For information, address Cornell
University
Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
Revolution and War_nodrm
?
Revolution and War
? A volume in the series
CoRNELL STUDIES IN SECURITY AFFAIRS
edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A complete list of titles in the series appears at the end of this book.
? Revolution and War
STEPHEN M. WALT
Cornell University Press
ITHACA AND LONDON
? ? Copyright (C) 1996 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1996 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell paperbacks, 1997
Printed in the United States of America
@ The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements
of the American National Standard for Information Sciences- Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39? 48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Walt, Stephen M.
Revolution and war I Stephen M. Walt.
p. em. - (Cornell studies in security affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN o-8014-3205-7 (cloth: alk. paper). - ISBN o-8014-8297-6 (plk. : alk. paper)
1. Worldpolitics. 2. Revolutions-History. 3? War. 4? Revolutions- Philosophy. 5? Politics and war. I. Title. II. Series.
D21. 3. W27 1996
303. 6'4-dc:I'. O
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentallyresponsiblesuppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www. cornellpress. cornell. edu.
Clothprinting 10987654321 Paperbackprinting 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
95-45006
? ? Preface
Contents
vii
1 Introduction 1
2 ATheory of Revolution and War 18
3 The French Revolution 46
4 The Russian Revolution 129
5 The Iranian Revolution 210 6 Ihe American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions 269 7 Conclusion 331
Index
353
(v]
? Revolution and war are among the most dramatic and important events in political life, yet few of the countless works on either topic devote much attention to the relationship between them. Students of revolution generally focus on the causes of revolution or its domestic consequences, examining its international aspects only insofar as they shaped the origins or course of the revolution itself. Students of international politics, by contrast, tend to take the state for granted and spend little time on those moments in history
where one state structure dissolves and a new one arises in its place. With a few notable exceptions, therefore, the literatures on revolution and war do not overlap. Indeed, the two fields do not even engage in much of a dia- logue.
This book is an attempt to bridge the gap. Specifically, I seek to explain why revolutions intensify the security competition between states and sharply increase the risk of war. I do so by examining the international con- sequences of the French, Russian, Iranian, American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions, drawing both on the theoretical and empirical litera- ture on revolutions and on several important ideas from international rela- tions theory.
My interest in this subject stems in part from a broader interest in U. S. for- eign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States repeatedly sought to prevent revolutionary movements from coming to power and often tried to overthrow them when they did. U. S. relations with most revolutionary states were predictably poor, even when these states were neither Marxist nor pro-Soviet. The U. S. experience was hardly unique: revolutions have been equally troublesome for others. By exploring how and why revolu- tions lead to war, therefore, I hope to provide practical guidance for national leaders who face an unexpected revolutionary upheaval.
[vii]
Preface
? Preface
The perspective I adopt is based on the familiar realist paradigm. I as- sutme that states exist in an anarchic environment, which leads them to place a very high value on security. In contrast to neorealist balance-of-power the- or. v, however, my focus is not limited to the distribution of aggregate power. I also examine the ways that domestic politics and ideology shape how na- tional leaders evaluate their security environment and how they choose among alternative courses of action. As we shall see, one cannot understand the international effects of a mass revolution by focusing solely on the bal- ance of power or the constraining effects of international anarchy. Nor can theBe factors explain why revolutionary states adopt particular policies,
why other states regard them as especially dangerous, or why revolutionary regimes are unwilling to abandon cherished international objectives even when their pursuit entails high costs. The balance of power is not irrelevant, but :it is neither the sole nor the most important factor in explaining how revolutions affect international politics.
Revolutions, I argue, intensify security competition and increase the prob- ability of war by altering each side's perceptions of the balance of threats. In addition to affecting the balance of power, a revolution also fosters malign perce'ptions of intent and a perverse combination of insecurity and over- confidence, based primarily on the possibility that revolution will spread to other countries. Although war does not occur in every case, strong pres- sures for war are alway s present and, invariably, the level of security com- petition increases significantly.
Much of this book takes the form of detailed narrative history. I found I could . neither understand nor explain these events without exploring them in some depth. Its length also reflects my own fascination with the events I was investigating-and if a great revolution is not fascinating, what is? -as well as my belief that valid empirical tests require a sophisticated under- standing of the historical record. As the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, "Theories must sink a huge anchor in details. "
Revolutions are highly partisan events, and scholarship on them often re- flects these political biases. lb compensate, I have tried to document my claims as extensively as possible, rely ing upon multiple sources and the most widely accepted historical accounts. A number of these works, such as T. C. W. Blanning's superb Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars and E. H. Carr's masterful History of Soviet Russia, both guided my interpretation of particulc1r cases and shaped my thinking on the broader subject of revolu- tion and war.
Like most scholarly endeavors, this book took longer than I expected. Yet I never found the subject boring; indeed, had I been less captivated by the drama of the events I was investigating, the book surely would have been
[viii]
? Preface
finished more quickly. There is much that I still find puzzling about these events and much that I will never fully comprehend. In the end? volume is simply my best effort to add to our evolving understanding onhe phe- nomena of revolution and war.
