Will anyone speak of an
unconscious
here?
Sartre - BeingAndNothingness - Chapter 2 - On Lying
?
CHAPTER TWO
Bad Faith
I. BAD FAITH AND FALSEHOOD
THE human being is not only the being by whom negatites are di:>- closed in the world; he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself. In our Introduction we defined consciousness as "a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself. " But now that we have eX:lmined the meaning of "the question," we can at present also write the formula thus: "Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingaess of its being. " In a prohibition or a veto, for example, the human being denies a future transcendence. But this negation is not explicative. My consciousness is not restricted to envisioning a negatite. It constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility. For that reason it must arise in the world as a Not; it is as a Not that the slave first apprehends the master,'or that the prisoner who is trying to escape sees the guard who is watching him. There are even men (e. g. , caretakers, overseers, gaolers,) whose social reality is uniquely that of the Not, who will live and die, having forever been only a Not upon the earth. Others so as to make the Not a part of their very subjectivity, establish their human personality as a perpetual negation. This is the meaning and function of what Scheler calls "the man of resentment"-in reality, the Not. But there exist more subtle behaviors, the description of which will lead us further into the inwardness of consciousness. Irony is one of these. In irony a man annihilates what he posits,within one and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to be believed; he affirms to deny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive object but it has no being other than its nothingness. Thus attitudes of negation toward the self permit us to raise a new ques- tion: What are we to say is the being of man who has the possibility of denying himself? But it is out of the question to discuss the attitude of
"self-negation" in its universality. The kinds of behavior which can be 47
. . . .
? 48 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
ranked under this heading are too diverse; we risk retaining only the ab- stract form of them. It is best to choose and to examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that con- sciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitide, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise foi).
Frequently this is identified with falsehood. W e say indifferently of a person that he shows signs of bad faith or that he lies to himself. We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general. Lying is a negative atti- tude, we will agree to that. But this negation does not bear on conscious- ness itself; it aims only anhe transcendent. The essence of the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession,of the truth which he is hiding. A man does not lie about what he is ignorant of; he does not lie when he spreads an error of which he himself is the dupe; he does not lie when he is mistaken. The ideal description of the liar would be a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such. Now this doubly negative atti- tude rests On the transcendent; the fact expressed is transcendent since it does not exist, and the original negation rests on a truth; that is, on a particular type of transcendence. As for the inner negation which I effect correlatively with the affirmation for myself of the truth, this rests on words; that is, on an event in the world. Furthermore the inner dis- position of the liar is positive; it could be the object of an affirmative judgment. The liar intends to deceive and he does not seek tq hide this intention from himself nor to disguise the translucency of consciousness; On the contrary, he recourse to it when there is a question of deciding secondary behavior. It explicitly exercises a regulatory control over all attitudes. As for his flaunted intention of telling the truth ("I'd never want to deceive you! This is true! I swear itl")-all this, of course, is the object of an inner negation, but also it is not recognized by the liar as his intention. It is played, imitated, it is the intention of the character which he plays in the eyes of his questioner, but this character, precisely because he does not exist, is a transcendent. Thus the lie does not put into the play the inner structure of present consciousness; all the negations which con- stitute it bear on objects which by this fact are removed from conscious-
? lless. The lie then does not require special ontological foundation, and the explanations which the existence of negation in general requires are valid without cbange in the case of deceit. Of course we have described the ideal lie; doubtless it happens often enough that the liar is more or less the victim of his lie, that he half persuades himself of it. But these com- mon, popular forms of the lie are also degenerate aspects of it; they repre- sent intermediaries between falsehood and bad faith. The lie is a behavior of transcendence.
The lie is also a normal phenomenon of what Heidegger calls the "Mit-
? BAD FAITII
49
sein. "1 It presupposes my existence, the existence of the Other, my exist- ence for the Other, and the existence of the Other for me. Thus there is no difficulty in holding that the liar must make the project of the lie in entire clarity and that he must possess a complete comprehension of the lie and of the truth which he is altering. It is sufficient that an over-all opacity hide his intentions from the Other; it is sufficient that the Other can take the lie for truth. By the lie consciousness affirms that it
by nature as hidden from tIle OtIler; it utilizes for its own profit the on- tological duality of myself and myself in the eyes of the Other.
The situation can not be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleaSing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. This does not mean that it can not be conditioned by the Mit-sein like all other phenomena of human reality, but the IHit? sein can call forth bad faith only by presenting itself as a situation which bad faith permits surpassing; bad faith does not come from outside to lIll- man reality. One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. 'But consciousness affects itself with bad faith. 'I1lCre must be an original intention and a project of bad faith; this project im- plies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehen- sion (of) consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully-and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to re- establish a semblance of duality-but in the unitary structure of a single project. How then can the lie subsist if the duality which conditions it suppressed?
To this difficulty is added another which is derived from the total trans- lucency of consciousness. That which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being of consciousness is conscious- ness of being. It appears then that I must be in good faith, at least to the extent that I am conscious of my bad faith. But then this whole psychic system is annihilated. We must agree in fact that if I deliberately and cynically attempt to lie tomyself, I fail completely in this undertaking;
the lie falls back and collapses beneath my look; it is ruined from behind by the very consciousness of lying to myself which pitilessly constitutes
1 A "being-with" others in the world. Tr.
? 50 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
itself well within my project as its very condition. W e have here an evanes- cent phenomenon which exists only in and through its own differentiation. To be sure, these phenomena are frequent and we shall see that there is in fact an "evanescence" of bad faith, which, it is evident, vacillates con- tinually between good faith and cynicism: Even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious, and though it belongs to the kind of psychic structures which we might call "metastablc,"2 it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It can even be the normal aspect of life for a very great number of people. A person can live in bad faith, which does not mean that he does not have awakenings to cynicism or to
, good faith, but which implies a constant and particular style of life. Our embarrassment then appears extreme since we can neither reject nor com- prehend bad faith.
To escape from these difficulties people gladly have recourse to the unconscious. In the psychoanalytical interpretation, for example, they use the hypothesis of a censor, conceived as a line of demarcation with customs, passport division, currency control, etc. , to reestablish the duality of the deceiver and the deceived. Here instinct or, if you prefer, original drives and complexes of drives constituted by our individual history, make up reality. It is neither true nor false since it does not exist for itself. It simply is, exactly like this table, which is neither true nor false in itself but
simply real. As for the conscious symbols of the instinct, this interpretation takes them not for appearances but for real psychic facts. Fear, forgetting, dreams exist really in the capacity of concrete facts of consciousness in the same way as the words and the attitudes of the liar are concrete, really existing patterns of behavior. The subject has the same relation to these phenomena as the deceived to the behavior of the deceiver. He estab. lishes them in their reality and must interpret them. There is a truth in the activities of the deceiver; if the deceived could reattach them to the situation where the deceiver establishes himself and to his project of the lie, they would become integral parts of truth, by virtue of being lying conduct. Similarly there is a truth in the symbolic acts; it is what the psychoanalyst discovers when he reattaches them to the historical situa- tion of the patient, to the unconscious complexes which they express, to the blocking of the censor. Thus the subject deceives himself about the meaning of his conduct, he apprehends it in its concrete existence but not in its truth, simply because he cannot derive it from an original situation
and from a psychic constitution which remain alien to him.
