The latter
corresponds
to the laukika jndna prsthalabdh, Kosa, vi.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
From the beginning, the ascetic creates a single creation through numerous minds capable of creating
52a. Empowerment continues after death.
? The Knowledges 1175 fictive beings; the contrary, when his practice is purified. 308
A beginner, by means of numerous minds capable of creating fictive beings, produces a single fictive being; later, when his practice is complete, the ascetic produces at his own will, by means of a single such mind, many or few creatures.
53a. Produced through meditation, it is neutral.
The mind capable of creating fictive beings, when it is acquired through meditation (that is, when it is the result of a Dhyana, or of a supernormal knowledge), is morally neutral: the result of a supernormal knowledge is in fact one of the classes of neutral items (ii. 71b).
53b. Innate, it is threefold.
But when it is innate, it can be good, bad, or neutral: for example gods, ndgas, etc. , who have been created with a view to aiding or harming.
Also capable of being created, among the ten material (rUpiri) dyatanas, are nine dyatanas, with the exclusion of sound, namely, the eye, visible things, the ear, the organ of smell, etc. 309
[But if nine dyatanas are capable of being created, there can therefore be creation of organs (indriya): there can therefore be an apparition of a new being (sattva), for the organs are of ? ? ? ? (color and shape) which belong to living beings. ]310
The organ is not capable of being created. Yet one can say without being incorrect that "creation consists of nine dyatanas" for creation--whether it refers to the transformation of the body of the creator or to the creation of a distinct body--consists of four dyatanas, physical matter {? ? ? ? ) odors, tastes, and tangible things, and does not exist independently of the five organs.
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311
meditation (or Dhyana), and innate.
It is also of three other types:
53c-d. Rddhi is also produced through mantras, plants, and actions; in all five types.
It is produced through meditation (bhavandja), or innate (upapattildbhika), or created through mantras (mantrakrta),
nb created through the use of drugs or medicines (osadhikrta) or
514 produced through karma (karmaja).
Examples of the fifth type (produced through karma) are the rddhi of Mandhatar, etc, and the rddhi of beings in intermediate existence (iii. 14d).
***
Are divine sight and the divine hearing called "divine" in the proper sense of the word, because they are of the nature of the organs of the gods, or rather figuratively so, because they are as if they were divine?
They are "as divine" in the case of the Bodhisattvas, Cakravar-
315 tins, and Grhapatiratnas.
316 When they are divine in the proper sense of the word
Rddhi is, we have said, of two types: produced through 312
54a-b. Divme sight and divine hearing are of pure tupa of 317
the sphere of the Dhyanas.
By reason of a preparatory exercise consisting of meditation on
? light and sound--the ascetic is in the Dhyanas, and in the eyes and ears of the ascetic--eyes and ears which are in Kamadhatu--there is found to be attracted (ii. 10a, English trans, p. 166) a pure rupa, & matter derived from the primary elements of the sphere of the Dhyana in which it exists, subtle and excellent. This rupa constitutes his eyes and ears; it sees and understands; it constitutes what is called divine sight and divine hearing. Arising by reason of physical matter (rupa) of the sphere of the Dhyanas, the organs are therefore divine in the proper sense of the word.
54c-d. They are always active, non-deficient; they bear on the distant, the subtle, etc.
Divine sight and divine hearing of this category, obtained 318
through meditation, are never tatsabhdga (i. 42), but are always accompanied by visual or auditory consciousness.
They are never deficient; for they come in pairs, and are in a good state (lit. "not seized by squinting"), as are the organs of beings born in Rupadhatu.
They grasp what is obscured, subtle, distant, etc. On this point, there is a stanza, "The eye of flesh does not see rupa which is distant, obscured, or subtle; it does not see in all directions. Divine
319 sight, the contrary. "
320
When one sees the rupas by means of divine sight, are the
objects of sight near or far away?
The objects are near or far away according to the person and according to the eye. If they desire to see, but make no effort to do so, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see, respectively, a Sahasra, a Dvisahasra, or a Trisahasra universe (iii. 73). If they make an effort,
55a-b. The Arhat, the Rhinoceros and the Master see a
321 Dvisahasra, a Trisahasra, infinite universes.
The Knowledges 1177
? 1178 Chapter Seven
If a Sravaka, desiring to see by divine sight, makes a great
322
effort, he will see a Dvisahasra Madhyama Lokadhatu. Pratyekabuddha will see a Trisahasra Mahasahasra Lokadhatu. And the Buddha the Blessed One, will see the Asamkhya Loka- dhatu: he sees according as he desires.
Why is this?
As his knowledge extends to all the dharmas, so too his divine
sight extends to all the rupas.
***
Is only rddhi innate, or can other supernatural powers be innate?
323
Four powers,--divine hearing, divine sight, memory of past existences, and knowledge of the mind of another,--are also innate. But the innate powers are not called supernormal knowledges.
55c-d. Divine sight, when it is innate, does not see
324
It is not capable of seeing the color and shape of intermediate beings which are seen only by the divine sight of supernormal knowledge. For the rest, innate divine sight is similar to the divine sight of supernormal knowledge.
56a. This knowledge of the mind of another is of three types.
55c. The others are also innate.
intermediary beings.
A
? ^ _ _ The Knowledges 1179
This knowledge signifies the knowledge of the mind of another when it is innate. It can be three types: good, bad, or neutral.
56b. Also when it is produced through reflection (tarka) or through formulas (vidyd).
