What did our
ministers?
Edmund Burke
von.
X 19
289
? ? ? ? 290 ossnnvar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
ly and inaccurate, and not fallacious. In matters of account, however, this want of care is not excusable; and the diiference between neutral nations entirely engrossing our navigation, and being only subsidiary to a vastly augmented trade, makes a most material difference to his argument. From that principle of fairness, though the author speaks otherwise, I am willing to suppose he means no more than that our navigation had so declined as to alarm us with the
probable loss of this valuable object. I shall however show, that his whole proposition, whatever modifica tions he may please to give without foundation; that our navigation had not decreased; that, on the
? had greatly increased in the war; that had increased by the war and that was probable the same cause would continue to augment to still greater height; to what an height hard to say, had our success continued.
But first must observe, am much less solicitous whether his fact be true or no, than whether his prin ciple well established. Cases are dead things, prin ciples are living and productive. affirm then, that,
. in time of war our trade had the good fortune to increase, and at the same time large, nay the largest, proportion of carriage had been engrossed by neutral nations, ought not in itself to have been considered as circumstance of distress. War time of inconvenience to trade; in general must be straitened, and must find 'its way as can. It often happy for nations that they are able to call in neutral navigation. They all aim at it. France en deavored at but could not compass it. Will this author say, that, in war with Spain, such an assist ance would not be of absolute necessity? that would not be the most gross of all follies to refuse it?
contrary,
? ? it
is is a
a it
it,
a it
it
it it
it
is
it
a
a
if
is
I I
;
I
it
it, is
? on rnn PRESENT srarn or THE NATION. 291
In the next place, his method of stating a medium of six years of war, and six years of peace, to decide this question, is altogether unfair. To say, in dero gation of the advantages of a war, that navigation is not equal to what it was in time of peace, is what
hitherto has never been heard of. No war ever bore that test but the war which he so bitterly laments. One may lay it down as a maxim, that an average es timate of an object in a steady course of rising or of falling, must in its nature be an unfair one; more particularly if the cause of the rise or fall be visible, and its continuance in any degree probable. Aver
age estimates are never just but when the object fluc tuates, and no reason can be assigned why it should not continue still to fluctuate. The author chooses to allow nothing at all for this: he has taken an av erage of six years of the war. He knew, for every body knows, that the first three years were on the whole rather unsuccessful ; and that, in consequence of this ill success, trade sunk, and navigation declined with it; but that grand delusion of the three last years turned the scale in our favor. At the begin ning of that war (as in the commencement of every war), traders were struck with a sort of panic. Many went out of the freighting business. But by degrees, as the war continued, the terror wore oif; the danger came to be better appreciated, and bet ter provided against; our trade was carried on in large fleets, under regular convoys, and with great safety. The freighting business revived. The ships
were fewer, but much larger; and though the num ber decreased, the tonnage was vastly augmented: insomuch that in 1761 the British shipping had risen by the author's own account to 527,557 tons. --In the
? ? ? ? ""1 OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
last year he has given us of the peace, it amounted to no more than 494,772; that in the last year the war was 32,785 tons more than i-n the corre spondent year of his peace average. No year of the peace exceeded except one, and that but little.
The fair account of the matter this. Our trade had, as we have just seen, increased to so astonishing degree in 1761, as to employ British and foreign
ships to the amount of 707,659 tons, which 149,500 more than we employed in the last year of the peace. --Thus our trade increased more than fifth; our British navigation had increased likewise with this astonishing increase of trade, but was not able to keep pace with it; and we added about 120,000 tons of foreign shipping to the 60,000, which had been employed in the last year of the peace. Whatever happened to our shipping in the former years of the war, this would be no true state of the case at the time of the treaty. If we had lost something in the beginning, we had then recovered,'and more than re covered, all our losses. Such the ground of the doleful complaints of the author, that the carrying trade was wholly engrossed the neutral nations.
have done fairly, and even very moderately, in taking this year, and not his average, as the standard of what might be expected in future, had the war continued. The author will be compelled to allow
unless he undertakes to show; first, that the pos session of Canada, Martinico, Guadaloupe, Grenada, the Havannah, the Philippines, the whole African trade, the whole East India trade, and the whole Newfoundland fishery, had no certain inevitable ten dency to increase the British shipping; unless, in the second place, he can prove that those trades were, or
.
? ? ? it,
I
a
by
is
is,
a
is is
it it
of
? on THE PRESENT sTATE or THE NATION. 293
might be, by law or indulgence, carried on in foreign vessels; and unless, thirdly, he can demonstrate that the premium of insurance on British ships was rising~ as the war continued. He can prove not one of these points. I will show him a fact more that is mortal to his assertions. It is the state of our shipping in 1762. The author had his reasons for stopping short at the preceding year. It would have appeared, had he pro ceeded farther, that our tonnage was in a course of uniform augmentation, owing to the freight derived
from our foreign conquests, and to the perfect securi ty of our navigation from our clear and decided supe riority at sea. This, I say, would have appeared from the state of the two years: --
? 1761. British . 1762. Ditto . 1761. Foreign . 1762. Ditto .
. . 527,557 tons. . 559,537 tons. . 180,102 tons.
. . 129,502 tons.
The two last years of the peace were in no degree equal to these. Much of the navigation of 1763 was also owing to the war ; this is manifest from the large part of it employed in the carriage from the ceded islands, with which the communication still continued
No such circumstances of glory and advan tage ever attended upon a war. Too happy will be our lot, if we should again be forced into a war, to behold anything that shall resemble them ; and if we
were not then the better for them, it is not in the ordinary course of God's providence to mend our condition.
In vain does the author declaim on the high pre miums given for the loans during the war. His long note swelled with calculations on that subject
open.
? ? ? OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
(even supposing the most inaccurate of all calcula>> tions to be just) would be entirely thrown away, did it not serve to raise a wonderful opinion of his finan cial skill in those who are not less surprised than ed ified, when, with a solemn face and mysterious air, they are told that two and two make four. For what else do we learn from this note ? That the more ex pense is incurred by a nation, the more money will be required to defray it; that in proportion to the continuance of that expense, will be the continuance of borrowing ; that the increase of borrowing and the increase of debt will go hand in hand ; and lastly, that the more money you want, the harder it will be to get it; and that the scarcity of the commodity will enhance the price. Who ever doubted the truth, or the insignificance, of these propositions? what do they prove ? that war is expensive, and peace desira ble. They contain nothing more than a common place against war; the easiest of all topics. To bring them home to his purpose, he ought to have shown that o1u' enemies had money upon better terms; which he has not shown, neither can he. I shall speak more fully to this point in another place. He ought to have shown that the money they raised, upon whatever terms, had procured them a more lucrative return. He knows that our expenditure purchased commerce and conquest: theirs acquired nothing but defeat and bankruptcy.
Thus the author has laid down his ideas on the subject of war. Next follow those he entertains on that of peace. The treaty of Paris upon the whole has his approbation. Indeed, if his account of the war be just, he might have spared himself all further trouble. The rest is drawn on as an inevitable con
""_q
? ? ? ? oN THE PRESENT surn OF THE NATION.
elusi0n. * If the House of Bourbon had the advan
tage, she must give the law; and the peace, though it were much worse than it had still been good one. But as the world yet deluded on the state of that war, other arguments are necessary; and the author has in my opinion very ill supplied them. He tells of many things we have got, and of which he has made out kind of bill. This matter may be brought within very narrow compass, we come to consider the requisites of good peace under some
plain distinct heads. apprehend they may be re duced to these: Stability; Indemnification; 3. Alliance.
As to the first, the author more than obscurely hints in several places, that he thinks the peace not likely to last. However, he does furnish security;
security, in any light, fear, but insufficient; on his hypothesis, surely very odd one. " By stipulat ing for the entire possession of the Continent (says he) the restored French islands are become in some measure dependent on the British empire; and the
good faith of France in observing the treaty guaran teed by the value at which she estimates their pos
sessi0n. "1'
When the advantages of the war were to be depreciated, then the loss of the ultramarine col onies lightened the expenses of France, facilitated her remittances, and therefore her cohmists put them into our hands. According to this author's system,
the actufl possession of those colonies ought to give us little or no advantage in the negotiation for peace and yet the chance of possessing them on future oc
Pages 12, 13. Page 17.
together.
295
? This author soon grows weary of his principles. They seldom last him for two pages
? ? T
2.
if
"
a
a
;
a
I
I
a
is
is,
a
a 1.
a
a
? 296 osssavar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
casion gives a perfect security for the preservation of that peace? " The conquest of the Havannah, if it did not serve Spain, rather distressed England, says our author. 1' But the molestation which her galleons may suffer from our station in Pensacola gives us ad vantages, for which we were not allowed to credit the nation for the Havannah itself ; a place surely full as well situated for every external purpose as Pensa cola, and of more internal benefit than ten thousand Pensacolas.
The author sets very little by conquests ; 1 I sup pose it is because he makes them so very lightly. On this subject he speaks with the greatest certainty imaginable. We have, according to him, nothing to do, but to go and take possession, whenever we think proper, of the French and Spanish settlements. It were better that he had examined a little what advan tage the peace gave us towards the invasion of these colonies, which we did n'ot possess before the peace. It would not have been amiss if he had consulted the public experience, and our commanders, concerning the absolute certainty of those conquests on which he is pleased to found our security. And after all, he should have discovered them to be so very sure, and so very easy, he might at least, to preserve con sistency, have looked few pages back, and (no un pleasing thing to him) listened to himself, where he says, "that the most successful enterprise could not compensate to the nation for the waste of its people, by carrying on war in unhealthy climates. "? po
* Page 6.
" Our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as
their correspondents in Spain were disabled from paying them for their goods sent to America. "-- State of the Nation, p.
Pages 12, 13. Page 6.
? ? ? 3
1'
?
7. . if, A
a
? on run PRESENT srarn or THE NATION.
sition which he repeats again, p. 9. So that, accord ing to himself, his security is not worth the suit; according to fact, he has only a chance, God knows what a chance, of getting at it; and therefore, ac cording to reason, the giving up the most valuable of all possessions, in hopes to conquer them back, un der any advantage of situation, is the most ridiculous security that ever was imagined for the peace of a na tion. It is true his friends did not give up Canada ; they could not give up everything; let us make the most of it. We have Canada, we know its value. We have not the French any longer to fight in North America; and from this circumstance we derive con siderable advantages. But here let me rest a little.
The author touches upon a string which sounds i1n der his fingers but a tremulous and melancholy note. North America was once indeed a great strength to this nation, in opportunity of ports, in ships, in provisions, in men. We found her a sound, an active, a vigorous member of the empire. I hope, by wise management, she will again become so. But one of our capital
present
restore that security for the peace, and for
cannot
everything
lost along with the affection and the obedience of our
valuable to this country, which we have
297
? misfortunes is her discontent and disobedi ence. To which of the author's favorites this discon tent is owing, we all know but too sufficiently. It would be a dismal event, if this foundation of his se
curity, and indeed of all our public strength, should, in reality, become our weakness; and if all the pow ers of this empire, which ought to fall with a com pacted weight upon the head of our enemies, should be dissipated and distracted by a jealous vigilance, or
by hostile attempts upon one another. Ten Canadas
? ? ? 298 oBsEBvATIoNs on A LATE PUBLICATION
colonies. He" is the wise minister, he is the true friend to Britain, who shall be able to restore it.
To return to the security for the peace. The au thor tells us, that the original great purposes of the war were more than accomplished by the treaty. Surely he has experience and reading enough to know, that, in the course of a war, events may hap pen, that render its original very far from being its principal purpose. This original may dwindle by circumstances, so as to become not a purpose of the second or even the third magnitude. I trust this is so obvious that it will not be necessary to put cases for its illustration. In that war, as soon as Spain en tered into the quarrel, the security of North America was no longer the sole nor the foremost object. The Family Compact had been I know not how long before in agitation. But then it was that we saw produced into daylight and action the most odious and most formidable of all the conspiracies against the liberties of Europe that ever has been framed. The war with
Spain was the first fruits of that league ; and a secu rity against that league ought to have been the funda
mental point of a pacification with the powers who compose it. We had. materials in our hands to have constructed that security in such a manner as never to be shaken. But how did the virtuous and able men of our author labor for this great end? They took no one step towards it. On the contrary they countenanced, and, indeed, as far as it depended on them, recognized it in all its parts; for our plenipo tentiary treated with those who acted for the two crowns, as if they had been different ministers of the same monarch. The Spanish minister received his instructions, not from Madrid, but from Versailles.
