Britain allowed an "Iranian Purchasing Office" to remain in london, where it
conducted
some of Iran's dealings in the pri- vate arms markets, and a visit by a British trade mission in May 1983 fueled expectations of a rapid increase in Anglo-Iranian trade.
Revolution and War_nodrm
The Iranian Revolution
public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
? ? ? Revolution and War
the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages. The Soviets condemned the
U. S. rescue mission in April, agreed that Iran could ship goods across Soviet territory in the event of a U. S. blockade, and issued frequent warnings about America's hostile intentions. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party supported Kho- meini and the radical clergy against both Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, and the Soviets endorsed Iran's request for an investigation of the shah's rule by the UN Security Council. The Islamic Republic also established close ties with Soviet allies such as Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicating that the fall of the shah had brought Moscow and Tehran closer together. 62
But it soon became apparent that the establishment of the Islamic Repub- lic had created as many problems for the Soviet Union as it had solved. To begin with, the revolution introduced an element of instability into a region on the Soviets' southern border, which increased the risk of U. S. military in- volvement and raised concerns about the impact of Islamic fundamentalism
. on the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. Khomeini and his followers saw Soviet Communism as an atheistic ideology that was every bit as objec- tionable as Western capitalism, and Khomeini soon declared, "We are in con-
60 A useful guide to the present state of U. S. -Iranian relations is Geoffrey Kemp, Forever En- emies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic ofIran (Washington, D. C. : Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 1994).
61 Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 283. In 1981, Brezhnev termed the Iranian Rev- olution a "major international event" and said that, "for all its complications and contradic- tions, it is still fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution. " Quoted in Karen Dawisha and Helene Carrerre d'Encausse, "Islam in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: A Double- Edged Sword? " in Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy, 170.
? 62 See Menashri, Iran, 99; Hunter, Iran and the World, 85, and "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Post-Revolution Period," in Iran's Revolution: The Searchfor Consensus, ed. R. K. Ramazani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 86.
[230]
? ? The Iranian Revolution
flict with international communism to the same extent as we are against the Western exploiters. . . . The danger of communist power is not less than that of America. "63 Iran's new leaders were well aware of earlier Soviet attempts to dominate Iran, and the new regime abrogated the 1921 Soviet-Persian friendship treaty in November 1980. Iran accused the Soviet Union of sup- plying arms to the Kurds and other rebellious ethnic minorities, and Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr warned that the Soviet Union "sought to divide Iran" in order to extend its control to theIndian Ocean. 64 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another source of tension, both because Afghanistan was a Muslim country and because the invasion reinforced Iranian fears about So- viet intentions. 65 Iran's fear of Communist subversion was another sore point, and as noted earlier, Iran eventually banned the Tudeh Party and ex- pelled eighteen Soviet diplomats in April 1983. 66 Finally, the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 posed a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union, as Iraq, a long-standing ally, was heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry. The Soviets declared they would remain neutral and offered to sell arms to Iran, but their
support for Iraq would remain a contentious issue for the rest of the decade. 67
By the mid-? . 98os, Soviet relations with Iran were much worse than they had been under the shah. Early hopes that the revolution might take on a "progressive" character had been dashed, and Iran's military successes against Iraq threatened to shift the regional balance of power and boost the ideological appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. 68 Cooperation between
63 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 156. In 1980, then-foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh told So- viet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, "Our Imam has described the United States as a great satan. Unfortunately, you too have proved in practice that you are no less satanic than the United States. " Quoted fu Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 71.
64 See Menashri, Iran, 99; "Chronology," ME/ 34, no. 2 (1980), 171; and Richard K. Herr- mann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 78-8o.
65 Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh called the invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile measure . . . against all Muslims of the world. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 284. Similarly, Khomeini condemned "the savage occupation of Afghanistan by the aggressive plunderers of the East" and hoped that "the noble Muslim people of Afghanistan will achieve victory . . . and be delivered from the clutches of the so-called champions of the working class. " Quoted in Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Dilemmas in Khomeini's Iran," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu- tion, 121.
66 Rafsanjani called the Tudeh Party a "disreputable party with a filthy record" in Novem- ber 1982, and Radio Tehran announced in May 1983 that "the mercenary leaders of that party . . . were laying the foundations of a . . . creeping coup d'etat so that they could . . . drag the country in the direction they wished. " "Chronology," ME] 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 132, 142-44.
67 An Iranian mob attacked the Soviet embassy in Tehran in December 19Bo, and the Sovi- ets suspended arms shipments to Iraq for a year. Shipments resumed after a series of Iranian victories in 1982. See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 287; Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolution- ary Iran, 81, 134-36; Menashri, Iran, 207; "Chronology," ME/ 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and 42, no. 2 (1988), 466.
68 See Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 90. [231]
? ? ? Revolution and War
Moscow and Tehran was confined to economic affairs, as the Soviet Union had become an increasingly important avenue for Iranian foreign trade once Iran's major ports were damaged in the war with Iraq. The two states even- tually signed a major economic agreement, in February 1982, and subse- quent trade deals helped compensate for the loss of trade between Iran and the West. 69 Rafsanjani described relations as "somewhat improved" in 1985; Prime Minister Musavi called the Soviet approach to the Iran-Iraq war
"more realistic. " Tensions reemerged after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein visited Moscow in December and got a renewed pledge of Soviet arms. Musavi now accused the Soviets of having "long desired access to southern waters through Iran," while Foreign Minister Velayati declared that "Iran will never accept Soviet domination. "70
Both Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq and the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan remained major sources of strain, and talks be- tween Velayati and Soviet president Andrei Gromyko in February 1987 were described as "businesslike. " Khomeini repeated his condemnation of Soviet support for Iraq; President Khamenei called Soviet policy in the gulf a "grave enor" in April, and Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet tanker in May. The U. S. reflagging operation and the resulting confrontation between
the U. S. and Iran brought Moscow and Tehran closer together in the sum- mer, however, and Rafsanjani accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at some point in the future. The Soviets also persuaded the UN Secu- rity Council to delay imposition of an arms embargo against Iran in the fall, but Iran's continued suspicions and the Soviets' reluctance to jeopardize their opening to the West kept the emerging detente from developing fur- ther. 71
Relations improved sharply following the Iranian ceasefire with Iraq and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets offered to aid Iran's postwar reconstruction, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov admitted that "mistakes had been made" in Moscow's earlier dealings with Iran. n An- other series of economic agreements was completed in the fall of 1988, and Khomeini called for improved relations between the two countries in a per- sonal message to Gorbachev in January 1989. Soviet foreign minister Eduard ? Shevardnadze met with Khomeini during a visit to Iran in February, when
69 There were also reports that Soviet intelligence officials were advising the Revolutionary Guards and that the Soviet Union and Iran had signed a secret military agreement in May 1982, but these stories were probably fabrications by exile groups hoping to obtain more sup- port from the West. See Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 98--99, 101, 132; and Menashri, Iran, 249.
70 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 363--64; and Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 94?
71 On these events, see MECS 1987 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1989), 414-15; Hunter, Iran and the World, 9()-()2; and Robert 0. Freedman, "Gorbachev, Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 122-28.
72 Quoted in Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 97--99?
[232]
? The Iranian Revolution
the Soviets reportedly passed on intelligence information about a U. S. spy ring within the Iranian armed forces. The rift with the West occasioned by the Rushdie affair in February 1989 pushed Iran even closer to the Soviet Union, and Khomeini endorsed Shevardnadze's call for improved ties by saying that Iran wanted better relations in order to resist the "devilish acts of the West. " Rafsanjani visited the Soviet Union three weeks after Khomeini's death, and Gorbachev told him, "Our country supports your anti-imperial- ist revolution. . . . We are ready to go as far as Iran is ready to meet us. " The two states signed a series of agreements for technical, cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation, and their subsequent joint declaration referred to "strengthening Iran's defense capability," suggesting that Iran was preparing to obtain weapons directly from the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Velayati praised the policy of glasnost then underway in the Soviet Union, and Raf- sanjani declared that the Soviets now "comprehended the reality of the [Is- lamic] revolution. "73 Thus, despite the ideological differences that still survived, relations between Iran and the Soviet Union were assuming a more normal footing as the Soviet Union itself began to come apart.
