The apocalyptic entrepreneur of rage has to prevent the action of local cells from endangering the grand plan with
premature
activism.
Sloterdijk - Rage and Time
This operation (with the code name "The Wrath of God") was less a part of governmental action than a service to the imaginary of mass culture.
The popular and anarchist doubt about the regulatory power of "existing conditions" is connected to the tendency toward the new form of heroic action. Another consequence is the assumption of a permanent state of exception, and thus of the inclination of the actors to claim the right to help
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themselves in their singular situations. Indeed, some theoreticians of the left such as Walter Benjamin and later Antonio Negri articulated the dangerous suggestion that for the majority of human beings living under conditions
4
of capitalism, the permanent state of exception is normal. Once the "order
of things" has become delegitimized, improvisations are needed, including some rough ones. Only a small step is required to go from the political and moral delegitimation of circumstances to their ontological delegitimation, and ontological delegitimations call into question not only the normative foundations of the institutions of the ancien regime but also the authority of the past as such. Once this moment has come, so-called reality becomes an object for revision and, if necessary, is authorized to be torn down. In light of this, the militant slogan of the twentieth century, transformed by Sartre, "on a raison de se revolter? would have to be slightly altered. It would need to be translated as: "not he who revolts against what exists is in the right, but he who avenges against it. "
THE AGGRESSOR AS GIVER
IN MY ANALYSIS OF RAGE, IT IS NECESSARY TO FIRST TURN TO ITS energetic dimension, and later I will turn to its temporal and pragmatic dimensions. This requires a certain asceticism with regard to reactions and patterns of interpretations. Initially it is necessary to bracket the desire to emphasize the devastating dynamism of rage. The concept of "destruction," at least, needs to be separated from any kind of moral valuation. It has to be understood as a metabolic phenomenon that needs to be investigated beyond either appraisal or criticism. The alleged or real tendency of rage to explode without concern for the future should not be put at center stage prematurely. Finally, it is necessary to leave out the common psychological attributions of motivation, as well as character diagnoses.
This provides a more even-tempered view of the phenomenon of rage, one that acknowledges that we are primarily dealing with an intensive form of energy that is ready to explode or be transferred. If one follows the image of effervescence, which already led the ancient authors to speak of furor, of eruption and storming ahead, it becomes apparent how much the expres- sion of rage possesses a giving, even a paradoxically generous trait. As a form of pure extroversion, the uninhibited expression of "foaming" rage adds an especially energetic supplement to the inventory of deeds. Naturally these mostly reveal themselves in a negative light because at first sight they
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seem only to consist of uproar and suffering. It is easier to become aware of the giving dimension of rage if one regards the object of rage under the aspect of its similarity with the subject.
Whether rage comes on the scene like a sudden explosion or like chronic presentiment (after its hate-inflicted transformation into a proj- ect), it draws its force from an excess of energy that longs for release. Rage that manifests itself in punishment or acts of injury is connected to the belief that there is too little suffering in the world on a local or global level. This belief results from the judgment that suffering could be "deserved" in certain situations. The rage bearer sees in those people who are unjustly without suffering his most plausible enemies. He will never be content with the fact that pain is distributed unevenly to the point of intolerability. He wants to return a fair share of the excess of pain that has been stored up inside him to the person who caused it but has not yet been punished. He is infused with the knowledge that those without pain exist in a state of acute deficiency, and what they are missing is suffering. Seeing the deserv- ing go unpunished leads the vengeful individual to the conviction that he owns what others are lacking. He wants to become a donor, a profligate spender, even if he must force his gifts onto their recipients. Their habit of refusing to accept only provides rage and hatred with an additional motive to turn against its addressees.
There cannot be any doubt that there is a link between rage and pride, thanks to which rage provides itself with a moral certainty of its own legiti- macy. The higher the factor of pride in rage, the more effectively will the "you may" be transformed into a "you should. " The completely motivated vengeful action would be one that takes itself to be the execution of an indis- pensable, noble necessity. The corresponding empirical models would be revenge murders at the family level and wars of religion and independence on the ethnic and national levels.
As I have already stated, the rage bearer possesses the immediate evi- dence to assist the object of her rage in overcoming his own lack. Hours not spent in agony, a burning loss that needs to be suffered, a house that still stands in place without having been bombed, a knife that does not stick in the gut of a slanderer: these nuisances need to be overcome. Much more so than in the case of envy, which aims to humiliate and expropriate, rage (and likewise hatred, the conservation of rage) is an intensive turning toward the addressee in the game because it requires an act of authentic expenditure. One thus rightly says that human beings are as a consequence "inflicted
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with" pain. The vengeful inflictor feels like someone who is rich enough to share something of his richness with his contemporaries.
As a rule, the donation of pain is sent to a precise address; however, the gift usually extends beyond the immediate recipient to affect those near her as well. Often the donator of pain agrees to this excess: if the individual des- ignated as object of rage led a pain-free life, then most likely the people in close proximity also led lives without suffering, defective lives. In this sense it never appears to be completely false for the donator of pain to involve these people. The more desperately the rage bearer's unconditional wish to give expresses itself, the less it is limited by a certain determinate addressee. Just like civil enthusiasm thinks it is embraced by the millions, rage that has been amplified to hatred addresses itself to a universe of unknown people. It is an affect capable of forming obscure general concepts and elevating itself to the level of vague abstractions.
When rage becomes hatred we can witness the basic operations of ide-
ology formation because conceptual fixations are the best preservative for
ephemeral responses. He who wants to remember his rage needs to preserve
it in hate containers. The advantage of these conceptualizations of rage is
that they can be used extensively without ever being used up entirely. Abso-
lute hatred ultimately does not require any determinate object right before
its eyes. Its abstractness, which is close to aimlessness, guarantees its spilling
over into what is universal. For its bearer, the knowledge that it is turning to
the general addressee is sufficient to make sure that he does not waste itself
unnecessarily. The condition is reached in which we can speak of expendi-
5
ture as such, expenditure pure and simple (sans phrase). In these divesti-
tures, the rage-filled giver of pain often risks his own life. In these cases, the giver makes himself into a physical addition to the bomb that is supposed to supply the missing suffering.
IT THUS DOES NOT MAKE ANY SENSE TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP between self-confident hatred and concepts such as nihilism—despite their prevalence as popular explanatory models. In general, the concept of hatred proves analytically unsuitable because it is deduced from the phenomenon of rage and can only be made intelligible as a form of preserving rage. One has to insist that rage, which is a standpoint, even a project, is not at all affil- iated with the nothingness we like to claim for hatred. Rage is not merely a militant form of indifference with regard to oneself and others. Even if
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rage reveals recklessness, it would be a mistake to think that it is indifferent about everything. Rage that has become reified as hatred is resolute good- will. Initially it appears as a pointed attack that brings about an intense local pain. Then it secures an allegedly necessary increase of pain in the world in order to persist in terrible reports and other media exaggerations. In light of this perspective, it is the subjective and passionate appearance of that which the penalizing judiciary wants to embody objectively and without passion. Both rest on the axiom according to which the balance of the world after its disruption can only be recovered through an increase of pain at the right location.
In the case of individual donations of rage, the person who hates initially draws on her own rage supply, even at the risk of using up her capacity for experiencing rage. Nothing guarantees to the simple vengeful person that his sources are inexhaustible. As long as vengeful energy is not transformed into a project and the individual constantly faces the possibility of returning to peace through satisfaction or exhaustion, the small circle of anger and abreaction belongs to the energetic processes connected to our emotions.
In this sense we can understand the abreactive crime as the manifesta- tion of a power that demands the right to discharge itself even if this puts the actor into a position of moral injustice. This is why crimes from such impulsive sources tend to exhaust themselves when the deed is finished. The moment that the victim is out of sight, the perpetrator is able to forget it. Is it not true, after all, what is said about the brothers of Joseph after they sold him to Egypt, "for their hatred had been taken from them, and in time they were left with only vague recollections of how greatly the ninny had angered them"? 6 Because rage is initially a finite resource, its satisfaction through the deed is often its end, which sometimes compels the actor to surrender deliberately to the forces of law.
An exemplary return of a fatigued vengeful person to endure his sentence is depicted by Friedrich Schiller in his 1792 story "The Criminal from Lost Honor. " If Hegel, who read this novella attentively, refers to the sentence as the honor of the crime, we should immediately think of Schiller's poor "sun keeper. " This well-known ravager reveals his true identity to a respectful civil servant in a sentimental gesture in order to then surrender himself to the courts. Something similar is done by Kleist in Michael Kolhaas, although this German story about the passion of righteousness stands under a darker sign. This story of an overly sensitive person who takes revenge for two horses that were stolen from him embodies the process by which the rage
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that drives a private person to carry out deeds of revenge becomes a meta- physics of self-administered justice. The fact that the raging citizen who sees his stubbornness fulfilled dies as a satisfied petit-bourgeois is revealing. It expresses nothing less than the anticipation of the revaluation of all values. The romantics, who opened themselves to the aesthetics of excess, picked up on the feeling that we can no longer depend on God's justice. They reveal a concern for those humiliated on the earth and those who make their contri- butions to the day of judgment during their lifetimes.
RAGE AND TIME: THE SIMPLE EXPLOSION
WHEN THE EXPENDITURE OF RAGE DEVELOPS MORE COMPLEX FORMS, the seeds of rage are consciously dispersed, and the fruits of rage are dili- gently harvested. Through hate culture, rage is carried out in the form of a project. Wherever revenge intentions ripen, dark energies become stabi- lized over longer periods. What Nietzsche says about the genesis of con- science, that it is premised on the human who can promise, is even more true for the memory of the one who engages in revenge. This person is an agent who remembers not only the injustice that has been inflicted upon him but also all his plans for paying it back. The person "who may promise" is, according to Nietzsche's complex characterization, the subject with the "lasting will. " Once this subject is constituted, revenge intentions can then be sustained over long periods of time—even passed from one generation to the next. Once the stage of transmission has reached the next agent, an authentic economy of rage has come into being. Now the resource of rage is no longer accumulated arbitrarily and occasionally wasted; rather, it is maintained and continually produced as the object of an ongoing project. Once it has reached this stage, rage becomes a treasure trove for its pos- sessor, opening up avenues to transpersonal motives. As soon as collectively administered amounts of rage are stored as treasures or assets, the question becomes pressing as to whether such accumulated assets can be invested like capital. I will answer this later with the support of a new psychopolitical definition for left-wing parties. In reality these parties need to be under- stood as banks of rage that, if they do their business well, will know how to effect politically and thymotically relevant gains.
If one admits that the banking and saving functions of rage assets are real and efficacious, one also understands how it is possible for rage to develop from its diffused initial stage to higher levels of organization. By
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passing through this progression, rage travels the road from local and inti- mate emotion to public and political program. The temporal structure of rage-potentials also undergoes a total transformation. Rage undergoes a metamorphosis from a blind form of expenditure in the here and now to a far-sighted, world-historical project of revolution for the sake of those who have been humiliated and offended.
However, as long as rage remains explosive, it expresses itself by "flaming up": "And the rage of Achilles rose forcefully. " The direct thymotic abreac- tion is a version of fulfilled presence. For the raging person, as for the happy person, time does not exist. The uproar in the here and now neutralizes the retrospective and prospective ecstasies of time so that both disappear in the momentary energy flow. The life of the subject of fury is the sparkles in the chalice of the situation. For the romantics of energy, this acting in anger is a kind of flow. It implies a return to a mystic and animal time that, as its con- noisseurs avow, has the quality of the constantly fleeting now.
