It would be a source of special pleasure to me if his
thoughts
should turn out to have more sense in them that I suspected.
Gottlob-Frege-Posthumous-Writings
Let us take
Biermann's formula: 'Two numbers formed from an indeterminate basic clement or the abstract unit 1 are equal, when to each element of the one there belongs an element of the other'1 and apply it e. g. to herds of sheep. llow clear everything now becomes! Two herds of sheep are equal when to each sheep of one herd there belongs a sheep of the other. Admittedly, when a sheep A belongs to a sheep B is something we are not told. Let us turn to the difficult question of whether it is conceivable that a herd of sheep is equal
*'Omnia una sunt', a Latinist would say, if not deterred by his feeling for the language, which would here be confirmed by the nature of things as well. Apparently, Biermann has not yet got round to asking himself what underlies this phenomenon of language; for he can say 'units' as though it were the same thing.
1 Hiermann, p. I.
? ? 80 On the Concept ofNumber
to a constellation of stars. The one thing we do at least know is that both are numbers. The only question we still have to settle is whether they are formed from the same basic element. * I believe we have already worked out what Biermann means: when he says that a number is formed from an indeterminate basic element, he means that a number is formed from objects falling under one concept, and the 'indeterminate basic element' then corresponds to the concept. In this case we can point to such a concept: heavy, inert body. Both the sheep and the stars fall under this concept. There can, therefore, presumably be no doubt that the herd of sheep and the constellation are formed from 'the same indeterminate basic element'. Now it is surely conceivable that every star in the constellation belongs to a sheep in the herd, and so it is also conceivable that a herd of sheep should be equal to a constellation. We must not say here that they may of course be equal in respect of the number of solid inert bodies out of which they are made up; for the herd of sheep is itself one of the numbers and the constellation itself is the other. We have already established that according to Biermann number is not a property in respect of which the herd is interchangeable with the constellation. True, we may say, this beetle and the bark of this tree
are equal' so far as their colour is concerned; but here neither the beetle nor the bark are a colour; moreover we do not have two colours, but one and the same. So according to Biermann this case is quite different from that of the numbers; for even if the phrase 'idea of a group' were to mean something quite different from the group itself, it still would not mean a property of the group. And even if, quite contrary to normal usage, Biermann were to use the term 'idea' in such a way that the idea of a group was a property of it, the proposition 'a number is the idea of a group' would amount to the same as 'a number is the number of a group': that is to say, a number is that property of a group which we call idea or number.
We still need to emphasize that according to Biermann's definition the word 'equal' does not mean complete coincidence: a number may be equal to another without being the same; a herd of sheep may be equal to a constellation without being the constellation itself. The question now arises what the number words mean: the most obvious answer would be that the number word 'two', for example, designates one (and only one) number, so that we may say: two is a number, three is a number, and so on. Two and three would be related to the concept of number in the same way as, say, Archimedes, Euclid and Diophantus are related to the concept of mathematician. If we say this, however, we should certainly get into difficulties. Let us again imagine a group consisting of a lion standing and a
*It is not clear from Biermann's wording whether or not this condition must be fulfilled; what we have is only: 'from a', and not 'from the same'. To be on the safe side, we will assume that it must.
1 Here English idiom requires 'alike' rather than 'equal', but in German the same word-'g/eich'-does duty for both (trans. ).
? On the Concept ofNumber 81
lioness lying on the ground. This group is a number. Let us assign to it the number word 'two' as its proper name. Then in future we shall mean our group of lions when we say 'two'. Let us now think of the Goethe-Schiller memorial in Weimar. We surely cannot give the Goethe-Schiller group the same name as the group of lions. To do this could lead to some singularly unfortunate mistakes in identity! We do not seem able to manage with the number words alone. But Biermann has a simple way of getting round this difficulty; as we call Homer, Virgil and Goethe poets, so we might with equal justification call both the Goethe-Schiller group and the group oflions lwo. If we call something two, that shows we want to allocate it to a certain species: we want to say that it has a certain property or properties. In just 1he same way by calling someone a poet I acknowledge he has certain properties characteristic of being a poet,* or by calling a thing blue I attribute a certain property to it or assign it to some species or other. I-ikewise by calling a group three I would be saying that it has a certain property. As we call the properties green, blue, yellow colours, so we could rail two and three numbers. But wait! Here we are again on the same false ! rack as before. We cannot repeat often enough: number is a group or plurality composed of things of the same kind; therefore numbers are the subjects of the properties expressed by the number words. We are no more JUstified in asserting that two is a number than we are in counting green as a u1loured object instead of a colour. Thus we are now able to say: two, three, four, etc. , are properties of groups with constituents of the same kind, which t-:roups or sets are called numbers. A somewhat more elevated way of putting the same thing is to say: two, three, four, etc. , are properties of ideas or groups with constituents of the same kind, and these ideas are called numbers. The most remarkable thing for the layman, for me myself and perhaps even for Biermann in all this, and the most astonishing, is that the number words do not designate numbers but properties of numbers. The equation 2 = 1 + 1 is generally considered to be true. Biermann's definition of a = b is not applicable here, since it relates to numbers, i. e. groups, whereas for us the sign '2' on the left does not mean a number here but a property of a number. Let us see whether we fare any better with the plus Nign. Biermann says: 'We construct a number containing all the elements of 1wo numbers a and b formed from the same basic element' . . . 'The resultant number we designate by a+ b . . . '1
We do not learn from this what 2 + 3 and 2 + 1 mean, for 1, 2 and 3 are not numbers at all. But perhaps we learn something else which merits our nttention. As we have seen, the constellation Orion is a number, the belt in this constellation is likewise a number and, moreover, a different one. If we understand Biermann correctly, both numbers are formed from 'the same
* We need not ask here whether one or more than one property is involved in the word 'two'.
1 Hiermann, p. I.
? ? ? 82 On the Concept ofNumber
basic element', for the elements of the belt are also the elements of Orion. Let us then form a number containing all the elements of Orion and of its belt. What could be simpler! We do not even have to bother constructing this number: it is already there. The constellation of Orion is itself this number. So let us designate Orion by a and its belt by b; then we have a+ b = a, whilst at the same time we have remained happily in accord with Biermann's definitions of the plus sign and the equals sign. But that's enough of pretending to be more stupid than we are! After all, Biermann is writing for people already familiar with these matters who will read the right thing into his words even when they are false or devoid of sense! * After all, the words are there so that the reader may understand what is meant, despite them. We have to bear in mind the condition that no element may be common to both numbers. It follows that no number may ever be added to itself: presumably we should have to say that a + a is devoid of sense; yet a little further on Biermann's text reads: a + a + a . . . (b-times). Let us see how that comes about. Biermann says: 'If we substitute the number a for each of the elements of a number b we obtain the sum a + a + a . . . (b-times), which we designate in short by a x b or ab. '1 The sense of this definition is not easy to grasp; let us take an example to clarify what is at stake: let b be the Goethe-Schiller group in the square in front of the theatre in Weimar, which according to Biermann is indubitably a number. Let a be the constel- lation of Orion. Now let us first of all substitute Orion for the figure of Goethe. It is no easy thing that Biermann is asking of us; his arithmetic would seem to be designed for gods. For him personally all this is child's play; we shall witness still greater feats. F o r the figure o f Schiller let us now substitute-well, what? Why, Orion, too! ** And what do we get then?