Relations with Medium Powers
Iran had enjoyed good political relations with Western Europe and Japan under the shah, based largely on Iran's importance as an oil supplier. The revolution damaged Iran's relations with each of these states, but the effects were generally not as severe as in the case of the United States.
GreatBritain. GreatBritain'searlierinvolvementinIranhadleftalegacy of suspicion. Attacks on the British embassy and several representatives of the Anglican Church led London to withdraw most of its diplomatic per- sonnel in 1980. 74 Britain supported the imposition of economic sanctions after the seizure of the U. S. embassy and reluctantly joined the U. S. -led em- bargo in June 1980. 75 The arrest of a group of Iranian students following a vi-
73 Khomeini's message also described Communism as an obsolete ideology and suggested that Gorbachev should embrace Islam instead. For these quotations, see Manshour Varasteh, "The Soviet Union and Iran, 1979-89,'' in Ehteshami and Varasteh, fran and the International Community, 57-59; "Chronology," MEJ 43, no. 3 (1989), 483; Hunter, Iran and the World, 94; Carol R. Saivetz, "The Soviet Union and Iran: Changing Relations in the Gorbachev Era," in Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. Miron Rezun (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990), 195--96; MECS 1989, 365; and Herrmann, "Role of Iran in Soviet Percep- tions," 8g.
74 Khomeini once termed Britain "the aged wolf of imperialism. " Quoted in Geoffrey Par- sons, "Iran and Western Europe," in Ramazani, Iran's Revolution, 71.
75 British participation in the embargo was limited to contracts signed after June 1980. See Robert Carswell and Richard Davis, "The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions,"inChristopheretal. ,AmericanHostagesinIran,198-9-9.
[233]
? Revolution and War
olent demonstration at the Iranian embassy in London was a further source of tension, leading Rafsanjani to warn of an "appropriate reaction" unless the students were released. 76
Subsequent efforts to improve relations foundered over Iran's extreme sensitivity to any sign of British opposition. The trade embargo was lifted after the release of the U. S. hostages, and Britain adopted a carefully neutral position in the Iran-Iraq war.
Britain allowed an "Iranian Purchasing Office" to remain in london, where it conducted some of Iran's dealings in the pri- vate arms markets, and a visit by a British trade mission in May 1983 fueled expectations of a rapid increase in Anglo-Iranian trade. 77 Yet relations be- tween the two countries remained fragile; Britain refused to accept the cre- dentials of an Iranian envoy in 1986, and Iran responded by rejecting a British diplomat's credentials shortly thereafter. The arrest of an Iranian diplomat for shoplifting in May 1987 led to the arrest and beating of a British diplomat in Tehran, triggering a series of tit-for-tat expulsions that ended with the two states breaking diplomatic relations. British naval forces participated in the multinational effort to escort merchant shipping in the Persian GuH in 1987, and the British government shut down the Iranian Purchasing Office in London after a British vessel was fired upon by Iranian forces. The British supported the UN effort to impose an arms embargo on Iran in order to force acceptance of Resolution 598, and Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe declared that although "the door was ajar" to improved re- lations, "the ball was in the Iranian hand. "78
Movement toward detente between Britain and Iran resumed in June 1988, beginning with an agreement on compensation for the damage to their respective embassies. A decision to restore diplomatic relations was an- nounced in September, and relations were formally reestablished two months later. The Rushdie affair reversed this positive trend, however; Rushdie went into hiding in Great Britain, Iran severed relations once again, and the Majlis voted to suspend commercial ties as well. Although Rafsan- jani and the moderates resumed efforts to normalize relations in the early 1990s, the reaffirmation of thefatwa against Rushdie and the radical resur- gence at the end of 1992 blocked any significant improvement in Anglo- Iranian relations.
France. Unlike the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union, France had no prior imperial role in Iran. In addition, the French govern- ment had granted Khomeini political asylum following his deportation from Iraq in 1978, and one might have expected Franco-Iranian ties to have
76 "Chronology," ME] 35, no. 1 (1981), 46.
77 Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe," So.
78 See MECS 1987, 413-14; and "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o2.
? [2341
? The Iranian Revolution
profited from this favorable historical legacy. Yet relations between France and revolutionary Iran were still strained, despite several well-intentioned efforts to establish a cordial relationship.
Tensions between France and Iran arose from several separate issues.
France had become the preferred haven for the anti-Khomeini opposition, including former prime minister Bakhtiar, former president Bani-Sadr, Is- lamic Mujahedin leader Masoud Rajavi, and several members of the Pahlavi family. The revolutionary government accused France of providing asylum to "criminal leaders" and held it responsible for "attacks against the clergy. " A congratulatory message from President Fran\ois Mitterand following Rajai's election in 1981 was denounced as a lie, and the assassination of a number of exile leaders on French soil both angered and alarmed the French. 79 Relations were strained further when a group of Iranian exiles seized a French-built missile boat previously ordered by the shah. French of- ficials recovered the ship and transferred it to Iran but refused to tum over the hijackers despite strong Iranian protests. In Lebanon, Iran's support for radical Shiite groups clashed with France's traditional support for the Lebanese Christians; pro-Iranian factions kidnapped several French citi- zens; and a terrorist truck bomb killed fifty-eight French soldiers in the UN peacekeeping force. 80 A final issue was French military support for Iraq: in addition to selling billions of dollars of weapons to the Iraqis, France also leased them five warplanes equipped with Exocet antiship missiles, which greatly enhanced their ability to attack Iran's oil and shipping facilities. 81
France sought to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic in 1986 in an attempt to obtain the release of its Lebanese hostages. A French parlia- mentary delegation visited Tehran in January, middle-level officials ex- changed visits in May and September, and France subsequently agreed to repay $330 million of a $1 billion loan provided by the Pahlavi regime, in ex- change for the release of two French hostages. It also agreed to expel a num- ber of members of the Mujahedin as a goodwill gesture. This detente evaporated the following year, however, after the French tried to interrogate Vahid Gordji, an Iranian translator whom they suspected of participating nn a series of terrorist bombings. Gordji took refuge in the Iranian embassy, which the French promptly blockaded, leading Iran to surround the French
79 "Chronology," ME/ 36, no. 4 (1982), 72. The shah's nephew was assassinated in Paris in 1979, former prime minister Bakhtiar narrowly escaped an attack in 1980 (a subsequent at? tempt in August 1991 succeeded) and General Ghulam Ovaisi, commander-in-chief of the army under the shah, was murdered in Paris in February 1984. See Parsons, "Iran and West- ern Europe," 75; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 267; and "Killing Off Iranian Dissenters: Bloody Trail Back to Tehran," Washington Post, November 21, 1993, A t .
80 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 150; and George Joffee, "Iran, the Southern Mediter- ranean, and Europe," in Ehteshemi and Varasteh, Iran and the International Community, 87-88. 81 See Hiro, Longest War, 82, 1 23-27; Mark Heller, The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for Third
Parties (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1984), JCf-40; and MECS 1987, 412.