By the distinction between the "id" and the "ego," Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I am the ego but I am not the id. I hold no privi- leged position in relation to my unconscious psyche. I am my own psychic phenomena in so far as I establish them in their conscious reality. For
2 Sartre's own word, meaning subject to sudden changes or Tr.
. . . . . . -
? BAD FAITH 51
example I am the impulse to steal this or that book from this bookstall. I am an integral part of the impulse; I bring it to light and I determine myself hand-in-hand with it to commit the theft. But I am not those psy- chic facts, in so far as I receive them passively and am obliged to resort to hypotheses about their origin and true meaning, just as the scholar makes conjectures about the nature and essence of an external phenome- non. This theft, for example, which I interpret as an immediate impulse determined by the rarity, the interest, or the of the volume whicl\ I am going to steal-it is in truth a process derived from self-punishment, which is attached more or less directly to an Oedipus complex. The im- pulse toward the theft contains a truth which can be reached only by more or less probable hypotheses. The criterion of this truth wiII be the number of conscious psychic facts which it explains; from a more pragmatic point of view it w:Jl be also the success of the psychiatric cure which it allows. Finally the discovery of this truth wiII necessitate the cooperation of the psychoanalyst, who appears as the . mediator between my unconscious . drives and my conscious life. The Other appears as being able to effect the synthesis between the unconscious thesis and the conscious antithesis. I can know myself only through the mediation of the other, which means that I stand in relation to my "id," in the position of the Otller. If I have a little knowledge of psychoanalysis, I can, under circumstances particularly favorable, try to psychoanalyze myself. But this attempt can succeed only if I distrust every kind of intuition, only if I apply to my case from the out- side, abstract schemes and rules already learned. As for the results, whether they are obtained by my efforts alone or with the cooperaticm of a techni- cian, theywiII never have the certainty which intuition confers; they will possess simply the always increasing probability of scientific hypotheses. The hypothesis of the Oedipus complex, like the atomic theory, is nothing but an "experimental idea;" as Pierce said, it is not to be distinguished from the totality of experiences which it allows to be realized and the re- sults which it enables us to foresee. Thus psychoanalysis substitutes for the notion of bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar; it allows me to under- stand how it is possible for me to be lied to without lying to myself since it places me in the same relation to myself that the Other is in respect to me; it replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the essential condi- tion of the lie, by that of? the "id" and the "ego. " It introduces into my subjectivity the deepest intersubjective structure of the Mit-sein. Can this explanation satisfy us?
Considered more closely the psychoanalytic theory is not as simple as it first appears. It is not accurate to hold that the "id" is presented as a thing in relation to the hypothesis of the psychoanalyst, for a thing is indifferent to the conjectures which we make concerning it, while the "id" on the contrary is sensitive to them when we approach the truth. Freud in fact reports resistance when at the end of the first period the doctor is
\
!
? BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
approaching the truth. 111is resistance is objective behavior apprehended from without: the patient shows defiance, refuses to speak, gives fantastic accounts of his dreams, sometimes even removes himself completely from thc psychoanalytic treatment. It is a fair question to ask what part of him- sclf can thus resist. It can not be the "Ego," envisaged as. a psychic totality of the facts of consciousness; this could not suspect that the psychiatrist is approaching the end since the ego's relation to the meaning of its own rcactions is exactly like that of the psychiatrist, himself. At the very most it is possible for the ego to appreciate objectively the degree of probability in the hypotheses set forth, as a witness of the psychoanalysis might be able to do, according to the number of subjective facts which they explain. Furthermore, this probabilitywould appear to the ego to border on cer- tainty, which he could not take offence at since most of the time it is he who by a conscious decision is in pursuit of the psychoanalytic therapy. Are we to say that the patient is disturbed by the daily revelations which the psychoanalyst makes to him and that he seeks to remove himself, at the same time pretending in his own eyes to wish to continue the treatment? In- this case it is no longer possible to resort to tIle unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness, with all its contradictions. But this is not the way that the psychoanalyst means to explain this resistance; for him it is secret and deep, it comes from afar; it has its roots in the very thing which the psychoanalyst is trying to make clear.
Furthermore it is equally impossible to explain the resistance as emanat- ing from the complex which the psychoanalyst wishes to bring to light. The complex as such is rather the collaborator of the psychoanalyst since it aims at expressing itself in clear consciousness, since it plays tricks on the ccnsor and seeks to elude it. The only level on which we can locate the refusal of the subject is that of the censor. It alone can comprehend the questions or the revelations of the psychoanalyst? as approaching more or less ncar to the real drives which it strives to repress-it alone because it alone knows what it is repressing.
If we reject the language and the materialistic mythology of psycho- analysis, we perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with dis- cernment must know what it is repressing. In fact if we abandon all the metaphors representing the repression as the impact of blind forces, we are compelled to admit that the censor must choose and in order to choose must be aware of so doing. How could it happen otllerwise that the cen- sor allows lawful sexual impulses to pass through, that it permits needs
(hunger, thirst, sleep) to be expressed in clear consciousness? And how are we to explain that it can relax its surveillance, that it can even be de- ceived by the disguises of the instinct? But it is not sufficient that it discern the condemned drives; it must also apprehend them as to be repressed, which implies in . it at the very least an awareness of its activity. In a word, how could the censor discern the impulses needing to be repressed without
? BAD FAITII
53
being conscious of discerning them? How can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself? To know is to know that one knows, said Alain. Let us say rather: All knowing is consciousness of knowing. Thus the resist- ance of the patient implies on the level of the censor an awareness of the thing repressed as such, a comprehension of the end toward which the questions of the psychoanalyst are leading, and an act of synthetic connec- tion by which it compares the truth of the repressed complex to the psy- choanalytic hypothesis which aims at it. These various operations in their turn imply that the censor is conscious (of) itself. But what type of self- consciousness can the censor have? It must be the consciousness (of) be- ing conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order not be
conscious of it. What does this mean if not that the censor is in bad faith? Psychoanalysis has not gained anything for us since in order to overcome bad faith, it has established between the unconscious and consciousness an autonomous consciousness in bad faith. The effort to establish a veritable duality and even a trinity (? s, lch, Ueberich expressing themselves through the censor) has resulted in a mere verbal terminology. The very es- sence of the reflexive idea of hiding something from oneself implies the unity of one and the same psychic mechanism and consequently a double activity in the heart of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain and 10-
eate the thing to be concealed and on the other hand to repress and dis- guise it. Each of the two aspects of this activity is complementary to the other; that is, it implies the other in its being. By separating consciousness from the unconscious by means of the censor, psychoanalysis has not succeeded in dissociating the two phases of the act, since the libido is a blind conatus toward conscious expression and since the conscious phe- nomenon is a passive, faked result. Psychoanalysis has merely localized this double activity of repulsion and attraction on the level of the censor.
Furthermore the problem still remains of accounting for the unity of the total phenomenon (repression of the drive which disguises itself and "passes" in symbolic form), to establish comprehensible connections a- mong its different phases. How can the repressed drive "disguise itself" if it does not include (1) the consciousness of being repressed, (2) the consciousness of having been pushed back because it is what it is, (3) a project of disguise? No mechanistic theory of condensation or of trans-
ference can explain these modifications by which the drive itself is affected, for the description of the process of disguise implies a veiled appeal to finality. And similarly how are we to account for the pleasure or the an- guish which accompanies the symbolic and conscious satisfaction of the drive if consciousness does not include-beyond the censor-an obscure comprehension of the end to be attained as simultaneously desired and forbidden. By rejecting the conscious unity of the psyche, Freud is obliged to imply everywhere a magic unity linking distant phenomena across obsta- cles, just as sympathetic magic unites the spellbound person and the wax
54
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
image fashioned in his likeness. The unconscious drive (Trieb) through magic is endowed with the character "repressed" or "condemned," which completely pervades it, colors it, and magically provokes its symbol- ism. Similarly the conscious phenomenon is entirely colored by its sym- bolic meaning although it can not apprehend this meaning by itself in clear consciousness.
