If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life.
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life.
Summa Theologica
Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than
God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it
would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately
divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of
the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good
of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in
so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love
on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature
of anyone to love God, except from this---that everything is dependent
on that good which is God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as
to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from
Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural
love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all
with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are
one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they
are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal
good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
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Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by
God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not
created by God.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16)
that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity. "
But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50],
A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels
are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the
angels have no active cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made. "
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
His own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire.
Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the
angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of
things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light. " And
they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of
corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had
been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which
they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no
'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as
produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality
to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
substance.
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning. " But, as was shown above [536](A[1]),
the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He
made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Reply to Objection 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God
produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude
that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above
([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1] ), God's will does not act by
necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He
willed, and when He willed.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure
of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and
which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by
the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of
truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was
bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
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Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God? " Damascene also says (De
Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all
creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised
the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making
thereof. "
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the
Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from
eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic
nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the
corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one
corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the
production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal
nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature
to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the
good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the
whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are
perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic
creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not
to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory
Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight
that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the
case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of
the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe.
Hence the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while
the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve
creation of the universe.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures. "
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Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that
the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it
would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is
contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the
sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made. "
I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature,
and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the
angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over
all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or
whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is
the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold
heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven. "
Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not
as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that
they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly
means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing
to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted
and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the
highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as
having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal
heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the
sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some
manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points
of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in
the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess
the excellence they have. " Therefore the angels were created in
beatitude.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was
made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in
time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and
incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its
beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in
beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v,
5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six
days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have
existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his
exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge,
according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore
straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the
Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word.
Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very
beginning of their creation.
On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the
nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon
as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore
the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.
I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its
ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of
rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can
procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called
beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's
ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby
in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is
God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward
to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is. " This is beyond
the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above ([541]Q[12],
A[4]).
So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude,
which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created
already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by
any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above
([542]Q[58], AA[3] ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to
his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of
their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of
nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end;
and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural
perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning
of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,
4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place
at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of
the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic
creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its
nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by
its operation.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word;
the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a
natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude
thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby
he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the
angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,
and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge
of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his
creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became
blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their
morning knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order
to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he
loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said ([543]Q[60],
A[5]). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks.
Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had
no need of grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for
grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to
you. " But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare
ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore
the angel did not need grace to turn to God.
On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
beatitude.
If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
(Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting. "
I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to
God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above
([544]Q[60], A[2]) the natural movement of the will is the principle of
all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed
towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is
anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it,
unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear
that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate
fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire;
consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is
moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.
Now it was shown above ([545]Q[12], AA[4],5), when we were treating of
God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate
beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of
every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the
movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be
moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of
grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own
will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is
the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to
God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power;
and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the
natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some
help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to
fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to
the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of
the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself,
can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the
weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount
upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man,
both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance
from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is
difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.
Reply to Objection 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be
termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God.
The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature
enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate
grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits
beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the
principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes
himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is
required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself,
according to Lam 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be
converted. " Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to
infinity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was
first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it
received its form, and was then called "light. " But such formation
comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
Objection 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God.
If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever
have turned away from God.
Objection 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But
the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems
that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created
in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were
beatified.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the
good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will,
that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same
time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them? "
I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point,
some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state,
while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems
more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that
they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things
which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine
Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the
first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now
it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to
beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect;
hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the "seed" of God. As, then, in
Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all
natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally
created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in
grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be
understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so
the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or
else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so
it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen.
ad lit. i, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of
the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to
be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can
fail to make use of it, and can sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes
midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is
the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands
not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the
principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be
given straightway with nature.
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Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
action was not meritorious for him.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But
it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
thereby merit beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he
did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby
to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be
meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower
angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the
distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of the
angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man. " Therefore
the same is the case with the angel.
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is evident
from what has gone before ([546]AA[1],2; [547]Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate
beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains,
then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.
And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit,
there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as
also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had
glory.
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious;
and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even
this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause
of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming
from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it
cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the
principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of
enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy
beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously
does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but
from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural
movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of
grace.
