No More Learning

Funds were exhausted, in all three presidencies;
the Nizam, and Hyder 'Ali, who had swept over the Carnatic up to
the gates of Madras, were supporting the Marathas; and fears were
entertained of the co-operation of a French fleet on the east coast.
But numerous successful engagements of minor importance took
place, including the seizure of Kalyan (October, 1780). 1
Amidst all these difficulties Hastings never lost his head. He
created a diversion in Central India by dispatching Captain Popham
from Bengal to support the rana of Gohad. Captain Popham after
capturing the fort of Lahar, fifty miles from Kalpi, advanced to
Gwalior which he carried by a brilliant night escalade on 3 August,
1780. This, an achievement of great merit in itself, was of far greater
importance in its political effects. This fort had always been looked
upon throughout India as impregnable, and its capture raised the
prestige of the English enormously. Warren Hastings writing to
Laurence Sulivan on 27 August, 1780,3 thus refers to this episode :
"I shall begin by reciting to you an event of the greatest importance
. . . an enterprise . . . (of which] in this country the effect is not to be
described . . . it is the key of Indostan”. But it also had another, and
perhaps even more important, result. Sindhia, to whom the fort
belonged, was dismayed at its loss and at once hurried northwards,
abandoning his colleagues.
To turn for a moment to the other members of the confederacy.
Hyder 'Ali had attacked the Carnatic, and Mudaji Bhonsle had sent
his son Chimnaji against Cuttack, but as he had no real intention of
1 Forrest, Maratha Series, I, 413-15.
2 East Indian Military Calendar, 1823, II, 93.
3 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 311.


## p. 269 (#297) ############################################

RELATIONS WITH NAGPUR
269
1
seriously aiding the cause, he was easily bought off by Hastings. "
Mudaji had, in fact, himself originally informed Warren Hastings of
the confederacy formed between Nana Phadnavis, the Nizam, and
Hyder 'Ali, also intimating that the obligation to attack Bengal had
been laid upon him, and that he could not refuse to obey. His son
Chimnaji was, however, instructed to delay his march as much as
possible. This he effectually contrived to do, reaching the Bengal
border in May, 1780, instead of in October, 1779, as he might have
done. Hastings, well aware of the enmity which existed, the alliance
notwithstanding, between the Poona ministers and Hyder 'Ali, asked
Mudaji if he would act as mediator between the English and Nana
Phadnayis, and even sent him a draft treaty. But these negotiations
came to nothing. Hastings then deputed David Anderson to inter-
view Chimnaji and inform him that a force, under Colonel Pearse,
was marching from Bengal to Madras,” and to ask for his assistance
for the detachment. This was granted, and the promise most faith-
fully kept. Anderson then went to Cuttack where he induced Mudaji
to recall his forces on the payment of fifteen lakhs. The Nizam took
no active part in the proceedings of the confederacy.
In October General Goddard advanced on Bassein and, starting
operations against the fort in November, captured it on 11 December.
The fall of Bassein was a very serious blow to Nana, as besides the
loss of a stronghold the moral effect of the victory was almost as
great as that caused by the capture of Gwalior, owing to the fact that
it had been taken from the Portuguese in 1739 and thus represented
a victory over Europeans.
Goddard in 1781 received orders to conclude peace if he saw any
chance of effecting it. The Madras Presidency, in particular, was
anxious for a cessation of hostilities, ascribing the attacks made on
them by Hyder 'Ali to the support of Raghunath Rao and the
consequent war. Sir Eyre Coote, at this time in Southern India,
wrote to Goddard in the strongest terms pointing out that he must
impose upon him as a duty he owed to his king, his country and his
employers to leave no means untried to effect a peace. He also wrote
in similar strain to the Bengal Council (March, 1781). He says,
I have frequently declared it to you, gentlemen, as my firm opinion that we
are altogether unequal to the difficult and dangerous contention in which we
are now engaged . . . and I must once more call upon you to apply the least
dangerous and least expensive means whereof a change may be speedily brought
about on a system of policy so ruinous in itself and so destructive to their (the
Company's] interests.
After the capture of Bassein Goddard moved up and forced the
Bhor Ghat pass. But he allowed himself to be delayed in negotiations,
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, a,
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, 1, 749.
8 Forrest, Maratha Series, 1, 445-7.
4 Forrest, Selections
from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m, 760.
707.


