No More Learning

war of faith: but we can't let that destroy us! Somebody has to be there who, as we say in the military, has initiative and takes over the leadership, and that's the vocation of one's superior. I see that now myself, and I'm not entirely certain whether before, in my sympathy for every spiritual endeavor, I wasn't sometimes carried away. "
Ulrich asked: "And what would have happened if you hadn't real- ized that? Would you have been discharged? "
"No, that wouldn't have happened," Stumm corrected him. "Pre- suming, ofcourse, that I still showed no deficiency in military feeling toward power relationships. But they would have given me an infan- try brigade in Wladisschmirschowitz or Knobljoluka, instead of let- ting me continue at the crossroads of military power and civilian enlightenment and still be of some use to the culture we all share! "
They had now gone back and forth several times on the path be- tween the house and the gate, near which the carriage was waiting, and this time, too, the General turned around before they reached the gate. "You mistrust me," he complained. ''You haven't even asked me what actually happened when the Peace Congress sud- denly materialized! "
'Well, what did happen? The Minister ofWar called you in again, and what did he say? "
"No! He didn't say anything! I waited a week, but he said nothing more," Stumm replied. And after a moment of silence he couldn't restrain himself any longer and proclaimed: "But they took 'Report D' away from me! "
''What is 'Report D'? " Ulrich asked, although he had some idea.
" 'Report Diotima,' of course," Stumm responded with pained pleasure. "In a ministry, a report is prepared for every important question, and that had to be done when Diotima began to use the gatherings at her house for a patriotic notion and after we found out about Arnheim's active involvement. This report was assigned to me, as you will doubtless have noticed, and so I was asked what name it should be given, because you can't just stick such a thing in a row like something in medical supplies or when you do a commissary course, and the name Tuzzi couldn't be mentioned for interministerial rea-
From the Posthumous Papers · 1253
sons. But I couldn't think ofanything appropriate either, so finally, in order not to say either too much or too little, I proposed calling it 'Report D': for me, 'D' was Diotima, but no one knew that, and for the others it sounded really terrific, like the name of a directory, or maybe even like a secret to which only the General Staff has access. It was one of my best ideas," Stumm concluded, adding with a sigh: "At that time I was still allowed to have ideas. "
But he did not seem entirely cheered up, and when Ulrich- whose mood of falling back into the world was almost used up, or at least its oral supply of talkativeness was pretty well consumed-now fell into silence after an appreciative smile, Stumm began to com- plain anew. "You don't trust me. After what I've said, you think I'm a militarist. But on my honor, I fight against it, and I don't want to simply drop all those things I believed in for so long. It's these mag- nificent ideas that really make people out of soldiers. I tell you, my friend, when I think about it I feel like a widower whose better half has died first! " He warmed up again. "The Republic of Minds is of course just as disorderly as any other republic; but what a blessing is the superb idea that no person is in sole possession of the truth and that there are a host of ideas that haven't yet even been discovered, perhaps because of the very lack of order that prevails among them! This makes me an innovator in the military. Of course, in the Gen- eral Staff they called me and my 'Report D' the 'mobile searchlight battery,' on account of the variety of my suggestions, but they really liked the cornucopia I was emptying! "
"And all that's over? ''
"Not unconditionally; but I've lost a lot of my confidence in the mind," Stumm grumbled, seeking consolation.
"You're right about that," Ulrich said dryly.
"Now you're saying that too? "
"I've always said it. I always warned you, even before the Minister
did. Mind is only moderately suited to governing. "
Stumm wanted to avoid a lecture, so he said: "That's what I've al-
ways thought too. "
Ulrich went on: "The mind is geared into life like a wheel, which it
drives and by which it is also driven. "
But Stumm let him go no further. "Ifyou should suspect," he in-
terrupted, "that such external circumstances were decisive for me,
1254 · THE MAN WITH0UT QUALITIES
you would be humiliating me! It's also a matter ofa spiritual purifica- tion! 'Report D' was, moreover, taken from me with great respect. The Minister called me in to tell me himself that it was necessary because the Chief of the General Staff wanted a personal report on the Congress for World Peace, and so they immediately took the whole business out of the Office for Military Development and at- tached it to the Information Offices of the Evidenzbiiro-"
"The Espionage Department? " Ulrich interjected, suddenly ani- mated again.
"Who else? Whoever doesn't know what he wants himself at least has to know what everyone else wants! And I ask you, what business does the General Staffhave at a Congress for World Peace? To inter- fere with it would be barbarous, and to encourage it in a pacifist way would be unmilitary! So they observe it. Who was it who said 'Readi- ness is all'? Well, whoever it was knew something about the military. " Stumm had forgotten his sorrow. He twisted his legs from side to side, trying to cut off a flower with the scabbard of his sword. ''I'm just afraid it will be too hard for them and they'll beg me on their knees to come back and take over my report," he said. "After all, you and I know from having been at it for nearly a year how such a con- gress ofideas splits up into proofs and counterproofs! Do you really believe-disregarding for the moment the special difficulties of gov- erning-that it's only the mind that can produce order, so to speak? "
He had now given up his preoccupation with the flower and, frowning and holding the scabbard in his hand, gazed urgently into his friend's face.
Ulrich smiled at him and said nothing.
Stumm let the saber drop because he needed the fingertips of both white-gloved hands for the delicate determination of an idea. "You must understand what I mean when I make a distinction be- tween mind and logic. Logic is order. And there must be order! That is the officer's basic principle, and I bow down to it! But on what basis order is established doesn't make the slightest bit of difference: that's mind-or, as the Minister of War put it in a rather old-fash- ioned way, reason-and that's not the officer's business. But the offi- cer mistrusts the ability ofcivilian life to become reasonable by itself, no matter what the ideas are by which it's always trying to do so. Be-
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1255
cause whatever mind there has ever been at any time, in the end it's always led to war! "
Thus Stumm explained his new insights and scruples, and Ulrich summarized them involuntarily in an allusion to a well-known saying when he asked: "So you really mean to say that war is an element of God's ordained ordering of the world? "
"That's talking on too high a plane! " Stumm agreed, with some reservation. "I ask myself straight out whether mind isn't simply dis- pensable. For if I'm to handle a person with spurs and bridle, like an animal, then I also have to have a part ofthe animal in me, because a really good rider stands closer to his steed than he does, for example, to the philosophy oflaw! The Prussians call this the scoundrel every- one carries inside himself, and constrain it with a Spartan spirit. But speaking as an Austrian general, I'd rather put it that the better, finer, and more ordered a nation is, the less it needs the mind, and in a perfect state it wouldn't be needed at all! I take this to be a really tough paradox! And by the way, who said what you just said? Who's it from? "
"Moltke. He said that man's noblest virtues-courage, renuncia- tion, conscientiousness, and readiness to sacrifice-really develop only in war, and that without war the world would bog down in apa- thetic materialism. "
'Well! " Stumm exclaimed. "That's interesting too! He's said some- thing I sometimes think myself! "
"But Moltke says in another letter to the same person, and there- fore almost in the same breath, that even a victorious war is a misfor- tune for the nation," Ulrich offered for consideration.