RAGE AS PROJECT: REVENGE
THE CREATION OF A QUALIFIED OR EXISTENTIAL TIME, THAT IS, A lived time with a retrospective and anticipatory character, occurs through the deferral of discharge. Rage potential is channeled into a vector that cre- ates a tension between then, now, and later. This is why we can say that the raging one who holds herself back preliminarily knows what it means to intend to do something. At the same time, she not only lives in history but also makes history—insofar as making history is the name here for taking motives from the past in order to take care of what comes. In this respect, nothing can be compared to revenge. Thymos that has been activated dis- covers through its desire for gratification the world as the realm of con- structing future projections, which gain momentum for the coming attack from what has been. Rage becomes the momentum of a movement into the future, which one can understand as the raw material for historical change.
As elementary as these considerations may appear, their implications reach into the innermost motives of twentieth-centuiy philosophy. If they are correct, they necessitate important modifications to one of the most well known theorems of modern philosophy. If they are correct, one should not interpret existential time as the immediate being-toward-death, as Hei- degger in Being and Time suggests in an interpretation that is as well known as it is rushed. The being-whole-ability of existence {das Ganz-sein-Kbnnen
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der Existenz) is what matters to the thinker, an ability that does not depend on the fact of the individual considering his own death in order to ascertain his directedness toward something that is an unconditional future fact. Das- ein can just as well orient itself because it traverses the distance from humil- iation to revenge as a whole. Existential time emerges from such an anxiety (Hingespanntheit) toward its decisive moment. Such an act of endowing for one's own being-toward-goals (Seins-zum-Ziele) is more powerful than every vague heroic meditation of the end. When Dasein is angry it does not have the form of running ahead toward its own death, but of an anticipa- tion of the indispensable day of rage. One would rather have to speak of a running ahead to gratification. If one thinks back to the protagonist of the Iliad it becomes clear that a warlike being-toward-destruction has become his second nature. His departure for the last battle in front of the walls of Troy marks the beginning of the sequence of action with which the down- fall of the hero became necessary. In this respect, Heidegger's thesis that Dasein is being-toward-death belongs to those Europeans who carry on the work of the myth of Achilles throughout the ages.
Revenge emerges out of the project form of rage. This concept initially requires analysis from a neutral and ecological vantage point. One may rightly understand the desire for revenge as one of the most unfriendly desires of humanity. That it belongs to the causes of the greatest miseries is proven by history insofar as it has not yet been classified a "life teacher. " Called "zra," it is classified among the deadly sins. If anyone could say something positive about it, it is that with it the possibility of unemployment vanishes from the life of avenger. He who has a strong intention to practice a revenge is, for the time being, safe from suffering problems of meaning. A persistent will excludes boredom. The deep simplicity of rage satisfies the all-too-human desire for strong motivations. One motive, one agent, one necessary deed: this is the formula for a complete project. The most important character- istic of a well-organized and well-planned existence manifests itself in the lack of any arbitrariness. The avenger is safe from the "need of needless- ness" that Heidegger claimed would be the sign of an existence abandoned by a sense of ne-cessity (Not-Wenidigkeit). It is indeed impossible to claim that the avenger would live like a leaf in the wind; chance no longer has any power over her. This way revengeful existence gains a quasi-metaphysical meaning in a postmetaphysical age: thanks to rage the "utopia of motivated life" realizes itself in a domain in which an increasing amount of people feel empty. No one expressed this more clearly than Stalin when he said about
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his colleagues Kamenew and Dschersinski, "To choose one's victim, to pre- pare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable vengeance, and then to go to b e d . . . there is nothing sweeter in the world. "7
RAGE AS BANK: REVOLUTION
THE PROJECT FORM OF RAGE (WHICH ONE WOULD CALL IN POLICE jargon self-administered justice or the mob mentality and in political jargon anarchism or the romanticism of violence) can expand to take on the form of a bank. This elevation (Aufhebung) of local anger resources and dispersed projects of hatred into an overarching instance. The task of this storehouse of rage, as for every authentic bank, consists in serving as a collection point and recycling agency for investments. This transition necessarily once again affects the temporal structure of those potentials invested in individual projects. Just as rage in its project form provides for a longer duration and allows for a pragmatic planning process, the bank form of rage requires that individual vengeful plans subject themselves to a superior perspective. This perspective proudly bears the title of "history"—history, of course, in the singular. Through the creation of a bank of rage (understood as a storage place for moral explosives and vengeful projects) individual vectors become part of a single project guided by a single administration, the demands of which do not always coincide with the rhythms of local actors and actions. But now subjection becomes inevitable: countless histories of rage are finally united in one common history.
This transition marks the transformation from the projective to the historical form of rage. As soon as a collective that invests its rage poten- tials—as well as its hopes and ideals—forms itself into a common, enduring operation, "history" itself takes on the form of an enterprise of the highest ambition. Historical narration takes on the task of accounting for the deeds and sufferings of the significant collective of rage. To say it almost with the words from 1848 of two famous colleagues: all history is the history of rage applications.
Once the rage economy becomes elevated to the level of a bank, anar- chistic companies led by small rage owners and locally organized anger groups become the subjects of harsh criticism. At the same time that the level of organization of rage is increased, there is a rationalization of the vengeful energy: it passes from pure impulsivity through a selective attack to a conception of attacks against the state of the world as a whole. From the
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perspective of the rage bankers, the actions of local anger agencies are blind expenditures that almost never produce any appropriate return because the anarchic acting out of the forces of rage regularly provokes the intervention of security forces, which can easily neutralize individual eruptions of hatred and local revolt.
On this level, vengeful actions are usually persecuted as transgressions or punished as crimes. It is thus not helpful to destroy telephone boxes or to set cars on fire unless the act is meant to integrate the act of vandalism into a "historical" perspective. The anger of destroyers and arsonists consum- mates itself in its expression, and that it often regenerates itself through the harsh reactions of the police and the judiciary does not change its blindness. It is an attempt to smash fog with a stick. Even a mass movement like that of the slave leader Spartacus in the years 73 through 71 B. C. could not achieve more than a flaring-up of hatred across Italy against the domination of the Roman landowners. Even though the rebellious gladiators of Capua dealt multiple defeats to the Roman army, the final result of this revolt was the horror of 6,000 crucified rebels enduring several days of agony before dying. Its consequences were increased repression and deepened discouragement. The revitalization of the legend of Spartacus and its inclusion in the sym- bolic arsenal of modern class struggle tells us, however, that in the archives of rage one deals with a "heritage" that is millennia old. Remember: if one wants to cultivate and pass on rage, one needs to make one's offspring into a part of a history of victims who call for revenge.
An analysis of our historical experience shows without a doubt that the small craftsmanship of rage is condemned to exhaust itself in costly botch-ups. So long as the local assets for revolutionary zeal are not pooled at long-term collection points and remain unguided by a visionary leader- ship, they waste themselves in expressions of their growing unrest. Isolated anger quanta heat up in shabby dishes until they evaporate or leave behind burned sediments that cannot again be reheated. This is unmistakably revealed by the history of smaller protest parties. Only when discrete ener- gies are invested into superior projects and far-sighted, sufficiently calm, diabolic directors take care of administrating collective rage capacities is it possible for multiple, isolated fires to be transformed into one big power plant. This plant could provide the energy for coordinated actions, up to the level of "world politics. " Visionary slogans become necessary for this to occur, slogans that do not need merely to address the intense anger of human beings but to reach their inner feelings of bitterness and finally their
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hope and their pride. The coldest rage writes up its activity reports in the style of hot idealism.
Just like the monetary economy, the rage economy passes a critical marker once rage has advanced from local accumulation and selective explosion to the level of a systematic investment and cyclic increase. In the case of money, one calls this difference the transition from treasure hoard- ing to capital. For rage, the corresponding transformation is reached once the vengeful infliction of pain is transformed from revenge to revolution. Revolution cannot be a matter of the resentment of an isolated private person, although such affects are also instantiated in its decisive moment. Revolution rather implies the creation of a bank of rage whose investments should be considered in as precise detail as an army operation before a final battle, or actions of a multinational corporation before being taken over by a hostile competitor.
The concept of the coming "revolution," considered in light of the events of 1917, finalizes the transition from the actualism to the futurism of rage. It implies a complete dismissal of the principle of expression. Vengeful acts of expression mean nothing more than a narcissistic expenditure of energy. The professional revolutionary, who is working as an employee of a bank of rage, does not express individual tensions, he follows a plan. This presup- poses the complete subordination of revolutionary affects under the com- mercial strategy. It does not suffice anymore to "embellish the world with horrors," to use the sarcastic-lucid phrase uttered by Schiller's hero in the play The Robbers, which Karl Moor proffers to characterize the maxim of his revolt against injustice. Whoever intends to embellish the world in the future needs to go much further in making it ugly than the romanticism of rebels and assassins could ever dream. Individual flowers of evil are no longer sufficient—one needs a whole art of gardening.
THE TERRIFYING FORCE OF THE NEGATIVE
BY "REVOLUTION," WHICH STILL SOUNDS SOMEWHAT FASCINATING even if it turns out to be increasingly empty, I mean the concept or, bet- ter, the phantasm that Lenin and Mao Zedong, the most successful entre- preneurs of rage, had in mind. By "revolutions" they meant that, through disciplined acts of hatred, one day there could be so much additional pain, so much excessive horror, so much numbing self-doubt among the secu- rity forces that everything that existed would soon melt down during a
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day of mass rage. Once what exists has lost its eternal and firm hold, the rotten world can then be created anew through the fire of transformation. But for this to happen, the power of destruction needs to accomplish its work to the very end. Only when what is old is eradicated completely can the reconstruction of the true circumstances can be started on a totally level foundation.
What Hegel referred to as the terrifying force of the negative gains its most distinct contour in this religiously conditioned speculation. Human rage, gathered from all sources and through effective modes of organiza- tion, provides for the bizarre calculation of big rage bankers the energy for a new creation. Assuming that the terrible end is sufficiently terrible, it should accordingly pass over into an epochal beginning.
Through deliberations of this kind at the height of unblemished ruth- lessness, one can encounter a form of anxiety that would curdle the blood of motley rebels and local hate projects if they were capable of envisioning the great strategic perspectives.
The apocalyptic entrepreneur of rage has to prevent the action of local cells from endangering the grand plan with premature activism. This commits him to an extreme ascetics that will also affect his followers. The world revolutionary must unfailingly plan against spontaneous feelings; he must tenaciously dismiss his first reactions. He knows that without the deepest asceticism in the here and now there will never be any reward in the beyond. The more that local outrage is in the right, the more it is wrong when seen from a global perspective. If one aims for the transformation of everything, one needs to curb the impatience of individual vengeful parties. It is much more necessary to commit all fac- tions waiting to explode to staying calm and prepared (In-Form-Bleiben) until the day of mature rage arrives.
The temporal structure of revolution thus needs to be conceived of as an all-inclusive advent. Whatever leads to revolution belongs to the meaning- ful time of real history. The course of this history is analogous to a burning fuse. A great historical experience and a dose of intuition are needed to be able to judge to what extent the fuse of rage has already burned up. If one possesses both, one is qualified to take a leadership role at the top of the rage bank. Such a boss is justified in dictating to his employees from his sovereign position that they should prepare and keep the dynamite dry; the first precondition for collecting rage as part of a political project of global significance is cold-bloodedness. On the one hand, this cold-bloodedness constantly needs to stir hatred and outrage. On the other hand, it is also
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necessary for securing restraint. This way Dasein, in pre-explosive times, is in the mood of waiting while remaining ready for the next fight.
