As for the populace, their feelings soon
changed, and if he put himself at their head, they would be just as
loud in their flattery of Vespasian.
changed, and if he put himself at their head, they would be just as
loud in their flattery of Vespasian.
Tacitus
e.
Aponius, Vipstanus Messala, Dillius, and Numisius
(see ii. 85, iii. 9, 10).
[143] Cp. chap. 8.
[144] i. e. Mucianus and his officers (see chap. 46).
VITELLIUS' MEASURES OF DEFENCE
After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly suppressed 54
the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but
only his precautions against it. Had he admitted the facts and sought
advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that
all went well only made matters worse. He was himself extraordinarily
silent about the war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was
forbidden. This only increased the number of people who, if permitted,
would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread
grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian leaders slow to
foster these rumours. Whenever they captured Vitellian spies they
escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning
army, and sent them back again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them
in private and then had them murdered. A centurion named Julius
Agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to
fire Vitellius' courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the
emperor to send him to inspect the enemy's forces and discover what
had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt to deceive Antonius
by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the
emperor's instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown
everything. He was given guides, who showed him the field of battle,
the ruins of Cremona and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to
Vitellius. Finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even
suggested that he had been bribed, he said, 'You want some certain
evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or
dead, I will give you evidence that you can believe. ' And he was as
good as his word. He went straight from the emperor's presence and
committed suicide. Some say he was killed by order of Vitellius, but
they give the same account of his heroic devotion. [145]
Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched Julius 55
Priscus and Alfenus Varus[146] with fourteen cohorts of Guards and all
his available cavalry to hold the Apennines. A legion levied from the
marines[147] was sent after them. This large army of picked men and
horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to
have even taken the offensive. His other cohorts[148] were given to
his brother, Lucius Vitellius, for the protection of the city. The
emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling
nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated
consuls for several years in advance. He lavished special
charters[149] on allied communities and extended Latin rights[150] to
foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. In
fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple
the empire. However, the mob accepted these munificent grants with
open mouths. Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them
invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a
revolution. At last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined
the camp at Mevania,[151] where they had taken up their position. A
long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but
most by their fears. Here he was still undecided and at the mercy of
treacherous advice.
During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A cloud of 56
ill-omened birds[152] flew over his head and its density obscured the
daylight. To this was added another omen of disaster. A bull broke
from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped
so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed
according to the proper ritual. But the chief portent was Vitellius
himself. He was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew
nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed
forward or protracted. He always had to ask some one else. At every
fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And
then he would get drunk. At last he found camp life too tedious, and
on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at Misenum[153] he returned to
Rome. Every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed
insensible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with his
full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out
with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his forces he sent his
keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken
prisoner. The more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this
policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted.
But the emperor's intimates refused them admittance. He had, indeed,
formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and
refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run
fatal.
In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The mutiny of 57
the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by Claudius Faventinus, a
centurion whom Galba had dismissed in disgrace. To obtain his object
he had forged a letter from Vespasian promising rewards for treachery.
The admiral, Claudius Apollinaris,[154] was neither a staunch loyalist
nor an enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor,
who happened to be at Minturnae,[155] offered to take the lead of the
rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns.
Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while Capua remained
loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the
civil war. To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius
Julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at Misenum and
had allowed lax discipline. To support him he was given one cohort of
the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under
him. The two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not
long before Julianus came over to Vespasian's side. They then joined
forces and occupied Tarracina,[156] which owed its strength more to
its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.
When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force at 58
Narnia[157] with the prefects of the Guard,[158] and sent his brother
Lucius with six regiments of Guards and five hundred horse to cope
with the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous depression
was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the
populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. For he dignified this
poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by
the specious titles of 'the army' or 'his legions'. His friends were
all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice
of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who
gave their names. As their numbers were too great, he gave the task of
selection to the two consuls. From each of the senators he levied a
fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights offered
money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar
assistance. Indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had
gradually changed into real sympathy. People began to feel pity, not
perhaps so much for Vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes.
He himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands
upon their compassion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when
they are frightened, beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the
title of Caesar,[159] but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a
superstitious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one
listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while a rash
and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it
always begins to flag. Gradually the senators and knights deserted
him. At first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but
soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. At last
Vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them
from the services which they refused to render.
FOOTNOTES:
[145] This incident was probably another historical
commonplace. See the story from Plutarch (ii. 46, note 316),
which is also told by Suetonius and Dio.
[146] The prefects of the Guards (cp. ii. 92).
[147] At Misenum. (Leg. II Adjutrix. ) The Ravenna marines were
on the Flavian side (see chap. 50).
[148] i. e. the rest of the Guards (2), with the city garrison (4),
and police (7) (cp. ii. 93).
[149] i. e. granting them special privileges denied to other
communities in the same province.
[150] A sort of 'half-way house to Roman citizenship'. Full
commercial rights were included but not those of
intermarriage. It was possible for individual citizens in a
Latin town to obtain the full rights of a Roman.
[151] Bevagna.
[152] Dio makes them vultures and the scene a sacrifice: they
scattered the victims and nearly knocked Vitellius off his
pulpit.
[153] Described in the following chapter.
[154] He had succeeded Bassus (iii. 12).
[155] Near the mouth of the Liris.
[156] Horace's 'Anxur perched on gleaming rocks'. It lay near
the Pontine marshes on the Appian way.
[157] Narni.
[158] Priscus and Varus (see chap. 55).
[159] i. 62, ii. 62.
THE PASSAGE OF THE APENNINES
The occupation of Mevania[160] had terrified Italy with the 59
prospect of a revival of the war, but Vitellius' cowardly retreat[161]
sensibly strengthened the popularity of the Flavian party. The
Samnites, Pelignians, and Marsians were now induced to rise. They were
jealous of Campania for stealing a march on them, and the change of
masters, as so often happens, made them perform all their military
duties with the utmost alacrity. But in crossing the Apennines
Antonius' army suffered severely from the rough December weather.
Though they met with no opposition, they found it hard enough to
struggle through the snow, and realized what danger they would have
had to face if Vitellius had not happened to turn back. Certainly
chance helped the Flavian generals quite as often as their own
strategy. Here they came across Petilius Cerialis,[162] who had been
enabled by his knowledge of the country to elude Vitellius' outposts,
disguised as a peasant. As he was a near relative of Vespasian and a
distinguished soldier he was given a place on the staff. Several
authorities say that Flavius Sabinus and Domitian[163] were also
afforded facilities for escape, and that Antonius sent messengers who
contrived by various devices to get through to them, and made
arrangements for an interview and safe conduct. Sabinus, however,
pleaded that his health was unequal to the fatigue of such a bold
step. Domitian was quite ready to venture, but although the guards to
whom Vitellius had entrusted him, promised that they would share his
flight, he was afraid they might be laying a trap for him. As a matter
of fact, Vitellius was too anxious for the safety of his own relatives
to plot any harm against Domitian.
Arrived at Carsulae[164] the Flavian generals took a few days' 60
rest and awaited the arrival of the main legionary force. [165] The
place suited them admirably for an encampment. It commanded a wide
view, and with so many prosperous towns in the rear their supplies
were safe. The Vitellians too, were only ten miles away, and they had
hopes of negotiating treason with them. The soldiers chafed at this
delay, preferring victory to peace. They did not even want to wait for
their own legions, for there would be more plunder than danger to
share with them. Antonius accordingly summoned a meeting of the men
and explained to them that Vitellius still had troops at his command.
