No More Learning

DODWELI. .
French adventurers in India
French projects
Contemplated alliance with the Dutch
Tipu's embassies
The French Revolution
Napoleon's expedition to Egypt
Mornington's precautions
Baird's expedition to the Red Sea
Decaen's instructions
French privateers
Gardane's mission
Capture of the French islands
323
324
325
325
326
327
327
328
329
330
331
332
CHAPTER XX.
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802.
By the VERY REVEREND, W. H. HUTTON, D. D. ,
Dean of Winchester.
War between Tipu and the Marathas
Settlement of the Guntoor question
Tipu's attack on Travancore
Cornwallis's triple alliance
The third Mysore War
Treaty of Seringapatam 1792
Shore refuses intervention
Causes of the fourth Mysore War
Death of Tipu Sultan
Tipu's character
Wellesley's settlement
Re-establishment of the Hindu reigning family
333
334
335
335
336
337
338
339
341
342
342
344


## p. xvi (#22) #############################################

XVI
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXI
OUDH AND THE CARNATIC, 1785-1801
By the DEAN OF WINCHESTER.
1. OUDH, 1785-1801.
PAGE
.
Condition of Oudh in 1787
Cornwallis's settlement
Shore and the succession question
Lucknow in 1794
Deposition of Wazir 'Ali
Oudh in 1798
Wellesley's views
Wellesley's negotiations
347
348
348
349
349
351
352
353
2. The CARNATIC, 1785-1801.
Position and character of Nawab Walajah
His debts
Cornwallis's treaty
Lord Hobart's proposals
Wellesley's views
The Tanjore question
The Seringapatam papers
The assumption of the Carnatic
355
355
356
357
359
360
361
361
CHAPTER XXII
THE FINAL STRUGGLE VV ITH
THE MARATHAS, 1784-1818
By the late S. M. EDWARDES. C. S. I. , C. V. O.
Mahadaji Sindhia
His position at Delhi
Rivalry of Nana Phadnavis
Ghulam Kadir seizes Delhi
Sindhia consolidates his position
Death of Mahadaji Sindhia
The Maratha confederacy
The pirate states
Intrigues and confusion at Poona
Wellesley's proposals to Baji Rao II
Holkar defeats Sindhia and Baji Rao
The Treaty of Bassein
War with Sindhia and Berar
War with Holkar
Barlow's settlement
State of Sindhia and Holkar
The Pindaris
The war with Nepal
Gangadhar Sastri's murder
Treaty of Gwalior
The last Maratha war
Lord Hastings's settlement
363
363
364
365
366
367
367
369
370
371
372
373
373
374
375
376
377
377
379
380
380
382


## p. xvii (#23) ############################################

CONTENTS
xvii
CHAPTER XXIII
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
By the late S. M. EDWARDES.
PAGE
Position of the raja of Satara
The powers of the Peshwa
The Huzur Daftar
The Deccani village
The Mamlatdar
Financial irregularities
Minor revenue divisions
The judicial system: panchayats
Criminal cases
Police
The army
General character of the administration
Division of the land revenue
Land tenures
Miscellaneous taxes
Customs, etc.
Total revenues
384
384
385
386
387
388
389
389
390
391
393
394
394
395
396
397
399
CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
By SIR MONTACU BURROWS. C. I. E.
Early English relations
Cleghorn and the capture of Colombo
Portuguese and Dutch influence on the island
The Company's administration
Frederick North's government
His attempt on Kandi
The massacre of 1803
The Kandian war
Eheylapola
The occupation of Kandi
401)
401
402
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
CHAPTER XXV
THE
REVENUE AD NIINISTRATION
OF BENGAL, 1765-86
By R. B. RIMSCOTHAM, B. Lit.
Grant of the diwanni
Revenue agents in Bengal
The zamindar
The supervisors of revenue
The kanungo
Concealment of the land revenue
Hastings as revenue administrator
The Committee of Circuit
Union of revenue and judicial powers
40:1
409
409
411
412
413
413
414
415


## p. xviii (#24) ###########################################

xviii
CONTENTS
PAGE
The rai-raian
Settlement of 1772
The collectors
The diwanni adalats
The changes of 1773: provincial councils
Criticisms of Francis, etc.
Interference of the Supreme Court
Krishna Kantu Nandi
Replies to the circular of 23 October, 1774
Discussions of 1775-76
The Amini Commission
Impey chief judge of the sadr
Annual settlements
Centralisation of 1781
Its defects
Macpherson's reorganisation
The chief Saristadar
416
416
417
418
418
419
421
421
422
423
424
426
426
427
· 428
430
431
CHAPTER XXVI
THE BENGAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM,
1786-1818
By LILIAN M. PENSON, Ph. D.
Cornwallis's instructions
His appointment
His advisers: John Shore
James Grant
Charles Grant
Sir William Jones
Cornwallis's character
The Board of Trade
The General Department
The Board of Revenue
The judicial system
The reform of the Board of Trade
The revenue reforms of 1787
The reform of criminal justice
The Secret Department of reform
The Secretariat
Further reforms of 1790
The decennial settlement
The permanent settlement
Reform of the police system
Separation of judicial and executive authority
The Cornwallis code
Changes introduced by Shore and Wellesley
The Select Committee of 1808
Lord Hastings's alterations
Importance Cornwallis's work
433
434
435
435
435
436
437
438
439
439
44. 2
441
442
444
446
446
447
448
450
451
452
454
456
458
458
480


