In reality it means the
dissolution
of Greek instincts, when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue.
first condition of personal excellence in virtue.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
Morality follows, the ideal con attheend.
.
.
.
On the other hand, the appearance of mo
scruples (or in other words, the coming to conscio
ness of the values which guide action) betray certain morbidness; strong ages and people
not ponder over their rights, nor over the princip
of action, over instinct or over reason. Conscio
ness is a sign that the real morality--that is to s
the certainty of instinct which leads to a defin
course of action--is going to the dogs. . . . Ev.
time a new world of consciousness is created, moralists are signs of a lesion, of impoverishm
and of disorganisation. Those who are dee instinctive fear bandying words over duties: amo them are found pyrrhonic opponents of dialect and of knowableness in general. . . . A virtue refuted with a "for. " . . .
Thesis : The appearance of moralists belo to periods when morality is declining.
Thesis : The moralist is a dissipator of ma
instincts, however much he may appear to be th restorer,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
34I
Thesis : That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a moral instinct, but the instincts of decadence, translated into the forms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts as corruption).
T:hesis : The instincts of decadence which, thanks to moralists, wish to become master of the in stinctive morality of stronger races and ages, are
(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched;
(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the unhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse;
(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble interpretation of their condition,
and who therefore require to be as poor physi ologists as possible.
424.
The humbug of the scientific spirit--One should not affect the spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and has to affect a certain kind of method which is
not yet seasonable. Neither should we falsify
things and thoughts, which we have arrived at differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and dialectics. It is thus that Kant in
his "morality" falsifies his inner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing is Herbert Spencer's Ethics. A man should neither conceal nor misrepresent the facts con cerning the way in which he conceived his
? ? ? ? scientific
THE WILL TO POWER.
342
thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly always have something of the
aphoristic and impetuous character of Pascal's Pense? es. The motive forces and valuations have
lain long below the surface; that which comes
uppermost is their effect.
I guard against all the humbug of a false
spirit:--
(1) In respect of the manner of demonstration,
if it does not correspond to the genesis of the thoughts;
(2) In respect of the demands for methods which, at a given period in science, may be quite
impossible;
(3) In respect of the demand for objectivity, for cold impersonal treatment, where, as in the case
of all valuations, we describe ourselves and our
intimate experiences in a couple of words. There
are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance,
Sainte-Beuve's. He actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth or
passion either "pro" or "con," and he would fain have lied that fact out of his life.
425.
"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral in
difference in regard to one's self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fatal circumstances. Un
scrupulousness in the use of dangerous means;
perversity and complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.
My profound indifference to myself: I refuse
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
343
to derive any advantage from my knowledge, nor
do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it
may entail. --I include among these disadvantages
that which is called the perversion of character;
this prospect is beside the point: I use my char
acter, but I try neither to understand it nor to
change it--the personal calculation of virtue has
not entered my head once. It strikes me that one
closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one
becomes interested in one's own personal case--or even in the "Salvation of one's soul"! . . . One
should not take one's morality too seriously, nor
should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality. . . .
A sort of heritage of morality is perhaps pre
supposed
with it and fling a great deal of it out of the
window without materially reducing one's means.
One is never tempted to admire "beautiful souls,"
one always knows one's self to be their superior.
The monsters of virtue should be met with inner
scorn; de? miaiser la vertu--Oh, the joy of it !
One should revolve round one's self, have no
desire to be "better" or "anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to omit
throwing the tentacles or meshes of every mor ality out to things.
426.
Concerning the psychology of philosophers. They should be psychologists--this was possible
only from the nineteenth century onwards--and no longer little Jack Horners, who see three or
? here: one feels that one can be lavish
? ? ? 344
THE WILL TO POWER.
four feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied
to burrow inside themselves. We psychologists of
the future are not very intent on self-contempla tion: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when an instrument endeavours "to know itself": *
we are instruments of knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness of an instrument--consequently we may not analyse
or "know" ourselves. The first sign of a great
psychologist's self-preservative
goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest,
no inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned. . . . The great egoism of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal,"
"disinterested"! --Oh to what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this !
