For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim.
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim.
Summa Theologica
But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that
which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the
same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is
of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered
as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of
predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of
predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there
is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of
predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God
produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was
above shown ([184]Q[22], A[3]). Wherefore, that which flows from
free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the
effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one
way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of
predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a
subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final
cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as
its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the
matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on
account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit
glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered
in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us;
because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all
included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for
grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help,
according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted. " Yet predestination has in this way,
in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards
which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and
from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the
cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as
was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness
of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already
stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and
reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus
He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the
divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be
manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in
themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for
the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.
That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows
some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said
above ([185]Q[22], A[2]). Let us then consider the whole of the human
race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His
goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of
His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the
reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle
refers, saying (Rom. 9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath
[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,
endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.
2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,
but some unto dishonor. " Yet why He chooses some for glory, and
reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan. ): "Why He draws one, and another
He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err. " Thus
too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary
matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God
from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.
Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from
the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part
of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some
stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this
account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? "
(Mat. 20:14,15).
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Whether predestination is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on
the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
(Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not
receive, unless this one were to lose it. " Hence the crown which is the
effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore
predestination cannot be certain.
Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e. g. Peter---may sin
and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the
effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now.
But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not
certain.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed. "
I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above
[186](A[1]), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all
things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
providence is infallible, as was shown above ([187]Q[22], A[4]). So
also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.
Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will
([188]Q[14], A[13]; [189]Q[19], A[4]) must also be taken into
consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things,
although they themselves are most certain and infallible.
Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in
two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his
crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain
way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another
person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's
place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others;
according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable,
and make others to stand in their stead. " Thus men are substituted in
the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews.
He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the
good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good
whether done by himself or by others.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is
predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not
possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is
predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall
short of its effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as
stated above [190](A[4]): and the fact that God wills any created thing
is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the
immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so
the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say
that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated,
taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can
predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is
not destroyed.
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Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not
certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it
seems; for it is written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number
many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who
belong to Him. " Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
Objection 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
by God cannot be certain.
Objection 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those
of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved
than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: "For wide is the
gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are
who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that
leadeth to life; and few there are who find it! " Therefore the number
of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of
the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
diminished. "
I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said
that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say
that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not
however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of
predestination; of which we spoke above [191](A[6]). Therefore we must
say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only
formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the
number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason
of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be
saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and
determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that
every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has
been said above when we treated of the infinite ([192]Q[7], AA[2],3).
Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out
some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very
nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things
which are required not principally, but only on account of something
else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts
and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other
thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of
a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make
in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does
not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses
just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the
wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole
universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of
the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential
parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been
ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many
elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo
corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the
universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number
of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the
universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain
to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate
end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only
by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It
is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for
whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the
missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis. ']"
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as
applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to
present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished,
but not the number of the predestined.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must
be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God
the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal
parts to the good of the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common
state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear
that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance
of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be
half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of
things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest.
Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is
deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are
saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the
mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which
very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature
fall short.
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Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since
the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause
anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered
by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account
of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg. : 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord? '] Or who hath been
His counsellor? " (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be
hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
it cannot be furthered by anything.
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would
not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such
a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under
the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those
of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would
not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good
works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most
certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by
good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways;
in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped
thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we
are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? " In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are
God's co-adjutors. " Nor is this on account of any defect in the power
of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the
beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may
communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the
first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]),
indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be
furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
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THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
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Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i. e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the
book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to
each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory. " But divine
energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine
power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if
the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be
a book of death, as there is a book of life.
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of
God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew. "
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to
possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined
is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be
written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart. "
For things are written down in material books to help the memory.
Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life.
For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God
standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His. "
Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses.
In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus
we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and
this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old
and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done,
and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his
deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the
names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the
art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
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Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the
life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore
the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
regard to the life of the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? " (Jn. 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination,
as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the
life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are
not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book
of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again
that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier
is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since
this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the
life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above
([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life
regards the life of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of
glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election,
and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is
chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end,
but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be
chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is
directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to
obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.
Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
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Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life. " But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in
a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it
becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life,
inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the
present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident,
either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that
state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus
a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of
the living. " But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is
placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that
shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is
promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men),
it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out,
of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man,
but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription
of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two
sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for
eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed
by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it
through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal
life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in
reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those,
however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine
predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book
of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to
have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these
latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting
out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God
knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not
ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the
book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were
any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in
themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting
out of the book of life refers.
Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of
the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein
anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in
the knowledge of God, although not anew.
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THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
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Whether there is power in God?
Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and
action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better
than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the
divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there
is no power in God.
Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19],
A[4]) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the
cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore,
to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is
pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be
an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the
other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active
power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else;
whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something
else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore,
that in God there is active power in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is
founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but
passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as
it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be
nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God
nobler than His power.
Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself;
except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the
divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists
in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action,
or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle
of an effect.
Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something
really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the
knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as
the cause precedes the operation and effect.
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Whether the power of God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.
Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect;
otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were
infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if
the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one. " Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power
to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine
essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity
in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not
follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly
manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is
not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal
agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is
clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him
either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5];
[208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than
His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of
God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even
if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be
ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards
an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered
toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the
effect produced by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a
body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can
move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The
reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent;
wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more
quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power
were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to
move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal
agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be
manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since
it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
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Whether God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg. : 'Hath not God', etc. ] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. " Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God. "
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the
same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is
of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered
as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of
predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of
predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there
is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of
predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God
produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was
above shown ([184]Q[22], A[3]). Wherefore, that which flows from
free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the
effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light---in one
way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of
predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a
subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final
cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as
its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the
matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on
account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit
glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered
in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us;
because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all
included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for
grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help,
according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted. " Yet predestination has in this way,
in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards
which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and
from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the
cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as
was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness
of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already
stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and
reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus
He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the
divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be
manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in
themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for
the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.
That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows
some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said
above ([185]Q[22], A[2]). Let us then consider the whole of the human
race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His
goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of
His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the
reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle
refers, saying (Rom. 9:22,23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath
[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,
endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.
2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,
but some unto dishonor. " Yet why He chooses some for glory, and
reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan. ): "Why He draws one, and another
He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err. " Thus
too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary
matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God
from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.
Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from
the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part
of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some
stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this
account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? "
(Mat. 20:14,15).
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Whether predestination is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on
the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,"
(Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not
receive, unless this one were to lose it. " Hence the crown which is the
effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore
predestination cannot be certain.
Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e. g. Peter---may sin
and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the
effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now.
But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore
now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not
certain.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed. "
I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above
[186](A[1]), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all
things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
providence is infallible, as was shown above ([187]Q[22], A[4]). So
also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.
Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will
([188]Q[14], A[13]; [189]Q[19], A[4]) must also be taken into
consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things,
although they themselves are most certain and infallible.
Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in
two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his
crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain
way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another
person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's
place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others;
according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable,
and make others to stand in their stead. " Thus men are substituted in
the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews.
He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives
the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the
good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good
whether done by himself or by others.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is
predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not
possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is
predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall
short of its effect.
Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as
stated above [190](A[4]): and the fact that God wills any created thing
is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the
immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so
the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say
that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated,
taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can
predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is
not destroyed.
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Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not
certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it
seems; for it is written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number
many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who
belong to Him. " Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.
Objection 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
by God cannot be certain.
Objection 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those
of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved
than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: "For wide is the
gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are
who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that
leadeth to life; and few there are who find it! " Therefore the number
of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of
the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
diminished. "
I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said
that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say
that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not
however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of
predestination; of which we spoke above [191](A[6]). Therefore we must
say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only
formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the
number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason
of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be
saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and
determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that
every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has
been said above when we treated of the infinite ([192]Q[7], AA[2],3).
Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out
some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very
nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things
which are required not principally, but only on account of something
else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts
and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other
thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of
a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make
in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does
not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses
just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the
wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole
universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of
the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential
parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been
ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many
elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo
corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the
universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species
is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number
of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the
universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain
to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate
end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only
by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It
is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for
whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the
missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis. ']"
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as
applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to
present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished,
but not the number of the predestined.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must
be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God
the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal
parts to the good of the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common
state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear
that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance
of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be
half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of
things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest.
Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is
deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are
saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the
mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which
very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature
fall short.
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Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since
the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause
anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered
by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account
of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg. : 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord? '] Or who hath been
His counsellor? " (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be
hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
it cannot be furthered by anything.
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would
not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such
a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under
the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those
of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would
not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good
works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most
certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by
good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways;
in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped
thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we
are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? " In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are
God's co-adjutors. " Nor is this on account of any defect in the power
of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the
beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may
communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the
first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]),
indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be
furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
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THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
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Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i. e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the
book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to
each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory. " But divine
energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine
power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if
the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be
a book of death, as there is a book of life.
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of
God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew. "
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to
possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined
is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be
written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart. "
For things are written down in material books to help the memory.
Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life.
For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God
standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His. "
Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses.
In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus
we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and
this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old
and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done,
and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his
deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the
names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the
art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
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Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the
life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore
the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
regard to the life of the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? " (Jn. 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination,
as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the
life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are
not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book
of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again
that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier
is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since
this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the
life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above
([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life
regards the life of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of
glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election,
and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is
chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end,
but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be
chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is
directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to
obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.
Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
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Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life. " But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in
a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it
becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life,
inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the
present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident,
either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that
state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus
a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of
the living. " But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is
placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that
shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is
promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men),
it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out,
of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man,
but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription
of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two
sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for
eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed
by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it
through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal
life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in
reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those,
however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine
predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book
of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to
have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these
latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting
out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God
knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not
ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the
book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were
any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in
themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting
out of the book of life refers.
Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of
the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein
anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in
the knowledge of God, although not anew.
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THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
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Whether there is power in God?
Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and
action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better
than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the
divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there
is no power in God.
Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19],
A[4]) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the
cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore,
to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is
pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be
an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the
other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active
power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else;
whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something
else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore,
that in God there is active power in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is
founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but
passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as
it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be
nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God
nobler than His power.
Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself;
except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the
divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists
in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action,
or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle
of an effect.
Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something
really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the
knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as
the cause precedes the operation and effect.
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Whether the power of God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.
Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect;
otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were
infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if
the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one. " Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power
to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine
essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity
in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not
follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly
manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is
not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal
agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is
clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him
either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5];
[208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than
His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of
God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even
if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be
ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards
an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered
toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the
effect produced by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a
body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can
move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The
reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent;
wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more
quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power
were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to
move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal
agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be
manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since
it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
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Whether God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg. : 'Hath not God', etc. ] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. " Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God. "
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