Aside from its inferiority in principle, the explanation by magic does not avoid the coexistence-on the level of the unconscious, on that of the censor, and on that of consciousness-of two contradictory, complement- ary structures which reciprocally imply and destroy each other. Proponents of the theory have hypostasized and "reified" bad faith; they have not escaped it. This is what has inspired a Viennese psychiatrist, Steckel, to depart from the psychoanalytical tradition and to write in La femme frig- ide:s "Every time that I have been able to carry my investigations far enough, I have established that the crux of the psychosis was conscious. " In addition the cases which he reports in his work bear witness to a patho- logical bad faith which the Freudian doctrine can not account for. There is the question, for example, of women whom marital infidelity has made frigid; that is, they succeed in hiding from themselves not complexes deeply sunk in half physiological darkness, but acts of conduct which are objectively discoverable, which they can not fail to record at the moment when they perform them. Frequently in fact the husband re\'eals to Stec-
kel that his wife has given objective signs of pleasure, but the woman when questioned will fiercely deny them. Here we find a pattern ot distraction. Admissions which Steckel was able to draw out inform us that these patho- logically frigid women apply themselves to becoming distracted in advance from the pleasure which they dread; many for example at the time of the sexual act, turn their thoughts away toward their daily occupations, make up their household accounts. Will anyone speak of an unconscious here? Yet if the frigid woman thus distracts her consciousness from the pleasure which she experiences, it is by no means cynically and in full agreement with herself; it is in order to prove to herself that she is frigid. W e have in fact to deal with a phenomenon of bad faith since the efforts taken in order not to be present to the experienced pleasure imply the recognition that the pleasure is experienced; they imply it in order to deny it. But we are no longer on the ground of psychoanlysis. Thus on the one hand the explanation by means of the unconscious, due to the fact that it breaks the psychic unity, can not account for the facts which at fii"st sight it appeared to explain. And on the other hand, there exists an infinity of types of behavior in bad faith which explicitly reject this kind of explana- tion because their essence implies that they can appear only in the trans- lucency of consciousness. We find that the problem which we had at- tempted to resolve is still untouched.
'N. R. F.
----. . ,.
?
Will anyone speak of an unconscious here? Yet if the frigid woman thus distracts her consciousness from the pleasure which she experiences, it is by no means cynically and in full agreement with herself; it is in order to prove to herself that she is frigid. W e have in fact to deal with a phenomenon of bad faith since the efforts taken in order not to be present to the experienced pleasure imply the recognition that the pleasure is experienced; they imply it in order to deny it. But we are no longer on the ground of psychoanlysis. Thus on the one hand the explanation by means of the unconscious, due to the fact that it breaks the psychic unity, can not account for the facts which at fii"st sight it appeared to explain. And on the other hand, there exists an infinity of types of behavior in bad faith which explicitly reject this kind of explana- tion because their essence implies that they can appear only in the trans- lucency of consciousness. We find that the problem which we had at- tempted to resolve is still untouched.
'N. R. F.
----. . ,.
? ? BAD FAITII
55
II. PATIERNS OF BAD FAITII
IF we wish to get out of this difficulty, we should examine more closely the patterns of bad faith and attempt a description of them. This descrip- tion will permit us perhaps to fix more exactly the conditions for the possi- bility of bad faith; that is, to reply to the question we raised at the outset: "\Vhat must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith? "
Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out with a parti- cular man for the first time. She knows very well the intentions which the man who is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows also that it will be necessary sooner or later for her to make a decision. But she does not want to realize the urgency; she concerns herself only with what is respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion. She does not apprehend this conduct as an attempt to achieve what we call "the first approach;" that is, she does not want to see possibilities of temporal devel- opment which his conduct presents. She restricts this behavior to what is in the present; she does not wish to read in the phrases which he addresses to her anything other than their explicit meaning. If he says to her, "I find you so attractivel" she disarms this phrase of its sexual background; she attaches to the conversation and to the behavior of the speaker, the im-
mediate meanings, which she imagines as objective qualities. The man who is speaking to her appears to her sincere and respectful as the table is round or square, as the wall coloring is blue or gray. The qualities thus attached to the person she is listening to are in this way fixed in a permanence like that of things, which is no other than the projection of the strict present of the qualities into the temporal flux. This is because she does not quite know what she wants. She is profoundly aware of the desire which she inspires, but the desire cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her. Yet she would find no charm in a respect which would be only respect. In order to satisfy her, there must be a feeling which is addressed wholly to her personality-i. e. , to her full freedom-and which would be a recogni- tion of her freedom. But at the same time this feeling must be wholly de- sire; that is, it must address itself to her body as object. This time then she refuses to apprehend the desire for what it is; she does not even give it a name; she recognizes it only to the extent that it transcends itself toward admiration, esteem, respect and that it is wholly absorbed in the more refined forms which it produces, to the extent of no longer figuring any- more as a sort of warmth and density. But then suppose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks changing the situation by calling for an immediate decision. To leave the hand there is to consent in herself to flirt, to engage herself. To withdraw it is to break the troubled and un- stable harmony which gives the hour its charm. The aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible. W e know what happens next; the young woman leaves her hand there, but she does not notice that she
. ,.
? 56 / BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
is leaving it. She does not notice because it happens by chance that she is at this moment all intellect. She draws her companion up to the,most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect-a personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the" hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion-neither consenting nor resisting-a thing.
We shall say that this woman is in bad faith. But we see immediately that she uses various procedures in order to maintain herself in this bad faith. She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-itself. But she permits herself to enjoy his desire, to the extent that she will ap- prehend it as not being what it is, will recognize its transcendence, Finally while sensing profoundly the presence of her own body-to the degree of being disturbed perhaps-she realizes herself as not being her own body,
and she contemplates it as though from above as a passive object to which events can happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them because all its possibilities are outside of it. What unity do we find in these various aspects of bad faith? It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea, The basic concept which is thus engendered, utilizes the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcen- dence, These tw,o aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the Qne, he can find him- self abruptly faced with the other.
W e can find the prototype of formulae of bad faith in certain famous expressions which have been rightly conceived to produce their whole effect in a spirit of bad faith. Take for example the title of a work by Jacques Chardonne, Love Is Much More than Love. 4 We see here how
unity is established between present love in its facticity-"the contact of two skins," sensuality, egoism, Proust's mechanism of jealousy, Adler's battle of the sexes, etc. -and love as transcendence-Mauriac's "river of fire," the longing for the infinite, Plato's eros, Lawrence's deep cosmic intuition, etc. Here we leave facticity to find ourselves suddenly beyond the present and the factual condition of man, beyond the psychological, in the heart of metaphysics. On the other hand, the title of a play by Sar- ment, I Am Too Great for Myself/ which also presents characters in bad
4 L'amour, c'est beaucoup plus que 1'amour. II Je suis trap grand pour moi.
? BAD FAITH
57
faith, thrQws us first into full transcendence in order suddenly to imprison us within the narrow limits of our factual essence. We will discover this structure again in the famous sentence: "He has become what he was" or in its no less famous opposite: "Eternity at last changes each man into him- self. "6 It is well understood that these various formulae have only the appearance of bad faith; they have been conceived in this paradoxical form explicitly to shock the mind and discountenance it by an enigma. But it is precisely this appearance which is of concern to us. What counts here is that the formulae do not constitute new, solidly structured ideas; on the contrary, they are formed so as to remain in perpetual disintegration and so that we may slide at any time from naturalistic present to tran- scendence and vice versa.
W e can see the use which bad faith can make of these judgments which all aim at establishing that I am not what I am. If I were only what I am, I could, for example, seriously consider an adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be compelled to recognize the truth in it. But thanks to transcendence, I am not subject to all that I am. I do not even have to discuss the justice of the reproach. As Suzanne says to Figaro, "To prove that I am right would be to recognize that I can be wrong. " I am on a plane where no reproach can touch me since what I really am is my transcendence. I flee from myself, I escape myself, I leave my tattered garment in the hands of the fault-finder. But the ambiguity necessary for bad faith comes from the fact that I affirm here that I am my transcendence in the mode of being of a thing. It is only thus, in fact, that I can feel that I escape all reproaches. It is in the sense that our young woman purifies the desire of anything humiliating by being willing to consider it only as pure transcendence, which she avoids even naming. But hwersely "I Am Too Great for Myself," while showing our transcendence changed into facticity, is the source of an infinity of excuses for our failures or our weaknesses. Similarly the young coquette maintains
transcendence to the extent that the respect, the esteem manifested by the actions of her admirer are already on the plane of the transcendent. But she arrests this transcendence, she glues it down with all the facticity of the present; respect is nothing other than respect, it is an arrested sur- passing which no longer surpasses itself toward anything.