? ? ? ? on THE PRESENT srarn or THE NATION.
299
This was not hid from our ministers at home; and the discovery ought to have alarmed them, if the good of their country had been the object of their anxiety. They could not but have seen that the whole Spanish monarchy was melted down into the cabinet of Ver sailles. But they thought this circumstance an ad
vantage; as it enabled them to go through with their work the more expeditiously. Expedition was every thing to them ; because France might happen during a protracted negotiation to discover the great imposi tion of our victories.
In the same spirit they negotiated the terms of the peace. If it were thought advisable not to take any positive security from Spain, the most obvious princi ples of policy dictated that the burden of the cessions ought to fall upon France; and that everything which was of grace and favor should be given to Spain. Spain could not, on her part, have executed a capital article in the family compact, which obliged her to
compensate the losses of France. At least she could not do it in America ; for she was expressly pre cluded by the treaty of Utrecht from ceding any ter ritory or giving any advantage in trade to that power.
What did our ministers? They_ took from Spain the territory of Florida, an object of no value except to show our dispositions to be quite equal at least towards both powers; and they enabled France to compensate Spain by the gift of Louisiana: loading us with all the harshness, leaving the act of kindness
with France, and opening thereby a door to the ful filling of this the most consolidating article of the family compact. Accordingly that dangerous league,
thus abetted and authorized by the English ministry without an attempt to invalidate it in any way, or in
? ? ? ? 300 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
any of its parts, exists to this hour; and has grown stronger and stronger every hour of its existence.
As to the second component of a good peace, com pensation, I have but little trouble; the author has said nothing upon that head. _ He has nothing to say.
After a war of such expense, this ought to have been a capital consideration. But on what he has been so prudently silent, I think it is right to speak plainly. All our new acquisitions together, at thistime, scarce afford matter of revenue, either at home or abroad, sufficient to defray the expense of their establishments; not one shilling towards the reduction of our debt. Guadaloupe or Martinico alone would have given us material aid; much in the way of duties, much in the way of trade and navigation. A good ministry would have considered how a renewal of the Assiento might have been obtained. We had as much right to ask it at the treaty of Paris as at the treaty of Utrecht. We had incomparably more in our hands to purchase it. Floods of treasure would have poured into this king dom from such a source ; and, under proper manage ment, no small part of it would have taken a public direction, and have fructified an exhausted exchequer.
If this gentleman's hero of finance, instead of fly ing from a treaty, which, though he now defends, he could not approve, and would not oppose ; if he, in stead of shifting into an office, which removed him from the manufacture of the treaty, had, by his credit with the then great director, acquired for us these, or any of these, objects, the possession of Guadaloupe or Martinico, or the renewal of the Assiento, he might have held his head high in his country; because he would have performed real service ; ten thousand times more real service, than all the economy of
? ? ? ? 0N THE PRESENT surn or rm-1 NATION.
301
which this writer is perpetually talking, or all the little tricks of finance which the expertest juggler of the treasury can practise, could amount to in a thou sand years. But the occasion is lost; the time is gone, perhaps forever.
As to the third requisite, alliance, there too _the author is silent. What strength of that kind did they acquire? They got no one new ally; they stript the enemy of not a single old one. They dis gusted (how justly, or unjustly, matters not) every ally we had; and from that time to this we stand friendless in Europe. But of this naked condition
'
? of their country I know some people are not ashamed. They have their system of politics; our ancestors grew great by another. In this manner these virtu ous men concluded the peace; and their practice is only consonant to their theory.
_ Many things more might be observed on this curi ous head of our author's speculations. But, taking leave of what the writer says in his serious part, if he be serious in any part, I shall only just point out a piece of his pleasantry. No man, I believe, ever de nied that the time for making peace is that in which the best terms may be obtained. But what that time is, together with the use that has been made of we are to judge seeing whether terms adequate to our advantages, and to our necessities, have been actually obtained. Here the pinch of the question, to which the author ought to have set his shoulders
in earnest. Instead of doing this, he slips out of the harness by jest; and sneeringly tells us, that, to determine this point, we must know the secrets of the French and Spanish cabinets)' and that Parliament
* Something however has transpired in the quarrels among those
? ? a
by is
it,
? ossnavar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
was pleased to approve the treaty of peace without calling for the correspondence concerning it. How
just this sarcasm on that Parliament may be, I not; but how becoming in the author, I leave it to his friends to determine.
Having thus gone through the questions of war and peace, the author proceeds to state our debt, and the interest which it carried, at the time of the treaty, with the unfairness and inaccuracy, however, which distinguish all his assertions, and all his calculations. To detect every fallacy, and rectify every mistake, would be endless. It will be enough to point outa few of them, in order to show how unsafe it is to place anything like an implicit trust in such a writer.
The interest of debt contracted during the war is stated by the author at 2,614,892l. The particulars appear in pp. 14 and 15. Among them is stated the unfunded debt, 9,975,017l. , supposed to carry inter est on a medium at 3 per cent, "which amounts to 299,250l. We are referred to the Considerations on the Trade and Finances of the Kingdom," p. 22, for the particulars of that unfunded debt. Turn to the work, and to the place referred to by the author him self, if you have a mind to see a clear detection of a capital fallacy of this article in his account. You will there see that this unfunded debt consists of the nine following articles 1 the remaining subsidy to
concerned in that transaction. It seems the good Genius of Britain, so much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilst we were gaining such advantages, the court of France was astonished at our concessions. " J'ai apporte? a Versailles, il est vrai, les Ratifica tions du Roi d'Angletcrre, :2 vostre grand e? tormement, et 12 celui de bien d'auzres. Jc dois cela an bonte? s du Roi d'Angleterre, a celles do Mi lord Bute, a Mons. lc Comte dc_Viry, t Mons. le Duc de Nivemois, et en fin t mon scavoir faire. "--Lettres, &c. , du Chev. D'Eon, p. 51.
