Man must wring himself free from them,
otherwise
he cannot be a good man.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
295
37 I.
Our "ego"--which is not one with the unitary controlling force of our beings! --is really only an
imagined synthesis; "egoistic" actions.
372.
Since instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent standpoint far they are concerned.
Every instinct, when active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain: the end stemmed, otherwise would be the end of
everything owing the waste would bring
about. Thus: that which "unegoistic," self sacrificing, and imprudent nothing particular
--it common all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare the whole ego (because they
simply not think they act counter our interests, against the ego; and often for the ego-- innocent both cases
373.
The origin of moral values. --Selfishness has
much value the physiological value him who
possesses Each individual represents the whole course Evolution, and he not, morals teach,
something that begins his birth. re present the ascent the line mankind, his value fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting his growth may even be extreme. (It the concern about
therefore there can be no -
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296
the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism. ) If he represent descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy, -feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross. " The preponderance of an altruistic way of
? valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex
amination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valua
tion; more plainly still: it is the feeling of im potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
297
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-con fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
? for appears life,
favour shown The hatred the case
The instinct revenge and resentment both cases here means enduring
self-preservative measure,
also the altruistic theory and practice.
egoism, whether one's own (as
the Christian), another's (as the Socialists), thus appears valua
the case
tion reached under the predominance revenge;
and also act prudence on the part the preservative instinct the suffering, the form
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THE WILL TO POWER.
of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self preservative instinct on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir CumstanceS.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in. that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even
except himself. But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures,--at least in its own
aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced
? imagination,--as
also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "criminal. " In the midst of the Roman and
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
299
to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.
376.
The turning of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards";
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
of dissimulation and falsehood find their
377. Falsity--Every sovereign
instinct makes the others instruments, retainers and syco
morality
? ? ? its
its
its
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THE WILL TO POWER.
phants: it never allows itself to be called by more hateful name: and brooks no terms of
praise which cannot indirectly find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame general crystallises form ceremonial and etiquette.
into rigorous This one
dominion, but
falsity.
the causes
Every instinct which aspires
which finds itself under yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the most generally accepted values strengthen and support its
self-esteem, and this explains why rule dares to come forward under the name of the
"master" combating and from whom would free (for instance, under the domination
Christian values, the desires the flesh and of
power act this way). This the other cause falsity.
? complete ingenuousness reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. the sign broken instinct when man sees the motive force and its
"expression" ("the mask") separate things--
sign
both cases
inner contradiction and much less
bearing, word, and passion, "good conscience" falseness,
formidable. Absolute innocence
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro priated--all these things are necessary for
victory.
the other case: that say, when extreme clearsightedness present, the genius the actor
needful well tremendous discipline self
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3OI
control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo crites; and then come princes, in whom their position
in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.
The fundamental thought: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge accurate self-classification, that one is very pro
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness. )
378.
"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood":
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the unreality of this popular "truthfulness. " There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's exposing themselves with every word they say, is a piece of naivete? .
People say what they think, they are "truth
ful"; but only under certain circumstances: that is to say, provided they be understood (inter pares),
and understood with good will into the bargain (once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have
and
? people
? ? ? 302
THE WILL TO POWER.
people think about him, but not what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar. ")
379.
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con. cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--
(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.
Only the most impersonal intellect ("the philosopher") can know the truth, "the true
things. "
(c) Genius, great men are great, because they
essence and nature
do not strive to further their own interests: the
? value man increases himself.
(d) Art the work subject"; misunderstanding
proportion effaces
the "pure free-willed "objectivity. "
(e) Happiness the object life: virtue means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation life by Scho
penhauer
gregarious
physics. *
moral one. Transference the standards into the realm meta
The "individual" lacks sense, he must there fore have his origin "the thing itself" (and the significance his existence must be shown
"error"); parents are only "accidental cause. "--The mistake on the part science
considering the individual the result all past life instead the epitome all past life, now becoming known,
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
38o.
3O3
1. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may present a proof of the moral valua tions:
(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(b) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence. 2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immoral ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.
381.
A great lie in history; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation |
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators--very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re quired a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre judices which is coincident with the emancipation
? ? ? ? 3O4
THE WILL TO POWER.
of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured-- self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual
activity: "objective" contemplation.
"Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the will. . . .