''You see, mind pinched him! " Stumm replied, convinced. ''I've never read a line of him; he always seemed much to<;> militaristic for me. And you can really take my word for it that I've' always been an antimilitarist. All my life I've believed that today no one believes in war anymore, you only make yourself look ridiculous if you say you do. And I don't want you to think I've changed because I'm different now! " He had motioned the carriage over and already set his foot on the running board, but hesitated and looked at Ulrich entreatingly. "I have remained true to myself," he went on. "But if before I loved the civilian mind with the feelings of a young girl, I now love it, if I
1256 · THE MAN WITH0 UT QUALITIES
may put it this way, more like a mature woman: it's not ideal, it won't even let itself be made coherent, all of a piece. That's why I've told you, and not just today but for a long time, that one has to treat peo- ple with kindness as well as with a firm hand, one has to both love them and treat them shabbily, in order for things to come out prop- erly. And that's ultimately no more than the military state of mind that rises above parties and is supposed to distinguish the soldier. I'm not claiming any personal merit here, but I want to show you that this conviction was what was speaking out of me before. "
"Now you're going to repeat that the civil war of '66 came about because all Germans declared themselves brothers," Ulrich said, smiling.
"Yes, of course! " Stumm confirmed. "And now on top of that ev- erybody is declaring themselves brothers! That makes me ask, what's going to come of it? What really comes happens so unexpectedly. Here we brooded for almost a whole year, and then it turned out quite differently. And so it seems to be my fate that while I was busily investigating the mind, the mind led me back to the military. Still, if you consider everything I've said, you'll find that I don't identify my- self with anything but find something true in everything; that's the essence, more or less, ofwhat we've been talking about. "
After looking at his watch, Stumm started to give the sign to leave, for his pleasure at having unburdened himselfwas so intense that he had forgotten everything else. But Ulrich amicably laid his hand on him and said: "You still haven't told me what your newest 'little job' is. "
Stumm held back. "Today there's no more time. I have to go. "
But Ulrich held him by one of the gold buttons gleaming on his stomach, and wouldn't let go until Stumm gave in. Stumm fished for Ulrich's head and pulled his ear to his mouth. 'Well, in strictest con- fidence," he whispered, "Leinsdorf. "
"I take it he's to be done away with, you political assassin! " Ulrich whispered back, but so openly that Stumm, offended, pointed to the coachman. They decided to speak aloud but avoid naming names. "Let me think about it," Ulrich proposed, "and see for myself whether I still know something about the world you move in. He brought down the last Minister ofCulture, and after the recent insult
From the Posthumous Papers · 1 2 5 7
he received, one has to assume that he will bring down the current one as well. But that would be, momentarily, an unpleasant distur- bance, and this has to be precluded. And, for whatever reason, he still clings firmly to the conviction that the Germans are the biggest threat to the nation, that Baron Wisnieczky, whom the Germans can't stand, is the man best suited to beat the drum among them that the government ought not to have changed course, and so on. . . . "
Stumm could have interrupted Ulrich but had been content to lis- ten, only now intervening. "But it was under him in the campaign that the slogan 'Action! ' came about; while everyone else was just saying 'It's a new spirit,' he was saying to everyone who didn't like to hear it: 'Something must be done! ' "
"And he can't be brought down, he's not in the government. And the Parallel Campaign has been, so to speak, shot out from under him," Ulrich said.
"So now the danger is that he'll start something else," the General went on.
"But what can you do about it? " Ulrich asked, curious.
'Well! I've been assigned the mission of diverting him a little and, ifyou like, also watching over him a bit-"
"Ah! A 'Report L,' you coy deceiver! "
"That's what you can call it between us, but of course it doesn't have an official name. My mission is simply to sit on Leinsdorf's neck"-this time Stumm wanted to enjoy the name too, but again he whispered it-"like a tick. Those were the Minister's own gracious words. "
"But he must have also given you a goal to aim for? "
The General laughed. "Talk! I'm to talk with him! Go along with everything he's thinking, and talk so much about it that he will, we hope, wear himself out and not do anything rash. 'Suck him dry,' the Minister told me, and called it an honorable mission and a demon- stration of his confidence. And if you were to ask me whether that's all, I can only respond: it's a lot! Our old Excellency is a person of enormous culture, and tremendously interesting! " He had given the coachman the sign to start, and called back: "The rest next time. I'm counting on you! "
It was only as the coach was rolling away that the idea occurred
1258 · THE MAN WITH0UT QUALITIES
to Ulrich that Stumm might also have had the intention of render- ing him innocuous, since he had once been suspected of being able to lead Count Leinsdorf's mind off on some quite extravagant fancy.
54
NAIVE DESCRIPTION OF HOW AN EMOTION ORIGINA TES
Agathe had gone on to read a large part of the pages that followed. They did not, at first, contain anything of the promised exposition of the current development of the concept of emotion, for before Ulrich gave a summary of these views, from which he hoped to de- rive the greatest benefit, he had, in his own words, sought to "present the origin and growth of an emotion as naively, clumsily spelling it out with his finger, as it might appear to a layman not unpracticed in
matters of the intellect. "
This entry went on: 'We are accustomed to regard emotion as
something that has causes and consequences, and I want to limit my- self to saying that the cause is an external stimulus. But of course appropriate circumstances are part of this stimulus as well, which is to say appropriate external, but also internal, circumstances, an inner readiness, and it is this trinity that actually decides whether and how this stimulus will be responded to. For whether an emotion occurs all at once or protractedly, how it expands and runs its course, what ideas it entails, and indeed what emotion it is, ordinarily depend no less on the previous state ofthe person experiencing the emotion and his environment than they do on the stimulus. This is no doubt self- evident in the case of the condition of the person experiencing the emotion: in other words, his temperament, character, age, educa- tion, predispositions, principles, prior experience, and present ten- sions, although these states have no definite boundaries and lose
From the Posthumous Papers · 1259
themselves in the person's being and destiny. But the external envi- ronment too, indeed simply knowing about it or implicitly assuming it, can also suppress or favor an emotion. Social life offers innumera- ble examples of this, for in every situation there are appropriate and inappropriate emotions, and emotions also change with time andre- gion, with what groups of emotions predominate in public and in pri- vate life, or at least which ones are favored and which suppressed; it is even the case that periods rich in emotion and poor in emotion have succeeded one another.