? ? ? Revolution and War
embassy in Tehran and arrest a French diplomat on various fabricated charges. France broke diplomatic relations, imposed an embargo on Iranian oil, and sent French warships to join the U. S. -led flotilla in the Persian Gu1f. s2
Gordji was finally deported in December 1987, and the end of the Iran- Iraq war paved the way for a slightly more durable detente. 83 Diplomatic re- lations were restored in June 1988 after France expelled fourteen members of the Islamic Mujahedin and agreed to repay another $300 million of the Iranian loan. The oil embargo was soon lifted, and French foreign minister Roland Dumas visited Tehran in February 1989. Khomeini's campaign against Salman Rushdie slowed the process of normalization at this point, but diplomatic ties were not cut off. Both sides seemed interested in estab- lishing a less acrimonious relationship (though the French decision to try two Iranian citizens for the murder of former prime minister Bakhtiar had cast yet another shadow over Franco-Iranian relations at the end of 1994). 84
OtherMediumPowers. IncontrasttoitsrelationswithBritainandFrance, Iran's dealings with other medium powers were fairly benign. West Ger- many joined the Western appeal for release of the U. S. hostages and sup- ported the economic embargo but did not take a strong position. The West German government served as an intermediary during the hostage crisis; Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher became the first Western leader to visit the Islamic Republic in July 1984. 85 Germany had become one of Iran's largest trading partners by 1986, and a brief rift following a West German television broadcast mocking Khomeini healed quickly. 86 Germany helped dilute UN Resolution 598 to make it more palatable to Iran, and Tehran re- turned the favor by facilitating the release of two German hostages in Lebanon in September 1988. The German government responded with un- characteristic sharpness to the death threat against Salman Rushdie, recall- ing their ambassador for "consultations" and hinting of economic sanctions, but a complete rift was avoided and German-Iranian relations resumed their generally cordial nature after Khomeini's death. Iran remained Ger- many's largest Middle Eastern trading partner, and an Iranian diplomat ad-
82 See "Chronology," ME] 42, no. 1 (1988), 94-95; MECS 1987, 412-13.
83 President Khamenei remarked that France had given up its bullying and was trying to normalize relations, while Prime Minister Musavi stated that recent progress in relations had been "very good" and he hoped "this tendency will continue and expand. " MECS 1 987, 413.
84 Evidence of this trend includes the French decision to repatriate two Iranians accused of murdering the brother of the head of the anti-Khomeini Islamic Mujahedin. See "France Sends Two Murder Suspects Back to Iran, Stirring Wide Protest," New York Times, January 4, 1994, A5.
85 Genscher reported that Iran "sought better relations with the West," a view that over- looked the divisions on this issue within Iran. See "Chronology," ME] 39, no. 1 (1985), 112.
86 Iran responded by expelling two German diplomats in February 1987. MECS 1987, 409?
? ? The Iranian Revolution
rnitted in October 1993 that the German and Iranian security agencies had engaged in "close collaboration" for several years. Germany had continued to take a softer line toward Iran than the other Western powers, but its deci- sion to place an Iranian diplomat on trial for the murder of several Kurdish
exiles introduced a discordant note in the harmony between Berlin and Tehran in 1992. 87
Relations between Iran and Japan have followed a similar pattern. Strong U. S. pressure persuaded Japan to reduce its oil purchases and impose other economic sanctions during the hostage crisis, but Japan has gone to some lengths to preserve its economic links with Iran. 88 Rafsanjani visited Japan in June 1984, and Iranian officials praised Japan's lack of an imperialist past and its achievements as a non-Western power. Minor tensions arose from Japan's refusal to complete a petrochemical project begun prior to the revo- lution, and from its oil purchases from other Arab states, but Japan has suc- ceeded in maintaining an essentially neutral position. 89
The Islamic Republic also established cordial relations with China and several less powerful states. China and Iran were brought together in part by their fear of the Soviet Union (especially after the invasion of Afgha- nistan), and Iran's difficulties in obtaining arms from the West led naturally to arms deals with China and North Korea. The Islamic Republic also culti- vated economic and political ties with several Eastern European states and a number of smaller European Community powers, suggesting that its Is- lamic ideology did not interfere with efforts to improve relations with smaller states, regardless of their internal arrangrnents or external cornrnit- rnents. 90
Iran and the Arab World
Under the shah, Iran's relations with most of the Arab world were guarded at best. In addition to inheriting the historical rivalries between Persians and Arabs and the Sunni-Shiite division within Islam, the shah was openly hostile to pan-Arabism and especially to "Arab socialists" such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt or the Baath regimes in Syria and Iraq. AI-
87 See Middle East International, no. 461 (October 22, 1993), 13, and no. 463 (November 19, 1993), 11.
:
90 Iran purchased $6oo million worth of Chinese arms in 1986 and $1 billion worth in 1987, and there were reports of negotiations for the purchase of Scud missiles from North Korea in the early 1990s. R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to the U. S. Intervention in the Persian Gulf," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, 44-45.
88 Japan had replaced the United States as Iran's largest trading partner b y 1982. See Kam- rim Mofid, "The Political Economy of Iran's Foreign Trade since the Revolution," in Ehte- shami and Varasteh, Iran and the International Community, 15o-51; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 193-96.
89 Menashri, Iran, j65; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 162.
[2371
? Revolution and War
though the shah and the conservative Arab monarchies shared a pro-West- em orientation and an aversion to radical political movements of any kind, the gulf states were also concerned by Iran's growing power, the shah's re- gional ambitions, and Iran's close ties with Israel. By introducing a power- ful ideological dimension into Iran's foreign policy, however, the revolution intensified mutual perceptions of threat and helped trigger a bitter and pro- tracted war with Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq War. Given that Iran and Iraq had been rivals since their emergence as independent states, and that Iran had held the upper hand since the early 1970s, it is hardly surprising that Iraq welcomed the fall of the shah at first. The Iraqi government sent a congratulatory message to
Khomeirui upon the founding of the Islamic Republic and invited Bazargan to visit Baghdad, but relations soon deteriorated and President Saddam Hussein decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Iran in September 1980. 91
The Iranian threat to Iraq sprang from several sources. Iranian control of the Shatt al-Arab threatened Iraq's only port, thereby jeopardizing Iraq's foreign trade, especially its oil exports. Moreover, the Islamic Republic had refused to withdraw from several territories it promised to vacate as part of the AlgieJrs accord in 1975 and had resumed its support for the Kurdish in- surgents within Iraq. Iraq responded in kind, sending material aid to Arab and Kurdish rebels within Iran.
Most important of all, Khomeini's universalist ideology directly chal- lenged its Arab neighbors, and especially secular regimes such as the Iraqi Baath. Shiites make up roughly 55 percent of the Iraqi population, and among them the revolution in Iran had clearly sparked greater restive- ness. 92 Under the leadership of Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric with ties to Khomeini, a fundamentalist movement known as Al-Dawa al-Islamiya
(Islamic Call) had become increasingly active in the 196os. Iran began pro- viding rhetorical and material support to the Shiite underground in Iraq in
91 Iraq praised Iran's "independent foreign policy" after the latter withdrew from the Cen- tral Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the spring of 1979, and then-president Ahmad al-Bakr offered "best wishes for the friendly Iranian people" and called for "the closest ties of friend- ship" between Iran and the Arab states in April. See Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 58-59; Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years ofCrisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 181-82; Philip Robins, "Iraq: Revolutionary Threats and Regime Responses," iJn The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 83; and Efraim Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited," International Affairs 64, no. 1 (1987-88), 87.
92 Baath concerns were nicely revealed by President Hussein's warnings in February and June 198o that Iraq might break up into separate Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish portions if pre- ventive steps were not taken. See Amazia Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 4 (1983), 445 and n. 85, and "The Impact of Khomeini's Revolu- tion on the Radical Shi'i Movement of Iraq," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 14o-43.
