"
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning.
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning.
Summa Theologica
But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article.
But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal. "
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be
eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now
God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He
is His own eternity.
Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make
eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is
caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so
the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second
Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is
shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is
said that "intelligence is equal to eternity. " In the words of Exodus,
"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will
reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. e.
beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period
of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to
exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign
is simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence
God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the
idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to
God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
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Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not
be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not
the only eternal.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning. " Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said
of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things
are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills. " (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed,
who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no
changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according
to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly
as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because
it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and
truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind.
Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because
they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
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Whether eternity differs from time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds
time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is
not a different thing from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the
"now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole
space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now"
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is
not substantially different from time.
Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after. " Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for
ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then
there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time
which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the
heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the
whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it
would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously
whole, but that time is not so.
Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and
eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the
case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its
subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for
inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what
is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent
being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according
as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to
change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured
by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
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The difference of aeviternity and time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time. " But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as
was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity;
for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age. "
Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after";
and thus it is the same as time.
Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is
impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it
is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since
God can reduce them to nothing.
Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity. "
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if
innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since
"before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity
has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the
first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly
appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then
an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old
with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the
changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after"
in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an
aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation,
comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not
contain "before" and "after. " We say then that since eternity is the
measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from
permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede
from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither
consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This
appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is
unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness
of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable
being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice;
moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of
places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is
measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In
this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with
such at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive
affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to
be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured
by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a
share of eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is
not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered
absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as
regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will
be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was,
we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject
to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet
suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an
angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can
make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not
to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
Reply to Objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite,
forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity
in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by
any other creature.
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Whether there is only one aeviternity?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is
written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages
are with Thee, O Lord. "
Objection 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to
have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all
temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some
way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on
each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there
is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is
one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of
spiritual things.
Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch
as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a
sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the
thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would
not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason
of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is
different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of
eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of
time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their
principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things
receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other
hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it
is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither
of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are
one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one
absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is
one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which,
since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore
time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the
thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives
unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the
measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their
multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion,
it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only;
because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its
genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be
measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all
the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the
second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ([45]Q[47], A[2]); we
concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is,
a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
we mean ages.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first
measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity
by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
Reply to Objection 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not
necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more
simple than the rest.
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THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
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Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being. " For
everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all "genera. " But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being. "
Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many. "
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being.
"
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call
"being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to
call being "one. " Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to
"being. "
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult. ): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
not an addition to "being. "
I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a
negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being. " This is the
very reason why "one" is the same as "being. " Now every being is either
simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and
potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts
are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is
manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence
it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with
"being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but
signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same
applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because
number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the
substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible
with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to
"man. " This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is
"one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but
by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were
again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence
we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the
"one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a
reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one
way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in
one way "one," and in another way "many. " Still, if it is absolutely
undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its
essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its
essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because
it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in
the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one"
absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be
undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided
in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be
"many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number
and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is
divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by
"many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under
"being," unless it were in some way contained under "one. " Thus
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult. ) that "there is no kind of
multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts,
are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in
subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are
many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions,
are one in principle. "
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being. "
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Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
"multitude" is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding
article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude. "
Objection 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite.
But "multitude" is constituted by "one. " Therefore it is not opposed to
"multitude. "
Objection 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one. " But the idea of "few"
is opposed to "many. " Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many. "
Objection 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed
as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as
privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it
would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it;
whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one. " Hence there
would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible.
Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
"one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by
"one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with
"being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided
is to the thing divided.
Reply to Objection 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a
thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according
to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which
are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in
some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing.
Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some
good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite
is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the
other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is
non-being absolutely, i. e. actually; or what is absolute being in the
genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental
being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or
vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and
vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is
homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is
heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous
whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as,
for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the
constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every
heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form
belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a
house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of
a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the
multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of
not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as
they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so
far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house
by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
houses.
Reply to Objection 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in
that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some
kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the
first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
Reply to Objection 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch
as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior
to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of
a line. " "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not
understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the
fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in
the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the
definition of "one. " But division comes to be understood from the very
negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that
this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a
consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of
multitude.
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Whether God is one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there
be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
Objection 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
On the contrary, It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one
Lord" (Dt. 6:4).
I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is
one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ([46]Q[3],
A[3]). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God.
Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
was shown above ([47]Q[4], A[2]) that God comprehends in Himself the
whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to
one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of
them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist.
Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth,
when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there
was only one such principle.
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that
exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But
things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they
are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one
better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many
are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way
one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so "per se"
and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into
one order should be only one. And this one is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence
the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle
of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in
being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is
convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on
matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still,
according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way
only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain
kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that
He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God
that He is one.
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Whether God is supremely one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one. " For "one" is so
called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
called "one. "
Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is
actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a
thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is
"one. "
Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one. " But every being
is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore
every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more
than any other being is "one. "
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place. "
I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as
His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as
was shown above ([48]Q[3], A[7]). Hence it is manifest that God is
"one" in the supreme degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject
to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light
of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is
divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more,
or less, or supremely, "one. "
Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of
number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in
some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one. " For as a
subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it
of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance,
still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
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HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to
consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning
which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own
natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to
see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all
things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
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Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan. ) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No
man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is
increatable? " Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him. "
Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God
is infinite, as was shown above ([49]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore in Himself
He is unknown.
Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being.
Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
above all intellect.
Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn.
2:2).
I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess
of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the
sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of
its excess of light.
Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain
to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside
God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the
rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its
being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle.
Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he
sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the
rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of
things, the natural desire would remain void.
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of
God.
Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain
vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and
comprehension as the Father has of the Son. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form,
is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely
known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as
appears from what was said above ([50]Q[7], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did
not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be
known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means
that He is not comprehended.
Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a
certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double,
treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every
relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it
is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to
its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to
know God.
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Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an
image?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect.
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article.
But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in
Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal. "
I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence,
as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be
eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas,
no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now
God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He
is His own eternity.
Reply to Objection 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make
eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is
caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so
the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.
Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second
Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is
shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is
said that "intelligence is equal to eternity. " In the words of Exodus,
"The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for
age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will
reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i. e.
beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period
of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to
exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign
is simultaneously whole.
Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence
God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the
idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.
Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to
God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
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Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not
be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
Objection 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.
Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not
the only eternal.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only
one who has no beginning. " Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said
of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things
are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills. " (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in
being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed,
who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no
changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according
to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3).
Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly
as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because
it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for
ever" (Ps. 80:16).
Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and
truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind.
Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because
they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone;
hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
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Whether eternity differs from time?
Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds
time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is
not a different thing from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the
"now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole
space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now"
of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is
not substantially different from time.
Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.
On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after. " Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.
I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither
beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This,
however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference
because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to
the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for
ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as
Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is
simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is
the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement.
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the
part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then
there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time
which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the
heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the
whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it
would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning
and end in time.
Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities;
because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to
note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:
thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which
cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the
essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously
whole, but that time is not so.
Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and
eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the
case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its
subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for
inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what
is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent
being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according
as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to
change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the
being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured
by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
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The difference of aeviternity and time
Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time. " But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as
was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity;
for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age. "
Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after";
and thus it is the same as time.
Objection 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is
impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it
is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since
God can reduce them to nothing.
Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to
be separate from aeviternity. "
I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the
mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist
in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a
beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,
however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding
article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would
always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be,
which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would
still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact
that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both,
together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has
"before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory,
however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if
innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since
"before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity
has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the
first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly
appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it
does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then
an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old
with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the
changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after"
in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an
aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation,
comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not
contain "before" and "after. " We say then that since eternity is the
measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from
permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede
from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither
consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they
have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This
appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is
unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness
of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable
being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice;
moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of
places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity
which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is
measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In
this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no
"before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while
eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with
such at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive
affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to
be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured
by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a
share of eternity.
Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is
not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered
absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as
regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will
be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was,
we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject
to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet
suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an
angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can
make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not
to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
Reply to Objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite,
forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity
in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by
any other creature.
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Whether there is only one aeviternity?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is
written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages
are with Thee, O Lord. "
Objection 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
Objection 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to
have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all
temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some
way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on
each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.
On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.
I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there
is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities.
Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is
one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of
spiritual things.
Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch
as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a
sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the
thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would
not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason
of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it
exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is
different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of
eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of
time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their
principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things
receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other
hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it
is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither
of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are
one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one
absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is
one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which,
since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore
time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the
thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives
unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the
measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their
multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion,
it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only;
because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its
genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be
measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all
the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the
second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ([45]Q[47], A[2]); we
concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is,
a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
we mean ages.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
Reply to Objection 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first
measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity
by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
Reply to Objection 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not
necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more
simple than the rest.