I am grateful to the many scholars who have offered advice and criticism on some or all of the manuscript. In particular, I thank Said Amir Arjomand, George Breslauer, Richard Cottam, Thomas Christensen, Steve David, Michael Desch, Jim Fearon, Markus Fischer, Gregory Gause, Alexander George, Charles Glaser, Avery Goldstein, Judith Goldstein, Jack Goldstone, Louisa Bertch Green, Robert Johnson, Friedrich Katz, David Laitin, Colin Lucas, Bernard Manin, Andrew Moravcsik, Norman Nie, Kenneth Oye, M. J. Peterson, John Padgett, R. K. Ramazani, Paul Schroeder, Jack Snyder, George Steinmetz, Ronald Suny, Sidney Tarrow, Stephen Van Evera, John
Waterbury, Dali Yang, and Marvin Zonis. I am especially indebted to John . Mearsheimer, whose comments were extremely helpful despite his basic disagreement with my argument. I am also grateful to various research as- ? ;istants who helped me along the way, especially Elizabeth Boyd, James Marquardt, Lisa Moses, Julie Alig, and David Edelstein.
Portions of the book were presented at seminars at the Center for Science and International Affairs and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Stud- ies, both at Harvard University, and at the University of Michigan, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Department of Politican Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, and the Workshop on Comparative Politics and Historical Sociology at the Univer- sit:y of Chicago. I am grateful for these opportunities to try out my ideas, and I thank the participants at these meetings for many helpful comments. Their suggestions added to my labors, but they also made this a better book.
This project would not have been possible without generous grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, the U. S. Institute of Peace, and the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. I did the initial work as a resi- dent associate at the Carnegie Endowment and as a guest scholar in the For- eign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and I thank the heads of these two institutions, Thomas Hughes and John D. Steinbruner, for providing supportive and stimulating environments in which to work.
An earlier and somewhat different version of my central argument was published as "Revolution and War" in volume 44 of World Politics (April 1992). I am grateful to Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to adapt the material here. I also express my thanks to Roger Haydon of Cor- nell University Press, who answered my various inquiries with his usual combination of sympathy and wit.
? ? [ix]
? Preface
I dedicate this book to my wife, Rebecca Stone, to whom I owe just about everything.
Chicago, Illinois
STEPHEN M. wALT
? [x]
? Revolution and War
? [1]
Introduction
Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom dearly under- stand quite what they are doing. But, again like professional revolution- aries, they do sometimes attain a relatively clear grasp of the implications of what they have already done; and sometimes at least, this constitutes a marked improvement on the achievements of their immediate prede- cessors.
-John Dunn
In this book I examine the international impact of revolutionary change, focusing primarily on the relationship between revolution and war. My chief objective is to explain why revolutions increase the intensity of secu- rity competition between states and thereby create a high probability of war. Because war does not occur in every case, my second objective is to clarify why certain revolutions lead to all-out war while others stop at the brink.
Although major revolutions are relatively rare, this subject is worth study- ing for at least two reasons. First, revolutions are more than just critical events in the history of individual nations; they are usually watershed events in in- ternational politics. Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power, alter the pattern of international alignments, cast doubt on existing agree- ments and diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to impmve their positions. They also demonstrate that novel ways of organizing social and political life are possible and often inspire sympathizers in other countries. Thus, although revolutions by definition occur within a single country, their impact is rarely confined to one state alone. 1
Indeed, revolutions usually disrupt the international system in important ways. According to one quantitative study, for example, states that undergo a "revolutionary" regime change are nearly twice as likely to be involved in war as are states that emerge from an "evolutionary" political process. 2 And
1 ElbakiHermassi,"TowardaComparativeStudyofRevolutions,"ComparativeStudiesin Society and History 18, no. 2 (1976).
2 Zeev Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Con- flict, 181&--1876," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989); and also see Jonathan R. Adel- man, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1985), 3-6.
? [t]
? Revolution and War
as the cases presented in this volume will show, revolutions invariably trig- ger intense policy debates in other countries. These disputes, typically di- vided between advocates of accommodation and advocates of intervention against the new regime, are strikingly similar, whether it is the European re- sponse to the French or Bolshevik revolutions or the U. S. reaction to the rev- olutions in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Iran. Yet despite the obvious relevance of this problem for policy makers, little effort has been made to assemble hypotheses and evidence that might resolve (or at least advance) the debate.
The need for a more informed debate is also apparent from the poor track record of U. S. policy in this area. Fear of revolution played a major role in shaping U. S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War, but U. S. responses to revolutionary change during this period were rarely very successfut. l Al- though the United States occasionally made modest efforts to reach a modus vivendi with new revolutionary governments (generally in the latter stages of the revolutionary process}, it usually regarded these groups with suspicion, if not outright hostility, having sought to prevent them from gain- ing power in the first place and still hoping to remove them from power after they obtained it. Not surprisingly, U. S. relations with most revolution- ary regimes have been quite poor. 4 Hard-liners blame these failures on ill- advised efforts at appeasement, while moderates attribute the problem primarily to exaggerated U. S. hostility. Although U. S. policy makers did
achieve their objectives in a few cases (such as the overthrow of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada in 1983}, it is hard to view U. S. policy as a suc- cess story. 5
The foreign policies of most revolutionary states have been equally un- successful. Many of these regimes were suspicious of the West in general
3 See Robert Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U. S. Influence," Interna- tional Security 15, no. 4 (1991) and Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic En- counter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. 141:r-42.
4 As the Mexican, Russian, and Turkish cases will show, this problem predates the Cold War.
5 For examples of these contending views, see W. Anthony Lake, "Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice," in U. S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86, ed. John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg, and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985); Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: U. S. Policy toward Radical Regimes," World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1g83); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.