We are no Pascals, we are not particularly in
terested in the "Salvation of the soul," in our own
happiness, and in our own virtue. --We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so con
cerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again different, we thoroughly mistrust all
men who thus contemplate their own navels: be cause introspection seems to us a degenerate form
of the psychologist's genius, as a note of interroga
tion affixed to the psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is actuated by
the will to see for the sake of seeing.
instinct: he never
? invariably inveighed against the "yvo? 6 geavro? w" of the Socratic school; he was
*TRANSLATOR's NoTE. --Goethe
of the opinion that an animal which tries to see inner self must be sick.
? ? its
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
345
The apparition of Greek philosophers since the
time of Socrates is a symptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount.
The "Sophist" is still quite Hellenic--as are also Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the great
Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The
Polis loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in
its rights of dominion over every other polis. . . . Cultures, that is to say, "the gods," are exchanged,
2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY,
427.
? prerogative of the deus autochthonus is lost. Good and Evil of
and thus the belief in the exclusive
whatever origin get mixed: the boundaries separ
ating good from evil gradually vanish. . . . This is the "Sophist. " . . .
On the other hand, the "philosopher" is the
reactionary: he insists upon the old virtues. He
sees the reason of decay in the decay of institu
tions: he therefore wishes to revive old institutions;
--he sees decay in the decline of authority: he
therefore endeavours to find new authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature and
exotic religions. . . . );--he will reinstate the ideal polis, after the concept "polis" has become super
annuated (just as the Jews kept themselves to gether as a "people" after they had fallen into slavery). They become interested in all tyrants:
their desire is to re-establish virtue with force majeure.
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
346
Gradually everything genuinely Hellenic is hel
responsible for the state of decay (and Plato is jus as ungrateful to Pericles, Homer, tragedy, an
rhetoric as the prophets are to David and Saul The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objectio.
to the fundamental principles of Hellenic culture the profound error of philosophers. --Conclusion: th
Greek world perishes. The cause thereof: Home mythology, ancient morality, etc.
The anti-Hellenic development of philosopher:
valuations:--the Egyptian influence ("Life afte
death" made into law. . . . );--the Semitic influenc (the "dignity of the sage," the "Sheik");--th
? Pythagorean influence,
Silence, means of terrorisation consisting of appeal
to a "Beyond," mathematics: the religious valua
tion consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmi entity;--the sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendenta influences;--the dialectical influence,--I am o opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting
and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts -- Decline of good intellectual taste: the hatefu noisiness of every kind of direct dialectics seem no longer to be felt.
The two decadent tendencies and extremes rul
side by side: (a) the luxuriant and more charming
kind of decadence which shows a love of pomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and
moral pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency
its Platonic denial of the senses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity.
the subterranean cult:
? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY, 347
428.
To what extent psychologists have been cor rupted by the moral idiosyncrasy! --Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to
advance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory that denies morality);--not one had the courage to identify the typical feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness
("pleasure"), with the will to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;--not
one had the courage to regard virtue as a result of immorality (as a result of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race, or of a polis); for the will to power was considered immoral.
In the whole of moral evolution, there is no
sign of truth: all the conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the psychological
tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this department of prevarication are sophisms.
The chief feature of all moral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and self-control:
they regard "fine feelings" as arguments: their
? heaving
godliness. . . . Moral philosophy is the most
breasts seem to them the bellows of
suspicious period in the history of the human intellect.
The first great example: in the name of morality and under its patronage, a great wrong
was committed, which as a matter of fact was in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient
stress cannot be laid upon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented
? ? ? 348
THE WILL TO POWER.
the decadence of every kind of Greek ability, but
also made it contagious. . . . This "virtue" made wholly abstract was the highest form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on the world.
The moment is a very remarkable one: the
Sophists are within sight of the first criticism of morality, the first knowledge of morality:--they
classify the majority of moral valuations (in view
of their dependence upon local conditions) together;
--they lead one to understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld dialectically:
that is to say, they guessed that all the funda mental principles of a morality must be sophistical
--a proposition which was afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso
phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);--they
postulate the primary truth that there is no such thing as a "moral per se," a "good per se," and that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this respect.
Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found in those days?
The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown
out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the
culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Hera clitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in the
elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance, And
--it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the science of epistemology and morality
has confirmed the attitude of the Sophists. . . . Our
? ? ? - CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
349
? great extent, Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean
modern attitude of mind
say that Protagorean even sufficient: because Protagoras was himself synthesis
the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.
(Plato: great Cagliostro-let think how Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him Plato's integrity by any chance
beyond question?
But we
least know absolute truth him not even
what he wished have taught --namely, things which were
relative truths: the separate and immortal life "souls. ")
429.
The Sophists are nothing more nor less than realists: they elevate all the values and practices which are common property the rank values --they have the courage, peculiar all strong
intellects, which consists knowing their im morality.
be supposed that these small Greek independent republics, filled with rage and envy
that they would fain have devoured each other, were led by principles humanity and honesty
Thucydides by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent the question destruction sub mission? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could have been able speak virtue the midst
that dreadful strain--or not Tartuffes, least detached philosophers, anchorites, exiles, and fleers
? ? ? if of
in
at
or of
of
? ofof.
to
to
.
is Is
Is
to
of so
. .
Is it
to . . .
a
it
in to
inof to atusaa
of
is, is to
to as
of
.
.
? 350
* THE WILL TO POWER.
from reality. . . . All of them, people who denied things in order to be able to exist.
The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and
Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they
were Jews or I know not what. Grote's tactics
in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to raise them to the rank of men of honour
and moralisers--but it was their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.
43O.
The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact that it always attempted to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness belongs to every kind of perfection: even the
mathematician carries out his calculations un
? consciously.
What, then, does Socrates' reaction mean, which
recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was amused when morality was unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what proves its superiority--without unconsciousness it is worth nothing!
In reality it means the dissolution of Greek instincts, when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue. All these great "men of virtue" and of words are themselves types of dissolution.
. . .
? ? ? -
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
351
In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some sense, from their Greek and Graeco-political soil, in order to be denaturalised under the cover of being sub limated. The great concepts "good" and "just"
are divorced from the first principles of which they form a part, and, as "ideas" become free, degenerate
into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them; they are regarded as entities
or as symbols of entities: a world is invented where
they are "at home," and from which they are supposed to hail.
In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in
Plato. . . . And then it was necessary to invent the abstract perfect man also:--good, just, wise,
and a dialectician to boot--in short, the scarecrow ofthe ancient philosopher: a plant without any
soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies"
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "in
dividual" per se! the highest form of Artifici ality. . . . .
Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of man--"the good man," "the happy man," "the
wise man. "--Socrates represents a moment of the most profound perversity in the history of values.
43 I.
Socrates. --This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics is a great question. What
? ? ? ? 352
THE WILL TO POWER.
really happened then? Socrates, the roturier
who was responsible for was thus able
triumph over more noble taste, the taste the
noble --the mob gets the upper hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners
were repudiated good society; they were re garded indecent; the youths were warned
against them. What was the purpose this display reasons? Why demonstrate Against others one could use authority. One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares,
authority: and last but not least, one understood each other.
there was tradition--also form
? There was no room found for dialectics.
Besides,
all such modes presenting reasons were dis
trusted. All honest things do not carry their
reasons their hands such fashion.
indecent show all the five fingers the same time. That which can be "demonstrated
every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and
little worth. The instinct
carries little conviction. Nothing more easily wiped away than the effect dialectician. can
only
extremity; necessary
means self-defence. One must an have extort one's
rights; otherwise one makes no use dialectics. That why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was dialectician, and so was Socrates.
As dialectician
person has merciless instru
can play the tyrant with when conquers. The
his opponent demon strate that he not an idiot; he made furious
ment his hand: it; compromises
dialectician leaves
? ? is
a it is
a
it to
a of
of
in
he is
a
he in
is be a
toin
of as
he
a
of to to
is
at ofP
to of of a
in
a
it,
be It
in "It
of
of
is is
to
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
353
and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason ing powers--he paralyses his opponent's intellect.