"Add to all this that external and internal circumstances, along with the stimulus-this can easily be measured-are not indepen- dent of each other. For the internal state has been adapted to the external state and its emotional stimuli, and is therefore dependent on them as well; and the external state must have been assimilated in some fashion or other, in such a way that its manifestation depends on the inner state before a disturbance of this equilibrium evokes a new emotion, and this new emotion either paves the way for a new equalization or is one itself. But in the same way, the 'stimulus,' too, does not ordinarily work directly but works only by virtue of being assimilated, and the inner state again only carries out this assimila- tion on the basis of perceptions with which the beginnings of the ex- citation must already have been associated.
"Aside from that, the stimulus capable of arousing an emotion is connected with the emotion insofar as what stimulates, for instance, a starving person is a matter ofindifference to a person who has been insulted, and vice versa. "
"Similar complications result when the subsequent process is to be described seriatim. Thus even the question ofwhen an emotion is present cannot be answered, although according to the basic view by which it is to be effected and then produce an effect itself, it must be assumed that there is such a point in time. But the arousing stimulus does not actually strike an existing state, like the ball in the mechani- cal contraption that sets off a sequence of consequences like falling dominoes, but continues in time, calling forth a fresh supply of inner forces that both work according to its sense and vary its effect. And just as little does the emotion, once present, dissipate immediately in
1260 • THE MAN WITH0UT QUALITIES
its effects, nor does it itself remain the same even for an instant, rest- ing, as it were, in the middle between the processes it assimilates and transmits; it is connected with a constant changing in everything to which it has connection internally and externally, and also receives reactions from both directions.
"It is a characteristic endeavor of the emotions to actively, often passionately, vary the stimuli to which they owe their origin, and to eliminate or abet them; and the major directions of life are those to- ward the outside and from the outside. That is why anger already contains the counterattack, desire the approach, and fear the transi- tion to flight, to paralysis, or something between both in the scream. But an emotion also receives more than a little ofits particularity and content through the retroactive effect of this active behavior; the well-known statement of an American psychologist that 'we do not weep because we are sad, but are sad because we weep' might be an exaggeration, yet it is certain that we don't just act the way we feel, but we also soon learn to feel the way we act, for whatever reasons.
"A familiar example of this back-and-forth pathway is a pair of dogs who begin to romp playfully but end up in a bloody fight; a simi- lar phenomenon can be observed in children and simple people. And is not, ultimately, the entire lovely theatricality of life such an exam- ple writ large, with its half-momentous, half-empty gestures ofhonor and being honored, of menacing, civility, strictness, and everything else: all gestures of wanting-to-represent-something and of the rep- resentation that sets judgment aside and influences the emotions di- rectly. Even the military 'drill' is part of this, based as it is on the effect that a behavior imposed for a long time finally produces the emotions from which it was supposed to have sprung. "
"More important than this reacting to an action, in this and other examples, is that an experience changes its meaningifits course hap- pens to veer from the sphere of the particular forces that steered it at the beginning into the sphere of other mental connections. For what is going on internally is similar to what is happening externally. The emotion pushes inside; it 'grabs hold of the whole person,' as collo- quial language not inappropriately has it; it suppresses what doesn't suit it and supports whatever can offer it nourishment. In a psychiat-
From the Posthumous Papers · 1 2 6 1
ric textbook, I came across strange names for this: 'switching energy' and 'switching work. ' But in this process the emotion also stimulates the inner sphere to turn toward it. The inner readiness not already expended in the first instant gradually pushes toward the emotion; and the emotion will be completely taken over from within as soon as it gets hold ofthe stronger energies in ideas, memories, or principles, or in other stored-up energy, and these will change it in such a way that it becomes hard to decide whether one should speak of a moving or of a being moved.
"But if, through such processes, an emotion has reached its high point, the same processes must weaken and dilute it again as well. For emotions and experiences will then crisscross the region of this climax, but no longer subordinate themselves to it completely; in- deed, they will finally displace it. This countercurrent of satiety and erosion really begins when the emotion first arises; the fact that the emotion spreads indicates not only an expansion of its power but, at the same time, a relaxation of the needs from which it arose or of which it makes use.
"This can also be observed in relation to the action; for emotion not only intensifies in the action, but also relaxes in it; and its satiety, if it is not disturbed by another emotion, can proceed to the point of excess, that is to say, to the point where a new emotion occurs. "
"One thing deserves special mention. So long as an emotion subju- gates the internal aspect, it comes in contact with activities that con- tribute to experiencing and understanding the external world; and thus the emotion will be able to partly pattern the world as we under- stand it according to its own pattern and sense, in order to be rein- forced within itself through the reactive aspect. Examples of this are well known: A violent feeling blinds one toward something that unin- volved observers perceive and causes one to see things others don't. For the melancholy person, everything is gloomy; he punishes with disregard anything that might cheer him up; the cheerful person sees the world in bright colors and is not capable of perceiving anything that might disturb this. The lover meets the most evil natures with trusting confidence, and the suspicious person not only finds his mis- trust confinned on every side, but these confirmations also seek him
1262 • THE MAN WITH 0 U T QUALITIES
out to plague him. In this way every emotion, if it attains a certain strength and duration, creates its own world, a selective and personal world, and this plays no small role in human relations! Here, too, is where our notorious inconsistency and our changeable opinions be- long. "
Here Ulrich had drawn a line and briefly reverted to the question of whether an emotion was a state or a process. The question's pecu- liarity now clearly emerged as illusory. What followed took up, in summary and continuing fashion, where the previous description had left off:
"Proceeding from the customary idea that emotion is a state that emanates from a cause and produces consequences, I was led in my exposition to a description that doubtless does represent a process if the result is obseiVed over a fairly long stretch. But if I then proceed from the total impression of a process and try to grasp this idea, I see just as clearly that the sequence between neighboring elements, the one-after-another that is an essential part of a process, is everywhere missing. Indeed, every indication of a sequence in a particular direc- tion is missing. On the contrary, it points to a mutual dependence and presupposition between the individual steps, and even to the image of effects that appear to precede their causes. Nor do any tem- poral relationships appear anywhere in the description, and all this points, for a variety of reasons, to emotion being a state.
