of a Franco-Russian Alliance (with
the war on two fronts for Germany); it constituted
Bismarck the arbiter and mediator between Russia and
Austria. A quarrel between Russia and Germany in the
Balkans was very unlikely; but a quarrel between Russia
and Austria was always on the horizon. Bismarck, by
the compact of 1884, could decide whether he would
support Russia or Austria, and the choice of the alter-
native gave him just the leverage he required to keep both
his 'friends' in order. The absorption of Russia in
Central Asia immensely facilitated the task. But what
Bismarck desired above all was to secure the requisite
degree of control over Austrian policy. If Austria was
'in hand ' the diversion of Russia or the coercion of Italy
was easy, and it is a fair inference that the compact of
1884 tightened, and was intended to tighten, the control
of the Wilhelmstrasse on the Ball-Platz.
The unscrupulous ingenuity and dexterity of Bismarck's
diplomacy may easily conceal the real source of his success
---German strength. Germany could secure allies, not
because her minister was a master of the technique of the
higher direction, but because she was a State of such
organised power. The Prussian sword was a permanent
weight in the scales of the international Balance of Power.
Europe in these days was steadily going to school in
Germany. In German universities the foreigner could
learn what organised work really meant, and it was a re-
velation that inspired justly a profound admiration and
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 439
a no less wholesome fear. From 1870 onwards the mighty
preparation of, and sacrifice by, trained brains from 1815
to 1870 was bringing its harvest safely home; and surely it
deserved to do so. German science in its broadest sense
had its origin in the universities, but by 1880 it had gripped
the whole nation. The German mind might be un-
political--which is very doubtful--but in commerce as in
the professions it understood, as no other national mind
in Europe understood, the meaning of science and the
vital difference between amateurism and expert know-
ledge. The most demonstrable manifestation of that
national science was the German nation in arms--the
German army as a political organ of the State that repre-
sented Power. That army was neither a luxury nor a
profession for the well-to-do and the rank and file who
could not be fitted by an individualistic rule of thumb into
the civil life of trade or agriculture. The foreign soldier
who studied at Berlin became acquainted with a great
national machine, the education and training of which
was based on the severest science co-ordinated to political
ends. Foreign soldiers in Europe realised that the German
army was not merely large in numbers or well-equipped
with guns and ammunition, but was trained for war.
From the Chief of the General Staff, now one of the grand
old men of Germany and history, to the lads of the Cadet-
tenhaus the German nation recognised, not that the army
must be ready (which it took for granted), but that it
would win not only by its numbers but by its superiority
in science--and that the science of war demands, as does
every science, not merely the devotion of a lifetime but
first-rate brains inpolitics who have grasped what an army
is and implies. The chiefs of the German army, whose
education did not cease until they were on the retired list,
assumed that the political direction was in the hands of one,
to whom war was a familiar subject, and who regarded war
as a necessary manifestation of national life and power and
the indispensable instrument of a national policy. How
Bismarck used the German army to assist his policy, and
how he manipulated his policy to increase the effective
use of the German army is written on the record. What
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BISMARCK
Europe had not yet grasped was that since 1862 the Prus-
sian army--the nation in arms--was also organised and
employed by Bismarck (in conjunction with the General
Staff) to be a political instrument, not merely for main-
taining the Hohenzollern dynasty in power but for main-
taining a defined type of polity in Germany, and for
educating the nation in the principles and ethics of that
polity. It would be instructive if we could have trans-
ferred him to London and seen how he would have used the
sea-power of Great Britain now as an instrument, and now
an end in itself, of policy. British sea-power was unique
in its capacity to satisfy the ends of an Imperial policy and
to achieve the British right to live and achieve national
purposes. Bismarck would have taught us how to adapt
our policy to the instrument, and how policy could have
secured at each stage further and effective opportunities
for obtaining the command of the sea and placing it beyond
dispute. The period from 1815 to 1890 is fertile in illus-
trations of the just criticism that British foreign policy
repeatedly incurs in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies--that the British Cabinets were generally ignorant
of naval or any other strategy and the essentially national
and imperial purpose for which the British fleet justifi-
ably existed; while the British Admiralty, at last and
reluctantly compelled to regard (1887) a starved Intelli-
gence Department as a necessary equipment of the Brain
of a navy, was no less ignorant of foreign policy and its
vital connection with naval strategy. Had the Wilhelm-
strasse been ignorant of the relations of strategy to policy,
and also been kept in one watertight ' political' compart-
ment, and had the great General Staff been ignoranc of
policy and shut up in another watertight ' military' com-
partment, Koniggratz, Gravelotte, and Sedan would not
have been won, nor would there have been a German
Central Europe controlling the Continental State system
from the assured basis of the Triple Alliance.
There were, however, two forces that Bismarck could
not control, the national consciousness of France and the
expanding nationalism of the Balkan races. The fall of
Ferry recalled Alsace-Lorraine to the French memory.