--The dialectician's irony is a form of mob revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the
cold knife-cuts of the syllogism. . . .
In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality
and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so
great, that he involuntarily honoured and deified
the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intoxi
cation: as the consciousness of being able to
exercise control over one's self by means of it-- as an instrument of the Will to Power.
432.
The problem of Socrates. --The two antitheses: the tragic and the Socratic spirits -- measured according to the law of Life.
To what extent is the Socratic spirit a
decadent phenomenon ? to what extent are
robust health and power still revealed by the
whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics,
his ability, and his severity? (the health of the Plebeian; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose
astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his cleverness; the whole type is "ugly"). Uglification : self-derision, dialectical dryness,
intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the "tyrant" (instinct). Everything in Socrates is
? exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature;
he is a buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
VOL. I. Z
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
354
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of cleverness: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
--the unravelment of the errors of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded in charming the world: ancient philo sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine. . . .
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is a moral-maniac P--Every "practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a state of distress,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against
the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
problem. very timely This is the Itwas a -one
in those days. Reason became virtue equalled happiness.
Solution ; Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
They
regard him as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to "happiness. " The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfoetation
of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness"
shows the pathological condition of the subcon scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt they were in danger.
and from dissolution--all decadent men.
virtue
? ? ? ? 356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -- Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re
garded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e. an intention), could only answer "Happiness" to
the question: "What does man desire? " (it was
impossible to answer "Power," because that would have been immoral);--consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi ness, why is it? Because he mistakes the means
thereto. -- What is the unfailing means of acquiring happiness Answer: virtue. --Why virtue? Be
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
? impossible:
virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
"happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power:
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta tion involves. . . .
The ancient philosophers combat everything
? ? ~ CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
-- >
-
that intoxicates and exalts--everything that im pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest, the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection--whereas the reverse is true. . .
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
Pyrrho did, for instance, thought every body did--that say, that goodness and uprightness "paltry people" were far superior philosophers.
All the deeper natures antiquity were dis gusted the philosophers virtue; all people
saw them was brawlers and actors. (This was the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho)
* --- -~
- |
- --
? 357
? practical life, patience, goodness, and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them:--this something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical practice, they are
more courageous their way dealing with the
exigencies
criticism the philosopher. --Philosophers and moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Result:
life.
435.
? ? A
of
in
at
it, as
of
. in
or is
In
.
is to
of in
in
of of
in
as to
*
? 358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing That lies beyond their wills: and however little they may be aware the fact,
generally discovered subsequently that they were among the most *powerful promoters of decadence.
Let examine the philosophers Greece--
Plato, for instance. He was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries,
ancestors. He was the seducer of the nobles:
and the belief tradition and
? he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
He denied all the first principles the
"noble Greek" sterling worth; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled politics for the future, and
was the example man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He profound and passionate everything that anti-Hellenic.
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(a? 8wdhopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon ism, and reaction.
The question "happiness,"
the "salvation the soul,"
"virtue," and the expression
physiological contradictoriness ? urpose.
these declining natures: their instincts lack all balance and
? ? in is
of
of . .
ofof . of
a in
of
is is
in
it
of
. .
of in
it in
.
is us
. . .
it.
of of
of
of
? >~ 436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to everything
--- CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
good follows, therefore,
that must lead
"backwards"). Even the fact that, according
Descartes had notion thoroughly Christian
mind, which includes the Creator all things,
and moral attitude
belief good God
the truthfulness God guarantees the judgments
~~~
? our senses for us. But for this religious sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should we obtain our right trust existence?
That thinking must be measure
what cannot be the subject
exist--is coarse non plus ultra
confidence (in the essential principle
the root all things); this itself mad assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think as is.
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
reality,-that thought, cannot moral blind
truth anything precisely
something
? ? to
at
a of
it
of
in (it . ofa a
.
