This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the "home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
love of God or of the "home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY
284.
235
The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever
ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.
We must ascertain to what extent such qualities are conditioned as means to the attainment of
certain desires and ends (often an "evil" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality): or as the expressions of certain states of need--that is to say, as preservative measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc. ).
In short, every one of them is not considered
? "good" for
approximates
"society"
ends the latter, necessary for their preserva
own sake, but rather because standard prescribed either by by the "herd," means the
tion and enhancement, and also the result
an actual gregarious instinct the individual;
these qualities are thus the service an instinct which fundamentally different from these
antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless the outside world; full
states virtue. For the herd
love dominion and feelings mistrust, etc. the "herdsman" this antagonism comes
the fore: must have qualities which are the reverse those possessed by the herd.
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THE WILL TO POWER.
236
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all
order of rank : its instinct is in favour of the
leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals (the sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc. ), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol
ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious
nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones
rigs itself out in the most beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe,
the hatred of the herd for all truthful
286.
? Let us not deceive ourselves | When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his
? ? ? man
conscious the opposite feelings,--that
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
237
breast, as altruism would have him hear he shows thereby that he belongs the herd. When
say, when he sees his danger and his undoing disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he
does not belong the herd. 287.
the herd should rule within the herd--but not
beyond it: the leaders the herd require fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
do also the independent ones the beasts prey, etc.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.
My philosophy aims
new order rank: not individualistic morality. " The spirit
? 288.
human pride--The "Free-Will" theory anti
Morality regarded
attempt establishing
religious. Its ultimate object right upon man regard himself
his highest states and actions: growing feeling pride.
bestow the the cause
form the
Man feels his power his "happiness"; they say: there must will behind these states--
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --Here broad distinction be tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.
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? 238
THE WILL TO POWER.
otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
Point of view, based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause. Then comes the counter-movement--that of the
? moral-philosophers.
These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value: thus morality becomes a
causa prima; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as
prima causa. The arrie`re pense? e is always this:
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical. . . .
In short: in order that man
may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a step in the development
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
239
of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self contradiction. . . . Any degree of consciousness renders perfection impossible. . . . A form of
theatricalness. )
29O.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt" was considered as some thing which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently- an act proceeding from
a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm--that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per fection.
29 I.
How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in
perfection)
and to have willed them. . . . (Criticism: all perfect action is precisely un conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is
? ? ? ? 240
THE WILL TO POWER.
consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also crimin ality. . . .
The value of an action must be judged by its
the utilitarians: to measure it knowing that origin.
results, say
according to origin involves the impossibility
ahead, perhaps.
stages
Who can tell what an action and sets motion? As stimulus?
But do we know its results? Five
provokes
powder-magazine Utilitarians are simpletons. And finally,
As the spark which fires
they would first all have
know what useful; here also their sight can travel only over
? five stages so. They have no notion the great economy which cannot dispense with evil. We do not know the origin the results:
has an action, then, any value
We have yet the action itself consider: the
states consciousness that accompany the yea nay which follows upon its performance: does the value an action lie the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value music would measured according the pleasure
displeasure which occasions gives the composer.
which Obviously feelings
value must accompany sensation power, restraint, impotence--for instance, freedom
lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently:
physio logical terms? could be the expression
could the value an action be reduced
completely free constrained life? --Maybe its biological value expressed this way.
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or
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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
24 I
then, an action can judged neither the
light its origin, nor its results, nor its accom paniments consciousness, then its value must be
292.
morality
The re-establishment "Mature": an action itself quite devoid value; the whole question
this: who performed it? One and the same "crime" may, one case, be the greatest privi lege, the other infamy. As matter fact,
the selfishness the judges which interprets an
amounts denaturalisation separate an action from man;
contempt against "sin";
are actions which are good bad themselves.
293.
The concept "reprehensible action" presents
with some difficulties. Nothing that happens can be reprehensible itself: one would not dare
eliminate completely; for everything
bound up with everything else, that exclude one part would mean exclude the whole.
reprehensible action, therefore, would mean
reprehensible world
And even then, reprehending would
the consequence VOL.
whole.
reprehensible world even
reprehensible. And attitude mind that
direct hatred believe that there
? action (in regard whether was useful
relation degree them).
author) according
harmful themselves (or likeness unlikeness
? ? I.
in is it
of .
all or in of
. . .
to
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
242
condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in practice. . . . If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal
value, is eternal and necessary. --In all correlations of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love
and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point
of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says yea
by the very fact of existence.