For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1996 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell paperbacks, 1997
Printed in the United States of America
@ The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements
of the American National Standard for Information Sciences- Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39? 48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Walt, Stephen M.
Revolution and war I Stephen M. Walt.
p. em. - (Cornell studies in security affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN o-8014-3205-7 (cloth: alk. paper). - ISBN o-8014-8297-6 (plk. : alk. paper)
1. Worldpolitics. 2. Revolutions-History. 3? War. 4? Revolutions- Philosophy. 5? Politics and war. I. Title. II. Series.
D21. 3. W27 1996
303. 6'4-dc:I'. O
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentallyresponsiblesuppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www. cornellpress. cornell. edu.
Clothprinting 10987654321 Paperbackprinting 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
95-45006
? ? Preface
Contents
vii
1 Introduction 1
2 ATheory of Revolution and War 18
3 The French Revolution 46
4 The Russian Revolution 129
5 The Iranian Revolution 210 6 Ihe American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions 269 7 Conclusion 331
Index
353
(v]
? Revolution and war are among the most dramatic and important events in political life, yet few of the countless works on either topic devote much attention to the relationship between them. Students of revolution generally focus on the causes of revolution or its domestic consequences, examining its international aspects only insofar as they shaped the origins or course of the revolution itself. Students of international politics, by contrast, tend to take the state for granted and spend little time on those moments in history
where one state structure dissolves and a new one arises in its place. With a few notable exceptions, therefore, the literatures on revolution and war do not overlap. Indeed, the two fields do not even engage in much of a dia- logue.
This book is an attempt to bridge the gap. Specifically, I seek to explain why revolutions intensify the security competition between states and sharply increase the risk of war. I do so by examining the international con- sequences of the French, Russian, Iranian, American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions, drawing both on the theoretical and empirical litera- ture on revolutions and on several important ideas from international rela- tions theory.
My interest in this subject stems in part from a broader interest in U. S. for- eign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States repeatedly sought to prevent revolutionary movements from coming to power and often tried to overthrow them when they did. U. S. relations with most revolutionary states were predictably poor, even when these states were neither Marxist nor pro-Soviet. The U. S. experience was hardly unique: revolutions have been equally troublesome for others. By exploring how and why revolu- tions lead to war, therefore, I hope to provide practical guidance for national leaders who face an unexpected revolutionary upheaval.
[vii]
Preface
? Preface
The perspective I adopt is based on the familiar realist paradigm. I as- sutme that states exist in an anarchic environment, which leads them to place a very high value on security. In contrast to neorealist balance-of-power the- or. v, however, my focus is not limited to the distribution of aggregate power. I also examine the ways that domestic politics and ideology shape how na- tional leaders evaluate their security environment and how they choose among alternative courses of action. As we shall see, one cannot understand the international effects of a mass revolution by focusing solely on the bal- ance of power or the constraining effects of international anarchy. Nor can theBe factors explain why revolutionary states adopt particular policies,
why other states regard them as especially dangerous, or why revolutionary regimes are unwilling to abandon cherished international objectives even when their pursuit entails high costs. The balance of power is not irrelevant, but :it is neither the sole nor the most important factor in explaining how revolutions affect international politics.
Revolutions, I argue, intensify security competition and increase the prob- ability of war by altering each side's perceptions of the balance of threats. In addition to affecting the balance of power, a revolution also fosters malign perce'ptions of intent and a perverse combination of insecurity and over- confidence, based primarily on the possibility that revolution will spread to other countries. Although war does not occur in every case, strong pres- sures for war are alway s present and, invariably, the level of security com- petition increases significantly.
Much of this book takes the form of detailed narrative history. I found I could . neither understand nor explain these events without exploring them in some depth. Its length also reflects my own fascination with the events I was investigating-and if a great revolution is not fascinating, what is? -as well as my belief that valid empirical tests require a sophisticated under- standing of the historical record. As the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, "Theories must sink a huge anchor in details. "
Revolutions are highly partisan events, and scholarship on them often re- flects these political biases. lb compensate, I have tried to document my claims as extensively as possible, rely ing upon multiple sources and the most widely accepted historical accounts. A number of these works, such as T. C. W. Blanning's superb Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars and E. H. Carr's masterful History of Soviet Russia, both guided my interpretation of particulc1r cases and shaped my thinking on the broader subject of revolu- tion and war.
Like most scholarly endeavors, this book took longer than I expected. Yet I never found the subject boring; indeed, had I been less captivated by the drama of the events I was investigating, the book surely would have been
[viii]
? Preface
finished more quickly. There is much that I still find puzzling about these events and much that I will never fully comprehend. In the end? volume is simply my best effort to add to our evolving understanding onhe phe- nomena of revolution and war.
I am grateful to the many scholars who have offered advice and criticism on some or all of the manuscript. In particular, I thank Said Amir Arjomand, George Breslauer, Richard Cottam, Thomas Christensen, Steve David, Michael Desch, Jim Fearon, Markus Fischer, Gregory Gause, Alexander George, Charles Glaser, Avery Goldstein, Judith Goldstein, Jack Goldstone, Louisa Bertch Green, Robert Johnson, Friedrich Katz, David Laitin, Colin Lucas, Bernard Manin, Andrew Moravcsik, Norman Nie, Kenneth Oye, M. J. Peterson, John Padgett, R. K. Ramazani, Paul Schroeder, Jack Snyder, George Steinmetz, Ronald Suny, Sidney Tarrow, Stephen Van Evera, John
Waterbury, Dali Yang, and Marvin Zonis. I am especially indebted to John . Mearsheimer, whose comments were extremely helpful despite his basic disagreement with my argument. I am also grateful to various research as- ? ;istants who helped me along the way, especially Elizabeth Boyd, James Marquardt, Lisa Moses, Julie Alig, and David Edelstein.