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to
do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one
act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
Objection 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant,
from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to
be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of
a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he
merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
first instant.
Objection 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote
from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between.
Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in
order to reach beatitude.
On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints.
Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving
beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some
obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his
first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
only one meritorious act.
I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of
charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every
perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according
to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its
natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to
have it at once naturally, as was shown above [548](A[1]; [549]Q[58],
AA[3],4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural
perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after
merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel
and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude
by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was
beatified straightway after one act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate
perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to
man than to the angel for securing beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things;
hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken
except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace,
and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for
different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited
beatitude, and in another was beatified.
Reply to Objection 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to
attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval
as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
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Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their
natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends
on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.
Objection 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But
grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much
less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent.
ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures
and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with
greater gifts of grace. "
I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His
wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the
angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so
likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the
various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one
thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in
whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature,
were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing
happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to
the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that
the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and
glory.
Reply to Objection 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise
does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for
grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various
degrees of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the
creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it
seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.
Reply to Objection 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the
angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another
way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels.
Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
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Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done
away. " But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with
beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
knowledge and love cease.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But
the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love
to remain.
Objection 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts,
as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not
in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge
and love in the angels.
On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains.
But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection.
Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.
I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as
principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in
the act of beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the
one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In
like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains
to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his
own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient
of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
uncreated beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty
at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from
existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
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Whether a beatified angel can sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was
said above [550](A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a
beatified angel can sin.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
inclined towards good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to
be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the
holy angels that nature which cannot sin. " Therefore the holy angels
cannot sin.
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is,
because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence.
God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it
would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately
divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of
the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with
the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good
of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in
so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love
on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature
of anyone to love God, except from this---that everything is dependent
on that good which is God.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as
to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from
Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural
love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all
with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
Reply to Objection 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are
one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they
are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal
good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.
Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by
God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not
created by God.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16)
that if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has
being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity. "
But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50],
A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels
are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the
angels have no active cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made. "
I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing,
except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in
everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown
above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of
His own essence: while all other things have their existence by
participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what
exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire.
Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the
angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of
things, but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light. " And
they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of
corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as
yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had
been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal
nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which
they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.
Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no
'formal' cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as
produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality
to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire
substance.
From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning. " But, as was shown above [536](A[1]),
the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity.
Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary
must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He
made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had not been.
Reply to Objection 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God
produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude
that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above
([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1] ), God's will does not act by
necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He
willed, and when He willed.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure
of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and
which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by
the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of
truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was
bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not
follow that the angels existed from eternity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God? " Damascene also says (De
Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before all
creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised
the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making
thereof. "
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the
Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from
eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic
nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the
corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one
corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the
production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much
more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal
nature.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " Now, this would not be true if anything had been
created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before
corporeal nature.
I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in
the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature
to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the
good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the
whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works are
perfect," as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic
creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not
to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory
Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight
that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the
case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as Jerome says.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of
the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe.
Hence the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while
the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve
creation of the universe.
If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning,"
must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but
not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say
"Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that
the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.
Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it
would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is
contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the
sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).
On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual
firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor;
and which was filled with angels directly it was made. "
I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature,
and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the
angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over
all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or
whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is
the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: "Behold
heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven of heaven. "
Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not
as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that
they are by their power in touch with bodies.
Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly
means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing
to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted
and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the
highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as
having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal
heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the
sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some
manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE
ARTICLES)
In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points
of inquiry:
(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
(3) Were they created in grace?
(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?
(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?
(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in
the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess
the excellence they have. " Therefore the angels were created in
beatitude.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was
made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in
time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and
incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its
beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in
beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v,
5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six
days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have
existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his
exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge,
according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore
straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the
Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word.
Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very
beginning of their creation.
On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the
nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon
as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore
the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.
I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its
ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of
rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can
procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called
beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's
ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby
in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is
God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward
to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is. " This is beyond
the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above ([541]Q[12],
A[4]).