Orion + Orion + Orion (Goethe-Schiller-group times).
Who would have thought it! A little later Biermann says: 'In a+ a+ . . . +a (b-times) we may pick one out of each group of a elements and their combination yields b'. If Biermann had not said it, I would not have believed
*It would have been more to the purpose, in my view, if ? 1 had been left unwritten. That would have spared the author a certain amount of effort, if only a modicum, and reduce the cost of printing, without imposing any further labour upon the reader.
** This seems a difficult thing to conceive of, let alone to carry out in practice. But we can see what is involved if we take one of the commercial photographs of the said memorial and with a penknife cut out the piece with the figure of Goethe on it, and do the same with the figure of Schiller. We then cut two pieces of cardboard with exactly the same outlines as the pieces removed and draw the constellation of Orion on each of them. Finally, we place these pieces of cardboard in the holes made in the photograph: Seein& is believing!
1 Biermann, p. 3.
? On the Concept ofNumber 83
it. What is a group of a elements? For a is itself a group! And in our example it just is the constellation of Orion. What is a group of Orion- elements? And here there is even more than one! Has the word 'Orion' suddenly become an adjective? In the Chinese language there is indeed no distinction between a substantive and adjective. Has this usage been smuggled in here? Is an Orion-element an Orionic element, a star of the constellation of stars? What groups of these stars are we talking about here? Well, no matter! Presumably, what is meant by an Orion-element is a star. So if we combine certain stars, what do we get then? The Goethe-Schiller group in Wiemar! It is possibly not quite clear to everyone how this comes about. Perhaps we may be able to throw further light on the matter by taking into consideration a few words in Biermann's account which we have so far skipped over. For Biermann talks about the 'abstract unit 1', from which a number may be formed. To go by the definite article, there is only one abstract unit and this is designated by '1'. Units have been mentioned before: 'counting the elements or units'. According to this, 'unit' should mean the same as 'element'. In that case, 'the abstract unit' should mean: the abstract element. Admittedly, this has not got us any further. The meaning of the word 'element' surely seems abstract enough already. From what are we to abstract further? What is the relationship of the meanings of the words 'unit', 'one' and the 'abstract unit'? Biermann's way of putting it seems to imply that there are many units, and perhaps many ones as well, hut only the one abstract unit 1. But isn't it very foolish of us to ask so many 4uestions? The same might happen to us as happened to the schoolboy who asked his teacher in religious instruction to explain something further and was told 'But that is just the divine mystery in all its profundity! ' Obscurity often has the greatest effect. If we established precisely what we understand by words like 'number', 'unit', 'one', 'the abstract unit 1', 'element', 'indeterminate basic element', we should forfeit the possibility of using a word now in one sense now in another, and as an end result the whole force of Biermann's account would be dissipated. Let us rather rejoice that we at last appear to have found, in the 'abstract unit 1', something that I have long been looking out for-one of those numbers with which mathematics is concerned; for when you come down to it, the heaps of sand and peas, the Goethe-Schiller statue and the Laocoon group did, after all, look somewhat incongruous in a discussion of arithmetic. Let us also hope that in the course of Biermann's account the abstract 2 and the abstract 3 will delight us by turning up just as unexpectedly as 1 has done. We might be somewhat at a loss, if we had not experienced so many extraordinary things already, to image how it is possible to form something out of the unique 'abstract unit
I'; or is perhaps 1 not the only component? We already met a similar case when a number had to be formed from the 'indeterminate basic element'. We attempted to explain this by a sort of miracle, but this explanation hardly 1cems to suit the present case; for what would here be the concept corresponding to the concept pea in our earlier example, and what objects,
? ? 84 On the Concept ofNumber
e. g. , would fall under this concept? But we are asking too many quesuons again. I suppose it would be unwise to expect an answer from Biermann; for we have probably carried his thought much further than he did himself, expending, as he did, so little thought on ? 1, possibly to avoid becoming entangled in the dreaded profundities of metaphysics; yet all that is needed is a pinch of logic. True, the way things have now fallen out, there is nothing in ? 1 to warm the heart of the logician or mathematician. * In this paragraph, and in some of the later ones, we might well find further material to improve our minds. For instance, is it not touching to see with what ingenuousness the word 'number'1 is introduced in ? 2, p. 10: 'Two numerical magnitudes of the new kind are equal when they can be transformed in such a way that both contain the same elements with the same number in each'? It should, of course, have been stated with what meaning 'number' is being used here. That was the problem to be solved! Biermann probably imagines that he has solved it, when he has, on the contrary, done all he could to dodge this crucial point. He has shown the most consummate skill in missing the very point that is at stake. But let us put all that aside now. I find it nauseating to have to clean out the same old stable over and over again, solely in order that others may join Biermann in writing even more paragraphs like his ? 1. I can well understand someone despairing of ever giving an accurate definition of number or even thinking that such a definition would be unfruitful and pointless and so beginning his book with a few principles concerning number, whilst simply assuming that everyone will know in any given case how to distinguish a number (natural number) from anything else and will recognize these principles as true without proof. But what I find difficult to understand is that anyone should recognize it to be necessary or at any rate useful to discuss the concept of number and then conduct this discussion so superficially and without availing himself of what has already been achieved in this field, with the result that he skirts the issue and does not even notice that he has done so. This is a procedure which deserves academic recognition, even if it does make one or two things seem axiomatic which could be proved if probed more deeply. What we do in such a case is to leave certain questions to look after themselves and simply take up the argument at a later stage. If
someone proceeds in the way Biermann does, he merely deludes himself,
* It is proof of the obstacles we have to contend with in order to make any common progress that writers of our day, including even historians of philosophy like K. Fischer (cf. my Grundlagen, p. Ill), behave just as if the human race, as far as these questions are concerned, had been asleep until now and had only just awoken from its slumber, and this after thinkers of acknowledged stature like Spinoza long ago conveyed illuminating thoughts about number. But who would think of consulting Spinoza about such childishly simple matters!
1 Here again we have 'Anzah/', the word for natural number (trans. ).
? On the Concept ofNumber 85
and possibly his readers as well, into thinking he has achieved something when he has uttered a few incomprehensible and barren phrases. This is just window-dressing and downright unscientific. Either certain questions should be left aside altogether, or we should really go deeply into them and not just make a parade of doing so. *
I cannot repeat the substance of my Grundlagen here. It is bad enough that I have been obliged to expend so many extra words on issues that have been essentially resolved. ** Here we can do no more than make the following brief remarks: there is only one number called 0, there is only one number called 1, only one number called 2, and so on. There are various designations for any one number. It is the same number which is designated by '1 + 1' and '2'. Nothing can be asserted of 2 which cannot also be asserted of 1 + 1; where there appears to be an exception, the explanation is that the signs '2' and '1 + 1' are being discussed and not their content. It is inevitable that various signs should be used for the same thing, since there are different possible ways of arriving at it, and then we first have to ascertain that it really is the same thing we have reached. *** 2 = 1 + 1 does
* Biermann may find my attack has become too personal when I take the liberty of surmising what he has been thinking, and on occasion surmising that he has not been thinking at all. Of course, I shall be more than willing to acknowledge my conjectures mistaken if Biermann will communicate what he was actually thinking.