Reflection might make them waver, despair would steel their hearts. In
civil war, he told them, the first steps may be left to chance,
nothing but careful strategy can win the final victory. The fleet at
Misenum and the richest districts of Campania had already deserted
Vitellius, and in the whole world nothing was left to him now except
the country between Narnia and Tarracina. The battle of Cremona had
brought them credit enough, and the destruction of the town more than
enough discredit. Their desire must be not to take Rome but to save
it. They would gain richer rewards and far more glory if they could
show that they had saved the senate and people of Rome without
shedding a drop of blood. Such considerations as these calmed their
excitement, and it was not long before the legions arrived.
Alarmed at the repute of this augmented army, Vitellius' Guards 61
began to waver. There was no one to encourage them to fight, while
many urged them to desert, being eager to hand over their companies or
squadrons to the enemy and by such a gift to secure the victor's
gratitude for the future. These also let the Flavians know that the
next camp at Interamna[166] had a garrison of four hundred cavalry.
Varus was promptly sent off with a light marching force, and the few
who offered resistance were killed. The majority threw away their arms
and begged for quarter. Some escaped to the main camp[167] and spread
universal panic by exaggerating the strength and prowess of the enemy,
in order to mitigate the disgrace of losing the fort. In the Vitellian
camp all offences went unpunished: desertion met with sure reward.
Their loyalty soon gave way and a competition in treachery began.
Tribunes and centurions deserted daily, but not the common soldiers,
who had grown stubbornly faithful to Vitellius. At last, however,
Priscus and Alfenus[168] abandoned the camp and returned to Vitellius,
thus finally releasing all the others from any obligation to blush for
their treachery.
About the same time Fabius Valens[169] was executed in his prison 62
at Urbinum, and his head was exhibited to Vitellius' Guards to show
them that further hope was vain. For they cherished a belief that
Valens had made his way into Germany, and was there mustering his old
force and fresh troops as well. This evidence of his death threw them
into despair. The Flavian army was vastly inspirited by it and
regarded Valens' death as the end of the war.
Valens had been born at Anagnia of an equestrian family. He was a man
of loose morality, not without intellectual gifts, who by indulging in
frivolity posed as a wit. In Nero's time he had acted in a
harlequinade at the Juvenalian Games. [170] At first he pleaded
compulsion, but afterwards he acted voluntarily, and his performances
were rather clever than respectable. Rising to the command of a
legion, he supported Verginius[171] and then defamed his character. He
murdered Fonteius Capito,[171] whose loyalty he had undermined--or
perhaps because he had failed to do so. He betrayed Galba and remained
faithful to Vitellius, a merit to which the treachery of others served
as a foil.
Now that their hopes were crushed on all sides, the Vitellians 63
prepared to go over to the enemy. But even at this crisis they saved
their honour by marching down with their standards and colours to the
plains below Narnia, where the Flavian army was drawn up in full
armour ready for battle in two deep lines on either side of the road.
The Vitellians marched in between and were surrounded. Antonius then
spoke to them kindly and told them to remain, some at Narnia and some
at Interamna. He also left behind some of the victorious legions,
which were strong enough to quell any outbreak but would not molest
them so long as they remained quiet.
FOOTNOTES:
[160] See chap. 55.
[161] See chap. 56.
[162] A distinguished officer, who successfully crushed the
rebellion on the Rhine (Book IV), and became governor of
Britain in 71.
[163] Vespasian's brother and younger son were both in Rome,
the former still holding the office of city prefect (cp. i. 46).
[164] Casigliano.
[165] From Verona (see chap. 52).
[166] Terni.
[167] At Narnia.
[168] The two prefects of the guard.
[169] See chap. 43.
[170] Properly a festival to celebrate the first cutting of
the beard. Nero forced high officials and their wives to take
part in unseemly performances (ii. 62), and the festivities
became a public scandal, culminating in Nero's own appearance
as a lyrist.
[171] See i. 7, 8.
THE ABDICATION OF VITELLIUS AND THE BURNING OF THE CAPITOL
During these days Antonius and Varus kept sending messages to
Vitellius, in which they offered him his life, a gift of money, and
the choice of a safe retreat in Campania, if he would stop the war and
surrender himself and his children to Vespasian. Mucianus wrote him
letters to the same effect. Vitellius usually took these offers
seriously and talked about the number of slaves he would have and the
choice of a seaside place. He had sunk, indeed, into such mental
torpor that, if other people had not remembered that he was an
emperor, he was certainly beginning to forget it himself. However, 64
it was to Flavius Sabinus, the City Prefect, that the leading men at
Rome addressed themselves. They urged him secretly not to lose all
share in the glory of victory. They pointed out that the City Garrison
was under his own command, and that he could count on the police and
their own bands of slaves, to say nothing of the good fortune of the
party and all the advantage that victory gives. He must not leave all
the glory to Antonius and Varus. Vitellius had nothing left but a few
regiments of guards, who were seriously alarmed at the bad news which
came from every quarter.
As for the populace, their feelings soon
changed, and if he put himself at their head, they would be just as
loud in their flattery of Vespasian. Vitellius himself could not even
cope with success, and disaster had positively paralysed him. The
credit of ending the war would go to the man who seized the city. It
was eminently fitting that Sabinus should secure the throne for his
brother, and that Vespasian should hold him higher than any one else.
Age had enfeebled Sabinus, and he showed no alacrity to listen to 65
such talk as this. Some people covertly insinuated that he was jealous
of his brother's success and was trying to delay its realization.
Flavius Sabinus was the elder brother and, while they were both
private persons, he had been the richer and more influential. It was
also believed that he had been chary in helping Vespasian to recover
his financial position, and had taken a mortgage on his house and
estates. Consequently, though they remained openly friendly, there
were suspicions of a secret enmity between them. The more charitable
explanation is that Sabinus's gentle nature shrank from the idea of
bloodshed and massacre, and that this was his reason for so constantly
discussing with Vitellius the prospects of peace and a capitulation on
terms. After several interviews at his house they finally came to a
settlement--so the report went--at the Temple of Apollo. [172] To the
actual conversation there were only two witnesses, Cluvius Rufus[173]
and Silius Italicus,[174] but the expression of their faces was
watched from a distance. Vitellius was said to look abject and
demoralized: Sabinus showed less sign of pride than of pity.
Had Vitellius found it no harder to persuade his friends than to 66
make his own renunciation, Vespasian's army might have marched into
Rome without bloodshed. But as it was, each of his friends in
proportion to his loyalty persisted in refusing terms of peace. They
pointed to the danger and disgrace. Would their conqueror keep his
promises any longer than he liked? However great Vespasian's
self-confidence, he could not allow Vitellius to live in private. Nor
would the losers acquiesce: their very pity would be a menace. [175]
'Of course,' they said, 'you are an old man. You have done with
fortune, good or bad. But what sort of repute or position would your
son Germanicus[176] enjoy? At present they are promising you money and
a household, and the pleasant shores of Campania. But when once
Vespasian has seized the throne, neither he nor his friends nor even
his army will feel their safety assured until the rival claimant is
dead. They imprisoned Fabius Valens and meant to make use of him if a
crisis occurred, but they found him too great an incubus. You may be
sure that Antonius and Fuscus and that typical representative of the
party, Mucianus, will have no choice but to kill you. Julius Caesar
did not let Pompey live unmolested, nor Augustus Antony. [177] Do you
suppose that Vespasian's is a loftier disposition? Why, he was one of
your father's dependants,[178] when your father was Claudius's
colleague. [179] No, think of your father's censorship, his three
consulships,[179] and all the honour your great house has won. You
must not disgrace them. Despair, at least, should nerve your courage.