But although this metastable concept of "transcendence-facticity" is one of the most basic instruments of bad faith, it is not the only one of its kind. W e can equally well use another kind of duplicity derived from hu- man reality which we will express roughly by saying that its being-far-itself implies complementarily a being-far-others. Upon anyone of my conducts it is always possible to converge two looks, mine and that of the Other. The conduct will not present exactly the same structure in each case. But
611 est dcvenu ce qu'il etait.
Tel qu'en eutin I'eterniM Ie change.
? (
. ,. . .
58
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
as we shall see later, as each look perceives it, there is between these two aspects of my being, no difference between appearance and being-as if I were to my self the truth of myself and as if the Other possessed only a deformed image of me. The equal dignity of being, possessed by my being- for-others and by my being-for-myself permits a perpetually disintegrating synthesis and a perpetual game of escape from the for-itself to the for- others and from the for-others to the for-itself. W e have seen also the use which our young lady made of our being-in-the-midst-of-the-world-i. e. , of our inert presence as a passive object among other objects-in order to relieve herself suddenly from the functions of her being-in-the-world- that is, from the being which causes there to be a world by projecting itself beyond the world toward its own possibilities. Let us note finally the confusing syntheses which play on the nihilating ambiguity of these temporal ekstases, affirming at once that I am what I have been (the
who deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into consideration the later changes) and? that I am not what I have been (the man who in the face of reproaches or rancor dissociates himself from his p,ast by insisting on his freedom and on his perpetual re-creation). In all these concepts, which have only a transitive role in the reasoning and which are eliminated from the conclusion, (like hypochon- driacs in the calculations of physicians), we find again the same structure. W e have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.
But what exactly is necessary in order for these concepts of disintegra- tion to be able to receive even a pretence of existence, in order for them to be able to appear for an instant to consciousness, even in a process of evanescence? A quick examination of the idea of sincerity, the antithesis of bad faith, will be very instructive in this connection. Actually sincerity
presents itself as a demand and consequently is not a state. Now what is the ideal to be attained in this case? It is necessary that a man be for himself only what he is. But is this not precisely the definition of the in-itself-or if you prefer-the principle of identity? To posit as an ideal the being of things, is this not to assert by the same stroke that this being does not belong to human reality and that the principle of identity, far from being a universal axiom universally applied, is only a synthetic principle enjoying a merely regional universality? Thus in order that the concepts of bad faith can put us under illusion at least for an instant, in order that the candor of "pure hearts" (ef. Gide, Kessel) can have validity for human reality as an ideal, the principle of identity must not represent a constitu- tive principle of buman reality and human reality must not be necessarily what it is but must be able to be what it is not. What does this mean?
If man is what he is, bad faith is for ever impossible and candor ceascs to be his ideal and becomes instead his being. But is man what he is? And more generally, how can he be what he is when he exists as consciousness
? BAD FAITH
59
of being? If candor or sincerity is a universal value, it is evident that the maxim "one must be what one is" does not serve solely as a regulating principle for judgments and concepts by which I express what I am. It posits not merely an ideal of knowing but an ideal of being; it proposes for us an absolute equivalence of being with itself as a prototype of being. In this sense it is necessary that we make ourselves what we are. But what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are, if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are?
Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice,his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the in- flexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestab- lishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behavior seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice
seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe. There is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it, to take inventory of it; the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in order to realize it. This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of cer- emony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a grocer, just as the soldier at attention makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard which does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see, since it is the rule and not the interest of the moment which determines the point he must fix his eyes on (the sight "fixed at ten paces"). There are indeed many precautions to imprisona man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition.
In a parallel situation, from within,the waiter in the cafe can not be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass. It is by no means that he can not form reflective judgments or concepts concerning his condition. He knows well what it
{
? 60 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
"means:" the obligation of getting up at five o'clock, of sweeping the floor of the shop before the restaurant opens, of starting the coffee pot going, etc. He knows the rights which it allows: the right to the tips, the right to belong to a union, etc. But all these concepts, all these judgments refer to the transcendent. It is a matter of abstract . possibilities, of rights and duties conferred on a "person possessing rights. " And it is precisely this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter in question) and who I am not. It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in representation. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him. I can not be he, I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby I affect him with nothingness. In vain do I fulfill the functions of a cafe waiter. I can be he only in the neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary cafe waiter through those gestures taken as an "analogue. "7 What I attcmpt to realize is a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter, as if it were not just in my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties and the rights of my position, as if it were not my free choice to get up each morning at five o'clock or to remain in even though it meant getting fired. As if from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not tran- scend it on every side, as if I did not co'nstitute myself as one beyond my condition. Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sense a cafe waiter-other- wise could I not just as wcll call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this can not be in the mode of being in-itself. 'I am a waiter in the mode of beiJlg what I am lIOt.
Furthermore we are dealing with more than mere social positions; I am never anyone of my attitudes, anyone of my actions. The good speaker is the one who plays at speaking, because he can not be speaking. The attentive pupil who wishes to be attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears open wide, so exhausts himself in playing the attentive role that he ends up by no longer hearing anything. Perpetually absent to my body, to my acts, I am despite myself that "divine absence" of which Valery speaks. I can not say either that I am here or that I am not here, in the sense that we say "that box of matches is on the table;" this would be to confuse my "being-in-the-world" with a "being-in the midst of the world. " Nor that I am standing, nor that I am seated; this would be to confuse my body with the idiosyncratic totality of which it is only one of the structures. On all sides I escape being and yet-I am. .
But take a mode of being which concerns only myself: I am sad. One T CE. L'Imaginairc:. Conclusion.
? BAD FAITH 61
might think that surely I am the sadness in the mode of being what I am. What is the sadness, however, if not the intentional unity which comes to reassemble and animate the totality of my conduct? It is the meaning of this dull look with which I view the world, of my bowed shoulders, of my lowered head, of the listlessness in my whole body. But at the very moment when I adopt each of these attitudes, do I not know that I shall not be able to hold on to it? Let a stranger suddenly appear and I will lift up my head, I will assume a lively cheerfulness. What will remain of my sadness except that I obligingly promise it an appointment for latcr after the departure of the visitor? Moreover is not this sadness itself a conduct? Is it not consciousness which affects itself with sadness as a magical re-
course against a situation too urgent? 8 And in this case even, should we not say that being sad means first to make oneself sad? That may be, someone will say, but after all doesn't giving oneself the being of sadness mean to receive this being? It makes no difference from where I receive it. The fact is that a consciousness which affects itself with sadness is sad preciscly for this reason. But it is difficult to comprehend the nature of conscious- ness; the being-sad is not a ready-made being which I give to myself as I can give this book to my friend. I do not possess the property or affecting myself with being. If I make myself sad, I must continue to make myself
sad from beginning to end. I can not treat my sadness as an impulse finally achieved and put it on file without recreating it, nor can I carry it in the manner of an inert body which continues its movement after the initial shock. There is no inertia in consciousness. If I make myself sad, it is be- catlse I am not sad-the being of the sadness escapes me by and in the very act by which I affect myself with it. The being-in-itself of sadness per- petually haunts my consciousness (of) being sad, but it is as a value which I can not realize; it stands as a regulative meaning of my sadne:;s, not as
its constitutive modality.
Someone may say that my consciousness at least is, whatever may be
the object or the state of which it makes itself consciousness. But how do we distinguish my consciousness (of) being sad from sadness? Is it not all one? It is true in a way that my consciousness is; if One means by this that for another it is a part of the totality of being on which judgments can be brought to bear. But it should be noted, as Husserl clearly underslood, that my consciousness appears originally to the Other as an absence. It is the object always present as the meaning of all my attitudes and all my con- duct-and always absent, for it gives itself to the intuition of another as a perpetual question:. . .