On the other hand, the appearance of mo
scruples (or in other words, the coming to conscio
ness of the values which guide action) betray certain morbidness; strong ages and people
not ponder over their rights, nor over the princip
of action, over instinct or over reason. Conscio
ness is a sign that the real morality--that is to s
the certainty of instinct which leads to a defin
course of action--is going to the dogs. . . . Ev.
time a new world of consciousness is created, moralists are signs of a lesion, of impoverishm
and of disorganisation. Those who are dee instinctive fear bandying words over duties: amo them are found pyrrhonic opponents of dialect and of knowableness in general. . . . A virtue refuted with a "for. " . . .
Thesis : The appearance of moralists belo to periods when morality is declining.
Thesis : The moralist is a dissipator of ma
instincts, however much he may appear to be th restorer,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
34I
Thesis : That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a moral instinct, but the instincts of decadence, translated into the forms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts as corruption).
T:hesis : The instincts of decadence which, thanks to moralists, wish to become master of the in stinctive morality of stronger races and ages, are
(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched;
(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the unhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse;
(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble interpretation of their condition,
and who therefore require to be as poor physi ologists as possible.
424.
The humbug of the scientific spirit--One should not affect the spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and has to affect a certain kind of method which is
not yet seasonable. Neither should we falsify
things and thoughts, which we have arrived at differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and dialectics. It is thus that Kant in
his "morality" falsifies his inner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing is Herbert Spencer's Ethics. A man should neither conceal nor misrepresent the facts con cerning the way in which he conceived his
? ? ? ? scientific
THE WILL TO POWER.
342
thoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly always have something of the
aphoristic and impetuous character of Pascal's Pense? es. The motive forces and valuations have
lain long below the surface; that which comes
uppermost is their effect.
I guard against all the humbug of a false
spirit:--
(1) In respect of the manner of demonstration,
if it does not correspond to the genesis of the thoughts;
(2) In respect of the demands for methods which, at a given period in science, may be quite
impossible;
(3) In respect of the demand for objectivity, for cold impersonal treatment, where, as in the case
of all valuations, we describe ourselves and our
intimate experiences in a couple of words. There
are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance,
Sainte-Beuve's. He actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth or
passion either "pro" or "con," and he would fain have lied that fact out of his life.
425.
"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral in
difference in regard to one's self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fatal circumstances. Un
scrupulousness in the use of dangerous means;
perversity and complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.
My profound indifference to myself: I refuse
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
343
to derive any advantage from my knowledge, nor
do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it
may entail. --I include among these disadvantages
that which is called the perversion of character;
this prospect is beside the point: I use my char
acter, but I try neither to understand it nor to
change it--the personal calculation of virtue has
not entered my head once. It strikes me that one
closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one
becomes interested in one's own personal case--or even in the "Salvation of one's soul"! . . . One
should not take one's morality too seriously, nor
should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality. . . .
A sort of heritage of morality is perhaps pre
supposed
with it and fling a great deal of it out of the
window without materially reducing one's means.
One is never tempted to admire "beautiful souls,"
one always knows one's self to be their superior.
The monsters of virtue should be met with inner
scorn; de? miaiser la vertu--Oh, the joy of it !
One should revolve round one's self, have no
desire to be "better" or "anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to omit
throwing the tentacles or meshes of every mor ality out to things.
426.
Concerning the psychology of philosophers. They should be psychologists--this was possible
only from the nineteenth century onwards--and no longer little Jack Horners, who see three or
? here: one feels that one can be lavish
? ? ? 344
THE WILL TO POWER.
four feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied
to burrow inside themselves. We psychologists of
the future are not very intent on self-contempla tion: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when an instrument endeavours "to know itself": *
we are instruments of knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness of an instrument--consequently we may not analyse
or "know" ourselves. The first sign of a great
psychologist's self-preservative
goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest,
no inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned. . . . The great egoism of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal,"
"disinterested"! --Oh to what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this !