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, I know nothing about at all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good
copy--the standard of his worth lies without him. I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will : not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. . . . I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already does instinctively. . . .
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
305
He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness; highest value (as art, for
instance) would lead and advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin ance of moral values.
Next Schopenhauer will now characterise
Kant: there was nothing Greek Kant; was
quite anti-historical (cf his attitude regard
the French Revolution) and moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element human nature *). Saintliness also
? lurked somewhere his soul. criticism the saintly type.
Hegel's value: "Passion. "
require
Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --This doubtless reference
passage letter written by Goethe Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp Marienborn, near Mainz, which
the following words occur:--"Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem ein langes
AMenschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schand. fleck des radikalen Bo? sen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu kissen. "-- ("Kant, on the other hand, after had tried throughout his life keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre judices, wantonly dirtied the end with the disreputable
stain the 'radical evil' human nature, order that Christians too might lured into kissing hem. ") From
this passage will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view Kant namely, that he was Christian
disguise. VOL.
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? 306
THE WILL TO POWER.
philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of value in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable and morally conditioned, in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow
better? "--a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of civilisation.
383.
Religious morality. --Passion, great desire; the passions of power, love, revenge, and property:
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.
The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be
This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out. " In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a parti cular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for
Fundamental instinct of all
? condemned.
Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a good man. . . .
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
307
their extirpation. conclusion always only
the emasculated man good man.
Instead making use and economising
the great sources passion, those torrents the
dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted
soul which are often
and most corrupted mental attitudes--would
fain make them dry up.
384.
-
Conquest over the passions 3-No, not
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
this
? They must
end may
deal (not
etc. ). At length we should trust them enough
enlisted our service and this necessary tyrannise them good
individuals, but communities, races,
restore their freedom them: they love like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.
385.
Intolerance the part morality sign
man's weakness: he frightened his own "immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts,
because he does not yet know how use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power lack ing that might become master here.
386.
There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
308
a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in rebus moralibus, that the "good man" alone and
nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts
highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, -
he gives what one is able to take).
With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse -- that is to say, an ever greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions
The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions:
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires for pleasure. . . . .
Passion is deprived of dignity (1)
only manifested itself an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the motive force,
should be directed). This is in the
? in one's service.
387.
? ? in
its
as if it
-
-
---* - ***- -
=-
-------------"
-
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
309
(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure. . . .
The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various | passions and desires; and as though every passion : did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .
388.
How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality, it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood:
It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of
its power flow over and bestow, its instinctive feeling ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism surely do
? obtrude, and the inner right everything. The the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing give, and perfectly useless
the desire be master,
certainty that one has opposite views, according
stretch out one's hand either support others.
protect
How was possible transform these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be
value which directed against himself, that he could sacrifice himself for another self! the
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THE WILL TO POWER.
psychological baseness and falseness which hither to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !
If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justifi
cation,
commanded it. --From this it follows that all the
and it is found in the fact that God
natural instincts of man (to love, etc. ) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God. . . . Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this ! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,
389.
Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists. ")
The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).
Pangs
? La Rochefoucauld)--inner en
Europe (Pascal,
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.
of conscience associated with all that
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3II
is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men
Gregarious
transferred to philosophy and religion.
consciousness and timorousness
Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish action out of consideration |
390.
My ultimate conclusion that the real man represents much higher value than the "de sirable" man any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" regard man kind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means which particular kind man has sought establish his measures preservation and growth law for all; that every "desideratum of this kind which has been made
dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength, and his trust the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals desire;
that man's ability fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately do justice the
actual, not merely the "desirable," worth man; that, up the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and the world, the poisonous fumes which have
hung over reality, and which have seduced men yearn for nonentity.
? ? ? . . .
to
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to
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D. A Criticism of the Words :
Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.
39 I.
The standard according to which the value o moral valuations is to be determined.
The fundamental fact that has been overlooked The contradiction between "becoming mor
moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.
Homo natura : The "will to power. "
392.
Moral values regarded as values of appearanc and compared with physiological values.
393.
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde
the ultimate "desiderata" concerning men, fo instance, have never been regarded as problem:
by philosophers. They always postulate "improvement" of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had beer helped over the note of interrogation following the question, why necessarily "improve"? To what extent is it desirable that man should be more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happieri
Granting that nobody yet knows the "wherefore? ' of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--
? the
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I3
who knows? --perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? Dubito:
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten
ment? . . . And suppose one will have happiness;
maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit. "
394.
