iii: "motion is the act of a
thing existing in potentiality.
thing existing in potentiality.
Summa Theologica
Reply to Objection 2: The shedding of the blood belonged directly to
Christ's Passion: for it is natural for blood to flow from a wounded
human body. But the flowing of the water was not necessary for the
Passion; but merely to show its effect, which is to wash away sins, and
to refresh us from the heat of concupiscence. And therefore the water
is not offered apart from the wine in this sacrament, as the wine is
offered apart from the bread; but the water is offered mixed with the
wine to show that the wine belongs of itself to this sacrament, as of
its very essence; but the water as something added to the wine.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the mixing of water with the wine is not
necessary for the sacrament, it does not matter, as to the essence of
the sacrament, what kind of water is added to the wine, whether natural
water, or artificial, as rose-water, although, as to the propriety of
the sacrament, he would sin who mixes any other than natural and true
water, because true water flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the
cross, and not phlegm, as some have said, in order to show that
Christ's body was truly composed of the four elements; as by the
flowing blood, it was shown to be composed of the four humors, as Pope
Innocent III says in a certain Decree. But because the mixing of water
with flour is essential to this sacrament, as making the composition of
bread, if rose-water, or any other liquor besides true water, be mixed
with the flour, the sacrament would not be valid, because it would not
be true bread.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether water should be added in great quantity?
Objection 1: It seems that water ought to be added in great quantity,
because as blood flowed sensibly from Christ's side, so did water:
hence it is written (Jn. 19:35): "He that saw it, hath given
testimony. " But water could not be sensibly present in this sacrament
except it were used in great quantity. Consequently it seems that water
ought to be added in great quantity.
Objection 2: Further, a little water mixed with much wine is corrupted.
But what is corrupted no longer exists. Therefore, it is the same thing
to add a little water in this sacrament as to add none. But it is not
lawful to add none. Therefore, neither is it lawful to add a little.
Objection 3: Further, if it sufficed to add a little, then as a
consequence it would suffice to throw one drop of water into an entire
cask. But this seems ridiculous. Therefore it does not suffice for a
small quantity to be added.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Extra, De Celeb. Miss. ):
"The pernicious abuse has prevailed in your country of adding water in
greater quantity than the wine, in the sacrifice, where according to
the reasonable custom of the entire Church more wine than water ought
to be employed. "
I answer that, There is a threefold opinion regarding the water added
to the wine, as Pope Innocent III says in a certain Decretal. For some
say that the water remains by itself when the wine is changed into
blood: but such an opinion cannot stand, because in the sacrament of
the altar after the consecration there is nothing else save the body
and the blood of Christ. Because, as Ambrose says in De Officiis (De
Mysteriis ix): "Before the blessing it is another species that is
named, after the blessing the Body is signified; otherwise it would not
be adored with adoration of latria. " And therefore others have said
that as the wine is changed into blood, so the water is changed into
the water which flowed from Christ's side. But this cannot be
maintained reasonably, because according to this the water would be
consecrated apart from the wine, as the wine is from the bread.
And therefore as he (Innocent III, Decretals, Extra, De Celeb. Miss. )
says, the more probable opinion is that which holds that the water is
changed into wine, and the wine into blood. Now, this could not be done
unless so little water was used that it would be changed into wine.
Consequently, it is always safer to add little water, especially if the
wine be weak, because the sacrament could not be celebrated if there
were such addition of water as to destroy the species of the wine.
Hence Pope Julius I reprehends some who "keep throughout the year a
linen cloth steeped in must, and at the time of sacrifice wash a part
of it with water, and so make the offering. "
Reply to Objection 1: For the signification of this sacrament it
suffices for the water to be appreciable by sense when it is mixed with
the wine: but it is not necessary for it to be sensible after the
mingling.