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR
441
After the death of the Comte de Chambord (August 23,
1883) the speeches of Manteuffel, the persecution of
Antoine in Alsace, and the insult at Paris by the boulevard
mob to the King of Spain, after he had been made colonel
of an Uhlan regiment, showed what slumbered in the
French heart, even while Ferry cultivated the friendship
of -Germany. From 1885 onwards Franco-German re-
lations passed from friction to tension and from tension
to serious strain. The theatrical but brief episode of
Boulanger (1886-89) coincided with events elsewhere to
make the years 1887 and 1888 critical. 1 In 1887 Boulanger
was Minister of War; the famous black horse on which he
rode in the Bois de Boulogne and captivated the cafe-
concert patriotism of the Boulevards seemed as formidable
a menace to the Republic as was his advocacy of revanche
and of a Russian alliance, openly discussed at Petersburg,
to the Foreign Office at Berlin. The 'Schnaebele in-
cident,' when a French police commissioner was lured
across the frontier in Alsace, arrested and thrown into
prison, almost brought matters to an open rupture.
In the Balkans the union of the two Bulgarias, the
furious anger of the Tsar, the demands of Turkey, the war
between Serbia and Bulgaria, the defeat of Serbia and the
intervention of Austria on Serbia's behalf, the collapse of
the Russian party in Bulgaria, and the failure of the
German consuls to save the Russophil officers at Rustchuk,
together with the active part played by the British
government, had produced a situation from which, quite
apart from the Franco-German embittered relations, a
For Bismarck the gravity of the situation lay in
two formidable possibilities: the Triple Alliance might
crumble away--the understanding of 1884 with Russia
might dissolve and be replaced by a Franco-Russian
alliance, linking the quarrel of France with Germany to
the avowed objects of a Russia, humiliated and frustrated,
in the south-east of Europe. Pressure from Paris and
Petersburg was being put upon Italy to detach herself
1 DiUce {European Politics in 1887, p. 16) asserts that in October 1886 France
refused an alliance with Russia and Austria an alliance with Great Britain-
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? 442
BISMARCK
from Germany and obtain her 'national satisfaction' in
a new Triple Alliance against Germany. Three important
contracts ran out in 1887: the Dual Alliance of 1879, the
Triple Alliance of 1882, the Compact of 1884 with Russia.
Their renewal was an essential condition of Bismarck's
system, and on their renewal, in Bismarck's view, clearly
depended the peace of Europe, more than ever a German
interest. The crisis in foreign policy coincided with an
embittered and strained situation in home politics.
Bismarck therefore had to satisfy Germany's allies,
Austria and Italy, to satisfy Russia and thereby renew the
isolation of France, satisfy German public opinion, begin-
ning to be as excited as opinion in France, Russia, and the
Balkans,--and also to crush the organised parliamentary
opposition at home. Nor could he forget Great
Britain. The retention of Italy was largely dependent
on British goodwill. Clearly it was not a moment to-
harass Great Britain either about Egypt or colonial
acquisitions.
The years 1887 and 188,8 were therefore the severest
touchstones of a German statesman's statecraft. Bis-
marck's performance was, when we appreciate the complex
difficulties, a consummate one. The master proved his
mastery.
How seriously the German government viewed the
situation was shown by the introduction (November 25,
1886) of a new Army Bill, augmenting the peace strength
of the army by forty thousand men, the increase to take
effect as from April 1, 1887. The expiration of the
Septennate in April 1888 was thereby anticipated by
twelve months. Opposition came from the Centre and
the Liberals. The aged Chief of the Staff addressed the
Reichstag (January 11, 1887) with the deliberate assertion
that if the bill were rejected ' we shall most certainly have
war. All political and civil liberty,' Moltke added, 'all
the results of culture, the finances, the State, all stand or
fall with the army. ' Bismarck's speeches in 1887 and 1888
were, as he fully realised, delivered quite as much to
Europe as to Germany. As expositions of the Chan-
cellor's system and policy they are amongst the loci classici,
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 443
and they deserve to be studied in extenso. Only a few
quotations can be given here:
'Our relations with Russia afford no motives for this bill . . .
we shall have no conflict with Russia unless we go to Bulgaria
for the express purpose of provoking a war. . . . What is Bulgaria
to us? It is nothing to us who rules in Bulgaria, or even what
becomes of Bulgaria. . . . The difficulty of our position is not
to keep peace with Austria and Russia, but between Russia and
Austria. . . . With words I can do nothing. Words are not
soldiers, nor are speeches battalions. When we have the enemy
in the Fatherland, and read them speeches they will laugh at us.