2. 94.
Criticism of the subjective feelings value. -- Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience
condemns this action, therefore this action reprehensible. But, matter fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been
condemned for long period time: all conscience does to imitate: does not create values. That
which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge (or the prejudice against) consequences.
The approbation conscience, the feeling well
being, "inner peace," the same order emotions the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. Self-contentment proves no
more favour that which gives rise than
its absence can prove anything against the value
the thing which fails give rise We are
far too ignorant able judge the value
our actions: this respect we lack the ability
? regard things objectively.
condemn an action, we do not do judges,
Even when we
? ? so as
to of it.
to it,
of
of
to of of
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it
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? with
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
243
but as adversaries. . . . When noble sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its
favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of
the most exalted pathos during production.
were wiser regard these sentiments misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away
from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the result often that we make fools our selves they actually make fools us.
295.
We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and
self-crucifixion two thousand years: these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we
have affiliated natural propensities with heavy conscience.
An attempt produce an entirely opposite
state affairs would be possible: that say, affiliate all desires beyond, all sympathy with things which are opposed the senses, the
intellect, and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly),
heavy conscience,
296.
? The great crimes psychology:
(1) That all pain and unhappiness should have been falsified by being associated with what wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed its innocence. )
? ? of
is to
of
is
It
in
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to a
of
. . .
to
its as
of a
to
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at in a
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? 244
THE WILL TO POWER.
(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness,
voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity,
ledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.
(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have
decked themselves in the most beautiful words,
and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.
(4) That greatness in man should have been given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice
for another's good, for other people; that even in
the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability.
(5) That love should have been twisted round to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal,
resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the wealth of a given personality. Only the
wholest people can love; the disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls! ).
This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the "home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. (Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of
the ego, altruism as the pre-eminence of others. )
(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); the passions regarded
as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless. The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,
a sort of barricade built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled,
know
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
245
the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of against the strong (and finally destroying them
their growth on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these classes are
best able prosper, sanctified and alone held honour by them. Let any one examine the Jewish priesthood.
297.
The vestiges the depreciation Nature through moral transcendence: The value of disinterested
ness, the cult altruism; the belief reward
the play natural consequences; the belief "goodness" and genius itself, the one, like the other, were the result disinterestedness; the continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of
the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunder standing history (as means educating up
morality) pessimism the attitude taken up
towards history (the latter just much result the depreciation Nature, that
pseudo-justification history, that refusal see history the pessimist sees it).
? 298.
"Morality for own sake. "--this
an im
portant step
itself appears final value.
religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for instance, the case Judaism. likewise goes through phase which separates itself
the denaturalisation
morals: this phase
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? 246
THE WILL TO POWER.
from religion, and in which no God is "moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal. . . . This is how the case stands at present.
"Art for Art's sake": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the slander of reality ("idealising"
into the hateful). When an ideal is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im poverished, and calumniated. "Beauty for Beauty's
sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," "Goodness for Goodness' sake. "--these are three forms of the evil
eye for reality.
Art, knowledge, and morality are means:
instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Life--with "God,"--they have also been regarded as revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through them. . . .
"Beautiful" and "ugly," "true" and "false,"
"good" and "evil"--these things are distinctions and . antagonisms which betray the preservative
and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man alone, but of all stable and enduring
organisms which take up a definite stand against
their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor: it is a means of separating things, leading to stronger isolation. . . .
299.
Moral naturalism : The tracing back of ap parently independent and supernatural values to
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
247
their real "nature"--that is to say, to natural immorality, to natural "utility," etc.
Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these
observations by the term moral naturalism: my object is to re-translate the moral values which have apparently become independent and un
natural into their real nature--that is to say, into their natural "immorality. "
M. B. --Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called "Idealisation"):--
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge, then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
3OO.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality. --Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtu`.
3OI.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
emancipated
from its real nature (until it is almost the opposite of Nature).
? ? ? ? 248
THE WILL TO POWER.
3O2.
Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right --as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo sopher to admire even this "nothing" (Wil admirari).
3O3.
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
? which--fortunately--has time.
Life general
on earth matter moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which no importance whatever the general
character the earth; the earth itself like
every star, hiatus between two nonentities, an event without plan, without reason, will, self
necessity-- foolish necessity. Something rebels
consciousness--the worst kind
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers
our hearts, "All this must be false because revolting. Could not all this appearance?