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THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
(3) Whether God is one?
(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
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Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being. " For
everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all "genera. " But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being. "
Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many. "
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being.
"
Objection 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and
"being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call
"being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to
call being "one. " Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition to
"being. "
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult. ): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
not an addition to "being. "
I answer that, "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a
negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being. " This is the
very reason why "one" is the same as "being. " Now every being is either
simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and
potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts
are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is
manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence
it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.
Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with
"being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," but
signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same
applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And because
number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the
substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one" convertible
with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to
"man. " This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is
"one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but
by its substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were
again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence
we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the
"one" which is convertible with "being," does not add a reality to
being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a
reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity.
Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one
way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in
one way "one," and in another way "many. " Still, if it is absolutely
undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its
essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its
essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because
it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in
the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one"
absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be
undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided
in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be
"many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number
and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is
divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by
"many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under
"being," unless it were in some way contained under "one. " Thus
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult. ) that "there is no kind of
multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts,
are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in
subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are
many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions,
are one in principle. "
Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being. "
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Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
"multitude" is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding
article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude. "
Objection 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite.
But "multitude" is constituted by "one. " Therefore it is not opposed to
"multitude. "
Objection 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one. " But the idea of "few"
is opposed to "many. " Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many. "
Objection 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed
as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as
privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it
would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by it;
whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one. " Hence there
would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible.
Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
I answer that, "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
"one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which
is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" measured by
"one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with
"being" is opposed to "multitude" by way of privation; as the undivided
is to the thing divided.
Reply to Objection 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a
thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according
to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which
are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in
some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing.
Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some
good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite
is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the
other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is
non-being absolutely, i. e. actually; or what is absolute being in the
genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental
being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or
vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and
vice versa.
Reply to Objection 2: A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is
homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is
heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous
whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as,
for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the
constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every
heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form
belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a
house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of
a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the
multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of
not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as
they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so
far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house
by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
houses.
Reply to Objection 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in
that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some
kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the
first sense two are many but not in the second sense.
Reply to Objection 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch
as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior
to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of
a line. " "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we do not
understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the
fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in
the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not placed in the
definition of "one. " But division comes to be understood from the very
negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that
this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a
consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of
multitude.
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Whether God is one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there
be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
Objection 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
On the contrary, It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one
Lord" (Dt. 6:4).
I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is
one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ([46]Q[3],
A[3]). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God.
Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
was shown above ([47]Q[4], A[2]) that God comprehends in Himself the
whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to
one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of
them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist.
Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth,
when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there
was only one such principle.
Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that
exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But
things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they
are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one
better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many
are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way
one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so "per se"
and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into
one order should be only one. And this one is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence
the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
Reply to Objection 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle
of number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in
being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" which is
convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on
matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still,
according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way
only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain
kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that
He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God
that He is one.
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Whether God is supremely one?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely "one. " For "one" is so
called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
called "one. "
Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is
actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a
thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and a point is
"one. "
Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one. " But every being
is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore
every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is not "one" more
than any other being is "one. "
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place. "
I answer that, Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as
His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as
was shown above ([48]Q[3], A[7]). Hence it is manifest that God is
"one" in the supreme degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject
to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light
of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is
divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more,
or less, or supremely, "one. "
Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of
number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in
some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely "one. " For as a
subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within it
of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is "one" by its substance,
still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
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HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)
As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to
consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning
which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?
(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own
natural powers to see the essence of God?
(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to
see the essence of God?
(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?
(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all
things in it?
(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?
(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
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Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan. ) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No
man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is
increatable? " Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him. "
Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God
is infinite, as was shown above ([49]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore in Himself
He is unknown.
Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being.
Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
above all intellect.
Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.
On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn.
2:2).
I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess
of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the
sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of
its excess of light.
Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain
to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside
God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the
rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its
being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle.
Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he
sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the
rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of
things, the natural desire would remain void.
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of
God.
Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain
vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and
comprehension as the Father has of the Son. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form,
is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely
known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as
appears from what was said above ([50]Q[7], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did
not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be
known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means
that He is not comprehended.
Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a
certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double,
treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every
relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it
is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to
its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to
know God.
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Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an
image?
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect.