When it is produced through reflection or through formulas, the knowledge of the mind of another can be morally good, bad, or
b2b neutral. A person, through the study of the Iksanikasastra, is
capable of interpreting signs: his knowledge of the mind of
another is produced through reflection; so too one can know the
mind of another through mantras. But, produced by meditation or 326
Dhyana, this knowledge is only good.
A knowledge of the mind of another, and memory of past existences are innate in the beings in hell. Through these two knowledges,
327
From their birth and as long as they are not crushed by their sufferings, they know the minds of others and remember their past existences (see iv. 80d).
Beings in the other realms of rebirth where a knowledge of the mind of another and a memory of past existences are innate always know because their sufferings do not overwhelm them.
328
Among humans, the five powers, rddhi, etc. , described above, are not innate.
56c. The beings in hell know from the very beginning.
56d. Among humans, not innate.
If this is so, how do certain persons, the Bodhisattvas, naturally
? 1180 Chapter Seven
possess a remembranace of past existences?
The remembrance of past existences that they possess by nature is not innate among them, that is, acquired by the mere fact of their human birth; it results from certain actions.
How is this?
A knowledge of the memory of past existences is of three types: a result of meditation (the supernormal knowledge described above), innate (as among the gods), or realized through action (as is the case with the Bodhisattvas).
***
? 1. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with 1. the distinction between patience (ksdnti), knowledge (jfidna), and seeing (drf) (Kurika 1); 2. the characteristics of the ten knowledges (2-9); 3. the aspects of the ten knowledges (10-13b); 4. different questions, prainanirdeia (13c-27); and the second deals with the qualities (guna) which consist of knowledge (jtidnamaya (28-55). (This is according to the gloss of the Japanese editor, Kyokuga Saeki. )
Among Vasubandhu's sources, the Prakaranapdda, xiii. 10, fol. 14: definition of the ten jUdnas; dariana which is notjfidna; object of thejndnas (I4bll); reciprocal inclusion (15a3); why? (15a8); which jndna is sdsrava, andsrava, sdsravapratyaya, samskrta, etc. Pali sources, Samyutta, ii. 57, Digha iii. 226-227. Papisambhiddmagga, Vibhanga, 306-344, especially 328.
2. On jndnadarsana, see vii. 27c. Prajnd (that is to say the caitta described in ii. 24 which accompanies all minds) is either pure (andsrava) or impure (sdsrava).
i. Pure, prajfid is "knowledge" (jndna) or "patience" (ksdnti).
a. "Knowledge" signifies a consciousness of certitude, free from doubt (niicita; jnanam niicitarupena utpadyate).
Knowledge can be "pure contemplation" (paratyaveksanamdtra; below note 6); such as kssyajndna and anutpadajndna (vi. 67a-b).
It can be accompanied by samttrana, by parimdrgandiaya; in other words, it can be an upanidbydnapurvaka manasikdra (i. 4lc- d): in this case it is dariana a "view" or seeing. This knowledge includes the desire to instruct itself; it is preceded by reflection; let us say then that it is "consideration" or examination. Nevertherless the Western equivalents are insufficient, for they do not refer to a "discursive" consciousness, but to a consciousness which can last only one moment, which is produced in the states of absorption free from vitarka and vicdra.
b. Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (niicaya), but as "consent" (ksamanarUpena). Perhaps we can render this nuance by saying that the ascetic, in the state of patience, thinks, "The dharmas are doubtless transitory . . . ," and, in the state of knowledge,"Thedharmasaretransitory. . . "Thepurepatiencesarethus iaiksisamyagdfsti (i. 4a). They are produced in fact in the course of the Path of Seeing and as a consequence they belong to the Saiksa. And they are dariana.
ii. Impure, prajnd is associated either with the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, etc. ), or with the mental consciousness (manovijnana).
In the first case, it is knowledge (jn~ana)\ it is never "seeing. "
In the second case, it is knowledge (samvrtijn~dna, vii. 2b); and it is "seeing": a. when it is bound to bad opinions (satkdyadrspi, etc. , i. 41a), b. when it is good (kuiala), that is to say associated with right views (samyagdrspi). However it happens that it is, improperly, termed "patience": the third nirvedhabhdgiya (vi. l8c) is in fact a "knowledge", even though it is termed "patience. "
3. Prakarana (xxiii. 10,10b3) quoted in the Vydkhyd ad vii. 7'.
4. samtirandtmakatvdt - upanidhydnasvabhdvatvdt (Koia i. 4l; below note 6 and viii. l). The impure ksdntis (for example vi. l8c) ? ? ? /? ? ? *, or more precisely samvrtijndna (vii.
note 40). Vydkhyd: amaldeva ksantay? ? ? jnanam ity avadbaranat sdsravdh ksdntayo jfianam ity uktarh bhavati.
5. See vii. 4b. Dhi = prajnd, dri - drspi = dariana. The prajnd or consciousness which consists of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (ksayajn"dna)f of the knowledge of no new arising of the defilements (anutpddajn~dna), is not drsti, or dariana.
6. As long as the ascetic has not done what he should do (krtakrtya), he reflects
Footnotes 1181
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(dhydyati), he inquires {parimdrgayati) into the subject of the Truths. When he has done that which he should have done, he only contemplates (pratyaveksanamdtra) the Suffering which is known, etc. , and he no longer inquires. [Compare Samantapdsddikd, 168, Milinda 338 (note trans, ii. p. 240)y paccavekkhanandna].
I. Hsuan-tsang here enumerates the ten jndnas: samvrti, dharma, anvaya, duhkha, samudaya, nirodha, mdrga, paracitta, ksaya, and anutpddajndna; an enumeration which, in the original, is given later on page 12. This is not the order of the Sdstra, below note 32.