302
say
? ? ? ? on rnn PRESENT srarn or rnn NATION. 303
the Duke of Brunswick; the remaining de? dommage ment to the Landgrave of Hesse; the German de mands ; the army and ordnance extraordinaries ; the deficiencies of grants and funds; Mr. Touchet's claim ; the debts due to Nova Scotia and Barbadoes; exchequer bills; and navy debt. The extreme fal lacy of this state cannot escape any reader who will
be at the pains to compare the interest money, with which he affirms us to have been loaded, in his " State of the Nation," with the items of the princi pal debt to which he refers in his " Considerations. " The reader must observe, that of this long list of nine articles, only two, the exchequer bills, and part of the navy debt, carried any interest at all. The first amounted to 1,800,000l. ; and this undoubtedly car ried interest. The whole navy debt indeed amounted to 4,576,915l. ; but of this only a part carried inter est. The author of the " Considerations," &c. labors to prove this very point in p. 18; and Mr. G. has always defended himself upon the same ground, for the insufficient provision he made for the discharge of that debt. The reader may see their own authority for it. *
** " The navy bills are not due till six months after they have been issued; six months also of the senmen's wages by act of Parliament must be, and in consequence of the rules prescribed by that act, twelve months' wages generally, and often much more are retained; and there has been besides at all times a large arrear of pay, which, though kept in the account, could never be claimed, the persons to whom it was due having left neither assignees nor representatives. The precise amount of such sums cannot be ascertained ; but they can hardly he reckoned less than thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand pounds. On 31st Dec. , 1754, when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as
it could be, it still amounted to 1,296,567]. 18s. 111d. consisting chiefly of articles which could not then be d|scharged ; such articles wiil be larger now, in proportion to the increase of the establishment; and an
? ? ? "1
Mr. G. did in fact provide no more than 2,150,000l. for the discharge of these bills in two years. It is much to be wished that these gentlemen would lay their heads together, that they would consider well this matter, and agree upon something. For when the scanty provision made for the unfunded debt is to be vindicated, then we are told it is a very small part of that debt which carries interest. But when the public is to be represented in a miserable condition, and the consequences of the late war to be laid before us in dreadful colors, then we are to be told that the un funded debt is within a trifle of ten millions, and so large a portion of it carries interest that we must not compute less than 3 per cent upon the whole.
In the year 1764, Parliament voted 650,000l. to wards the discharge of the navy debt. This sum could not be applied solely to the discharge of bills carrying interest; because part of the debt due on seamen's wages must have been paid, and some bills carried no interest at all. Notwithstanding this, we find by an account in the journals of the House of Commons, in the following session, that the navy debt carrying interest was, on the 31st of December, 1764, no more than 1,687,442l. I am sure therefore that I admit too much when I admit the navy debt carrying interest, after the creation of the navy an nuities in the year 1763, to have been 2,200,000l. Add the exchequer bills; and the whole unfimded
allowance must always be made for them in judging of the state of the navy debt, though they are not distinguishable in the account. In providing for that which is payable, the principal object of the legislature is always to discharge the bills, for they are the greatest article; they bear an interest of 4 per cent; and, when the quantity Of them is large, they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money trans2w tions. "
? OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION'
? ? ? ? on rnn PRESENT sum or rnn NATION.
305
debt carrying interest will be four millions instead of ten ; and the annual interest paid for it at 4 per cent will be 160,000l. instead of 5299,250l. An error of no small magnitude, and which could not have been owing to inadvertency.
The misrepresentation of the increase of the peace establishment is still more extraordinary than that of the interest of the unfunded debt. The increase is great, undoubtedly. However, the author finds no fault with and urges only as matter of argu ment to support the strange chimerical proposals he
to make us in the close of his work for the increase of revenue. The greater he made that establishment, the stronger he expected to stand in argument: but, whatever he expected or proposed, he should have stated the matter fairly. He tells us that this es
tablishment nearly 1,500,000l. more than was in 1752, 1753, and other years of peace. This he has done in his usual manner, by assertion, without troubling himself either with proof or probability. For he has not given us any state of the peace establish
ment in the years 1753 and 1754, the time which he means to compare with_the present. As am obliged to force him to that precision, from which he always flies as from his most dangerous enemy, have berm at the trouble to search the journals in
the period between the two last wars: and find that the peace establishment, consisting of the navy, the ordnance, and the several incidental expenses, amounted to 2,346,594l. Now this writer wild
enough to imagine, that the peace establishment of 1764 and the subsequent years, made up from the same articles, 3,800,000l. and upwards? His as
sertion however goes to this. But must take the 70],. l. 20
? ? ? I
is
a
is
I
I
I
it
is
it,
is
it
? 306 OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
liberty of correcting him in this gross mistake, and from an authority he cannot refuse,"from his favorite work, and standing authority, the Gonsiderations. _" We find there, p. 43,* the peace establishment of 1764 and 1765 stated at 3,609,70Ol. This is near two hundred thousand pounds less than that given in " The State of the Nation. " But even from this, in order to render the articles which compose the peace establishment in the two periods correspondent (for otherwise they cannot be compared), we must
deduct first, his articles of the deficiency of land and malt, which amount to 300,000l. They certainly are no_ part of the establishment; nor are they included in that sum, which'I have stated above for the estab lishment in the time of the former peace. If they were proper to be stated at all, they ought to be stated in both accounts. We must also deduct the deficiencies of funds, 202,400l. These deficiencies are the difference between the interest charged on the public for moneys borrowed, and the produce of the taxes laid for the discharge of that interest. Annual provision is indeed to be made for them by Parlia
? * Navy . .
Army . . . . . .
Ordnance . . . . . . .
The four American governments .
General surveys in America .
Foundling Hospital . . . . .
To the African committee . . .
For the civil establishment on the coast of Africa
Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000_
. .
Deficiency of land and malt . Deficiency of funds . . . . . . Extraordinaries of the army and navy
Total
. . . .
.
.
.