The possibility of a French attack, which to-day is not imminent,
will recur as soon as France thinks she is stronger than we are,
either by alliances or being better armed. . . . In case of an
unsuccessful war, the peace of 1870 would be mere child's play
as compared with the peace of 1890. We should have the same
French against us whom we met from 1807 to 1813, and who
would again suck our blood so that we should be paralysed for
thirty years. . . . We have interests which do not affect Austria,
and Austria has interests which are far removed from us, and
each must go therefore its own way. '--(January II, 1887. )
'We cannot trust the existence of the army to a vacil-
lating majority. If the status of the army is to depend on
Parliament and Budget grants, we shall be compelled to
say: "videat Imperator ne quid. detrimenti capiat Res-
publica" and "salus Reipublica will become suprema lex"
(January 14, 1887). On January 14, an amendment
limiting the proposed increase to three years was carried
by 183 to 154 votes, the Centre voting with the Liberals
in the majority. Bismarck quietly drew a paper from his
portfolio and filled in the date. 'I have,' he said to the
Reichstag, excited by the results of the division, 'an
Imperial Message to communicate. ' He read from the
piece of paper a decree dissolving the Reichstag.
Six weeks later the elections justified the Chancellor's
prediction ' that I shall carry the Army Bill, because the
Progressists are against it. ' The Liberal opposition was
badly beaten. The Liberals lost thirty-three seats, the
Socialists sixteen, the Clerical Centre only two--but the
reconstituted National Liberals, now really a branch of
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? 444
BISMARCK
moderate Conservatism, gained nearly fifty seats, and
the Government Party of a hundred and fifty-four was
increased to two hundred and twenty. The Army
Bill was reintroduced on March 9 and passed, the
Centre abstaining from voting, for reasons discussed
below. On April 28 Schnaebele was released. There
had been a regrettable misunderstanding. It is diffi-
cult to avoid the conclusion that the 'Schnaebele inci-
dent' was deliberately planned, possibly to provoke the
French into a serious indiscretion, certainly to assist the
passage of the Army Bill by driving into the German
elector's mind the peril from France. The British reader
will recall how in 1901 during the Boer War certain naval
incidents were employed to emphasise the tyranny of
Great Britain, and the impotence of the German Navy,
in order to promote the passage of the Naval Bill, then
before the Reichstag.
In the spring, Bismarck had succeeded in renewing the
Triple Alliance (March 1887). Crispi, who had succeeded
as Premier on the death of Depretis (July) in the early
autumn, ostentatiously paid a visit to Count Kalnoky at
Vienna (September 14), and had then gone on to Friedrichs-
ruhe (October 2). On the return journey, he informed a
German journalist of the Frankfurter Zeitung that Italy
wished well to Bulgaria, but ' there can be no doubt that
Italy, like every other European State, has every reason
to fear Russia's advances to Constantinople. We cannot
allow the Mediterranean to become a Russian lake. ' This
carefully prepared ' aside' drew its significance from the
peril that the situation in Bulgaria still involved.
The relations of Austria and Russia and of Germany and
Russia were the crucial questions for Bismarck. He had
provoked a storm of criticism at Vienna by deliberately
revealing in the semi-official North German Gazette the
agreement of January 15, 1877, between Austria and
Russia by which the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had been provisionally arranged in advance.
Europe was as much puzzled as Austrian public opinion at
the revelation. Why should Bismarck select this moment
to let out secrets which embarrassed the Austrian ministry,
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? THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR 445
and embittered the relations of Germany and Austria,
and of Austria and Russia, when his avowed policy was to
keep the peace between them--Germany as the tertius
gaudens duobus litigantibus i Had Bismarck not got the
renewal of the Triple Alliance safely in his pocket? The
explanation is probably \o be found first in Bismarck's
desire to remind Austria-Hungary that her Balkan policy
must be dependent on German goodwill; secondly, in the
relations of Germany and Russia, and of Bismarck and the
Tsar. Austria had continuously to be kept in control, Russia
convinced that Germany might, under certain eventualities,
prefer a Russian to an Austrian policy in the Balkans.
The Compact of 1884 had run out in the spring of
1887 and had not been renewed. Since 1884 the Pan-
Slavist, anti-German party in Russia had slowly regained
its ascendency, in spite of Katkoff's death in the August
of 1887. Count Tolstoi, General Ignatieff, Pobodonostzev
and General Bogdanovitch (author of the pamphlet which
caused a great stir, Ualliance Franco-Russe et la Coalition
Europeenne), utilising the crisis in Bulgaria and the Tsar's
envenomed hostility to Prince Alexander of Battenberg,
and marked disapproval of the election of Prince Ferdinand
of Coburg in Prince Alexander's place, combined to pro-
duce a serious anti-German movement in Russia. The
military preparations and movements of Russian troops
on the Austrian frontier, replied to by military prepara-
tions and movements of troops in Galicia and Hungary,
seemed to foreshadow a war between Austria and Russia;
and when the Tsar, at Copenhagen in September, pointedly
omitted to visit the German Emperor at Stettin the
warfare in the press on all sides became fiercer. The
Tsar, however, did come to Berlin (November 18), and
Bismarck has related how he convinced Alexander in. that
forged documents were responsible for the Russian mis-
interpretation of German policy in Bulgaria. It is pro-
bable, indeed almost certain, that the 'Re-insurance
Treaty,' the existence and non-renewal of which were
revealed by Bismarck in 1896, was concluded (November
18, 1887) at this time. 1 But the conclusion of this pecu-
1 Sec Appendix B.
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