We are no Pascals, we are not particularly in
terested in the "Salvation of the soul," in our own
happiness, and in our own virtue. --We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so con
cerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again different, we thoroughly mistrust all
men who thus contemplate their own navels: be cause introspection seems to us a degenerate form
of the psychologist's genius, as a note of interroga
tion affixed to the psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is actuated by
the will to see for the sake of seeing.
instinct: he never
? invariably inveighed against the "yvo? 6 geavro? w" of the Socratic school; he was
*TRANSLATOR's NoTE. --Goethe
of the opinion that an animal which tries to see inner self must be sick.
? ? its
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
345
The apparition of Greek philosophers since the
time of Socrates is a symptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount.
The "Sophist" is still quite Hellenic--as are also Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the great
Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The
Polis loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in
its rights of dominion over every other polis. . . . Cultures, that is to say, "the gods," are exchanged,
2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY,
427.
? prerogative of the deus autochthonus is lost. Good and Evil of
and thus the belief in the exclusive
whatever origin get mixed: the boundaries separ
ating good from evil gradually vanish. . . . This is the "Sophist. " . . .
On the other hand, the "philosopher" is the
reactionary: he insists upon the old virtues. He
sees the reason of decay in the decay of institu
tions: he therefore wishes to revive old institutions;
--he sees decay in the decline of authority: he
therefore endeavours to find new authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature and
exotic religions. . . . );--he will reinstate the ideal polis, after the concept "polis" has become super
annuated (just as the Jews kept themselves to gether as a "people" after they had fallen into slavery). They become interested in all tyrants:
their desire is to re-establish virtue with force majeure.
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
346
Gradually everything genuinely Hellenic is hel
responsible for the state of decay (and Plato is jus as ungrateful to Pericles, Homer, tragedy, an
rhetoric as the prophets are to David and Saul The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objectio.
to the fundamental principles of Hellenic culture the profound error of philosophers. --Conclusion: th
Greek world perishes. The cause thereof: Home mythology, ancient morality, etc.
The anti-Hellenic development of philosopher:
valuations:--the Egyptian influence ("Life afte
death" made into law. . . . );--the Semitic influenc (the "dignity of the sage," the "Sheik");--th
? Pythagorean influence,
Silence, means of terrorisation consisting of appeal
to a "Beyond," mathematics: the religious valua
tion consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmi entity;--the sacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendenta influences;--the dialectical influence,--I am o opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting
and pedantic meticulousness in his concepts -- Decline of good intellectual taste: the hatefu noisiness of every kind of direct dialectics seem no longer to be felt.
The two decadent tendencies and extremes rul
side by side: (a) the luxuriant and more charming
kind of decadence which shows a love of pomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and
moral pathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency
its Platonic denial of the senses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity.
the subterranean cult:
? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY, 347
428.
To what extent psychologists have been cor rupted by the moral idiosyncrasy! --Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to
advance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory that denies morality);--not one had the courage to identify the typical feature of happiness, of every kind of happiness
("pleasure"), with the will to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;--not
one had the courage to regard virtue as a result of immorality (as a result of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race, or of a polis); for the will to power was considered immoral.
In the whole of moral evolution, there is no
sign of truth: all the conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the psychological
tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this department of prevarication are sophisms.
The chief feature of all moral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and self-control:
they regard "fine feelings" as arguments: their
? heaving
godliness. . . . Moral philosophy is the most
breasts seem to them the bellows of
suspicious period in the history of the human intellect.
The first great example: in the name of morality and under its patronage, a great wrong
was committed, which as a matter of fact was in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient
stress cannot be laid upon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented
? ? ? 348
THE WILL TO POWER.
the decadence of every kind of Greek ability, but
also made it contagious. . . . This "virtue" made wholly abstract was the highest form of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on the world.
The moment is a very remarkable one: the
Sophists are within sight of the first criticism of morality, the first knowledge of morality:--they
classify the majority of moral valuations (in view
of their dependence upon local conditions) together;
--they lead one to understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld dialectically:
that is to say, they guessed that all the funda mental principles of a morality must be sophistical
--a proposition which was afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso
phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);--they
postulate the primary truth that there is no such thing as a "moral per se," a "good per se," and that it is madness to talk of "truth" in this respect.
Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found in those days?
The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown
out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the
culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Hera clitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in the
elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance, And
--it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the science of epistemology and morality
has confirmed the attitude of the Sophists. . . . Our
? ? ? - CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
349
? great extent, Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean
modern attitude of mind
say that Protagorean even sufficient: because Protagoras was himself synthesis
the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.
(Plato: great Cagliostro-let think how Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him Plato's integrity by any chance
beyond question?
But we
least know absolute truth him not even
what he wished have taught --namely, things which were
relative truths: the separate and immortal life "souls. ")
429.
The Sophists are nothing more nor less than realists: they elevate all the values and practices which are common property the rank values --they have the courage, peculiar all strong
intellects, which consists knowing their im morality.
be supposed that these small Greek independent republics, filled with rage and envy
that they would fain have devoured each other, were led by principles humanity and honesty
Thucydides by any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths the Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent the question destruction sub mission? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could have been able speak virtue the midst
that dreadful strain--or not Tartuffes, least detached philosophers, anchorites, exiles, and fleers
? ? ? if of
in
at
or of
of
? ofof.
to
to
.
is Is
Is
to
of so
. .
Is it
to . . .
a
it
in to
inof to atusaa
of
is, is to
to as
of
.
.
? 350
* THE WILL TO POWER.
from reality. . . . All of them, people who denied things in order to be able to exist.
The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and
Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they
were Jews or I know not what. Grote's tactics
in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to raise them to the rank of men of honour
and moralisers--but it was their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.
43O.
The great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact that it always attempted to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required to enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness belongs to every kind of perfection: even the
mathematician carries out his calculations un
? consciously.
What, then, does Socrates' reaction mean, which
recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and which was amused when morality was unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what proves its superiority--without unconsciousness it is worth nothing!
In reality it means the dissolution of Greek instincts, when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue. All these great "men of virtue" and of words are themselves types of dissolution.
. . .
? ? ? -
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
351
In practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some sense, from their Greek and Graeco-political soil, in order to be denaturalised under the cover of being sub limated. The great concepts "good" and "just"
are divorced from the first principles of which they form a part, and, as "ideas" become free, degenerate
into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them; they are regarded as entities
or as symbols of entities: a world is invented where
they are "at home," and from which they are supposed to hail.
In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in
Plato. . . . And then it was necessary to invent the abstract perfect man also:--good, just, wise,
and a dialectician to boot--in short, the scarecrow ofthe ancient philosopher: a plant without any
soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which "justifies"
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "in
dividual" per se! the highest form of Artifici ality. . . . .
Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of man--"the good man," "the happy man," "the
wise man. "--Socrates represents a moment of the most profound perversity in the history of values.
43 I.
Socrates. --This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics is a great question. What
? ? ? ? 352
THE WILL TO POWER.
really happened then? Socrates, the roturier
who was responsible for was thus able
triumph over more noble taste, the taste the
noble --the mob gets the upper hand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners
were repudiated good society; they were re garded indecent; the youths were warned
against them. What was the purpose this display reasons? Why demonstrate Against others one could use authority. One commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares,
authority: and last but not least, one understood each other.
there was tradition--also form
? There was no room found for dialectics.
Besides,
all such modes presenting reasons were dis
trusted. All honest things do not carry their
reasons their hands such fashion.
indecent show all the five fingers the same time. That which can be "demonstrated
every party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and
little worth. The instinct
carries little conviction. Nothing more easily wiped away than the effect dialectician. can
only
extremity; necessary
means self-defence. One must an have extort one's
rights; otherwise one makes no use dialectics. That why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard the Fox was dialectician, and so was Socrates.
As dialectician
person has merciless instru
can play the tyrant with when conquers. The
his opponent demon strate that he not an idiot; he made furious
ment his hand: it; compromises
dialectician leaves
? ? is
a it is
a
it to
a of
of
in
he is
a
he in
is be a
toin
of as
he
a
of to to
is
at ofP
to of of a
in
a
it,
be It
in "It
of
of
is is
to
? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
353
and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason ing powers--he paralyses his opponent's intellect.