And man spite all, use Kant's words"--
How VIRTUE MADE TO DOMINATE. 3O4.
Concerning
treatise we wish speak
-
the ideal
the moralist--In this
the great politics
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to of.
IS
. to
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? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
* virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
? any other dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with -
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which pur, sans me? lange, cru, vert, dans toute
force, dans toute son a^prete? , superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never achieved by
approximate Even this narrower kind politics--in the
man--the most he can do
politics
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon
virtue--the ideal never seems have
? ? it.
it.
sa
is, of
of in
is
to
is
is
of to
be
*
y
? 250
THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter: systematic self denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
? self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist among other things, necessarily great actor; his only danger
that his pose may unconsciously become
second nature, just like his ideal, which keep
his esse and his operari apart divine way;
everything does must be done sub specie boni --a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal divine
ideal And, matter fact, they say that
the moralist's canon and of his
? ? !
he as
a
a
of
in a
is,
A
a
is to
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
25 I
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under
good
stands how to remain what He the God.
3O5.
by means virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re
The dominion virtue not established nounces power, one loses the Will Power.
306.
The victory moral ideal achieved by the
same "immoral" means any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
? -
3O7.
He who knows the way fame originates will suspicious even the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality just "immoral" any other
thing earth; morality immorality.
itself form
The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity all phenomena saved--
3O9.
There are some who seek for the immoral side things. When they say: "this
? ? of of
on
. of .
is
is of be
is in
as
is to
as a
is,
is
of
of a
of
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? 252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover recover my equanimity.
IO.
A. The ways which lead power: the presenta tion of the new virtue under the name of an old one,--the awakening "interest" concerning ("happiness" declared its reward, and vice versa? ),--artistic slandering
its way,--the exploitation advantages and accidents with the view glorifying it,-the con
version adherents into fanatics means
? sacrifices and grand scale.
separations,--symbolism
Power attained: (1) Means virtue; (2) seductive means (court) etiquette virtue.
II.
constraint virtue; (3) the
By what means does virtue attain power? -- With precisely the same means political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining opposing virtues that happen be already power, the changing
and scorn;
"immorality. "
How does
desire behave towards itself in
their names, systematic persecution short, means acts of general
that stands
? ? in of a
of its
by
to
of a
as of a
of
in
of
of
to
3
toof 3
of B.
I
of
on
ainit it,
by
of
of of be all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue? --A process of re christening; systematic denial of intentions;
practice misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards adversaries. possible, too, the protection sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also intoxicated and fired with A enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and
party must be won, which either triumphs perishes--one must unconscious and naif.
I2.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, that we no longer recognise
such. The same has happened the love
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease the nervus sympathicus, for instance,
eulogised Pessimism, Pascalism, Carlylism, etc.
We should begin entertain doubts concerning
man we heard that he required reasons order remain respectable: we should, any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
we should hear, course time, that such-and such an aspirant for virtue was need bad reasons order remain respectable, would not
? the sexes which has become
the slavish attitude mind appears Christian
"for" certain cases
sometimes single "for" enough refute one.
amour-passion;
may compromising;
? ? in
in a
to if
as of
in
to
in
so
of
its
it
of
to
Ifa ofita as
is of
3.
in
to
or
as
its
be
If
to of be 3I 3
be
in
inis or
Z
? 254
THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him. But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my bad reasons,--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc. ,
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue. . . Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent
the moralisation of the masses. "
3I4.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.
3 I 5.
Morality in the valuation of races and classes. -- In view of the fact that the passions and funda mental instincts in every race and class express
preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them "virtuous" practically means: That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.
It means that they should cease from differen
tiating themselves from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, that they are declining. . . .
It means that the will to one kind of morality
? the means which enable the latter to
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
255
is merely the tyranny of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the under
mining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them: but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY
284.
235
The qualities and tendencies which are praised: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever
ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.
We must ascertain to what extent such qualities are conditioned as means to the attainment of
certain desires and ends (often an "evil" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality): or as the expressions of certain states of need--that is to say, as preservative measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc. ).
In short, every one of them is not considered
? "good" for
approximates
"society"
ends the latter, necessary for their preserva
own sake, but rather because standard prescribed either by by the "herd," means the
tion and enhancement, and also the result
an actual gregarious instinct the individual;
these qualities are thus the service an instinct which fundamentally different from these
antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless the outside world; full
states virtue. For the herd
love dominion and feelings mistrust, etc. the "herdsman" this antagonism comes
the fore: must have qualities which are the reverse those possessed by the herd.