Bad Faith
I. BAD FAITH AND FALSEHOOD
THE human being is not only the being by whom negatites are di:>- closed in the world; he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself. In our Introduction we defined consciousness as "a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself. " But now that we have eX:lmined the meaning of "the question," we can at present also write the formula thus: "Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingaess of its being. " In a prohibition or a veto, for example, the human being denies a future transcendence. But this negation is not explicative. My consciousness is not restricted to envisioning a negatite. It constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another human reality projects as its possibility. For that reason it must arise in the world as a Not; it is as a Not that the slave first apprehends the master,'or that the prisoner who is trying to escape sees the guard who is watching him. There are even men (e. g. , caretakers, overseers, gaolers,) whose social reality is uniquely that of the Not, who will live and die, having forever been only a Not upon the earth. Others so as to make the Not a part of their very subjectivity, establish their human personality as a perpetual negation. This is the meaning and function of what Scheler calls "the man of resentment"-in reality, the Not. But there exist more subtle behaviors, the description of which will lead us further into the inwardness of consciousness. Irony is one of these. In irony a man annihilates what he posits,within one and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to be believed; he affirms to deny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive object but it has no being other than its nothingness. Thus attitudes of negation toward the self permit us to raise a new ques- tion: What are we to say is the being of man who has the possibility of denying himself? But it is out of the question to discuss the attitude of
"self-negation" in its universality. The kinds of behavior which can be 47
. . . .
? 48 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
ranked under this heading are too diverse; we risk retaining only the ab- stract form of them. It is best to choose and to examine one determined attitude which is essential to human reality and which is such that con- sciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This attitide, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise foi).
Frequently this is identified with falsehood. W e say indifferently of a person that he shows signs of bad faith or that he lies to himself. We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general. Lying is a negative atti- tude, we will agree to that. But this negation does not bear on conscious- ness itself; it aims only anhe transcendent. The essence of the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession,of the truth which he is hiding. A man does not lie about what he is ignorant of; he does not lie when he spreads an error of which he himself is the dupe; he does not lie when he is mistaken. The ideal description of the liar would be a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such. Now this doubly negative atti- tude rests On the transcendent; the fact expressed is transcendent since it does not exist, and the original negation rests on a truth; that is, on a particular type of transcendence. As for the inner negation which I effect correlatively with the affirmation for myself of the truth, this rests on words; that is, on an event in the world. Furthermore the inner dis- position of the liar is positive; it could be the object of an affirmative judgment. The liar intends to deceive and he does not seek tq hide this intention from himself nor to disguise the translucency of consciousness; On the contrary, he recourse to it when there is a question of deciding secondary behavior. It explicitly exercises a regulatory control over all attitudes. As for his flaunted intention of telling the truth ("I'd never want to deceive you! This is true! I swear itl")-all this, of course, is the object of an inner negation, but also it is not recognized by the liar as his intention. It is played, imitated, it is the intention of the character which he plays in the eyes of his questioner, but this character, precisely because he does not exist, is a transcendent. Thus the lie does not put into the play the inner structure of present consciousness; all the negations which con- stitute it bear on objects which by this fact are removed from conscious-
? lless. The lie then does not require special ontological foundation, and the explanations which the existence of negation in general requires are valid without cbange in the case of deceit. Of course we have described the ideal lie; doubtless it happens often enough that the liar is more or less the victim of his lie, that he half persuades himself of it. But these com- mon, popular forms of the lie are also degenerate aspects of it; they repre- sent intermediaries between falsehood and bad faith. The lie is a behavior of transcendence.
The lie is also a normal phenomenon of what Heidegger calls the "Mit-
? BAD FAITII
49
sein. "1 It presupposes my existence, the existence of the Other, my exist- ence for the Other, and the existence of the Other for me. Thus there is no difficulty in holding that the liar must make the project of the lie in entire clarity and that he must possess a complete comprehension of the lie and of the truth which he is altering. It is sufficient that an over-all opacity hide his intentions from the Other; it is sufficient that the Other can take the lie for truth. By the lie consciousness affirms that it
by nature as hidden from tIle OtIler; it utilizes for its own profit the on- tological duality of myself and myself in the eyes of the Other.
The situation can not be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleaSing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. This does not mean that it can not be conditioned by the Mit-sein like all other phenomena of human reality, but the IHit? sein can call forth bad faith only by presenting itself as a situation which bad faith permits surpassing; bad faith does not come from outside to lIll- man reality. One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. 'But consciousness affects itself with bad faith. 'I1lCre must be an original intention and a project of bad faith; this project im- plies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehen- sion (of) consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully-and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to re- establish a semblance of duality-but in the unitary structure of a single project. How then can the lie subsist if the duality which conditions it suppressed?
To this difficulty is added another which is derived from the total trans- lucency of consciousness. That which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being of consciousness is conscious- ness of being. It appears then that I must be in good faith, at least to the extent that I am conscious of my bad faith. But then this whole psychic system is annihilated. We must agree in fact that if I deliberately and cynically attempt to lie tomyself, I fail completely in this undertaking;
the lie falls back and collapses beneath my look; it is ruined from behind by the very consciousness of lying to myself which pitilessly constitutes
1 A "being-with" others in the world. Tr.
? 50 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
itself well within my project as its very condition. W e have here an evanes- cent phenomenon which exists only in and through its own differentiation. To be sure, these phenomena are frequent and we shall see that there is in fact an "evanescence" of bad faith, which, it is evident, vacillates con- tinually between good faith and cynicism: Even though the existence of bad faith is very precarious, and though it belongs to the kind of psychic structures which we might call "metastablc,"2 it presents nonetheless an autonomous and durable form. It can even be the normal aspect of life for a very great number of people. A person can live in bad faith, which does not mean that he does not have awakenings to cynicism or to
, good faith, but which implies a constant and particular style of life. Our embarrassment then appears extreme since we can neither reject nor com- prehend bad faith.
To escape from these difficulties people gladly have recourse to the unconscious. In the psychoanalytical interpretation, for example, they use the hypothesis of a censor, conceived as a line of demarcation with customs, passport division, currency control, etc. , to reestablish the duality of the deceiver and the deceived. Here instinct or, if you prefer, original drives and complexes of drives constituted by our individual history, make up reality. It is neither true nor false since it does not exist for itself. It simply is, exactly like this table, which is neither true nor false in itself but
simply real. As for the conscious symbols of the instinct, this interpretation takes them not for appearances but for real psychic facts. Fear, forgetting, dreams exist really in the capacity of concrete facts of consciousness in the same way as the words and the attitudes of the liar are concrete, really existing patterns of behavior. The subject has the same relation to these phenomena as the deceived to the behavior of the deceiver. He estab. lishes them in their reality and must interpret them. There is a truth in the activities of the deceiver; if the deceived could reattach them to the situation where the deceiver establishes himself and to his project of the lie, they would become integral parts of truth, by virtue of being lying conduct. Similarly there is a truth in the symbolic acts; it is what the psychoanalyst discovers when he reattaches them to the historical situa- tion of the patient, to the unconscious complexes which they express, to the blocking of the censor. Thus the subject deceives himself about the meaning of his conduct, he apprehends it in its concrete existence but not in its truth, simply because he cannot derive it from an original situation
and from a psychic constitution which remain alien to him.