"So strictly speaking I can merely say of an emotion that it seems to be a state as much as it is a process, or that it appears to be neither a state nor a process; one statement can be justified as easily as the other.
"But even that depends, as can easily be shown, at least as much on the manner of description as on what is described.
For it is not a particular idiosyncrasy of mental activity, let alone that of emotion, but occurs also in other areas in describing nature; for instance, ev- erywhere where there is talk of a system and its elements, or of a whole and its parts, that in one person's view can appear as a state while another person sees it as a process. Even the duration of a pro- cess is associated for us with the concept of a state. I could probably not say that the logic of this double idea-formation is clear, but ap- parently it has more to do with the distinction between states and processes belonging to the way thinking expresses itself in language
From the Posthumous Papers · 1263
than it does with the scientific picture presented by facts, a picture that states and processes might improve but might also, perhaps, allow to disappear behind something else. "
"The German language says: Anger is in me, and it says: I am in anger [Ich bin in Zorn]. It says: I am angry, I feel angry [Ich fohle mich zomig]. It says: I am in love [Ich bin verliebt], and I have fallen in love [Ich habe mich verliebt]. The names the language has given to the emotions probably point back frequently, in its history, to lan- guage's having been affected by the impression of actions and through dangerous or obvious attitudes toward actions; nevertheless, language talks of an emotion as, in one case, a state embracing vari- ous processes, in another as of a process consisting of a series of states. As the examples show, it also includes quite directly in its forms of expression, various though these may be, the idea-forma- tions ofthe individual and ofexternal and internal, and in all this the language behaves as capriciously and unpredictably as ifit had always intended to substantiate the disorder of German emotions.
"This heterogeneity of the linguistic picture of our emotions, which arose from impressive but incomplete experiences, is still re- flected today in the idea-formation of science, especially when these ideas are taken more in breadth than in depth. There are psychologi- cal theories in which the T appears as the most certain element, present in every movement of the mind, but especially in the emo- tion of what is capable of being experienced, and there are other theories that completely ignore the T and regard only the relation- ships between expressions as capable of being experienced, describ- ing them as if they were phenomena in a force field, whose origin is left out ofaccount. There are also ego psychologies and psychologies without the ego. But other distinctions, too, are occasionally formu- lated: thus emotion may appear in one place as a process that runs through the relation of an T to the external world, in another as a special case and state of connectedness, and so forth: distinctions that, given a more conceptual orientation ofthe thirst for knowledge, easily press to the fore so long as the truth is not clear.
"Much is here still left to opinion, even if one takes the greatest care to distinguish opinion from the facts. It seems clear to us that an
1264 · THE MAN WITH0UT QUALITIES
emotion takes shape not just anywhere in the world but within a liv- ing being, and that it is T who feels, or feels stimulation within itself. Something is clearly going on within me when I feel, and I am also changing my state. Also, though the emotion brings about a more intense relation to the external world than does a sense perception, it seems to me to be more 'inward' than a sense perception. That is one group of impressions. On the other hand, a stand taken by the entire person is associated with the emotion as well, and that is another group. I know about emotion, in distinction to sense perception, that it concerns 'all of me' more than sense perception does. Also, it is only by means of an individual person that an emotion brings some- thing about externally, whether it is because the person acts or be- cause he begins to see the world differently. Indeed, it cannot even be maintained that an emotion is an internal change in a person with- out the addition that it causes changes in his relation to the external world. "
"So does the being and becoming of an emotion take place 'in' us, or to us, or by means of us? This leads me back to my own descrip- tion. And if I may give credence to its disinterestedness, the relation- ships it discreetly illuminates once again reinforce the same thing: My emotion arises inside me and outside me; it changes from the inside and the outside; it changes the world directly from inside and indirectly, that is through my behavior, from outside; and it is there- fore, even ifthis contradicts our prejudice, simultaneously inside and outside, or at least so entangled with both that the question as to what in an emotion is internal and what external, and what in it is T and what the world, becomes almost meaningless.
"This must somehow furnish the basic facts, and can do so expedi- tiously, for, expressed in rather measured words, it merely states that in every act of feeling a double direction is experienced that imparts to it the nature of a transitory phenomenon: inward, or back to the individual, and outward, or toward the object with which it is con- cerned. What, on the other hand, inward and outward are, and even more what it means to belong to the T or the world, in other words what stands at the end of both directions and would therefore be necessary to permit us to understand their presence completely: this
From the Posthumous Papers · 1 2 6 5
is of course not to be clearly grasped in the first experience of it, and its origin is no clearer than anything else one experiences without knowing how. It is only through continuing experience and investiga- tion that a genuine concept for this can be developed.
"That is why a psychology that considers it important that it be a real science of experience will treat these concepts and proceed no differently from the way such a science does with the concepts of state and process; and the closely related ideas of the individual per- son, the mind, and the '1,' but also complete ideas of inward and out- ward, will appear in it as something to be explained, and not as something by whose aid one immediately explains something else. "
"The everyday wisdom of psychology agrees with this remarkably well, for we usually assume in advance, without thinking about it much, that a person who shows himselfin a way that corresponds to a specific emotion really feels that way. So it not seldom happens, per- haps it even happens quite often, that an external behavior, together with the emotions it embraces, will be comprehended directly as being all of a piece, and with great certainty.
'W e first experience directly, as a whole, whether the attitude of a being approaching us is friendly or hostile, and the consideration whether this impression is correct comes, at best, afterward. What approaches us in the first impression is not something that might perhaps prove to be awful; what we feel is the awfulness itself, even if an instant later the impression should turn out to be mistaken. And if we succeed in reconstituting the first impression, this apparent re- versal permits us to also discern a rational sequence of experiences, such as that something is beautiful and charming, or shameful or nauseating.
"This has even been presetved in a double usage of language we meet with every day, when we say that we consider something awful, delightful, or the like, emphasizing thereby that the emotions de- pend on the person, just as much as we say that something is awful, delightful, and the like, emphasizing that the origin of our emotions is rooted as a quality in objects and events. This doubleness or even amphibian ambiguity of the emotions supports the idea that they are to be obsetved not only within us, but also in the external world. "
1266 · THE MAN WITH 0 U T QUALITIES
With these last observations Ulrich had already arrived at the third answer to the question of how the concept ofemotion is to be deter- mined; or, more reservedly, at the opinion on this question that pre- vails today.