Portions of the book were presented at seminars at the Center for Science and International Affairs and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Stud- ies, both at Harvard University, and at the University of Michigan, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Department of Politican Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, and the Workshop on Comparative Politics and Historical Sociology at the Univer- sit:y of Chicago. I am grateful for these opportunities to try out my ideas, and I thank the participants at these meetings for many helpful comments. Their suggestions added to my labors, but they also made this a better book.
This project would not have been possible without generous grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, the U. S. Institute of Peace, and the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. I did the initial work as a resi- dent associate at the Carnegie Endowment and as a guest scholar in the For- eign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and I thank the heads of these two institutions, Thomas Hughes and John D. Steinbruner, for providing supportive and stimulating environments in which to work.
An earlier and somewhat different version of my central argument was published as "Revolution and War" in volume 44 of World Politics (April 1992). I am grateful to Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to adapt the material here. I also express my thanks to Roger Haydon of Cor- nell University Press, who answered my various inquiries with his usual combination of sympathy and wit.
? ? [ix]
? Preface
I dedicate this book to my wife, Rebecca Stone, to whom I owe just about everything.
Chicago, Illinois
STEPHEN M. wALT
? [x]
? Revolution and War
? [1]
Introduction
Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom dearly under- stand quite what they are doing. But, again like professional revolution- aries, they do sometimes attain a relatively clear grasp of the implications of what they have already done; and sometimes at least, this constitutes a marked improvement on the achievements of their immediate prede- cessors.
-John Dunn
In this book I examine the international impact of revolutionary change, focusing primarily on the relationship between revolution and war. My chief objective is to explain why revolutions increase the intensity of secu- rity competition between states and thereby create a high probability of war. Because war does not occur in every case, my second objective is to clarify why certain revolutions lead to all-out war while others stop at the brink.
Although major revolutions are relatively rare, this subject is worth study- ing for at least two reasons. First, revolutions are more than just critical events in the history of individual nations; they are usually watershed events in in- ternational politics. Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power, alter the pattern of international alignments, cast doubt on existing agree- ments and diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to impmve their positions. They also demonstrate that novel ways of organizing social and political life are possible and often inspire sympathizers in other countries. Thus, although revolutions by definition occur within a single country, their impact is rarely confined to one state alone. 1
Indeed, revolutions usually disrupt the international system in important ways. According to one quantitative study, for example, states that undergo a "revolutionary" regime change are nearly twice as likely to be involved in war as are states that emerge from an "evolutionary" political process. 2 And
1 ElbakiHermassi,"TowardaComparativeStudyofRevolutions,"ComparativeStudiesin Society and History 18, no. 2 (1976).
2 Zeev Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Con- flict, 181&--1876," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989); and also see Jonathan R. Adel- man, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1985), 3-6.
? [t]
? Revolution and War
as the cases presented in this volume will show, revolutions invariably trig- ger intense policy debates in other countries. These disputes, typically di- vided between advocates of accommodation and advocates of intervention against the new regime, are strikingly similar, whether it is the European re- sponse to the French or Bolshevik revolutions or the U. S. reaction to the rev- olutions in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Iran. Yet despite the obvious relevance of this problem for policy makers, little effort has been made to assemble hypotheses and evidence that might resolve (or at least advance) the debate.
The need for a more informed debate is also apparent from the poor track record of U. S. policy in this area. Fear of revolution played a major role in shaping U. S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War, but U. S. responses to revolutionary change during this period were rarely very successfut. l Al- though the United States occasionally made modest efforts to reach a modus vivendi with new revolutionary governments (generally in the latter stages of the revolutionary process}, it usually regarded these groups with suspicion, if not outright hostility, having sought to prevent them from gain- ing power in the first place and still hoping to remove them from power after they obtained it. Not surprisingly, U. S. relations with most revolution- ary regimes have been quite poor. 4 Hard-liners blame these failures on ill- advised efforts at appeasement, while moderates attribute the problem primarily to exaggerated U. S. hostility. Although U. S. policy makers did
achieve their objectives in a few cases (such as the overthrow of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada in 1983}, it is hard to view U. S. policy as a suc- cess story. 5
The foreign policies of most revolutionary states have been equally un- successful. Many of these regimes were suspicious of the West in general
3 See Robert Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U. S. Influence," Interna- tional Security 15, no. 4 (1991) and Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic En- counter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. 141:r-42.
4 As the Mexican, Russian, and Turkish cases will show, this problem predates the Cold War.
5 For examples of these contending views, see W. Anthony Lake, "Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice," in U. S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86, ed. John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg, and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985); Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: U. S. Policy toward Radical Regimes," World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1g83); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U. S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984); W. Scott Thompson, "Choosing to Win," Foreign Policy no. 43 (summer 1981); and Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: Ameri- can Interventionfor Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
[2]
? Introduction
and the United States in particular, but most sought to avoid an immediate military confrontation. Often, however, they were unable to do so, suggest- ing that policy makers on both sides did not fully understand the problems they would encounter when dealing with each other, which in turn points to the need for more informed policy guidance. Providing that guidance is a major goal of this book.