By the distinction between the "id" and the "ego," Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I am the ego but I am not the id. I hold no privi- leged position in relation to my unconscious psyche. I am my own psychic phenomena in so far as I establish them in their conscious reality. For
2 Sartre's own word, meaning subject to sudden changes or Tr.
. . . . . . -
? BAD FAITH 51
example I am the impulse to steal this or that book from this bookstall. I am an integral part of the impulse; I bring it to light and I determine myself hand-in-hand with it to commit the theft. But I am not those psy- chic facts, in so far as I receive them passively and am obliged to resort to hypotheses about their origin and true meaning, just as the scholar makes conjectures about the nature and essence of an external phenome- non. This theft, for example, which I interpret as an immediate impulse determined by the rarity, the interest, or the of the volume whicl\ I am going to steal-it is in truth a process derived from self-punishment, which is attached more or less directly to an Oedipus complex. The im- pulse toward the theft contains a truth which can be reached only by more or less probable hypotheses. The criterion of this truth wiII be the number of conscious psychic facts which it explains; from a more pragmatic point of view it w:Jl be also the success of the psychiatric cure which it allows. Finally the discovery of this truth wiII necessitate the cooperation of the psychoanalyst, who appears as the . mediator between my unconscious . drives and my conscious life. The Other appears as being able to effect the synthesis between the unconscious thesis and the conscious antithesis. I can know myself only through the mediation of the other, which means that I stand in relation to my "id," in the position of the Otller. If I have a little knowledge of psychoanalysis, I can, under circumstances particularly favorable, try to psychoanalyze myself. But this attempt can succeed only if I distrust every kind of intuition, only if I apply to my case from the out- side, abstract schemes and rules already learned. As for the results, whether they are obtained by my efforts alone or with the cooperaticm of a techni- cian, theywiII never have the certainty which intuition confers; they will possess simply the always increasing probability of scientific hypotheses. The hypothesis of the Oedipus complex, like the atomic theory, is nothing but an "experimental idea;" as Pierce said, it is not to be distinguished from the totality of experiences which it allows to be realized and the re- sults which it enables us to foresee. Thus psychoanalysis substitutes for the notion of bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar; it allows me to under- stand how it is possible for me to be lied to without lying to myself since it places me in the same relation to myself that the Other is in respect to me; it replaces the duality of the deceiver and the deceived, the essential condi- tion of the lie, by that of? the "id" and the "ego. " It introduces into my subjectivity the deepest intersubjective structure of the Mit-sein. Can this explanation satisfy us?
Considered more closely the psychoanalytic theory is not as simple as it first appears. It is not accurate to hold that the "id" is presented as a thing in relation to the hypothesis of the psychoanalyst, for a thing is indifferent to the conjectures which we make concerning it, while the "id" on the contrary is sensitive to them when we approach the truth. Freud in fact reports resistance when at the end of the first period the doctor is
\
!
? BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
approaching the truth. 111is resistance is objective behavior apprehended from without: the patient shows defiance, refuses to speak, gives fantastic accounts of his dreams, sometimes even removes himself completely from thc psychoanalytic treatment. It is a fair question to ask what part of him- sclf can thus resist. It can not be the "Ego," envisaged as. a psychic totality of the facts of consciousness; this could not suspect that the psychiatrist is approaching the end since the ego's relation to the meaning of its own rcactions is exactly like that of the psychiatrist, himself. At the very most it is possible for the ego to appreciate objectively the degree of probability in the hypotheses set forth, as a witness of the psychoanalysis might be able to do, according to the number of subjective facts which they explain. Furthermore, this probabilitywould appear to the ego to border on cer- tainty, which he could not take offence at since most of the time it is he who by a conscious decision is in pursuit of the psychoanalytic therapy. Are we to say that the patient is disturbed by the daily revelations which the psychoanalyst makes to him and that he seeks to remove himself, at the same time pretending in his own eyes to wish to continue the treatment? In- this case it is no longer possible to resort to tIle unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness, with all its contradictions. But this is not the way that the psychoanalyst means to explain this resistance; for him it is secret and deep, it comes from afar; it has its roots in the very thing which the psychoanalyst is trying to make clear.
Furthermore it is equally impossible to explain the resistance as emanat- ing from the complex which the psychoanalyst wishes to bring to light. The complex as such is rather the collaborator of the psychoanalyst since it aims at expressing itself in clear consciousness, since it plays tricks on the ccnsor and seeks to elude it. The only level on which we can locate the refusal of the subject is that of the censor. It alone can comprehend the questions or the revelations of the psychoanalyst? as approaching more or less ncar to the real drives which it strives to repress-it alone because it alone knows what it is repressing.
If we reject the language and the materialistic mythology of psycho- analysis, we perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with dis- cernment must know what it is repressing. In fact if we abandon all the metaphors representing the repression as the impact of blind forces, we are compelled to admit that the censor must choose and in order to choose must be aware of so doing. How could it happen otllerwise that the cen- sor allows lawful sexual impulses to pass through, that it permits needs
(hunger, thirst, sleep) to be expressed in clear consciousness? And how are we to explain that it can relax its surveillance, that it can even be de- ceived by the disguises of the instinct? But it is not sufficient that it discern the condemned drives; it must also apprehend them as to be repressed, which implies in . it at the very least an awareness of its activity. In a word, how could the censor discern the impulses needing to be repressed without
? BAD FAITII
53
being conscious of discerning them? How can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself? To know is to know that one knows, said Alain. Let us say rather: All knowing is consciousness of knowing. Thus the resist- ance of the patient implies on the level of the censor an awareness of the thing repressed as such, a comprehension of the end toward which the questions of the psychoanalyst are leading, and an act of synthetic connec- tion by which it compares the truth of the repressed complex to the psy- choanalytic hypothesis which aims at it. These various operations in their turn imply that the censor is conscious (of) itself. But what type of self- consciousness can the censor have? It must be the consciousness (of) be- ing conscious of the drive to be repressed, but precisely in order not be
conscious of it. What does this mean if not that the censor is in bad faith? Psychoanalysis has not gained anything for us since in order to overcome bad faith, it has established between the unconscious and consciousness an autonomous consciousness in bad faith. The effort to establish a veritable duality and even a trinity (? s, lch, Ueberich expressing themselves through the censor) has resulted in a mere verbal terminology. The very es- sence of the reflexive idea of hiding something from oneself implies the unity of one and the same psychic mechanism and consequently a double activity in the heart of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain and 10-
eate the thing to be concealed and on the other hand to repress and dis- guise it. Each of the two aspects of this activity is complementary to the other; that is, it implies the other in its being. By separating consciousness from the unconscious by means of the censor, psychoanalysis has not succeeded in dissociating the two phases of the act, since the libido is a blind conatus toward conscious expression and since the conscious phe- nomenon is a passive, faked result. Psychoanalysis has merely localized this double activity of repulsion and attraction on the level of the censor.
Furthermore the problem still remains of accounting for the unity of the total phenomenon (repression of the drive which disguises itself and "passes" in symbolic form), to establish comprehensible connections a- mong its different phases. How can the repressed drive "disguise itself" if it does not include (1) the consciousness of being repressed, (2) the consciousness of having been pushed back because it is what it is, (3) a project of disguise? No mechanistic theory of condensation or of trans-
ference can explain these modifications by which the drive itself is affected, for the description of the process of disguise implies a veiled appeal to finality. And similarly how are we to account for the pleasure or the an- guish which accompanies the symbolic and conscious satisfaction of the drive if consciousness does not include-beyond the censor-an obscure comprehension of the end to be attained as simultaneously desired and forbidden. By rejecting the conscious unity of the psyche, Freud is obliged to imply everywhere a magic unity linking distant phenomena across obsta- cles, just as sympathetic magic unites the spellbound person and the wax
54
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
image fashioned in his likeness. The unconscious drive (Trieb) through magic is endowed with the character "repressed" or "condemned," which completely pervades it, colors it, and magically provokes its symbol- ism. Similarly the conscious phenomenon is entirely colored by its sym- bolic meaning although it can not apprehend this meaning by itself in clear consciousness.