? ? of
of
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THE WILL TO POWER.
236
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all
order of rank : its instinct is in favour of the
leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals (the sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc. ), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol
ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious
nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones
rigs itself out in the most beautiful words--and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe,
the hatred of the herd for all truthful
286.
? Let us not deceive ourselves | When a man hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his
? ? ? man
conscious the opposite feelings,--that
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
237
breast, as altruism would have him hear he shows thereby that he belongs the herd. When
say, when he sees his danger and his undoing disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he
does not belong the herd. 287.
the herd should rule within the herd--but not
beyond it: the leaders the herd require fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
do also the independent ones the beasts prey, etc.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.
My philosophy aims
new order rank: not individualistic morality. " The spirit
? 288.
human pride--The "Free-Will" theory anti
Morality regarded
attempt establishing
religious. Its ultimate object right upon man regard himself
his highest states and actions: growing feeling pride.
bestow the the cause
form the
Man feels his power his "happiness"; they say: there must will behind these states--
*TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --Here broad distinction be tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.
? ? is a
it
of a
to
to
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of
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of
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at
of
of a of
a
is
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of or
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as 3.
at an
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is
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? 238
THE WILL TO POWER.
otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the necessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
Point of view, based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause. Then comes the counter-movement--that of the
? moral-philosophers.
These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value: thus morality becomes a
causa prima; for this there must be some kind of principle in man, and "free will" is posited as
prima causa. The arrie`re pense? e is always this:
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is automatic and mechanical. . . .
In short: in order that man
may respect himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of "Free Will" morality. It is a step in the development
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
239
of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
often the expression of an imperfect and often morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self contradiction. . . . Any degree of consciousness renders perfection impossible. . . . A form of
theatricalness. )
29O.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt" was considered as some thing which had no connection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the notion "punishment" was held to be an educating and beneficent act, consequently- an act proceeding from
a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm--that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per fection.
29 I.
How false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has preceded it in
perfection)
and to have willed them. . . . (Criticism: all perfect action is precisely un conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is
? ? ? ? 240
THE WILL TO POWER.
consciousness! And morality has been measured in the light of this supposition, as also crimin ality. . . .
The value of an action must be judged by its
the utilitarians: to measure it knowing that origin.
results, say
according to origin involves the impossibility
ahead, perhaps.
stages
Who can tell what an action and sets motion? As stimulus?
But do we know its results? Five
provokes
powder-magazine Utilitarians are simpletons. And finally,
As the spark which fires
they would first all have
know what useful; here also their sight can travel only over
? five stages so. They have no notion the great economy which cannot dispense with evil. We do not know the origin the results:
has an action, then, any value
We have yet the action itself consider: the
states consciousness that accompany the yea nay which follows upon its performance: does the value an action lie the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value music would measured according the pleasure
displeasure which occasions gives the composer.
which Obviously feelings
value must accompany sensation power, restraint, impotence--for instance, freedom
lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently:
physio logical terms? could be the expression
could the value an action be reduced
completely free constrained life? --Maybe its biological value expressed this way.
? ? is
or
of
. . .
its in
it
it, . ) in a
in
F
a .
. . .
of . of
ofit or or
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orto of be
of
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a
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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
24 I
then, an action can judged neither the
light its origin, nor its results, nor its accom paniments consciousness, then its value must be
292.
morality
The re-establishment "Mature": an action itself quite devoid value; the whole question
this: who performed it? One and the same "crime" may, one case, be the greatest privi lege, the other infamy. As matter fact,
the selfishness the judges which interprets an
amounts denaturalisation separate an action from man;
contempt against "sin";
are actions which are good bad themselves.
293.
The concept "reprehensible action" presents
with some difficulties. Nothing that happens can be reprehensible itself: one would not dare
eliminate completely; for everything
bound up with everything else, that exclude one part would mean exclude the whole.
reprehensible action, therefore, would mean
reprehensible world
And even then, reprehending would
the consequence VOL.
whole.
reprehensible world even
reprehensible. And attitude mind that
direct hatred believe that there
? action (in regard whether was useful
relation degree them).
author) according
harmful themselves (or likeness unlikeness
? ? I.
in is it
of .
all or in of
. . .
to
asous toitinto
to toin is is or a, A It
If, of
to
it its in to
.
in
of inas toof a
. .
an be a a to in or its of
Q ofofa
be
or to
. toto
. in a
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
242
condemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in practice. . . . If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal
value, is eternal and necessary. --In all correlations of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love
and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point
of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type of living organism: everything that lives says yea
by the very fact of existence.