In addition to these practical benefits, examining the international conse- quences of revolutions should yield important theoretical insights as well.
? A volume in the series
CoRNELL STUDIES IN SECURITY AFFAIRS
edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A complete list of titles in the series appears at the end of this book.
? Revolution and War
STEPHEN M. WALT
Cornell University Press
ITHACA AND LONDON
? ? Copyright (C) 1996 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1996 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell paperbacks, 1997
Printed in the United States of America
@ The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements
of the American National Standard for Information Sciences- Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39? 48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Walt, Stephen M.
Revolution and war I Stephen M. Walt.
p. em. - (Cornell studies in security affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN o-8014-3205-7 (cloth: alk. paper). - ISBN o-8014-8297-6 (plk. : alk. paper)
1. Worldpolitics. 2. Revolutions-History. 3? War. 4? Revolutions- Philosophy. 5? Politics and war. I. Title. II. Series.
D21. 3. W27 1996
303. 6'4-dc:I'. O
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentallyresponsiblesuppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www. cornellpress. cornell. edu.
Clothprinting 10987654321 Paperbackprinting 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
95-45006
? ? Preface
Contents
vii
1 Introduction 1
2 ATheory of Revolution and War 18
3 The French Revolution 46
4 The Russian Revolution 129
5 The Iranian Revolution 210 6 Ihe American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions 269 7 Conclusion 331
Index
353
(v]
? Revolution and war are among the most dramatic and important events in political life, yet few of the countless works on either topic devote much attention to the relationship between them. Students of revolution generally focus on the causes of revolution or its domestic consequences, examining its international aspects only insofar as they shaped the origins or course of the revolution itself. Students of international politics, by contrast, tend to take the state for granted and spend little time on those moments in history
where one state structure dissolves and a new one arises in its place. With a few notable exceptions, therefore, the literatures on revolution and war do not overlap. Indeed, the two fields do not even engage in much of a dia- logue.
This book is an attempt to bridge the gap. Specifically, I seek to explain why revolutions intensify the security competition between states and sharply increase the risk of war. I do so by examining the international con- sequences of the French, Russian, Iranian, American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions, drawing both on the theoretical and empirical litera- ture on revolutions and on several important ideas from international rela- tions theory.
My interest in this subject stems in part from a broader interest in U. S. for- eign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States repeatedly sought to prevent revolutionary movements from coming to power and often tried to overthrow them when they did. U. S. relations with most revolutionary states were predictably poor, even when these states were neither Marxist nor pro-Soviet. The U. S. experience was hardly unique: revolutions have been equally troublesome for others. By exploring how and why revolu- tions lead to war, therefore, I hope to provide practical guidance for national leaders who face an unexpected revolutionary upheaval.
[vii]
Preface
? Preface
The perspective I adopt is based on the familiar realist paradigm. I as- sutme that states exist in an anarchic environment, which leads them to place a very high value on security. In contrast to neorealist balance-of-power the- or. v, however, my focus is not limited to the distribution of aggregate power. I also examine the ways that domestic politics and ideology shape how na- tional leaders evaluate their security environment and how they choose among alternative courses of action. As we shall see, one cannot understand the international effects of a mass revolution by focusing solely on the bal- ance of power or the constraining effects of international anarchy. Nor can theBe factors explain why revolutionary states adopt particular policies,
why other states regard them as especially dangerous, or why revolutionary regimes are unwilling to abandon cherished international objectives even when their pursuit entails high costs. The balance of power is not irrelevant, but :it is neither the sole nor the most important factor in explaining how revolutions affect international politics.
Revolutions, I argue, intensify security competition and increase the prob- ability of war by altering each side's perceptions of the balance of threats. In addition to affecting the balance of power, a revolution also fosters malign perce'ptions of intent and a perverse combination of insecurity and over- confidence, based primarily on the possibility that revolution will spread to other countries. Although war does not occur in every case, strong pres- sures for war are alway s present and, invariably, the level of security com- petition increases significantly.
Much of this book takes the form of detailed narrative history. I found I could . neither understand nor explain these events without exploring them in some depth. Its length also reflects my own fascination with the events I was investigating-and if a great revolution is not fascinating, what is? -as well as my belief that valid empirical tests require a sophisticated under- standing of the historical record. As the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, "Theories must sink a huge anchor in details. "
Revolutions are highly partisan events, and scholarship on them often re- flects these political biases. lb compensate, I have tried to document my claims as extensively as possible, rely ing upon multiple sources and the most widely accepted historical accounts. A number of these works, such as T. C. W. Blanning's superb Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars and E. H. Carr's masterful History of Soviet Russia, both guided my interpretation of particulc1r cases and shaped my thinking on the broader subject of revolu- tion and war.
Like most scholarly endeavors, this book took longer than I expected. Yet I never found the subject boring; indeed, had I been less captivated by the drama of the events I was investigating, the book surely would have been
[viii]
? Preface
finished more quickly. There is much that I still find puzzling about these events and much that I will never fully comprehend. In the end? volume is simply my best effort to add to our evolving understanding onhe phe- nomena of revolution and war.