289
? ? ? ? 290 ossnnvar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
ly and inaccurate, and not fallacious. In matters of account, however, this want of care is not excusable; and the diiference between neutral nations entirely engrossing our navigation, and being only subsidiary to a vastly augmented trade, makes a most material difference to his argument. From that principle of fairness, though the author speaks otherwise, I am willing to suppose he means no more than that our navigation had so declined as to alarm us with the
probable loss of this valuable object. I shall however show, that his whole proposition, whatever modifica tions he may please to give without foundation; that our navigation had not decreased; that, on the
? had greatly increased in the war; that had increased by the war and that was probable the same cause would continue to augment to still greater height; to what an height hard to say, had our success continued.
But first must observe, am much less solicitous whether his fact be true or no, than whether his prin ciple well established. Cases are dead things, prin ciples are living and productive. affirm then, that,
. in time of war our trade had the good fortune to increase, and at the same time large, nay the largest, proportion of carriage had been engrossed by neutral nations, ought not in itself to have been considered as circumstance of distress. War time of inconvenience to trade; in general must be straitened, and must find 'its way as can. It often happy for nations that they are able to call in neutral navigation. They all aim at it. France en deavored at but could not compass it. Will this author say, that, in war with Spain, such an assist ance would not be of absolute necessity? that would not be the most gross of all follies to refuse it?
contrary,
? ? it
is is a
a it
it,
a it
it
it it
it
is
it
a
a
if
is
I I
;
I
it
it, is
? on rnn PRESENT srarn or THE NATION. 291
In the next place, his method of stating a medium of six years of war, and six years of peace, to decide this question, is altogether unfair. To say, in dero gation of the advantages of a war, that navigation is not equal to what it was in time of peace, is what
hitherto has never been heard of. No war ever bore that test but the war which he so bitterly laments. One may lay it down as a maxim, that an average es timate of an object in a steady course of rising or of falling, must in its nature be an unfair one; more particularly if the cause of the rise or fall be visible, and its continuance in any degree probable. Aver
age estimates are never just but when the object fluc tuates, and no reason can be assigned why it should not continue still to fluctuate. The author chooses to allow nothing at all for this: he has taken an av erage of six years of the war. He knew, for every body knows, that the first three years were on the whole rather unsuccessful ; and that, in consequence of this ill success, trade sunk, and navigation declined with it; but that grand delusion of the three last years turned the scale in our favor. At the begin ning of that war (as in the commencement of every war), traders were struck with a sort of panic. Many went out of the freighting business. But by degrees, as the war continued, the terror wore oif; the danger came to be better appreciated, and bet ter provided against; our trade was carried on in large fleets, under regular convoys, and with great safety. The freighting business revived. The ships
were fewer, but much larger; and though the num ber decreased, the tonnage was vastly augmented: insomuch that in 1761 the British shipping had risen by the author's own account to 527,557 tons. --In the
? ? ? ? ""1 OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
last year he has given us of the peace, it amounted to no more than 494,772; that in the last year the war was 32,785 tons more than i-n the corre spondent year of his peace average. No year of the peace exceeded except one, and that but little.
The fair account of the matter this. Our trade had, as we have just seen, increased to so astonishing degree in 1761, as to employ British and foreign
ships to the amount of 707,659 tons, which 149,500 more than we employed in the last year of the peace. --Thus our trade increased more than fifth; our British navigation had increased likewise with this astonishing increase of trade, but was not able to keep pace with it; and we added about 120,000 tons of foreign shipping to the 60,000, which had been employed in the last year of the peace. Whatever happened to our shipping in the former years of the war, this would be no true state of the case at the time of the treaty. If we had lost something in the beginning, we had then recovered,'and more than re covered, all our losses. Such the ground of the doleful complaints of the author, that the carrying trade was wholly engrossed the neutral nations.
have done fairly, and even very moderately, in taking this year, and not his average, as the standard of what might be expected in future, had the war continued. The author will be compelled to allow
unless he undertakes to show; first, that the pos session of Canada, Martinico, Guadaloupe, Grenada, the Havannah, the Philippines, the whole African trade, the whole East India trade, and the whole Newfoundland fishery, had no certain inevitable ten dency to increase the British shipping; unless, in the second place, he can prove that those trades were, or
.
? ? ? it,
I
a
by
is
is,
a
is is
it it
of
? on THE PRESENT sTATE or THE NATION. 293
might be, by law or indulgence, carried on in foreign vessels; and unless, thirdly, he can demonstrate that the premium of insurance on British ships was rising~ as the war continued. He can prove not one of these points. I will show him a fact more that is mortal to his assertions. It is the state of our shipping in 1762. The author had his reasons for stopping short at the preceding year. It would have appeared, had he pro ceeded farther, that our tonnage was in a course of uniform augmentation, owing to the freight derived
from our foreign conquests, and to the perfect securi ty of our navigation from our clear and decided supe riority at sea. This, I say, would have appeared from the state of the two years: --
? 1761. British . 1762. Ditto . 1761. Foreign . 1762. Ditto .
. . 527,557 tons. . 559,537 tons. . 180,102 tons.
. . 129,502 tons.
The two last years of the peace were in no degree equal to these. Much of the navigation of 1763 was also owing to the war ; this is manifest from the large part of it employed in the carriage from the ceded islands, with which the communication still continued
No such circumstances of glory and advan tage ever attended upon a war. Too happy will be our lot, if we should again be forced into a war, to behold anything that shall resemble them ; and if we
were not then the better for them, it is not in the ordinary course of God's providence to mend our condition.
In vain does the author declaim on the high pre miums given for the loans during the war. His long note swelled with calculations on that subject
open.
? ? ? OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
(even supposing the most inaccurate of all calcula>> tions to be just) would be entirely thrown away, did it not serve to raise a wonderful opinion of his finan cial skill in those who are not less surprised than ed ified, when, with a solemn face and mysterious air, they are told that two and two make four. For what else do we learn from this note ? That the more ex pense is incurred by a nation, the more money will be required to defray it; that in proportion to the continuance of that expense, will be the continuance of borrowing ; that the increase of borrowing and the increase of debt will go hand in hand ; and lastly, that the more money you want, the harder it will be to get it; and that the scarcity of the commodity will enhance the price. Who ever doubted the truth, or the insignificance, of these propositions? what do they prove ? that war is expensive, and peace desira ble. They contain nothing more than a common place against war; the easiest of all topics. To bring them home to his purpose, he ought to have shown that o1u' enemies had money upon better terms; which he has not shown, neither can he. I shall speak more fully to this point in another place. He ought to have shown that the money they raised, upon whatever terms, had procured them a more lucrative return. He knows that our expenditure purchased commerce and conquest: theirs acquired nothing but defeat and bankruptcy.
Thus the author has laid down his ideas on the subject of war. Next follow those he entertains on that of peace. The treaty of Paris upon the whole has his approbation. Indeed, if his account of the war be just, he might have spared himself all further trouble. The rest is drawn on as an inevitable con
""_q
? ? ? ? oN THE PRESENT surn OF THE NATION.
elusi0n. * If the House of Bourbon had the advan
tage, she must give the law; and the peace, though it were much worse than it had still been good one. But as the world yet deluded on the state of that war, other arguments are necessary; and the author has in my opinion very ill supplied them. He tells of many things we have got, and of which he has made out kind of bill. This matter may be brought within very narrow compass, we come to consider the requisites of good peace under some
plain distinct heads. apprehend they may be re duced to these: Stability; Indemnification; 3. Alliance.
As to the first, the author more than obscurely hints in several places, that he thinks the peace not likely to last. However, he does furnish security;
security, in any light, fear, but insufficient; on his hypothesis, surely very odd one. " By stipulat ing for the entire possession of the Continent (says he) the restored French islands are become in some measure dependent on the British empire; and the
good faith of France in observing the treaty guaran teed by the value at which she estimates their pos
sessi0n. "1'
When the advantages of the war were to be depreciated, then the loss of the ultramarine col onies lightened the expenses of France, facilitated her remittances, and therefore her cohmists put them into our hands. According to this author's system,
the actufl possession of those colonies ought to give us little or no advantage in the negotiation for peace and yet the chance of possessing them on future oc
Pages 12, 13. Page 17.
together.
295
? This author soon grows weary of his principles. They seldom last him for two pages
? ? T
2.
if
"
a
a
;
a
I
I
a
is
is,
a
a 1.
a
a
? 296 osssavar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
casion gives a perfect security for the preservation of that peace? " The conquest of the Havannah, if it did not serve Spain, rather distressed England, says our author. 1' But the molestation which her galleons may suffer from our station in Pensacola gives us ad vantages, for which we were not allowed to credit the nation for the Havannah itself ; a place surely full as well situated for every external purpose as Pensa cola, and of more internal benefit than ten thousand Pensacolas.
The author sets very little by conquests ; 1 I sup pose it is because he makes them so very lightly. On this subject he speaks with the greatest certainty imaginable. We have, according to him, nothing to do, but to go and take possession, whenever we think proper, of the French and Spanish settlements. It were better that he had examined a little what advan tage the peace gave us towards the invasion of these colonies, which we did n'ot possess before the peace. It would not have been amiss if he had consulted the public experience, and our commanders, concerning the absolute certainty of those conquests on which he is pleased to found our security. And after all, he should have discovered them to be so very sure, and so very easy, he might at least, to preserve con sistency, have looked few pages back, and (no un pleasing thing to him) listened to himself, where he says, "that the most successful enterprise could not compensate to the nation for the waste of its people, by carrying on war in unhealthy climates. "? po
* Page 6.
" Our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as
their correspondents in Spain were disabled from paying them for their goods sent to America. "-- State of the Nation, p.
Pages 12, 13. Page 6.
? ? ? 3
1'
?
7. . if, A
a
? on run PRESENT srarn or THE NATION.
sition which he repeats again, p. 9. So that, accord ing to himself, his security is not worth the suit; according to fact, he has only a chance, God knows what a chance, of getting at it; and therefore, ac cording to reason, the giving up the most valuable of all possessions, in hopes to conquer them back, un der any advantage of situation, is the most ridiculous security that ever was imagined for the peace of a na tion. It is true his friends did not give up Canada ; they could not give up everything; let us make the most of it. We have Canada, we know its value. We have not the French any longer to fight in North America; and from this circumstance we derive con siderable advantages. But here let me rest a little.
The author touches upon a string which sounds i1n der his fingers but a tremulous and melancholy note. North America was once indeed a great strength to this nation, in opportunity of ports, in ships, in provisions, in men. We found her a sound, an active, a vigorous member of the empire. I hope, by wise management, she will again become so. But one of our capital
present
restore that security for the peace, and for
cannot
everything
lost along with the affection and the obedience of our
valuable to this country, which we have
297
? misfortunes is her discontent and disobedi ence. To which of the author's favorites this discon tent is owing, we all know but too sufficiently. It would be a dismal event, if this foundation of his se
curity, and indeed of all our public strength, should, in reality, become our weakness; and if all the pow ers of this empire, which ought to fall with a com pacted weight upon the head of our enemies, should be dissipated and distracted by a jealous vigilance, or
by hostile attempts upon one another. Ten Canadas
? ? ? 298 oBsEBvATIoNs on A LATE PUBLICATION
colonies. He" is the wise minister, he is the true friend to Britain, who shall be able to restore it.
To return to the security for the peace. The au thor tells us, that the original great purposes of the war were more than accomplished by the treaty. Surely he has experience and reading enough to know, that, in the course of a war, events may hap pen, that render its original very far from being its principal purpose. This original may dwindle by circumstances, so as to become not a purpose of the second or even the third magnitude. I trust this is so obvious that it will not be necessary to put cases for its illustration. In that war, as soon as Spain en tered into the quarrel, the security of North America was no longer the sole nor the foremost object. The Family Compact had been I know not how long before in agitation. But then it was that we saw produced into daylight and action the most odious and most formidable of all the conspiracies against the liberties of Europe that ever has been framed. The war with
Spain was the first fruits of that league ; and a secu rity against that league ought to have been the funda
mental point of a pacification with the powers who compose it. We had. materials in our hands to have constructed that security in such a manner as never to be shaken. But how did the virtuous and able men of our author labor for this great end? They took no one step towards it. On the contrary they countenanced, and, indeed, as far as it depended on them, recognized it in all its parts; for our plenipo tentiary treated with those who acted for the two crowns, as if they had been different ministers of the same monarch. The Spanish minister received his instructions, not from Madrid, but from Versailles.
