xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance.
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance.
Summa Theologica
ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man
to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it
directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice,
receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save
logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61],
A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that
concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and
they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4;[1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear
and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is
no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is
but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there
are not different moral virtues about different passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but
one mean between contraries, e. g. between black and white. Secondly,
because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same
manner, e. g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by
withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the
different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require
different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in
a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love
proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the
same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or
dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible
passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different
things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and
despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome
something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are
different virtues about such like passions: e. g. temperance, about the
concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle
and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle
causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as
in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a
second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral
virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore
neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according
to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia"
[*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason
is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing
hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions,
without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about
several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference
of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference
of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e. g.
pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a
difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always
causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference
between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower
powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence,
one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by
sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to
the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason,
and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and
pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the
inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to
man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's
good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance. " As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence
there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern
the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which
way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has
no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base
condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in
common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money
considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or
love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult
to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence"
[*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia"
[*{philotimia}], i. e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard
to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity. "
Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible
part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may
be rendered "affability. " Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another
virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For
frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters
than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games,
which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have
the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule
as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because
evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to
reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there
being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,
again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other
hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be
not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there
are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,
perfect, and exemplar virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal
rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
division of the genus "virtue. " Therefore none of them should be called
principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means.
But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the
moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral
virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated
above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are
principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. " But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56],
A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which
requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues
which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual
virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly
shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are
called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated
above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called
not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject,
they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards
good, which is the object of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as
is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone
is a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral
virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical
reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral.
xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues. '" [*Cf. Chrysostom's
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the
modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds
within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and
suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common
weal. "]
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. " Consequently the exemplar
of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist
the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as
existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so
that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while
temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His
unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in
His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues;
since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been
speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of
God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the
thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows,
neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and
justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow
the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who
have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the
"perfect virtues. " Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of
God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto
by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the
Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues
according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about
buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires;
for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men
living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues
of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i. e. they bring them to the relative mean;
"the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the
third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,"
viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking
of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids
is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little
earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of
their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also
to those who have retired from public life on account of failing
health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded
to others the power and renown of authority. " This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this
burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of
truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the
pressure of charity. "
Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal
directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into
the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or
even towards one individual.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues.
For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which
is disposed according to nature. " But that which is Divine is above
man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a
man.
Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But
the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]),
which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are
not virtues of man.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because
they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all
things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed
to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any
habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq. ): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him. "
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.
Therefore they are theological virtues.
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]).
Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the
power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about
which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers
of the Divine nature. " And because such happiness surpasses the
capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to
act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to
this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God
some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of
his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like
principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their
object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly,
because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain
thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological
virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as
kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that
these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of
which he is made a partaker.
Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though
God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us
virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but
exemplate virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to
God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in
proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their
nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the
object of supernatural happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore,
the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us
to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the
four cardinal virtues are the "order of love. " Now love is charity,
which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not
distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues
is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge
of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and
moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore
the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always
charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of
love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of
the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called,
then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad
2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way,
as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues
directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz.
the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one
theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.
Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be
only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other,
the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three. "
I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues
direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter
happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles
which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical
matters.
to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the
common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it
directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice,
receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save
logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that
is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61],
A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues
about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that
concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of
sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and
they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated
above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4;[1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is
but one moral virtue about all the passions.
Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about
different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral
virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is
one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear
and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is
no need for different moral virtues about different passions.
Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of
different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is
but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there
are not different moral virtues about different passions.
On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about
desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue
about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the
concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).
On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily
suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions
are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear
and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to
one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral
virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands
in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but
one mean between contraries, e. g. between black and white. Secondly,
because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same
manner, e. g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by
withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the
different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require
different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in
a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love
proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the
same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or
dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible
passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different
things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and
despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome
something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are
different virtues about such like passions: e. g. temperance, about the
concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity,
about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle
and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not
suffice for the unity of moral virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle
causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as
in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too
between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a
second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same
object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the
same virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the
passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ
according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral
virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the
objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a
house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore
neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according
to the objects of those passions.
Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the
sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the
species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so
that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and
the same applies to the other passions.
Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various
objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of
virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same
applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according
to the objects of the passions.
Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.
But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus
temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia"
[*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be
different virtues about fears of evils.
On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about
pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;
whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their
relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the
appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are
variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different
species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason
is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing
hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions,
without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about
several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference
of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference
of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e. g.
pleasure.
And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong
to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a
difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always
causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference
between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good
and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower
powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence,
one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by
sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to
the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason,
and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues.
Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and
pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the
inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to
man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's
good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being
differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the
sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life
either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of
the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of
"temperance. " As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are
not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence
there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner
power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the
former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body,
while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods
again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern
the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which
way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has
no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base
condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in
common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money
considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or
love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult
to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence"
[*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia"
[*{philotimia}], i. e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard
to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity. "
Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible
part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard
to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the
concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his
behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to
wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions,
viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the
same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in
his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue
which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may
be rendered "affability. " Secondly, one man behaves towards another by
being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another
virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For
frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters
than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games,
which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).
It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten
moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness,
friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in
respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we
add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.
Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have
the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same
specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the
passions do.
Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule
as virtues are, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of
species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because
evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to
reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there
being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion.
Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,
again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other
hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be
not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there
are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal
virtues?
(2) Of their number;
(3) Which are they?
(4) Whether they differ from one another?
(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,
perfect, and exemplar virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called
cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal
rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the
division of the genus "virtue. " Therefore none of them should be called
principal.
Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means.
But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the
moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in
comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral
virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated
above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are
principal, rather than the moral virtues.
On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor
in spirit" (Lk. 6:20) says: "We know that there are four cardinal
virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. " But these
are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to
speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56],
A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which
requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done.
On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers
imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of
the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well
without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the
perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues
which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues.
Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual
virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly
shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are
called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its
species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the
generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one
species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect
of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is
applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another,
nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance
principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue
into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not
found in the same way in all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated
above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called
not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in
prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject,
they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards
good, which is the object of the appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as
is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that
which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone
is a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral
virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical
reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore
there are only two cardinal virtues.
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher
than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to
rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that
there are many more principal virtues.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of
good works is built on four virtues. "
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either
way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as
defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as
existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal
virtue, called "Prudence. " Secondly, according as the reason puts its
order into something else; either into operations, and then we have
"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need
of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions
inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a
curb, which we call "Temperance. " Secondly, by the passions withdrawing
us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or
toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason
dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude. "
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of
virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz.
the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by
"Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is
threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty,
subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of
"Fortitude. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues
simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by
participation is threefold, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks
before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject
and as to the formal principle.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?
Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called
principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the
principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all
the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any
be called a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should
above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev. ) that "he who gathers the other virtues
without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind. "
Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.
But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath a
perfect work. " Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal
virtue.
On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De
Invent. Rhet. ii).
I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as
cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as
we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain
acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is
found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its
judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by
reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found
chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person,
and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found
chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good
defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in
perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.
First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they
are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all
the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in
reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue
that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice;
every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any
passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as
also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this
way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the
objections fail.
Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,
each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus
they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are
called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of
the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which
commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between
equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against
dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other
virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called
principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse
and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral.
xxii, 1):
"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound
fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice,
without prudence, fortitude and temperance. " But this would not be so,
if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore
the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the
function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of
temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic.
xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
and is not weakened and bent by any enticement. " And of temperance he
says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in
all things that we decide to do and say. " Therefore it seems that these
virtues are not distinct from one another.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the
necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have
knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular
end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness
and steadfastness. " But the first of these seems to belong to prudence
which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i. e.
choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on
the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man
should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude,
which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and
steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is
general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct
from one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are
four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same
four virtues are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are
understood differently by various writers. For some take them as
signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in
all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain
rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a
certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any
matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions
or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a
disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in
accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil
involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this
way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct
virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from
the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain
firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said,
belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is
directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this,
we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a
"moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in
all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to
belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction
from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to
reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way
of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations.
According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct
from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one
another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit,
and virtue, and moral virtue.
Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according
as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter,
in which special commendation is given to that general condition from
which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this
way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits,
differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the
first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues
qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of
prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are
directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest,
for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less
difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of
touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to
do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of
death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense
fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be
brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far,
to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers
of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De
Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear,
and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust,
after showing himself to be unconquered by toil. "
From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance
observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by
the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are
taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense
that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down
by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,
however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues,
perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly
divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and
social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the
"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God. " Now the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice,
fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God. " Therefore these virtues
cannot be exemplar.
Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without
any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul
that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it
has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the
passions; it does not have to conquer them. " Now it was stated above
([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without
passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.
Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs
and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God. " But it seems
wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is
not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he
despises what most men admire, viz. power and office. " Therefore there
are no "perfecting" virtues.
Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the
"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their
country and for the safety of the city. " But it is only legal justice
that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social. "
On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus,
together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The
four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social*
virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae:
literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect
[*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul]
virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues. '" [*Cf. Chrysostom's
fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the
modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds
within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and
suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common
weal. "]
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs
to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is
God: if we follow Him we shall live aright. " Consequently the exemplar
of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist
the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as
existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so
that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while
temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is
that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His
unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in
His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on
Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him
according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues;
since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the
conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been
speaking of these virtues until now.
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to
Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as
Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as
your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some
virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues
which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of
movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way
and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called
"perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of
God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the
thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows,
neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and
justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow
the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who
have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the
"perfect virtues. " Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of
God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of
passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto
by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the
Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues
according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about
buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires;
for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men
living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues
of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence
Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social
virtues check the passions," i. e. they bring them to the relative mean;
"the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the
third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is
impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,"
viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking
of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids
is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little
earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of
their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also
to those who have retired from public life on account of failing
health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded
to others the power and renown of authority. " This agrees with what
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a
hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this
burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of
truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the
pressure of charity. "
Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal
directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into
the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,
1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we
understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but
also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or
even towards one individual.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?
(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual
and moral virtues?
(3) How many, and which are they?
(4) Of their order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are any theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues.
For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a
perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which
is disposed according to nature. " But that which is Divine is above
man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a
man.
Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But
the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]),
which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are
not virtues of man.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because
they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all
things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed
to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any
habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq. ): "Ye that fear the Lord
believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him. "
Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.
Therefore they are theological virtues.
I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he
is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]).
Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5],
A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which
man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a
happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the
power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about
which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers
of the Divine nature. " And because such happiness surpasses the
capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to
act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to
this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God
some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural
happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of
his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like
principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their
object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly,
because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
in Holy Writ.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain
thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological
virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as
kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that
these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of
which he is made a partaker.
Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though
God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us
virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but
exemplate virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to
God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in
proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their
nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the
object of supernatural happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not
distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as
to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues
which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the
virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore,
the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us
to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs
us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it
considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not
distinct from the intellectual virtues.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the
four cardinal virtues are the "order of love. " Now love is charity,
which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not
distinct from the theological.
On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that
which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above
man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in
proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]).
Therefore they are distinct from one another.
I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are
specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal
difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues
is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge
of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and
moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore
the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and
intellectual virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's
intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the
theological virtues, supernaturally.
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7)
reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as
they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on
the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always
charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of
love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of
the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called,
then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each
cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and
cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad
2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of
charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity
essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way,
as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological
virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not
fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural
inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues
directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz.
the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one
theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the
intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the
intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is
imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral
virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.
Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.
Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be
only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other,
the will.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three. "
I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues
direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural
inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter
happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles
which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which
are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical
matters.