I am grateful to the many scholars who have offered advice and criticism on some or all of the manuscript. In particular, I thank Said Amir Arjomand, George Breslauer, Richard Cottam, Thomas Christensen, Steve David, Michael Desch, Jim Fearon, Markus Fischer, Gregory Gause, Alexander George, Charles Glaser, Avery Goldstein, Judith Goldstein, Jack Goldstone, Louisa Bertch Green, Robert Johnson, Friedrich Katz, David Laitin, Colin Lucas, Bernard Manin, Andrew Moravcsik, Norman Nie, Kenneth Oye, M. J. Peterson, John Padgett, R. K. Ramazani, Paul Schroeder, Jack Snyder, George Steinmetz, Ronald Suny, Sidney Tarrow, Stephen Van Evera, John
Waterbury, Dali Yang, and Marvin Zonis. I am especially indebted to John . Mearsheimer, whose comments were extremely helpful despite his basic disagreement with my argument. I am also grateful to various research as- ? ;istants who helped me along the way, especially Elizabeth Boyd, James Marquardt, Lisa Moses, Julie Alig, and David Edelstein.
Portions of the book were presented at seminars at the Center for Science and International Affairs and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Stud- ies, both at Harvard University, and at the University of Michigan, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Department of Politican Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, and the Workshop on Comparative Politics and Historical Sociology at the Univer- sit:y of Chicago. I am grateful for these opportunities to try out my ideas, and I thank the participants at these meetings for many helpful comments. Their suggestions added to my labors, but they also made this a better book.
This project would not have been possible without generous grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, the U. S. Institute of Peace, and the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. I did the initial work as a resi- dent associate at the Carnegie Endowment and as a guest scholar in the For- eign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and I thank the heads of these two institutions, Thomas Hughes and John D. Steinbruner, for providing supportive and stimulating environments in which to work.
An earlier and somewhat different version of my central argument was published as "Revolution and War" in volume 44 of World Politics (April 1992). I am grateful to Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to adapt the material here. I also express my thanks to Roger Haydon of Cor- nell University Press, who answered my various inquiries with his usual combination of sympathy and wit.
? ? [ix]
? Preface
I dedicate this book to my wife, Rebecca Stone, to whom I owe just about everything.
Chicago, Illinois
STEPHEN M. wALT
? [x]
? Revolution and War
? [1]
Introduction
Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom dearly under- stand quite what they are doing. But, again like professional revolution- aries, they do sometimes attain a relatively clear grasp of the implications of what they have already done; and sometimes at least, this constitutes a marked improvement on the achievements of their immediate prede- cessors.
-John Dunn
In this book I examine the international impact of revolutionary change, focusing primarily on the relationship between revolution and war. My chief objective is to explain why revolutions increase the intensity of secu- rity competition between states and thereby create a high probability of war. Because war does not occur in every case, my second objective is to clarify why certain revolutions lead to all-out war while others stop at the brink.
Although major revolutions are relatively rare, this subject is worth study- ing for at least two reasons. First, revolutions are more than just critical events in the history of individual nations; they are usually watershed events in in- ternational politics. Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power, alter the pattern of international alignments, cast doubt on existing agree- ments and diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to impmve their positions. They also demonstrate that novel ways of organizing social and political life are possible and often inspire sympathizers in other countries. Thus, although revolutions by definition occur within a single country, their impact is rarely confined to one state alone. 1
Indeed, revolutions usually disrupt the international system in important ways. According to one quantitative study, for example, states that undergo a "revolutionary" regime change are nearly twice as likely to be involved in war as are states that emerge from an "evolutionary" political process. 2 And
1 ElbakiHermassi,"TowardaComparativeStudyofRevolutions,"ComparativeStudiesin Society and History 18, no. 2 (1976).
2 Zeev Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Con- flict, 181&--1876," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989); and also see Jonathan R. Adel- man, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1985), 3-6.
? [t]
? Revolution and War
as the cases presented in this volume will show, revolutions invariably trig- ger intense policy debates in other countries. These disputes, typically di- vided between advocates of accommodation and advocates of intervention against the new regime, are strikingly similar, whether it is the European re- sponse to the French or Bolshevik revolutions or the U. S. reaction to the rev- olutions in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Iran. Yet despite the obvious relevance of this problem for policy makers, little effort has been made to assemble hypotheses and evidence that might resolve (or at least advance) the debate.
The need for a more informed debate is also apparent from the poor track record of U. S. policy in this area. Fear of revolution played a major role in shaping U. S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War, but U. S. responses to revolutionary change during this period were rarely very successfut. l Al- though the United States occasionally made modest efforts to reach a modus vivendi with new revolutionary governments (generally in the latter stages of the revolutionary process}, it usually regarded these groups with suspicion, if not outright hostility, having sought to prevent them from gain- ing power in the first place and still hoping to remove them from power after they obtained it. Not surprisingly, U. S. relations with most revolution- ary regimes have been quite poor. 4 Hard-liners blame these failures on ill- advised efforts at appeasement, while moderates attribute the problem primarily to exaggerated U. S. hostility. Although U. S. policy makers did
achieve their objectives in a few cases (such as the overthrow of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada in 1983}, it is hard to view U. S. policy as a suc- cess story. 5
The foreign policies of most revolutionary states have been equally un- successful. Many of these regimes were suspicious of the West in general
3 See Robert Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U. S. Influence," Interna- tional Security 15, no. 4 (1991) and Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic En- counter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. 141:r-42.
4 As the Mexican, Russian, and Turkish cases will show, this problem predates the Cold War.
5 For examples of these contending views, see W. Anthony Lake, "Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice," in U. S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86, ed. John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg, and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985); Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: U. S. Policy toward Radical Regimes," World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1g83); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.