Aside from its inferiority in principle, the explanation by magic does not avoid the coexistence-on the level of the unconscious, on that of the censor, and on that of consciousness-of two contradictory, complement- ary structures which reciprocally imply and destroy each other. Proponents of the theory have hypostasized and "reified" bad faith; they have not escaped it. This is what has inspired a Viennese psychiatrist, Steckel, to depart from the psychoanalytical tradition and to write in La femme frig- ide:s "Every time that I have been able to carry my investigations far enough, I have established that the crux of the psychosis was conscious. " In addition the cases which he reports in his work bear witness to a patho- logical bad faith which the Freudian doctrine can not account for. There is the question, for example, of women whom marital infidelity has made frigid; that is, they succeed in hiding from themselves not complexes deeply sunk in half physiological darkness, but acts of conduct which are objectively discoverable, which they can not fail to record at the moment when they perform them. Frequently in fact the husband re\'eals to Stec-
kel that his wife has given objective signs of pleasure, but the woman when questioned will fiercely deny them. Here we find a pattern ot distraction. Admissions which Steckel was able to draw out inform us that these patho- logically frigid women apply themselves to becoming distracted in advance from the pleasure which they dread; many for example at the time of the sexual act, turn their thoughts away toward their daily occupations, make up their household accounts. Will anyone speak of an unconscious here? Yet if the frigid woman thus distracts her consciousness from the pleasure which she experiences, it is by no means cynically and in full agreement with herself; it is in order to prove to herself that she is frigid. W e have in fact to deal with a phenomenon of bad faith since the efforts taken in order not to be present to the experienced pleasure imply the recognition that the pleasure is experienced; they imply it in order to deny it. But we are no longer on the ground of psychoanlysis. Thus on the one hand the explanation by means of the unconscious, due to the fact that it breaks the psychic unity, can not account for the facts which at fii"st sight it appeared to explain. And on the other hand, there exists an infinity of types of behavior in bad faith which explicitly reject this kind of explana- tion because their essence implies that they can appear only in the trans- lucency of consciousness. We find that the problem which we had at- tempted to resolve is still untouched.
'N. R. F.
----. . ,.
?
Will anyone speak of an unconscious here? Yet if the frigid woman thus distracts her consciousness from the pleasure which she experiences, it is by no means cynically and in full agreement with herself; it is in order to prove to herself that she is frigid. W e have in fact to deal with a phenomenon of bad faith since the efforts taken in order not to be present to the experienced pleasure imply the recognition that the pleasure is experienced; they imply it in order to deny it. But we are no longer on the ground of psychoanlysis. Thus on the one hand the explanation by means of the unconscious, due to the fact that it breaks the psychic unity, can not account for the facts which at fii"st sight it appeared to explain. And on the other hand, there exists an infinity of types of behavior in bad faith which explicitly reject this kind of explana- tion because their essence implies that they can appear only in the trans- lucency of consciousness. We find that the problem which we had at- tempted to resolve is still untouched.
'N. R. F.
----. . ,.
? ? BAD FAITII
55
II. PATIERNS OF BAD FAITII
IF we wish to get out of this difficulty, we should examine more closely the patterns of bad faith and attempt a description of them. This descrip- tion will permit us perhaps to fix more exactly the conditions for the possi- bility of bad faith; that is, to reply to the question we raised at the outset: "\Vhat must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith? "
Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out with a parti- cular man for the first time. She knows very well the intentions which the man who is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows also that it will be necessary sooner or later for her to make a decision. But she does not want to realize the urgency; she concerns herself only with what is respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion. She does not apprehend this conduct as an attempt to achieve what we call "the first approach;" that is, she does not want to see possibilities of temporal devel- opment which his conduct presents. She restricts this behavior to what is in the present; she does not wish to read in the phrases which he addresses to her anything other than their explicit meaning. If he says to her, "I find you so attractivel" she disarms this phrase of its sexual background; she attaches to the conversation and to the behavior of the speaker, the im-
mediate meanings, which she imagines as objective qualities. The man who is speaking to her appears to her sincere and respectful as the table is round or square, as the wall coloring is blue or gray. The qualities thus attached to the person she is listening to are in this way fixed in a permanence like that of things, which is no other than the projection of the strict present of the qualities into the temporal flux. This is because she does not quite know what she wants. She is profoundly aware of the desire which she inspires, but the desire cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her. Yet she would find no charm in a respect which would be only respect. In order to satisfy her, there must be a feeling which is addressed wholly to her personality-i. e. , to her full freedom-and which would be a recogni- tion of her freedom. But at the same time this feeling must be wholly de- sire; that is, it must address itself to her body as object. This time then she refuses to apprehend the desire for what it is; she does not even give it a name; she recognizes it only to the extent that it transcends itself toward admiration, esteem, respect and that it is wholly absorbed in the more refined forms which it produces, to the extent of no longer figuring any- more as a sort of warmth and density. But then suppose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks changing the situation by calling for an immediate decision. To leave the hand there is to consent in herself to flirt, to engage herself. To withdraw it is to break the troubled and un- stable harmony which gives the hour its charm. The aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible. W e know what happens next; the young woman leaves her hand there, but she does not notice that she
. ,.
? 56 / BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
is leaving it. She does not notice because it happens by chance that she is at this moment all intellect. She draws her companion up to the,most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect-a personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the" hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion-neither consenting nor resisting-a thing.
We shall say that this woman is in bad faith. But we see immediately that she uses various procedures in order to maintain herself in this bad faith. She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-itself. But she permits herself to enjoy his desire, to the extent that she will ap- prehend it as not being what it is, will recognize its transcendence, Finally while sensing profoundly the presence of her own body-to the degree of being disturbed perhaps-she realizes herself as not being her own body,
and she contemplates it as though from above as a passive object to which events can happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them because all its possibilities are outside of it. What unity do we find in these various aspects of bad faith? It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea, The basic concept which is thus engendered, utilizes the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcen- dence, These tw,o aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the Qne, he can find him- self abruptly faced with the other.
W e can find the prototype of formulae of bad faith in certain famous expressions which have been rightly conceived to produce their whole effect in a spirit of bad faith. Take for example the title of a work by Jacques Chardonne, Love Is Much More than Love. 4 We see here how
unity is established between present love in its facticity-"the contact of two skins," sensuality, egoism, Proust's mechanism of jealousy, Adler's battle of the sexes, etc. -and love as transcendence-Mauriac's "river of fire," the longing for the infinite, Plato's eros, Lawrence's deep cosmic intuition, etc. Here we leave facticity to find ourselves suddenly beyond the present and the factual condition of man, beyond the psychological, in the heart of metaphysics. On the other hand, the title of a play by Sar- ment, I Am Too Great for Myself/ which also presents characters in bad
4 L'amour, c'est beaucoup plus que 1'amour. II Je suis trap grand pour moi.
? BAD FAITH
57
faith, thrQws us first into full transcendence in order suddenly to imprison us within the narrow limits of our factual essence. We will discover this structure again in the famous sentence: "He has become what he was" or in its no less famous opposite: "Eternity at last changes each man into him- self. "6 It is well understood that these various formulae have only the appearance of bad faith; they have been conceived in this paradoxical form explicitly to shock the mind and discountenance it by an enigma. But it is precisely this appearance which is of concern to us. What counts here is that the formulae do not constitute new, solidly structured ideas; on the contrary, they are formed so as to remain in perpetual disintegration and so that we may slide at any time from naturalistic present to tran- scendence and vice versa.
W e can see the use which bad faith can make of these judgments which all aim at establishing that I am not what I am. If I were only what I am, I could, for example, seriously consider an adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be compelled to recognize the truth in it. But thanks to transcendence, I am not subject to all that I am. I do not even have to discuss the justice of the reproach. As Suzanne says to Figaro, "To prove that I am right would be to recognize that I can be wrong. " I am on a plane where no reproach can touch me since what I really am is my transcendence. I flee from myself, I escape myself, I leave my tattered garment in the hands of the fault-finder. But the ambiguity necessary for bad faith comes from the fact that I affirm here that I am my transcendence in the mode of being of a thing. It is only thus, in fact, that I can feel that I escape all reproaches. It is in the sense that our young woman purifies the desire of anything humiliating by being willing to consider it only as pure transcendence, which she avoids even naming. But hwersely "I Am Too Great for Myself," while showing our transcendence changed into facticity, is the source of an infinity of excuses for our failures or our weaknesses. Similarly the young coquette maintains
transcendence to the extent that the respect, the esteem manifested by the actions of her admirer are already on the plane of the transcendent. But she arrests this transcendence, she glues it down with all the facticity of the present; respect is nothing other than respect, it is an arrested sur- passing which no longer surpasses itself toward anything.