WHERE CAN ONE STUDY THIS HIGHER ECONOMY? NO ONE BELIEVES that studying Heidegger academically will be sufficient for gaining such dan- gerous knowledge. As much as the affinities with the basic claims of Being and Time are obvious, the Master from Messkirch only approached the temporal structure of revolutionary resentment in a formalist way before, for a time, evading it for the black heaven of the "national revolution. " Hei- degger never fully understood the logical and systematic implications of the concept of revolution. He understood it just as little as he understood the connection between our historicity and Daseins ability to be resentful. His investigation of the temporal structures of the caring, projecting, and dying Dasein does not provide us with an appropriate conception of the deep nexus of rage and time. The birth of history out of the project form of rage and, even more, the totality of processes leading to the capitalization of resentment remain obscure in his work.
APART FROM HEIDEGGER, WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REFER TO Marx and Lenin as the authorities for the dynamism of prerevolutionary and revolutionary negativity. It is peculiar that studying these authors is currently next to impossible. The reason for this is not that the texts are impenetrable but that the wall of Zeitgeist barricades access to them in a way that even the most patient person cannot independently overcome. With the exception of some still citable "passages," the works of the Marxist classics have become practically unreadable for people with contemporary intellectual, moral, and aesthetic reflexes. They seem to be written in an illusionary foreign tongue. Obsolete polemics permeate them to a degree that, for the time being, the deterring effect outweighs even the most moti- vated investigatory curiosity. Furthermore, they illustrate a fidelity to con- cepts one usually only finds in fundamentalist sects. Although they appeal to the science of "society" and its "contradictions," many classic leftist texts (with the exception of a few technical primary texts such as Capital) can be read only as unintended parodies. Only thanks to a completely untimely ascetics would it be possible to deduce from the writings of Marx and Lenin the building blocks of a theory of the present. (Mao Zedong's works would
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have to be taken off the list of reasonable literature from the very begin- ning). Nonetheless, the works of these authors provide a massive compen- dium of rage insights. Without these, the tragedies of the twentieth century cannot be adequately depicted and explained. I will return to this sunken body of work in chapters 3 and 4 because they indirectly provide informa- tion about what lies ahead.
One of the last chances to get to know a little bit more about the unpop- ular strategies of the major rage economy is to draw on events in the West- ern world toward the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. In this morbid but equally glorious epoch, the thousand flowers of radicalism were in bloom as if for the last time. Then, it would have easily been pos- sible to assure oneself of Marx's remark that historical dramas regularly repeat themselves as farces after their first staging as tragedies. In this case, the farce consisted in the attempt to project the circumstances of the 1930s onto those of 1968 and afterward in order to derive the rules for "resis- tance" against the "ruling system. " Back then, one could often hear the doc- trine that patience should be the first virtue of the revolutionary. Words of advice like these mirrored a generational conflict in the radical left between the old school and the revolutionary youth. The late-Stalinist intelligentsia advised this youth that, although the revolution had already "begun" and in the future it would be necessary to always count "from now on," the manifest eruption of the revolution should, under no circumstances, be accelerated voluntaristically.
Only today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as the peace of real consumerism is threatened through what is in many places proclaimed as "return of history" (part of it being a return of left-fascist whispers at the margins of academia), do we find a new chance to understand what the praise of revolutionary virtues truly meant. Patience designated the attitude of the historical subject of rage. This subject had freed itself from its personal motives through a cold quasi-idealist ascetics. Once a private factor becomes part of the inevitable revenge against the status quo (or according to the jargon of the time, praxis), voluntarism and a premature expenditure are unavoidable consequences. They are the "teething troubles" of the growing revolution. Although such eruptive episodes might still seem justified from the perspective of the actors, from the perspective of a leading employee of the world bank of rage they are the worst thing that could happen before the day of decision. The leading functionaries are convinced that a pre- mature eruption will prevent the coming into being of this most intensive
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tension. Only this tension will allow the collection of globally dispersed assets of rage into one single and final action, which goes by the name of "world revolution. " The hostile acquisition of the "world" by those who are worse off presupposes that the various factions among the worse off refrain from wasting their powers in spontaneous and individual ventures.
The most famous examples of an anarchistic waste of rage deposits are the assassins who, on March 1, 1881, killed Czar Alexander II, the famous emancipator of the serfs. The immediate consequences consisted in the intensification of repression and the expansion of an omnipresent police system. Even more devastating was the senseless waste of hatred assets by the imitators of the assassins of 1881. These were a group of students of the University of St. Petersburg who were planning to kill the murdered czar's successor, Alexander III, on March 1,1886—as is well known, days of political rage follow a special calendar. Among the students was the twenty- one-year-old Alexander Ulyanov. The attempt was uncovered by the police before it could be carried out, and Alexander was imprisoned with four- teen other conspirators. He was sent to court and, in May 1887, hanged with four other insurgents who likewise were unable to feel remorse. The lives of the other ten were spared in line with the manners of a Russian autocracy famous for its acts of pardoning. Vladimir Ulyanov, the "brother of the hanged," subsequently underwent a process of change from which he emerged as "Lenin," the first wholehearted politician of rage in mod- ern times. In this capacity, he came to understand that the way to power can only lead through the conquest of the state apparatus, not through the merely symbolically relevant assassination of its representative.
The often cited phrase of the young Lenin, "we will not go this way,"
which was probably dated earlier or even invented, is rightly conceived of as
8
the first sentence of the Russian Revolution. With him begins the century
of the big business of rage. Who can forgo the killing of the prince, can receive, as a bonus to the conquered power, the dead prince for free.
68
THE WRATHFUL GOD
THE DISCOVERY OF THE METAPHYSICAL REVENGE BANK
AT THE END OF THE INTRODUCTION I CLAIMED THAT THE psychopolitical constellation of rage and time (or rage and history) is antici- pated by the theological constellation of rage and eternity. What this means exactly at this point needs to be developed. Nontrivial insights concerning the function and architecture of monotheistic religions will surface in the course of this investigation.
That theology wants to be a political quantity, that it can, and that it indeed needs to be such follow from a simple diagnosis. The religions that were relevant for the course of occidental European history, that is, the Mes- opotamian as well as the Mediterranean religions, have always been politi- cal and will remain so as long as they survive. In these religions, gods are the transcendent party supporters of their peoples and protectors of their kingdoms. They exercise this function even at the risk of having to invent a people and a kingdom that suits them. This is especially true for the God of monotheism. This God had to travel a long geopolitical path, from his precarious Egyptian beginnings to his Roman and American triumphs. This is the case despite the assertions of those who worship him: he is not a mere
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god of empires (since empires are notoriously perishable structures) but the
1
timeless and transpolitical creator and shepherd of all men.
In fact, the one and only God of Israel was initially a god without an empire. As an ally of a small people primarily concerned with their survival chances, he initially did not seem to be anything more than a provincial god. In time, however, he would transform himself into the most politically viru- lent god in the skies above Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Although barely noticeable in the world, he was conscious of his omnipotence. He succeeded in offensively positioning himself against the pompously incar- nated imperial gods of the Near East and Rome, at the same time claiming clear superiority. As the claimant of an illustrious monopoly, he invited the ancient people of Israel to live far beyond their political means in matters of religion. He expected that they would trust him and thus hold their heads higher than the most powerful of emperors. He thus revealed himself as the
deuspoliticus par excellence, as the party member of all party members, as the anchor of a sacred one-sidedness that manifested itself in the far-reaching concept of the Covenant. As during the blossoming of communism, when the dogma was spread around that Marxist science united in itself objec- tivity and partisanship, so the Jewish and Christian theologies, which were always blooming plants, have made it clear from the beginning that God's universal justice expresses itself in the preferential treatment of one of the two allied peoples.
We have to assume that there is a constitutive primary phase in the development of the management of rage with a global scope (called, from a modern perspective, the submission of politics to morality, the art of the possible under the art of what can be wished), an initial phase that extends for more than two millennia. In this phase a threatening and sublime con- ception is shaped, according to which an autonomously steering and judg- ing but also participating and excitable as well as "agitating" (eifernder) God constantly intervenes in the course of human conflicts, alias history. Because the history of humanity is to a large extent synonymous with that which upsets God, these interventions mostly happen in the mode of wrath. God rages against his own people no less than against their adversaries. He shows his rage by sending wars, epidemics, famines, and natural catastro- phes as servile spirits of punishment (technically speaking, these spirits are secondary causes on behalf of the majesty who is the primary cause). At a later point, it was said about this God that when the day of Last Judg- ment would come, he would impose eternal bodily and spiritual pain on
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those who missed the chance to repent during their lives on earth and thus avoided their just sentence.
The motive of the court of judgment originated in the conceptions of the beyond in Ancient Egypt and the Near East. During its culmination in the late Middle Ages and the baroque period, it advanced to become the most aston- ishing of visual illustrations. If one had to define the, historically speaking, exceptionalism of Christian intelligence, one could put it as follows: Christian thinking is (or was until very recently) that thinking that in its concern for salvation also conceives of its opposite, hell. Even in the twentieth century, the Catholic Irishman James Joyce depicted, with the shiniest and blackest of
2 colors,themetaphysicalhorroroftheexperienceofsufferingforeternity. In
light of the influence of this idea, the concept of eternity became associated with a final penal and torture institution, based on a vast divine memory of injustice and corresponding rage competence. With the help of this set of
3 ideas,anxietybecamepartofthespiritualhistoryofChristianity. Itisprob-
ably correct to assume that theology secretly dispensed with the unfavorable ballast of dogmatic conceptions of hell during the twentieth century. Insofar as traces of the idea of a wrathful God have seeped into our contemporary memory, it still conjures up the memory of the most Christian of hells.
If the wrath of God is translated back into historical time and taken up by a human, universal direction, "history" comes into being. It enters the scene with a revolutionary climax whose meaning consists in avenging the injustice that provokes rage against those who caused the injustice and, even more so, against its structural conditions. One could define modernity as the epoch in which the motives of rage and immanence become fused. This liaison generates the coming into existence of a globally operative rage agency. In the next chapter, I will describe as the embodiment of such an institution the party that is always in the right. Only a control center of such a scale could realize what Schiller referred to with his dictum that world his- tory is the world's court of justice. But first I want to examine not the trans- lation of Holy Wrath into secular history but its accumulation in eternity.
PRELUDE: THE WRATH OF GOD AGAINST THE SECULAR WORLD
IF IT IS CORRECT THAT THE GLOBALIZATION OF RAGE HAD TO PASS through an extended theological starting phase before it could be translated into secular control, we are faced with an essential difficulty of understanding.
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In the introduction to this work, I attempted to show why it is impossible for modern human beings to understand the rage of Achilles within the parameters of the age of Homer. What follows is an analogous demonstra- tion in regards to the prophetism of rage in the tradition of Judaism docu- mented in the Bible, as well as in the Christian tradition in the Scholastic and Puritan theology of rage. For our contemporaries it is impossible to appreciate the rage of the One God as it has been preached by the interpret- ers of triumphant monotheism at the highpoints of their self-confidence. It is fundamentally mistaken to believe that it would be possible to do with- out a reconsideration of the early history of the horror metaphysicus because contemporary Islamism provides an example. The wave of violence that is carried out by Islamists at most tells us something about the most recent performances of the well-known tropes of the wrathful God, as well as the agitating God known since the early days of Judaism. It does not help us to diagnose how it was ever possible that God could acquire the attribute ofwrathfulness.