2. 94.
Criticism of the subjective feelings value. -- Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience
condemns this action, therefore this action reprehensible. But, matter fact, conscience condemns an action because that action has been
condemned for long period time: all conscience does to imitate: does not create values. That
which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge (or the prejudice against) consequences.
The approbation conscience, the feeling well
being, "inner peace," the same order emotions the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. Self-contentment proves no
more favour that which gives rise than
its absence can prove anything against the value
the thing which fails give rise We are
far too ignorant able judge the value
our actions: this respect we lack the ability
? regard things objectively.
condemn an action, we do not do judges,
Even when we
? ? so as
to of it.
to it,
of
of
to of of
in to
be .
it
its
to to
as a
in
as
of
is
of .
a of
is of
its
of
of
is
of
of
.
? with
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
243
but as adversaries. . . . When noble sentiments accompany an action, they prove nothing in its
favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of
the most exalted pathos during production.
were wiser regard these sentiments misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our power, away
from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the result often that we make fools our selves they actually make fools us.
295.
We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and
self-crucifixion two thousand years: these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we
have affiliated natural propensities with heavy conscience.
An attempt produce an entirely opposite
state affairs would be possible: that say, affiliate all desires beyond, all sympathy with things which are opposed the senses, the
intellect, and nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly),
heavy conscience,
296.
? The great crimes psychology:
(1) That all pain and unhappiness should have been falsified by being associated with what wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed its innocence. )
? ? of
is to
of
is
It
in
is
to a
of
. . .
to
its as
of a
to
of
at in a
of
to
? 244
THE WILL TO POWER.
(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness,
voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity,
ledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.
(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have
decked themselves in the most beautiful words,
and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.
(4) That greatness in man should have been given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice
for another's good, for other people; that even in
the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability.
(5) That love should have been twisted round to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal,
resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the wealth of a given personality. Only the
wholest people can love; the disinterested ones, the "objective" ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls! ).
This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the "home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself. (Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of
the ego, altruism as the pre-eminence of others. )
(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction); the passions regarded
as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless. The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,
a sort of barricade built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled,
know
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
245
the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of against the strong (and finally destroying them
their growth on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these classes are
best able prosper, sanctified and alone held honour by them. Let any one examine the Jewish priesthood.
297.
The vestiges the depreciation Nature through moral transcendence: The value of disinterested
ness, the cult altruism; the belief reward
the play natural consequences; the belief "goodness" and genius itself, the one, like the other, were the result disinterestedness; the continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of
the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunder standing history (as means educating up
morality) pessimism the attitude taken up
towards history (the latter just much result the depreciation Nature, that
pseudo-justification history, that refusal see history the pessimist sees it).
? 298.
"Morality for own sake. "--this
an im
portant step
itself appears final value.
religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for instance, the case Judaism. likewise goes through phase which separates itself
the denaturalisation
morals: this phase
? ? it a
as
of
it
of
as if
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in
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in a
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);
Inof as Itis as
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or of
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to is
in ato inin in
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? 246
THE WILL TO POWER.
from religion, and in which no God is "moral" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal. . . . This is how the case stands at present.
"Art for Art's sake": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by this means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the slander of reality ("idealising"
into the hateful). When an ideal is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im poverished, and calumniated. "Beauty for Beauty's
sake," "Truth for Truth's sake," "Goodness for Goodness' sake. "--these are three forms of the evil
eye for reality.
Art, knowledge, and morality are means:
instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Life--with "God,"--they have also been regarded as revelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through them. . . .
"Beautiful" and "ugly," "true" and "false,"
"good" and "evil"--these things are distinctions and . antagonisms which betray the preservative
and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily of man alone, but of all stable and enduring
organisms which take up a definite stand against
their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor: it is a means of separating things, leading to stronger isolation. . . .
299.
Moral naturalism : The tracing back of ap parently independent and supernatural values to
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
247
their real "nature"--that is to say, to natural immorality, to natural "utility," etc.
Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these
observations by the term moral naturalism: my object is to re-translate the moral values which have apparently become independent and un
natural into their real nature--that is to say, into their natural "immorality. "
M. B. --Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis. The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called "Idealisation"):--
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge, then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
3OO.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality. --Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtu`.