## p. xix (#25) #############################################

CONTENTS
xfx
CHAPTER XXVII
THE MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM
AND LAND REVENUE TO 1818
By J T. GWYNN, I. C. S. (Retd. ).
PAGE
462
463
463
466
467
468
468
470
471
472
474
474
476
470
480
South Indian administration in the eighteenth century
Position of the poligars
Position of the ryots
Land and sair revenue
Early Company's administration
Lionel Place in the jagir
Crlonel Alexander Read
Thomas Munro
Early ryotwari
Introduction of the permanent zamindari settlement
The. Bengal judicial system
The poligar settlements
Village settlements
Munro and the Fifth Report
Results of the early period
CHAPTER XXVIII
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
By W. A. J: ARCHBOLD, M. A. , LL. B.
Early history of the Kabul kingdom
Zaman Shah
Shah Shuja
English views on Central Asia
Missions to Persia, Kabul and Lahore
Rise of Dost Muhammad
Russian designs in Central Asia
Lord Auckland
Burnes's mission
The siege of Herat
The Tripartite Treaty
Preparation for the invasion of Afghanistan
The Simla Manifesto
Home policy
Keane's advance
The storm of Ghazni
Shah Shuja's position
The Russian expedition
Difficulties with the Sikhs
Troubles in Afghanistan
Surrender of Dost Muhammad
Situation in 1841
The revolt at Kabul
Macnaghten's negotiations
Retreat and massacre of the Kabul force
Auckland's measures
Sale's defence of Jallalabad
Ellenborough appointed Governor-General
Nott at Kandahar
Ellenborough's orders
Kabul reoccupied
The evacuation of Afghanistan
483
485
485
486
486
488
489
490
491
493
495
497
498
498
499
501
502
502
503
504
505
505
506
508
510
511
512
513
515
516
518
520


## p. xx (#26) ##############################################

XX
CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXIX
THE CONQUEST OF SIND AND
THE PANJAB
By W. A. J. ARCHBOLD.
I. SIND.
PAGE
The Talpura Mirs
The navigation of the Indus
Sind and the Tripartite Treaty
Treaties with the Mirs
Ellenborough's early views
Napier's instructions
The Khairpur succession
Imam Garh
Outbreak in Lower Sind
Battles of Miani and Dabo
Annexation
522
523
525
527
528
530
533
534
536
536
538
II. THE PANJAB.
Rise of Ranjit Singh
The Cis-Satlej Sikhs
Expansion of Ranjit's dominions
The capture of Peshawar
Projects against Sind
Character of Ranjit.
Intrigue and disorder after his death
Ellenborough's views
Further revolutions
The first Sikh War
Battles of Firozshah and Sobraon
Hardinge's settlement
Revision of the treaty
Murder of Agnew and Anderson
The second Sikh War
Annexation of the Panjab
539
540
541
543
544
544
546
547
548
548
550
552
553
554
555
556
CHAPTER XXX
BURMA, 1782-1852
By G. E. HARVEY, I. C. S.
Early English intercourse
The first Burmese War
The Residents
The second Burmese War
Administration of Arakan
Administration of Tenasserim
558
559
560
561
562
565


## p. xxi (#27) #############################################

CONTENTS
xxi
CHAPTER XXXI
THE INDIAN STATES, 1818-57
By the late Lr. -COL. C. E. LUARD.
Lord Hastings's settlement
Malcolm's work in Central India
Settlement in Rajputana
Hastings and Oudh
Hastings and the Nizam
The Bharatpur succession
Ellenborough and Gwalior
Annexation of Satara
Annexation of Nagpur
Dealings with Jhansi and Karauli
Annexation of Oudh:
Dalhousie's policy
PAGE
570
571
573
575
575
577
578
881
582
582
583
586
CHAPTER XXXII
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY
IN BRITISH INDIA
By H. H. DODWELL.
Dual origin of the Company's authority
Developments in the Carnatic
Developments in Bengal
The Crown and the Company
Language of statutes and treaties
Hastings's' assertion of British sovereignty
Francis's views
French and English policy
Browne's mission to Delhi
The attitude of Cornwallis
Wellesley and Shah 'Alam
Lord Hastings's views
Amherst and Akbar II
Ellenborough's and Dalhousie's negotiations
Disappearance of the Moghul Empire
589
390
591
592
592
597
599
600
601
603
604
605
606
606
807
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
The Portuguese in India (Chapter 1)
The Dutch in India (Chapter II)
The French Factories in India (Chapter in)
The East India Company, 1600-1740 (Chapter rv)
The Struggle with the French (Chapters V, vi, and VIII)
The Conquest of Bengal (Chapters vil and ix)
Warren Hastings and Bengal, 1772-85 (Chapters X-XIII and XVI-XVII)
The First Conflict of the Company with the Marathas, 1761-82
(Chapter XIV)
The Carnatic, 1761-84 (Chapter xv)
Legislation and Governments, 1786-1818 (Chapter XVII)
The Exclusion of the French, 1784-1815 (Chapter Xix)
Tipu Sultan. 1785-1802 (Chapter XX)
609
613
615
618
621
623
625
.
627
628
631
632
634


## p. xxii (#28) ############################################

xxii
CONTENTS
The Carnatic, 1785-1801 (Chapter XXI)
Oudh, 1785-1801 (Chapter XXI)
The Final Struggle with the Marathas, 1784-1818 (Chapter XXri)
Maratha Administration (Chapter XXII)
The Conquest of Ceylon, 1795-1815 (Chapter XXIV)
The Revenue Administration of Bengal, 1765-86 (Chapter XXV)
The Bengal Administrative System, 1786-1818. (Chapter XXVI)
The Madras District System and Land Revenue to 1818. (Chapter XXVII)
Afghanistan, Russia and Persia (Chapter XXVIII)
The Conquest of Sind (Chapter XXIX)
The Conquest of the Panjab (Chapter XXIX)
Burma, 1782-1852 (Chapter Xxx)
The Indian States, 1818-57 (Chapter XXXI)
The Development of Sovereignty in British India (Chapter xxxu)
PAGE
635
636
636
638
639
640
641
642
644
647
648
650
652
654.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
654
INDEX
661