For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1996 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell paperbacks, 1997
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Revolution and war I Stephen M. Walt.
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ISBN o-8014-3205-7 (cloth: alk. paper). - ISBN o-8014-8297-6 (plk. : alk. paper)
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? ? Preface
Contents
vii
1 Introduction 1
2 ATheory of Revolution and War 18
3 The French Revolution 46
4 The Russian Revolution 129
5 The Iranian Revolution 210 6 Ihe American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions 269 7 Conclusion 331
Index
353
(v]
? Revolution and war are among the most dramatic and important events in political life, yet few of the countless works on either topic devote much attention to the relationship between them. Students of revolution generally focus on the causes of revolution or its domestic consequences, examining its international aspects only insofar as they shaped the origins or course of the revolution itself. Students of international politics, by contrast, tend to take the state for granted and spend little time on those moments in history
where one state structure dissolves and a new one arises in its place. With a few notable exceptions, therefore, the literatures on revolution and war do not overlap. Indeed, the two fields do not even engage in much of a dia- logue.
This book is an attempt to bridge the gap. Specifically, I seek to explain why revolutions intensify the security competition between states and sharply increase the risk of war. I do so by examining the international con- sequences of the French, Russian, Iranian, American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese revolutions, drawing both on the theoretical and empirical litera- ture on revolutions and on several important ideas from international rela- tions theory.
My interest in this subject stems in part from a broader interest in U. S. for- eign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the United States repeatedly sought to prevent revolutionary movements from coming to power and often tried to overthrow them when they did. U. S. relations with most revolutionary states were predictably poor, even when these states were neither Marxist nor pro-Soviet. The U. S. experience was hardly unique: revolutions have been equally troublesome for others. By exploring how and why revolu- tions lead to war, therefore, I hope to provide practical guidance for national leaders who face an unexpected revolutionary upheaval.
[vii]
Preface
? Preface
The perspective I adopt is based on the familiar realist paradigm. I as- sutme that states exist in an anarchic environment, which leads them to place a very high value on security. In contrast to neorealist balance-of-power the- or. v, however, my focus is not limited to the distribution of aggregate power. I also examine the ways that domestic politics and ideology shape how na- tional leaders evaluate their security environment and how they choose among alternative courses of action. As we shall see, one cannot understand the international effects of a mass revolution by focusing solely on the bal- ance of power or the constraining effects of international anarchy. Nor can theBe factors explain why revolutionary states adopt particular policies,
why other states regard them as especially dangerous, or why revolutionary regimes are unwilling to abandon cherished international objectives even when their pursuit entails high costs. The balance of power is not irrelevant, but :it is neither the sole nor the most important factor in explaining how revolutions affect international politics.
Revolutions, I argue, intensify security competition and increase the prob- ability of war by altering each side's perceptions of the balance of threats. In addition to affecting the balance of power, a revolution also fosters malign perce'ptions of intent and a perverse combination of insecurity and over- confidence, based primarily on the possibility that revolution will spread to other countries. Although war does not occur in every case, strong pres- sures for war are alway s present and, invariably, the level of security com- petition increases significantly.
Much of this book takes the form of detailed narrative history. I found I could . neither understand nor explain these events without exploring them in some depth. Its length also reflects my own fascination with the events I was investigating-and if a great revolution is not fascinating, what is? -as well as my belief that valid empirical tests require a sophisticated under- standing of the historical record. As the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould reminds us, "Theories must sink a huge anchor in details. "
Revolutions are highly partisan events, and scholarship on them often re- flects these political biases. lb compensate, I have tried to document my claims as extensively as possible, rely ing upon multiple sources and the most widely accepted historical accounts. A number of these works, such as T. C. W. Blanning's superb Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars and E. H. Carr's masterful History of Soviet Russia, both guided my interpretation of particulc1r cases and shaped my thinking on the broader subject of revolu- tion and war.
Like most scholarly endeavors, this book took longer than I expected. Yet I never found the subject boring; indeed, had I been less captivated by the drama of the events I was investigating, the book surely would have been
[viii]
? Preface
finished more quickly. There is much that I still find puzzling about these events and much that I will never fully comprehend. In the end? volume is simply my best effort to add to our evolving understanding onhe phe- nomena of revolution and war.
I am grateful to the many scholars who have offered advice and criticism on some or all of the manuscript. In particular, I thank Said Amir Arjomand, George Breslauer, Richard Cottam, Thomas Christensen, Steve David, Michael Desch, Jim Fearon, Markus Fischer, Gregory Gause, Alexander George, Charles Glaser, Avery Goldstein, Judith Goldstein, Jack Goldstone, Louisa Bertch Green, Robert Johnson, Friedrich Katz, David Laitin, Colin Lucas, Bernard Manin, Andrew Moravcsik, Norman Nie, Kenneth Oye, M. J. Peterson, John Padgett, R. K. Ramazani, Paul Schroeder, Jack Snyder, George Steinmetz, Ronald Suny, Sidney Tarrow, Stephen Van Evera, John
Waterbury, Dali Yang, and Marvin Zonis. I am especially indebted to John . Mearsheimer, whose comments were extremely helpful despite his basic disagreement with my argument. I am also grateful to various research as- ? ;istants who helped me along the way, especially Elizabeth Boyd, James Marquardt, Lisa Moses, Julie Alig, and David Edelstein.