The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called moral improvement.
We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already--that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
"the older man. " . . . The man's aspect is altered, but not his actual nature. . . . It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested,
? ? ? ? 314
THE WILL TO POWER.
nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per
form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
--starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can
not be undone. Because some one forgets some thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven,'
or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church
abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
? meanwhile canonises the man who
The Church believes things that do not
exist, believes "Souls"; believes "influences" that do not exist--in divine in
performed
? ? it. it
in
in it
in
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I 5
fluences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words,
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.
395.
"Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in one might be
allowed ask whether there not perhaps
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded whole, could not the
"improvement mankind"--that say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded the result
long course secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Euro peans" "better"? Or, put into other words,
wherever history shows "man" state particular glory and power, his type always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares
to which it lends an
? not our modern soft-hearted
which could be likened that the Chinese, perhaps expression physiological deteriora tion cannot be denied, for instance, that
European morality,
? ? is a of
is to
us
of a to
? . . .
an
to
It
of
of
of in
as
is it,
of
isa a
as
? 316
THE WILL TO POWER.
little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which it seems otherwise, all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro position: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well. " A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro.
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving and the increased "civilisation" of man? Noth
ing would then be more expensive than virtue:
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital : and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody
else's nurse. " Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger | So few "actions"
mained fresh the memory men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
the deepest sense the word?
? which would make life on earth worth
Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not the great things and deeds which have re
living
? ? in
all
in of
. . .
of
--
-
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
396.
317
? The priests--and with them the half-priests or
philosophers of all ages--have always called that
doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--
that is to say, tended to "improve. " In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and
miracle-worker who, because he had tried a
certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no
poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them. "--
that is to say, "by our truths. " This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They
have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits")
pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all
other forms of proof. "That which makes good
must be good; that which is good cannot lie"-- these are their inexorable conclusions--"that
which bears good fruit must consequently be
true;
false step, a vice can refute. . . . This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and
behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis
covered anything more interesting than spying out
the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove their Christianity by looking about for the world's
? there is no other criterion of truth.
295
37 I.
Our "ego"--which is not one with the unitary controlling force of our beings! --is really only an
imagined synthesis; "egoistic" actions.
372.
Since instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent standpoint far they are concerned.
Every instinct, when active, sacrifices strength
and other instincts into the bargain: the end stemmed, otherwise would be the end of
everything owing the waste would bring
about. Thus: that which "unegoistic," self sacrificing, and imprudent nothing particular
--it common all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare the whole ego (because they
simply not think they act counter our interests, against the ego; and often for the ego-- innocent both cases
373.
The origin of moral values. --Selfishness has
much value the physiological value him who
possesses Each individual represents the whole course Evolution, and he not, morals teach,
something that begins his birth. re present the ascent the line mankind, his value fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting his growth may even be extreme. (It the concern about
therefore there can be no -
? ? ? is
of
is as
is
as
is, in
is is
of
If
it
of inin
of
! /),of
to
at
it as is itis
of
it.
do
a all
he
as
to
as
in
to
it
? THE WILL TO POWER.
296
the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism. ) If he represent descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has
little worth : and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as
possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter
may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the curbing of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and
deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy, -feelings which are only
too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty,
of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why
the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross. " The preponderance of an altruistic way of
? valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex
amination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valua
tion; more plainly still: it is the feeling of im potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
297
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the
particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-con fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the
Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their
existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian,
who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he
has found some one whom he can hold responsible
? for appears life,
favour shown The hatred the case
The instinct revenge and resentment both cases here means enduring
self-preservative measure,
also the altruistic theory and practice.
egoism, whether one's own (as
the Christian), another's (as the Socialists), thus appears valua
the case
tion reached under the predominance revenge;
and also act prudence on the part the preservative instinct the suffering, the form
*
? ? of of
of
in
ofas a
as
is of
as of an
of of to
of
in
in
it.
or it be
as a
as a
in
? 298
THE WILL TO POWER.
of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism
(one's own or that of others) is yet another self preservative instinct on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly
appears under certain definite physiological cir CumstanceS.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it
only shows that he is oppressed by his inade
quate culture, and is unable to understand why
he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if
he were more at ease he would take jolly good
care not to cry in. that way: in that case he
would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same
holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even
except himself. But that is no reason for taking
him seriously. In both cases we are in the
presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures,--at least in its own
aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced
? imagination,--as
also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "criminal. " In the midst of the Roman and
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
299
to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while
among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it
is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which
praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.