To appreciate the authentic teaching concerning God's rage, two con- cepts are necessary, and their meaning is, if at all, only metaphorically understandable for us: glory and hell. The content of these terms, which formerly depicted the extremes of high and low in a world formed by God's presence, cannot be concretized by contemporaries. We cannot clarify them even given our best efforts. If a modern human being were to be capable of using these concepts according to their metaphysical meaning, he would have to affirm the most horrible sentence of world literature—he would have to agree to the inscription above the gates of Hell in Dante's Inferno, where we can read for eternity: "Divine power made me, / highest wisdom, and primal love. " The impossibility of deliberately agreeing to these words of terror provides an inkling of the complexity of the task that has to be solved. The solution can no longer be achieved. To see this difficulty means to enter into an investigation concerning the price paid for monotheism. This much needs to be said in advance: the price for monotheism had to be paid by two transactions, of which it is not easy to say which was the more deadly. One was the introduction of resentment into the teaching of last things, the other the internalization of terror into Christian psychagogy.
Before approaching these dangerous domains, we should attempt to ease the censorship of the Zeitgeist. Because of this censorship, that theological issues of all kinds are excluded from the domain of topics to be seriously discussed by enlightened human beings. "God talk" has been banned from
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European high society for more than 150 years. This is the case in spite of
periodically circulating rumors of a return of religion. Flaubert's bon mot
in his Dictionary of Received Ideas concerning "conversation"—that "poli-
tics and religion are to be excluded from it"—is still an apt description of
4
the state of affairs. However often one speaks of a "revitalization" of the
religious, the truth remains that simply because there is a widespread dis- satisfaction with the disenchanted world, this does not at all lead to a new belief in extra- or superworldly entities. When John Paul II often remarked in a melancholic tone that human beings in Europe live as if God does not exist, he revealed a better understanding of the real conditions than the subversive crypto-Catholics who publish in the culture sections of Ger- man newspapers, who would like it the most if they could elect the Lord in Heaven as the Person of the Year.
We can specifically say about the Christian message that it has not been admissible in the secular realm for a long time; it is no longer plausible. The only way to get a hold of its audience is through marginal means of communication, such as TV channels owned by certain sects. This remark will provoke the protest of one or another representative of the church who does not like to admit the possibility that belief in the Redeemer could be a hobby similar to enjoying horror movies or breeding fighting dogs. This reservation can be easily understood, yet it does not change the fact that the Christian cause survives only as a subculture. What is at issue here cannot anyhow be expressed by sociological or statistical data. The alienation of the public from the Gospel goes far beyond Paul's concession that God talk is a nuisance for Jews and a foolishness for Greeks. Apart from nuisance and foolishness, embarrassment is perhaps the best characterization of the contemporary mode of being of the religious. For some time now, religious sensibilities have retreated into the intimate regions of the psyche and are regarded as the true pudenda of the moderns. After the Enlightenment, one has to cross a great threshold of embarrassment to still be touched by the question concerning a praiseworthy Higher Being. Theologians like to react to this situation with the profound remark that modern man still lives in the historical situation of a "distance" to God. However beautiful this phrase is, it is already mistaken. The problem that exists between God and us contemporaries is not that we are too far away from him. Rather, God would get too close if we were to take his offerings seriously. No quality of the God of the theologians reveals this better than the most embarrassing among them: God's wrath.
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THE WRATHFUL GOD
This said, the following thesis should make sense: what seemed to be the clearest manifestation of a new weight of religion, of a new religiosity as such—the attention that was paid to the dying and death of Pope John Paul II and the choice of his successor, Benedict XVI, in April 2005—actually had little to do with the religious side of the changing of the guard in the Office of the Saint Peter. In fact, the fascination was exerted largely, if not exclusively, by the pompous Roman liturgies based on relics of the impe- rial Caesarian myth. Without being able to give themselves a clear account of what they were doing, the masses, as well as the media, felt during the course of events how the personal aura of the pope still radiates with the charisma of Caesar. To a diligent observer of the pontificate of John Paul II," it is clear that the papal cult, which the pope cleverly updated, was essen- tially characterized by a media Caesarism. In spite of all the assertions of the mystic intensity of the event, it was how the Christian message pro- vided a religious form to Caesarian content. Only because of the latter was it possible that Roma aeterna could appear as the most successful content
provider for all secular networks. But what else does this show than that the Church only wins the struggle for attention when it presents a program that can be misinterpreted in a secular, tragic, and spectacular way? Because Catholicism, at least in its Roman form, is in the last instance still more an empire—or, more specifically, a copy of an empire—than it is a church, the embarrassment of religious speech retreats into the background during its main events and completely cedes the floor to the pompous apparatus.
Once again: in a post-Enlightenment atmosphere "God" cannot be a topic under any circumstances, with the exception of special issues of elitist culture journals. A fortiori, a public discourse concerning the "attributes" of the impossible object remains unthinkable. Yet more impossible, if such a comparative form exists, would be the demand to conceive of a wrathful God or a God of rage in a time in which a friendly God is already an implau- sible hypothesis. But we precisely have to deal with this unpopular entity, which I will refer to from now on in a preliminary fashion as a "thought figure," in order to understand the emergence of the modern economy of rage. We have to trace the preliminary stages of its transformation into a formal banking system.
The most recent opportunity to witness the configuration of the con- cepts "God" and "rage" was the debate concerning the new forms of reli- gious and political fundamentalism, a debate more than usually visible in the late 1980s. A significant publication from that time was La revanche de
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Dieu (The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Juda- ism in the Modern World), which appeared in French in 1989. The French subtitle did not just mention an advance but, more straightforwardly, a ureconquete du monde"—this was of course reminiscent of the historical pattern of the Reconquista. The author of the book, Gilles Kepel, who has been one of the most important voices in matters of culture and politics in the Middle East since this publication, investigates the strategies of the radi- cal monotheist mobilization in various corners of the world. The oriental aspect of the topic seems to be couched in an ecumenical register of old and new fanaticisms.
The ironic tone of the term "revanche de Dieu' cannot be missed. The author makes it clear that he discusses his subject matter solely with the means available to a cultural scientist of his time. When he mentions the "vengeful God," he does not affirmatively refer to the theology of the wrath- ful God. At the center of the investigation is the return of militant religious groups onto the stage of world politics. In the meantime, we have become accustomed to interpreting the resurgence of these groups as "fundamental- ist reactions"—they are the expressions of revenge from a heated religious milieu against the dominant secular milieu. Chronologically, the return of fundamentalisms begins with the appearance of evangelical fundamental- ists in the United States and their adamant denunciation of the worldview of modern natural science as diabolic. For decades, these groups have been increasing their influence on American society. The trend is continued by the ultraorthodox Jews of Israel, whose agitations can no longer be ignored by any government and who would like to see their secular nation trans- formed, sooner rather than later, into a rabbi-ocracy; the trend finds its inevitable end in more recent Islamist phenomena. Although the Islamists, just like their Christian counterparts, reveal a tendency toward militant big- otry, particularly unmistakable are the similarities to the years of fighting and defiance of Roman Catholicism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; however, they add a new element to their political appearances. They draw on historical Islam as a "readymade" in order to arbitrarily instrumentalize it in a terrorist advertising campaign throughout the global public sphere. What Marcel Duchamp achieved for art history during the early twentieth century, Osama Bin Laden repeats with the sup- port of religious technicians for the Islam of the late twentieth century. The significance of the readymade procedure for the modern cultural economy has been laid out in the subde analyses of Boris Groys, and the effects of his
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THE WRATHFUL GOD
5
work on contemporary cultural science have barely begun. As a result of
the subversive interpretation of the sacred tradition, we see that Islam, and in particular the traditional authority of the Ulema, the council of scholars and jurists, is undermined by the rebellious fascination of religious pirates.
This "revenge of God" is launched by the various political surrealists, ter- rorists, and fanatics through the media of Western entertainment societies, which are always hungry for events. This rage constitutes only a semicomi- cal, semimacabre spectacle compared with to the millennia-old theological traditions, in which mention of the wrath of God and his interventions in human affairs bears a tone of sympathetic seriousness. These interventions were conceived of in both historical and eschatological terms. The memory of this tradition is the first step of the descent into the catacombs of the his- tory of ideas.
THE KING OF RAGE
NATURALLY THE COUNTLESS REFERENCES TO THE FIGURE OF THE wrathful God in the Old Testament interest us here only in a limited man- ner. The source of the New Testament, as well as sources from later Catho- lic dogmatism, are only selective and should be consulted from a different point of view. The traces of these traditions in the Koran will be left out here completely because when measured against the bulk of Jewish and Chris- tian remarks they do not provide anything that would be genuinely new. In this chapter we can thus only pursue a few of those theological terms that have been important in the development of the one "God" and the corre- sponding transformation of God's people into memory devices. The other abundant references to the divine life of affects in the euphoric as well as the dysphoric sense do not concern us in this context.
For professionals as well as amateurs it is a trivial fact that the early depictions of Yahweh, the Lord of Israel, are marked by clear anthropomor- phisms (or better, anthropo-psychisms). Every reader of the Bible could make sure that the God of Exodus was still capable of combining the traits of a theatrical weather demon with those of a furious, unrestrained war- lord. What is decisive for what follows is, of course, the question of how the first signs of a superior moral view characterize this primitive and ener- getic, meteorological and military conception of God. Part of this change is the formation of a retention function, which is supposed to prevent the disappearance of the past into what is truly passe and, because of the lack
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of memory, was never real. Through the divine act of retention, the first project culminating in a "history" means more than the recurrence of the same; it also means more than an expression of megalomania and forget- ting, in which empires come and go. The historical progression culminating in the "omniscient God" runs for a long time parallel to the path leading to
6
a god of good memory. The emergence and gaining shape of a retaining,
deferring, preserving, and recording activity in God signals the transforma-
tion of his exercise of power away from the eruptive style to the habitus of
7
a judge or a king. Rage might have been a plausible but incidental attribute
for a God who from time to time slips into the roller of thunders. For a God, however, who is supposed to be a royal judge and demands respect and fear in an aura of numinous majesty, the ability to rage becomes constitutive. About such a God we can say for the first time that sovereignty requires that one is believably threatening.
Through the account concerning the function of God as judge, the tem- poral profile of his actions change: while he used to be conceived of as a protector of his people, as an impulsive interventionist (one can think of the destruction of the Egyptian army at the Red Sea or the eradication of all of humankind with the exception of Noah during the flood), he initially distinguishes himself through his righteous upsurges—from a psychologi- cal perspective, one would speak of momentous decompensations. Between God's aggravation with sinful humanity and the downpour of deadly rain there is but a blink of an eye. The passage concerning the remorse that God felt after having created human beings points to a misunderstanding between expectation and fulfillment insofar as remorse implies a modifi- cation to the divine sense of time. The situation drastically changes if one takes into account the final scene of the great flood. Here God raises with the rainbow an important symbol of patience for both sides, a symbol that expresses his intention to never repeat such a destructive action, even though humanity does not significantly differ after the flood, at least in its moral character. Riidiger Safranski summarizes this fact with the fitting remark, which is respectfully unrespectful: that God transformed himself from a "fundamentalist to a realist. " The realist (der Realo) is the one who concedes that everything in need of improvement needs time—and which things are not in need of improvement? 8
As a result of the change of direction toward a conception of God as judge and avenger, the "retentional" qualities of the Lord in heaven increasingly became emphasized.