Reply to Objection 2: If no water were added, the signification would
be utterly excluded: but when the water is changed into wine, it is
signified that the people is incorporated with Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: If water were added to a cask, it would not
suffice for the signification of this sacrament, but the water must be
added to the wine at the actual celebration of the sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CHANGE OF BREAD AND WINE INTO THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST (EIGHT
ARTICLES)
We have to consider the change of the bread and wine into the body and
blood of Christ; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament
after the consecration? *
(2) Whether it is annihilated?
(3) Whether it is changed into the body and blood of Christ?
(4) Whether the accidents remain after the change?
(5) Whether the substantial form remains there?
(6) Whether this change is instantaneous?
(7) Whether it is more miraculous than any other change?
(8) By what words it may be suitably expressed?
[*The titles of the Articles here given were taken by St. Thomas from
his Commentary on the Sentences (Sent. iv, D, 90). However, in writing
the Articles he introduced a new point of inquiry, that of the First
Article; and substituted another division of the matter under
discussion, as may be seen by referring to the titles of the various
Articles. Most editions have ignored St. Thomas's original division,
and give the one to which he subsequently adhered. ]
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as
in a figure or sign?
Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ is not in this sacrament
in very truth, but only as in a figure, or sign. For it is written (Jn.
6:54) that when our Lord had uttered these words: "Except you eat the
flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood," etc. , "Many of His
disciples on hearing it said: 'this is a hard saying'": to whom He
rejoined: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth
nothing": as if He were to say, according to Augustine's exposition on
Ps. 4 [*On Ps. 98:9]: "Give a spiritual meaning to what I have said.
You are not to eat this body which you see, nor to drink the blood
which they who crucify Me are to spill. It is a mystery that I put
before you: in its spiritual sense it will quicken you; but the flesh
profiteth nothing. "
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you
all days even to the consummation of the world. " Now in explaining
this, Augustine makes this observation (Tract. xxx in Joan. ): "The Lord
is on high until the world be ended; nevertheless the truth of the Lord
is here with us; for the body, in which He rose again, must be in one
place; but His truth is spread abroad everywhere. " Therefore, the body
of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a
sign.
Objection 3: Further, no body can be in several places at the one time.
For this does not even belong to an angel; since for the same reason it
could be everywhere. But Christ's is a true body, and it is in heaven.
Consequently, it seems that it is not in very truth in the sacrament of
the altar, but only as in a sign.
Objection 4: Further, the Church's sacraments are ordained for the
profit of the faithful. But according to Gregory in a certain Homily
(xxviii in Evang. ), the ruler is rebuked "for demanding Christ's bodily
presence. " Moreover the apostles were prevented from receiving the Holy
Ghost because they were attached to His bodily presence, as Augustine
says on Jn. 16:7: "Except I go, the Paraclete will not come to you"
(Tract. xciv in Joan. ). Therefore Christ is not in the sacrament of the
altar according to His bodily presence.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii): "There is no room for
doubt regarding the truth of Christ's body and blood; for now by our
Lord's own declaring and by our faith His flesh is truly food, and His
blood is truly drink. " And Ambrose says (De Sacram. vi): "As the Lord
Jesus Christ is God's true Son so is it Christ's true flesh which we
take, and His true blood which we drink. "
I answer that, The presence of Christ's true body and blood in this
sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith
alone, which rests upon Divine authority. Hence, on Lk. 22:19: "This is
My body which shall be delivered up for you," Cyril says: "Doubt not
whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour's words with faith;
for since He is the Truth, He lieth not. "
Now this is suitable, first for the perfection of the New Law. For, the
sacrifices of the Old Law contained only in figure that true sacrifice
of Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 10:1: "For the law having a
shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things. "
And therefore it was necessary that the sacrifice of the New Law
instituted by Christ should have something more, namely, that it should
contain Christ Himself crucified, not merely in signification or
figure, but also in very truth. And therefore this sacrament which
contains Christ Himself, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), is
perfective of all the other sacraments, in which Christ's virtue is
participated.