376.
The turning of man's nature inwards. The
process of turning a nature inwards arises when,
owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting
themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, "it steps backwards";
in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the
powers
scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
of dissimulation and falsehood find their
377. Falsity--Every sovereign
instinct makes the others instruments, retainers and syco
morality
? ? ? its
its
its
? 300
THE WILL TO POWER.
phants: it never allows itself to be called by more hateful name: and brooks no terms of
praise which cannot indirectly find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and
blame general crystallises form ceremonial and etiquette.
into rigorous This one
dominion, but
falsity.
the causes
Every instinct which aspires
which finds itself under yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the most generally accepted values strengthen and support its
self-esteem, and this explains why rule dares to come forward under the name of the
"master" combating and from whom would free (for instance, under the domination
Christian values, the desires the flesh and of
power act this way). This the other cause falsity.
? complete ingenuousness reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of
those concerned. the sign broken instinct when man sees the motive force and its
"expression" ("the mask") separate things--
sign
both cases
inner contradiction and much less
bearing, word, and passion, "good conscience" falseness,
formidable. Absolute innocence
and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and
most pompous words and attitudes are appro priated--all these things are necessary for
victory.
the other case: that say, when extreme clearsightedness present, the genius the actor
needful well tremendous discipline self
? ? is
it of of
in
a a is it it of
In is In a
of in
it
as
isa isto
as
It
of
it
of
is
is a
it
to
as is of
it
in
ofinisof astoa
be in
in
to
its
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3OI
control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo crites; and then come princes, in whom their position
in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth.
The fundamental thought: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so
inexorably against perfect self-knowledge accurate self-classification, that one is very pro
bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to truth are perhaps something quite different and
only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness. )
378.
"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood":
insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg ment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be
lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the unreality of this popular "truthfulness. " There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people's exposing themselves with every word they say, is a piece of naivete? .
People say what they think, they are "truth
ful"; but only under certain circumstances: that is to say, provided they be understood (inter pares),
and understood with good will into the bargain (once more inter pares). One conceals one's self in the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have
and
? people
? ? ? 302
THE WILL TO POWER.
people think about him, but not what he thinks. ("The powerful man is always a liar. ")
379.
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con. cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values:--
(a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.
Only the most impersonal intellect ("the philosopher") can know the truth, "the true
things. "
(c) Genius, great men are great, because they
essence and nature
do not strive to further their own interests: the
? value man increases himself.
(d) Art the work subject"; misunderstanding
proportion effaces
the "pure free-willed "objectivity. "
(e) Happiness the object life: virtue means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation life by Scho
penhauer
gregarious
physics. *
moral one. Transference the standards into the realm meta
The "individual" lacks sense, he must there fore have his origin "the thing itself" (and the significance his existence must be shown
"error"); parents are only "accidental cause. "--The mistake on the part science
considering the individual the result all past life instead the epitome all past life, now becoming known,
? ? of
of
as
as
of
in
of of
of
is in
of
of
of an
as he
to be
(b)
in
of
is a
of as
as a
of
in of
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
38o.
3O3
1. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may present a proof of the moral valua tions:
(a) The decline of a people and corruption.
(b) The rise of a people and virtue.
(c) The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence. 2. Systematic falsification of great men, great
creators, and great periods. The desire is to make
faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas
carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immoral ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to
greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.
381.
A great lie in history; as if the corruption of
the Church were the cause of the Reformation |
This was only the pretext and self-deception of
the agitators--very strong needs were making
themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re quired a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre judices which is coincident with the emancipation
? ? ? ? 3O4
THE WILL TO POWER.
of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived
to set up the only moral value he honoured-- self-effacement, as the one condition of highest
intellectual
activity: "objective" contemplation.
"Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the will. . . .
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a
fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will, of morality and immorality, I know nothing about at all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than
the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type
of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good
copy--the standard of his worth lies without him. I value a man according to the quantum of power
and fullness of his will : not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con
sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous. . . . I
test the power of a will according to the amount
of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn
to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil
and pain of existence with the finger of reproach,
but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what the good man already does instinctively. . . .
