No More Learning

And therefore, as when the Authority is evident,
the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority
is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but
himselfe.




Things Personated, Inanimate

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by
Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may
be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate,
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the
Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by
those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore,
such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill
Government.




Irrational

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may
be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during
that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall
recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give
Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State
Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.




False Gods

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were
Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the
State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods
of the Heathen could not be Personated.




The True God

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed
the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own
name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus.
Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus
Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the
Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father.
And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working
in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of
himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.




A Multitude Of Men, How One Person

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of
every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person
One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one
Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.




Every One Is Author

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot
be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their
Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their
common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning
all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre
he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him
commission to Act.




An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in
the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy
the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.




Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable

And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is
not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve
not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on
the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The
like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring
till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing
Execution, is a decree of Dilation.




Negative Voyce

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no
Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of
men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a
mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of
a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply.
The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another
conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the
other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors
conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and
Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before
a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.





PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH



CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH




The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn)
to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep
them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of
their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in
the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.




Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without
the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and
the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of
Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep
them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not
great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all
places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one
another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the
Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was
their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of
Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives,
and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now
do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own
security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and
fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour
as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open
force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are
rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.




Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side
or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient
to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion.
The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not
determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we
feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so
visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to
move him to attempt.




Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application
of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce
their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are
easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also
when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for
their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of
men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature,
without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose
all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to
be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would
be Peace without subjection.




And That Continually

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all
the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one
judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For
though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a
forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy,
or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for
a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve,
and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.




Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,




Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live
sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred
amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than
their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of
them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common
benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind
cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst
these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth
in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason,
do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their
common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the
rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another
that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet
they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,
that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the
likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of
Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their
pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended
with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is
most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and
controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is
by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder
if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their
Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.




The Generation Of A Common-wealth

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie,
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one
Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills,
by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to
appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every
one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he
that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those
things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to
submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his
Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of
them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with
every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to
this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right
to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. " This done, the
Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine
CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to
speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the
Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him
by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so
much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is
inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall
ayd against their enemies abroad.




The Definition Of A Common-wealth

And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to
define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,
to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. "




Soveraigne, And Subject, What

And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have
Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by
Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves,
and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if
they refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them
their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst
themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be
called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and
the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of
a Common-wealth by Institution.



CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION




The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that
Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of
that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.




The Consequences To Such Institution, Are




I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government




From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by
the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And
Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being
thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude;
nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man,
to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their
Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty
to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment,
as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And
because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some
body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that
it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly
disposition.




2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which
is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as
yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants
as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd,
because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach
thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of
his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns
therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they
had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by
way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his
Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want
of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man,
but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose
actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them
all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then
no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for
no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made
a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that
are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.




3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented
to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the
rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore
unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his
consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or
be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.




4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every
particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently
he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that
whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones
selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne
power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper
signification.




5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.




6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace

And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,




And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall,
in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines
of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth
the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded
but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally
received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most
sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never
breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace,
but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live
as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.




7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May

Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject

Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of
his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before
constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had
right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this
Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power,
is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of
Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the
lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law
be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which
being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were
in these parts the Civill Law.




8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature

And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For
without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one
Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and
Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and
contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.




9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of
Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to
be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the
Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength
of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which
Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command
of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that
hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.




10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all
Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and
War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the
common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such
Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.




11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No

Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.




12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one
another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It
is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the
worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the
Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to
put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not
onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the
Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to
appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to
one another.




These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly
of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if
he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want
of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising
Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of
Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall
presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this
division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If
there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of
England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and
fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed
in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of
Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right,
that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and
no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto
been.




And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.




The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse
power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not
the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One,
signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together,
they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,)
then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power;
and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough,
when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch
they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and
Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants
are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the
presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.




Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other
Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of
Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate
of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and
horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the
dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence,
make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can
in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or
sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men
are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their
Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a
great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely
Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.



CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,

AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER




The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For
the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it
is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One
man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth:
when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or
More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be
indivisible) entire.




Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are
displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which
signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that
want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when
they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
Governours.




Subordinate Representatives Dangerous

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as
well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative
of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the
Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every
man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of
Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting
the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power
to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such
Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And
I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent
of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from
every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them
for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their
Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title
of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that
Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall
Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the truth committed to them.




Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth
not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or
Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or
is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall
Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure
the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the
private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the
most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he
preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent
than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the
publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from
the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can
be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or
contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a
war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the
publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one
that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a
treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted
but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the
most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition
of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long
discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but
not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the
Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time,
wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of
their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that
of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme,
(which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or
the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day,
all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and
they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as
a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve
one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the
Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous,
than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which
cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators,
that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have
great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse
Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than
absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and
Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the
hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by
his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person,
and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is
to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and
Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that
this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call
Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed
who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely
by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that
case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be
attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of
the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are
not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is
the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for
such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient
rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most
interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom
least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every
man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant
into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction,
or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a
Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition
of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is
no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of
Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For
as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and
is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he
is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also
(in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers
and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or
Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs;
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power;
and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than
Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where
the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is
in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished
from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes
that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce
them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other
Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective
Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands
for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which
Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise
if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies
Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or
other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a
Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For
Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne;
nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the
Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a
Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or
Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to
certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans;
If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but
Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there
is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect
a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and
returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power
to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the
Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which
they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think
good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the
decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor,
to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing
into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was,
when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is
not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore
was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and
by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge
to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea
(for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy;
because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed
by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.
Of The Right Of Succession

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for
an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall
Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly,
should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they
that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This
Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may
be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right
is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him
that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute
the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth,
as Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their
Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the
publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest
difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest
who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he
hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact
ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question,
who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign
Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the
Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that
either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession,
or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death
of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude
without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in
whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at
all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch;
every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks
best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne
sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of
every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had
its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution
of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the
Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or
by other tacite signes sufficient.




Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe
imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate.
If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his
Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.




Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession;
for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise,
he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise
where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth,
there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male,
for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the
Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does
not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.




Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is
to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government
remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in
himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be
preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined
by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other
men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are
naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly,
where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so
still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is
alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and
'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour
from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.




To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,

Not Unlawfull

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same
government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed
a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the
Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore
the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes
to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the
Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the
Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it
our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of
his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those
Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though
by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.



CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL


A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or
many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their
lives and liberty in his Power.




Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by
Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases
they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such
Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if
it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged
to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or
acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no
Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the
Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because
he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of
the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign.
Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:
But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is
acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such
absolution.




The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of
Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary
for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme
Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre,
and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours,
Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of
Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are
the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same
Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.




Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over
his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child
because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or
by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God
hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally
Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to
both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man
can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.
In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and
for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the
Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by
the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth
now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes
of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of
Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and
to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents
between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract;
or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right
passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons
Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had
recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the
Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was
in the Mother.




Or Education;

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it
cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother:
and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her
will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the
power of the Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she
nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to
obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over
it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the
Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom
it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which
one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise
obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.




Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers
power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign
Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother;
because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child,
and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of
the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion
followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign
of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their
Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man,
hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a
Title, without the effect.




The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of Possession

The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.




Despoticall Dominion, How Attained

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some
Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or
Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by
other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and
the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use
thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished
is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be
derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave
to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in
prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him
of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men,
(commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their
bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master,
justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him;
and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is
trusted by him.




Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over
the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but
because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor
obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to
spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the
Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which
the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of
the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome,
or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given,
but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on
condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in
security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his
corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it
not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his
servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he
holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is,
of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case
the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise
punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same;
and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall
Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution;
and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent
chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he
hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and
in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular,
to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other,
from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of
ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute
over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every
man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which
is the condition of war.




Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some
Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little
Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of
a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants
together: wherein the Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a
Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by
its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without
the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to
defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of
danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to
the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small
company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes,
and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And
thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and
deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes
of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and putting themselves under
Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their
protection.




The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to
us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye. "
This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God
himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c. ) "This
shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He
shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his
horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and
to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall
take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He
shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give
them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and
give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall
take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your
youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your
flocks; and you shall be his servants. " This is absolute power, and
summed up in the last words, "you shall be his servants. " Againe, when
the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented
thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c. ) "We will be as all other nations,
and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our
wars. " Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the
Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power,
as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of
King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give to thy servant
understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and
Evill. " It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and
to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are
Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought
the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his
Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9)
"God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of
God. " For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants
obey your masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your
Parents in All things. " There is simple obedience in those that are
subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3)
"The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that
they shall bid you observe, that observe and do. " There again is simple
obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they subject
themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey
them. " This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe
acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed,
where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such
taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing
from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that
need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to
take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, (Mat.
21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a
shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me.
And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need
of them: And they will let them go. " They will not ask whether his
necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that
necessity; but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You
shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. " and verse 11. "Who told thee
that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded
thee thou shouldest not eat? " For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good
and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the
Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull,
told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and
Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them
Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new
ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that
having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that
place, as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the
meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c. " as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of
them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.




Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute

So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make
it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The
condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but
there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where,
and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may
ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the
Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an
argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom,
and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths,
and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance
thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should
lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be
inferred, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining
Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and
Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither
poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have
hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.



CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS




Liberty What

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may
be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to
Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move,
but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition
of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And
so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained,
with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks,
or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we
use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without
those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of
motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to
say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth
still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.




What It Is To Be Free

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength
and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will
to. " But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but
Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not
subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The
way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk
in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant
any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any
law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath
obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the
word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or
inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that
he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination
to doe.




Feare And Liberty Consistent

Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the
action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for
Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining,
was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men
doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers
had Liberty to omit.




Liberty And Necessity Consistent

Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not
only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise
in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed
from their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of
mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause,
which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of
God the first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all
mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that
seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man
in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that
which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things,
which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they
can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods
will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans
will, and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty
of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of
that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.




Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips
of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature
but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.




Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,
for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being
a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of
actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what
their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.
For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that
is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men
to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe,
if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd,
for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may
be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they
demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to
be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only
in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath
praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise
contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet,
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves
think fit; & the like.




Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For
it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the
Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise,
than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth often happen in
Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the command of
the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha
caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases,
he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is
neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also
in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For
though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to
Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an
Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe
what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God, because
David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned. " In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of
their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice;
and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he
would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and
every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written
with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall
accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of
Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a
Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens
wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to
be Just.




The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;

Not Of Private Men

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in
the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all
their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular
men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with
that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws,
nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as
amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against
his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect
from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a
full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and
Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not
every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is
to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge)
most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition
of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their
frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours
round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free
Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist
their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie
to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of
the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet
no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie,
or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in
Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the
Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name
of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for
their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the
Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of
men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if
it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne
parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and
other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths, which
were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of
the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of
Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them
from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and
all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it
down in his Politiques,(lib. 6.