8. See vii. 3a, 7a, 8, 10b, 12a-b, 18c, 20c-21. Vydkhyd: samvrtau bhavarh sdmvrtam, and below: svabhdvatah samvrtk jndnam samvrtau va jndnam samvrtijndnam.
See below vii. 21.
The Madhyamikas distinguish between lokasamvrtijndna and? ogisamvrtijndna (see for example Bodhicarydvatdra ix. 2).
The latter corresponds to the laukika jndna prsthalabdh, Kosa, vi. trans, p. 141-2; and vii. l2a-b (prsthaja), 20c.
9. Samvrtisadvastu, vi. 4; Sutrdlamkdra, i. 12, Kathdvatthu, v. 6.
10. Pure jndna is the consciousness of the general characteristics of the dharmas; it is called dharmajndna when it bears on the dharmas of Kamadhatu, anvayajndna when it bears on the dharmas of the two higher Dhatus, vi. 26.
II. The Andhakas {Kathdvatthu, v. 6) say: sammutindnam pi saccdrammanam eva: Conventional knowledge has for its object only the Truths (according to Aung and Rhys-Davids).
12. See vi. 44d, 50a, vii. l, 7, 12a-b.
13. Paramartha: "when they are not by nature asaiksi samyagdrsti. " We have seen (vi. 50d) that all the Arhats possess "correct view proper to the Asaiksas"; this samyagdrsti is by its nature darfana; it consists of dharmajndna and anvayajndna.
14. Ksayajndna and anutpddajndna necessarily have Bhavagra from whence the Arhat is about to deliver himself for their object. When a person dies from a poisoned wound, the poison, after having spread over all the body, concentrates itself, at the moment of death, in the wound; in this same way the ascetic's jndna concentrates itself on the object to be abandoned, namely the skandhas of Bhavagra; it bears on Suffering (yena pidyate) and its Arising.
15. Vydkhyd: duhkhdkdrair anityddibhih/ samudaydkdrair vd hetvddibhih . . . Paramartha: "under six aspects of duhkha and samudaya (Gloss of the Japanese editor: anitya, duhkha, hetu samudaya, prabhava, pratyaya: two aspects of suffering, four aspects of its arising. See below vii. l2a-b, which justifies the correction of Hsuan-tsang).
16. The consciousness of another's mind, in principle, is conventional knowledge, samvrtijndna. But when another's mind is a pure mind, that is to say a mind forming part of the pure path (darfanamdrga or bhdvandmdrga), the consciousness which I have of this mind should be pure; it embraces mdrgajndna, pure knowledge relative to the Path; the following mdrgajndna which is relative to Kamadhatu or to the higher spheres is either a dharmajndna or an anvayajndna. Therefore the knowledge of the mind of another (paracittavid) contains fourjndnas.
17. See vii. lla-d and the Balas, Abhijnas, etc.
18. The text has: Paracittajndna by the lower does not know the higher: it does not know, by the Anagamin path, the path of the Arhat. . .
19. He begins the preparatory cultivations from the time that he sees that the ascetic is about to enter into darianamdrga; this cultivation is accomplished when he sees the mind of another occupied in the duhkha of Kamadhatu, in duhkha as part of dharmajfidna.
? 20. On the paracittajndna of the Pratyekabuddhas, see Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 515al8, p. 515c7, and elsewhere. Four opinions according to Sarhghabhadra, namely the two opinions mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also: "The Fratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 8, 14", "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 11 and 12. " The third opinion is the correct one: for if he knows moment 8, it is because his preparatory cultivation with its consciousness as part of anvayajndna lasts only 5 moments; thus during moments 9-13 he could prepare himself for the consciousness of moment 14.
21. Nettippakarana, 15: khind me jdtiti idam khaye ndnam naparam itthattdyd ti pajdndti idam anuppdde ndnam.
22. Paramartha, "According to the Abhidharma. " This is the text of the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a8 (Hsiian-tsang's translation); see also Jfidnaprastbana, TD 26, p. 1021c.
23. Omitted by Paramartha; given by the Prakarana and Hsiian-tsang.
24. The Vydkhyd explains tad upadaya as tat puraskrtya. See p. 1108.
Hsiian-tsang translates tad updddya asyu-tz'u ? ? |? ? > by reason of this" (Gloss of the
editor: "the jndna which grasps these aspects: Suffering is known . . . "); Paramartha has i-tz'u- i tJljktit "taking this meaning into consideration"; the Prakarana has
yu-tz'u-erh-ch'i ? ? ? ? ? ?
25. We have, Nettippakarana, 54: cakkhu, vijjd, buddhi, bhuri, medhd, dloka. Compare Kosa,
vi. 54d.
26. In fact pure jndna bears on duhkha, on the dharmas and their general characteristics, and not on a "self" knowing the duhkha, a self which implies the formula duhkham me parijn~dtam. All knowledge which envisions a "self" is saihvrtijndna, conventional, impure knowledge.
27. The specific (vis'esa) characteristic of the two pure jndnas, which are nirvikalpa, is known by inference {anumiyate) by reason of the two samvrtijndnas which are their outflowing (nisyanda). Below vii. l2a-b.
28. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: pafcdtyasramanasautrdntikadayah. According to these masters, there are some pure aspects outside of the sixteen recognized by the Vaibhasikas (see below vii. l2c).
29. See ii. trans, p. 263, iv. trans, p. 701.
30. The Sdstra is quoted in the Vydkhyd: ? at tdvaj jndnam darsanam api tat/ sydt tu darsanam najndnam astdv abhisamaydntikdh ksdntayah. According to the note of the Japanese, the Jndnaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957c2, and the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 694c5.