It would be a source of special pleasure to me if his thoughts should turn out to have more sense in them that I suspected. Of course, I could have saved myself the effort of trying to penetrate the workings of his mind by simply adhering to the text of his argument. I could then have briefly shown the mistakes in his logic. But this way of proceeding might easily have prompted a charge of unfairness. Someone might then have said, for instance: he sticks to the letter of the argument, which admittedly, is not quite happy in places; he pontificates on matters of style and makes no attempt at all to deal with the thoughts themselves. I did not just want to show that there are faults of expression; I wanted to show that the thought itself is sometimes incorrect and sometimes impossible to locate. I found myself in the same position as a judge who sometimes has to have recourse to the legislator's intentions when the text of the law proves inadequate: in such a case you could not get by without making conjectures.
** Biermann ought really to apologise to me for having put me to so much trouble simply because he has made so little effort himself.
*** It is wrong when a distinction is made in school or textbooks between v'(i2 and v(-a)2? We have to decide once and for all which of the numbers whose square is b we want to understand by Jb. T o designate first one, then another, by ? ygis reprehensible. Each sign may have only one meaning so that we run no risk of drawing wrong conclusions. We should not talk about the different ways in which a number comes into being. Numbers do not come into being, they are eternal. There is not a 4 resulting from 22, and another resulting from (-2)2; '4', '22', '(-2)2, are simply different signs for the same thing and their differences simply indicate the different ways in which it is possible for us to arrive at the same thing.
? 86 On the Concept ofNumber
not mean that the contents of '2' and '1 + 1' agree in one respect, though they are otherwise different; for what is the special property in which they are supposed to be alike? Is it in respect of number? But two is a number through and through and nothing else but a number. This agreement with respect to number is therefore the same here as complete coincidence, identity. What a wilderness of numbers there would be if we were to regard 2, 1 + 1, 3 - 1, etc. , all as different numbers which agree only in one property. The chaos would be even greater if we were to recognize many noughts, ones, twos, and so on. Every whole number would have infinitely many factors, every equation infinitely many solutions, even if all these were equal to one another. In that event we should, of course, be compelled by the nature of the case to regard all these solutions that are equal to one another as one and the same solution. Thus the equals sign in arithmetic expresses complete coincidence, identity.
Numerical signs, whether they are simple or built up by using arithmetical signs, are proper names of numbers. Therefore, we cannot use the names of numbers either with the indefinite article, e. g. this is a one, or in the plural-many twos. The plus sign does not mean the same as 'and'. In the sentences '3 and 5 are odd', '3 and 5 are factors of 15 other than 1' we cannot substitute '2 and 6' or '8' for '3 and 5'. On the other hand, '2 + 6' or '8' are always substitutable for '3 + 5'. It is therefore incorrect to say' 1 and 1 is 2' instead of 'the sum of 1 and 1 is 2'. It is wrong to say 'number is just so many ones'; and if we say 'units' for 'ones', if anything we magnify the error by confusing units with one, even though verbally there is a gain in smoothness. Our feeling for language warns us against the form 'ones' for good reason. If we say 'units' instead, we merely get round the prohibition.
? ? ~
On Concept and Object
In a series of articles in this Quar- terly on intuition and its psychical elaboration, Benno Kerry has several times referred to my Grundlagen der Arithmetik and other works of mine, sometimes agreeing and sometimes disagreeing with me. I cannot but be pleased at this, and I think the best way I can show my appreciation is to take up the discussion of the points he contests. This seems to me all the more necessary, because his op- position is at least partly based on a misunderstanding, which might be
1 Until his death in 1889 Benno Kerry was Privatdozent in Philosophy at the University of Strasburg.
The dispute with Kerry relates to Kerry's eight articles Uber Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung in the Vierteijahrsschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie:" (1885), pp. 433-493, 10 (1886), pp. 419-467, 11 (1887), pp. 53-
116, 11 (1887), pp. 249-307, l3 (1889), pp. 71-124, l3 (1889), pp. 392-419, 14 (1890), pp. 317-353, 15 (1891), pp. 127-167. In the second and fourth articles Kerry had gone into Frege's views in particular detail. -The piece for the NachlajJ is obviously a preliminary draft of the article Ober Begriff und Gegenstand, which nppeared in 1892. The latter is printed on the left with the original pagination, with the corresponding passages of the piec~ from the NachlajJ on the right (ed. ).
Translators' note: For the article Uber Begriff und Gegenstand we have taken over the translation by Peter Geach published in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Geach and Black, pp. 42-55 (Blackwell 1960), both because we are largely in agreement with it and because it has been so widely read and quoted from. Where the wording of the draft agrees with that of the published article, we have relied heavily on the Geach translation, though we have departed from it in several places, mainly in order to remain consistent with the renderings we have adopted elsewhere of certain terms-here notably 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung'. Again such a departure has been necessary in places where the agreement in wording extends only to part of a Nentence.
We have chosen not to adhere to the format of the German text in presenting the draft as if both it and the criticism of Biermann were about the concept of number. The fact that they were both found, unseparated, in a folder under the heading 'On the Concept of Number' seems to us no good reason for the German editors' lay- out.
We should like to express our grateful thanks to Professor P. T. Geach for Jlc:rmitting us to make use of his translation in this way.
[A criticism ofKerry]I
87
? ? 88 On Concept and Object
shared by others, of what I say about the concept; and because, even apart from this special oc- casion, the matter is important and difficult enough for a more thorough treatment than seemed to me suit- able in my Grundlagen.
The word 'concept' is used in various ways; its sense is sometimes psychological, sometimes logical, and sometimes perhaps a confused mixture of both. Since this licence exists, it is natural to restrict it by requiring that when once a usage is adopted it shall be maintained. What I decided was to keep strictly to a purely logical use; the question whether this or that use is more appropriate is one that I should like to leave on one side, as of minor importance. Agreement about the mode of expression will easily be reached when once it is recognized that there is something that deserves a special term.
It seems to me that Kerry's misunderstanding results from his unintentionally confusing his own usage of the word 'concept' with mine. This readily gives rise to contradictions, for which my usage is not to blame.
[193] Kerry contests what he calls my definition of 'concept'. I would remark, in the first place, that my
I turn now to consider, as briefly as possible, the objections which B. Kerry* has brought against my definitions.
He begins by contesting what he calls my definition of a concept, and there is no doubt that here he is
* Uber Anschauung und ihre psy- chische Verarbeitung in der Viertel- jahrschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Volume Xl, No. 3, pp.