55
FEELING AND BEHA VIOR.
THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF EMOTION
"The school oftheoretical psychology most successful at the moment treats emotions and the actions associated with emotions as an indis- soluble entity. What we feel when we act is for this psychology one aspect, and how we act with feeling the other aspect, of one and the same process. Contemporary psychology investigates both as a unit. For theories in this category, emotion is-in their terms-an internal and external behavior, event, and action; and because this bringing together of emotion and behavior has proved itself quite well, the question of how the two sides are to be ultimately separated again and distinguished from each other has become for the time being almost secondary. That is why instead of a single answer there is a whole bundle of answers, and this bundle is rather untidy. "
'W e are sometimes told that emotion is simply identical with the internal and external events, but we are usually merely told that these events are to be considered equivalent to the emotion. Some- times emotion is called, rather vaguely, 'the total process,' sometimes merely internal action, behavior, course, or event. Sometimes it also seems that two concepts of emotion are being used side by side: one in which emotion would be in a broader sense the 'whole,' the other in which it would be, in a narrower sense, a partial experience that in some rather hazy way stamps its name, indeed its nature, on the
From the Posthumous Papers · 1267
whole. And sometimes people seem to follow the conjecture that one and the same thing, which presents itself to obsexvation as a complex process, becomes an emotion when it is experienced; in other words, the emotion would then be the experience, the result, and, so to speak, what the process yields in consciousness.
"The origin of these contradictions is no doubt always the same. For every such description of an emotion exhibits components, pre- ponderantly in the plural, that are obviously not emotions, because they are actually known and equally respected as sensation, compre- hension, idea, will, or an external process, such as can be experienced at any time, and which also participate exactly as they are in the total experience. But in and above all this there is also just as clearly some- thing that seems in and of itself to be emotion in the simplest and most unmistakable sense, and nothing else: neither acting, nor a pro- cess of thinking, nor anything else.
"That's why all these explanations can be summarized in two cate- gories. They characterize the emotion either as an 'aspect,' a 'compo- nent,' or a 'force' of the total process, or else as the 'becoming aware' of this process, its 'inner result,' or something similar; expressions in which one can see clearly enough the embarrassment for want of better ones! "
"The most peculiar idea in these theories is that at first they leave vague the relation of the emotion to everything it is not, but with which it is filled; but they make it appear quite probable that this connection is in any case, and however it might be thought of other- wise, so constituted that it admits of no discontinuous changes, and that everything changes, so to speak, in the same breath.
"It can be thought of in terms of the example of melody. In mel- ody the notes have their independent existence and can be recog- nized individually, and their propinquity, their simultaneity, their sequence, and whatever else can be heard are not abstract concepts but an overflowing sensory exposition. But although all these ele- ments can be heard singly in spite of their connectedness, they can also be heard connectedly, for that is precisely what melody is; and if the melody is heard, it is not that there is something new in addition to the notes, intexvals, and rhythms, but something with them. The
1268 · THE MAN WITH0UT QUALITIES
melody is not a supplement but a second-order phenomenon, a spe- cial form of existence, under which the form of the individual exis- tences can just barely be discerned; and this is also true of emotion in relation to ideas, movements, sensations, intentions, and mute forces that unite in it. And as sensitive as a melody is to any change in its 'components,' so that it immediately takes on another form or is de- stroyed entirely, so can an emotion be sensitive to an action or an interfering idea.
"In whatever relationship the emotion may therefore stand to 'in- ternal and external behavior,' this demonstrates how any change in this behavior could correspond to a change in the emotion, and vice versa, as if they were the two sides of a page. "
"(There are many model and experimental examples that confinn the broad extent of this theoretical idea, and other examples out- side science that this idea fitfully illuminates, whether apparently or actually. I would like to retain one of these. The fervor of many portraits-and there are portraits, not just pictures, even of things- consists not least in that in them the individual existence opens up toward itself inwardly and closes itself off from the rest of the world. For the independent forms of life, even if they represent themselves as relatively hermetic, always have common links with the dispersive circle of a constantly changing environment. So when I took Agathe on my arm and we both took ourselves out of the frame of our lives and felt united in another frame, perhaps something similar was hap- pening with our emotions. I didn't know what hers were, nor she mine, but they were only there for each other, hanging open and clinging to each other while all other dependency disappeared; and that is why we said we were outside the world and in ourselves, and used the odd comparison with a picture for this animated holding back and stopping short, this true homecoming and this becoming a unity of alien parts. )"
"So the peculiar thought I am talking about teaches that the altera- tions and modulations of the emotion, and those of the internal and external behavior, can correspond to each other point for point with-
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1269
out the emotion having to be equated with the behavior or with part of it, or without anything else having to be maintained about the emotion beyond its possessing qualities that also have their civic rights elsewhere in nature. This result has the advantage of not inter- fering with the natural distinction between an emotion and an event, and yet bridges them in such a way that the distinction loses its sig- nificance. It demonstrates in the most general fashion how the spheres of two actions, which can remain totally unlike one another, may yet be delineated in each other.
"This obviously gives the question of how, then, an emotion is sup- posed to 'consist' of other mental, indeed even of physical processes, an entirely new and remarkable tum; but this only explains how every change in the behavior corresponds to a change in the emo- tion, and vice versa, and not what really leads to such changes as take place during the entire duration of the emotion. In that case, the emotion would appear to be merely the echo of its accompanying action, and this action would be the mirror image of the emotion, so it would be hard to understand their reciprocally changing each other.
"Here, consequently, the second major idea that can be derived from the newly opened up science of the emotions begins. I would like to call it the idea of shaping and consolidating. "
"This idea is based on several notions and considerations. Since I would like to clarify it for myself, let me first go back to our saying that an emotion brings about a behavior, and the behavior reacts on the emotion; for this crude observation easily allows a better one to counter it, that between both there is, rather, a relationship of mu- tual reinforcement and resonance, a rampant swelling into each other, which also, to be sure, brings about mutual change in both components. The emotion is translated into the language of the ac- tion, and the action into the language of the emotion. As with every translation, something new is added and some things are lost in the process.