31. Paramartha adds: "Furthermore, in order to indicate that the darsanas here differ from the drstis discussed above. "
32. Same order in the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 693c22. The order differs in Hsiian-tsang (above note 7) and Mahdvyutpatti, 57.
33. This question is absent in Paramartha and in the original. The original has tatra . . . = "Among these jndnas, saihvrtijndna constitutes . . . "
34. Vydkhyd: samvrtijndnam samvrtijndnam eva svabhavdsamgrahatah/ ekasya ca paracittajndnasya bhdga ekadesah/.
35. The part which presents the aspect "Duhkha is known by me . . . "
36. The Vydkhyd does not give the Sdstra's definition. Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 694a3: lokasamvrtijndnam katamat/ sdsravd prajnd.
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37. Definition of the Sdstra, quoted in the Vydkhyd and which corresponds to Prakarana, TD 26. p. 693c23:
dharmajridnam katamat/ kdmapratisamyuktesu samskdresu ? ad andsravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuktdndm sarhskdrdndm hetau yad andstravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuk- tdndm sarhskdrdndm nirodhe yad andsravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuktdndm sarhskd- rdndm prahdndya marge yad andsravam jfidnam idam ucyate dharmajfldnam/ api khalu dharmajndne dharmajndnabhumau ca yad andsravam jfidnam idam ucyate dharmajridnam. anvayajfidnam katamat/ rupdrupyapratisamyuktesu samskdresu yad andsravam jfidnam . . . See vi. 26, anvetity anvayajfidna.
38. Correct sdsravahetuka vi, note 11, line 11.
39. Vydkhyd:nirodhamdrgau hy adhdtupatitau/ tdv adhardv api na hinau vyavasthdpyete/ duhkhasamudayasatye tv adharabhumike nihlne/ na taddlambanam dharmajridnam rupdrupyadhdtupratipaksa ity avagantavyam. Nirodha and mdrga do not form part of the Dhdtus. To consider nirodha with respect to Kamadhatu (nirodhe dharmajndna) is to also combat the klesas of the higher spheres.
In the state of darsanamdrga, it is the anvayadharmaksdntis which expell the anusayas of the higher spheres.
40. Vydkhyd: sodasdkdram usmagatddisu/ svasdmdnyalaksanddigrahandd iti svalaksanagra- handt sdmdnyalaksanagrahandc ca/ ddisabdena bhumksva tistha gacchety evamdkdram ca/ na hy ete svalaksandkdrdh ? ? tarhy evamdkdrd eva.
In the usmagatas, etc. (vi. l7c), samvrtijndna grasps the sixteen aspects of the Truths. Samvrtijndna grasps their general characteristics (for example, impermanence), their unique characteristics (for example, the specific characteristic of rupa); and it also grasps the aspect which is expressed by the words "Eat! Go! . . . ": such a samvrtijndna does not have for its aspect a unique characteristic, and one can only say that it is evamdkdra, "of such an aspect. "
41. According to Paramartha: svasvasatydkdratai catustayam.
42. Paramartha: paramanojndnam api tathdmalam. Cetopariydye nana or paricce nana (-paracittajndna) is not sammatinana (Vibhanga, 330). The Andhakas think that it bears solely on the mind, Kathdvatthu, v. 7, and wrongly maintain that a Sravaka can, through this fidna, know when others attain a result, v. 10.
43. See note 42.
44. See note 42.
45. The Vydkhyd quotes the Sutra: sardgam cittam sardgam cittam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti/ vigatardgam cittam vigatardgam cittam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti/ yathd sardgam vigatardgam evarh sadvesarh vigatadvesarh samoham vigatamoham samksiptam viksiptarh linam pragrhitam uddhatam anuddhatam avy up as ant am,vy up as ant am asamdhitam samdhitam abhdvitarh bhdvitam avimuktarh vimuktam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti.
According to the glosses of the Bhdsya, one should add the two pairs amahadgata and mahadgata, sa-uttara and anuttara before avyupasdnta: in all twelve pairs. However these two pairs are missing in the Sutra quoted in the Vijndnakdya (TD 26, p. 534al-a5) and in the edition of the Sutra quoted by the Vydkhyd below vii. 42a-d.
According to Saeki, the list of the Ekottara (TD 2, p. 776b20) includes some eleven parts, that of the Madhyama (TD 1, p. 553bl9) has ten, by omitting uddhata-anuddhata and avyupasdnta-vyupasanta, and by adding sadosa-adosa\ that of the Samyukta (TD 2, p. 150a6) has ten pairs.
Pali sources, for example Samyutta, v. 265, Anguttata, iv. 32, Vibhaiiga, 329, Visuddhimagga, 410 (whose explanation diverge from those of the Abhidharma). We have
? Footnotes 1185 only eight pairs: sardga-vitardga, sadosa-vitadosa, samoha-vitamoha, sankhitta-vikkhitta,
mahaggata-amahaggata, sauttara-anuttara, asamdhita-samdhita, and avimutta-vimutta. 46. Vydkhyd: yathd ? add vastram iti paricchinndkdram vijndnam utpadyate na tadd malam
grhndti and vice versa. See i, trans, p. 67.
47. That is to say "associated with rdga, rdgasamprayukta. All this paragraph is according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950a24, quoted by Saeki, xxvi. 8a.
48. These two explanations will be commented upon and refuted above page 1105 and
following.
49.