## p. 270 (#298) ############################################

270
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
which Nana began in order to give himself time to bring up more
troops. Holkar and Hari Pant advanced with a large force and when
Goddard, seeing that the negotiations were leading to nothing, tried
to retire on Kalyan and Bombay, he was attacked fiercely and lost
400 men killed and wounded. This it may be noted was the only
reverse Goddard ever suffered.
Sindhia who had hastened northwards on the fall of Gwalior was
defeated on 16 February, 1781, at Sipri (now Shivpuri) by Major
Camac, who had been sent in June, 1780, to support the rana of
Gohad. The effect of the fall of Gwalior and of Bassein, his own defeat
and the enhancement of his rival Holkar's reputation by the victory
at Bhor Ghat, convinced Sindhia that his real advantage lay in
coming to early terms with the English, and he never again took up
arms against them. He opened negotiations with Colonel Muir and
signed a treaty on 13 October, 1781. 1 By this treaty Sindhia agreed
to retire to Ujjain while Colonel Muir recrossed the Jumna. But the
really important clause in the agreement was that by which Mahadaji
undertook to effect a treaty between the ministers and the English
and so stand guarantee for its observance.
Hastings, on receiving this news, deputed David Anderson, in
January, 1782, with full powers to conclude a treaty. His instructions
to Anderson are contained in a letter dated 4 November, 1781, from
Benares. The points which Anderson was to bear in mind were : to
make an alliance with the Peshwa through Sindhia's mediation against
all enemies, but in particular against Hyder 'Ali; otherwise simply
peace, on the condition that we restored all territory gained during
the war, except the city of Ahmadabad and lands granted to Fateh
Singh Gaekwad; adequate provision to be made for Raghunath Rao;
Bassein to be kept if possible, even if all the lands obtained by the
Treaty of Purandhar had to be restored, except Salsette and the
islands and revenues of Broach; but if the retention of Bassein hin-
dered the settlement of the peace, it must be given up; nothing was to
be done hostile to the raja of Berar; Fateh Singh Gaekwad was to be
included in the treaty; the treacherous rana of Gohad was to be left
to make his own terms; all other European nations were to be pro-
hibited from founding new settlements; and if possible the Marathas
were to be induced to attack Hyder 'Ali.
Hastings, when he learnt of Colonel Muir's negotiations, was at
Benares, surrounded by rebels, almost in their hands, yet, wholly
undisturbed, he issued these instructions to his envoy. Well might
he refer to this transaction with pardonable pride in one of his letters
as having "conducted a successful negotiation of peace with Mah-
dajee Sindia in the most desperate period of my distress". 3 Anderson
1 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, m,
813; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 33.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department,
8 Gleig, Warren Hastings, II, 453.
DII, 821-2.


## p. 271 (#299) ############################################

TREATY OF SALBAI
271
joined Mahadaji Sindhia, who was acting as our intermediary, and
on 17 May the Treaty of Salbai was signed. 1
The Treaty of Salbai contains seventeen clauses, the chief stipu-
lațions being that the whole of the territory conquered since the
Treaty of Purandhar (1776) should be restored, together with three
lakhs' worth of revenue at Broach; the Gaekwad's possessions to be
restored to what they were before the war, in 1775; Raghunath Rao,
within three months from the signing of the treaty, to fix on a place of
residence, receiving no further help from the English, the Peshwa
undertaking to pay him an allowance of 25,000 rupees a month, if
he would of his own accord repair to Sindhia; Hyder 'Ali to return
all territory recently taken from the English, and the nawab of Arcot;
and the Peshwa and the English undertook that their several allies
should remain at peace with one another.
Anderson writing about these negotiations (27 February, 1783)
remarks on Sindhia's difficulties as intermediary owing to differences
among the ministers at Poona, the opposition of his rival Holkar, who
was supported by Hari Pant, and the Nizam's intrigues. The treaty
was ratified by Nana till the next year, as he was still striving for the
restoration of Salsette and was, in fact, secretly intriguing with
Hyder 'Ali in hopes of being able to reject the treaty altogether.
But on 7 December, 1782, Hyder 'Ali had died. In any case his
support would have been unlikely, as he was said to be convinced of
the futility of opposing these new forces which had entered the arena
or Indian politics, and to have left a written message for his son Tipu
enjoining him to make peace with the English on any terms, and so
avoid ruining himself, advice which Tipu did not follow. Hyder
'Ali's death obliged Nana to ratify the treaty, which he did not do
until 20 February, 1783.
The importance of this treaty, which placed the political relations
of the English and the Marathas on an entirely new and definite
footing, cannot be over-estimated. It formed the turning-point in the
history of the English in India. It secured us peace with the Marathas
for twenty years, and, without the acquisition of any fresh territory,
it established, beyond dispute, the dominance of the British as con-
trolling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in 1818 to the
position of the paramount power, being an inevitable result of the
position gained by the Treaty of Salbai.
No greater vindication of Hastings's policy can be asked for than
this successful termination of seven years of constant struggling, no
finer monument be raised to his courage, talents and amazing powers
of organisation for it was he, single-handed, who found money and
men, and steered the political course which led to victory.
1 Gleig, op. cit. 1, chap. xii; Aitchison, Treaties, IV, 41.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers in the Foreign Department, ui,
929.