## p. 1 (#29) ###############################################

CHAPTER I
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498—1598
THE last decade of the fifteenth century witnessed the discovery
of a new world by Columbus and of a new route to an old world by
Vasco da Gama. Both discoveries were epoch-making, though in
totally different ways. The latter, however, had the more immediate
effect on the history of Europe; and perhaps no event during the
middle ages had such far-reaching repercussion on the civilised world
as the opening of the sea-route to India. Vast countries, hitherto
visited only by rare travellers or not at all, and known by name only
to the learned few, were suddenly brought into touch with the West;
and the luxuries of the East, which had hitherto passed through so
many hands before they reached the European market, could now be
brought direct to Lisbon. As a result, the sea-borne trade of the
Muslims in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea was paralysed, and
the prosperous houses of Genoa and Venice were faced with the ruin
of half their trade in the Levant, while Portugal rose suddenly to such
prosperity and fame that she was soon without a rival in Europe.
Persia, too, was threatened with the loss of the heavy customs she had
for centuries been levying on the wares which were carried westward
through her territory. Nothing can better illustrate the revolutionary
effect of the opening of the sea-route to India on the markets of
Europe than the detailed statement of the payments made by
merchants 'trading from India to Alexandria which is given by con-
temporary Portuguese writers. I repeat here the excellent summary
given by Mr. Whiteway:
The profits on wares sent from the East to Europe were enormous to bear
the cost of passage through so many jurisdictions and the expense. of so many
transhipments. There has come to us a detailed statement of the payments made
by the merchants trading from India to Alexandria, which is full of interest; it
refers to a time when an independent Sultan ruled in Cairo, but under the
Ottoman Turks the payments would certainly not have been smaller. The Red
Sea merchants lived in Jedda and had their factors in Calicut. The regulations
of the Sultan of Cairo required that one-third of the imports should be pepper,
and this amount must be sold to him in Jedda at Calicut prices. Say a merchant
brought goods from Calicut to the value there of £300, and among them no
pepper. He would have to buy in Jedda, at Jedda prices, pepper worth in
Calicut £100, and re-sell it to the Sultan at the Calicut price. On
the balance of the goods he would pay 10 per cent. ad valorem, and again on
the balance, after deducting this 10 per cent. , 4 per cent. more. Instead,
however, of getting the Calicut price of the pepper in money, he was compelled
to take copper in Jedda from the Sultan at Calicut prices--that is, copper 1. 0
Jędda vas worth 7 cruzados the quintal, but this he was compelled to buy at
12 cruzados, the Calicut price. Practically, therefore, the Sultan of Cairo was;
at no expense to himself, a partner to the extent of one-third in every voyage.
1 Rise of Portuguese Power in India, pp. 7. 8.
1


## p. 2 (#30) ###############################################

2
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498-1598
In spite of these exactions the profits on the double journey would be very large
indeed.
To continue, however, with the goods to Europe. Brought to Suez in smaller
boats from Jedda, the importer had to pay 5 per cent. ad valorem in ready
money; and to supply this money there were banks at Suez prepared to cash
drafts. The journey to Cairo took three days; and a camel to carry about 450 lbs.
cost about 37s. 6d. A mile out of Cairo the goods were registered. The value
of pepper in the Cairo market was about 20d. the pound, and a merchant buy-
ing pepper had to buy an amount equal to one-third of his purchases. From
Cairo the goods were taken down the Nile in boats, and were carried from the
river to Alexandria on camels. At Alexandria they were registered again, and
buyer and seller had each to pay 5 per cent. ad valorem. The shipper had also
lo pay 5 per cent. to frank him across the sea.
The Pope, Alexander VI, in view of the wonderful discoveries by
the Spaniards and the Portuguese, had taken upon himself between
1493 and 1494 to issue no less than four bulis with the object of
parcelling out the world between these two nations. The Pope's
delimitations, which with each bull showed greater advantages to
Spain, were somewhat modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas (June,
1494), which gave Portugal all the lands which might be discovered
east of a straight line drawn from the Arctic to the Antarctic Pole at
a distance of 370 leagues west of Cape Verde, and to Spain all lands
west of that line. And in 1502 the same Pope gave the king of Portu-
gal permission to style himself “Lord of the Navigation, Conquest and
Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India”.
It must not be forgotten that by the end of the fifteenth century
the Portuguese had explored not only the whole length of the western
coast of Africa but also a portion of the mainland beyond the Cape
of Good Hope; and that Vasco da Gama was not sent to discover
India, but merely to find the direct sea-route to that country. The
original idea underlying this mission was to find spices and Christians.
Factories were established without great difficulty, but the chief care
of the Portuguese commanders was the attempt to drive all Muham-
madan shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in order to
ensure the carrying of all Indian products in Portuguese vessels. The
next hundred years are therefore occupied not only in establishing
factories on the coast of India, but also in placing garrisons at a
number of strategic points, i. e. at the entrance of the Red Sea and
elsewhere outside India.
So long as their energies were mainly devoted to the control of
the high seas and to the capture or defence of these strategic points,
the Portuguese were pre-eminently successful, though thwarted of two
of the prizes they most coveted, namely Aden and Jedda. But they
showed themselves incapable of founding on Indian soil anything
resembling an overseas empire; and although they have continued to
hold a certain number of their Indian possessions down to the present
1 See especially Van der Linden, “Alexander VI and his Bulls, 1493-1494",
American Historical Review, XXI, No. 1, 1916.


## p. 3 (#31) ###############################################

HISTORICAL SOURCES
3
day, they were not strong enough, when the time came, to defeat
their European rivals in the East, and lost one by one those outlying
bases which had once given them the command of the eastern seas.
Though, as has been so often observed, the predominance of the
religious orders in civil affairs contributed greatly to the decline of
the Portuguese power in India, the devoted labours in other spheres
of the Jesuits at Goa must never be lost sight of. The contributions of
their missionaries to the historical and geographical literature of the
world constitute an inestimable treasure-house of knowledge, and have
placed under a lasting obligation all students of the East. It is also
a fortunate circumstance that, apart from the literary activity of the
Jesuits, the Portuguese produced during this heroic age, in addition
to a great epic poet, a number of fine chroniclers, who wrote minute
and thrilling narratives of their progress in the East; notably Barros,
Couto, Castanheda, Goes, Alvarez, Almeida, Duarte Barbosa, and last
but not least the great Affonso d'Albuquerque himself, whose Letters
and Commentaries will bear comparison with those of any other
soldier-statesman.
Finally a word may be said regarding the Muhammadan sources
for the history of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red
Sea, existing in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Although these writers,
like the Portuguese, are not free from prejudice nor above the sup-
pression of incidents wounding national and religious pride, their
narratives are usually in complete accord with those of their enemies,
and bear striking testimony to the intelligent grasp which the Portu-
guese gained of the public affairs and private intrigues of the
Musulmans.
The principal states in Hindustan and Western India at the end of
the fifteenth century were the Muhammadan kingdoms of Delhi,
Gujarat, Berar, Bidar, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur: and the Hindu
kingdoms of Vijayanagar, Kannanur, Calicut and Cochin.
It was actually the power of Vijayanagar which prevented the
Muhammadan states of Northern India from making a coalition against
the Portuguese when they first settled on the coast; and when in
1565 the power of Vijayanagar was broken and a coalition formed,
the Portuguese were too strongly established to be ousted. As, during
the first half of the sixteenth century, Vijayanagar was really the
dominating power in Southern India, it is strange that the Portuguese
never tried to conciliate tha: state, but on the contrary were at times
openly hostile.
On 8 July, 1497, three vessels, varying from 60 to 150 tons burden,
left Lisbon under Vasco da Gama, and on 17 May, 1498, they anchored
1 See Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, October, 1921, and January,
1922, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507-1517; and between
1517-1538", by the present writer.