249 IT.
? explanation is not meant as a proper definition. One cannot require that everything shall be defined, any more than one can require that a chemist shall decompose every substance. What is simple cannot be decomposed, and what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition. Now something logically simple is no more given us a t the outset than most of the chemical elements are; it is reached only by means o f scientific work. I f some- thing has been discovered that is simple, or at least must count as simple for the time being, we shall have to coin a term for it, since language will not originally contain an expression that exactly answers. On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible; there is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended.
Kerry wants to make out that the distinction between concept and object is not absolute. 'In a previous passage,' he says, 'I have myself expressed the opinion that the relation between the content of the concept and the concept-object is, in u certain respect, a peculiar and irreducible one; but this was in no way bound up with the view that the properties of being a concept and of being an object are mutually ex-
touching on a crucial point, perhaps the most important one in the whole issue. The first thing to say is that my explanation is not meant as a proper definition. One cannot define everything, any more than one can decompose every chemical substance. To do either presupposes that we are dealing with something composite. In many cases one has to be satisfied with leading the reader, by means of hints, to understand the word as it is intended.
On Concept and Object 89
The difference of opinion con- cerns the distinction between con- cept* and object. Kerry would like to make out that it is not absolute. 'In a previous passage,' he says, 'we have ourselves expressed the opinion that the relation between the concept-content and the concept- object is, in a certain respect, a peculiar and irreducible one; but this was in no way bound up with the view that the properties of being an
* In my paper Funktion und Begriff (Jena 1891) I called a concept a function whose value is always a truth-value, and this could be taken as a definition. But in that case the difficulty which, as I am trying to show, arises for the con- cept, arises for the function too.
? ? ? 90 On Concept and Object
elusive. The latter view no more object and being a concept are follows from the former than it mutually exclusive. The latter view
would follow, if, e. g. , the relation of father and son were one that could not be further reduced, that a man could not be at once a father and a son (though of course not, e. g. , father of the man whose son he was). '
Let us fasten on this simile. If there were, or had been beings that were fathers but could not be sons, such beings would obviously be quite different in kind from all men who are sons. Now it is something like this that happens here. The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. *
On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate. This admit- tedly needs elucidation, otherwise it might appear false. Surely one can just as well assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is green or is a mammal? [194]. If anybody thinks this, he is not distinguishing the usages o f the word 'is'. In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign of predication. (In this sense the
*It is, in fact, the reference of a grammatical predicate.
no more follows from the former than it would follow if, say, the relation of father and son were one that could not be further reduced, that a man could not be at once a father and a son (though of course not e. g. father of the man whose son he was). ' 1
Let me fasten on this simile. If there were, or had been, beings that were fathers, though they were so constituted by nature that they could not be sons, such beings would be obviously quite different in kind from all men who are sons. Now something like this happens here.
The concept-as I understand the word-is predicative even in cases where we speak of a subject- concept. For instance, the sentence 'All mammals are warm-blooded' says the same as 'Whatever is a mammal is warm-blooded'. On the other hand, a name of an object-a proper name-is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predi- cate. This may strike one as false if one does not distinguish between a proper name's occurring as only part of a predicate, which is cer- tainly possible, and its being itself the whole predicate, which is not pos- sible. One can assert of a thing that it is green or is a mammal; but one cannot in the same way assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is Venus.
1 Vjschr. f wissensch. Philosophie 11 ( 1887), p. 272 (ed. ).
? ? ? German word ist can sometimes be replaced by the mere personal suffix: cf. dies Blatt ist griin and dies Blatt griint. ) We are here saying that something falls under a concept, and the grammatical predicate stands for this concept. In the first three examples, on the other hand, 'is' is used like the 'equals' sign in
In order to see this, it is of course necessary to distinguish the two uses of the word 'is'. For in the first cases it serves as a copula, as a mere auxiliary indicating that we have a statement, and is sometimes then replaceable by the mere verb ending: e. g. 'dieses Blatt ist griin' ['this grass is green'], 'dieses Blatt griint' [lit. 'this grass greens']. Here one is saying that something falls under a concept. The grammatical predicate means this concept. In the second cases, the word 'is' is used like the equals sign in arithmetic, to express an equation. * Let us consider the following example: in the sentence 'That is Saturn' we have two proper names for the same object. For the word 'that', together with an appropriate pointing gesture, must here be construed as a proper name (in the logical sense) i. e. as a sign for an object. I am not here asserting the meaning of the word 'Saturn' of the object I am pointing to; if that were so, I should be asserting an object of itself, which would be nonsensical- one just cannot assert an object of
* I use the word 'equal' and the sign '=' in the sense 'the same as', 'not different from'. Cf. E. Schroder,
Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik (Leipzig 1890), Vol. 1, ? 1, especially p. 127 & p. 128. Schroder, however, is to be criticized for not here distinguishing two fundamentally different relations; the relation of an object to a concept it falls under, and the sub- ordination of one concept to
arithmetic, equation. *
to express
an
*I use the word 'equal' and the symbol '=' in the sense 'the same as', 'no other than', 'identical with'. Cf. E. Schroeder, Vorlesungen ueber die Algebra der Logik (Leipzig
On Concept and Object 91
1890), Vol. 1, ? 1. Schroeder must
however be criticized for not dis-
tinguishing two fundamentally dif-
ferent relations; the relation o f an
object to a concept it falls under,
and the subordination of one con-
cept to another. His remarks on
the Vollwurzel are likewise open
to objection. Schroeder's symbol ~ another. His discussion of the does not simply take the place of the Vollwurzel is likewise open to objec- copula. tion.
? ? ? 92
On Concept and Object
In the sentence 'The mor- ning star is Venus', we have two proper names, 'morning star' and 'Venus', for the same object. In the sentence 'the morning star is a planet' we have a proper name, 'the morning star', and a concept-word, 'planet'. So far as language goes, no more has happened than that 'Venus' has been replaced by 'a planet'; but really the relation has become wholly different. An equation is reversible; an object's falling under a concept is an irre- versible relation. In the sentence 'the morning star is Venus', 'is' is ob- viously not the mere copula; its content is an essential part of the predicate, so that the word 'Venus' does not constitute the whole of the predicate. * One might say instead: 'the morning star is no other than V enus'; what was previously im- plicit in the single word 'is' is here set forth in four separate words, and
* Cf. my Grundlagen, ? 66, footnote.
*Cf. my Grundlagen, ? 57.
something-. The 'is' is not the mere copula, but is to be compared with a word like 'griint', in which the verb ending by itself takes the place of the copula, whilst the stem gives the actual content. * The content of the predicate is not comprised in the word 'Saturn' alone; an essential part of it is contained in the word 'is', or at least has to be added in thought. As the logical predicate we may Sftke, say: no other than Saturn. I t is ~is which is predicated here and not just Saturn. Saturn is an object, no other than Saturn is a concept.
? ? only as an object. Kerry, too, would probably not wish to dispute that there is something of this kind. But this would mean admitting a dis- tinction, which it is very important recognize, between what can occur only as an object, and everything else. And this distinction would not he effaced even if it were true, as Kerry thinks it is, that there are concepts that can also be objects.
concept, and Kerry himself surely does not wish to dispute that this is possible either. But this means ad- mitting a distinction, which it is of fundamental importance to rec- ognize, between what, by its very nature, can occur only as an object, and everything else.