The troops are steadfast; you still enjoy the people's favour. Indeed,
nothing worse can happen to you than what we are eager to face of our
own free will. If we are defeated, we must die; if we surrender, we
must die. All that matters is whether we breathe our last amid mockery
and insult or bravely and with honour. '
But Vitellius was deaf to all courageous counsel. His mind was 67
obsessed with pity for his wife and children, and an anxious fear that
obstinate resistance might make the conqueror merciless towards them.
He had also a mother,[180] very old and infirm, but she had
opportunely died a few days before and thus forestalled the ruin of
her house. All she had got out of her son's principate was sorrow and
a good name. On December 17 he heard the news that the legion and the
Guards at Narnia had deserted him and surrendered to the enemy. He at
once put on mourning and left the palace, surrounded by his sorrowful
household. His small son was carried in a little litter, as though
this had been his funeral. The populace uttered untimely flatteries:
the soldiers kept an ominous silence.
On that day there was no one so indifferent to the tragedy of 68
human life as to be unmoved by this spectacle. A Roman emperor,
yesterday master of the inhabited world, had left the seat of his
authority, and was now passing through the streets of the city,
through the crowding populace, quitting the throne. Such a sight had
never been seen or heard of before. The dictator, Caesar, had been the
victim of sudden violence; Caligula of a secret conspiracy. Nero's had
been a stealthy flight to some obscure country house under cover of
night. Piso and Galba might almost be said to have fallen on the field
of battle. But here was Vitellius--before the assembly of his own
people, his own soldiers around him, with women even looking
on--uttering a few sentences suitable to his miserable situation. He
said it was in the interest of peace and of his country that he now
resigned. He begged them only to retain his memory in their hearts and
to take pity on his brother, his wife, and his little innocent
children. As he said this, he held out his son to them and commended
him, now to individuals, now to the whole assembly. At last tears
choked his voice. Turning to the consul, Caecilius Simplex,[181] who
was standing by, he unstrapped his sword and offered to surrender it
as a symbol of his power over the life and death of his subjects. The
consul refused. The people in the assembly shouted 'No'. So he left
them with the intention of depositing the regalia in the Temple of
Concord and then going to his brother's house. But he was faced with a
still louder uproar. They refused to let him enter a private house,
and shouted to him to return to the palace. They blocked every other
way and only left the road leading into the Via Sacra open. [182] Not
knowing what else to do, Vitellius returned to the palace.
A rumour of his abdication had preceded him, and Flavius Sabinus 69
had sent written instructions to the Guards'[183] officers to keep the
men in hand. Thus the whole empire seemed to have fallen into
Vespasian's lap. The chief senators, the majority of the knights, and
the whole of the city garrison and the police came flocking to the
house of Flavius Sabinus. There they heard the news of the popular
enthusiasm for Vitellius and the threatening attitude of the German
Guards. [184] But Sabinus had gone too far to draw back, and when he
showed hesitation, they all began to urge him to fight, each being
afraid for his own safety if the Vitellians were to fall on them when
they were disunited and consequently weaker. However, as so often
happens on these occasions, every one offered to give advice but few
to share the danger. While Sabinus' Body Guard were marching down by
the Fundane reservoir[185] they were attacked by some of the most
determined Vitellians. The surprise was unpremeditated, but the
Vitellians got the best of an unimportant skirmish. In the panic
Sabinus chose what was at the moment the safest course, and occupied
the summit of the Capitol,[186] where his troops were joined by a few
senators and knights. It is not easy to record their names, since
after Vespasian's victory crowds of people claimed credit for this
service to the party. There were even some women who endured the
siege, the most famous of them being Verulana Gratilla, who had
neither children nor relatives to attract her, but only her love of
danger. [187]
The Vitellians, who were investing them, kept a half-hearted watch,
and Sabinus was thus enabled to send for his own children and his
nephew Domitian at dead of night, dispatching a courier by an
unguarded route to tell the Flavian generals that he and his men were
under siege, and would be in great straits unless they were rescued.
All night, indeed, he was quite unmolested, and could have escaped
with perfect safety. The Vitellian troops could face danger with
spirit, but were much too careless in the task of keeping guard;
besides which a sudden storm of chilly rain interfered with their
sight and hearing.
At daybreak, before the two sides commenced hostilities, Sabinus 70
sent Cornelius Martialis, who had been a senior centurion, to
Vitellius with instructions to complain that the conditions were being
violated; that he had evidently made a mere empty show of abdication,
meant to deceive a number of eminent gentlemen. Else why had he gone
from the meeting to his brother's house, which caught the eye from a
conspicuous position overlooking the Forum, and not rather to his
wife's on the Aventine. That was the proper course for a private
citizen, anxious to avoid all pretension to supreme authority. But no,
Vitellius had returned to the palace, the very stronghold of imperial
majesty. From there he had launched a column of armed men, who had
strewn with innocent dead the most crowded quarter of Rome, and even
laid violent hands upon the Capitol. As for Sabinus himself, the
messenger was to say, he was only a civilian, a mere member of the
senate. While the issue was being decided between Vespasian and
Vitellius by the engagement of legions, the capture of towns, the
capitulation of cohorts; even when the provinces of Spain, of Germany,
of Britain, had risen in revolt; he, though Vespasian's brother, had
still remained faithful to his allegiance, until Vitellius, unasked,
began to invite him to a conference. Peace and union, he was to remind
him, serve the interest of the losers, and only the reputation of the
winners. If Vitellius regretted their compact, he ought not to take
arms against Sabinus, whom he had treacherously deceived, and against
Vespasian's son, who was still a mere boy. What was the good of
killing one youth and one old man? He ought rather to march out
against the legions and fight for the empire on the field. The result
of the battle would decide all other questions.
Greatly alarmed, Vitellius replied with a few words in which he tried
to excuse himself and throw the blame on his soldiers. 'I am too
unassuming,' he said, 'to cope with their overpowering impatience. ' He
then warned Martialis to make his way out of the house by a secret
passage, for fear that the soldiers should kill him as an ambassador
of the peace to which they were so hostile. Vitellius himself was not
in a position to issue orders or prohibitions; no longer an emperor,
merely an excuse for war.
Martialis had hardly returned to the Capitol when the furious 71
soldiery arrived. They had no general to lead them: each was a law to
himself. Their column marched at full speed through the Forum and past
the temples overlooking it. Then in battle order they advanced up the
steep hill in front of them, until they reached the lowest gates of
the fortress on the Capitol. In old days there was a series of
colonnades at the side of this slope, on the right as you go up.
Emerging on to the roof of these, the besieged overwhelmed the
Vitellians with showers of stones and tiles. The attacking party
carried nothing but swords, and it seemed a long business to send for
siege-engines and missiles. So they flung torches into the
nearest[188] colonnade and, following in the wake of the flames, would
have burst through the burnt gates of the Capitol, if Sabinus had not
torn down all the available statues--the monuments of our ancestors'
glory--and built a sort of barricade on the very threshold. They then
tried to attack the Capitol by two opposite approaches, one near the
'Grove of Refuge'[189] and the other by the hundred steps which lead
up to the Tarpeian Rock. This double assault came as a surprise. That
by the Refuge was the closer and more vigorous. Nothing could stop the
Vitellians, who climbed up by some contiguous houses built on to the
side of the hill, which in the days of prolonged peace had been raised
to such a height that their roofs were level with the floor of the
Capitol. It is uncertain whether the buildings at this point were
fired by the assailants or--as tradition prefers--by the besieged in
trying to dislodge their enemies who had struggled up so far. The fire
spread to the colonnades adjoining the temples, and then the
'eagles'[190] supporting the roof, which were made of very old wood,
caught the flames and fed them. And so the Capitol, with its doors
fast shut, undefended and unplundered, was burnt to the ground.