Secondly, this belongs to Christ's love, out of which for our salvation
He assumed a true body of our nature. And because it is the special
feature of friendship to live together with friends, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ix), He promises us His bodily presence as a reward,
saying (Mat. 24:28): "Where the body is, there shall the eagles be
gathered together. " Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage He does not deprive
us of His bodily presence; but unites us with Himself in this sacrament
through the truth of His body and blood. Hence (Jn. 6:57) he says: "He
that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in
him. " Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, and the
uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Christ with us.
Thirdly, it belongs to the perfection of faith, which concerns His
humanity just as it does His Godhead, according to Jn. 14:1: "You
believe in God, believe also in Me. " And since faith is of things
unseen, as Christ shows us His Godhead invisibly, so also in this
sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner.
Some men accordingly, not paying heed to these things, have contended
that Christ's body and blood are not in this sacrament except as in a
sign, a thing to be rejected as heretical, since it is contrary to
Christ's words. Hence Berengarius, who had been the first deviser of
this heresy, was afterwards forced to withdraw his error, and to
acknowledge the truth of the faith.
Reply to Objection 1: From this authority the aforesaid heretics have
taken occasion to err from evilly understanding Augustine's words. For
when Augustine says: "You are not to eat this body which you see," he
means not to exclude the truth of Christ's body, but that it was not to
be eaten in this species in which it was seen by them. And by the
words: "It is a mystery that I put before you; in its spiritual sense
it will quicken you," he intends not that the body of Christ is in this
sacrament merely according to mystical signification, but
"spiritually," that is, invisibly, and by the power of the spirit.
Hence (Tract. xxvii), expounding Jn. 6:64: "the flesh profiteth
nothing," he says: "Yea, but as they understood it, for they understood
that the flesh was to be eaten as it is divided piecemeal in a dead
body, or as sold in the shambles, not as it is quickened by the spirit
. . . Let the spirit draw nigh to the flesh . . . then the flesh
profiteth very much: for if the flesh profiteth nothing, the Word had
not been made flesh, that It might dwell among us. "
Reply to Objection 2: That saying of Augustine and all others like it
are to be understood of Christ's body as it is beheld in its proper
species; according as our Lord Himself says (Mat. 26:11): "But Me you
have not always. " Nevertheless He is invisibly under the species of
this sacrament, wherever this sacrament is performed.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's body is not in this sacrament in the
same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is
commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to
this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ's body is upon many altars,
not as in different places, but "sacramentally": and thereby we do not
understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament
is a kind of sign; but that Christ's body is here after a fashion
proper to this sacrament, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 4: This argument holds good of Christ's bodily
presence, as He is present after the manner of a body, that is, as it
is in its visible appearance, but not as it is spiritually, that is,
invisibly, after the manner and by the virtue of the spirit. Hence
Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan. ) says: "If thou hast understood"
Christ's words spiritually concerning His flesh, "they are spirit and
life to thee; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are also
spirit and life, but not to thee. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in this sacrament the substance of the bread and wine remains after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread and wine does
remain in this sacrament after the consecration: because Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iv): "Since it is customary for men to eat bread and
drink wine, God has wedded his Godhead to them, and made them His body
and blood": and further on: "The bread of communication is not simple
bread, but is united to the Godhead. " But wedding together belongs to
things actually existing. Therefore the bread and wine are at the same
time, in this sacrament, with the body and the blood of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, there ought to be conformity between the
sacraments. But in the other sacraments the substance of the matter
remains, like the substance of water in Baptism, and the substance of
chrism in Confirmation. Therefore the substance of the bread and wine
remains also in this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, bread and wine are made use of in this sacrament,
inasmuch as they denote ecclesiastical unity, as "one bread is made
from many grains and wine from many grapes," as Augustine says in his
book on the Creed (Tract. xxvi in Joan. ). But this belongs to the
substance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of the bread and
wine remains in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "Although the figure of
the bread and wine be seen, still, after the Consecration, they are to
be believed to be nothing else than the body end blood of Christ. "
I answer that, Some have held that the substance of the bread and wine
remains in this sacrament after the consecration. But this opinion
cannot stand: first of all, because by such an opinion the truth of
this sacrament is destroyed, to which it belongs that Christ's true
body exists in this sacrament; which indeed was not there before the
consecration. Now a thing cannot be in any place, where it was not
previously, except by change of place, or by the conversion of another
thing into itself; just as fire begins anew to be in some house, either
because it is carried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it
is evident that Christ's body does not begin to be present in this
sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would follow that
it would cease to be in heaven: for what is moved locally does not come
anew to some place unless it quit the former one. Secondly, because
every body moved locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which
cannot be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one
movement of the same body moved locally to be terminated in different
places at the one time, whereas the body of Christ under this sacrament
begins at the one time to be in several places. And consequently it
remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament
except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is
changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence
the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the
substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.