## p. 4 (#32) ###############################################

4
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498-1598
off a small village eight miles north of Calicut. It is not without
significance that the first landing of these men, whose main object
was to usurp the spice trade, hitherto a monopoly of the Muham-
madans, should have been on Hindu territory. One wonders what
might have been the fate of da Gama and his companions if the
landing had been attempted, say, in some part of the powerful Muslim
kingdom of Gujarat. As it turned out, the Hindu ruler of Calicut,
whose hereditary title was Zamorin, gave a friendly reception to
these strangers, had them conducted by a pilot to a safer anchorage,
and invited da Gama to pay him a visit in Calicut. In response to this
invitation a party of fourteen set out for the Zamorin's capital; and so
great was their ignorance of things Indian that they mistook a Hindu
temple for a Christian chapel, imagining that what was not Muham-
madan must be Christian. Though they cannot have found the Hindu
idols very orthodox in type, they nevertheless entered the temple
and prayed there. 1
For the attainment of their immediate object these early Portu.
guese adventurers were poorly equipped. In the first place they had
brought no presents for the local rulers with whom they would have
to treat-a strange omission in view of their past experiences in Africa;
and secondly their wares proved unattractive to the Indians, which
in the circumstances was quite natural. In spite of the difficulties
which the Muhammadan traders, in self-defence, put in their way,
the adventurers achieved, thanks to the Zamorin, a certain measure
of success and seem to have established quite friendly relations with
the people of the country. When, however, on 29 August, 1498, da
Gama set out on his return voyage, he carried with him five out of
twelve inhabitants whom he had made prisoners as a reprisal for
the detention of some of his goods, ultimately restored to him. This
was the one injudicious act associated with the first expedition, and
no doubt helped to confirm the stories, eagerly spread by the Muslim
traders, of the high-handed methods of the Portuguese in Africa. As
a reconnaissance, da Gama's voyage was of the utmost importance;
for on his return to Lisbon after an absence of two years with two out
of his three ships, and fifty-five survivors out of the original company
of 170, he was able to show specimens of the articles obtainable in the
Calicut market, and to tell the merchants of Portugal what wares met
with the favour of the Malabaris. Of the religion and customs of that
.
part of India he seems to have learnt surprisingly little. To judge by
the instructions issued to the second expedition, it would appear that
da Gama's party had actually passed three months in a Hindu country
without discovering the existence of the Hindu religion. All the
inhabitants of India who were not Muslims were assumed to be
Christians, but of course bad Christians as they were not Catholics;
1. See Whiteway, op. cit. p. 80.
2 Idem, p. 89, n. 1.


## p. 5 (#33) ###############################################

PEDRO ALVAREZ CABRAT.
6
>
and we know how much time and how many lives the Portuguese
afterwards devoted to the conversion to the Roman faith of the
Ethiopians who were already. Christians. Still it remains a mystery
why they failed to discover that the Zamorin was neither Christian
nor Muslim, seeing that they were for so long in daily intercourse
with him.
After the return of da Gama, preparations were immediately made
in Portugal to equip a new fleet on a far larger scale than the first,
and, on 9 March, 1500, Pedro Alvarez Cabral set out from Lisbon in
command of a fleet of thirteen vessels and 1200 men. Among his
captains was Bartholomeu Dias, who had been the first sailor to round
the Cape. After a series of amazing adventures, including the acci-
dental discovery of Brazil and Madagascar, Cabral with six vessels
reached Calicut on 13 September, 1500, and on the 18th he had an
interview on shore with the Zamorin. Cabral was eminently unsuited
for the diplomatic side of his mission, and showed no disposition to
consider the sentiments and prejudices of those with whom he was
sent to trade. Misunderstandings due to ignorance and mistrust arose
after the first interview, and reached a climax with the seizure on
16 December of a ship belonging to the Arabs, which led to a riot in
which forty Portuguese perished and their factory was levelled with
the ground. In consequence of this it became impossible for Cabral
to remain at Calicut, but, before leaving with only two ships laden,
he put to death 600 innocent boatmen who had had nothing to do
with the riot, and for two days bombarded the town. On 24 December
they reached Cochin, where, though they did not actually meet the
raja—who afterwards proyed such a valuable ally to them—they
succeeded in loading the remainder of their ships. Scarcely had they
done so, however, when news came that a large fleet was sailing down
the coast from Calicut to attack them. Cabral stole away on the night
of 9 January, 1501, leaving in Cochin about thirty Portuguese, among
whom was the famous Duarte Barbosa 1 On the following day Cabral
only escaped an encounter with the Zamorin's fleet by reason of a
calm. It may be mentioned that when off Kannanur he was assisted
by the local raja with supplies. Eventually Cabral reached Portugal
with five vessels so richly laden that the expenses of the whole expe-
dition were more than covered. But the most important result of
this in many ways disastrous journey was the discovery of the Cochin
harbour, which was greatly superior to Calicut as an anchorage, and
the further knowledge of Indian politics, which taught them that in
the raja of Cochin, the enemy of the Zamorin, they might find a
constant ally.
In 1501 a fleet of four trading vessels went to Cochin and returned
in safety, having been warned at Mozambique to avoid Calicut.
It is convenient here to review the new situation in which Portu-
1 Duarte Barbosa, ed. by M. Longworth Dames (Hakluyt Society. )