But although this metastable concept of "transcendence-facticity" is one of the most basic instruments of bad faith, it is not the only one of its kind. W e can equally well use another kind of duplicity derived from hu- man reality which we will express roughly by saying that its being-far-itself implies complementarily a being-far-others. Upon anyone of my conducts it is always possible to converge two looks, mine and that of the Other. The conduct will not present exactly the same structure in each case. But
611 est dcvenu ce qu'il etait.
Tel qu'en eutin I'eterniM Ie change.
? (
. ,. . .
58
BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
as we shall see later, as each look perceives it, there is between these two aspects of my being, no difference between appearance and being-as if I were to my self the truth of myself and as if the Other possessed only a deformed image of me. The equal dignity of being, possessed by my being- for-others and by my being-for-myself permits a perpetually disintegrating synthesis and a perpetual game of escape from the for-itself to the for- others and from the for-others to the for-itself. W e have seen also the use which our young lady made of our being-in-the-midst-of-the-world-i. e. , of our inert presence as a passive object among other objects-in order to relieve herself suddenly from the functions of her being-in-the-world- that is, from the being which causes there to be a world by projecting itself beyond the world toward its own possibilities. Let us note finally the confusing syntheses which play on the nihilating ambiguity of these temporal ekstases, affirming at once that I am what I have been (the
who deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life and refuses to take into consideration the later changes) and? that I am not what I have been (the man who in the face of reproaches or rancor dissociates himself from his p,ast by insisting on his freedom and on his perpetual re-creation). In all these concepts, which have only a transitive role in the reasoning and which are eliminated from the conclusion, (like hypochon- driacs in the calculations of physicians), we find again the same structure. W e have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.
But what exactly is necessary in order for these concepts of disintegra- tion to be able to receive even a pretence of existence, in order for them to be able to appear for an instant to consciousness, even in a process of evanescence? A quick examination of the idea of sincerity, the antithesis of bad faith, will be very instructive in this connection. Actually sincerity
presents itself as a demand and consequently is not a state. Now what is the ideal to be attained in this case? It is necessary that a man be for himself only what he is. But is this not precisely the definition of the in-itself-or if you prefer-the principle of identity? To posit as an ideal the being of things, is this not to assert by the same stroke that this being does not belong to human reality and that the principle of identity, far from being a universal axiom universally applied, is only a synthetic principle enjoying a merely regional universality? Thus in order that the concepts of bad faith can put us under illusion at least for an instant, in order that the candor of "pure hearts" (ef. Gide, Kessel) can have validity for human reality as an ideal, the principle of identity must not represent a constitu- tive principle of buman reality and human reality must not be necessarily what it is but must be able to be what it is not. What does this mean?
If man is what he is, bad faith is for ever impossible and candor ceascs to be his ideal and becomes instead his being. But is man what he is? And more generally, how can he be what he is when he exists as consciousness
? BAD FAITH
59
of being? If candor or sincerity is a universal value, it is evident that the maxim "one must be what one is" does not serve solely as a regulating principle for judgments and concepts by which I express what I am. It posits not merely an ideal of knowing but an ideal of being; it proposes for us an absolute equivalence of being with itself as a prototype of being. In this sense it is necessary that we make ourselves what we are. But what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are, if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are?
Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice,his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the in- flexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestab- lishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behavior seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice
seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe. There is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it, to take inventory of it; the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in order to realize it. This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly one of cer- emony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a grocer, just as the soldier at attention makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard which does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see, since it is the rule and not the interest of the moment which determines the point he must fix his eyes on (the sight "fixed at ten paces"). There are indeed many precautions to imprisona man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition.
In a parallel situation, from within,the waiter in the cafe can not be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass. It is by no means that he can not form reflective judgments or concepts concerning his condition. He knows well what it
{
? 60 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
"means:" the obligation of getting up at five o'clock, of sweeping the floor of the shop before the restaurant opens, of starting the coffee pot going, etc. He knows the rights which it allows: the right to the tips, the right to belong to a union, etc. But all these concepts, all these judgments refer to the transcendent. It is a matter of abstract . possibilities, of rights and duties conferred on a "person possessing rights. " And it is precisely this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter in question) and who I am not. It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in representation. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him. I can not be he, I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby I affect him with nothingness. In vain do I fulfill the functions of a cafe waiter. I can be he only in the neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary cafe waiter through those gestures taken as an "analogue. "7 What I attcmpt to realize is a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter, as if it were not just in my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties and the rights of my position, as if it were not my free choice to get up each morning at five o'clock or to remain in even though it meant getting fired. As if from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not tran- scend it on every side, as if I did not co'nstitute myself as one beyond my condition. Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sense a cafe waiter-other- wise could I not just as wcll call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this can not be in the mode of being in-itself. 'I am a waiter in the mode of beiJlg what I am lIOt.
Furthermore we are dealing with more than mere social positions; I am never anyone of my attitudes, anyone of my actions. The good speaker is the one who plays at speaking, because he can not be speaking. The attentive pupil who wishes to be attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears open wide, so exhausts himself in playing the attentive role that he ends up by no longer hearing anything. Perpetually absent to my body, to my acts, I am despite myself that "divine absence" of which Valery speaks. I can not say either that I am here or that I am not here, in the sense that we say "that box of matches is on the table;" this would be to confuse my "being-in-the-world" with a "being-in the midst of the world. " Nor that I am standing, nor that I am seated; this would be to confuse my body with the idiosyncratic totality of which it is only one of the structures. On all sides I escape being and yet-I am. .
But take a mode of being which concerns only myself: I am sad. One T CE. L'Imaginairc:. Conclusion.
? BAD FAITH 61
might think that surely I am the sadness in the mode of being what I am. What is the sadness, however, if not the intentional unity which comes to reassemble and animate the totality of my conduct? It is the meaning of this dull look with which I view the world, of my bowed shoulders, of my lowered head, of the listlessness in my whole body. But at the very moment when I adopt each of these attitudes, do I not know that I shall not be able to hold on to it? Let a stranger suddenly appear and I will lift up my head, I will assume a lively cheerfulness. What will remain of my sadness except that I obligingly promise it an appointment for latcr after the departure of the visitor? Moreover is not this sadness itself a conduct? Is it not consciousness which affects itself with sadness as a magical re-
course against a situation too urgent? 8 And in this case even, should we not say that being sad means first to make oneself sad? That may be, someone will say, but after all doesn't giving oneself the being of sadness mean to receive this being? It makes no difference from where I receive it. The fact is that a consciousness which affects itself with sadness is sad preciscly for this reason. But it is difficult to comprehend the nature of conscious- ness; the being-sad is not a ready-made being which I give to myself as I can give this book to my friend. I do not possess the property or affecting myself with being. If I make myself sad, I must continue to make myself
sad from beginning to end. I can not treat my sadness as an impulse finally achieved and put it on file without recreating it, nor can I carry it in the manner of an inert body which continues its movement after the initial shock. There is no inertia in consciousness. If I make myself sad, it is be- catlse I am not sad-the being of the sadness escapes me by and in the very act by which I affect myself with it. The being-in-itself of sadness per- petually haunts my consciousness (of) being sad, but it is as a value which I can not realize; it stands as a regulative meaning of my sadne:;s, not as
its constitutive modality.
Someone may say that my consciousness at least is, whatever may be
the object or the state of which it makes itself consciousness. But how do we distinguish my consciousness (of) being sad from sadness? Is it not all one? It is true in a way that my consciousness is; if One means by this that for another it is a part of the totality of being on which judgments can be brought to bear. But it should be noted, as Husserl clearly underslood, that my consciousness appears originally to the Other as an absence. It is the object always present as the meaning of all my attitudes and all my con- duct-and always absent, for it gives itself to the intuition of another as a perpetual question:. . .