"Among the simplest relationships, the familiar expression that one's limbs are paralyzed with fear already speaks of this; for it could just as well be maintained that the fear is paralyzed by the limbs: a
1270 · THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES
distinction such as the one between 'rigid with terror' and 'trembling with fear' rests entirely on this second case. And what is claimed by the simplest movement of expression is also true of the comprehen- sive emotional action: in other words, an emotion changes not just as a consequence of the action it evokes, but already within the action by which it is assimilated in a particular way, repeated, and changed, in the course of which both the emotion and the action mutually shape and consolidate themselves. Ideas, desires, and impulses of all sorts also enter into an emotion in this way, and the emotion enters them. "
"But such a relationship ofcourse presupposes a differentiation in the interaction in which the lead should alternate sequentially, so that now feeling, now acting, dominates, now a resolve, scruple, or idea becomes dominant and makes a contribution that carries all the components forward in a common direction. So this relationship is contained in the idea of a mutual shaping and consolidation, and it is this idea that really makes it complete.
"On the other side, the unity described previously must at the same time be able to assimilate changes and yet still have the ability to maintain its identity as a more or less defined emotional action; but it must also be able to exclude, for it assimilates influences from within and without or fends them off. Up to now, all I know of this unity is the law of its completed state. Therefore the origins of these influences must also be able to be adduced and ultimately explained, thanks to which providence or arrangement it happens that they enter into what is going on in the sense of a common development. "
"Now, in all probability a particular ability to endure and be resus- citated, a solidity and degree of solidity, and thus finally also a partic- ular 'energy,' cannot be ascribed to the unity alone, to the structure as such, the mere shape of the event; nor is it very likely that there exist other internal participatory energies that focus specifically on this. On the other hand, it is probable that these energies play noth- ing more than a secondary role; for our emotions and ideas probably also control the same numerous, instantaneous internal relationships
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1 2 7 1
and the same enduring dispositions, inclinations, principles, inten- tions, and needs that produce our actions as well as our emotions and ideas. Our emotions and ideas are the storage batteries of these ele- ments, and it is to be assumed that the energies to which they give rise somehow bring about the shaping and consolidation of the emotions. "
"How that happens I will try to make clear by means of a widely held prejudice. The opinion is often voiced that there is some kind of 'inner relation' among an emotion, the object to which it is directed, and the action that connects them. The idea is that it would then be more comprehensible that these form a unified whole, that they suc- ceed one another, and so on. The heart ofthe matter is that a particu- lar drive or a particular emotion-for example, hunger and the instinct for food-are directed not at random objects and actions but primarily, of course, at those that promise satisfaction. A sonata is of no help to a starving person, but food is: that is to say, something belonging to a more or less specific category of objects and events; and this gives rise to the appearance of this category and this state of stimulation always being connected. There is some truth in this, but no more mysterious a truth than that to eat soup we use a spoon and not a fork.
'W e do so because it seems to us appropriate; and it is nothing but this commonplace appearing-to-be-appropriate that fulfills the task of mediating among an emotion, its object, the concomitant actions, ideas, decisions, and those deeper impulses that for the most part elude observation. Ifwe act with an intention, or from a desire, or for a purpose-for instance, to help or hurt someone-it seems natural to us that our action is determined by the demand that it be appro- priate; but beyond that it can turn out in many different ways. The same is true for every emotion. An emotion, too, longs for everything that seems suited to satisfying it, in which process this characteristic will be sometimes more tightly, sometimes more loosely, related; and precisely this looser connection is the natural path to shaping and consolidation.
"For it occasionally happens even to the drives that they go astray, and wherever an emotion is at its peak, it then happens that an action
1272 · THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES
is merely attempted, that an intention or an idea is thrown in that later turns out to be inappropriate and is dropped, and that the emo- tion enters the sphere ofa source ofenergy, or this sphere enters that of the emotion, from which it frees itself again. So in the course of the event not everything is shaped and consolidated; a great deal is also abandoned. In other words, there is also a shaping without con- solidation, and this constitutes an indispensable part of the con- solidating arrangement. For since everything that seems appropriate to serve the directing energies can be absorbed by the unity of the emotional behavior, but only so much of this is retained as is really appropriate, there enter of themselves into the feeling, acting, and thinking the common trait, succession, and duration which make it comprehensible that the feeling, acting, and thinking mutually and increasingly consolidate and shape themselves. "
"The weak point of this explanation lies where the precisely de- scribed unity that arises at the end is supposed to be connected to the unknown and vaguely bounded sphere ofthe impulses that lies at the beginning. This sphere is hardly anything other than what is em- braced by the essences 'person' and T according to the proportion of their involvement, about which we know little. But if one considers that in the moment of an emotion even what is most inward can be recast, then it will not seem unthinkable that in such a moment the shaped unity ofthe action, too, can reach that point. Ifone considers, on the other hand, how much has to happen beforehand in order to prepare such a success as a person giving up principles and habits, one will have to desist from every idea that concentrates on the mo- mentary effect. And ifone were, finally, to be satisfied by saying that other laws and connections are valid for the area of the source than for the outlet, where the emotion becomes perceivable as internal and external action, then one would again come up against the insuf- ficiency that we have no idea at all according to what law the transi- tion from the causative forces to the resulting product could come about. Perhaps the postulation of a lopse, general unity that em- braces the entire process can be combined with this, in that it would ultimately enable a specific and solid unity to emerge: but this ques-
From the Posthumous Papers · 1273 tion extends beyond psychology, and for the time being extends
beyond our abilities too. "
"This knowledge, that in the process of an emotion from its source to its appearance a unity is indicated, but that it cannot be said when and how this unity assumes the closed form that is supposed to char- acterize the emotion's completely developed behavior (and in ana- lyzing which I used the articulation of a melody as example)-this quite negative knowledge permits, remarkably, an idea to be brought in by means of which the deferred answer to the question of how the concept of the emotion appears in more recent research comes to a singular conclusion. This is the admission that the actual event corre- sponds neither in its entirety nor in its final form to the mental image that has been made of it. This is usefully demonstrated by a kind of double negative: One says to oneself: perhaps the pure unity that theoretically represents the law of the completed emotion never ex- ists; indeed, it may not even be at all possible for it to exist, because it would be so completely cut off inside its own compass that it would not be able to assimilate any more influences of any other kind. But, one now says to oneself, there never is such a completely circum- scribed emotion! In other words: emotions never occur purely, but always only in an approximating actualization. And in still other words: the process of shaping and consolidating never ends. "
"But this is nothing other than what presently characterizes psy- chological thinking everywhere. Moreover, one sees in the basic mental concepts only ideational patterns according to which the in- ternal action can be ordered, but one no longer expects that it is re- ally constructed out of such elements, like a picture printed by the four-color process. In truth, according to this view, the pure nature ofthe emotion, ofthe idea, ofsensation, and ofthe will are as little to be met with in the internal world as are the thread of a current or a difficult point in the outer world: There is merely an interwoven whole, which sometimes seems to will and sometimes to think be- cause this or that quality predominates.
