But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him.
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him.
Summa Theologica
Dei xxi, 6), the
"demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a
spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
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Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause
of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to
the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not
follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any
corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly
body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since
the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows
that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should
not be fulfilled. " Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies
take place of necessity.
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
[941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things
happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi,
Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not
to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has
not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that
a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as
to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this
cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it
is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing
cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some
terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to
the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on
the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some
heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this
matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is
accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result
of necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that
take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite.
Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to
local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its
effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of
another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause;
nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not
reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
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ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang. ): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real. "
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order. "
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher
cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by
their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in
regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who
had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115],
A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since
it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be
directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to
all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115],
A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being,
nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing.
Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can
therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a
grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts
after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this
world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of
a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure. " And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by
luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by
the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can
change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the
ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be
ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided
the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application
to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning
thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold
his tongue. " For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate:
wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck
or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate. " But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in
God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate,
as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God,
and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22],
A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of
the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as
being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by
certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by
the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some
of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged. " Of each of these
things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110],
A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is
in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production
of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the
nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i. e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as
the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this
order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus
fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to
the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet
wrote: "Thy fate draws thee. "
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Whether fate is unchangeable?
Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence. "
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved. " But fate is a "disposition inherent to
changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is
changeable.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can
be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes,
which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first
principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have
held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself
necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this
reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must
follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ([954]Q[115],
A[6]).
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate
could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason
that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes,
is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a
certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity.
In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If
God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen. " Wherefore
Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly
afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
Providence must also itself be unchangeable. "
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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Whether all things are subject to fate?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the
stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a
reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the
world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and
seed. " Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 1 seqq. ). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things. " But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
([955]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate. "
I answer that, As stated above [956](A[2]), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done
immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither
is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of
spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state
of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate. " Hence it is
clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is
involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up
with second causes.
Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done
by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and
power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that
whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to
fate, as already stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way
changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created
causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly
in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can teach another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
Lord says (Mat. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of
Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God. " Therefore to
be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master
to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch
as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
active quality just as heat is.
Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and
the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.
Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
words or gestures.
But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If
of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already
in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the
master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn
nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man
who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no
way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in
faith and truth. "
I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For
Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one
passive intellect in common, as stated above ([957]Q[76], A[2]). From
this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men.
Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a
knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly
disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as
knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the
identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by
both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one
passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as
to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
([958]Q[76], A[2]).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our
souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the
participation of separate forms, as stated above ([959]Q[84], AA[3],4);
but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from
the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to
this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master,
but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would
be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that
natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter
acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we
have proved above ([960]Q[79], A[2]; [961]Q[84], A[3]) that the passive
intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible
(species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order
to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an
exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as
the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas
other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man,
sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force
of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First,
that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by
alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the
sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
end.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an
exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For
in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the
light of the active intellect, through which certain universal
principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as
proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of
which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research
advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what
he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple
from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously
unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1):
"All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge. "
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the
unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain
helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the
acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain
less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able
to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some
sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led
to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by
strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active
power as of a higher nature, as explained above ([962]Q[106], A[1];
[963]Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human
intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he
proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by
reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw
the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes
knowledge. " In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior
help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect
is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God.
Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps.
102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps.
93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us"
(Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle
by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by
which one is directed in working.
Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light
in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly:
but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power
of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
proposed to him from without.
Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple
are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
required in a master.
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Whether man can teach the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church. "
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
are made known to angels through men.
Objection 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened
immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
angels, as stated above ([964]Q[116], A[1]; [965]Q[112], A[3]). But
some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the
Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2:
"Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son. "
Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the
superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily
(Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
instructed by men concerning Divine things.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to
them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way
as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are
subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words
(Mat. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a
greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of
heaven is greater than he. " Therefore angels are never enlightened by
men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known
to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone
to know the heart's secrets.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers
in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church. " As though he
were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church
in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew
it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at
first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men
will be gathered together. "
It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19).
Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the
apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the
angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can
understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph. )---that from the
preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is
to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were
realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the
Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in
the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the
Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke
in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater
than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they
have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of
beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we
might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a
small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
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Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change
corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by
prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered
to death the lying Ananias and Saphira. " But in the working of miracles
a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of
the soul, can change corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched
you, that you should not obey the truth? " the gloss says that "some
have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
children. " But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
the power of his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior
bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid:
indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and
death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change
corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter
obeys God alone at will. "
I answer that, As stated above ([966]Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is
not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and
form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore
of the angels also we have stated ([967]Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot
change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing
corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less
therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
except by means of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power
of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what
wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power? "
Reply to Objection 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the
fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul
is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says
is the cause of the "evil eye. "
But it has been shown above ([968]Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter
does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which
change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the
more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in
contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and
clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as
Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil. ; [*De Insomniis ii]).