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
305
He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a non plus
ultra. . . . Here intellectuality is placed much
lower than goodness; highest value (as art, for
instance) would lead and advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin ance of moral values.
Next Schopenhauer will now characterise
Kant: there was nothing Greek Kant; was
quite anti-historical (cf his attitude regard
the French Revolution) and moral fanatic (see Goethe's words concerning the radically evil
element human nature *). Saintliness also
? lurked somewhere his soul. criticism the saintly type.
Hegel's value: "Passion. "
require
Herbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man.
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --This doubtless reference
passage letter written by Goethe Herder, on 7th June 1793, from the camp Marienborn, near Mainz, which
the following words occur:--"Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem ein langes
AMenschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem Schand. fleck des radikalen Bo? sen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt werden den Saum zu kissen. "-- ("Kant, on the other hand, after had tried throughout his life keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre judices, wantonly dirtied the end with the disreputable
stain the 'radical evil' human nature, order that Christians too might lured into kissing hem. ") From
this passage will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view Kant namely, that he was Christian
disguise. VOL.
? ? U
in in
its
in
of I.
to
in a
it of
be
; it
at
in
be to
in a
to he
its
. era I
in
is I
he to a up
in
of
in
to
to
a a to
.
in to,
? 306
THE WILL TO POWER.
philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of value in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and
technology must be shown to be morally valuable and morally conditioned, in its aim, means, and
result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's question concerning civilisation, "Will it make man grow
better? "--a funny question, for the reverse is
obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of civilisation.
383.
Religious morality. --Passion, great desire; the passions of power, love, revenge, and property:
the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and "purify" the soul by driving them out of it.
The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they are evil and ought to be
This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out. " In this particular case when, with that "bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a parti cular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man's character. . . . And the same
applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for
Fundamental instinct of all
? condemned.
Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a good man. . . .
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
307
their extirpation. conclusion always only
the emasculated man good man.
Instead making use and economising
the great sources passion, those torrents the
dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted
soul which are often
and most corrupted mental attitudes--would
fain make them dry up.
384.
-
Conquest over the passions 3-No, not
to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation.
this
? They must
end may
deal (not
etc. ). At length we should trust them enough
enlisted our service and this necessary tyrannise them good
individuals, but communities, races,
restore their freedom them: they love like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.
385.
Intolerance the part morality sign
man's weakness: he frightened his own "immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts,
because he does not yet know how use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power lack ing that might become master here.
386.
There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be
? ? . ofto
. of is
:
of
of is:
on
is to of
in
of
is Its
isa if us ato
of
to is
as
it
as be be
of of so
to
a of
? THE WILL TO POWER.
308
a desirable thing: they still believe to-day in rebus moralibus, that the "good man" alone and
nothing else than the "good man" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's evolution will
be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts
highest
degree an uneconomical thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity,
and it is nothing more than the expression of the
agreeableness which the "good man" creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, -
he gives what one is able to take).
With a more educated eye one learns to desire
exactly the reverse -- that is to say, an ever greater dominion of evil, man's gradual emancipa
tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest
forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the
passions
The whole idea of the hierarchy of the passions:
as if the only right and normal thing were to be
led by reason--whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as
their end is concerned, nothing more than desires for pleasure. . . . .
Passion is deprived of dignity (1)
only manifested itself an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the motive force,
should be directed). This is in the
? in one's service.
387.
? ? in
its
as if it
-
-
---* - ***- -
=-
-------------"
-
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
309
(2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose--merely at pleasure. . . .
The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as
if the latter were an independent entity, and not
a state of relationship between all the various | passions and desires; and as though every passion : did not possess its quantum of reason. . . .
388.
How it was that, under the pressure of the
dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality, it was precisely the passions--love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were
necessarily misunderstood:
It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of
its power flow over and bestow, its instinctive feeling ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love
and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism surely do
? obtrude, and the inner right everything. The the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and one does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing give, and perfectly useless
the desire be master,
certainty that one has opposite views, according
stretch out one's hand either support others.
protect
How was possible transform these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be
value which directed against himself, that he could sacrifice himself for another self! the
? ? of
to
it,
is
. .
to
to
O so
or
as
it
to
to
to to
is to
to
it
to
as
if to
a
of
? 3IO
THE WILL TO POWER.
psychological baseness and falseness which hither to has laid down the law in the Church and in
Church-infected philosophy !