? ? ? [238]
? The Iranian Revolution
the fall of 1979, and Iranian officials made no secret of their desire to re- place the Baath regime in Iraq with another Islamic republic. Khomeini named Sadr head of the "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq," and al-Sadr began to issue increasingly explicit calls for a Shiite up- rising. A group of Shiites of Iranian origin tried to assassinate Iraqi deputy premier Tariq Aziz in April 198o, and Khomeini now declared that "the people and Army of Iraq must turn their back on the Baath regime and overthrow it. "93 Iraq responded by increasing its support for Iranian dissi- dents and launching a crackdown against Al-Dawa adherents. Sadr was ar- rested and executed and over 35,000 Shiites were deported, while the government began a major campaign to improve living conditions in the remaining Shiite communities in order to reduce their receptivity to Iranian propaganda. The war of words escalated throughout 1980, with neither side attempting to conceal its hostility. 94
Iraq's decision to invade was primarily a response to its fear of Iranian fundamentalism, but it also reflected Iraq's larger ambitions within the Arab world. In addition, Iraqi officials were convinced that the revolution in Iran had created a set of unusually promising conditions: the military balance seemed to favor them, the Iranian armed forces had been weakened by purges and desertions, and the new regime faced a challenge from Kurdish insurgents and several other dissident ethnic groups. 95 The Iraqis also be- lieved that the predominantly Arab population of Khuzistan (an oil-rich province adjacent to the border) would support the invasion and turn
93 Quoted in Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 189. On these points see Baram, "Impact of Kho- meini's Revolution," 141-42; Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a Movements: Charac- teristics, Causes, and Prospects," ME/ 35, no. 4 (1981); Robins, "Revolutionary Threats and Regime Responses," 85-92; Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 62--67; King, Iran-Iraq War, 8-<j; and Halliday, "Iranian Foreign Policy," 95-96.
94 Iranian officials described the Baath as "fascist and racist" and as being a "bunch of athe- ists. " Iraqi leaders portrayed Khomeini's religious views as "a medieval sectarian philoso- phy" and called the Islamic Republic a backwards regime of "dwarf Persians. " Iranian foreign minister Qotzbadeh announced, "We have decided to overthrow the Ba'thist regime of Iraq," and Khomeini warned that if Iraq attacked Iran, "the Iranian Army would advance toward Baghdad to . . . overthrow the regime there. " Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 181-92.
95 Roughly 23,000 Iranian military officers had been executed or purged or had fled into exile by 1986. The army lost 50 percent of the officers between the ranks of major and colonel, the air force lost 50 percent of its pilots, and the regular army dropped from 285,000 men to approximately 1. 5o,ooo. See Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy," 89-90, William F. Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Military 1 982, Staff Paper (Washington, D. C. : Brook- ings Institution, 1982), 8-18; Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: Routledge, 1988), chap. 5; Nikola B. Schahgaldian with the assistance of Gina Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corp. , 1987), 17-27; Gregory F. Rose, "The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist As- sessment," Iranian Studies 17, nos. 2-3, (1984); and Nader Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1988), esp. 61-65.
? ? Revolution and War
against the government in Tehran. This sense of optimism was encouraged by the testimony of Iranian exiles in Baghdad, including former prime min- ister Bakhtiar and several former Iranian generals. 96 The window of oppor- tunity would not last forever, and the threat would increase dramatically once the Islamic Republic began to mobilize Iran's superior resources.
Given these beliefs, the temptation to eliminate the threat through the use of force proved irresistible. At a minimum, Iraq's leaders sought to restore its former position in the Shatt al-Arab, create a buffer zone along the bor- der, and persuade Iran to halt its support for dissident Shiites in Iraq. At most, they hoped to annex Khuzistan-thereby acquiring some of Iran's most valuable oil fields-and perhaps to topple or divide the new regime as well. Any of these outcomes would reduce the threat from Iran and enhance Iraq's overall position. 97
Unfortunately for Hussein, the decision to invade was based on several profound miscalculations. The danger that the revolution in Iran would spread to Iraq turned out to be minimal, as the vast majority of Iraqi Shiites reJlal ined loyal to Baghdad; even the execution of Muhammed al-Sadr in June 1980 did not cause significant unrest. Similarly, the Arab population of Khuzistan did not rise up and welcome the Iraqi invaders, and the Iraqi Army proved to be a less potent offensive weaponthan Hussein had hoped. Far from undermining the Islamic Republic, the invasion enabled the Iran- ian clergy to invoke Iranian nationalism and traditional Arab-Persian ani- mosities as a means of rallying popular support. Like the Austro-Prussian invasion of 1792 and the Allied intervention in Russia in 1918, the Iraqi at- tack also justified extensive efforts by the revolutionary state to repress in- ternal dissent, thereby facilitating the consolidation of the clerical regime. 98
Most important of all, Hussein and his advisors misjudged the resolve and the fighting capacities of the Islamic Republic. Although Iran's military effort suffered from poor leadership, inadequate supplies, and rivalries within the revolutionary elite, the enthusiasm and commitment of the Rev-
96 See Renfrew, "Who Started the War? " 98; Hiro, Longest War, 2; King, Iran-Iraq War, 8-10; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, Adelphi Paper no. 220 (London: Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), 11-13; and Jiman Tagavi, "The Iran-Iraq War: The F i r s t T h r e e Y e a r s , " i n R o se n , I r a n s i n c e t h e R e vo l u t i o n , 6 7 .
97 Iraqi officials denied any annexationist ambitions, but Hussein added that "if the [Khuzistanis,] Baluchis, or Azerbaijanis want their stand and decision to be different, then this will be another matter. " Another Iraqi official warned that "Arabistan [Khuzistan] oil will remain Iraqi" unless Iran agreed to negotiate, and Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz commented that "Five small Irans would be better than one big Iran. " Similarly, Hussein de- clared, "We are for [Iran's] fragmentation, weakening, destruction, and instability as long as it is anenemyoftheArabnation and Iraq. " Hiro, Longest War, 46; Hunter, Iran and the World, 106; and Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 205, 209.
98 Bani-Sadr remarked in October 1980: "The war is very useful for us. It consolidates our Islamic Republic. " Quoted in MECS 1979-80 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), 27; and see also MECS 1981-82 (NewYork: Holmes and Meier, 1984), 54J.
[2. 40]
? The Iranian Revolution
olutionary Guards and regular army more than compensated for these defi- ciencies. Like the revolutionary regimes in France and Russia, the Islamic Republic was able to direct the fervor that had toppled the old regime against a foreign invader. 99 Indeed, the revolutionary government refused to consider anything less than total victory, and its refusal to compromise would keep the war going for nearly eight years. 100
The war ntself can be divided into four main phases. 101 During the first phase, Iraq seized approximately ten thousand square miles of Iranian terri- tory, capturing the city of Khorramshahr and laying siege to the refinery cen- ter at Abadan. The Iraqi advance halted at the end of November, and for the next twelve months there was little change in the adversaries' positions. Iran's military performance improved steadily throughout the year, how- ever, and by September 1981 its army had lifted the siege of Abadan and made a number of minor gains. Both sides began attacking each other's oil facilities during this phase, but neither was able to land a decisive blow. 102
The second phase began with a successful Iranian offensive in March 1982. A second advance in May retook Khorramshahr, and Hussein now or- dered a complete Iraqi withdrawal. Iran rejected an offer to return to the sta- tus quo ante and launched a counterinvasion of Iraq in July, intended "to deliver the Iraqi nation from this accursed [Baath] party. " In Khomeini's words, it was time for the Iraqi people to "rise up and install the Islamic government that you want. . . .
public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
? ? ? Revolution and War
the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages. The Soviets condemned the
U. S. rescue mission in April, agreed that Iran could ship goods across Soviet territory in the event of a U. S. blockade, and issued frequent warnings about America's hostile intentions. The pro-Soviet Tudeh Party supported Kho- meini and the radical clergy against both Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, and the Soviets endorsed Iran's request for an investigation of the shah's rule by the UN Security Council. The Islamic Republic also established close ties with Soviet allies such as Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicating that the fall of the shah had brought Moscow and Tehran closer together. 62
But it soon became apparent that the establishment of the Islamic Repub- lic had created as many problems for the Soviet Union as it had solved. To begin with, the revolution introduced an element of instability into a region on the Soviets' southern border, which increased the risk of U. S. military in- volvement and raised concerns about the impact of Islamic fundamentalism
. on the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. Khomeini and his followers saw Soviet Communism as an atheistic ideology that was every bit as objec- tionable as Western capitalism, and Khomeini soon declared, "We are in con-
60 A useful guide to the present state of U. S. -Iranian relations is Geoffrey Kemp, Forever En- emies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic ofIran (Washington, D. C. : Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 1994).