Since the foundation of the city no such deplorable and horrible 72
disaster had ever befallen the people of Rome. It was no case of
foreign invasion. Had our own wickedness allowed, the country might
have been enjoying the blessings of a benign Providence; and yet here
was the seat of Jupiter Almighty--the temple solemnly founded by our
ancestors as the pledge of their imperial greatness, on which not even
Porsenna,[191] when Rome surrendered, nor the Gauls, when they took
it, had ever dared to lay rash hands--being brought utterly to ruin by
the mad folly of two rival emperors! [192] The Capitol had been burnt
before in civil war,[193] but that was the crime of private persons.
Now it had been openly assaulted by the people of Rome and openly
burnt by them. And what was the cause of war? what the recompense for
such a disaster? Were we fighting for our country?
King Tarquinius Priscus had vowed to build this temple in the Sabine
war, and had laid the foundations on a scale that suited rather his
hope of the city's future greatness than the still moderate fortunes
of the Roman people. Later Servius Tullius, with the aid of Rome's
allies, and Tarquinius Superbus, with the spoils of the Volscians
after the capture of Suessa Pometia,[194] continued the building. But
the glory of completing it was reserved for the days of freedom. After
the expulsion of the kings, Horatius Pulvillus, in his second
consulship[195] dedicated this monument on such a magnificent scale,
that in later days, with all her boundless wealth, Rome has been able
to embellish but never to enlarge it. After an interval of four
hundred and fifteen years, in the consulship of Lucius Scipio and
Caius Norbanus,[196] it was burnt and rebuilt on the same site. Sulla
after his victory undertook the task of restoring it, but did not
dedicate it. This only was lacking to justify his title of 'Fortune's
Favourite'. [197] Much as the emperors did to it, the name of Lutatius
Catulus[198] still remained upon it up to the time of Vitellius. [199]
This was the temple that was now ablaze.
The besieged suffered more panic than their assailants. The 73
Vitellian soldiers lacked neither resource nor steadiness in moments
of crisis. But on the other side the troops were terrified, the
general[200] inert, and apparently so paralysed that he was
practically deaf and dumb. He neither adopted others' plans nor formed
any of his own, but only drifted about from place to place, attracted
by the shouts of the enemy, contradicting all his own orders. The
result was what always happens in a hopeless disaster: everybody gave
orders and nobody obeyed them. At last they threw away their weapons
and began to peer round for a way of escape or some means of hiding.
Then the Vitellians came bursting in, and with fire and sword made one
red havoc. A few good soldiers dared to show fight and were cut to
pieces. Of these the most notable were Cornelius Martialis,[201]
Aemilius Pacensis,[202] Casperius Niger, and Didius Scaeva. Flavius
Sabinus, who stood unarmed and making no attempt to escape, was
surrounded together with the consul Quintius Atticus,[203] whose empty
title made him a marked man, as well as his personal vanity, which had
led him to distribute manifestoes full of compliments to Vespasian and
insults against Vitellius. The rest escaped by various means. Some
disguised themselves as slaves: some were sheltered by faithful
dependants: some hid among the baggage. Others again caught the
Vitellians' password, by which they recognized each other, and
actually went about demanding it and giving it when challenged, thus
escaping under a cloak of effrontery.
When the enemy first broke in, Domitian had taken refuge with the 74
sacristan, and was enabled by the ingenuity of a freedman to escape
among a crowd of worshippers in a linen dress,[204] and to take refuge
near the Velabrum with Cornelius Primus, one of his father's
dependants. When his father came to the throne, Domitian pulled down
the sacristan's lodging and built a little chapel to Jupiter the
Saviour with an altar, on which his adventures were depicted in marble
relief. Later, when he became emperor, he dedicated a huge temple to
Jupiter the Guardian with a statue of himself in the lap of the god.
Sabinus and Atticus were loaded with chains and taken to Vitellius,
who received them without any language or looks of disfavour, much to
the chagrin of those who wanted to see them punished with death and
themselves rewarded for their successful labours. When those who stood
nearest started an outcry, the dregs of the populace soon began to
demand Sabinus' execution with mingled threats and flatteries.
Vitellius came out on to the steps of the palace prepared to plead for
him: but they forced him to desist. Sabinus was stabbed and riddled
with wounds: his head was cut off and the trunk dragged away to 75
the Ladder of Sighs. [205] Such was the end of a man who certainly
merits no contempt. He had served his country for thirty-five years,
and won credit both as civilian and soldier. His integrity and
fairness were beyond criticism. He talked too much about himself, but
this is the one charge which rumour could hint against him in the
seven years when he was Governor of Moesia, and the twelve years
during which he was Prefect of the City. At the end of his life some
thought he showed a lack of enterprise, but many believed him a
moderate man, who was anxious to save his fellow citizens from
bloodshed. In this, at any rate, all would agree, that before
Vespasian became emperor the reputation of his house rested on
Sabinus. It is said that Mucianus was delighted to hear of his murder,
and many people maintained that it served the interests of peace by
putting an end to the jealousy of two rivals, one of whom was the
emperor's brother, while the other posed as his partner in the
empire. [206]
When the people further demanded the execution of the consul,
Vitellius withstood them. He had forgiven Atticus, and felt that he
owed him a favour, for, when asked who had set fire to the Capitol,
Atticus had taken the blame on himself, by which avowal--or was it a
well-timed falsehood? --he had fixed all the guilt and odium on himself
and exonerated the Vitellian party.
FOOTNOTES:
[172] On the Palatine.
[173] See i. 8.
[174] A friend of Vitellius and the author of the historical
epic on the second Punic War.
[175] This apparently means that, if Vitellius were spared,
pity for his position would inspire his supporters to make
further trouble.
[176] See ii. 59.
[177] Two good points, but both untrue.
[178] This too is probably hyperbole, but Vespasian may have
owed his command in Germany to the influence of Vitellius'
father.
[179] See i. 52, note 99.
[180] See ii. 64, 89.
[181] See ii. 60.
[182] i. e. the way back from the Forum to the Palace.
[183] Including the city garrison and police.
[184] In chap. 78 we find three cohorts of Guards still
faithful to Vitellius, and, as it appears from ii. 93, 94 that
men from the legions of Germany had been enlisted in the
Guards, the term _Germanicae cohortes_ seems to refer to these
three cohorts, in which perhaps the majority were men from the
German army.
[185] Said to be on the Quirinal.
[186] Either the whole hill, or, if the expression is exact,
the south-west summit.
[187] This seems to have led her later into the paths of
conspiracy, for she is said to have been banished by Domitian
for her friendship with Arulenus Rusticus.
[188] _Prominentem_ seems to mean the one that projected
towards them.
[189] The space lying between the two peaks of the Capitoline.
[190] A technical term for the beams of the pediment.
[191] 'Lars Porsenna of Clusium,' 507 B. C.
[192] 'Burning the Capitol' was a proverb of utter iniquity.
[193] In the war between Sulla and Marius, 83 B. C.
[194] The capital town of the Volscians. This early history is
told in the first book of Livy.
[195] 507 B. C.
[196] 83 B. C. The interval is really 425 years.
[197] This, according to Pliny, was Sulla's own saying.
[198] Consul in 69 B. C. He took the title of Capitolinus.