Biermann's formula: 'Two numbers formed from an indeterminate basic clement or the abstract unit 1 are equal, when to each element of the one there belongs an element of the other'1 and apply it e. g. to herds of sheep. llow clear everything now becomes! Two herds of sheep are equal when to each sheep of one herd there belongs a sheep of the other. Admittedly, when a sheep A belongs to a sheep B is something we are not told. Let us turn to the difficult question of whether it is conceivable that a herd of sheep is equal
*'Omnia una sunt', a Latinist would say, if not deterred by his feeling for the language, which would here be confirmed by the nature of things as well. Apparently, Biermann has not yet got round to asking himself what underlies this phenomenon of language; for he can say 'units' as though it were the same thing.
1 Hiermann, p. I.
? ? 80 On the Concept ofNumber
to a constellation of stars. The one thing we do at least know is that both are numbers. The only question we still have to settle is whether they are formed from the same basic element. * I believe we have already worked out what Biermann means: when he says that a number is formed from an indeterminate basic element, he means that a number is formed from objects falling under one concept, and the 'indeterminate basic element' then corresponds to the concept. In this case we can point to such a concept: heavy, inert body. Both the sheep and the stars fall under this concept. There can, therefore, presumably be no doubt that the herd of sheep and the constellation are formed from 'the same indeterminate basic element'. Now it is surely conceivable that every star in the constellation belongs to a sheep in the herd, and so it is also conceivable that a herd of sheep should be equal to a constellation. We must not say here that they may of course be equal in respect of the number of solid inert bodies out of which they are made up; for the herd of sheep is itself one of the numbers and the constellation itself is the other. We have already established that according to Biermann number is not a property in respect of which the herd is interchangeable with the constellation. True, we may say, this beetle and the bark of this tree
are equal' so far as their colour is concerned; but here neither the beetle nor the bark are a colour; moreover we do not have two colours, but one and the same. So according to Biermann this case is quite different from that of the numbers; for even if the phrase 'idea of a group' were to mean something quite different from the group itself, it still would not mean a property of the group. And even if, quite contrary to normal usage, Biermann were to use the term 'idea' in such a way that the idea of a group was a property of it, the proposition 'a number is the idea of a group' would amount to the same as 'a number is the number of a group': that is to say, a number is that property of a group which we call idea or number.
We still need to emphasize that according to Biermann's definition the word 'equal' does not mean complete coincidence: a number may be equal to another without being the same; a herd of sheep may be equal to a constellation without being the constellation itself. The question now arises what the number words mean: the most obvious answer would be that the number word 'two', for example, designates one (and only one) number, so that we may say: two is a number, three is a number, and so on. Two and three would be related to the concept of number in the same way as, say, Archimedes, Euclid and Diophantus are related to the concept of mathematician. If we say this, however, we should certainly get into difficulties. Let us again imagine a group consisting of a lion standing and a
*It is not clear from Biermann's wording whether or not this condition must be fulfilled; what we have is only: 'from a', and not 'from the same'. To be on the safe side, we will assume that it must.
1 Here English idiom requires 'alike' rather than 'equal', but in German the same word-'g/eich'-does duty for both (trans. ).
? On the Concept ofNumber 81
lioness lying on the ground. This group is a number. Let us assign to it the number word 'two' as its proper name. Then in future we shall mean our group of lions when we say 'two'. Let us now think of the Goethe-Schiller memorial in Weimar. We surely cannot give the Goethe-Schiller group the same name as the group of lions. To do this could lead to some singularly unfortunate mistakes in identity! We do not seem able to manage with the number words alone. But Biermann has a simple way of getting round this difficulty; as we call Homer, Virgil and Goethe poets, so we might with equal justification call both the Goethe-Schiller group and the group oflions lwo. If we call something two, that shows we want to allocate it to a certain species: we want to say that it has a certain property or properties. In just 1he same way by calling someone a poet I acknowledge he has certain properties characteristic of being a poet,* or by calling a thing blue I attribute a certain property to it or assign it to some species or other. I-ikewise by calling a group three I would be saying that it has a certain property. As we call the properties green, blue, yellow colours, so we could rail two and three numbers. But wait! Here we are again on the same false ! rack as before. We cannot repeat often enough: number is a group or plurality composed of things of the same kind; therefore numbers are the subjects of the properties expressed by the number words. We are no more JUstified in asserting that two is a number than we are in counting green as a u1loured object instead of a colour. Thus we are now able to say: two, three, four, etc. , are properties of groups with constituents of the same kind, which t-:roups or sets are called numbers. A somewhat more elevated way of putting the same thing is to say: two, three, four, etc. , are properties of ideas or groups with constituents of the same kind, and these ideas are called numbers. The most remarkable thing for the layman, for me myself and perhaps even for Biermann in all this, and the most astonishing, is that the number words do not designate numbers but properties of numbers. The equation 2 = 1 + 1 is generally considered to be true. Biermann's definition of a = b is not applicable here, since it relates to numbers, i. e. groups, whereas for us the sign '2' on the left does not mean a number here but a property of a number. Let us see whether we fare any better with the plus Nign. Biermann says: 'We construct a number containing all the elements of 1wo numbers a and b formed from the same basic element' . . . 'The resultant number we designate by a+ b . . . '1
We do not learn from this what 2 + 3 and 2 + 1 mean, for 1, 2 and 3 are not numbers at all. But perhaps we learn something else which merits our nttention. As we have seen, the constellation Orion is a number, the belt in this constellation is likewise a number and, moreover, a different one. If we understand Biermann correctly, both numbers are formed from 'the same
* We need not ask here whether one or more than one property is involved in the word 'two'.
1 Hiermann, p. I.
? ? ? 82 On the Concept ofNumber
basic element', for the elements of the belt are also the elements of Orion. Let us then form a number containing all the elements of Orion and of its belt. What could be simpler! We do not even have to bother constructing this number: it is already there. The constellation of Orion is itself this number. So let us designate Orion by a and its belt by b; then we have a+ b = a, whilst at the same time we have remained happily in accord with Biermann's definitions of the plus sign and the equals sign. But that's enough of pretending to be more stupid than we are! After all, Biermann is writing for people already familiar with these matters who will read the right thing into his words even when they are false or devoid of sense! * After all, the words are there so that the reader may understand what is meant, despite them. We have to bear in mind the condition that no element may be common to both numbers. It follows that no number may ever be added to itself: presumably we should have to say that a + a is devoid of sense; yet a little further on Biermann's text reads: a + a + a . . . (b-times). Let us see how that comes about. Biermann says: 'If we substitute the number a for each of the elements of a number b we obtain the sum a + a + a . . . (b-times), which we designate in short by a x b or ab. '1 The sense of this definition is not easy to grasp; let us take an example to clarify what is at stake: let b be the Goethe-Schiller group in the square in front of the theatre in Weimar, which according to Biermann is indubitably a number. Let a be the constel- lation of Orion. Now let us first of all substitute Orion for the figure of Goethe. It is no easy thing that Biermann is asking of us; his arithmetic would seem to be designed for gods. For him personally all this is child's play; we shall witness still greater feats. F o r the figure o f Schiller let us now substitute-well, what? Why, Orion, too! ** And what do we get then?