## p. 272 (#300) ############################################

272
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
It forms the turning-point in Mahadaji's career. Mahadaji and
Nana were both desirous of forcing Tipu to conform to the Treaty of
Salbai in order that he should figure as a tributary, but each of them
wished to claim the whole credit for doing so and Sindhia was not
prepared to abrogate his newly-established, independence of Poona
by sharing that credit with Nana. Hitherto, though he had often
disregarded orders, Mahadaji had considered himself a vassal of the
Peshwa, and had generally acted in conformity with the wishes of
his chief. During the next twelve years, however, assured that the
English would leave him a free hand, he becomes the most prominent
actor on the stage of Indian history, pursuing with quiet tenacity, but
without ever forgetting, as his successor did, the limits of his strength,
his policy of personal aggrandisement, a policy, moreover, which, to
a very large extent, determined the general course of events in India,
up to his death in 1794.


## p. 273 (#301) ############################################

CHAPTER X V
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
In the Carnatic the course of events was very different from that
in Bengal. In both provinces the English had attained military supre-
macy; but in the south they did not follow this up by the almost
immediate assumption of political control. The reasons for the differ-
ence seem to be that with the overthrow of the French the Carnatic
had become a secondary area not rich enough to provoke direct
administration or to bring the interests of the nawab and the Com-
pany's servants into direct conflict. The pet vice of the latter in the
Carnatic was indeed quite different from that which prevailed in
Bengal. In Bengal they had sought to trade untaxed; in the Carnatic
they found their easiest advantage to lie in lending money to the
nawab. Muhammad 'Ali had from the first found himself in em-
barrassed circumstances. The war with the French had been carried
on at his expense though largely with the Company's funds; so that
the fall of Pondichery found him with a debt of 22,25,373 pagodas
owing to the Company. In 1766 this had been reduced to 13,65,104
pagodas; but in reality his financial position had grown worse instead
of better, for at the later date he owed private creditors a sum
exceeding that which he had owed the Company in 1761. These
private loans had been borrowed at the high rates of interest prevailing
in the country-at first from 30 to 36 per cent. ; then 25 per cent. ;
and then on the intervention of the governor, Palk, to 20 per cent.
When questioned, the nawab stated, probably with truth, that he
would have had to pay higher rates to Indian lenders. In 1766 the
interest was reduced by the Company's orders to 10 per cent. The
existence of thiş large private debt, which so far from being liquidated
went on increasing throughout the whole of Mohammad 'Ali's gov-
ernment, branching out into all those divers funds which Burke
enumerated with such passionate emphasis, affected the whole of
the relations between the English and the Nawab Walajah, as he
became after Clive's Treaty of Allahabad. Having the control of so
large a portion of the private savings of the settlement, the nawab
was able to exercise a most unwholesome influence over the policy of
the council, particularly in regard to Tanjore; and was sure of a
following even when the Company or the governor was positively
opposed to his designs. Not a governor but was corrupted by his
bribes or calumniated by his hatred. For a time at least the financial
interests thus created dominated Madras in the person of Paul
Benfield, who, though probably not quite deserving all the strictures
of Burke, undoubtedly subordinated public affairs to the exigencies
of private concerns. The true history of the period will perhaps
18