## p.
6 (#34) ###############################################

6
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498-1598
gal found herself as a result of these adventures. The Portuguese had
now learnt that the Indians were not Christians, were capable of
showing themselves formidable foes, and must consequently be treated
with some consideration. They realised that the possibilities of trade
were enormous, and that the rival they had to fear was the Arab
trader. It could make no difference to the Hindus whether they traded
with the Arabs or the Portuguese, though, as far as imports were
concerned, the latter were able to introduce many commodities which
were not brought by the Arabs from the Red Sea. The main business
then of the Portuguese was to conciliate the local Indian rulers and
drive away the Arab merchantmen. Although the Zamorin was an
avowed friend to the latter, to whom Calicut owed its prosperity, the
Portuguese had the great advantage of beginning their Indian enter-
prise at Hindu ports; and not until they moved further north along
the west coast of India did they find themselves in conflict with a
Muslim state whose sympathy with the Arabs was founded on some-
thing more binding than trade relations.
The object of the Portuguese was now not only to hinder as far as
possible trade between India and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf,
but also to divert to Portugal all the trade of the East with Europe.
To this end a fleet of twenty ships was dispatched in February, 1502,
under Vasco da Gama, followed in April by five more vessels under
Estavão da Gama. In September this combined fleet assembled off
Anjadiva (south of Goa), where they perpetrated one of the most
dreadful deeds in the annals of a not over-nice period. A rich Muslim
pilgrim vessel on its way to India from the Red Sea was intercepted
by da Gama's fleet, plundered and sunk; there were many women
and children on board; but to these no mercy was shown; and we
actually read that da Gama watched the horrors of the scene through
a porthole, merciless and unmoved.
He reached Calicut on 29 October, 1502. His aim was to compel
the Zamorin to turn the Muhammadans out of the country. This was
an instruction previously issued to Cabral, but at a time when the
powers in Lisbon imagined the Zamorin to be some sort of Christian.
When da Gama arrived the second time, he found the Portuguese
ostensibly at war with the Zamorin, and made the expulsion of the
Muhammadans a preliminary condition to any peace. The Zamorin,
of course, refused; and his refusal was followed by acts of wanton and
revolting cruelty on the part of the Portuguese leader. It is needless
here to enter into the details which are all too vividly described by
the Portuguese historians; it is, however, quite evident that da Gama
had no bowels of compassion, and that his only policy when opposed
was one of frightfulness. On 3 November he sailed for Cochin, where
he established a factory. From there he proceeded to Kannanur,
where, after erecting a defensive palisade, he sailed for, and eventually
reached, Lisbon on 1 September, 1503.
According to the original plan, Vincente Sodre had been left


## p. 7 (#35) ###############################################

DUARTE PACHECO
7
behind to patrol the coast with six vessels and a caravel. It cannot
be supposed that the raja of Cochin bore any love to da Gama and his
Portuguese, by whom he had been treated in a most high-handed
manner, especially in regard to prices; but he was anxious to obtain
the support of Sodre in the event of an attack by the Zamorin. Sodre,
however, thought it would be more profitable to intercept vessels at
the mouth of the Red Sea, and so sailed away from the Indian coast
to the despair of the factors left in Cochin and Kannanur. He took
several rich prizes, but perished with three of his ships at the end of
April, 1503, in a bay in one of the Curia Muria islands. Meanwhile,
as da Gama had foreseen, the Zamorin proceeded to revenge himself
on Cochin, eventually succeeding in overrunning the raja's territory;
and the raja himself was forced to retreat to an island sanctuary,
taking the Portuguese with him. During 1503 the authorities in
Lisbon, probably under the impression that the safety of the factories
at Cochin and Kannanur was assured by the piesence of Sodre with
his patrol, did not send out a fleet. But in April of that year three
a
small squadrons were dispatched under the respective commands of
Affonso d'Albuquerque, his cousin Francisco d'Albuquerque, and
Soldanha. Francisco was the first to arrive, and found the Zamorin
and the Portuguese still at war. He drove the Zamorin's troops from
the immediate vicinity of Cochin, and set about constructing the first
fortress built by the Portuguese in India. On the arrival of Affonso,
the rest of the Cochin territory was cleared of the Zamorin's men,
and a treaty of peace was concluded between the two Hindu princes,
bý which the Zamorin agreed to pay upwards of 4000 cwt. of pepper:
It was in connection with the late delivery of the second consignment
that hostilities again broke out between Calicut and Cochin, provoked
no doubt by the Portuguese. Nevertheless, on the last day of January,
1504, the two d'Albuquerques started for home; Francisco disap-
peared mysteriously on the voyage, and the great Affonso reached
Portugal with only two vessels.
The famous Duarte Pacheco had been left with less than a
hundred men to defend Cochin against the entire forces of the Zamorin,
numbering some 60,000. Only about 8000 of the Cochin troops courd
be relied on to fight beside the Portuguese. Pacheco was not only a
great soldier, but also a man of resource and intelligence. He quickly
took stock of all the local resources, and in order to secure the regular
provision of supplies during the siege of Cochin, which was self-
supporting, he managed to conciliate the leading Muhammadan
merchants on whom such supplies had always depended. The first
assault was made on Palm Sunday, 31 March, and the siege dragged
on for nearly four months, during which Pacheco showed himself
the master of every situation, while the Zamorin's forces were daily
reduced by gun-fire and sickness. Lisbon had, of course, no news of
what was passing, and towards the end of 1504 Lopo Soares arrived
in Indian waters with a fleet of fourteen vessels with orders to prevent