Orion + Orion + Orion (Goethe-Schiller-group times).
Who would have thought it! A little later Biermann says: 'In a+ a+ . . . +a (b-times) we may pick one out of each group of a elements and their combination yields b'. If Biermann had not said it, I would not have believed
*It would have been more to the purpose, in my view, if ? 1 had been left unwritten. That would have spared the author a certain amount of effort, if only a modicum, and reduce the cost of printing, without imposing any further labour upon the reader.
** This seems a difficult thing to conceive of, let alone to carry out in practice. But we can see what is involved if we take one of the commercial photographs of the said memorial and with a penknife cut out the piece with the figure of Goethe on it, and do the same with the figure of Schiller. We then cut two pieces of cardboard with exactly the same outlines as the pieces removed and draw the constellation of Orion on each of them. Finally, we place these pieces of cardboard in the holes made in the photograph: Seein& is believing!
1 Biermann, p. 3.
? On the Concept ofNumber 83
it. What is a group of a elements? For a is itself a group! And in our example it just is the constellation of Orion. What is a group of Orion- elements? And here there is even more than one! Has the word 'Orion' suddenly become an adjective? In the Chinese language there is indeed no distinction between a substantive and adjective. Has this usage been smuggled in here? Is an Orion-element an Orionic element, a star of the constellation of stars? What groups of these stars are we talking about here? Well, no matter! Presumably, what is meant by an Orion-element is a star. So if we combine certain stars, what do we get then? The Goethe-Schiller group in Wiemar! It is possibly not quite clear to everyone how this comes about. Perhaps we may be able to throw further light on the matter by taking into consideration a few words in Biermann's account which we have so far skipped over. For Biermann talks about the 'abstract unit 1', from which a number may be formed. To go by the definite article, there is only one abstract unit and this is designated by '1'. Units have been mentioned before: 'counting the elements or units'. According to this, 'unit' should mean the same as 'element'. In that case, 'the abstract unit' should mean: the abstract element. Admittedly, this has not got us any further. The meaning of the word 'element' surely seems abstract enough already. From what are we to abstract further? What is the relationship of the meanings of the words 'unit', 'one' and the 'abstract unit'? Biermann's way of putting it seems to imply that there are many units, and perhaps many ones as well, hut only the one abstract unit 1. But isn't it very foolish of us to ask so many 4uestions? The same might happen to us as happened to the schoolboy who asked his teacher in religious instruction to explain something further and was told 'But that is just the divine mystery in all its profundity! ' Obscurity often has the greatest effect. If we established precisely what we understand by words like 'number', 'unit', 'one', 'the abstract unit 1', 'element', 'indeterminate basic element', we should forfeit the possibility of using a word now in one sense now in another, and as an end result the whole force of Biermann's account would be dissipated. Let us rather rejoice that we at last appear to have found, in the 'abstract unit 1', something that I have long been looking out for-one of those numbers with which mathematics is concerned; for when you come down to it, the heaps of sand and peas, the Goethe-Schiller statue and the Laocoon group did, after all, look somewhat incongruous in a discussion of arithmetic. Let us also hope that in the course of Biermann's account the abstract 2 and the abstract 3 will delight us by turning up just as unexpectedly as 1 has done. We might be somewhat at a loss, if we had not experienced so many extraordinary things already, to image how it is possible to form something out of the unique 'abstract unit
I'; or is perhaps 1 not the only component? We already met a similar case when a number had to be formed from the 'indeterminate basic element'. We attempted to explain this by a sort of miracle, but this explanation hardly 1cems to suit the present case; for what would here be the concept corresponding to the concept pea in our earlier example, and what objects,
? ? 84 On the Concept ofNumber
e. g. , would fall under this concept? But we are asking too many quesuons again. I suppose it would be unwise to expect an answer from Biermann; for we have probably carried his thought much further than he did himself, expending, as he did, so little thought on ? 1, possibly to avoid becoming entangled in the dreaded profundities of metaphysics; yet all that is needed is a pinch of logic. True, the way things have now fallen out, there is nothing in ? 1 to warm the heart of the logician or mathematician. * In this paragraph, and in some of the later ones, we might well find further material to improve our minds. For instance, is it not touching to see with what ingenuousness the word 'number'1 is introduced in ? 2, p. 10: 'Two numerical magnitudes of the new kind are equal when they can be transformed in such a way that both contain the same elements with the same number in each'? It should, of course, have been stated with what meaning 'number' is being used here. That was the problem to be solved! Biermann probably imagines that he has solved it, when he has, on the contrary, done all he could to dodge this crucial point. He has shown the most consummate skill in missing the very point that is at stake. But let us put all that aside now. I find it nauseating to have to clean out the same old stable over and over again, solely in order that others may join Biermann in writing even more paragraphs like his ? 1. I can well understand someone despairing of ever giving an accurate definition of number or even thinking that such a definition would be unfruitful and pointless and so beginning his book with a few principles concerning number, whilst simply assuming that everyone will know in any given case how to distinguish a number (natural number) from anything else and will recognize these principles as true without proof. But what I find difficult to understand is that anyone should recognize it to be necessary or at any rate useful to discuss the concept of number and then conduct this discussion so superficially and without availing himself of what has already been achieved in this field, with the result that he skirts the issue and does not even notice that he has done so. This is a procedure which deserves academic recognition, even if it does make one or two things seem axiomatic which could be proved if probed more deeply. What we do in such a case is to leave certain questions to look after themselves and simply take up the argument at a later stage. If
someone proceeds in the way Biermann does, he merely deludes himself,
* It is proof of the obstacles we have to contend with in order to make any common progress that writers of our day, including even historians of philosophy like K. Fischer (cf. my Grundlagen, p. Ill), behave just as if the human race, as far as these questions are concerned, had been asleep until now and had only just awoken from its slumber, and this after thinkers of acknowledged stature like Spinoza long ago conveyed illuminating thoughts about number. But who would think of consulting Spinoza about such childishly simple matters!
1 Here again we have 'Anzah/', the word for natural number (trans. ).
? On the Concept ofNumber 85
and possibly his readers as well, into thinking he has achieved something when he has uttered a few incomprehensible and barren phrases. This is just window-dressing and downright unscientific. Either certain questions should be left aside altogether, or we should really go deeply into them and not just make a parade of doing so. *
I cannot repeat the substance of my Grundlagen here. It is bad enough that I have been obliged to expend so many extra words on issues that have been essentially resolved. ** Here we can do no more than make the following brief remarks: there is only one number called 0, there is only one number called 1, only one number called 2, and so on. There are various designations for any one number. It is the same number which is designated by '1 + 1' and '2'. Nothing can be asserted of 2 which cannot also be asserted of 1 + 1; where there appears to be an exception, the explanation is that the signs '2' and '1 + 1' are being discussed and not their content. It is inevitable that various signs should be used for the same thing, since there are different possible ways of arriving at it, and then we first have to ascertain that it really is the same thing we have reached. *** 2 = 1 + 1 does
* Biermann may find my attack has become too personal when I take the liberty of surmising what he has been thinking, and on occasion surmising that he has not been thinking at all. Of course, I shall be more than willing to acknowledge my conjectures mistaken if Biermann will communicate what he was actually thinking.