52a. Empowerment continues after death.
? The Knowledges 1175 fictive beings; the contrary, when his practice is purified. 308
A beginner, by means of numerous minds capable of creating fictive beings, produces a single fictive being; later, when his practice is complete, the ascetic produces at his own will, by means of a single such mind, many or few creatures.
53a. Produced through meditation, it is neutral.
The mind capable of creating fictive beings, when it is acquired through meditation (that is, when it is the result of a Dhyana, or of a supernormal knowledge), is morally neutral: the result of a supernormal knowledge is in fact one of the classes of neutral items (ii. 71b).
53b. Innate, it is threefold.
But when it is innate, it can be good, bad, or neutral: for example gods, ndgas, etc. , who have been created with a view to aiding or harming.
Also capable of being created, among the ten material (rUpiri) dyatanas, are nine dyatanas, with the exclusion of sound, namely, the eye, visible things, the ear, the organ of smell, etc. 309
[But if nine dyatanas are capable of being created, there can therefore be creation of organs (indriya): there can therefore be an apparition of a new being (sattva), for the organs are of ? ? ? ? (color and shape) which belong to living beings. ]310
The organ is not capable of being created. Yet one can say without being incorrect that "creation consists of nine dyatanas" for creation--whether it refers to the transformation of the body of the creator or to the creation of a distinct body--consists of four dyatanas, physical matter {? ? ? ? ) odors, tastes, and tangible things, and does not exist independently of the five organs.
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311
meditation (or Dhyana), and innate.
It is also of three other types:
53c-d. Rddhi is also produced through mantras, plants, and actions; in all five types.
It is produced through meditation (bhavandja), or innate (upapattildbhika), or created through mantras (mantrakrta),
nb created through the use of drugs or medicines (osadhikrta) or
514 produced through karma (karmaja).
Examples of the fifth type (produced through karma) are the rddhi of Mandhatar, etc, and the rddhi of beings in intermediate existence (iii. 14d).
***
Are divine sight and the divine hearing called "divine" in the proper sense of the word, because they are of the nature of the organs of the gods, or rather figuratively so, because they are as if they were divine?
They are "as divine" in the case of the Bodhisattvas, Cakravar-
315 tins, and Grhapatiratnas.
316 When they are divine in the proper sense of the word
Rddhi is, we have said, of two types: produced through 312
54a-b. Divme sight and divine hearing are of pure tupa of 317
the sphere of the Dhyanas.
By reason of a preparatory exercise consisting of meditation on
? light and sound--the ascetic is in the Dhyanas, and in the eyes and ears of the ascetic--eyes and ears which are in Kamadhatu--there is found to be attracted (ii. 10a, English trans, p. 166) a pure rupa, & matter derived from the primary elements of the sphere of the Dhyana in which it exists, subtle and excellent. This rupa constitutes his eyes and ears; it sees and understands; it constitutes what is called divine sight and divine hearing. Arising by reason of physical matter (rupa) of the sphere of the Dhyanas, the organs are therefore divine in the proper sense of the word.
54c-d. They are always active, non-deficient; they bear on the distant, the subtle, etc.
Divine sight and divine hearing of this category, obtained 318
through meditation, are never tatsabhdga (i. 42), but are always accompanied by visual or auditory consciousness.
They are never deficient; for they come in pairs, and are in a good state (lit. "not seized by squinting"), as are the organs of beings born in Rupadhatu.
They grasp what is obscured, subtle, distant, etc. On this point, there is a stanza, "The eye of flesh does not see rupa which is distant, obscured, or subtle; it does not see in all directions. Divine
319 sight, the contrary. "
320
When one sees the rupas by means of divine sight, are the
objects of sight near or far away?
The objects are near or far away according to the person and according to the eye. If they desire to see, but make no effort to do so, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas see, respectively, a Sahasra, a Dvisahasra, or a Trisahasra universe (iii. 73). If they make an effort,
55a-b. The Arhat, the Rhinoceros and the Master see a
321 Dvisahasra, a Trisahasra, infinite universes.
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If a Sravaka, desiring to see by divine sight, makes a great
322
effort, he will see a Dvisahasra Madhyama Lokadhatu. Pratyekabuddha will see a Trisahasra Mahasahasra Lokadhatu. And the Buddha the Blessed One, will see the Asamkhya Loka- dhatu: he sees according as he desires.
Why is this?
As his knowledge extends to all the dharmas, so too his divine
sight extends to all the rupas.
***
Is only rddhi innate, or can other supernatural powers be innate?
323
Four powers,--divine hearing, divine sight, memory of past existences, and knowledge of the mind of another,--are also innate. But the innate powers are not called supernormal knowledges.
55c-d. Divine sight, when it is innate, does not see
324
It is not capable of seeing the color and shape of intermediate beings which are seen only by the divine sight of supernormal knowledge. For the rest, innate divine sight is similar to the divine sight of supernormal knowledge.
56a. This knowledge of the mind of another is of three types.
55c. The others are also innate.
intermediary beings.
A
? ^ _ _ The Knowledges 1179
This knowledge signifies the knowledge of the mind of another when it is innate. It can be three types: good, bad, or neutral.
56b. Also when it is produced through reflection (tarka) or through formulas (vidyd).
When it is produced through reflection or through formulas, the knowledge of the mind of another can be morally good, bad, or
b2b neutral. A person, through the study of the Iksanikasastra, is
capable of interpreting signs: his knowledge of the mind of
another is produced through reflection; so too one can know the
mind of another through mantras. But, produced by meditation or 326
Dhyana, this knowledge is only good.