Portions of the book were presented at seminars at the Center for Science and International Affairs and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Stud- ies, both at Harvard University, and at the University of Michigan, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Department of Politican Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, and the Workshop on Comparative Politics and Historical Sociology at the Univer- sit:y of Chicago. I am grateful for these opportunities to try out my ideas, and I thank the participants at these meetings for many helpful comments. Their suggestions added to my labors, but they also made this a better book.
This project would not have been possible without generous grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, the U. S. Institute of Peace, and the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. I did the initial work as a resi- dent associate at the Carnegie Endowment and as a guest scholar in the For- eign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and I thank the heads of these two institutions, Thomas Hughes and John D. Steinbruner, for providing supportive and stimulating environments in which to work.
An earlier and somewhat different version of my central argument was published as "Revolution and War" in volume 44 of World Politics (April 1992). I am grateful to Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to adapt the material here. I also express my thanks to Roger Haydon of Cor- nell University Press, who answered my various inquiries with his usual combination of sympathy and wit.
? ? [ix]
? Preface
I dedicate this book to my wife, Rebecca Stone, to whom I owe just about everything.
Chicago, Illinois
STEPHEN M. wALT
? [x]
? Revolution and War
? [1]
Introduction
Like professional revolutionaries, social scientists seldom dearly under- stand quite what they are doing. But, again like professional revolution- aries, they do sometimes attain a relatively clear grasp of the implications of what they have already done; and sometimes at least, this constitutes a marked improvement on the achievements of their immediate prede- cessors.
-John Dunn
In this book I examine the international impact of revolutionary change, focusing primarily on the relationship between revolution and war. My chief objective is to explain why revolutions increase the intensity of secu- rity competition between states and thereby create a high probability of war. Because war does not occur in every case, my second objective is to clarify why certain revolutions lead to all-out war while others stop at the brink.
Although major revolutions are relatively rare, this subject is worth study- ing for at least two reasons. First, revolutions are more than just critical events in the history of individual nations; they are usually watershed events in in- ternational politics. Revolutions cause sudden shifts in the balance of power, alter the pattern of international alignments, cast doubt on existing agree- ments and diplomatic norms, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to impmve their positions. They also demonstrate that novel ways of organizing social and political life are possible and often inspire sympathizers in other countries. Thus, although revolutions by definition occur within a single country, their impact is rarely confined to one state alone. 1
Indeed, revolutions usually disrupt the international system in important ways. According to one quantitative study, for example, states that undergo a "revolutionary" regime change are nearly twice as likely to be involved in war as are states that emerge from an "evolutionary" political process. 2 And
1 ElbakiHermassi,"TowardaComparativeStudyofRevolutions,"ComparativeStudiesin Society and History 18, no. 2 (1976).
2 Zeev Maoz, "Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Con- flict, 181&--1876," International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989); and also see Jonathan R. Adel- man, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1985), 3-6.
? [t]
? Revolution and War
as the cases presented in this volume will show, revolutions invariably trig- ger intense policy debates in other countries. These disputes, typically di- vided between advocates of accommodation and advocates of intervention against the new regime, are strikingly similar, whether it is the European re- sponse to the French or Bolshevik revolutions or the U. S. reaction to the rev- olutions in Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, or Iran. Yet despite the obvious relevance of this problem for policy makers, little effort has been made to assemble hypotheses and evidence that might resolve (or at least advance) the debate.
The need for a more informed debate is also apparent from the poor track record of U. S. policy in this area. Fear of revolution played a major role in shaping U. S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War, but U. S. responses to revolutionary change during this period were rarely very successfut. l Al- though the United States occasionally made modest efforts to reach a modus vivendi with new revolutionary governments (generally in the latter stages of the revolutionary process}, it usually regarded these groups with suspicion, if not outright hostility, having sought to prevent them from gain- ing power in the first place and still hoping to remove them from power after they obtained it. Not surprisingly, U. S. relations with most revolution- ary regimes have been quite poor. 4 Hard-liners blame these failures on ill- advised efforts at appeasement, while moderates attribute the problem primarily to exaggerated U. S. hostility. Although U. S. policy makers did
achieve their objectives in a few cases (such as the overthrow of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada in 1983}, it is hard to view U. S. policy as a suc- cess story. 5
The foreign policies of most revolutionary states have been equally un- successful. Many of these regimes were suspicious of the West in general
3 See Robert Pastor, "Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U. S. Influence," Interna- tional Security 15, no. 4 (1991) and Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic En- counter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); and Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. 141:r-42.
4 As the Mexican, Russian, and Turkish cases will show, this problem predates the Cold War.
5 For examples of these contending views, see W. Anthony Lake, "Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice," in U. S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86, ed. John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg, and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1985); Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: U. S. Policy toward Radical Regimes," World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 (1g83); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U. S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984); W. Scott Thompson, "Choosing to Win," Foreign Policy no. 43 (summer 1981); and Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: Ameri- can Interventionfor Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
[2]
? Introduction
and the United States in particular, but most sought to avoid an immediate military confrontation. Often, however, they were unable to do so, suggest- ing that policy makers on both sides did not fully understand the problems they would encounter when dealing with each other, which in turn points to the need for more informed policy guidance. Providing that guidance is a major goal of this book.
In addition to these practical benefits, examining the international conse- quences of revolutions should yield important theoretical insights as well.