The popular and anarchist doubt about the regulatory power of "existing conditions" is connected to the tendency toward the new form of heroic action. Another consequence is the assumption of a permanent state of exception, and thus of the inclination of the actors to claim the right to help
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RAGE TRANSACTIONS
themselves in their singular situations. Indeed, some theoreticians of the left such as Walter Benjamin and later Antonio Negri articulated the dangerous suggestion that for the majority of human beings living under conditions
4
of capitalism, the permanent state of exception is normal. Once the "order
of things" has become delegitimized, improvisations are needed, including some rough ones. Only a small step is required to go from the political and moral delegitimation of circumstances to their ontological delegitimation, and ontological delegitimations call into question not only the normative foundations of the institutions of the ancien regime but also the authority of the past as such. Once this moment has come, so-called reality becomes an object for revision and, if necessary, is authorized to be torn down. In light of this, the militant slogan of the twentieth century, transformed by Sartre, "on a raison de se revolter? would have to be slightly altered. It would need to be translated as: "not he who revolts against what exists is in the right, but he who avenges against it. "
THE AGGRESSOR AS GIVER
IN MY ANALYSIS OF RAGE, IT IS NECESSARY TO FIRST TURN TO ITS energetic dimension, and later I will turn to its temporal and pragmatic dimensions. This requires a certain asceticism with regard to reactions and patterns of interpretations. Initially it is necessary to bracket the desire to emphasize the devastating dynamism of rage. The concept of "destruction," at least, needs to be separated from any kind of moral valuation. It has to be understood as a metabolic phenomenon that needs to be investigated beyond either appraisal or criticism. The alleged or real tendency of rage to explode without concern for the future should not be put at center stage prematurely. Finally, it is necessary to leave out the common psychological attributions of motivation, as well as character diagnoses.
This provides a more even-tempered view of the phenomenon of rage, one that acknowledges that we are primarily dealing with an intensive form of energy that is ready to explode or be transferred. If one follows the image of effervescence, which already led the ancient authors to speak of furor, of eruption and storming ahead, it becomes apparent how much the expres- sion of rage possesses a giving, even a paradoxically generous trait. As a form of pure extroversion, the uninhibited expression of "foaming" rage adds an especially energetic supplement to the inventory of deeds. Naturally these mostly reveal themselves in a negative light because at first sight they
55
RAGE TRANSACTIONS
seem only to consist of uproar and suffering. It is easier to become aware of the giving dimension of rage if one regards the object of rage under the aspect of its similarity with the subject.
Whether rage comes on the scene like a sudden explosion or like chronic presentiment (after its hate-inflicted transformation into a proj- ect), it draws its force from an excess of energy that longs for release. Rage that manifests itself in punishment or acts of injury is connected to the belief that there is too little suffering in the world on a local or global level. This belief results from the judgment that suffering could be "deserved" in certain situations. The rage bearer sees in those people who are unjustly without suffering his most plausible enemies. He will never be content with the fact that pain is distributed unevenly to the point of intolerability. He wants to return a fair share of the excess of pain that has been stored up inside him to the person who caused it but has not yet been punished. He is infused with the knowledge that those without pain exist in a state of acute deficiency, and what they are missing is suffering. Seeing the deserv- ing go unpunished leads the vengeful individual to the conviction that he owns what others are lacking. He wants to become a donor, a profligate spender, even if he must force his gifts onto their recipients. Their habit of refusing to accept only provides rage and hatred with an additional motive to turn against its addressees.
There cannot be any doubt that there is a link between rage and pride, thanks to which rage provides itself with a moral certainty of its own legiti- macy. The higher the factor of pride in rage, the more effectively will the "you may" be transformed into a "you should. " The completely motivated vengeful action would be one that takes itself to be the execution of an indis- pensable, noble necessity. The corresponding empirical models would be revenge murders at the family level and wars of religion and independence on the ethnic and national levels.
As I have already stated, the rage bearer possesses the immediate evi- dence to assist the object of her rage in overcoming his own lack. Hours not spent in agony, a burning loss that needs to be suffered, a house that still stands in place without having been bombed, a knife that does not stick in the gut of a slanderer: these nuisances need to be overcome. Much more so than in the case of envy, which aims to humiliate and expropriate, rage (and likewise hatred, the conservation of rage) is an intensive turning toward the addressee in the game because it requires an act of authentic expenditure. One thus rightly says that human beings are as a consequence "inflicted
56
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with" pain. The vengeful inflictor feels like someone who is rich enough to share something of his richness with his contemporaries.
As a rule, the donation of pain is sent to a precise address; however, the gift usually extends beyond the immediate recipient to affect those near her as well. Often the donator of pain agrees to this excess: if the individual des- ignated as object of rage led a pain-free life, then most likely the people in close proximity also led lives without suffering, defective lives. In this sense it never appears to be completely false for the donator of pain to involve these people. The more desperately the rage bearer's unconditional wish to give expresses itself, the less it is limited by a certain determinate addressee. Just like civil enthusiasm thinks it is embraced by the millions, rage that has been amplified to hatred addresses itself to a universe of unknown people. It is an affect capable of forming obscure general concepts and elevating itself to the level of vague abstractions.
When rage becomes hatred we can witness the basic operations of ide-
ology formation because conceptual fixations are the best preservative for
ephemeral responses. He who wants to remember his rage needs to preserve
it in hate containers. The advantage of these conceptualizations of rage is
that they can be used extensively without ever being used up entirely. Abso-
lute hatred ultimately does not require any determinate object right before
its eyes. Its abstractness, which is close to aimlessness, guarantees its spilling
over into what is universal. For its bearer, the knowledge that it is turning to
the general addressee is sufficient to make sure that he does not waste itself
unnecessarily. The condition is reached in which we can speak of expendi-
5
ture as such, expenditure pure and simple (sans phrase). In these divesti-
tures, the rage-filled giver of pain often risks his own life. In these cases, the giver makes himself into a physical addition to the bomb that is supposed to supply the missing suffering.
IT THUS DOES NOT MAKE ANY SENSE TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP between self-confident hatred and concepts such as nihilism—despite their prevalence as popular explanatory models. In general, the concept of hatred proves analytically unsuitable because it is deduced from the phenomenon of rage and can only be made intelligible as a form of preserving rage. One has to insist that rage, which is a standpoint, even a project, is not at all affil- iated with the nothingness we like to claim for hatred. Rage is not merely a militant form of indifference with regard to oneself and others. Even if
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RAGE TRANSACTIONS
rage reveals recklessness, it would be a mistake to think that it is indifferent about everything. Rage that has become reified as hatred is resolute good- will. Initially it appears as a pointed attack that brings about an intense local pain. Then it secures an allegedly necessary increase of pain in the world in order to persist in terrible reports and other media exaggerations. In light of this perspective, it is the subjective and passionate appearance of that which the penalizing judiciary wants to embody objectively and without passion. Both rest on the axiom according to which the balance of the world after its disruption can only be recovered through an increase of pain at the right location.
In the case of individual donations of rage, the person who hates initially draws on her own rage supply, even at the risk of using up her capacity for experiencing rage. Nothing guarantees to the simple vengeful person that his sources are inexhaustible. As long as vengeful energy is not transformed into a project and the individual constantly faces the possibility of returning to peace through satisfaction or exhaustion, the small circle of anger and abreaction belongs to the energetic processes connected to our emotions.
In this sense we can understand the abreactive crime as the manifesta- tion of a power that demands the right to discharge itself even if this puts the actor into a position of moral injustice. This is why crimes from such impulsive sources tend to exhaust themselves when the deed is finished. The moment that the victim is out of sight, the perpetrator is able to forget it. Is it not true, after all, what is said about the brothers of Joseph after they sold him to Egypt, "for their hatred had been taken from them, and in time they were left with only vague recollections of how greatly the ninny had angered them"? 6 Because rage is initially a finite resource, its satisfaction through the deed is often its end, which sometimes compels the actor to surrender deliberately to the forces of law.
An exemplary return of a fatigued vengeful person to endure his sentence is depicted by Friedrich Schiller in his 1792 story "The Criminal from Lost Honor. " If Hegel, who read this novella attentively, refers to the sentence as the honor of the crime, we should immediately think of Schiller's poor "sun keeper. " This well-known ravager reveals his true identity to a respectful civil servant in a sentimental gesture in order to then surrender himself to the courts. Something similar is done by Kleist in Michael Kolhaas, although this German story about the passion of righteousness stands under a darker sign. This story of an overly sensitive person who takes revenge for two horses that were stolen from him embodies the process by which the rage
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RAGE TRANSACTIONS
that drives a private person to carry out deeds of revenge becomes a meta- physics of self-administered justice. The fact that the raging citizen who sees his stubbornness fulfilled dies as a satisfied petit-bourgeois is revealing. It expresses nothing less than the anticipation of the revaluation of all values. The romantics, who opened themselves to the aesthetics of excess, picked up on the feeling that we can no longer depend on God's justice. They reveal a concern for those humiliated on the earth and those who make their contri- butions to the day of judgment during their lifetimes.
RAGE AND TIME: THE SIMPLE EXPLOSION
WHEN THE EXPENDITURE OF RAGE DEVELOPS MORE COMPLEX FORMS, the seeds of rage are consciously dispersed, and the fruits of rage are dili- gently harvested. Through hate culture, rage is carried out in the form of a project. Wherever revenge intentions ripen, dark energies become stabi- lized over longer periods. What Nietzsche says about the genesis of con- science, that it is premised on the human who can promise, is even more true for the memory of the one who engages in revenge. This person is an agent who remembers not only the injustice that has been inflicted upon him but also all his plans for paying it back. The person "who may promise" is, according to Nietzsche's complex characterization, the subject with the "lasting will. " Once this subject is constituted, revenge intentions can then be sustained over long periods of time—even passed from one generation to the next. Once the stage of transmission has reached the next agent, an authentic economy of rage has come into being. Now the resource of rage is no longer accumulated arbitrarily and occasionally wasted; rather, it is maintained and continually produced as the object of an ongoing project. Once it has reached this stage, rage becomes a treasure trove for its pos- sessor, opening up avenues to transpersonal motives. As soon as collectively administered amounts of rage are stored as treasures or assets, the question becomes pressing as to whether such accumulated assets can be invested like capital. I will answer this later with the support of a new psychopolitical definition for left-wing parties. In reality these parties need to be under- stood as banks of rage that, if they do their business well, will know how to effect politically and thymotically relevant gains.
If one admits that the banking and saving functions of rage assets are real and efficacious, one also understands how it is possible for rage to develop from its diffused initial stage to higher levels of organization. By
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RAGE TRANSACTIONS
passing through this progression, rage travels the road from local and inti- mate emotion to public and political program. The temporal structure of rage-potentials also undergoes a total transformation. Rage undergoes a metamorphosis from a blind form of expenditure in the here and now to a far-sighted, world-historical project of revolution for the sake of those who have been humiliated and offended.
However, as long as rage remains explosive, it expresses itself by "flaming up": "And the rage of Achilles rose forcefully. " The direct thymotic abreac- tion is a version of fulfilled presence. For the raging person, as for the happy person, time does not exist. The uproar in the here and now neutralizes the retrospective and prospective ecstasies of time so that both disappear in the momentary energy flow. The life of the subject of fury is the sparkles in the chalice of the situation. For the romantics of energy, this acting in anger is a kind of flow. It implies a return to a mystic and animal time that, as its con- noisseurs avow, has the quality of the constantly fleeting now.