[199] On the monument which details his exploits Augustus says
that he restored the Capitol at immense cost without
inscribing his name on it.
[200] Flavius Sabinus.
(see ii. 85, iii. 9, 10).
[143] Cp. chap. 8.
[144] i. e. Mucianus and his officers (see chap. 46).
VITELLIUS' MEASURES OF DEFENCE
After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly suppressed 54
the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but
only his precautions against it. Had he admitted the facts and sought
advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that
all went well only made matters worse. He was himself extraordinarily
silent about the war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was
forbidden. This only increased the number of people who, if permitted,
would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread
grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian leaders slow to
foster these rumours. Whenever they captured Vitellian spies they
escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning
army, and sent them back again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them
in private and then had them murdered. A centurion named Julius
Agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to
fire Vitellius' courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the
emperor to send him to inspect the enemy's forces and discover what
had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt to deceive Antonius
by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the
emperor's instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown
everything. He was given guides, who showed him the field of battle,
the ruins of Cremona and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to
Vitellius. Finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even
suggested that he had been bribed, he said, 'You want some certain
evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or
dead, I will give you evidence that you can believe. ' And he was as
good as his word. He went straight from the emperor's presence and
committed suicide. Some say he was killed by order of Vitellius, but
they give the same account of his heroic devotion. [145]
Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched Julius 55
Priscus and Alfenus Varus[146] with fourteen cohorts of Guards and all
his available cavalry to hold the Apennines. A legion levied from the
marines[147] was sent after them. This large army of picked men and
horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to
have even taken the offensive. His other cohorts[148] were given to
his brother, Lucius Vitellius, for the protection of the city. The
emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling
nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated
consuls for several years in advance. He lavished special
charters[149] on allied communities and extended Latin rights[150] to
foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. In
fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple
the empire. However, the mob accepted these munificent grants with
open mouths. Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them
invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a
revolution. At last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined
the camp at Mevania,[151] where they had taken up their position. A
long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but
most by their fears. Here he was still undecided and at the mercy of
treacherous advice.
During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A cloud of 56
ill-omened birds[152] flew over his head and its density obscured the
daylight. To this was added another omen of disaster. A bull broke
from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped
so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed
according to the proper ritual. But the chief portent was Vitellius
himself. He was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew
nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed
forward or protracted. He always had to ask some one else. At every
fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And
then he would get drunk. At last he found camp life too tedious, and
on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at Misenum[153] he returned to
Rome. Every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed
insensible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with his
full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out
with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his forces he sent his
keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken
prisoner. The more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this
policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted.
But the emperor's intimates refused them admittance. He had, indeed,
formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and
refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run
fatal.
In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The mutiny of 57
the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by Claudius Faventinus, a
centurion whom Galba had dismissed in disgrace. To obtain his object
he had forged a letter from Vespasian promising rewards for treachery.
The admiral, Claudius Apollinaris,[154] was neither a staunch loyalist
nor an enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor,
who happened to be at Minturnae,[155] offered to take the lead of the
rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns.
Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while Capua remained
loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the
civil war. To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius
Julianus, who had lately been in command of the fleet at Misenum and
had allowed lax discipline. To support him he was given one cohort of
the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under
him. The two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not
long before Julianus came over to Vespasian's side. They then joined
forces and occupied Tarracina,[156] which owed its strength more to
its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.
When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force at 58
Narnia[157] with the prefects of the Guard,[158] and sent his brother
Lucius with six regiments of Guards and five hundred horse to cope
with the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous depression
was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the
populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. For he dignified this
poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by
the specious titles of 'the army' or 'his legions'. His friends were
all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice
of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who
gave their names. As their numbers were too great, he gave the task of
selection to the two consuls. From each of the senators he levied a
fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights offered
money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar
assistance. Indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had
gradually changed into real sympathy. People began to feel pity, not
perhaps so much for Vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes.
He himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands
upon their compassion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when
they are frightened, beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the
title of Caesar,[159] but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a
superstitious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one
listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while a rash
and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it
always begins to flag. Gradually the senators and knights deserted
him. At first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but
soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. At last
Vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them
from the services which they refused to render.
FOOTNOTES:
[145] This incident was probably another historical
commonplace. See the story from Plutarch (ii. 46, note 316),
which is also told by Suetonius and Dio.
[146] The prefects of the Guards (cp. ii. 92).
[147] At Misenum. (Leg. II Adjutrix. ) The Ravenna marines were
on the Flavian side (see chap. 50).
[148] i. e. the rest of the Guards (2), with the city garrison (4),
and police (7) (cp. ii. 93).
[149] i. e. granting them special privileges denied to other
communities in the same province.
[150] A sort of 'half-way house to Roman citizenship'. Full
commercial rights were included but not those of
intermarriage. It was possible for individual citizens in a
Latin town to obtain the full rights of a Roman.
[151] Bevagna.
[152] Dio makes them vultures and the scene a sacrifice: they
scattered the victims and nearly knocked Vitellius off his
pulpit.
[153] Described in the following chapter.
[154] He had succeeded Bassus (iii. 12).
[155] Near the mouth of the Liris.
[156] Horace's 'Anxur perched on gleaming rocks'. It lay near
the Pontine marshes on the Appian way.
[157] Narni.
[158] Priscus and Varus (see chap. 55).
[159] i. 62, ii. 62.
THE PASSAGE OF THE APENNINES
The occupation of Mevania[160] had terrified Italy with the 59
prospect of a revival of the war, but Vitellius' cowardly retreat[161]
sensibly strengthened the popularity of the Flavian party. The
Samnites, Pelignians, and Marsians were now induced to rise. They were
jealous of Campania for stealing a march on them, and the change of
masters, as so often happens, made them perform all their military
duties with the utmost alacrity. But in crossing the Apennines
Antonius' army suffered severely from the rough December weather.
Though they met with no opposition, they found it hard enough to
struggle through the snow, and realized what danger they would have
had to face if Vitellius had not happened to turn back. Certainly
chance helped the Flavian generals quite as often as their own
strategy. Here they came across Petilius Cerialis,[162] who had been
enabled by his knowledge of the country to elude Vitellius' outposts,
disguised as a peasant. As he was a near relative of Vespasian and a
distinguished soldier he was given a place on the staff. Several
authorities say that Flavius Sabinus and Domitian[163] were also
afforded facilities for escape, and that Antonius sent messengers who
contrived by various devices to get through to them, and made
arrangements for an interview and safe conduct. Sabinus, however,
pleaded that his health was unequal to the fatigue of such a bold
step. Domitian was quite ready to venture, but although the guards to
whom Vitellius had entrusted him, promised that they would share his
flight, he was afraid they might be laying a trap for him. As a matter
of fact, Vitellius was too anxious for the safety of his own relatives
to plot any harm against Domitian.
Arrived at Carsulae[164] the Flavian generals took a few days' 60
rest and awaited the arrival of the main legionary force. [165] The
place suited them admirably for an encampment. It commanded a wide
view, and with so many prosperous towns in the rear their supplies
were safe. The Vitellians too, were only ten miles away, and they had
hopes of negotiating treason with them. The soldiers chafed at this
delay, preferring victory to peace. They did not even want to wait for
their own legions, for there would be more plunder than danger to
share with them. Antonius accordingly summoned a meeting of the men
and explained to them that Vitellius still had troops at his command.