A knowledge of the mind of another, and memory of past existences are innate in the beings in hell. Through these two knowledges,
327
From their birth and as long as they are not crushed by their sufferings, they know the minds of others and remember their past existences (see iv. 80d).
Beings in the other realms of rebirth where a knowledge of the mind of another and a memory of past existences are innate always know because their sufferings do not overwhelm them.
328
Among humans, the five powers, rddhi, etc. , described above, are not innate.
56c. The beings in hell know from the very beginning.
56d. Among humans, not innate.
If this is so, how do certain persons, the Bodhisattvas, naturally
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possess a remembranace of past existences?
The remembrance of past existences that they possess by nature is not innate among them, that is, acquired by the mere fact of their human birth; it results from certain actions.
How is this?
A knowledge of the memory of past existences is of three types: a result of meditation (the supernormal knowledge described above), innate (as among the gods), or realized through action (as is the case with the Bodhisattvas).
***
? 1. This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first deals with 1. the distinction between patience (ksdnti), knowledge (jfidna), and seeing (drf) (Kurika 1); 2. the characteristics of the ten knowledges (2-9); 3. the aspects of the ten knowledges (10-13b); 4. different questions, prainanirdeia (13c-27); and the second deals with the qualities (guna) which consist of knowledge (jtidnamaya (28-55). (This is according to the gloss of the Japanese editor, Kyokuga Saeki. )
Among Vasubandhu's sources, the Prakaranapdda, xiii. 10, fol. 14: definition of the ten jUdnas; dariana which is notjfidna; object of thejndnas (I4bll); reciprocal inclusion (15a3); why? (15a8); which jndna is sdsrava, andsrava, sdsravapratyaya, samskrta, etc. Pali sources, Samyutta, ii. 57, Digha iii. 226-227. Papisambhiddmagga, Vibhanga, 306-344, especially 328.
2. On jndnadarsana, see vii. 27c. Prajnd (that is to say the caitta described in ii. 24 which accompanies all minds) is either pure (andsrava) or impure (sdsrava).
i. Pure, prajfid is "knowledge" (jndna) or "patience" (ksdnti).
a. "Knowledge" signifies a consciousness of certitude, free from doubt (niicita; jnanam niicitarupena utpadyate).
Knowledge can be "pure contemplation" (paratyaveksanamdtra; below note 6); such as kssyajndna and anutpadajndna (vi. 67a-b).
It can be accompanied by samttrana, by parimdrgandiaya; in other words, it can be an upanidbydnapurvaka manasikdra (i. 4lc- d): in this case it is dariana a "view" or seeing. This knowledge includes the desire to instruct itself; it is preceded by reflection; let us say then that it is "consideration" or examination. Nevertherless the Western equivalents are insufficient, for they do not refer to a "discursive" consciousness, but to a consciousness which can last only one moment, which is produced in the states of absorption free from vitarka and vicdra.
b. Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (niicaya), but as "consent" (ksamanarUpena). Perhaps we can render this nuance by saying that the ascetic, in the state of patience, thinks, "The dharmas are doubtless transitory . . . ," and, in the state of knowledge,"Thedharmasaretransitory. . . "Thepurepatiencesarethus iaiksisamyagdfsti (i. 4a). They are produced in fact in the course of the Path of Seeing and as a consequence they belong to the Saiksa. And they are dariana.
ii. Impure, prajnd is associated either with the five sense consciousnesses (eye consciousness, etc. ), or with the mental consciousness (manovijnana).
In the first case, it is knowledge (jn~ana)\ it is never "seeing. "
In the second case, it is knowledge (samvrtijn~dna, vii. 2b); and it is "seeing": a. when it is bound to bad opinions (satkdyadrspi, etc. , i. 41a), b. when it is good (kuiala), that is to say associated with right views (samyagdrspi). However it happens that it is, improperly, termed "patience": the third nirvedhabhdgiya (vi. l8c) is in fact a "knowledge", even though it is termed "patience. "
3. Prakarana (xxiii. 10,10b3) quoted in the Vydkhyd ad vii. 7'.
4. samtirandtmakatvdt - upanidhydnasvabhdvatvdt (Koia i. 4l; below note 6 and viii. l). The impure ksdntis (for example vi. l8c) ? ? ? /? ? ? *, or more precisely samvrtijndna (vii.
note 40). Vydkhyd: amaldeva ksantay? ? ? jnanam ity avadbaranat sdsravdh ksdntayo jfianam ity uktarh bhavati.
5. See vii. 4b. Dhi = prajnd, dri - drspi = dariana. The prajnd or consciousness which consists of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (ksayajn"dna)f of the knowledge of no new arising of the defilements (anutpddajn~dna), is not drsti, or dariana.
6. As long as the ascetic has not done what he should do (krtakrtya), he reflects
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(dhydyati), he inquires {parimdrgayati) into the subject of the Truths. When he has done that which he should have done, he only contemplates (pratyaveksanamdtra) the Suffering which is known, etc. , and he no longer inquires. [Compare Samantapdsddikd, 168, Milinda 338 (note trans, ii. p. 240)y paccavekkhanandna].
I. Hsuan-tsang here enumerates the ten jndnas: samvrti, dharma, anvaya, duhkha, samudaya, nirodha, mdrga, paracitta, ksaya, and anutpddajndna; an enumeration which, in the original, is given later on page 12. This is not the order of the Sdstra, below note 32.
8. See vii. 3a, 7a, 8, 10b, 12a-b, 18c, 20c-21. Vydkhyd: samvrtau bhavarh sdmvrtam, and below: svabhdvatah samvrtk jndnam samvrtau va jndnam samvrtijndnam.