It would be a source of special pleasure to me if his thoughts should turn out to have more sense in them that I suspected. Of course, I could have saved myself the effort of trying to penetrate the workings of his mind by simply adhering to the text of his argument. I could then have briefly shown the mistakes in his logic. But this way of proceeding might easily have prompted a charge of unfairness. Someone might then have said, for instance: he sticks to the letter of the argument, which admittedly, is not quite happy in places; he pontificates on matters of style and makes no attempt at all to deal with the thoughts themselves. I did not just want to show that there are faults of expression; I wanted to show that the thought itself is sometimes incorrect and sometimes impossible to locate. I found myself in the same position as a judge who sometimes has to have recourse to the legislator's intentions when the text of the law proves inadequate: in such a case you could not get by without making conjectures.
** Biermann ought really to apologise to me for having put me to so much trouble simply because he has made so little effort himself.
*** It is wrong when a distinction is made in school or textbooks between v'(i2 and v(-a)2? We have to decide once and for all which of the numbers whose square is b we want to understand by Jb. T o designate first one, then another, by ? ygis reprehensible. Each sign may have only one meaning so that we run no risk of drawing wrong conclusions. We should not talk about the different ways in which a number comes into being. Numbers do not come into being, they are eternal. There is not a 4 resulting from 22, and another resulting from (-2)2; '4', '22', '(-2)2, are simply different signs for the same thing and their differences simply indicate the different ways in which it is possible for us to arrive at the same thing.
? 86 On the Concept ofNumber
not mean that the contents of '2' and '1 + 1' agree in one respect, though they are otherwise different; for what is the special property in which they are supposed to be alike? Is it in respect of number? But two is a number through and through and nothing else but a number. This agreement with respect to number is therefore the same here as complete coincidence, identity. What a wilderness of numbers there would be if we were to regard 2, 1 + 1, 3 - 1, etc. , all as different numbers which agree only in one property. The chaos would be even greater if we were to recognize many noughts, ones, twos, and so on. Every whole number would have infinitely many factors, every equation infinitely many solutions, even if all these were equal to one another. In that event we should, of course, be compelled by the nature of the case to regard all these solutions that are equal to one another as one and the same solution. Thus the equals sign in arithmetic expresses complete coincidence, identity.
Numerical signs, whether they are simple or built up by using arithmetical signs, are proper names of numbers. Therefore, we cannot use the names of numbers either with the indefinite article, e. g. this is a one, or in the plural-many twos. The plus sign does not mean the same as 'and'. In the sentences '3 and 5 are odd', '3 and 5 are factors of 15 other than 1' we cannot substitute '2 and 6' or '8' for '3 and 5'. On the other hand, '2 + 6' or '8' are always substitutable for '3 + 5'. It is therefore incorrect to say' 1 and 1 is 2' instead of 'the sum of 1 and 1 is 2'. It is wrong to say 'number is just so many ones'; and if we say 'units' for 'ones', if anything we magnify the error by confusing units with one, even though verbally there is a gain in smoothness. Our feeling for language warns us against the form 'ones' for good reason. If we say 'units' instead, we merely get round the prohibition.
? ? ~
On Concept and Object
In a series of articles in this Quar- terly on intuition and its psychical elaboration, Benno Kerry has several times referred to my Grundlagen der Arithmetik and other works of mine, sometimes agreeing and sometimes disagreeing with me. I cannot but be pleased at this, and I think the best way I can show my appreciation is to take up the discussion of the points he contests. This seems to me all the more necessary, because his op- position is at least partly based on a misunderstanding, which might be
1 Until his death in 1889 Benno Kerry was Privatdozent in Philosophy at the University of Strasburg.
The dispute with Kerry relates to Kerry's eight articles Uber Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung in the Vierteijahrsschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie:" (1885), pp. 433-493, 10 (1886), pp. 419-467, 11 (1887), pp. 53-
116, 11 (1887), pp. 249-307, l3 (1889), pp. 71-124, l3 (1889), pp. 392-419, 14 (1890), pp. 317-353, 15 (1891), pp. 127-167. In the second and fourth articles Kerry had gone into Frege's views in particular detail. -The piece for the NachlajJ is obviously a preliminary draft of the article Ober Begriff und Gegenstand, which nppeared in 1892. The latter is printed on the left with the original pagination, with the corresponding passages of the piec~ from the NachlajJ on the right (ed. ).
Translators' note: For the article Uber Begriff und Gegenstand we have taken over the translation by Peter Geach published in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Geach and Black, pp. 42-55 (Blackwell 1960), both because we are largely in agreement with it and because it has been so widely read and quoted from. Where the wording of the draft agrees with that of the published article, we have relied heavily on the Geach translation, though we have departed from it in several places, mainly in order to remain consistent with the renderings we have adopted elsewhere of certain terms-here notably 'bedeuten' and 'Bedeutung'. Again such a departure has been necessary in places where the agreement in wording extends only to part of a Nentence.
We have chosen not to adhere to the format of the German text in presenting the draft as if both it and the criticism of Biermann were about the concept of number. The fact that they were both found, unseparated, in a folder under the heading 'On the Concept of Number' seems to us no good reason for the German editors' lay- out.
We should like to express our grateful thanks to Professor P. T. Geach for Jlc:rmitting us to make use of his translation in this way.
[A criticism ofKerry]I
87
? ? 88 On Concept and Object
shared by others, of what I say about the concept; and because, even apart from this special oc- casion, the matter is important and difficult enough for a more thorough treatment than seemed to me suit- able in my Grundlagen.
The word 'concept' is used in various ways; its sense is sometimes psychological, sometimes logical, and sometimes perhaps a confused mixture of both. Since this licence exists, it is natural to restrict it by requiring that when once a usage is adopted it shall be maintained. What I decided was to keep strictly to a purely logical use; the question whether this or that use is more appropriate is one that I should like to leave on one side, as of minor importance. Agreement about the mode of expression will easily be reached when once it is recognized that there is something that deserves a special term.
It seems to me that Kerry's misunderstanding results from his unintentionally confusing his own usage of the word 'concept' with mine. This readily gives rise to contradictions, for which my usage is not to blame.
[193] Kerry contests what he calls my definition of 'concept'. I would remark, in the first place, that my
I turn now to consider, as briefly as possible, the objections which B. Kerry* has brought against my definitions.
He begins by contesting what he calls my definition of a concept, and there is no doubt that here he is
* Uber Anschauung und ihre psy- chische Verarbeitung in der Viertel- jahrschrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Volume Xl, No. 3, pp.
249 IT.
? explanation is not meant as a proper definition. One cannot require that everything shall be defined, any more than one can require that a chemist shall decompose every substance. What is simple cannot be decomposed, and what is logically simple cannot have a proper definition. Now something logically simple is no more given us a t the outset than most of the chemical elements are; it is reached only by means o f scientific work. I f some- thing has been discovered that is simple, or at least must count as simple for the time being, we shall have to coin a term for it, since language will not originally contain an expression that exactly answers. On the introduction of a name for something logically simple, a definition is not possible; there is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as is intended.