Reflection might make them waver, despair would steel their hearts. In
civil war, he told them, the first steps may be left to chance,
nothing but careful strategy can win the final victory. The fleet at
Misenum and the richest districts of Campania had already deserted
Vitellius, and in the whole world nothing was left to him now except
the country between Narnia and Tarracina. The battle of Cremona had
brought them credit enough, and the destruction of the town more than
enough discredit. Their desire must be not to take Rome but to save
it. They would gain richer rewards and far more glory if they could
show that they had saved the senate and people of Rome without
shedding a drop of blood. Such considerations as these calmed their
excitement, and it was not long before the legions arrived.
Alarmed at the repute of this augmented army, Vitellius' Guards 61
began to waver. There was no one to encourage them to fight, while
many urged them to desert, being eager to hand over their companies or
squadrons to the enemy and by such a gift to secure the victor's
gratitude for the future. These also let the Flavians know that the
next camp at Interamna[166] had a garrison of four hundred cavalry.
Varus was promptly sent off with a light marching force, and the few
who offered resistance were killed. The majority threw away their arms
and begged for quarter. Some escaped to the main camp[167] and spread
universal panic by exaggerating the strength and prowess of the enemy,
in order to mitigate the disgrace of losing the fort. In the Vitellian
camp all offences went unpunished: desertion met with sure reward.
Their loyalty soon gave way and a competition in treachery began.
Tribunes and centurions deserted daily, but not the common soldiers,
who had grown stubbornly faithful to Vitellius. At last, however,
Priscus and Alfenus[168] abandoned the camp and returned to Vitellius,
thus finally releasing all the others from any obligation to blush for
their treachery.
About the same time Fabius Valens[169] was executed in his prison 62
at Urbinum, and his head was exhibited to Vitellius' Guards to show
them that further hope was vain. For they cherished a belief that
Valens had made his way into Germany, and was there mustering his old
force and fresh troops as well. This evidence of his death threw them
into despair. The Flavian army was vastly inspirited by it and
regarded Valens' death as the end of the war.
Valens had been born at Anagnia of an equestrian family. He was a man
of loose morality, not without intellectual gifts, who by indulging in
frivolity posed as a wit. In Nero's time he had acted in a
harlequinade at the Juvenalian Games. [170] At first he pleaded
compulsion, but afterwards he acted voluntarily, and his performances
were rather clever than respectable. Rising to the command of a
legion, he supported Verginius[171] and then defamed his character. He
murdered Fonteius Capito,[171] whose loyalty he had undermined--or
perhaps because he had failed to do so. He betrayed Galba and remained
faithful to Vitellius, a merit to which the treachery of others served
as a foil.
Now that their hopes were crushed on all sides, the Vitellians 63
prepared to go over to the enemy. But even at this crisis they saved
their honour by marching down with their standards and colours to the
plains below Narnia, where the Flavian army was drawn up in full
armour ready for battle in two deep lines on either side of the road.
The Vitellians marched in between and were surrounded. Antonius then
spoke to them kindly and told them to remain, some at Narnia and some
at Interamna. He also left behind some of the victorious legions,
which were strong enough to quell any outbreak but would not molest
them so long as they remained quiet.
FOOTNOTES:
[160] See chap. 55.
[161] See chap. 56.
[162] A distinguished officer, who successfully crushed the
rebellion on the Rhine (Book IV), and became governor of
Britain in 71.
[163] Vespasian's brother and younger son were both in Rome,
the former still holding the office of city prefect (cp. i. 46).
[164] Casigliano.
[165] From Verona (see chap. 52).
[166] Terni.
[167] At Narnia.
[168] The two prefects of the guard.
[169] See chap. 43.
[170] Properly a festival to celebrate the first cutting of
the beard. Nero forced high officials and their wives to take
part in unseemly performances (ii. 62), and the festivities
became a public scandal, culminating in Nero's own appearance
as a lyrist.
[171] See i. 7, 8.
THE ABDICATION OF VITELLIUS AND THE BURNING OF THE CAPITOL
During these days Antonius and Varus kept sending messages to
Vitellius, in which they offered him his life, a gift of money, and
the choice of a safe retreat in Campania, if he would stop the war and
surrender himself and his children to Vespasian. Mucianus wrote him
letters to the same effect. Vitellius usually took these offers
seriously and talked about the number of slaves he would have and the
choice of a seaside place. He had sunk, indeed, into such mental
torpor that, if other people had not remembered that he was an
emperor, he was certainly beginning to forget it himself. However, 64
it was to Flavius Sabinus, the City Prefect, that the leading men at
Rome addressed themselves. They urged him secretly not to lose all
share in the glory of victory. They pointed out that the City Garrison
was under his own command, and that he could count on the police and
their own bands of slaves, to say nothing of the good fortune of the
party and all the advantage that victory gives. He must not leave all
the glory to Antonius and Varus. Vitellius had nothing left but a few
regiments of guards, who were seriously alarmed at the bad news which
came from every quarter.
As for the populace, their feelings soon
changed, and if he put himself at their head, they would be just as
loud in their flattery of Vespasian. Vitellius himself could not even
cope with success, and disaster had positively paralysed him. The
credit of ending the war would go to the man who seized the city. It
was eminently fitting that Sabinus should secure the throne for his
brother, and that Vespasian should hold him higher than any one else.
Age had enfeebled Sabinus, and he showed no alacrity to listen to 65
such talk as this. Some people covertly insinuated that he was jealous
of his brother's success and was trying to delay its realization.
Flavius Sabinus was the elder brother and, while they were both
private persons, he had been the richer and more influential. It was
also believed that he had been chary in helping Vespasian to recover
his financial position, and had taken a mortgage on his house and
estates. Consequently, though they remained openly friendly, there
were suspicions of a secret enmity between them. The more charitable
explanation is that Sabinus's gentle nature shrank from the idea of
bloodshed and massacre, and that this was his reason for so constantly
discussing with Vitellius the prospects of peace and a capitulation on
terms. After several interviews at his house they finally came to a
settlement--so the report went--at the Temple of Apollo. [172] To the
actual conversation there were only two witnesses, Cluvius Rufus[173]
and Silius Italicus,[174] but the expression of their faces was
watched from a distance. Vitellius was said to look abject and
demoralized: Sabinus showed less sign of pride than of pity.
Had Vitellius found it no harder to persuade his friends than to 66
make his own renunciation, Vespasian's army might have marched into
Rome without bloodshed. But as it was, each of his friends in
proportion to his loyalty persisted in refusing terms of peace. They
pointed to the danger and disgrace. Would their conqueror keep his
promises any longer than he liked? However great Vespasian's
self-confidence, he could not allow Vitellius to live in private. Nor
would the losers acquiesce: their very pity would be a menace. [175]
'Of course,' they said, 'you are an old man. You have done with
fortune, good or bad. But what sort of repute or position would your
son Germanicus[176] enjoy? At present they are promising you money and
a household, and the pleasant shores of Campania. But when once
Vespasian has seized the throne, neither he nor his friends nor even
his army will feel their safety assured until the rival claimant is
dead. They imprisoned Fabius Valens and meant to make use of him if a
crisis occurred, but they found him too great an incubus. You may be
sure that Antonius and Fuscus and that typical representative of the
party, Mucianus, will have no choice but to kill you. Julius Caesar
did not let Pompey live unmolested, nor Augustus Antony. [177] Do you
suppose that Vespasian's is a loftier disposition? Why, he was one of
your father's dependants,[178] when your father was Claudius's
colleague. [179] No, think of your father's censorship, his three
consulships,[179] and all the honour your great house has won. You
must not disgrace them. Despair, at least, should nerve your courage.