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by
God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and
the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
stated above ([969]Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite
must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the
apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in
exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it,
as stated above (ad 2).
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Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
local motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the separate soul is
a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its
command.
Objection 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this
soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without
some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate
soul has the power to move bodies locally.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if
one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to
local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the
separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the
separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the
power of God, it can exceed those limits.
Reply to Objection 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose
powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who
are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may
obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate
substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that
substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the
lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul
is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form,
it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom
(Hom. xxviii in Matt. ) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of
the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
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OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul;
secondly, as to the body.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
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Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from
matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it
could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not
composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
generation but by creation.
Objection 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is
the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be
caused by the animal's generating power.
Objection 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form
of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some
part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of
the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made
from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul
is not produced through the semen.
Objection 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive
of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal
is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter
and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and
again this is impossible, for it has been proved above ([970]Q[76],
A[4]) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is
the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain,
this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its
own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
be generated from the semen.
On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the
latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according
to Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having
life. " Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are
produced by the seminal power.
I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are
created by God ([971]Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the
sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
would arrive at existence by creation.
But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above ([972]Q[75],
A[3]): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent
composites exist through them.
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive
soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by
certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to
act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat
carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest
in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium,
but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living
bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both
without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of nutrition,
in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of
generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain
active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument
derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it
matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or
by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that
the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by
some seminal power derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect
self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ([973]Q[25], A[3]) on
this point, nor need we repeat it here.
Reply to Objection 2: The generating power begets not only by its own
virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore
the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an
animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a
more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
Reply to Objection 3: This active force which is in the semen, and
which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a
certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of
the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there
is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
species as stated above ([974]Q[115], A[3], ad 2). And since in this
(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a
heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man. "
Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the
active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De
Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female.
In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is
in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment,
then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by
the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually
informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which
was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the
generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be
more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher
says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active
principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts
of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the
offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by
nourishment and growth.
"demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees,
animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a
spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
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Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause
of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to
the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs.
Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in
corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not
follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any
corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly
body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since
the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows
that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin.
per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should
not be fulfilled. " Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies
take place of necessity.
I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above
[941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.
But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom
to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents.
Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of
necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who
supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the
cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things
happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi,
Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to
their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not
to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a
being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a
thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has
not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause,
because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that
a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as
to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this
cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it
is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this
clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing
cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some
terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to
the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on
the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some
heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this
matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is
accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result
of necessity.
Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that
take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite.
Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to
local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its
effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of
another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause;
nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not
reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
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ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
(2) Where is it?
(3) Is it unchangeable?
(4) Are all things subject to fate?
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Whether there be such a thing as fate?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang. ): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real. "
Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.
On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order. "
I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like
as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher
cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by
their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in
regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who
had ordered it, it is directly intended.
So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).
On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in
human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115],
A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since
it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be
directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to
all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115],
A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being,
nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing.
Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the
proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can
therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a
grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts
after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this
world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of
a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below,
whether by luck or by chance.
We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise
the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave
found a treasure. " And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can
it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure
is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave
there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by
luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by
the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can
change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the
ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be
ascribed to God alone.
So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken,"
we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided
the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application
to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning
thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold
his tongue. " For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate:
wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck
or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if
compared to Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in
the world," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
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Whether fate is in created things?
Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate. " But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in
God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate,
as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God,
and not in creatures.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance
or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition
inherent to changeable things. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22],
A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of
the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as
being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain
effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by
certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which
obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by
the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some
of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged. " Of each of these
things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110],
A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is
in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production
of their effects.
Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which
Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the
nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power
or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i. e. order, of second causes.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as
the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that
disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it
signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this
order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus
fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to
the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet
wrote: "Thy fate draws thee. "
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Whether fate is unchangeable?
Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence. "
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved. " But fate is a "disposition inherent to
changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is
changeable.
Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem
principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.
I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can
be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes,
which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first
principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have
held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself
necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this
reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must
follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ([954]Q[115],
A[6]).
Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate
could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason
that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes,
is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a
certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity.
In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "If
God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen. " Wherefore
Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly
afterwards adds---"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable
Providence must also itself be unchangeable. "
From this the answers to the objections are clear.
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Whether all things are subject to fate?
Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius
says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the
stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a
reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the
world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and
seed. " Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 1 seqq. ). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things. " But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
([955]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate. "
I answer that, As stated above [956](A[2]), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done
immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither
is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of
spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De
Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state
of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate. " Hence it is
clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is
involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up
with second causes.
Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done
by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and
power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that
whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to
fate, as already stated.
Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way
changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created
causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
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OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly
in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?
(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?
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Whether one man can teach another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
Lord says (Mat. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of
Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God. " Therefore to
be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master
to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.
Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch
as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
active quality just as heat is.
Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and
the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.
Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
words or gestures.
But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If
of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already
in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the
master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn
nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man
who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no
way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in
faith and truth. "
I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For
Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one
passive intellect in common, as stated above ([957]Q[76], A[2]). From
this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men.
Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a
knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly
disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as
knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the
identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by
both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one
passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as
to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
([958]Q[76], A[2]).
Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our
souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the
participation of separate forms, as stated above ([959]Q[84], AA[3],4);
but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from
the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to
this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master,
but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would
be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that
natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter
acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we
have proved above ([960]Q[79], A[2]; [961]Q[84], A[3]) that the passive
intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible
(species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order
to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an
exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as
the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas
other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man,
sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force
of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First,
that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by
alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the
sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
end.
Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an
exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For
in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the
light of the active intellect, through which certain universal
principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as
proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of
which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research
advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what
he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple
from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously
unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1):
"All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge. "
Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the
unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain
helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the
acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain
less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able
to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some
sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led
to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by
strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active
power as of a higher nature, as explained above ([962]Q[106], A[1];
[963]Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human
intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he
proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by
reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw
the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes
knowledge. " In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior
help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect
is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God.
Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (Ps.
102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (Ps.
93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us"
(Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.
Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle
by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by
which one is directed in working.
Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light
in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly:
but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power
of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
proposed to him from without.
Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple
are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
required in a master.
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Whether man can teach the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church. "
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
are made known to angels through men.
Objection 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened
immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
angels, as stated above ([964]Q[116], A[1]; [965]Q[112], A[3]). But
some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the
Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2:
"Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son. "
Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the
superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily
(Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
instructed by men concerning Divine things.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to
them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way
as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are
subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's words
(Mat. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a
greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of
heaven is greater than he. " Therefore angels are never enlightened by
men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known
to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone
to know the heart's secrets.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers
in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church. " As though he
were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church
in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew
it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at
first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men
will be gathered together. "
It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19).
Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the
apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the
angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can
understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph. )---that from the
preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is
to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were
realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the
Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in
the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the
Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke
in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater
than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they
have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of
beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we
might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a
small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
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Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change
corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by
prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered
to death the lying Ananias and Saphira. " But in the working of miracles
a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of
the soul, can change corporeal matter.
Objection 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched
you, that you should not obey the truth? " the gloss says that "some
have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
children. " But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
the power of his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior
bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid:
indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and
death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change
corporeal matter.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter
obeys God alone at will. "
I answer that, As stated above ([966]Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is
not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and
form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore
of the angels also we have stated ([967]Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot
change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing
corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less
therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
except by means of bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power
of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what
wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power? "
Reply to Objection 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the
fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul
is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says
is the cause of the "evil eye. "
But it has been shown above ([968]Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter
does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which
change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the
more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in
contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and
clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as
Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil. ; [*De Insomniis ii]).
Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by
God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and
the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
stated above ([969]Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite
must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the
apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in
exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it,
as stated above (ad 2).
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Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
local motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the separate soul is
a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its
command.
Objection 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this
soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without
some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate
soul has the power to move bodies locally.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if
one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to
local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the
separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the
separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the
power of God, it can exceed those limits.
Reply to Objection 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose
powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who
are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may
obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate
substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that
substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the
lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul
is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form,
it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom
(Hom. xxviii in Matt. ) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of
the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul;
secondly, as to the body.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from
matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it
could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not
composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
generation but by creation.
Objection 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is
the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be
caused by the animal's generating power.
Objection 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form
of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some
part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of
the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made
from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul
is not produced through the semen.
Objection 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive
of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal
is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter
and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and
again this is impossible, for it has been proved above ([970]Q[76],
A[4]) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is
the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain,
this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its
own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
be generated from the semen.
On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the
latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according
to Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having
life. " Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are
produced by the seminal power.
I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are
created by God ([971]Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the
sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
would arrive at existence by creation.
But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above ([972]Q[75],
A[3]): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent
composites exist through them.
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive
soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by
certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to
act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat
carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest
in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium,
but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living
bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both
without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of nutrition,
in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of
generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain
active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument
derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it
matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or
by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that
the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by
some seminal power derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect
self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ([973]Q[25], A[3]) on
this point, nor need we repeat it here.
Reply to Objection 2: The generating power begets not only by its own
virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore
the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an
animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a
more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
Reply to Objection 3: This active force which is in the semen, and
which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a
certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of
the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there
is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
species as stated above ([974]Q[115], A[3], ad 2). And since in this
(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a
heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man. "
Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the
active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De
Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female.
In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is
in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment,
then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by
the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually
informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which
was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the
generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be
more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher
says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active
principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts
of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the
offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by
nourishment and growth.