? ? ? ? on THE PRESENT srarn or THE NATION.
299
This was not hid from our ministers at home; and the discovery ought to have alarmed them, if the good of their country had been the object of their anxiety. They could not but have seen that the whole Spanish monarchy was melted down into the cabinet of Ver sailles. But they thought this circumstance an ad
vantage; as it enabled them to go through with their work the more expeditiously. Expedition was every thing to them ; because France might happen during a protracted negotiation to discover the great imposi tion of our victories.
In the same spirit they negotiated the terms of the peace. If it were thought advisable not to take any positive security from Spain, the most obvious princi ples of policy dictated that the burden of the cessions ought to fall upon France; and that everything which was of grace and favor should be given to Spain. Spain could not, on her part, have executed a capital article in the family compact, which obliged her to
compensate the losses of France. At least she could not do it in America ; for she was expressly pre cluded by the treaty of Utrecht from ceding any ter ritory or giving any advantage in trade to that power.
What did our ministers? They_ took from Spain the territory of Florida, an object of no value except to show our dispositions to be quite equal at least towards both powers; and they enabled France to compensate Spain by the gift of Louisiana: loading us with all the harshness, leaving the act of kindness
with France, and opening thereby a door to the ful filling of this the most consolidating article of the family compact. Accordingly that dangerous league,
thus abetted and authorized by the English ministry without an attempt to invalidate it in any way, or in
? ? ? ? 300 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
any of its parts, exists to this hour; and has grown stronger and stronger every hour of its existence.
As to the second component of a good peace, com pensation, I have but little trouble; the author has said nothing upon that head. _ He has nothing to say.
After a war of such expense, this ought to have been a capital consideration. But on what he has been so prudently silent, I think it is right to speak plainly. All our new acquisitions together, at thistime, scarce afford matter of revenue, either at home or abroad, sufficient to defray the expense of their establishments; not one shilling towards the reduction of our debt. Guadaloupe or Martinico alone would have given us material aid; much in the way of duties, much in the way of trade and navigation. A good ministry would have considered how a renewal of the Assiento might have been obtained. We had as much right to ask it at the treaty of Paris as at the treaty of Utrecht. We had incomparably more in our hands to purchase it. Floods of treasure would have poured into this king dom from such a source ; and, under proper manage ment, no small part of it would have taken a public direction, and have fructified an exhausted exchequer.
If this gentleman's hero of finance, instead of fly ing from a treaty, which, though he now defends, he could not approve, and would not oppose ; if he, in stead of shifting into an office, which removed him from the manufacture of the treaty, had, by his credit with the then great director, acquired for us these, or any of these, objects, the possession of Guadaloupe or Martinico, or the renewal of the Assiento, he might have held his head high in his country; because he would have performed real service ; ten thousand times more real service, than all the economy of
? ? ? ? 0N THE PRESENT surn or rm-1 NATION.
301
which this writer is perpetually talking, or all the little tricks of finance which the expertest juggler of the treasury can practise, could amount to in a thou sand years. But the occasion is lost; the time is gone, perhaps forever.
As to the third requisite, alliance, there too _the author is silent. What strength of that kind did they acquire? They got no one new ally; they stript the enemy of not a single old one. They dis gusted (how justly, or unjustly, matters not) every ally we had; and from that time to this we stand friendless in Europe. But of this naked condition
'
? of their country I know some people are not ashamed. They have their system of politics; our ancestors grew great by another. In this manner these virtu ous men concluded the peace; and their practice is only consonant to their theory.
_ Many things more might be observed on this curi ous head of our author's speculations. But, taking leave of what the writer says in his serious part, if he be serious in any part, I shall only just point out a piece of his pleasantry. No man, I believe, ever de nied that the time for making peace is that in which the best terms may be obtained. But what that time is, together with the use that has been made of we are to judge seeing whether terms adequate to our advantages, and to our necessities, have been actually obtained. Here the pinch of the question, to which the author ought to have set his shoulders
in earnest. Instead of doing this, he slips out of the harness by jest; and sneeringly tells us, that, to determine this point, we must know the secrets of the French and Spanish cabinets)' and that Parliament
* Something however has transpired in the quarrels among those
? ? a
by is
it,
? ossnavar1ons on A LATE PUBLICATION
was pleased to approve the treaty of peace without calling for the correspondence concerning it. How
just this sarcasm on that Parliament may be, I not; but how becoming in the author, I leave it to his friends to determine.
Having thus gone through the questions of war and peace, the author proceeds to state our debt, and the interest which it carried, at the time of the treaty, with the unfairness and inaccuracy, however, which distinguish all his assertions, and all his calculations. To detect every fallacy, and rectify every mistake, would be endless. It will be enough to point outa few of them, in order to show how unsafe it is to place anything like an implicit trust in such a writer.
The interest of debt contracted during the war is stated by the author at 2,614,892l. The particulars appear in pp. 14 and 15. Among them is stated the unfunded debt, 9,975,017l. , supposed to carry inter est on a medium at 3 per cent, "which amounts to 299,250l. We are referred to the Considerations on the Trade and Finances of the Kingdom," p. 22, for the particulars of that unfunded debt. Turn to the work, and to the place referred to by the author him self, if you have a mind to see a clear detection of a capital fallacy of this article in his account. You will there see that this unfunded debt consists of the nine following articles 1 the remaining subsidy to
concerned in that transaction. It seems the good Genius of Britain, so much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilst we were gaining such advantages, the court of France was astonished at our concessions. " J'ai apporte? a Versailles, il est vrai, les Ratifica tions du Roi d'Angletcrre, :2 vostre grand e? tormement, et 12 celui de bien d'auzres. Jc dois cela an bonte? s du Roi d'Angleterre, a celles do Mi lord Bute, a Mons. lc Comte dc_Viry, t Mons. le Duc de Nivemois, et en fin t mon scavoir faire. "--Lettres, &c. , du Chev. D'Eon, p. 51.