## p. 8 (#36) ###############################################

8
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498-1598
any but Portuguese ships lading at Cochin. At the request of the
Zamorin he visited Calicut, arranged a peace, and then, having taken
in a cargo, he sailed for home carrying with him Duarte Pacheco, and
leaving in his place a man who did everything to make the raja regret
the departure of that brave soldier.
With the year 1505 begins a new era in the history of Portuguese
India. The sending of an annual fleet, and the abandonment of a
handful of men to their fate between the departure of one fleet and
the arrival of the next, had proved a failure. One can picture the
.
feelings of anxiety and desolation which must have possessed these
little colonies of strangers without means of escape either by sea or
land. Their only consolation can have been the thought that they
were as safe in their isolated factories as they would have been on
the high seas. It was now decided to appoint a viceroy who should
remain at his post in India for three years. At the beginning of 1505
Francisco d'Almeida set out in command of a large fleet and 1500
soldiers, with orders to build fortresses at Kilwa, Anjadiva, Kannanur
and Cochin.
It was a fortunate chance that led to the appointment of this man
as viceroy, for in the first instance Tristão da Cunha had been selected
although owing to "temporary blindness" he had been unable to
accept (just as the illness of Bobadilla who had been first proposed
for the Eastern Mission by Ignatius Loyola, led to the dispatch of the
great Francisco Xavier).
Almeida reached India in September, 1505, and at once began to
build a fort at Anjadiva, which proved useless and was dismantled
two years later. He next proceeded southwards to Kannanur and
later to Cochin, where he arrived in time to settle in Portuguese
interests a question of succession to the throne.
Now that the Portuguese fleet was continuously patrolling the
Malabar coast, it became expedient for the Red Sea merchantmen
to adopt a new route by way of the Maldives. Almeida sent his son
Lourenço to patrol this route and to explore Ceylon; but nothing was
achieved beyond a hasty visit to that island.
In March, 1506, an engagement took place between a large fleet
of Muhammadan traders, armed and equipped by the Zamorin, and
a Portuguese fleet of four vessels, resulting in the capture of the largest
Muslim ships and a veritable massacre of their crews, with no casu-
alties among the Portuguese. Later owing to the unwarranted sinking
of a Muhammadan vessel belonging to a well-known merchant of
Kannanur, the ruler of that place, aided by the Zamorin, besieged
the Portuguese garrison, who, after great suffering from shortage of
food, were, at the end of four months, saved by the arrival of Tristão
da Cunha (August, 1507).
Tristão da Cunha, having recovered his sight, left Portugal in
April, 1506, with ten cargo vessels and a squadron of four ships under


## p. 9 (#37) ###############################################

FRANCISCO D'ALMEIDA
the famous Affonso d’Albuquerque, who was designated to succeed
Almeida, though with only the lower title of Governor of India. Their
instructions were that da Cunha, having captured and fortified
Socotra, in order to block the entrance to the Red Sea as an answer
to the Egypto-Venetian confederacy, should proceed to India, leaving
Albuquerque with six ships and 400 men to attack Jedda and Aden.
They finally reached Socotra, where they took the Arab fort by storm,
and built a new fortress. On 10 August, 1507, Tristão left for India,
and, as we have seen, was able by the end of the month to relieve the
beleaguered garrison of Kannanur. At the end of November his own
fleet and that of the viceroy completely destroyed the Zamorin's fleet;
on 10 December Tristão set out for Portugal with a full cargo.
Albuquerque remained in Socotra until August, 1507, arranging
for the defences and internal administration of the island. Perceiving,
however, that Socotra was ill-placed for blockading the Red Sea, and
further that with his slender forces he had no chance of successfully
attacking Aden, he ignored his instructions and determined to attack
Ormuz.
The second phase in the history of Portuguese India began in the
middle of Almeida's viceroyalty. Till then the most northerly point
touched by the Portuguese vessels had been Anjadiva, and not till
1508. did they venture nearer to what ultimately became the centre of
their activities. But then begins their struggle with the Muhammadan
.
powers, for on the Malabar Coast, though they had encountered
Muḥammadan merchants and their fleets, their political dealings had
been only with Hindu rulers.
There were two motives which now induced the Muhammadans
to take concerted action. On the one hand, the rulers of Arabia and
Egypt were being deprived of the duties levied on Indian goods
passing up the Red Sea and across Egypt on their way to Alexandria;
and on the other hand the great Musulman kingdoms of Gujarat,
Bijapur and the rest had begun to realise that the Portuguese must
ultimately attempt at the northern sea-ports what they had so success-
fully achieved at the southern. The news that the Portuguese had
decided to appoint a resident viceroy and to keep a standing fleet in
Indian waters impelled these Muslim rulers to negotiate with the
sultan of Egypt for joint action against them. Even the Zamorin is
said to have thought of inviting the help of the sultan of Egypt. So
prompt was his response, that his fleet, specially equipped at Suez,
was ready in May and reached Aden in August, 1507, under the
command of Amir Husayn, whom Portuguese writers called Mir
Hashim; and it was this fleet that the Portuguese encountered before
they had tried issues with the Indian Muslims. Lourenço d'Almeida,
the gallant son of the viceroy, set out for the north in January, 1508,
and was anchored off Chaul when the Egyptian fleet arrived off that
harbour; and in this, their first laval battle with the Muhammadans,


## p. 10 (#38) ##############################################

10
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498–1598
3
they met with a severe reverse, and their young commander was
killed (January, 1508). '
Meanwhile, Albuquerque had left Socotra with his own fleet in
August, 1507, and, having systematically destroyed the chief ports
belonging to the king of Ormuz, he then entered into negotiations.
These led to nothing but a nominal treaty, and finally, in February,
1508, Albuquerque was compelled to leave for India, reaching
Kannanur in December, 1508.
He arrived in India just as Almeida was setting sail to avenge the
death of his son Lourenço. Almeida met the Muslim fleets off Diu
and gained a signal victory, February, 1509. On his return to Cochin
in March, a great quarrel arose about delivering the government to
Albuquerque, and it was not until 5 November, 1509, that this was
finally arranged.
The first expedition which the new governor undertook was
against Calicut, but it achieved nothing beyond the destruction of a
few buildings, and Albuquerque himself received two wounds in the
shoulder. But as soon as he had recovered, he set to work to refit the
whole fleet, and determined to set out for the Red Sea in search of
the sultan of Egypt's fleet. On 10 February, 1510, he sailed from
Cochin with twenty-three ships for Guardafui, but was diverted from
his course by learning of the defenceless state of Goa, off which he
anchored on 28 February. Only a slight resistance was offered, and
on 4 March he received the keys of the fortress. His first care was
to strengthen the fortifications in case Yusuf Adil Khan, the ruler
of Bijapur, should attempt to recover the place. Albuquerque had
already contemplated making Goa the headquarters of the Portuguese
in India; but, in spite of all his preparations and individual attention
to every detail of defence, he was unable to resist Yusuf Adil Khan's
attack, and after many misadventures he had at last to retire to
Anjadiva on 16 August, much to the relief of his captains who had all
along been opposed to the adventure. During the next two months
he received important reinforcements in ships and men, and at the
end of November he sailed back to Goa and recovered the place by
storm. In reporting this victory to King Manoel, Albuquerque wrote:
"My determination now is to prevent any Moor entering Goa, to
leave a sufficient force of men and ships in the place, then with
another fleet to visit the Red Sea and Ormuz".
Amir Husayn, who since his defeat in February, 1509, had been
at Cambay awaiting reinforcements from Suez, then sailed back, to
find the new fleet still in process of building.
2
1 The story of his heroic death is told by Camoens in his Lusiads, Canto
X, 29-32.
2 Called by the Portuguese Idalcao or Hidalcao. He is also called by Albu-
querque Sabaic. See Whiteway, op. cit. p. 133, note. See also Fonseca, History
of Goa, p. 131, note.