See below vii. 21.
The Madhyamikas distinguish between lokasamvrtijndna and? ogisamvrtijndna (see for example Bodhicarydvatdra ix. 2).
The latter corresponds to the laukika jndna prsthalabdh, Kosa, vi. trans, p. 141-2; and vii. l2a-b (prsthaja), 20c.
9. Samvrtisadvastu, vi. 4; Sutrdlamkdra, i. 12, Kathdvatthu, v. 6.
10. Pure jndna is the consciousness of the general characteristics of the dharmas; it is called dharmajndna when it bears on the dharmas of Kamadhatu, anvayajndna when it bears on the dharmas of the two higher Dhatus, vi. 26.
II. The Andhakas {Kathdvatthu, v. 6) say: sammutindnam pi saccdrammanam eva: Conventional knowledge has for its object only the Truths (according to Aung and Rhys-Davids).
12. See vi. 44d, 50a, vii. l, 7, 12a-b.
13. Paramartha: "when they are not by nature asaiksi samyagdrsti. " We have seen (vi. 50d) that all the Arhats possess "correct view proper to the Asaiksas"; this samyagdrsti is by its nature darfana; it consists of dharmajndna and anvayajndna.
14. Ksayajndna and anutpddajndna necessarily have Bhavagra from whence the Arhat is about to deliver himself for their object. When a person dies from a poisoned wound, the poison, after having spread over all the body, concentrates itself, at the moment of death, in the wound; in this same way the ascetic's jndna concentrates itself on the object to be abandoned, namely the skandhas of Bhavagra; it bears on Suffering (yena pidyate) and its Arising.
15. Vydkhyd: duhkhdkdrair anityddibhih/ samudaydkdrair vd hetvddibhih . . . Paramartha: "under six aspects of duhkha and samudaya (Gloss of the Japanese editor: anitya, duhkha, hetu samudaya, prabhava, pratyaya: two aspects of suffering, four aspects of its arising. See below vii. l2a-b, which justifies the correction of Hsuan-tsang).
16. The consciousness of another's mind, in principle, is conventional knowledge, samvrtijndna. But when another's mind is a pure mind, that is to say a mind forming part of the pure path (darfanamdrga or bhdvandmdrga), the consciousness which I have of this mind should be pure; it embraces mdrgajndna, pure knowledge relative to the Path; the following mdrgajndna which is relative to Kamadhatu or to the higher spheres is either a dharmajndna or an anvayajndna. Therefore the knowledge of the mind of another (paracittavid) contains fourjndnas.
17. See vii. lla-d and the Balas, Abhijnas, etc.
18. The text has: Paracittajndna by the lower does not know the higher: it does not know, by the Anagamin path, the path of the Arhat. . .
19. He begins the preparatory cultivations from the time that he sees that the ascetic is about to enter into darianamdrga; this cultivation is accomplished when he sees the mind of another occupied in the duhkha of Kamadhatu, in duhkha as part of dharmajfidna.
? 20. On the paracittajndna of the Pratyekabuddhas, see Vibhdsd TD 27, p. 515al8, p. 515c7, and elsewhere. Four opinions according to Sarhghabhadra, namely the two opinions mentioned by Vasubandhu, and also: "The Fratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 8, 14", "The Pratyekabuddha knows moments 1, 2, 11 and 12. " The third opinion is the correct one: for if he knows moment 8, it is because his preparatory cultivation with its consciousness as part of anvayajndna lasts only 5 moments; thus during moments 9-13 he could prepare himself for the consciousness of moment 14.
21. Nettippakarana, 15: khind me jdtiti idam khaye ndnam naparam itthattdyd ti pajdndti idam anuppdde ndnam.
22. Paramartha, "According to the Abhidharma. " This is the text of the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a8 (Hsiian-tsang's translation); see also Jfidnaprastbana, TD 26, p. 1021c.
23. Omitted by Paramartha; given by the Prakarana and Hsiian-tsang.
24. The Vydkhyd explains tad upadaya as tat puraskrtya. See p. 1108.
Hsiian-tsang translates tad updddya asyu-tz'u ? ? |? ? > by reason of this" (Gloss of the
editor: "the jndna which grasps these aspects: Suffering is known . . . "); Paramartha has i-tz'u- i tJljktit "taking this meaning into consideration"; the Prakarana has
yu-tz'u-erh-ch'i ? ? ? ? ? ?
25. We have, Nettippakarana, 54: cakkhu, vijjd, buddhi, bhuri, medhd, dloka. Compare Kosa,
vi. 54d.
26. In fact pure jndna bears on duhkha, on the dharmas and their general characteristics, and not on a "self" knowing the duhkha, a self which implies the formula duhkham me parijn~dtam. All knowledge which envisions a "self" is saihvrtijndna, conventional, impure knowledge.
27. The specific (vis'esa) characteristic of the two pure jndnas, which are nirvikalpa, is known by inference {anumiyate) by reason of the two samvrtijndnas which are their outflowing (nisyanda). Below vii. l2a-b.
28. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor: pafcdtyasramanasautrdntikadayah. According to these masters, there are some pure aspects outside of the sixteen recognized by the Vaibhasikas (see below vii. l2c).
29. See ii. trans, p. 263, iv. trans, p. 701.
30. The Sdstra is quoted in the Vydkhyd: ? at tdvaj jndnam darsanam api tat/ sydt tu darsanam najndnam astdv abhisamaydntikdh ksdntayah. According to the note of the Japanese, the Jndnaprasthana, TD 26, p. 957c2, and the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 694c5.