302
say
? ? ? ? on rnn PRESENT srarn or rnn NATION. 303
the Duke of Brunswick; the remaining de? dommage ment to the Landgrave of Hesse; the German de mands ; the army and ordnance extraordinaries ; the deficiencies of grants and funds; Mr. Touchet's claim ; the debts due to Nova Scotia and Barbadoes; exchequer bills; and navy debt. The extreme fal lacy of this state cannot escape any reader who will
be at the pains to compare the interest money, with which he affirms us to have been loaded, in his " State of the Nation," with the items of the princi pal debt to which he refers in his " Considerations. " The reader must observe, that of this long list of nine articles, only two, the exchequer bills, and part of the navy debt, carried any interest at all. The first amounted to 1,800,000l. ; and this undoubtedly car ried interest. The whole navy debt indeed amounted to 4,576,915l. ; but of this only a part carried inter est. The author of the " Considerations," &c. labors to prove this very point in p. 18; and Mr. G. has always defended himself upon the same ground, for the insufficient provision he made for the discharge of that debt. The reader may see their own authority for it. *
** " The navy bills are not due till six months after they have been issued; six months also of the senmen's wages by act of Parliament must be, and in consequence of the rules prescribed by that act, twelve months' wages generally, and often much more are retained; and there has been besides at all times a large arrear of pay, which, though kept in the account, could never be claimed, the persons to whom it was due having left neither assignees nor representatives. The precise amount of such sums cannot be ascertained ; but they can hardly he reckoned less than thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand pounds. On 31st Dec. , 1754, when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as
it could be, it still amounted to 1,296,567]. 18s. 111d. consisting chiefly of articles which could not then be d|scharged ; such articles wiil be larger now, in proportion to the increase of the establishment; and an
? ? ? "1
Mr. G. did in fact provide no more than 2,150,000l. for the discharge of these bills in two years. It is much to be wished that these gentlemen would lay their heads together, that they would consider well this matter, and agree upon something. For when the scanty provision made for the unfunded debt is to be vindicated, then we are told it is a very small part of that debt which carries interest. But when the public is to be represented in a miserable condition, and the consequences of the late war to be laid before us in dreadful colors, then we are to be told that the un funded debt is within a trifle of ten millions, and so large a portion of it carries interest that we must not compute less than 3 per cent upon the whole.
In the year 1764, Parliament voted 650,000l. to wards the discharge of the navy debt. This sum could not be applied solely to the discharge of bills carrying interest; because part of the debt due on seamen's wages must have been paid, and some bills carried no interest at all. Notwithstanding this, we find by an account in the journals of the House of Commons, in the following session, that the navy debt carrying interest was, on the 31st of December, 1764, no more than 1,687,442l. I am sure therefore that I admit too much when I admit the navy debt carrying interest, after the creation of the navy an nuities in the year 1763, to have been 2,200,000l. Add the exchequer bills; and the whole unfimded
allowance must always be made for them in judging of the state of the navy debt, though they are not distinguishable in the account. In providing for that which is payable, the principal object of the legislature is always to discharge the bills, for they are the greatest article; they bear an interest of 4 per cent; and, when the quantity Of them is large, they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money trans2w tions. "
? OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION'
? ? ? ? on rnn PRESENT sum or rnn NATION.
305
debt carrying interest will be four millions instead of ten ; and the annual interest paid for it at 4 per cent will be 160,000l. instead of 5299,250l. An error of no small magnitude, and which could not have been owing to inadvertency.
The misrepresentation of the increase of the peace establishment is still more extraordinary than that of the interest of the unfunded debt. The increase is great, undoubtedly. However, the author finds no fault with and urges only as matter of argu ment to support the strange chimerical proposals he
to make us in the close of his work for the increase of revenue. The greater he made that establishment, the stronger he expected to stand in argument: but, whatever he expected or proposed, he should have stated the matter fairly. He tells us that this es
tablishment nearly 1,500,000l. more than was in 1752, 1753, and other years of peace. This he has done in his usual manner, by assertion, without troubling himself either with proof or probability. For he has not given us any state of the peace establish
ment in the years 1753 and 1754, the time which he means to compare with_the present. As am obliged to force him to that precision, from which he always flies as from his most dangerous enemy, have berm at the trouble to search the journals in
the period between the two last wars: and find that the peace establishment, consisting of the navy, the ordnance, and the several incidental expenses, amounted to 2,346,594l. Now this writer wild
enough to imagine, that the peace establishment of 1764 and the subsequent years, made up from the same articles, 3,800,000l. and upwards? His as
sertion however goes to this. But must take the 70],. l. 20
? ? ? I
is
a
is
I
I
I
it
is
it,
is
it
? 306 OBSERVATIONS ON A LATE PUBLICATION
liberty of correcting him in this gross mistake, and from an authority he cannot refuse,"from his favorite work, and standing authority, the Gonsiderations. _" We find there, p. 43,* the peace establishment of 1764 and 1765 stated at 3,609,70Ol. This is near two hundred thousand pounds less than that given in " The State of the Nation. " But even from this, in order to render the articles which compose the peace establishment in the two periods correspondent (for otherwise they cannot be compared), we must
deduct first, his articles of the deficiency of land and malt, which amount to 300,000l. They certainly are no_ part of the establishment; nor are they included in that sum, which'I have stated above for the estab lishment in the time of the former peace. If they were proper to be stated at all, they ought to be stated in both accounts. We must also deduct the deficiencies of funds, 202,400l. These deficiencies are the difference between the interest charged on the public for moneys borrowed, and the produce of the taxes laid for the discharge of that interest. Annual provision is indeed to be made for them by Parlia
? * Navy . .
Army . . . . . .
Ordnance . . . . . . .
The four American governments .
General surveys in America .
Foundling Hospital . . . . .
To the African committee . . .
For the civil establishment on the coast of Africa
Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000_
. .
Deficiency of land and malt . Deficiency of funds . . . . . . Extraordinaries of the army and navy
Total
. . . .
.
.
.