3OI.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
emancipated
from its real nature (until it is almost the opposite of Nature).
? ? ? ? 248
THE WILL TO POWER.
3O2.
Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right --as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo sopher to admire even this "nothing" (Wil admirari).
3O3.
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
? which--fortunately--has time.
Life general
on earth matter moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which no importance whatever the general
character the earth; the earth itself like
every star, hiatus between two nonentities, an event without plan, without reason, will, self
necessity-- foolish necessity. Something rebels
consciousness--the worst kind
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers
our hearts, "All this must be false because revolting. Could not all this appearance?
And man spite all, use Kant's words"--
How VIRTUE MADE TO DOMINATE. 3O4.
Concerning
treatise we wish speak
-
the ideal
the moralist--In this
the great politics
? ? of of
of
is to
4.
to of.
IS
. to
of
a its
in. aofof is . aa
be
in of us
to
in
or it
is,
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
* virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
? any other dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with -
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which pur, sans me? lange, cru, vert, dans toute
force, dans toute son a^prete? , superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never achieved by
approximate Even this narrower kind politics--in the
man--the most he can do
politics
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon
virtue--the ideal never seems have
? ? it.
it.
sa
is, of
of in
is
to
is
is
of to
be
*
y
? 250
THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter: systematic self denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
? self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist among other things, necessarily great actor; his only danger
that his pose may unconsciously become
second nature, just like his ideal, which keep
his esse and his operari apart divine way;
everything does must be done sub specie boni --a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal divine
ideal And, matter fact, they say that
the moralist's canon and of his
? ? !
he as
a
a
of
in a
is,
A
a
is to
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
25 I
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under
good
stands how to remain what He the God.
3O5.
by means virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re
The dominion virtue not established nounces power, one loses the Will Power.
306.
The victory moral ideal achieved by the
same "immoral" means any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
? -
3O7.
He who knows the way fame originates will suspicious even the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality just "immoral" any other
thing earth; morality immorality.
itself form
The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity all phenomena saved--
3O9.
There are some who seek for the immoral side things. When they say: "this
? ? of of
on
. of .
is
is of be
is in
as
is to
as a
is,
is
of
of a
of
as
is
? 252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover recover my equanimity.
IO.
A. The ways which lead power: the presenta tion of the new virtue under the name of an old one,--the awakening "interest" concerning ("happiness" declared its reward, and vice versa? ),--artistic slandering
its way,--the exploitation advantages and accidents with the view glorifying it,-the con
version adherents into fanatics means
? sacrifices and grand scale.
separations,--symbolism
Power attained: (1) Means virtue; (2) seductive means (court) etiquette virtue.
II.
constraint virtue; (3) the
By what means does virtue attain power? -- With precisely the same means political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining opposing virtues that happen be already power, the changing
and scorn;
"immorality. "
How does
desire behave towards itself in
their names, systematic persecution short, means acts of general
that stands
? ? in of a
of its
by
to
of a
as of a
of
in
of
of
to
3
toof 3
of B.
I
of
on
ainit it,
by
of
of of be all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue? --A process of re christening; systematic denial of intentions;
practice misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards adversaries. possible, too, the protection sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also intoxicated and fired with A enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and
party must be won, which either triumphs perishes--one must unconscious and naif.
I2.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, that we no longer recognise
such. The same has happened the love
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease the nervus sympathicus, for instance,
eulogised Pessimism, Pascalism, Carlylism, etc.
We should begin entertain doubts concerning
man we heard that he required reasons order remain respectable: we should, any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
we should hear, course time, that such-and such an aspirant for virtue was need bad reasons order remain respectable, would not
? the sexes which has become
the slavish attitude mind appears Christian
"for" certain cases
sometimes single "for" enough refute one.
amour-passion;
may compromising;
? ? in
in a
to if
as of
in
to
in
so
of
its
it
of
to
Ifa ofita as
is of
3.
in
to
or
as
its
be
If
to of be 3I 3
be
in
inis or
Z
? 254
THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him. But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my bad reasons,--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc. ,
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue. . . Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent
the moralisation of the masses. "
3I4.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.
3 I 5.
Morality in the valuation of races and classes. -- In view of the fact that the passions and funda mental instincts in every race and class express
preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them "virtuous" practically means: That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.
It means that they should cease from differen
tiating themselves from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, that they are declining. . . .
It means that the will to one kind of morality
? the means which enable the latter to
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
255
is merely the tyranny of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the under
mining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them: but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.