31. Paramartha adds: "Furthermore, in order to indicate that the darsanas here differ from the drstis discussed above. "
32. Same order in the Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 693c22. The order differs in Hsiian-tsang (above note 7) and Mahdvyutpatti, 57.
33. This question is absent in Paramartha and in the original. The original has tatra . . . = "Among these jndnas, saihvrtijndna constitutes . . . "
34. Vydkhyd: samvrtijndnam samvrtijndnam eva svabhavdsamgrahatah/ ekasya ca paracittajndnasya bhdga ekadesah/.
35. The part which presents the aspect "Duhkha is known by me . . . "
36. The Vydkhyd does not give the Sdstra's definition. Prakaranapada, TD 26, p. 694a3: lokasamvrtijndnam katamat/ sdsravd prajnd.
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37. Definition of the Sdstra, quoted in the Vydkhyd and which corresponds to Prakarana, TD 26. p. 693c23:
dharmajridnam katamat/ kdmapratisamyuktesu samskdresu ? ad andsravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuktdndm sarhskdrdndm hetau yad andstravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuk- tdndm sarhskdrdndm nirodhe yad andsravam jfidnam/ kdmapratisarhyuktdndm sarhskd- rdndm prahdndya marge yad andsravam jfidnam idam ucyate dharmajfldnam/ api khalu dharmajndne dharmajndnabhumau ca yad andsravam jfidnam idam ucyate dharmajridnam. anvayajfidnam katamat/ rupdrupyapratisamyuktesu samskdresu yad andsravam jfidnam . . . See vi. 26, anvetity anvayajfidna.
38. Correct sdsravahetuka vi, note 11, line 11.
39. Vydkhyd:nirodhamdrgau hy adhdtupatitau/ tdv adhardv api na hinau vyavasthdpyete/ duhkhasamudayasatye tv adharabhumike nihlne/ na taddlambanam dharmajridnam rupdrupyadhdtupratipaksa ity avagantavyam. Nirodha and mdrga do not form part of the Dhdtus. To consider nirodha with respect to Kamadhatu (nirodhe dharmajndna) is to also combat the klesas of the higher spheres.
In the state of darsanamdrga, it is the anvayadharmaksdntis which expell the anusayas of the higher spheres.
40. Vydkhyd: sodasdkdram usmagatddisu/ svasdmdnyalaksanddigrahandd iti svalaksanagra- handt sdmdnyalaksanagrahandc ca/ ddisabdena bhumksva tistha gacchety evamdkdram ca/ na hy ete svalaksandkdrdh ? ? tarhy evamdkdrd eva.
In the usmagatas, etc. (vi. l7c), samvrtijndna grasps the sixteen aspects of the Truths. Samvrtijndna grasps their general characteristics (for example, impermanence), their unique characteristics (for example, the specific characteristic of rupa); and it also grasps the aspect which is expressed by the words "Eat! Go! . . . ": such a samvrtijndna does not have for its aspect a unique characteristic, and one can only say that it is evamdkdra, "of such an aspect. "
41. According to Paramartha: svasvasatydkdratai catustayam.
42. Paramartha: paramanojndnam api tathdmalam. Cetopariydye nana or paricce nana (-paracittajndna) is not sammatinana (Vibhanga, 330). The Andhakas think that it bears solely on the mind, Kathdvatthu, v. 7, and wrongly maintain that a Sravaka can, through this fidna, know when others attain a result, v. 10.
43. See note 42.
44. See note 42.
45. The Vydkhyd quotes the Sutra: sardgam cittam sardgam cittam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti/ vigatardgam cittam vigatardgam cittam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti/ yathd sardgam vigatardgam evarh sadvesarh vigatadvesarh samoham vigatamoham samksiptam viksiptarh linam pragrhitam uddhatam anuddhatam avy up as ant am,vy up as ant am asamdhitam samdhitam abhdvitarh bhdvitam avimuktarh vimuktam itiyathdbhutam prajdndti.
According to the glosses of the Bhdsya, one should add the two pairs amahadgata and mahadgata, sa-uttara and anuttara before avyupasdnta: in all twelve pairs. However these two pairs are missing in the Sutra quoted in the Vijndnakdya (TD 26, p. 534al-a5) and in the edition of the Sutra quoted by the Vydkhyd below vii. 42a-d.
According to Saeki, the list of the Ekottara (TD 2, p. 776b20) includes some eleven parts, that of the Madhyama (TD 1, p. 553bl9) has ten, by omitting uddhata-anuddhata and avyupasdnta-vyupasanta, and by adding sadosa-adosa\ that of the Samyukta (TD 2, p. 150a6) has ten pairs.
Pali sources, for example Samyutta, v. 265, Anguttata, iv. 32, Vibhaiiga, 329, Visuddhimagga, 410 (whose explanation diverge from those of the Abhidharma). We have
? Footnotes 1185 only eight pairs: sardga-vitardga, sadosa-vitadosa, samoha-vitamoha, sankhitta-vikkhitta,
mahaggata-amahaggata, sauttara-anuttara, asamdhita-samdhita, and avimutta-vimutta. 46. Vydkhyd: yathd ? add vastram iti paricchinndkdram vijndnam utpadyate na tadd malam
grhndti and vice versa. See i, trans, p. 67.
47. That is to say "associated with rdga, rdgasamprayukta. All this paragraph is according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 950a24, quoted by Saeki, xxvi. 8a.
48. These two explanations will be commented upon and refuted above page 1105 and
following.
49.