If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do
is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought
not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justifi
cation,
commanded it. --From this it follows that all the
and it is found in the fact that God
natural instincts of man (to love, etc. ) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he
re-acquires a right to them only after having
denied them as an obedient worshipper of God. . . . Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity,
went as far as this ! let any one examine his relations to his sister. "Not to make one's self
loved," seemed Christian to him,
389.
Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this ("an ideal") makes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The "egoists. ")
The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in
The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, the creature who is an
instrument).
Pangs
? La Rochefoucauld)--inner en
Europe (Pascal,
feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man.
of conscience associated with all that
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3II
is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness--the gloominess of the world from
the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men
Gregarious
transferred to philosophy and religion.
consciousness and timorousness
Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish action out of consideration |
390.
My ultimate conclusion that the real man represents much higher value than the "de sirable" man any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" regard man kind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means which particular kind man has sought establish his measures preservation and growth law for all; that every "desideratum of this kind which has been made
dominate has reduced man's worth, his strength, and his trust the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals desire;
that man's ability fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately do justice the
actual, not merely the "desirable," worth man; that, up the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and the world, the poisonous fumes which have
hung over reality, and which have seduced men yearn for nonentity.
? ? ? . . .
to
as a
a
to
of
to
to
in" of
to
of
is, in
a to
of
of
to
of
to
of a
to
i
? 312
THE WILL TO POWER.
D. A Criticism of the Words :
Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.
39 I.
The standard according to which the value o moral valuations is to be determined.
The fundamental fact that has been overlooked The contradiction between "becoming mor
moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.
Homo natura : The "will to power. "
392.
Moral values regarded as values of appearanc and compared with physiological values.
393.
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde
the ultimate "desiderata" concerning men, fo instance, have never been regarded as problem:
by philosophers. They always postulate "improvement" of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had beer helped over the note of interrogation following the question, why necessarily "improve"? To what extent is it desirable that man should be more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happieri
Granting that nobody yet knows the "wherefore? ' of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--
? the
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I3
who knows? --perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? Dubito:
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten
ment? . . . And suppose one will have happiness;
maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit. "
394.
The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called moral improvement.
We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already--that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
"the older man. " . . . The man's aspect is altered, but not his actual nature. . . . It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested,
? ? ? ? 314
THE WILL TO POWER.
nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per
form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
--starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can
not be undone. Because some one forgets some thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven,'
or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church
abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
? meanwhile canonises the man who
The Church believes things that do not
exist, believes "Souls"; believes "influences" that do not exist--in divine in
performed
? ? it. it
in
in it
in
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I 5
fluences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words,
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.
395.
"Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in one might be
allowed ask whether there not perhaps
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded whole, could not the
"improvement mankind"--that say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded the result
long course secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Euro peans" "better"? Or, put into other words,
wherever history shows "man" state particular glory and power, his type always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares
to which it lends an
? not our modern soft-hearted
which could be likened that the Chinese, perhaps expression physiological deteriora tion cannot be denied, for instance, that
European morality,
? ? is a of
is to
us
of a to
? . . .
an
to
It
of
of
of in
as
is it,
of
isa a
as
? 316
THE WILL TO POWER.
little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which it seems otherwise, all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro position: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well. " A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro.
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving and the increased "civilisation" of man? Noth
ing would then be more expensive than virtue:
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital : and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody
else's nurse. " Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger | So few "actions"
mained fresh the memory men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
the deepest sense the word?
? which would make life on earth worth
Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not the great things and deeds which have re
living
? ? in
all
in of
. . .
of
--
-
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
396.
317
? The priests--and with them the half-priests or
philosophers of all ages--have always called that
doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--
that is to say, tended to "improve. " In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and
miracle-worker who, because he had tried a
certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no
poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them. "--
that is to say, "by our truths. " This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They
have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits")
pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all
other forms of proof. "That which makes good
must be good; that which is good cannot lie"-- these are their inexorable conclusions--"that
which bears good fruit must consequently be
true;
false step, a vice can refute. . . . This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and
behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis
covered anything more interesting than spying out
the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove their Christianity by looking about for the world's
? there is no other criterion of truth.