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"The names of the individual emotions therefore characterize only types, which approximate real experiences without corresponding to them entirely; and with this, a guiding principle with the following content-even if this is rather crudely put-takes the place of the axiom of the older psychology by which the emotion, as one of the elemental experiences, was supposed to have an unalterable nature, or to be experienced in a way that distinguished it once and for all from other experiences: There are no experiences that are from the beginning distinct emotions, or even emotions at all; there are merely experiences that are destined to become emotion and to become a distinct emotion.
"This also gives the idea ofarrangement and consolidation the sig- nificance that in this process emotion and behavior not only form, consolidate, and, as far as it is given them, determine; it is in this process that the emotion originates in the first place: so that it is never this or that specific emotion that is present at the beginning- say, in a weak state-together with its mode of action, but only some- thing that is appropriate and has been destined to become such an emotion and action, which, however, it never becomes in a pure state. "
"But of course this 'something' is not completely random, since it is understood to be something that from the start and by disposition is intended or appropriate to becoming an emotion, and, moreover, a specific emotion. For in the final analysis anger is not fatigue, and apparently not in the first analysis either; and just as little are satiety and hunger to be confused, even in their early stages. Therefore at the beginning something unfinished, a start, a nucleus, something like an emotion and things associated with that emotion, will already be present. I would like to call it a feeling that is not yet an emotion; but it is better to present an example, and for that I will take the relatively simple one ofphysical pain inflicted externally.
"This pain can be a locally restricted sensation that penetrates or burns in one spot and is unpleasant but alien. But this sensation can also flare up and overwhelm the entire person with affliction. Often, too, at the beginning there is merely an empty spot at the place, from which it is only in the following moments that sensation or emotion
From the Posthumous Papers · 1 2 75
wells up: it is not only children who at the beginning often do not know whether something hurts. Earlier, one assumed that in these cases an emotion is superimposed on the sensation, but today one prefers to suppose that a nucleus of experience, originally as little a sensation as it is an emotion, can develop equally well into the one as the other.
"Also already part of this original stability of experience is the be- ginning of an instinctive or reflex action, a shrinking back, collapsing, fending off, or a spontaneous counterattack; and because this more or less involves the entire person, it will also involve an internal 'flight or fight' condition, in other words a coloration of the emotion by the kind of fear or attack. This proceeds of course even more strongly from the drives triggered, for not only are these dispositions for a purposive action but, once aroused, they also produce nonspecific mental states, which we characterize as moods of fearfulness or irri- tability, or in other cases of being in love, of sensitivity, and so forth. Even not acting and not being able to do anything has such an emo- tional coloration; but the drives are for the most part connected with a more or less definite will formation, and this leads to an inquiry into the situation that is in itself a confrontation and therefore has an ag- gressive coloration. But this inquiry can also have the effect of cool- ness and calm; or if the pain is quite severe, it does not take place, and one suddenly avoids its source. So even this example goes back and forth from the very beginning between sensation, emotion, auto- matic response, will, flight, defense, attack, pain, anger, curiosity, and being coolly collected, and thereby demonstrates that what is present is not so much the original state of a single emotion as rather varying beginnings of several, succeeding or complementing one an- other.
"This gives to the assertion that a feeling is present, but not yet an emotion, the sense that the disposition to an emotion is always pres- ent but that it does not need to be realized, and that a beginning is always present but it can tum out later to have served as the begin- ning of a different emotion. "
"The peculiar manner in which the emotion is from the beginning both present and not present can be expressed in the comparison
1276 · THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES
that one must imagine its development as the image of a forest, and not as the image of a tree. A birch, for example, remains itself from its germination to its death; but on the other hand, a birch forest can begin as a mixed forest; it becomes a birch forest as soon as birch trees-as the result of causes that can be quite varied-predominate in it and the departures from the pure stamp of the birch type are no longer significant.
"It is the same with the emotion and (this is always open to misun- derstanding) with the action connected to the emotion. They always have their particular characteristics, but these change with every- thing that adheres to them until, with growing certitude, they take on the marks of a familiar emotion and 'deserve' its name, which always retains a trace of free judgment. But emotion and the action of emo- tion can also depart from this type and approximate another; this is not unusual, because an emotion can waver and, in any event, goes through various stages. What distinguishes this from the ordinary view is that in the ordinary view the emotion has validity as a specific experience, which we do not always recognize with certainty. On the other hand, the more recently established view ascribes the lack of certainty to the emotion and tries to understand it from its nature and to limit it concisely. "
There followed in an appendix individual examples that really ought to have been marginal notations but had been suppressed at the places they had been intended for in order not to interrupt the exposition. And so these stragglers that had dropped out of their con- text no longer belonged to a specific place, although they did belong to the whole and retained ideas that might possibly have some useful application for the whole:
"In the relation 'to love something,' what carries such enormous distinctions as that between love of God and loving to go fishing is not the love but the 'something. ' The emotion itself: the devotion, anxiousness, desire, hurt, gnawing-in other words, loving--does not admit a distinction. ''
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1 2 77
"But it is just as certain that loving one's walking stick or honor is not 'apples and oranges' only for the reason that these two things do not resemble each other, but also because the use we make of them, the circumstances in which they assume importance-in short, the entire group of experiences-are different. It is from the noninter- changeability of a group of experiences that we derive the certainty of knowing our emotion. That is why we only truly recognize it after it has had some effect in the world and has been shaped by the world; we do not know what we feel before our action has made that decision. "
"And where we say that our emotion is divided, we should rather say that it is not yet complete, or that we have not yet settled down. "
"And where it appears as paradox or paradoxical combination, what we have is often something else. We say that the courageous person ignores pain; but in truth it is the bitter salt of pain that overflows in courageousness. And in the martyr it rises in flames to heaven. In the coward, on the contrary, the pain becomes unbearably concentrated through the anticipatory fear. The example ofloathing is even clearer; those feelings inflicted with violence are associated with it, which, if received voluntarily, are the most intense desire.