Secondly, because this position is contrary to the form of this
sacrament, in which it is said: "This is My body," which would not be
true if the substance of the bread were to remain there; for the
substance of bread never is the body of Christ. Rather should one say
in that case: "Here is My body. "
Thirdly, because it would be opposed to the veneration of this
sacrament, if any substance were there, which could not be adored with
adoration of latria.
Fourthly, because it is contrary to the rite of the Church, according
to which it is not lawful to take the body of Christ after bodily food,
while it is nevertheless lawful to take one consecrated host after
another. Hence this opinion is to be avoided as heretical.
Reply to Objection 1: God "wedded His Godhead," i. e. His Divine power,
to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but
in order that He may make from them His body and blood.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not really present in the other
sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter
remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.
Reply to Objection 3: The species which remain in this sacrament, as
shall be said later [4530](A[5]), suffice for its signification;
because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the
consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?
Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated
after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its
original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the
substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in
this sacrament, as stated above [4531](A[2]); nor can we assign any
place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the
consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into
its original matter.
Objection 2: Further, what is the term "wherefrom" in every change
exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e. g. when air
is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the
potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes
black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine
is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the
term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix):
"Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing
the body of Christ is signified. " Therefore, when the consecration
takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains,
unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.
Objection 3: Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this
proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the
bread or wine is something. " Consequently, this is true: "The substance
of the bread or wine is nothing. "
On the contrary, Augustine says ([4532]Q[83]): "God is not the cause of
tending to nothing. " But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power.
Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not
annihilated.
I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not
remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the
substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and
blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the
bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it
is annihilated.
Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the
four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so
that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist
without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under
the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it
will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of
the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion,
which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the
substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the
consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is
already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ,
just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation.
Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be
there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is
dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively
quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of
its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there
would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which
is contrary to what has been said above [4533](A[2]). But if this begin
to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in
which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of
bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to
have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated
their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be
annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned
whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by
the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded
the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread,
or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be
assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the
sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body. " Hence it is
clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.
Reply to Objection 1: The substance of the bread or wine, after the
consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor
elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is
changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is
generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is
annihilated.
Reply to Objection 2: The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not
changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the
subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality
of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body
of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the consecration this proposition
is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into
which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and
consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?
Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of
Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there
must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is
now in act. because as is said in Phys.
iii: "motion is the act of a
thing existing in potentiality. " But no subject can be assigned for the
substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the
very nature of substance for it "not to be in a subject," as it is said
in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance
of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.
Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is
converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted
into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the
form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like
manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of
the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if
bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ's body
must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is
false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of
Christ's body.
Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes
the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys.
i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the
principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of
themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction.
Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become
this matter whereby Christ's body is individuated, and so it is not
possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance
of Christ's body.
On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: "To thee it ought neither to
be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be
changed into the substance of Christ. "
I answer that, As stated above [4534](A[2]), since Christ's true body
is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local
motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from
what was stated above (A[1], ad 2), it must be said then that it begins
to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself.
Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely
supernatural, and effected by God's power alone. Hence Ambrose says
[(De Sacram. iv): "See how Christ's word changes nature's laws, as He
wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see
therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a
Virgin": and] [*The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine
edition] (De Myster. iv): "It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the
order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why,
then, do you look for nature's order in Christ's body, since the Lord
Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature? " Chrysostom
likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: "The words which I have
spoken to you," namely, of this sacrament, "are spirit and life," says:
i. e. "spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but
they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from
the laws here established. "
For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But
every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate
genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent
bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing
in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or
created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on
this account every change made according to nature's laws is a formal
change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the [4535]FP, Q[7], A[1];
Q[26], A[2]; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being.
Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms
succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all
being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed
into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power
in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into
the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the
wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a
formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural
movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called
"transubstantiation. "
Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of formal
change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject;
but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire
substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order
of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both
substances as in a subject, just as order and number.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal conversion
or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some
matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire
substance; for in this case no subject is possible.
Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into
matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be
made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all
being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both
matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being
can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing
that whereby it was distinguished from the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after
the change?
Objection 1: It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not
remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed,
that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally
before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after
consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this
sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.
Objection 2: Further, there ought not to be any deception in a
sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems,
then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain,
the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to
this sacrament.
Objection 3: Further, although our faith is not subject to reason,
still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the
beginning of this work ([4536]FP, Q[1], A[6], ad 2; A[8]). But our
reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to
be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread
which faith believes to be the substance of Christ's body. Therefore it
is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain
subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.
Objection 4: Further, what remains after the change has taken place
seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the
bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the
accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for
"an accident cannot have an accident" (Metaph. iii). Therefore the
accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper
(Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): "Under the species which we
behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i. e. flesh and
blood. "
I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the
bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably
done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary,
but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And
therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of
under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by
men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be
derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own
species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord's body and blood
invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: As is said in the book De Causis, an effect
depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by
God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for
that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.
Reply to Objection 2: There is no deception in this sacrament; for the
accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the
intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii,
is preserved by faith from deception.
And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not
contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not
reach.
Reply to Objection 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was
stated above (A[4], ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have
some resemblance of a subject.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after
the consecration?
Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in
this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said
[4537](A[5]) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But
since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 2: Further, the form of Christ's body is His soul: for it is
said in De Anima ii, that the soul "is the act of a physical body which
has life in potentiality". But it cannot be said that the substantial
form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that
it remains after the consecration.
Objection 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its
substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and
performs every operation which bread would do were it present.
Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament
after the consecration.
On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of
bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of
Christ, as stated above ([4538]AA[2],3,4). Therefore the substantial
form of the bread does not remain.
I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only
do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form.
But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of
the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into
the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that
it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its
matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is
said: "This is My body. "
Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain,
it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first
cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then
the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what
was said above [4539](A[2]). Nor could it remain in any other matter,
because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it
were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually
intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated
from matter are such.
Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents
of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ
may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated
above [4540](A[5]).
And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread
does not remain.
Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a
thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs
and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by
its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it
produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking
the matter made up of flour and water.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the
whole order of perfect being, i. e. being, corporeal being, and animated
being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the
form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being,
but not according as it bestows animated being.
Reply to Objection 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by
reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such
operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration
on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations
follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is
changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form,
such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it
"strengthens man's heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found
in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but
because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves,
as will be said later (Q[77], A[3], ad 2,3; [4541]AA[5],6).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?
Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously,
but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of
bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is
in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time
between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place
according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant
in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of
Christ is present.
Objection 2: Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and
something is "in being. " But these two things do not exist at the one
time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in
being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in
such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but
successive.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament
"is made by the words of Christ. " But Christ's words are pronounced
successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.
On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite,
to which it belongs to operate in an instant.
I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason.
First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change.
For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its
subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a
substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its
introduction into matter is instantaneous.
Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared
successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively.
When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for
receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is
illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses
infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the
form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said,
"'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were
opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed. "
For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First,
because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this
conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this
conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly,
because it is effected by God's infinite power.
Reply to Objection 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St.