The troops are steadfast; you still enjoy the people's favour. Indeed,
nothing worse can happen to you than what we are eager to face of our
own free will. If we are defeated, we must die; if we surrender, we
must die. All that matters is whether we breathe our last amid mockery
and insult or bravely and with honour. '
But Vitellius was deaf to all courageous counsel. His mind was 67
obsessed with pity for his wife and children, and an anxious fear that
obstinate resistance might make the conqueror merciless towards them.
He had also a mother,[180] very old and infirm, but she had
opportunely died a few days before and thus forestalled the ruin of
her house. All she had got out of her son's principate was sorrow and
a good name. On December 17 he heard the news that the legion and the
Guards at Narnia had deserted him and surrendered to the enemy. He at
once put on mourning and left the palace, surrounded by his sorrowful
household. His small son was carried in a little litter, as though
this had been his funeral. The populace uttered untimely flatteries:
the soldiers kept an ominous silence.
On that day there was no one so indifferent to the tragedy of 68
human life as to be unmoved by this spectacle. A Roman emperor,
yesterday master of the inhabited world, had left the seat of his
authority, and was now passing through the streets of the city,
through the crowding populace, quitting the throne. Such a sight had
never been seen or heard of before. The dictator, Caesar, had been the
victim of sudden violence; Caligula of a secret conspiracy. Nero's had
been a stealthy flight to some obscure country house under cover of
night. Piso and Galba might almost be said to have fallen on the field
of battle. But here was Vitellius--before the assembly of his own
people, his own soldiers around him, with women even looking
on--uttering a few sentences suitable to his miserable situation. He
said it was in the interest of peace and of his country that he now
resigned. He begged them only to retain his memory in their hearts and
to take pity on his brother, his wife, and his little innocent
children. As he said this, he held out his son to them and commended
him, now to individuals, now to the whole assembly. At last tears
choked his voice. Turning to the consul, Caecilius Simplex,[181] who
was standing by, he unstrapped his sword and offered to surrender it
as a symbol of his power over the life and death of his subjects. The
consul refused. The people in the assembly shouted 'No'. So he left
them with the intention of depositing the regalia in the Temple of
Concord and then going to his brother's house. But he was faced with a
still louder uproar. They refused to let him enter a private house,
and shouted to him to return to the palace. They blocked every other
way and only left the road leading into the Via Sacra open. [182] Not
knowing what else to do, Vitellius returned to the palace.
A rumour of his abdication had preceded him, and Flavius Sabinus 69
had sent written instructions to the Guards'[183] officers to keep the
men in hand. Thus the whole empire seemed to have fallen into
Vespasian's lap. The chief senators, the majority of the knights, and
the whole of the city garrison and the police came flocking to the
house of Flavius Sabinus. There they heard the news of the popular
enthusiasm for Vitellius and the threatening attitude of the German
Guards. [184] But Sabinus had gone too far to draw back, and when he
showed hesitation, they all began to urge him to fight, each being
afraid for his own safety if the Vitellians were to fall on them when
they were disunited and consequently weaker. However, as so often
happens on these occasions, every one offered to give advice but few
to share the danger. While Sabinus' Body Guard were marching down by
the Fundane reservoir[185] they were attacked by some of the most
determined Vitellians. The surprise was unpremeditated, but the
Vitellians got the best of an unimportant skirmish. In the panic
Sabinus chose what was at the moment the safest course, and occupied
the summit of the Capitol,[186] where his troops were joined by a few
senators and knights. It is not easy to record their names, since
after Vespasian's victory crowds of people claimed credit for this
service to the party. There were even some women who endured the
siege, the most famous of them being Verulana Gratilla, who had
neither children nor relatives to attract her, but only her love of
danger. [187]
The Vitellians, who were investing them, kept a half-hearted watch,
and Sabinus was thus enabled to send for his own children and his
nephew Domitian at dead of night, dispatching a courier by an
unguarded route to tell the Flavian generals that he and his men were
under siege, and would be in great straits unless they were rescued.
All night, indeed, he was quite unmolested, and could have escaped
with perfect safety. The Vitellian troops could face danger with
spirit, but were much too careless in the task of keeping guard;
besides which a sudden storm of chilly rain interfered with their
sight and hearing.
At daybreak, before the two sides commenced hostilities, Sabinus 70
sent Cornelius Martialis, who had been a senior centurion, to
Vitellius with instructions to complain that the conditions were being
violated; that he had evidently made a mere empty show of abdication,
meant to deceive a number of eminent gentlemen. Else why had he gone
from the meeting to his brother's house, which caught the eye from a
conspicuous position overlooking the Forum, and not rather to his
wife's on the Aventine. That was the proper course for a private
citizen, anxious to avoid all pretension to supreme authority. But no,
Vitellius had returned to the palace, the very stronghold of imperial
majesty. From there he had launched a column of armed men, who had
strewn with innocent dead the most crowded quarter of Rome, and even
laid violent hands upon the Capitol. As for Sabinus himself, the
messenger was to say, he was only a civilian, a mere member of the
senate. While the issue was being decided between Vespasian and
Vitellius by the engagement of legions, the capture of towns, the
capitulation of cohorts; even when the provinces of Spain, of Germany,
of Britain, had risen in revolt; he, though Vespasian's brother, had
still remained faithful to his allegiance, until Vitellius, unasked,
began to invite him to a conference. Peace and union, he was to remind
him, serve the interest of the losers, and only the reputation of the
winners. If Vitellius regretted their compact, he ought not to take
arms against Sabinus, whom he had treacherously deceived, and against
Vespasian's son, who was still a mere boy. What was the good of
killing one youth and one old man? He ought rather to march out
against the legions and fight for the empire on the field. The result
of the battle would decide all other questions.
Greatly alarmed, Vitellius replied with a few words in which he tried
to excuse himself and throw the blame on his soldiers. 'I am too
unassuming,' he said, 'to cope with their overpowering impatience. ' He
then warned Martialis to make his way out of the house by a secret
passage, for fear that the soldiers should kill him as an ambassador
of the peace to which they were so hostile. Vitellius himself was not
in a position to issue orders or prohibitions; no longer an emperor,
merely an excuse for war.
Martialis had hardly returned to the Capitol when the furious 71
soldiery arrived. They had no general to lead them: each was a law to
himself. Their column marched at full speed through the Forum and past
the temples overlooking it. Then in battle order they advanced up the
steep hill in front of them, until they reached the lowest gates of
the fortress on the Capitol. In old days there was a series of
colonnades at the side of this slope, on the right as you go up.
Emerging on to the roof of these, the besieged overwhelmed the
Vitellians with showers of stones and tiles. The attacking party
carried nothing but swords, and it seemed a long business to send for
siege-engines and missiles. So they flung torches into the
nearest[188] colonnade and, following in the wake of the flames, would
have burst through the burnt gates of the Capitol, if Sabinus had not
torn down all the available statues--the monuments of our ancestors'
glory--and built a sort of barricade on the very threshold. They then
tried to attack the Capitol by two opposite approaches, one near the
'Grove of Refuge'[189] and the other by the hundred steps which lead
up to the Tarpeian Rock. This double assault came as a surprise. That
by the Refuge was the closer and more vigorous. Nothing could stop the
Vitellians, who climbed up by some contiguous houses built on to the
side of the hill, which in the days of prolonged peace had been raised
to such a height that their roofs were level with the floor of the
Capitol. It is uncertain whether the buildings at this point were
fired by the assailants or--as tradition prefers--by the besieged in
trying to dislodge their enemies who had struggled up so far. The fire
spread to the colonnades adjoining the temples, and then the
'eagles'[190] supporting the roof, which were made of very old wood,
caught the flames and fed them. And so the Capitol, with its doors
fast shut, undefended and unplundered, was burnt to the ground.