61 Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 283. In 1981, Brezhnev termed the Iranian Rev- olution a "major international event" and said that, "for all its complications and contradic- tions, it is still fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution. " Quoted in Karen Dawisha and Helene Carrerre d'Encausse, "Islam in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union: A Double- Edged Sword? " in Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy, 170.
? 62 See Menashri, Iran, 99; Hunter, Iran and the World, 85, and "Soviet-Iranian Relations in the Post-Revolution Period," in Iran's Revolution: The Searchfor Consensus, ed. R. K. Ramazani (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 86.
[230]
? ? The Iranian Revolution
flict with international communism to the same extent as we are against the Western exploiters. . . . The danger of communist power is not less than that of America. "63 Iran's new leaders were well aware of earlier Soviet attempts to dominate Iran, and the new regime abrogated the 1921 Soviet-Persian friendship treaty in November 1980. Iran accused the Soviet Union of sup- plying arms to the Kurds and other rebellious ethnic minorities, and Presi-
dent Bani-Sadr warned that the Soviet Union "sought to divide Iran" in order to extend its control to theIndian Ocean. 64 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another source of tension, both because Afghanistan was a Muslim country and because the invasion reinforced Iranian fears about So- viet intentions. 65 Iran's fear of Communist subversion was another sore point, and as noted earlier, Iran eventually banned the Tudeh Party and ex- pelled eighteen Soviet diplomats in April 1983. 66 Finally, the Iraqi invasion in September 1980 posed a serious dilemma for the Soviet Union, as Iraq, a long-standing ally, was heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry. The Soviets declared they would remain neutral and offered to sell arms to Iran, but their
support for Iraq would remain a contentious issue for the rest of the decade. 67
By the mid-? . 98os, Soviet relations with Iran were much worse than they had been under the shah. Early hopes that the revolution might take on a "progressive" character had been dashed, and Iran's military successes against Iraq threatened to shift the regional balance of power and boost the ideological appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. 68 Cooperation between
63 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 156. In 1980, then-foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh told So- viet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, "Our Imam has described the United States as a great satan. Unfortunately, you too have proved in practice that you are no less satanic than the United States. " Quoted fu Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 71.
64 See Menashri, Iran, 99; "Chronology," ME/ 34, no. 2 (1980), 171; and Richard K. Herr- mann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and Policy, 1946-1988," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 78-8o.
65 Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh called the invasion of Afghanistan "a hostile measure . . . against all Muslims of the world. " Quoted in Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 284. Similarly, Khomeini condemned "the savage occupation of Afghanistan by the aggressive plunderers of the East" and hoped that "the noble Muslim people of Afghanistan will achieve victory . . . and be delivered from the clutches of the so-called champions of the working class. " Quoted in Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Dilemmas in Khomeini's Iran," in Rosen, Iran since the Revolu- tion, 121.
66 Rafsanjani called the Tudeh Party a "disreputable party with a filthy record" in Novem- ber 1982, and Radio Tehran announced in May 1983 that "the mercenary leaders of that party . . . were laying the foundations of a . . . creeping coup d'etat so that they could . . . drag the country in the direction they wished. " "Chronology," ME] 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 132, 142-44.
67 An Iranian mob attacked the Soviet embassy in Tehran in December 19Bo, and the Sovi- ets suspended arms shipments to Iraq for a year. Shipments resumed after a series of Iranian victories in 1982. See Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 287; Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolution- ary Iran, 81, 134-36; Menashri, Iran, 207; "Chronology," ME/ 37, no. 2 (1983), 246; and 42, no. 2 (1988), 466.
68 See Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 90. [231]
? ? ? Revolution and War
Moscow and Tehran was confined to economic affairs, as the Soviet Union had become an increasingly important avenue for Iranian foreign trade once Iran's major ports were damaged in the war with Iraq. The two states even- tually signed a major economic agreement, in February 1982, and subse- quent trade deals helped compensate for the loss of trade between Iran and the West. 69 Rafsanjani described relations as "somewhat improved" in 1985; Prime Minister Musavi called the Soviet approach to the Iran-Iraq war
"more realistic. " Tensions reemerged after Iraqi president Saddam Hussein visited Moscow in December and got a renewed pledge of Soviet arms. Musavi now accused the Soviets of having "long desired access to southern waters through Iran," while Foreign Minister Velayati declared that "Iran will never accept Soviet domination. "70
Both Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq and the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan remained major sources of strain, and talks be- tween Velayati and Soviet president Andrei Gromyko in February 1987 were described as "businesslike. " Khomeini repeated his condemnation of Soviet support for Iraq; President Khamenei called Soviet policy in the gulf a "grave enor" in April, and Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet tanker in May. The U. S. reflagging operation and the resulting confrontation between
the U. S. and Iran brought Moscow and Tehran closer together in the sum- mer, however, and Rafsanjani accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at some point in the future. The Soviets also persuaded the UN Secu- rity Council to delay imposition of an arms embargo against Iran in the fall, but Iran's continued suspicions and the Soviets' reluctance to jeopardize their opening to the West kept the emerging detente from developing fur- ther. 71
Relations improved sharply following the Iranian ceasefire with Iraq and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets offered to aid Iran's postwar reconstruction, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov admitted that "mistakes had been made" in Moscow's earlier dealings with Iran. n An- other series of economic agreements was completed in the fall of 1988, and Khomeini called for improved relations between the two countries in a per- sonal message to Gorbachev in January 1989. Soviet foreign minister Eduard ? Shevardnadze met with Khomeini during a visit to Iran in February, when
69 There were also reports that Soviet intelligence officials were advising the Revolutionary Guards and that the Soviet Union and Iran had signed a secret military agreement in May 1982, but these stories were probably fabrications by exile groups hoping to obtain more sup- port from the West. See Yodfat, Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, 98--99, 101, 132; and Menashri, Iran, 249.
70 Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 363--64; and Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 94?
71 On these events, see MECS 1987 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1989), 414-15; Hunter, Iran and the World, 9()-()2; and Robert 0. Freedman, "Gorbachev, Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 122-28.
72 Quoted in Hunter, "Soviet-Iranian Relations," 97--99?
[232]
? The Iranian Revolution
the Soviets reportedly passed on intelligence information about a U. S. spy ring within the Iranian armed forces. The rift with the West occasioned by the Rushdie affair in February 1989 pushed Iran even closer to the Soviet Union, and Khomeini endorsed Shevardnadze's call for improved ties by saying that Iran wanted better relations in order to resist the "devilish acts of the West. " Rafsanjani visited the Soviet Union three weeks after Khomeini's death, and Gorbachev told him, "Our country supports your anti-imperial- ist revolution. . . . We are ready to go as far as Iran is ready to meet us. " The two states signed a series of agreements for technical, cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation, and their subsequent joint declaration referred to "strengthening Iran's defense capability," suggesting that Iran was preparing to obtain weapons directly from the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Velayati praised the policy of glasnost then underway in the Soviet Union, and Raf- sanjani declared that the Soviets now "comprehended the reality of the [Is- lamic] revolution. "73 Thus, despite the ideological differences that still survived, relations between Iran and the Soviet Union were assuming a more normal footing as the Soviet Union itself began to come apart.