--The dialectician's irony is a form of mob revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the
cold knife-cuts of the syllogism. . . .
In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality
and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so
great, that he involuntarily honoured and deified
the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intoxi
cation: as the consciousness of being able to
exercise control over one's self by means of it-- as an instrument of the Will to Power.
432.
The problem of Socrates. --The two antitheses: the tragic and the Socratic spirits -- measured according to the law of Life.
To what extent is the Socratic spirit a
decadent phenomenon ? to what extent are
robust health and power still revealed by the
whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics,
his ability, and his severity? (the health of the Plebeian; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose
astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his cleverness; the whole type is "ugly"). Uglification : self-derision, dialectical dryness,
intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the "tyrant" (instinct). Everything in Socrates is
? exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature;
he is a buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
VOL. I. Z
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
354
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of cleverness: he calls it "virtue" (he regarded it as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
--the unravelment of the errors of passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded in charming the world: ancient philo sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine. . . .
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is a moral-maniac P--Every "practical" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a state of distress,
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against
the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
problem. very timely This is the Itwas a -one
in those days. Reason became virtue equalled happiness.
Solution ; Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
They
regard him as a doctor: Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to "happiness. " The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfoetation
of logic and clear reasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness"
shows the pathological condition of the subcon scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt they were in danger.
and from dissolution--all decadent men.
virtue
? ? ? ? 356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -- Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re
garded "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e. an intention), could only answer "Happiness" to
the question: "What does man desire? " (it was
impossible to answer "Power," because that would have been immoral);--consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi ness, why is it? Because he mistakes the means
thereto. -- What is the unfailing means of acquiring happiness Answer: virtue. --Why virtue? Be
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
? impossible:
virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
"happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power:
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta tion involves. . . .
The ancient philosophers combat everything
? ? ~ CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
-- >
-
that intoxicates and exalts--everything that im pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest, the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection--whereas the reverse is true. . .
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
Pyrrho did, for instance, thought every body did--that say, that goodness and uprightness "paltry people" were far superior philosophers.
All the deeper natures antiquity were dis gusted the philosophers virtue; all people
saw them was brawlers and actors. (This was the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho)
* --- -~
- |
- --
? 357
? practical life, patience, goodness, and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them:--this something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical practice, they are
more courageous their way dealing with the
exigencies
criticism the philosopher. --Philosophers and moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Result:
life.
435.
? ? A
of
in
at
it, as
of
. in
or is
In
.
is to
of in
in
of of
in
as to
*
? 358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing That lies beyond their wills: and however little they may be aware the fact,
generally discovered subsequently that they were among the most *powerful promoters of decadence.
Let examine the philosophers Greece--
Plato, for instance. He was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love contest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries,
ancestors. He was the seducer of the nobles:
and the belief tradition and
? he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
He denied all the first principles the
"noble Greek" sterling worth; he made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled politics for the future, and
was the example man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He profound and passionate everything that anti-Hellenic.
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(a? 8wdhopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon ism, and reaction.
The question "happiness,"
the "salvation the soul,"
"virtue," and the expression
physiological contradictoriness ? urpose.
these declining natures: their instincts lack all balance and
? ? in is
of
of . .
ofof . of
a in
of
is is
in
it
of
. .
of in
it in
.
is us
. . .
it.
of of
of
of
? >~ 436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to everything
--- CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
good follows, therefore,
that must lead
"backwards"). Even the fact that, according
Descartes had notion thoroughly Christian
mind, which includes the Creator all things,
and moral attitude
belief good God
the truthfulness God guarantees the judgments
~~~
? our senses for us. But for this religious sanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should we obtain our right trust existence?
That thinking must be measure
what cannot be the subject
exist--is coarse non plus ultra
confidence (in the essential principle
the root all things); this itself mad assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think as is.
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
reality,-that thought, cannot moral blind
truth anything precisely
something
? ? to
at
a of
it
of
in (it . ofa a
.