## p. 11 (#39) ##############################################

ALBUQUERQUE
11
Albuquerque now devoted all his energies to the strengthening of
Goa, and to increasing its commercial importance. He dispatched
several captains along the coast with orders to compel all the ships
they met to put into that port. In the city itself every encouragement
was given to trade, and vessels soon began to arrive there from
Ormuz and elsewhere. Even Moors trading in spices were encouraged
to settle there, and in order to secure a permanent population,
Albuquerque did everything in his power to encourage his Portuguese
to take Indian wives.
In April, 1511, Albuquerque set out for Malacca, at which point
all traffic between India and China was concentrated. The first attack
on Malacca (25 July, 1511) led to no definite result, and Albuquerque's
captains were against making a further attempt. He, however, finally
convinced them of the wisdom of his policy by pointing out that if
they were only to take Malacca out of the hands of the Moors, Cairo
and Mecca would be entirely ruined, and Venice would then be able
to obtain no spiceries except what her merchants might buy in
Portugal”. In August, 1511, a second and successful attack was made,
and the Portuguese became absolute masters of the place. Great
importance was attached to this triumph of Portuguese arms. King
Manoel wrote to inform Leo X of the event, and the Pope made the
news the occasion of a series of ceremonies of public thanksgiving of
unusual pomp and splendour. Tristão da Cunha was head of the
special mission sent to Rome, bearing magnificent presents to the
pontiff, including an elephant of extraordinary size, which, as it
passed the papal palace stopped, and kneeling down, bowed thrice
to the Pope who was watching the procession from a window.
Albuquerque reached Cochin again in January, 1512, after an
absence of less than twelve months, to find that affairs had everywhere
fallen into disorder, while Goa was constantly alarmed by persistent
rumours of the advent of the Turkish fleet. “The Rumes are coming"
was the constant cry. In April, 1512, he wrote to King Manoel as
follows: “I would respectfully submit to your Majesty that until we
go to the Red Sea and assure these people that such beings as the
Rumes are not in existence, there can be no confidence or peace for
your Majesty's subjects in these parts”. The security of Goa was not,
however, yet assurred : and at the end of 1512 Albuquerque was
obliged to take a large force to attack the fort of Benasterim, six
miles from Goa, which had been strongly fortified and garrisoned by
the king of Bijapur. The reduction of this fort was one of Albu-
querque's most gallant exploits.
Not till February, 1513, was Albuquerque able to set out for the
Red Sea. He first attacked Aden. His force was composed of 1000
Portuguese and 400 Malabaris, who landed in small boats carrying
with them scaling ladders. The Aden garrison, in order to avoid the
fire of the Portuguese guns, enticed Albuquerque's men within the
city walls, and, after four hours of fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the


## p. 12 (#40) ##############################################

12
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498–1598
1
besieging force was obliged to withdraw to its ships. After this
Albuquerque attempted to proceed to Jedda, but the winds were
unfavourable, and he decided in May to anchor at Kamaran. Haying
destroyed all the fortifications on this island, he returned to Aden,
but, finding it even stronger than when he left it, he set sail for India
in August, 1513. The Portuguese historians tell us that Albuquerque
lay ten days off Aden on his return from Kamaran,' but do not refer
to any further attack on that city; but some Muslim historians speak
of a second unsuccessful attack and assert that the guns of the fort
did great damage to the Portuguese ships lying at anchor. ?
In 1513 Albuquerque came into diplomatic contact with Persia.
Ismail Safavi had sent ambassadors to the kings of Gujarat, Ormuz
and Bijapur; and the ambassador sent to Bijapur visited Albuquerque
at Kannanur, and invited him to send Miguel Ferreira 'to Ismail.
Ferreira returned with the Persian via Ormuz, and at Tabriz had
many interviews with the shah, who expressed a great desire for the
destruction of the sultan and the house of Mecca. When he dismissed
Ferreira, he sent with him an ambassador to Albuquerque with rich
presents. While they were at Ormuz on the return journey, Albu-
querque himself arrived there, but, instead of coming to terms, he
established Portuguese sužerainty over Ormuz, thus denying Shah
Ismail's claims in that quarter.
In November, 1515, Albuquerque, feeling his end was near, set
sail for India, having just learnt that Lopo Soares had been appointed
captain-major in India and that he himself had been recalled. The
last letter he addressed to King Manoel, dated at sea, 6 December,
1515, must be quoted here :
This letter to your Majesty is not wiitten by my hand, as when I write I
am troubled with hiccoughs, which is a sign of approaching death. I have here a
son to whom I bequeath the little I possess. Events in India will speak for
themselves as well as for me. I leave the chief place in India in your Majesty's
:
power, the only thing left to be done being the closing of the gates of the
Straits. I beg your Majesty to remember all I have done for India, and to
make my son great for my sake. 3
He died on 16 December, 1515, having done n. ore than any other
Portuguese leader to establish the prestige of his king, and to make
the name of his fellow-countrymen respected and feared. He realised
that the three keys to the eastern trade were Malacca, Ormuz and
Aden. He obtained complete control of the first two, and almost
secured the third. He combined the most resolute determination with
the greatest personal bravery. He was scrupulously loyal to his
master; and the only blot on his character was his ruthless cruelty
towards his enemies, the Muhammadans.
>
1 Barros, a, viii, $4.
2 See J. R. A. S. Oct. 1921, p. 559.
3 Cartas, I, 380, The Letters of Albuquerque, published by Royal Academy
of Lisbon, 1884.