Relations with Medium Powers
Iran had enjoyed good political relations with Western Europe and Japan under the shah, based largely on Iran's importance as an oil supplier. The revolution damaged Iran's relations with each of these states, but the effects were generally not as severe as in the case of the United States.
GreatBritain. GreatBritain'searlierinvolvementinIranhadleftalegacy of suspicion. Attacks on the British embassy and several representatives of the Anglican Church led London to withdraw most of its diplomatic per- sonnel in 1980. 74 Britain supported the imposition of economic sanctions after the seizure of the U. S. embassy and reluctantly joined the U. S. -led em- bargo in June 1980. 75 The arrest of a group of Iranian students following a vi-
73 Khomeini's message also described Communism as an obsolete ideology and suggested that Gorbachev should embrace Islam instead. For these quotations, see Manshour Varasteh, "The Soviet Union and Iran, 1979-89,'' in Ehteshami and Varasteh, fran and the International Community, 57-59; "Chronology," MEJ 43, no. 3 (1989), 483; Hunter, Iran and the World, 94; Carol R. Saivetz, "The Soviet Union and Iran: Changing Relations in the Gorbachev Era," in Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. Miron Rezun (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990), 195--96; MECS 1989, 365; and Herrmann, "Role of Iran in Soviet Percep- tions," 8g.
74 Khomeini once termed Britain "the aged wolf of imperialism. " Quoted in Geoffrey Par- sons, "Iran and Western Europe," in Ramazani, Iran's Revolution, 71.
75 British participation in the embargo was limited to contracts signed after June 1980. See Robert Carswell and Richard Davis, "The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions,"inChristopheretal. ,AmericanHostagesinIran,198-9-9.
[233]
? Revolution and War
olent demonstration at the Iranian embassy in London was a further source of tension, leading Rafsanjani to warn of an "appropriate reaction" unless the students were released. 76
Subsequent efforts to improve relations foundered over Iran's extreme sensitivity to any sign of British opposition. The trade embargo was lifted after the release of the U. S. hostages, and Britain adopted a carefully neutral position in the Iran-Iraq war.
Britain allowed an "Iranian Purchasing Office" to remain in london, where it conducted some of Iran's dealings in the pri- vate arms markets, and a visit by a British trade mission in May 1983 fueled expectations of a rapid increase in Anglo-Iranian trade. 77 Yet relations be- tween the two countries remained fragile; Britain refused to accept the cre- dentials of an Iranian envoy in 1986, and Iran responded by rejecting a British diplomat's credentials shortly thereafter. The arrest of an Iranian diplomat for shoplifting in May 1987 led to the arrest and beating of a British diplomat in Tehran, triggering a series of tit-for-tat expulsions that ended with the two states breaking diplomatic relations. British naval forces participated in the multinational effort to escort merchant shipping in the Persian GuH in 1987, and the British government shut down the Iranian Purchasing Office in London after a British vessel was fired upon by Iranian forces. The British supported the UN effort to impose an arms embargo on Iran in order to force acceptance of Resolution 598, and Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe declared that although "the door was ajar" to improved re- lations, "the ball was in the Iranian hand. "78
Movement toward detente between Britain and Iran resumed in June 1988, beginning with an agreement on compensation for the damage to their respective embassies. A decision to restore diplomatic relations was an- nounced in September, and relations were formally reestablished two months later. The Rushdie affair reversed this positive trend, however; Rushdie went into hiding in Great Britain, Iran severed relations once again, and the Majlis voted to suspend commercial ties as well. Although Rafsan- jani and the moderates resumed efforts to normalize relations in the early 1990s, the reaffirmation of thefatwa against Rushdie and the radical resur- gence at the end of 1992 blocked any significant improvement in Anglo- Iranian relations.
France. Unlike the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union, France had no prior imperial role in Iran. In addition, the French govern- ment had granted Khomeini political asylum following his deportation from Iraq in 1978, and one might have expected Franco-Iranian ties to have
76 "Chronology," ME] 35, no. 1 (1981), 46.
77 Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe," So.
78 See MECS 1987, 413-14; and "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o2.
? [2341
? The Iranian Revolution
profited from this favorable historical legacy. Yet relations between France and revolutionary Iran were still strained, despite several well-intentioned efforts to establish a cordial relationship.
Tensions between France and Iran arose from several separate issues.
France had become the preferred haven for the anti-Khomeini opposition, including former prime minister Bakhtiar, former president Bani-Sadr, Is- lamic Mujahedin leader Masoud Rajavi, and several members of the Pahlavi family. The revolutionary government accused France of providing asylum to "criminal leaders" and held it responsible for "attacks against the clergy. " A congratulatory message from President Fran\ois Mitterand following Rajai's election in 1981 was denounced as a lie, and the assassination of a number of exile leaders on French soil both angered and alarmed the French. 79 Relations were strained further when a group of Iranian exiles seized a French-built missile boat previously ordered by the shah. French of- ficials recovered the ship and transferred it to Iran but refused to tum over the hijackers despite strong Iranian protests. In Lebanon, Iran's support for radical Shiite groups clashed with France's traditional support for the Lebanese Christians; pro-Iranian factions kidnapped several French citi- zens; and a terrorist truck bomb killed fifty-eight French soldiers in the UN peacekeeping force. 80 A final issue was French military support for Iraq: in addition to selling billions of dollars of weapons to the Iraqis, France also leased them five warplanes equipped with Exocet antiship missiles, which greatly enhanced their ability to attack Iran's oil and shipping facilities. 81
France sought to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic in 1986 in an attempt to obtain the release of its Lebanese hostages. A French parlia- mentary delegation visited Tehran in January, middle-level officials ex- changed visits in May and September, and France subsequently agreed to repay $330 million of a $1 billion loan provided by the Pahlavi regime, in ex- change for the release of two French hostages. It also agreed to expel a num- ber of members of the Mujahedin as a goodwill gesture. This detente evaporated the following year, however, after the French tried to interrogate Vahid Gordji, an Iranian translator whom they suspected of participating nn a series of terrorist bombings. Gordji took refuge in the Iranian embassy, which the French promptly blockaded, leading Iran to surround the French
79 "Chronology," ME/ 36, no. 4 (1982), 72. The shah's nephew was assassinated in Paris in 1979, former prime minister Bakhtiar narrowly escaped an attack in 1980 (a subsequent at? tempt in August 1991 succeeded) and General Ghulam Ovaisi, commander-in-chief of the army under the shah, was murdered in Paris in February 1984. See Parsons, "Iran and West- ern Europe," 75; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 267; and "Killing Off Iranian Dissenters: Bloody Trail Back to Tehran," Washington Post, November 21, 1993, A t .
80 See Hunter, Iran and the World, 150; and George Joffee, "Iran, the Southern Mediter- ranean, and Europe," in Ehteshemi and Varasteh, Iran and the International Community, 87-88. 81 See Hiro, Longest War, 82, 1 23-27; Mark Heller, The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for Third
Parties (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1984), JCf-40; and MECS 1987, 412.