"Of course there are differing sources here, and also varying com- binations, but what comes into being most particularly are various directions in which the predominant emotion develops. "
"Because they are constantly fluid, emotions cannot be stopped; nor can they be looked at 'under the microscope. ' This means that the more closely we obseiVe them, the less we know what it is we feel. Attention is already a change in the emotion. But if emotions were a 'mixture,' this should really be most apparent at the moment when it is stopped, even if attention inteiVenes. ''
1278 • THE MAN WITH 0 U T QUALITIES
"Because the external action has no independent significance for the mind, emotions cannot be distinguished by it alone. Innumerable times we do not know what we feel, although we act vigorously and decisively. The enormous ambiguity of what a person does who is being observed mistrustfully or jealously rests on this lack of clarity. "
"The emotion's lack of clarity does not, however, demonstrate its wealmess, for emotions vanish precisely when feeling is at its height. Even at high degrees of intensity, emotions are extremely labile; see for instance the 'courage of despair,' or happiness suddenly changing into pain. At this level they also bring about contradictory actions, like paralysis instead of flight, or 'being suffocated' by one's own anger. But in quite violent excitation they lose, so to speak, their color, so that all that remains is a dead sensation ofthe accompanying physical manifestations, contraction ofthe skin, surging ofthe blood, blotting out of the senses. And what appears fully in these most in- tense stages is an absolute bedazzlement, so that it can be said that the shaping of the emotion, and with it the entire world of our emo- tions, is valid only in intermediate stages. "
"In these average stages we of course recognize and name an emotion no differently from the way we do other phenomena that are in flux, to repeat this once again. To determine the distinction between hate and anger is as easy and as difficult as ascertaining the distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated murder, or between a basin and a bowl. Not that what is at work here is capri- ciousness in naming, but every aspect and deflection can be useful for comparison and concept formation. And so in this way the hun- dred and one kinds of love about which Agathe and I joked, not en- tirely without sorrow, are connected. The question of how it happens that such quite different things are characterized by the single word 'love' has the same answer as the question of why we unhesitatingly talk of dinner forks, manure forks, tree-branch forks, rifle forks, road forks, and other forks. Underlying all these fork impressions is a
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1279
common 'forkness': it is not in them as a common nucleus, but it might almost be said that it is nothing more than a comparison possi- ble for each of them. For they do not all even need to be similar to one another: it is already sufficient if one leads to another, if you go from one to the next, as long as the neighboring members are similar to one another. The more remote ones are then similar through the mediation of these proximate members. Indeed, even what consti- tutes the similarity, that which associates the neighboring members, can change in such a chain; and so one travels excitedly from one end of the path to the other, hardly knowing oneself how one has tra- versed it. "
"But if we wished to regard, as we are inclined to do, the similarity existing among all kinds oflove for its similarity to a kind of'ur-love,' which so to speak would sit as an armless and legless torso in the middle of them all, it would most likely be the same error as believ- ing in an 'ur-fork. ' And yet we have living witness for there really being such an emotion. It is merely difficult to determine the degree of this 'really. ' It is different from that of the real world. An emotion that is not an emotion for something; an emotion without desire, without preferment, without movement, without knowledge, with- out limits; an emotion to which no distinct behavior and action be- longs, at least no behavior that is quite real: as truly as this emotion is not served with arms and legs, so truly have we encountered it again and again, and it has seemed to us more alive than life itself! Love is already too particular a name for this, even if it most intimately re- lated to a love for which tenderness or inclination are expressions that are too obvious. It realizes itself in many different ways and in many connections, but it can never let itself be detached from this actualization, which always contaminates it. Thus has it appeared to us and vanished, an intimation that always remained the same. Ap- parently the dry reflections with which I have filled these pages have little to do with this, and yet I am almost certain that they have brought me to the right path to it! "
1280
THE DO-GOODER SINGS
Professor August Lindner sang. He was waiting for Agathe.
Ah, the boy's eyes seem to me So crystal clear and lovely,
And a something shines in them That captivates my heart.
Ah, those sweet eyes glance at me, Shining into mine!
Were he to see his image there He would greet me tenderly.
And this is why I yield myself To serve his eyes alone,
For a something shines in them That captivates my heart.
It had originally been a Spanish song. There was a small piano in the house, dating from Frau Lindner's time; it was occasionally de- voted to the mission ofrounding out the education and culture ofson Peter, which had already led Peter to remove several strings. Lind- ner himself never used it, except possibly to strike a few solemn chords now and then; and although he had been pacing up and down in front of this sound machine for quite some time, it was only after cautiously making sure that the housekeeper as well as Peter was out ofthe house that he had let himselfbe carried away by this unwonted impulse. He was quite pleased with his voice, a high baritone obvi- ously well suited to expressing emotion; and now Lindner had not closed the piano but was standing there thinking, leaning on it with his arm, his weightless leg crossed over his supporting leg. Agathe, who had already visited him several times, was over an hour late. The
From the Posthurrwus Papers · 1 2 81
emptiness of the house, stemming in part from that fact and in part from the arrangements he had made, welled up in his consciousness as a culpable plan.
He had found a soul of bedazzling richness, which he was making great efforts to save and which evoked the impression of confiding itself to his charge; and what man would not be charmed at finding something he had hardly expected to find, a tender female creature he could train according to his principles? But mixed in with this were deep notes of discontent. Lindner considered punctuality an obligation of conscience, placing it no lower than honesty and con- tractual obligations; people who made no punctual division of their time seemed to him pathologically scatterbrained, forcing their more serious fellow men, moreover, to lose parcels oftheir time along with them; and so he regarded them as worse than muggers. In such cases he took it as his duty to bring it to the attention of such beings, po- litely but unrelentingly, that his time did not belong to him but to his activity; and because white lies injure one's own mind, while people are not all equal, some being influential and some not, he had derived numerous character exercises from this; a host of their most powerful and malleable maxims now came to his mind and interfered with the gentle arousal brought on by the song.
But no matter: he had not sung any religious songs since his stu- dent days, and enjoyed it with a circumspectfrisson. "What southern naivete, and what charm," he thought, "emanate from such worldly lines! How delightfully and tenderly they relate to the boy Jesus! " He tried to imitate the poem's artlessness in his mind, and arrived at the result: "If I didn't know better, I'd be capable of believing that I feel a girl's chaste stirrings for her boy!