RAGE AS PROJECT: REVENGE
THE CREATION OF A QUALIFIED OR EXISTENTIAL TIME, THAT IS, A lived time with a retrospective and anticipatory character, occurs through the deferral of discharge. Rage potential is channeled into a vector that cre- ates a tension between then, now, and later. This is why we can say that the raging one who holds herself back preliminarily knows what it means to intend to do something. At the same time, she not only lives in history but also makes history—insofar as making history is the name here for taking motives from the past in order to take care of what comes. In this respect, nothing can be compared to revenge. Thymos that has been activated dis- covers through its desire for gratification the world as the realm of con- structing future projections, which gain momentum for the coming attack from what has been. Rage becomes the momentum of a movement into the future, which one can understand as the raw material for historical change.
As elementary as these considerations may appear, their implications reach into the innermost motives of twentieth-centuiy philosophy. If they are correct, they necessitate important modifications to one of the most well known theorems of modern philosophy. If they are correct, one should not interpret existential time as the immediate being-toward-death, as Hei- degger in Being and Time suggests in an interpretation that is as well known as it is rushed. The being-whole-ability of existence {das Ganz-sein-Kbnnen
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der Existenz) is what matters to the thinker, an ability that does not depend on the fact of the individual considering his own death in order to ascertain his directedness toward something that is an unconditional future fact. Das- ein can just as well orient itself because it traverses the distance from humil- iation to revenge as a whole. Existential time emerges from such an anxiety (Hingespanntheit) toward its decisive moment. Such an act of endowing for one's own being-toward-goals (Seins-zum-Ziele) is more powerful than every vague heroic meditation of the end. When Dasein is angry it does not have the form of running ahead toward its own death, but of an anticipa- tion of the indispensable day of rage. One would rather have to speak of a running ahead to gratification. If one thinks back to the protagonist of the Iliad it becomes clear that a warlike being-toward-destruction has become his second nature. His departure for the last battle in front of the walls of Troy marks the beginning of the sequence of action with which the down- fall of the hero became necessary. In this respect, Heidegger's thesis that Dasein is being-toward-death belongs to those Europeans who carry on the work of the myth of Achilles throughout the ages.
Revenge emerges out of the project form of rage. This concept initially requires analysis from a neutral and ecological vantage point. One may rightly understand the desire for revenge as one of the most unfriendly desires of humanity. That it belongs to the causes of the greatest miseries is proven by history insofar as it has not yet been classified a "life teacher. " Called "zra," it is classified among the deadly sins. If anyone could say something positive about it, it is that with it the possibility of unemployment vanishes from the life of avenger. He who has a strong intention to practice a revenge is, for the time being, safe from suffering problems of meaning. A persistent will excludes boredom. The deep simplicity of rage satisfies the all-too-human desire for strong motivations. One motive, one agent, one necessary deed: this is the formula for a complete project. The most important character- istic of a well-organized and well-planned existence manifests itself in the lack of any arbitrariness. The avenger is safe from the "need of needless- ness" that Heidegger claimed would be the sign of an existence abandoned by a sense of ne-cessity (Not-Wenidigkeit). It is indeed impossible to claim that the avenger would live like a leaf in the wind; chance no longer has any power over her. This way revengeful existence gains a quasi-metaphysical meaning in a postmetaphysical age: thanks to rage the "utopia of motivated life" realizes itself in a domain in which an increasing amount of people feel empty. No one expressed this more clearly than Stalin when he said about
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his colleagues Kamenew and Dschersinski, "To choose one's victim, to pre- pare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable vengeance, and then to go to b e d . . . there is nothing sweeter in the world. "7
RAGE AS BANK: REVOLUTION
THE PROJECT FORM OF RAGE (WHICH ONE WOULD CALL IN POLICE jargon self-administered justice or the mob mentality and in political jargon anarchism or the romanticism of violence) can expand to take on the form of a bank. This elevation (Aufhebung) of local anger resources and dispersed projects of hatred into an overarching instance. The task of this storehouse of rage, as for every authentic bank, consists in serving as a collection point and recycling agency for investments. This transition necessarily once again affects the temporal structure of those potentials invested in individual projects. Just as rage in its project form provides for a longer duration and allows for a pragmatic planning process, the bank form of rage requires that individual vengeful plans subject themselves to a superior perspective. This perspective proudly bears the title of "history"—history, of course, in the singular. Through the creation of a bank of rage (understood as a storage place for moral explosives and vengeful projects) individual vectors become part of a single project guided by a single administration, the demands of which do not always coincide with the rhythms of local actors and actions. But now subjection becomes inevitable: countless histories of rage are finally united in one common history.
This transition marks the transformation from the projective to the historical form of rage. As soon as a collective that invests its rage poten- tials—as well as its hopes and ideals—forms itself into a common, enduring operation, "history" itself takes on the form of an enterprise of the highest ambition. Historical narration takes on the task of accounting for the deeds and sufferings of the significant collective of rage. To say it almost with the words from 1848 of two famous colleagues: all history is the history of rage applications.
Once the rage economy becomes elevated to the level of a bank, anar- chistic companies led by small rage owners and locally organized anger groups become the subjects of harsh criticism. At the same time that the level of organization of rage is increased, there is a rationalization of the vengeful energy: it passes from pure impulsivity through a selective attack to a conception of attacks against the state of the world as a whole. From the
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perspective of the rage bankers, the actions of local anger agencies are blind expenditures that almost never produce any appropriate return because the anarchic acting out of the forces of rage regularly provokes the intervention of security forces, which can easily neutralize individual eruptions of hatred and local revolt.
On this level, vengeful actions are usually persecuted as transgressions or punished as crimes. It is thus not helpful to destroy telephone boxes or to set cars on fire unless the act is meant to integrate the act of vandalism into a "historical" perspective. The anger of destroyers and arsonists consum- mates itself in its expression, and that it often regenerates itself through the harsh reactions of the police and the judiciary does not change its blindness. It is an attempt to smash fog with a stick. Even a mass movement like that of the slave leader Spartacus in the years 73 through 71 B. C. could not achieve more than a flaring-up of hatred across Italy against the domination of the Roman landowners. Even though the rebellious gladiators of Capua dealt multiple defeats to the Roman army, the final result of this revolt was the horror of 6,000 crucified rebels enduring several days of agony before dying. Its consequences were increased repression and deepened discouragement. The revitalization of the legend of Spartacus and its inclusion in the sym- bolic arsenal of modern class struggle tells us, however, that in the archives of rage one deals with a "heritage" that is millennia old. Remember: if one wants to cultivate and pass on rage, one needs to make one's offspring into a part of a history of victims who call for revenge.
An analysis of our historical experience shows without a doubt that the small craftsmanship of rage is condemned to exhaust itself in costly botch-ups. So long as the local assets for revolutionary zeal are not pooled at long-term collection points and remain unguided by a visionary leader- ship, they waste themselves in expressions of their growing unrest. Isolated anger quanta heat up in shabby dishes until they evaporate or leave behind burned sediments that cannot again be reheated. This is unmistakably revealed by the history of smaller protest parties. Only when discrete ener- gies are invested into superior projects and far-sighted, sufficiently calm, diabolic directors take care of administrating collective rage capacities is it possible for multiple, isolated fires to be transformed into one big power plant. This plant could provide the energy for coordinated actions, up to the level of "world politics. " Visionary slogans become necessary for this to occur, slogans that do not need merely to address the intense anger of human beings but to reach their inner feelings of bitterness and finally their
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hope and their pride. The coldest rage writes up its activity reports in the style of hot idealism.
Just like the monetary economy, the rage economy passes a critical marker once rage has advanced from local accumulation and selective explosion to the level of a systematic investment and cyclic increase. In the case of money, one calls this difference the transition from treasure hoard- ing to capital. For rage, the corresponding transformation is reached once the vengeful infliction of pain is transformed from revenge to revolution. Revolution cannot be a matter of the resentment of an isolated private person, although such affects are also instantiated in its decisive moment. Revolution rather implies the creation of a bank of rage whose investments should be considered in as precise detail as an army operation before a final battle, or actions of a multinational corporation before being taken over by a hostile competitor.
The concept of the coming "revolution," considered in light of the events of 1917, finalizes the transition from the actualism to the futurism of rage. It implies a complete dismissal of the principle of expression. Vengeful acts of expression mean nothing more than a narcissistic expenditure of energy. The professional revolutionary, who is working as an employee of a bank of rage, does not express individual tensions, he follows a plan. This presup- poses the complete subordination of revolutionary affects under the com- mercial strategy. It does not suffice anymore to "embellish the world with horrors," to use the sarcastic-lucid phrase uttered by Schiller's hero in the play The Robbers, which Karl Moor proffers to characterize the maxim of his revolt against injustice. Whoever intends to embellish the world in the future needs to go much further in making it ugly than the romanticism of rebels and assassins could ever dream. Individual flowers of evil are no longer sufficient—one needs a whole art of gardening.
THE TERRIFYING FORCE OF THE NEGATIVE
BY "REVOLUTION," WHICH STILL SOUNDS SOMEWHAT FASCINATING even if it turns out to be increasingly empty, I mean the concept or, bet- ter, the phantasm that Lenin and Mao Zedong, the most successful entre- preneurs of rage, had in mind. By "revolutions" they meant that, through disciplined acts of hatred, one day there could be so much additional pain, so much excessive horror, so much numbing self-doubt among the secu- rity forces that everything that existed would soon melt down during a
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day of mass rage. Once what exists has lost its eternal and firm hold, the rotten world can then be created anew through the fire of transformation. But for this to happen, the power of destruction needs to accomplish its work to the very end. Only when what is old is eradicated completely can the reconstruction of the true circumstances can be started on a totally level foundation.
What Hegel referred to as the terrifying force of the negative gains its most distinct contour in this religiously conditioned speculation. Human rage, gathered from all sources and through effective modes of organiza- tion, provides for the bizarre calculation of big rage bankers the energy for a new creation. Assuming that the terrible end is sufficiently terrible, it should accordingly pass over into an epochal beginning.
Through deliberations of this kind at the height of unblemished ruth- lessness, one can encounter a form of anxiety that would curdle the blood of motley rebels and local hate projects if they were capable of envisioning the great strategic perspectives.
The apocalyptic entrepreneur of rage has to prevent the action of local cells from endangering the grand plan with premature activism. This commits him to an extreme ascetics that will also affect his followers. The world revolutionary must unfailingly plan against spontaneous feelings; he must tenaciously dismiss his first reactions. He knows that without the deepest asceticism in the here and now there will never be any reward in the beyond. The more that local outrage is in the right, the more it is wrong when seen from a global perspective. If one aims for the transformation of everything, one needs to curb the impatience of individual vengeful parties. It is much more necessary to commit all fac- tions waiting to explode to staying calm and prepared (In-Form-Bleiben) until the day of mature rage arrives.
The temporal structure of revolution thus needs to be conceived of as an all-inclusive advent. Whatever leads to revolution belongs to the meaning- ful time of real history. The course of this history is analogous to a burning fuse. A great historical experience and a dose of intuition are needed to be able to judge to what extent the fuse of rage has already burned up. If one possesses both, one is qualified to take a leadership role at the top of the rage bank. Such a boss is justified in dictating to his employees from his sovereign position that they should prepare and keep the dynamite dry; the first precondition for collecting rage as part of a political project of global significance is cold-bloodedness. On the one hand, this cold-bloodedness constantly needs to stir hatred and outrage. On the other hand, it is also
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necessary for securing restraint. This way Dasein, in pre-explosive times, is in the mood of waiting while remaining ready for the next fight.