? ? ? Revolution and War
embassy in Tehran and arrest a French diplomat on various fabricated charges. France broke diplomatic relations, imposed an embargo on Iranian oil, and sent French warships to join the U. S. -led flotilla in the Persian Gu1f. s2
Gordji was finally deported in December 1987, and the end of the Iran- Iraq war paved the way for a slightly more durable detente. 83 Diplomatic re- lations were restored in June 1988 after France expelled fourteen members of the Islamic Mujahedin and agreed to repay another $300 million of the Iranian loan. The oil embargo was soon lifted, and French foreign minister Roland Dumas visited Tehran in February 1989. Khomeini's campaign against Salman Rushdie slowed the process of normalization at this point, but diplomatic ties were not cut off. Both sides seemed interested in estab- lishing a less acrimonious relationship (though the French decision to try two Iranian citizens for the murder of former prime minister Bakhtiar had cast yet another shadow over Franco-Iranian relations at the end of 1994). 84
OtherMediumPowers. IncontrasttoitsrelationswithBritainandFrance, Iran's dealings with other medium powers were fairly benign. West Ger- many joined the Western appeal for release of the U. S. hostages and sup- ported the economic embargo but did not take a strong position. The West German government served as an intermediary during the hostage crisis; Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher became the first Western leader to visit the Islamic Republic in July 1984. 85 Germany had become one of Iran's largest trading partners by 1986, and a brief rift following a West German television broadcast mocking Khomeini healed quickly. 86 Germany helped dilute UN Resolution 598 to make it more palatable to Iran, and Tehran re- turned the favor by facilitating the release of two German hostages in Lebanon in September 1988. The German government responded with un- characteristic sharpness to the death threat against Salman Rushdie, recall- ing their ambassador for "consultations" and hinting of economic sanctions, but a complete rift was avoided and German-Iranian relations resumed their generally cordial nature after Khomeini's death. Iran remained Ger- many's largest Middle Eastern trading partner, and an Iranian diplomat ad-
82 See "Chronology," ME] 42, no. 1 (1988), 94-95; MECS 1987, 412-13.
83 President Khamenei remarked that France had given up its bullying and was trying to normalize relations, while Prime Minister Musavi stated that recent progress in relations had been "very good" and he hoped "this tendency will continue and expand. " MECS 1 987, 413.
84 Evidence of this trend includes the French decision to repatriate two Iranians accused of murdering the brother of the head of the anti-Khomeini Islamic Mujahedin. See "France Sends Two Murder Suspects Back to Iran, Stirring Wide Protest," New York Times, January 4, 1994, A5.
85 Genscher reported that Iran "sought better relations with the West," a view that over- looked the divisions on this issue within Iran. See "Chronology," ME] 39, no. 1 (1985), 112.
86 Iran responded by expelling two German diplomats in February 1987. MECS 1987, 409?
? ? The Iranian Revolution
rnitted in October 1993 that the German and Iranian security agencies had engaged in "close collaboration" for several years. Germany had continued to take a softer line toward Iran than the other Western powers, but its deci- sion to place an Iranian diplomat on trial for the murder of several Kurdish
exiles introduced a discordant note in the harmony between Berlin and Tehran in 1992. 87
Relations between Iran and Japan have followed a similar pattern. Strong U. S. pressure persuaded Japan to reduce its oil purchases and impose other economic sanctions during the hostage crisis, but Japan has gone to some lengths to preserve its economic links with Iran. 88 Rafsanjani visited Japan in June 1984, and Iranian officials praised Japan's lack of an imperialist past and its achievements as a non-Western power. Minor tensions arose from Japan's refusal to complete a petrochemical project begun prior to the revo- lution, and from its oil purchases from other Arab states, but Japan has suc- ceeded in maintaining an essentially neutral position. 89
The Islamic Republic also established cordial relations with China and several less powerful states. China and Iran were brought together in part by their fear of the Soviet Union (especially after the invasion of Afgha- nistan), and Iran's difficulties in obtaining arms from the West led naturally to arms deals with China and North Korea. The Islamic Republic also culti- vated economic and political ties with several Eastern European states and a number of smaller European Community powers, suggesting that its Is- lamic ideology did not interfere with efforts to improve relations with smaller states, regardless of their internal arrangrnents or external cornrnit- rnents. 90
Iran and the Arab World
Under the shah, Iran's relations with most of the Arab world were guarded at best. In addition to inheriting the historical rivalries between Persians and Arabs and the Sunni-Shiite division within Islam, the shah was openly hostile to pan-Arabism and especially to "Arab socialists" such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt or the Baath regimes in Syria and Iraq. AI-
87 See Middle East International, no. 461 (October 22, 1993), 13, and no. 463 (November 19, 1993), 11.
:
90 Iran purchased $6oo million worth of Chinese arms in 1986 and $1 billion worth in 1987, and there were reports of negotiations for the purchase of Scud missiles from North Korea in the early 1990s. R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to the U. S. Intervention in the Persian Gulf," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East nor West, 44-45.
88 Japan had replaced the United States as Iran's largest trading partner b y 1982. See Kam- rim Mofid, "The Political Economy of Iran's Foreign Trade since the Revolution," in Ehte- shami and Varasteh, Iran and the International Community, 15o-51; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 193-96.
89 Menashri, Iran, j65; and Hunter, Iran and the World, 162.
[2371
? Revolution and War
though the shah and the conservative Arab monarchies shared a pro-West- em orientation and an aversion to radical political movements of any kind, the gulf states were also concerned by Iran's growing power, the shah's re- gional ambitions, and Iran's close ties with Israel. By introducing a power- ful ideological dimension into Iran's foreign policy, however, the revolution intensified mutual perceptions of threat and helped trigger a bitter and pro- tracted war with Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq War. Given that Iran and Iraq had been rivals since their emergence as independent states, and that Iran had held the upper hand since the early 1970s, it is hardly surprising that Iraq welcomed the fall of the shah at first. The Iraqi government sent a congratulatory message to
Khomeirui upon the founding of the Islamic Republic and invited Bazargan to visit Baghdad, but relations soon deteriorated and President Saddam Hussein decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Iran in September 1980. 91
The Iranian threat to Iraq sprang from several sources. Iranian control of the Shatt al-Arab threatened Iraq's only port, thereby jeopardizing Iraq's foreign trade, especially its oil exports. Moreover, the Islamic Republic had refused to withdraw from several territories it promised to vacate as part of the AlgieJrs accord in 1975 and had resumed its support for the Kurdish in- surgents within Iraq. Iraq responded in kind, sending material aid to Arab and Kurdish rebels within Iran.
Most important of all, Khomeini's universalist ideology directly chal- lenged its Arab neighbors, and especially secular regimes such as the Iraqi Baath. Shiites make up roughly 55 percent of the Iraqi population, and among them the revolution in Iran had clearly sparked greater restive- ness. 92 Under the leadership of Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric with ties to Khomeini, a fundamentalist movement known as Al-Dawa al-Islamiya
(Islamic Call) had become increasingly active in the 196os. Iran began pro- viding rhetorical and material support to the Shiite underground in Iraq in
91 Iraq praised Iran's "independent foreign policy" after the latter withdrew from the Cen- tral Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the spring of 1979, and then-president Ahmad al-Bakr offered "best wishes for the friendly Iranian people" and called for "the closest ties of friend- ship" between Iran and the Arab states in April. See Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 58-59; Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years ofCrisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 181-82; Philip Robins, "Iraq: Revolutionary Threats and Regime Responses," iJn The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 83; and Efraim Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq War Revisited," International Affairs 64, no. 1 (1987-88), 87.
92 Baath concerns were nicely revealed by President Hussein's warnings in February and June 198o that Iraq might break up into separate Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish portions if pre- ventive steps were not taken. See Amazia Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 4 (1983), 445 and n. 85, and "The Impact of Khomeini's Revolu- tion on the Radical Shi'i Movement of Iraq," in Menashri, Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, 14o-43.