## p. 274 (#302) ############################################

274
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
never be written. The persons principally concerned did not entrust
their designs to the publicity of the Company's records; and though
a certain number of private papers have come to light, many others
have been destroyed or concealed; so that we are often left to guess
at what actually happened.
While the French war was still continuing, there was a strong
inclination on the part of the council to take the direct administra-
tion of the territory secured by the Company's arms. But the
nawab's protests and perhaps more solid arguments induced the
council to abandon that idea; 1 nor, even under the pressure of cir-
cumstances, did it in fact proceed to that extremity. Probably the
financial help which was received from Bengal saved the nawab's
independence. At the fall of Pondichery he found his nominal power
undiminished. He had granted to the Company the district imme-
diately surrounding Madras, and mortgaged other parts of his
dominions, but the English displayed no desire to take any part in the
administration of these areas; and even in the Company's jagir the
revenue was ultimately leased out to the nawab himself.
In the south the first ostensible exercise of power resulted from
Clive's Treaty of Allahabad. Among the other grants which he
secured from Shah 'Alam was one exempting Walajah from his tradi-
tional dependence on the Deccan and another for the Northern
Sarkars, which in the time of French greatness had been granted by
the Nizam to Bussy, and which after the expulsion of the French had
lapsed into the hands of that prince. By this time the feeble prince,
whom Bussy had had such difficulty in maintaining at Hyderabad,
had been replaced, and put to death, by his more vigorous brother,
Nizam 'Ali. The latter had already made more than one offer of the
sarkars to the English on conditions of military help; but these had
not been accepted, in view of the Company's strong desire to limit
its responsibilities; and offers, the origins of which are obscure, to set
up Walajah in the Deccan instead of Nizam 'Ali, had also been
rejected under English dissuasion. However, the English now took
steps to carry the grant of 1765 into effect. Caillaud was sent up
into the sarkars, and succeeded in occupying them practically without
resistance. But it was not to be expected that Nizam 'Ali would
silently acquiesce in this dismemberment of his dominions. In the
end Caillaud was sent to Hyderabad to settle the dispute, and on
12 November, 1766, he concluded a treaty with Nizam 'Ali on the
following terms : in return for a grant of the five sarkars the Com-
pany agreed “to have a body of troops ready to settle the affairs of His
1 Madras Mil. Consultations, 1754, p. 145; 1755, pp. 146 sqq. ; 20 August
and 1. September, 1757.
· Bengal Select Committee to. Madras, 27 April, 1768; R. J. Sulivan, Ana-
lysis of the Political History of India, p. 104:


## p. 275 (#303) ############################################

EARLY RELATIONS WITH HYDER
275
Highness's government in everything that is right and proper, when-
ever required", but it retained liberty to withdraw the troops if
demanded by the safety of the English settlements, and it was to pay
a tribute of nine lakhs a year in each year in which its military
assistance was not required. By a final article the Nizam was to assist
the English when needed. This agreement was pointed directly at
Hyder 'Ali, against whom the Nizam had already entered into an
alliance with the Marathas, and with whom now the English were
inevitably embroiled. The Company condemned the negotiations as
showing great lack of firmness.
Hyder 'Ali, who had very recently established his power in
Mysore, was the son of a soldier who had risen to the post of command-
ant of the fortress of Bangalore. During the Seven Years' War he had
coquetted with the idea of assisting the French, but had judged the
situation too correctly to involve himself in their failing fortunes.
Instead, he had succeeded in placing himself in the position of the
chief minister-the dalavay-seizing the person of Khande Rao, the
last holder of that post, and keeping him in prisoned in an iron cage
until he died. The raja was kept a prisoner in his palace, and showu
to the people once a year; but altogether ceased to enjoy power or
influence. The new ruler of Mysore was an unlettered soldier, but a
man of great energy and talent. His main preoccupation was the
extension of his dominions. He quickly extended his rule to the
Malabar Coast; but when he turned his attention to the north he
found his way blocked by the Marathas and the Nizam. Meanwhile
his conquests on the Malabar Coast had brought him into contact
with the English factories there. At first the Bombay. Presidency
was in favour of an agreement. It decided to afford Hyder facilities
for building fighting vessels in the Marine Yard at Bombay; and
hoped that Madras would be able to accommodate the disputes sub-
sisting between Hyder and Walajah. Hyder also hoped for advant-
ages from supplies of arms and gunpowder from the English, and
offered his alliance, both parties affording military help to the other
in case of need. This was in 1766, just before Caillaud's treaty with
the Nizam. But by then Hyder's conquest of the petty Nair chiefs
with whom the English were in alliance had on the whole indisposed
the Bombay Government to any formal alliance with its restless
neighbour, though it was at the same time anxious to avoid hostilities
if possible. In the meantime, as has been seen, the Madras Govern-
ment had agreed to assist the Nizam against Hyder as the price of the
cession of the Northern Sarkars, rather than face the probable alter-
native of an alliance between Hyder 'Ali and the Nizam against
Walajah.
1 Caillaud's proceedings on this mission are recorded in two volumes (Mili-
tory Sundries, 31-32) in the Madras Record Office.
? Forrest, Bombay Selections, 11, 123-31