WHERE CAN ONE STUDY THIS HIGHER ECONOMY? NO ONE BELIEVES that studying Heidegger academically will be sufficient for gaining such dan- gerous knowledge. As much as the affinities with the basic claims of Being and Time are obvious, the Master from Messkirch only approached the temporal structure of revolutionary resentment in a formalist way before, for a time, evading it for the black heaven of the "national revolution. " Hei- degger never fully understood the logical and systematic implications of the concept of revolution. He understood it just as little as he understood the connection between our historicity and Daseins ability to be resentful. His investigation of the temporal structures of the caring, projecting, and dying Dasein does not provide us with an appropriate conception of the deep nexus of rage and time. The birth of history out of the project form of rage and, even more, the totality of processes leading to the capitalization of resentment remain obscure in his work.
APART FROM HEIDEGGER, WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REFER TO Marx and Lenin as the authorities for the dynamism of prerevolutionary and revolutionary negativity. It is peculiar that studying these authors is currently next to impossible. The reason for this is not that the texts are impenetrable but that the wall of Zeitgeist barricades access to them in a way that even the most patient person cannot independently overcome. With the exception of some still citable "passages," the works of the Marxist classics have become practically unreadable for people with contemporary intellectual, moral, and aesthetic reflexes. They seem to be written in an illusionary foreign tongue. Obsolete polemics permeate them to a degree that, for the time being, the deterring effect outweighs even the most moti- vated investigatory curiosity. Furthermore, they illustrate a fidelity to con- cepts one usually only finds in fundamentalist sects. Although they appeal to the science of "society" and its "contradictions," many classic leftist texts (with the exception of a few technical primary texts such as Capital) can be read only as unintended parodies. Only thanks to a completely untimely ascetics would it be possible to deduce from the writings of Marx and Lenin the building blocks of a theory of the present. (Mao Zedong's works would
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have to be taken off the list of reasonable literature from the very begin- ning). Nonetheless, the works of these authors provide a massive compen- dium of rage insights. Without these, the tragedies of the twentieth century cannot be adequately depicted and explained. I will return to this sunken body of work in chapters 3 and 4 because they indirectly provide informa- tion about what lies ahead.
One of the last chances to get to know a little bit more about the unpop- ular strategies of the major rage economy is to draw on events in the West- ern world toward the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. In this morbid but equally glorious epoch, the thousand flowers of radicalism were in bloom as if for the last time. Then, it would have easily been pos- sible to assure oneself of Marx's remark that historical dramas regularly repeat themselves as farces after their first staging as tragedies. In this case, the farce consisted in the attempt to project the circumstances of the 1930s onto those of 1968 and afterward in order to derive the rules for "resis- tance" against the "ruling system. " Back then, one could often hear the doc- trine that patience should be the first virtue of the revolutionary. Words of advice like these mirrored a generational conflict in the radical left between the old school and the revolutionary youth. The late-Stalinist intelligentsia advised this youth that, although the revolution had already "begun" and in the future it would be necessary to always count "from now on," the manifest eruption of the revolution should, under no circumstances, be accelerated voluntaristically.
Only today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as the peace of real consumerism is threatened through what is in many places proclaimed as "return of history" (part of it being a return of left-fascist whispers at the margins of academia), do we find a new chance to understand what the praise of revolutionary virtues truly meant. Patience designated the attitude of the historical subject of rage. This subject had freed itself from its personal motives through a cold quasi-idealist ascetics. Once a private factor becomes part of the inevitable revenge against the status quo (or according to the jargon of the time, praxis), voluntarism and a premature expenditure are unavoidable consequences. They are the "teething troubles" of the growing revolution. Although such eruptive episodes might still seem justified from the perspective of the actors, from the perspective of a leading employee of the world bank of rage they are the worst thing that could happen before the day of decision. The leading functionaries are convinced that a pre- mature eruption will prevent the coming into being of this most intensive
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tension. Only this tension will allow the collection of globally dispersed assets of rage into one single and final action, which goes by the name of "world revolution. " The hostile acquisition of the "world" by those who are worse off presupposes that the various factions among the worse off refrain from wasting their powers in spontaneous and individual ventures.
The most famous examples of an anarchistic waste of rage deposits are the assassins who, on March 1, 1881, killed Czar Alexander II, the famous emancipator of the serfs. The immediate consequences consisted in the intensification of repression and the expansion of an omnipresent police system. Even more devastating was the senseless waste of hatred assets by the imitators of the assassins of 1881. These were a group of students of the University of St. Petersburg who were planning to kill the murdered czar's successor, Alexander III, on March 1,1886—as is well known, days of political rage follow a special calendar. Among the students was the twenty- one-year-old Alexander Ulyanov. The attempt was uncovered by the police before it could be carried out, and Alexander was imprisoned with four- teen other conspirators. He was sent to court and, in May 1887, hanged with four other insurgents who likewise were unable to feel remorse. The lives of the other ten were spared in line with the manners of a Russian autocracy famous for its acts of pardoning. Vladimir Ulyanov, the "brother of the hanged," subsequently underwent a process of change from which he emerged as "Lenin," the first wholehearted politician of rage in mod- ern times. In this capacity, he came to understand that the way to power can only lead through the conquest of the state apparatus, not through the merely symbolically relevant assassination of its representative.
The often cited phrase of the young Lenin, "we will not go this way,"
which was probably dated earlier or even invented, is rightly conceived of as
8
the first sentence of the Russian Revolution. With him begins the century
of the big business of rage. Who can forgo the killing of the prince, can receive, as a bonus to the conquered power, the dead prince for free.
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THE WRATHFUL GOD
THE DISCOVERY OF THE METAPHYSICAL REVENGE BANK
AT THE END OF THE INTRODUCTION I CLAIMED THAT THE psychopolitical constellation of rage and time (or rage and history) is antici- pated by the theological constellation of rage and eternity. What this means exactly at this point needs to be developed. Nontrivial insights concerning the function and architecture of monotheistic religions will surface in the course of this investigation.
That theology wants to be a political quantity, that it can, and that it indeed needs to be such follow from a simple diagnosis. The religions that were relevant for the course of occidental European history, that is, the Mes- opotamian as well as the Mediterranean religions, have always been politi- cal and will remain so as long as they survive. In these religions, gods are the transcendent party supporters of their peoples and protectors of their kingdoms. They exercise this function even at the risk of having to invent a people and a kingdom that suits them. This is especially true for the God of monotheism. This God had to travel a long geopolitical path, from his precarious Egyptian beginnings to his Roman and American triumphs. This is the case despite the assertions of those who worship him: he is not a mere
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god of empires (since empires are notoriously perishable structures) but the
1
timeless and transpolitical creator and shepherd of all men.
In fact, the one and only God of Israel was initially a god without an empire. As an ally of a small people primarily concerned with their survival chances, he initially did not seem to be anything more than a provincial god. In time, however, he would transform himself into the most politically viru- lent god in the skies above Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Although barely noticeable in the world, he was conscious of his omnipotence. He succeeded in offensively positioning himself against the pompously incar- nated imperial gods of the Near East and Rome, at the same time claiming clear superiority. As the claimant of an illustrious monopoly, he invited the ancient people of Israel to live far beyond their political means in matters of religion. He expected that they would trust him and thus hold their heads higher than the most powerful of emperors. He thus revealed himself as the
deuspoliticus par excellence, as the party member of all party members, as the anchor of a sacred one-sidedness that manifested itself in the far-reaching concept of the Covenant. As during the blossoming of communism, when the dogma was spread around that Marxist science united in itself objec- tivity and partisanship, so the Jewish and Christian theologies, which were always blooming plants, have made it clear from the beginning that God's universal justice expresses itself in the preferential treatment of one of the two allied peoples.
We have to assume that there is a constitutive primary phase in the development of the management of rage with a global scope (called, from a modern perspective, the submission of politics to morality, the art of the possible under the art of what can be wished), an initial phase that extends for more than two millennia. In this phase a threatening and sublime con- ception is shaped, according to which an autonomously steering and judg- ing but also participating and excitable as well as "agitating" (eifernder) God constantly intervenes in the course of human conflicts, alias history. Because the history of humanity is to a large extent synonymous with that which upsets God, these interventions mostly happen in the mode of wrath. God rages against his own people no less than against their adversaries. He shows his rage by sending wars, epidemics, famines, and natural catastro- phes as servile spirits of punishment (technically speaking, these spirits are secondary causes on behalf of the majesty who is the primary cause). At a later point, it was said about this God that when the day of Last Judg- ment would come, he would impose eternal bodily and spiritual pain on
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those who missed the chance to repent during their lives on earth and thus avoided their just sentence.
The motive of the court of judgment originated in the conceptions of the beyond in Ancient Egypt and the Near East. During its culmination in the late Middle Ages and the baroque period, it advanced to become the most aston- ishing of visual illustrations. If one had to define the, historically speaking, exceptionalism of Christian intelligence, one could put it as follows: Christian thinking is (or was until very recently) that thinking that in its concern for salvation also conceives of its opposite, hell. Even in the twentieth century, the Catholic Irishman James Joyce depicted, with the shiniest and blackest of
2 colors,themetaphysicalhorroroftheexperienceofsufferingforeternity. In
light of the influence of this idea, the concept of eternity became associated with a final penal and torture institution, based on a vast divine memory of injustice and corresponding rage competence. With the help of this set of
3 ideas,anxietybecamepartofthespiritualhistoryofChristianity. Itisprob-
ably correct to assume that theology secretly dispensed with the unfavorable ballast of dogmatic conceptions of hell during the twentieth century. Insofar as traces of the idea of a wrathful God have seeped into our contemporary memory, it still conjures up the memory of the most Christian of hells.
If the wrath of God is translated back into historical time and taken up by a human, universal direction, "history" comes into being. It enters the scene with a revolutionary climax whose meaning consists in avenging the injustice that provokes rage against those who caused the injustice and, even more so, against its structural conditions. One could define modernity as the epoch in which the motives of rage and immanence become fused. This liaison generates the coming into existence of a globally operative rage agency. In the next chapter, I will describe as the embodiment of such an institution the party that is always in the right. Only a control center of such a scale could realize what Schiller referred to with his dictum that world his- tory is the world's court of justice. But first I want to examine not the trans- lation of Holy Wrath into secular history but its accumulation in eternity.
PRELUDE: THE WRATH OF GOD AGAINST THE SECULAR WORLD
IF IT IS CORRECT THAT THE GLOBALIZATION OF RAGE HAD TO PASS through an extended theological starting phase before it could be translated into secular control, we are faced with an essential difficulty of understanding.
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In the introduction to this work, I attempted to show why it is impossible for modern human beings to understand the rage of Achilles within the parameters of the age of Homer. What follows is an analogous demonstra- tion in regards to the prophetism of rage in the tradition of Judaism docu- mented in the Bible, as well as in the Christian tradition in the Scholastic and Puritan theology of rage. For our contemporaries it is impossible to appreciate the rage of the One God as it has been preached by the interpret- ers of triumphant monotheism at the highpoints of their self-confidence. It is fundamentally mistaken to believe that it would be possible to do with- out a reconsideration of the early history of the horror metaphysicus because contemporary Islamism provides an example. The wave of violence that is carried out by Islamists at most tells us something about the most recent performances of the well-known tropes of the wrathful God, as well as the agitating God known since the early days of Judaism. It does not help us to diagnose how it was ever possible that God could acquire the attribute ofwrathfulness.