So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude,
which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created
already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by
any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above
([542]Q[58], AA[3] ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to
his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of
their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of
nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end;
and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural
perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning
of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,
4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place
at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of
the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic
creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its
nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by
its operation.
Reply to Objection 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word;
the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a
natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude
thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby
he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the
angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,
and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge
of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his
creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became
blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their
morning knowledge.
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Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order
to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he
loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said ([543]Q[60],
A[5]). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks.
Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had
no need of grace in order to turn to God.
Objection 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for
grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to
you. " But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare
ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore
the angel did not need grace to turn to God.
On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
beatitude.
If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it
would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
(Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting. "
I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to
God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above
([544]Q[60], A[2]) the natural movement of the will is the principle of
all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is directed
towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is
anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it,
unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear
that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate
fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire;
consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is
moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.
Now it was shown above ([545]Q[12], AA[4],5), when we were treating of
God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate
beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of
every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the
movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be
moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of
grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own
will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is
the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to
God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power;
and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the
natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some
help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to
fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to
the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of
the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself,
can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the
weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount
upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man,
both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance
from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is
difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.
Reply to Objection 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be
termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God.
The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature
enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate
grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits
beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the
principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes
himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is
required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself,
according to Lam 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be
converted. " Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to
infinity.
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Whether the angels were created in grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was
first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it
received its form, and was then called "light. " But such formation
comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
Objection 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God.
If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever
have turned away from God.
Objection 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But
the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems
that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created
in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were
beatified.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought the
good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will,
that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same
time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them? "
I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point,
some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state,
while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems
more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that
they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things
which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine
Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the
first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now
it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to
beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect;
hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the "seed" of God. As, then, in
Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all
natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally
created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in
grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be
understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so
the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or
else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so
it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen.
ad lit. i, 15).
Reply to Objection 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of
the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to
be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can
fail to make use of it, and can sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes
midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is
the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands
not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the
principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be
given straightway with nature.
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Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
action was not meritorious for him.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But
it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
thereby merit beatitude.
Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he
did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby
to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be
meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower
angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the
distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of the
angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man. " Therefore
the same is the case with the angel.
I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is evident
from what has gone before ([546]AA[1],2; [547]Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate
beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains,
then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.
And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit,
there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as
also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had
glory.
But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious;
and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even
this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause
of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming
from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it
cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the
principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of
enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy
beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.
Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously
does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but
from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural
movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of
grace.
The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
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Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to
do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one
act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
Objection 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant,
from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to
be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of
a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he
merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
first instant.
Objection 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote
from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between.
Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in
order to reach beatitude.
On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints.
Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving
beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some
obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his
first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
only one meritorious act.
I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of
charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every
perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according
to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its
natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to
have it at once naturally, as was shown above [548](A[1]; [549]Q[58],
AA[3],4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural
perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after
merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel
and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude
by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was
beatified straightway after one act of charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate
perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to
man than to the angel for securing beatitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things;
hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken
except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace,
and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for
different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited
beatitude, and in another was beatified.
Reply to Objection 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to
attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval
as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
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Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their
natural gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends
on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.
Objection 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But
grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much
less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural
gifts.
Objection 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent.
ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures
and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with
greater gifts of grace. "
I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His
wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the
angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so
likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the
various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one
thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in
whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature,
were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing
happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to
the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that
the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and
glory.
Reply to Objection 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise
does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for
grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various
degrees of grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the
creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it
seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.
Reply to Objection 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the
angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another
way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels.
Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
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Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done
away. " But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with
beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
knowledge and love cease.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But
the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love
to remain.
Objection 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts,
as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not
in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge
and love in the angels.
On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains.
But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection.
Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.
I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as
principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in
the act of beatitude.
Reply to Objection 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the
one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In
like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains
to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his
own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient
of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
uncreated beatitude.
Reply to Objection 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty
at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from
existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
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Whether a beatified angel can sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was
said above [550](A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a
beatified angel can sin.
Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
inclined towards good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to
be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the
holy angels that nature which cannot sin. " Therefore the holy angels
cannot sin.
I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is,
because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence.