Bonaventure, Sent. , iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a
mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of
two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to
different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of
rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no
mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and
of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to
movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the
heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.
Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement
depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements
which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by
it, as was said in the [4542]FP, Q[53], A[3] concerning the movements
of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements
there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although
the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the
heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which
(pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the
heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between
every two signate instants in connection with that change.
Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and
the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in
comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the
time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the
part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place
containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and
time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line
and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to
bodies.
Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another
according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things
really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not
change a thing objectively.
And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is
wrought by Christ's words which are spoken by the priest, so that the
last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which
Christ's body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread
is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to
be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not
made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore
a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present; but
a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is
there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds good in
natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).
Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is "in
becoming," and is "in being" simultaneously; just as becoming
illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in
such, a thing is said to be "in being" according as it now is; but to
be "in becoming," according as it was not before.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about
in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words, for then the
meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the
forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this
change is successive.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this proposition is false: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread"?
Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: "The body of
Christ is made out of bread. " For everything out of which another is
made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say
that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing
is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still
we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in
Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ's body is made out of bread,
it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this
seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making,
but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ's body
is made out of bread.
Objection 2: Further, the term of "becoming" is something that is, or
something that is "made. " But this proposition is never true: "The
bread is the body of Christ"; or "The bread is made the body of
Christ"; or again, "The bread will be the body of Christ. " Therefore it
seems that not even this is true: "The body of Christ is made out of
bread. "
Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is
converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems
to be false: "The bread is converted into the body of Christ," because
such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the
world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being.
Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: "The body
of Christ is made out of bread. "
Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that
thing. But this proposition is false: "Bread can be the body of
Christ. " Therefore this is likewise false: "The body of Christ is made
out of bread. "
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): "When the consecration
takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread. "
I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has
something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and
in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common
to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in
creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ's
body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after
black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not
coexistent.
Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with
creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging
to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every
natural transmutation.
Again, this conversion has something in common with natural
transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First
of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as
bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not
converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one
side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the
bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural
transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the
previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common,
that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not
happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject
remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same
accidents remain.
From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in
such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are
the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be
predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense:
for we do not say, "Non-being is being" or, "Bread is the body of
Christ," or, "Air is fire," or, "White is black. " Yet because of the
relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition
"ex" [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say
that "being is made out of non-being," and "out of bread, the body of
Christ," and "out of air, fire," and "out of white, black. " But because
in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot
use the word "conversion" in creation, so as to say that "non-being is
converted into being": we can, however, use the word in this sacrament,
just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole
substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this
conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.
Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which
are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be
granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident
that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof
we say that "a white thing can be black," or that "air can be fire";
although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of
whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole
substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof;
whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it
is said, "Air can be fire," it is verified by synecdoche by reason of
the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because
there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other,
as that "non-being can be being," or that "bread can be the body of
Christ": and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that "being
is made of [de] non-being," or that "the body of Christ is made of
bread," because this preposition "of" [de] denotes a consubstantial
cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural
transmutations is considered according to something common in the
subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that "bread will be
the body of Christ," or that it "may become the body of Christ," just
as it is not granted in creation that "non-being will be being," or
that "non-being may become being," because this manner of speaking is
verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for
instance, when we say that "a white thing becomes black," or "a white
thing will be black. "
Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something
remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above
[4543](A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of
similitude, namely, that "bread is the body of Christ," or, "bread will
be the body of Christ," or "the body of Christ is made of bread";
provided that by the word "bread" is not understood the substance of
bread, but in general "that which is contained under the species of
bread," under which species there is first contained the substance of
bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.
Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made,
sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the
transmutation, as when it is said "a black thing is made out of a white
one"; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as
when it is said---"out of morning comes the day. " And so it is not
granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, "that morning
becomes the day. " So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be
said properly that "the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is
not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by
similitude, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes
be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore,
since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties
than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that
something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode
of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But
in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be
changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain
(which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause),
but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while
the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we
shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion"
is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.