? ? ? [238]
? The Iranian Revolution
the fall of 1979, and Iranian officials made no secret of their desire to re- place the Baath regime in Iraq with another Islamic republic. Khomeini named Sadr head of the "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq," and al-Sadr began to issue increasingly explicit calls for a Shiite up- rising. A group of Shiites of Iranian origin tried to assassinate Iraqi deputy premier Tariq Aziz in April 198o, and Khomeini now declared that "the people and Army of Iraq must turn their back on the Baath regime and overthrow it. "93 Iraq responded by increasing its support for Iranian dissi- dents and launching a crackdown against Al-Dawa adherents. Sadr was ar- rested and executed and over 35,000 Shiites were deported, while the government began a major campaign to improve living conditions in the remaining Shiite communities in order to reduce their receptivity to Iranian propaganda. The war of words escalated throughout 1980, with neither side attempting to conceal its hostility. 94
Iraq's decision to invade was primarily a response to its fear of Iranian fundamentalism, but it also reflected Iraq's larger ambitions within the Arab world. In addition, Iraqi officials were convinced that the revolution in Iran had created a set of unusually promising conditions: the military balance seemed to favor them, the Iranian armed forces had been weakened by purges and desertions, and the new regime faced a challenge from Kurdish insurgents and several other dissident ethnic groups. 95 The Iraqis also be- lieved that the predominantly Arab population of Khuzistan (an oil-rich province adjacent to the border) would support the invasion and turn
93 Quoted in Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 189. On these points see Baram, "Impact of Kho- meini's Revolution," 141-42; Hanna Batatu, "Iraq's Underground Shi'a Movements: Charac- teristics, Causes, and Prospects," ME/ 35, no. 4 (1981); Robins, "Revolutionary Threats and Regime Responses," 85-92; Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 62--67; King, Iran-Iraq War, 8-<j; and Halliday, "Iranian Foreign Policy," 95-96.
94 Iranian officials described the Baath as "fascist and racist" and as being a "bunch of athe- ists. " Iraqi leaders portrayed Khomeini's religious views as "a medieval sectarian philoso- phy" and called the Islamic Republic a backwards regime of "dwarf Persians. " Iranian foreign minister Qotzbadeh announced, "We have decided to overthrow the Ba'thist regime of Iraq," and Khomeini warned that if Iraq attacked Iran, "the Iranian Army would advance toward Baghdad to . . . overthrow the regime there. " Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 181-92.
95 Roughly 23,000 Iranian military officers had been executed or purged or had fled into exile by 1986. The army lost 50 percent of the officers between the ranks of major and colonel, the air force lost 50 percent of its pilots, and the regular army dropped from 285,000 men to approximately 1. 5o,ooo. See Karsh, "Military Power and Foreign Policy," 89-90, William F. Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Military 1 982, Staff Paper (Washington, D. C. : Brook- ings Institution, 1982), 8-18; Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: Routledge, 1988), chap. 5; Nikola B. Schahgaldian with the assistance of Gina Barkhordarian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corp. , 1987), 17-27; Gregory F. Rose, "The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran's Armed Forces: A Revisionist As- sessment," Iranian Studies 17, nos. 2-3, (1984); and Nader Entessar, "The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1988), esp. 61-65.
? ? Revolution and War
against the government in Tehran. This sense of optimism was encouraged by the testimony of Iranian exiles in Baghdad, including former prime min- ister Bakhtiar and several former Iranian generals. 96 The window of oppor- tunity would not last forever, and the threat would increase dramatically once the Islamic Republic began to mobilize Iran's superior resources.
Given these beliefs, the temptation to eliminate the threat through the use of force proved irresistible. At a minimum, Iraq's leaders sought to restore its former position in the Shatt al-Arab, create a buffer zone along the bor- der, and persuade Iran to halt its support for dissident Shiites in Iraq. At most, they hoped to annex Khuzistan-thereby acquiring some of Iran's most valuable oil fields-and perhaps to topple or divide the new regime as well. Any of these outcomes would reduce the threat from Iran and enhance Iraq's overall position. 97
Unfortunately for Hussein, the decision to invade was based on several profound miscalculations. The danger that the revolution in Iran would spread to Iraq turned out to be minimal, as the vast majority of Iraqi Shiites reJlal ined loyal to Baghdad; even the execution of Muhammed al-Sadr in June 1980 did not cause significant unrest. Similarly, the Arab population of Khuzistan did not rise up and welcome the Iraqi invaders, and the Iraqi Army proved to be a less potent offensive weaponthan Hussein had hoped. Far from undermining the Islamic Republic, the invasion enabled the Iran- ian clergy to invoke Iranian nationalism and traditional Arab-Persian ani- mosities as a means of rallying popular support. Like the Austro-Prussian invasion of 1792 and the Allied intervention in Russia in 1918, the Iraqi at- tack also justified extensive efforts by the revolutionary state to repress in- ternal dissent, thereby facilitating the consolidation of the clerical regime. 98
Most important of all, Hussein and his advisors misjudged the resolve and the fighting capacities of the Islamic Republic. Although Iran's military effort suffered from poor leadership, inadequate supplies, and rivalries within the revolutionary elite, the enthusiasm and commitment of the Rev-
96 See Renfrew, "Who Started the War? " 98; Hiro, Longest War, 2; King, Iran-Iraq War, 8-10; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, Adelphi Paper no. 220 (London: Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), 11-13; and Jiman Tagavi, "The Iran-Iraq War: The F i r s t T h r e e Y e a r s , " i n R o se n , I r a n s i n c e t h e R e vo l u t i o n , 6 7 .
97 Iraqi officials denied any annexationist ambitions, but Hussein added that "if the [Khuzistanis,] Baluchis, or Azerbaijanis want their stand and decision to be different, then this will be another matter. " Another Iraqi official warned that "Arabistan [Khuzistan] oil will remain Iraqi" unless Iran agreed to negotiate, and Iraqi deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz commented that "Five small Irans would be better than one big Iran. " Similarly, Hussein de- clared, "We are for [Iran's] fragmentation, weakening, destruction, and instability as long as it is anenemyoftheArabnation and Iraq. " Hiro, Longest War, 46; Hunter, Iran and the World, 106; and Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, 205, 209.
98 Bani-Sadr remarked in October 1980: "The war is very useful for us. It consolidates our Islamic Republic. " Quoted in MECS 1979-80 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), 27; and see also MECS 1981-82 (NewYork: Holmes and Meier, 1984), 54J.
[2. 40]
? The Iranian Revolution
olutionary Guards and regular army more than compensated for these defi- ciencies. Like the revolutionary regimes in France and Russia, the Islamic Republic was able to direct the fervor that had toppled the old regime against a foreign invader. 99 Indeed, the revolutionary government refused to consider anything less than total victory, and its refusal to compromise would keep the war going for nearly eight years. 100
The war ntself can be divided into four main phases. 101 During the first phase, Iraq seized approximately ten thousand square miles of Iranian terri- tory, capturing the city of Khorramshahr and laying siege to the refinery cen- ter at Abadan. The Iraqi advance halted at the end of November, and for the next twelve months there was little change in the adversaries' positions. Iran's military performance improved steadily throughout the year, how- ever, and by September 1981 its army had lifted the siege of Abadan and made a number of minor gains. Both sides began attacking each other's oil facilities during this phase, but neither was able to land a decisive blow. 102
The second phase began with a successful Iranian offensive in March 1982. A second advance in May retook Khorramshahr, and Hussein now or- dered a complete Iraqi withdrawal. Iran rejected an offer to return to the sta- tus quo ante and launched a counterinvasion of Iraq in July, intended "to deliver the Iraqi nation from this accursed [Baath] party. " In Khomeini's words, it was time for the Iraqi people to "rise up and install the Islamic government that you want. . . .