Kerry wants to make out that the distinction between concept and object is not absolute. 'In a previous passage,' he says, 'I have myself expressed the opinion that the relation between the content of the concept and the concept-object is, in u certain respect, a peculiar and irreducible one; but this was in no way bound up with the view that the properties of being a concept and of being an object are mutually ex-
touching on a crucial point, perhaps the most important one in the whole issue. The first thing to say is that my explanation is not meant as a proper definition. One cannot define everything, any more than one can decompose every chemical substance. To do either presupposes that we are dealing with something composite. In many cases one has to be satisfied with leading the reader, by means of hints, to understand the word as it is intended.
On Concept and Object 89
The difference of opinion con- cerns the distinction between con- cept* and object. Kerry would like to make out that it is not absolute. 'In a previous passage,' he says, 'we have ourselves expressed the opinion that the relation between the concept-content and the concept- object is, in a certain respect, a peculiar and irreducible one; but this was in no way bound up with the view that the properties of being an
* In my paper Funktion und Begriff (Jena 1891) I called a concept a function whose value is always a truth-value, and this could be taken as a definition. But in that case the difficulty which, as I am trying to show, arises for the con- cept, arises for the function too.
? ? ? 90 On Concept and Object
elusive. The latter view no more object and being a concept are follows from the former than it mutually exclusive. The latter view
would follow, if, e. g. , the relation of father and son were one that could not be further reduced, that a man could not be at once a father and a son (though of course not, e. g. , father of the man whose son he was). '
Let us fasten on this simile. If there were, or had been beings that were fathers but could not be sons, such beings would obviously be quite different in kind from all men who are sons. Now it is something like this that happens here. The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. *
On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate. This admit- tedly needs elucidation, otherwise it might appear false. Surely one can just as well assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is green or is a mammal? [194]. If anybody thinks this, he is not distinguishing the usages o f the word 'is'. In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign of predication. (In this sense the
*It is, in fact, the reference of a grammatical predicate.
no more follows from the former than it would follow if, say, the relation of father and son were one that could not be further reduced, that a man could not be at once a father and a son (though of course not e. g. father of the man whose son he was). ' 1
Let me fasten on this simile. If there were, or had been, beings that were fathers, though they were so constituted by nature that they could not be sons, such beings would be obviously quite different in kind from all men who are sons. Now something like this happens here.
The concept-as I understand the word-is predicative even in cases where we speak of a subject- concept. For instance, the sentence 'All mammals are warm-blooded' says the same as 'Whatever is a mammal is warm-blooded'. On the other hand, a name of an object-a proper name-is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predi- cate. This may strike one as false if one does not distinguish between a proper name's occurring as only part of a predicate, which is cer- tainly possible, and its being itself the whole predicate, which is not pos- sible. One can assert of a thing that it is green or is a mammal; but one cannot in the same way assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is Venus.
1 Vjschr. f wissensch. Philosophie 11 ( 1887), p. 272 (ed. ).
? ? ? German word ist can sometimes be replaced by the mere personal suffix: cf. dies Blatt ist griin and dies Blatt griint. ) We are here saying that something falls under a concept, and the grammatical predicate stands for this concept. In the first three examples, on the other hand, 'is' is used like the 'equals' sign in
In order to see this, it is of course necessary to distinguish the two uses of the word 'is'. For in the first cases it serves as a copula, as a mere auxiliary indicating that we have a statement, and is sometimes then replaceable by the mere verb ending: e. g. 'dieses Blatt ist griin' ['this grass is green'], 'dieses Blatt griint' [lit. 'this grass greens']. Here one is saying that something falls under a concept. The grammatical predicate means this concept. In the second cases, the word 'is' is used like the equals sign in arithmetic, to express an equation. * Let us consider the following example: in the sentence 'That is Saturn' we have two proper names for the same object. For the word 'that', together with an appropriate pointing gesture, must here be construed as a proper name (in the logical sense) i. e. as a sign for an object. I am not here asserting the meaning of the word 'Saturn' of the object I am pointing to; if that were so, I should be asserting an object of itself, which would be nonsensical- one just cannot assert an object of
* I use the word 'equal' and the sign '=' in the sense 'the same as', 'not different from'. Cf. E. Schroder,
Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der Logik (Leipzig 1890), Vol. 1, ? 1, especially p. 127 & p. 128. Schroder, however, is to be criticized for not here distinguishing two fundamentally different relations; the relation of an object to a concept it falls under, and the sub- ordination of one concept to
arithmetic, equation. *
to express
an
*I use the word 'equal' and the symbol '=' in the sense 'the same as', 'no other than', 'identical with'. Cf. E. Schroeder, Vorlesungen ueber die Algebra der Logik (Leipzig
On Concept and Object 91
1890), Vol. 1, ? 1. Schroeder must
however be criticized for not dis-
tinguishing two fundamentally dif-
ferent relations; the relation o f an
object to a concept it falls under,
and the subordination of one con-
cept to another. His remarks on
the Vollwurzel are likewise open
to objection. Schroeder's symbol ~ another. His discussion of the does not simply take the place of the Vollwurzel is likewise open to objec- copula. tion.
? ? ? 92
On Concept and Object
In the sentence 'The mor- ning star is Venus', we have two proper names, 'morning star' and 'Venus', for the same object. In the sentence 'the morning star is a planet' we have a proper name, 'the morning star', and a concept-word, 'planet'. So far as language goes, no more has happened than that 'Venus' has been replaced by 'a planet'; but really the relation has become wholly different. An equation is reversible; an object's falling under a concept is an irre- versible relation. In the sentence 'the morning star is Venus', 'is' is ob- viously not the mere copula; its content is an essential part of the predicate, so that the word 'Venus' does not constitute the whole of the predicate. * One might say instead: 'the morning star is no other than V enus'; what was previously im- plicit in the single word 'is' is here set forth in four separate words, and
* Cf. my Grundlagen, ? 66, footnote.
*Cf. my Grundlagen, ? 57.
something-. The 'is' is not the mere copula, but is to be compared with a word like 'griint', in which the verb ending by itself takes the place of the copula, whilst the stem gives the actual content. * The content of the predicate is not comprised in the word 'Saturn' alone; an essential part of it is contained in the word 'is', or at least has to be added in thought. As the logical predicate we may Sftke, say: no other than Saturn. I t is ~is which is predicated here and not just Saturn. Saturn is an object, no other than Saturn is a concept.
? ? only as an object. Kerry, too, would probably not wish to dispute that there is something of this kind. But this would mean admitting a dis- tinction, which it is very important recognize, between what can occur only as an object, and everything else. And this distinction would not he effaced even if it were true, as Kerry thinks it is, that there are concepts that can also be objects.
concept, and Kerry himself surely does not wish to dispute that this is possible either. But this means ad- mitting a distinction, which it is of fundamental importance to rec- ognize, between what, by its very nature, can occur only as an object, and everything else.