To appreciate the authentic teaching concerning God's rage, two con- cepts are necessary, and their meaning is, if at all, only metaphorically understandable for us: glory and hell. The content of these terms, which formerly depicted the extremes of high and low in a world formed by God's presence, cannot be concretized by contemporaries. We cannot clarify them even given our best efforts. If a modern human being were to be capable of using these concepts according to their metaphysical meaning, he would have to affirm the most horrible sentence of world literature—he would have to agree to the inscription above the gates of Hell in Dante's Inferno, where we can read for eternity: "Divine power made me, / highest wisdom, and primal love. " The impossibility of deliberately agreeing to these words of terror provides an inkling of the complexity of the task that has to be solved. The solution can no longer be achieved. To see this difficulty means to enter into an investigation concerning the price paid for monotheism. This much needs to be said in advance: the price for monotheism had to be paid by two transactions, of which it is not easy to say which was the more deadly. One was the introduction of resentment into the teaching of last things, the other the internalization of terror into Christian psychagogy.
Before approaching these dangerous domains, we should attempt to ease the censorship of the Zeitgeist. Because of this censorship, that theological issues of all kinds are excluded from the domain of topics to be seriously discussed by enlightened human beings. "God talk" has been banned from
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European high society for more than 150 years. This is the case in spite of
periodically circulating rumors of a return of religion. Flaubert's bon mot
in his Dictionary of Received Ideas concerning "conversation"—that "poli-
tics and religion are to be excluded from it"—is still an apt description of
4
the state of affairs. However often one speaks of a "revitalization" of the
religious, the truth remains that simply because there is a widespread dis- satisfaction with the disenchanted world, this does not at all lead to a new belief in extra- or superworldly entities. When John Paul II often remarked in a melancholic tone that human beings in Europe live as if God does not exist, he revealed a better understanding of the real conditions than the subversive crypto-Catholics who publish in the culture sections of Ger- man newspapers, who would like it the most if they could elect the Lord in Heaven as the Person of the Year.
We can specifically say about the Christian message that it has not been admissible in the secular realm for a long time; it is no longer plausible. The only way to get a hold of its audience is through marginal means of communication, such as TV channels owned by certain sects. This remark will provoke the protest of one or another representative of the church who does not like to admit the possibility that belief in the Redeemer could be a hobby similar to enjoying horror movies or breeding fighting dogs. This reservation can be easily understood, yet it does not change the fact that the Christian cause survives only as a subculture. What is at issue here cannot anyhow be expressed by sociological or statistical data. The alienation of the public from the Gospel goes far beyond Paul's concession that God talk is a nuisance for Jews and a foolishness for Greeks. Apart from nuisance and foolishness, embarrassment is perhaps the best characterization of the contemporary mode of being of the religious. For some time now, religious sensibilities have retreated into the intimate regions of the psyche and are regarded as the true pudenda of the moderns. After the Enlightenment, one has to cross a great threshold of embarrassment to still be touched by the question concerning a praiseworthy Higher Being. Theologians like to react to this situation with the profound remark that modern man still lives in the historical situation of a "distance" to God. However beautiful this phrase is, it is already mistaken. The problem that exists between God and us contemporaries is not that we are too far away from him. Rather, God would get too close if we were to take his offerings seriously. No quality of the God of the theologians reveals this better than the most embarrassing among them: God's wrath.
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This said, the following thesis should make sense: what seemed to be the clearest manifestation of a new weight of religion, of a new religiosity as such—the attention that was paid to the dying and death of Pope John Paul II and the choice of his successor, Benedict XVI, in April 2005—actually had little to do with the religious side of the changing of the guard in the Office of the Saint Peter. In fact, the fascination was exerted largely, if not exclusively, by the pompous Roman liturgies based on relics of the impe- rial Caesarian myth. Without being able to give themselves a clear account of what they were doing, the masses, as well as the media, felt during the course of events how the personal aura of the pope still radiates with the charisma of Caesar. To a diligent observer of the pontificate of John Paul II," it is clear that the papal cult, which the pope cleverly updated, was essen- tially characterized by a media Caesarism. In spite of all the assertions of the mystic intensity of the event, it was how the Christian message pro- vided a religious form to Caesarian content. Only because of the latter was it possible that Roma aeterna could appear as the most successful content
provider for all secular networks. But what else does this show than that the Church only wins the struggle for attention when it presents a program that can be misinterpreted in a secular, tragic, and spectacular way? Because Catholicism, at least in its Roman form, is in the last instance still more an empire—or, more specifically, a copy of an empire—than it is a church, the embarrassment of religious speech retreats into the background during its main events and completely cedes the floor to the pompous apparatus.
Once again: in a post-Enlightenment atmosphere "God" cannot be a topic under any circumstances, with the exception of special issues of elitist culture journals. A fortiori, a public discourse concerning the "attributes" of the impossible object remains unthinkable. Yet more impossible, if such a comparative form exists, would be the demand to conceive of a wrathful God or a God of rage in a time in which a friendly God is already an implau- sible hypothesis. But we precisely have to deal with this unpopular entity, which I will refer to from now on in a preliminary fashion as a "thought figure," in order to understand the emergence of the modern economy of rage. We have to trace the preliminary stages of its transformation into a formal banking system.
The most recent opportunity to witness the configuration of the con- cepts "God" and "rage" was the debate concerning the new forms of reli- gious and political fundamentalism, a debate more than usually visible in the late 1980s. A significant publication from that time was La revanche de
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Dieu (The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Juda- ism in the Modern World), which appeared in French in 1989. The French subtitle did not just mention an advance but, more straightforwardly, a ureconquete du monde"—this was of course reminiscent of the historical pattern of the Reconquista. The author of the book, Gilles Kepel, who has been one of the most important voices in matters of culture and politics in the Middle East since this publication, investigates the strategies of the radi- cal monotheist mobilization in various corners of the world. The oriental aspect of the topic seems to be couched in an ecumenical register of old and new fanaticisms.
The ironic tone of the term "revanche de Dieu' cannot be missed. The author makes it clear that he discusses his subject matter solely with the means available to a cultural scientist of his time. When he mentions the "vengeful God," he does not affirmatively refer to the theology of the wrath- ful God. At the center of the investigation is the return of militant religious groups onto the stage of world politics. In the meantime, we have become accustomed to interpreting the resurgence of these groups as "fundamental- ist reactions"—they are the expressions of revenge from a heated religious milieu against the dominant secular milieu. Chronologically, the return of fundamentalisms begins with the appearance of evangelical fundamental- ists in the United States and their adamant denunciation of the worldview of modern natural science as diabolic. For decades, these groups have been increasing their influence on American society. The trend is continued by the ultraorthodox Jews of Israel, whose agitations can no longer be ignored by any government and who would like to see their secular nation trans- formed, sooner rather than later, into a rabbi-ocracy; the trend finds its inevitable end in more recent Islamist phenomena. Although the Islamists, just like their Christian counterparts, reveal a tendency toward militant big- otry, particularly unmistakable are the similarities to the years of fighting and defiance of Roman Catholicism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; however, they add a new element to their political appearances. They draw on historical Islam as a "readymade" in order to arbitrarily instrumentalize it in a terrorist advertising campaign throughout the global public sphere. What Marcel Duchamp achieved for art history during the early twentieth century, Osama Bin Laden repeats with the sup- port of religious technicians for the Islam of the late twentieth century. The significance of the readymade procedure for the modern cultural economy has been laid out in the subde analyses of Boris Groys, and the effects of his
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5
work on contemporary cultural science have barely begun. As a result of
the subversive interpretation of the sacred tradition, we see that Islam, and in particular the traditional authority of the Ulema, the council of scholars and jurists, is undermined by the rebellious fascination of religious pirates.
This "revenge of God" is launched by the various political surrealists, ter- rorists, and fanatics through the media of Western entertainment societies, which are always hungry for events. This rage constitutes only a semicomi- cal, semimacabre spectacle compared with to the millennia-old theological traditions, in which mention of the wrath of God and his interventions in human affairs bears a tone of sympathetic seriousness. These interventions were conceived of in both historical and eschatological terms. The memory of this tradition is the first step of the descent into the catacombs of the his- tory of ideas.
THE KING OF RAGE
NATURALLY THE COUNTLESS REFERENCES TO THE FIGURE OF THE wrathful God in the Old Testament interest us here only in a limited man- ner. The source of the New Testament, as well as sources from later Catho- lic dogmatism, are only selective and should be consulted from a different point of view. The traces of these traditions in the Koran will be left out here completely because when measured against the bulk of Jewish and Chris- tian remarks they do not provide anything that would be genuinely new. In this chapter we can thus only pursue a few of those theological terms that have been important in the development of the one "God" and the corre- sponding transformation of God's people into memory devices. The other abundant references to the divine life of affects in the euphoric as well as the dysphoric sense do not concern us in this context.
For professionals as well as amateurs it is a trivial fact that the early depictions of Yahweh, the Lord of Israel, are marked by clear anthropomor- phisms (or better, anthropo-psychisms). Every reader of the Bible could make sure that the God of Exodus was still capable of combining the traits of a theatrical weather demon with those of a furious, unrestrained war- lord. What is decisive for what follows is, of course, the question of how the first signs of a superior moral view characterize this primitive and ener- getic, meteorological and military conception of God. Part of this change is the formation of a retention function, which is supposed to prevent the disappearance of the past into what is truly passe and, because of the lack
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of memory, was never real. Through the divine act of retention, the first project culminating in a "history" means more than the recurrence of the same; it also means more than an expression of megalomania and forget- ting, in which empires come and go. The historical progression culminating in the "omniscient God" runs for a long time parallel to the path leading to
6
a god of good memory. The emergence and gaining shape of a retaining,
deferring, preserving, and recording activity in God signals the transforma-
tion of his exercise of power away from the eruptive style to the habitus of
7
a judge or a king. Rage might have been a plausible but incidental attribute
for a God who from time to time slips into the roller of thunders. For a God, however, who is supposed to be a royal judge and demands respect and fear in an aura of numinous majesty, the ability to rage becomes constitutive. About such a God we can say for the first time that sovereignty requires that one is believably threatening.
Through the account concerning the function of God as judge, the tem- poral profile of his actions change: while he used to be conceived of as a protector of his people, as an impulsive interventionist (one can think of the destruction of the Egyptian army at the Red Sea or the eradication of all of humankind with the exception of Noah during the flood), he initially distinguishes himself through his righteous upsurges—from a psychologi- cal perspective, one would speak of momentous decompensations. Between God's aggravation with sinful humanity and the downpour of deadly rain there is but a blink of an eye. The passage concerning the remorse that God felt after having created human beings points to a misunderstanding between expectation and fulfillment insofar as remorse implies a modifi- cation to the divine sense of time. The situation drastically changes if one takes into account the final scene of the great flood. Here God raises with the rainbow an important symbol of patience for both sides, a symbol that expresses his intention to never repeat such a destructive action, even though humanity does not significantly differ after the flood, at least in its moral character. Riidiger Safranski summarizes this fact with the fitting remark, which is respectfully unrespectful: that God transformed himself from a "fundamentalist to a realist. " The realist (der Realo) is the one who concedes that everything in need of improvement needs time—and which things are not in need of improvement? 8
As a result of the change of direction toward a conception of God as judge and avenger, the "retentional" qualities of the Lord in heaven increasingly became emphasized.