Since the foundation of the city no such deplorable and horrible 72
disaster had ever befallen the people of Rome. It was no case of
foreign invasion. Had our own wickedness allowed, the country might
have been enjoying the blessings of a benign Providence; and yet here
was the seat of Jupiter Almighty--the temple solemnly founded by our
ancestors as the pledge of their imperial greatness, on which not even
Porsenna,[191] when Rome surrendered, nor the Gauls, when they took
it, had ever dared to lay rash hands--being brought utterly to ruin by
the mad folly of two rival emperors! [192] The Capitol had been burnt
before in civil war,[193] but that was the crime of private persons.
Now it had been openly assaulted by the people of Rome and openly
burnt by them. And what was the cause of war? what the recompense for
such a disaster? Were we fighting for our country?
King Tarquinius Priscus had vowed to build this temple in the Sabine
war, and had laid the foundations on a scale that suited rather his
hope of the city's future greatness than the still moderate fortunes
of the Roman people. Later Servius Tullius, with the aid of Rome's
allies, and Tarquinius Superbus, with the spoils of the Volscians
after the capture of Suessa Pometia,[194] continued the building. But
the glory of completing it was reserved for the days of freedom. After
the expulsion of the kings, Horatius Pulvillus, in his second
consulship[195] dedicated this monument on such a magnificent scale,
that in later days, with all her boundless wealth, Rome has been able
to embellish but never to enlarge it. After an interval of four
hundred and fifteen years, in the consulship of Lucius Scipio and
Caius Norbanus,[196] it was burnt and rebuilt on the same site. Sulla
after his victory undertook the task of restoring it, but did not
dedicate it. This only was lacking to justify his title of 'Fortune's
Favourite'. [197] Much as the emperors did to it, the name of Lutatius
Catulus[198] still remained upon it up to the time of Vitellius. [199]
This was the temple that was now ablaze.
The besieged suffered more panic than their assailants. The 73
Vitellian soldiers lacked neither resource nor steadiness in moments
of crisis. But on the other side the troops were terrified, the
general[200] inert, and apparently so paralysed that he was
practically deaf and dumb. He neither adopted others' plans nor formed
any of his own, but only drifted about from place to place, attracted
by the shouts of the enemy, contradicting all his own orders. The
result was what always happens in a hopeless disaster: everybody gave
orders and nobody obeyed them. At last they threw away their weapons
and began to peer round for a way of escape or some means of hiding.
Then the Vitellians came bursting in, and with fire and sword made one
red havoc. A few good soldiers dared to show fight and were cut to
pieces. Of these the most notable were Cornelius Martialis,[201]
Aemilius Pacensis,[202] Casperius Niger, and Didius Scaeva. Flavius
Sabinus, who stood unarmed and making no attempt to escape, was
surrounded together with the consul Quintius Atticus,[203] whose empty
title made him a marked man, as well as his personal vanity, which had
led him to distribute manifestoes full of compliments to Vespasian and
insults against Vitellius. The rest escaped by various means. Some
disguised themselves as slaves: some were sheltered by faithful
dependants: some hid among the baggage. Others again caught the
Vitellians' password, by which they recognized each other, and
actually went about demanding it and giving it when challenged, thus
escaping under a cloak of effrontery.
When the enemy first broke in, Domitian had taken refuge with the 74
sacristan, and was enabled by the ingenuity of a freedman to escape
among a crowd of worshippers in a linen dress,[204] and to take refuge
near the Velabrum with Cornelius Primus, one of his father's
dependants. When his father came to the throne, Domitian pulled down
the sacristan's lodging and built a little chapel to Jupiter the
Saviour with an altar, on which his adventures were depicted in marble
relief. Later, when he became emperor, he dedicated a huge temple to
Jupiter the Guardian with a statue of himself in the lap of the god.
Sabinus and Atticus were loaded with chains and taken to Vitellius,
who received them without any language or looks of disfavour, much to
the chagrin of those who wanted to see them punished with death and
themselves rewarded for their successful labours. When those who stood
nearest started an outcry, the dregs of the populace soon began to
demand Sabinus' execution with mingled threats and flatteries.
Vitellius came out on to the steps of the palace prepared to plead for
him: but they forced him to desist. Sabinus was stabbed and riddled
with wounds: his head was cut off and the trunk dragged away to 75
the Ladder of Sighs. [205] Such was the end of a man who certainly
merits no contempt. He had served his country for thirty-five years,
and won credit both as civilian and soldier. His integrity and
fairness were beyond criticism. He talked too much about himself, but
this is the one charge which rumour could hint against him in the
seven years when he was Governor of Moesia, and the twelve years
during which he was Prefect of the City. At the end of his life some
thought he showed a lack of enterprise, but many believed him a
moderate man, who was anxious to save his fellow citizens from
bloodshed. In this, at any rate, all would agree, that before
Vespasian became emperor the reputation of his house rested on
Sabinus. It is said that Mucianus was delighted to hear of his murder,
and many people maintained that it served the interests of peace by
putting an end to the jealousy of two rivals, one of whom was the
emperor's brother, while the other posed as his partner in the
empire. [206]
When the people further demanded the execution of the consul,
Vitellius withstood them. He had forgiven Atticus, and felt that he
owed him a favour, for, when asked who had set fire to the Capitol,
Atticus had taken the blame on himself, by which avowal--or was it a
well-timed falsehood? --he had fixed all the guilt and odium on himself
and exonerated the Vitellian party.
FOOTNOTES:
[172] On the Palatine.
[173] See i. 8.
[174] A friend of Vitellius and the author of the historical
epic on the second Punic War.
[175] This apparently means that, if Vitellius were spared,
pity for his position would inspire his supporters to make
further trouble.
[176] See ii. 59.
[177] Two good points, but both untrue.
[178] This too is probably hyperbole, but Vespasian may have
owed his command in Germany to the influence of Vitellius'
father.
[179] See i. 52, note 99.
[180] See ii. 64, 89.
[181] See ii. 60.
[182] i. e. the way back from the Forum to the Palace.
[183] Including the city garrison and police.
[184] In chap. 78 we find three cohorts of Guards still
faithful to Vitellius, and, as it appears from ii. 93, 94 that
men from the legions of Germany had been enlisted in the
Guards, the term _Germanicae cohortes_ seems to refer to these
three cohorts, in which perhaps the majority were men from the
German army.
[185] Said to be on the Quirinal.
[186] Either the whole hill, or, if the expression is exact,
the south-west summit.
[187] This seems to have led her later into the paths of
conspiracy, for she is said to have been banished by Domitian
for her friendship with Arulenus Rusticus.
[188] _Prominentem_ seems to mean the one that projected
towards them.
[189] The space lying between the two peaks of the Capitoline.
[190] A technical term for the beams of the pediment.
[191] 'Lars Porsenna of Clusium,' 507 B. C.
[192] 'Burning the Capitol' was a proverb of utter iniquity.
[193] In the war between Sulla and Marius, 83 B. C.
[194] The capital town of the Volscians. This early history is
told in the first book of Livy.
[195] 507 B. C.
[196] 83 B. C. The interval is really 425 years.
[197] This, according to Pliny, was Sulla's own saying.
[198] Consul in 69 B. C. He took the title of Capitolinus.
[199] On the monument which details his exploits Augustus says
that he restored the Capitol at immense cost without
inscribing his name on it.
[200] Flavius Sabinus.