## p. 13 (#41) ##############################################

DIOGO LOPES DE SEQUEIRA
13
.
1
Had Albuquerque lived long enough to return to Aden from
Ormuz, he would have found the governor of that town ready to
submit, whereas owing to the stupidity of his successor, Lopo Soares,
the chance of adding Aden to the Portuguese possessions was thrown
away. In February, 1516, Lopo set out with a fleet of twenty-seven
sail for the Red Sea in order to engage the fleet which the sultan of
Egypt had been so long preparing at Suez.
Suez. When he arrived unex-
pectedly before Aden, the governor, Amir Mirjan, who had been
recently attacked by Rais Salman, the commander of the Egyptian
fleet, offered the keys of the citadel to the Portuguese general, but
Lopo, instead of taking advantage of this surprising offer, continued
his course in search of the Egyptian fleet, thinking to return and take
possession of Aden when he had disposed of Rais Salman. Hearing
that Salman and his fleet had been driven by stress of weather into
Jedda, he followed him thither; but instead of bombarding the city,
he sailed away two days later on the plea that he had instructions to
fight the fleet but not to attack Jedda. On his return he destroyed
the town of Zeyla, and, on reaching Aden, found Amir Mirjan in a
very different mood, and the fortifications repaired. He returned to
Goa in September, 1516, having achieved nothing. The remaining
two years of his governorship were uneventful, saving that he suc-
ceeded in entering into relations with China.
In December, -1518, he was succeeded by Diogo Lopes de Sequeira,
who in February, 1520, made a fruitless expedition into the Red Sea
with a fleet of twenty-four vessels. On his way back he was enter-
tained by Malik Ayaz at Diu, which the Portuguese had coveted ever
since the time of Albuquerque, and which had once been offered
them. Diogo Lopes in his conversations with Malik Ayaz must have
shown his hand too clearly, for when he revisited the place in
February, 1521, with a large fleet, its defences were so strong that the
Portuguese refrained from attack.
Duarte de Menezes succeeded Diogo Lopes as governor on his
arrival at Goa, September, 1521. His government was marked only
by unpleasant happenings at Ormuz which reflected small credit
on the Portuguese. King John III, who succeeded King Manoel in
1521, selected as viceroy Vasco da Gama, now a man sixty-four years
of age. Vasco reached India in September, 1524, to die on Christmas
Day of the same year. He was buried in Cochin, whence in 1538 his
remains were carried to Portugal. He was succeeded by Henrique
de Menezes, who held the office of governor from 1524 to 1526, mostly
engaged in fighting on the Malabar Coast. The next governor was
Lopo Vaz de Sampaya, who was in turn succeeded by Nino da Cunha.
i Not “Sulaiman"; Castanheda calls him correctly Salmao Rex. The Arabic
historian Ibn ad-Dayba' says that Salman had been sent by Sultan Salim of
Turkey to help the Egyptians against the Portuguese. See J. R. A. S. Oct. 1921,
p. :549.


## p. 14 (#42) ##############################################

14
THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA, 1498–1598
Nino da Cunha arrived in India in November, 1529. Early in
1530 the headquarters of the government were moved from Cochin
to Goa, which from this date became, as it has ever since remained,
the capital of Portuguese India. The next eight years were mainly
occupied with the dealings of the Portuguese with Sultan Bahadur
of Gujarat, and their acquisition of Diu. The history of this period
is copiously illustrated by both the Portuguese and the Muslims; and
on the whole the various narratives were convincingly consistent. In
order the better to understand the local conditions with which the
Portuguese had to cope, it is necessary to sketch briefly the state of
affairs in Gujarat itself. In the year 1526 the emperor Babur had
made himself master of Hindustan from the Indus to the borders of
Bengal. He, however, died in 1530 before he could subdue the king-
doms of Bengal, Gujarat or the Deccan. His son and successor
Humayun endeavoured to complete his father's work, and one of his
first undertakings was an invasion of Gujarat and Malwa. The
campaign opened with the battle of Mandasor at the beginning of
1535. The troops of Bahadur were in every engagement unsuccess-
ful and in the early stages of the campaign he was deserted by his
most valuable soldier, the famous master-gunner Mustafa Rumi Khan,
who, aggrieved at the treatment he received at Bahadur's hands,
offered his services to Humayun. In October, while Humayun was
still pressing his conquest, Bahadur had made an appeal to the
Portuguese for help, and had agreed to give them a footing at Diu in
return for a contingent of 500 Portuguese. He had already, in 1534,
made considerable concessions, ceding the island of Bassein with all
its dependencies and revenues to the Portuguese. When at last, in
1537, Humayun suddenly withdrew, Bahadur, feeling that his troubles
were over, regretted his promises, and set about negotiating with Nino
da Cunha for his withdrawal from Diu. It may be mentioned inci-
dentally that the 500 men had not been forthcoming. Long discussions
took place with a view to a conference between Bahadur and Nino da
Cunha, who had come up to settle the matter, Bahadur begging the
Portuguese governor to visit him ashore, and the Portuguese insisting
that the sultan should visit the fleet and conduct negotiations on
board. Each thoroughly mistrusted the other; but eventually Baha-
dur consented to visit Nino on board, where a scuffle arose, and
Bahadur was drowned endeavouring to escape.
All Portuguese
historians say that Bahadur had intended to murder the Portuguese
governor on the occasion of his return visit. The exact circumstances
which led to the drowning of Bahadur will probably never be known.
The various narratives for the first time here come in conflict, each
side blaming the other for the disaster, which occurred on 13
February, 1537.
Early in Bahadur's disastrous campaign with Humayun, the king
of Gujarat had made plans for escaping from India with his belong
ings in the event of defeat. He had dispatched a certain Asaf Khan


## p. 15 (#43) ##############################################

SIEGE OF DIU
15
to Mecca with his harem and treasure, and with rich presents for the
sultan Sulaiman-the Ottoman sultans since 1517 had been in posses-
sion of Egypt—entreating him to come to his assistance. The envoy
had an audience with the sultan Sulaiman at Adrianople after the
death of Bahadur; and by way of avenging the death of the Muslim
king the sultan at once gave order for the equipment of a powerful
fleet in Suez to be sent to attack the Portuguese at Diu.