## p. 276 (#304) ############################################

276
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
English hopes rested in the triple alliance of themselves, the
Nizam, and the Marathas. But the Marathas, who were first in the
field, were quickly bought off by, Hyder. The Nizam, accompanied
by a detachment under the command of General Joseph Smith,
invaded Mysore, and advanced within sight of Bangalore. But the
attack was not seriously pressed home; the invaders entered Mysore
on 29 April, 1767, but all the time Mahfuz Khan (brother and rival of
Walajah) remained in the Nizam's camp as Hyder's agent; many
letters passed between the enemies; and a secret understanding was
reached, probably while the Nizam was still before Bangalore. Thus
the English were abandoned by the allies on whose assistance they
had relied, and left by themselves to encounter the full brunt of
Hyder's attack. They had indeed managed matters with a great
want of skill.
The war which followed (August, 1767, to April, 1769) was one
of tactical success and strategic failure in the Carnatic. At Changama
and Tiruvannamalai Smith succeeded in driving Hyder off the field
of battle; and after the severe lessons which he received on those
occasions, Hyder was careful how he ventured within the reach of
the English infantry; but these successes led to nothing. The English
leaders had not at their disposal sufficient bodies of cavalry to keep
the enemy's horse out of the Carnatic. They were further distracted
by personal jealousies between Smith, the senior commander, and
Colonel Wood, the favourite of the council. And they were harassed
by the appointment of "field-deputies” sent by the council to keep
watch over their movements. On 23 February, 1768, the Nizam made
peace with the English in the same irresponsible manner as he had
broken with them; confirming his previous treaty engagements, con-
senting to a limitation of the forces which the English were obliged
to send to him on demand to two battalions and six guns, and ceding
to the Company the diwanni of Mysore when that country should
have been conquered from the enemy. About the same time the
Bombay forces managed to capture the town of Mangalore; but the
place was not defended when Hyder appeared to recover it, and the
peace with the Nizam made little difference to the course of the war.
The Carnatic lay still open to the ravages of the enemy horse, so that
the principal sources of English finance were dried up; and, finally,
when in the month of March, 1769, Hyder appeared before Madras
at the head of a body of cavalry, and when Smith had conspicuously
failed to expel the enemy from the nawab's country, the Madras
Government resolved to make peace. But it had to do so on Hyder's
terms. These were generous enough, but included the burden of a
defensive alliance, so that the Madras Council was still far from free
of the political difficulties in which it had become involved. In the
1 Smith's Narrative, ap. Orme MŚS, - Various, 10; and Cosby's Journal (Brit.
Mus. Add. MSS, 29898).


## p. 277 (#305) ############################################

ENGLISH POLICY
277
1
following year a further treaty was concluded between Hyder and
the Bombay Government, which thereby secured further commercial
privileges,
The general conduct of the war, incompetent as it had been, was
a small evil, compared with the purposeless, undecided policy by
which it was preceded and followed. At this time the interests of
Southern and Western India were closely connected; the Marathas,
the Nizam, Hyder 'Ali, and the English at Bombay and Madras, were
in close and intimate association from which they could not escape.
Moreover, the interests of the three Indian powers were mutually
destructive. The one certain thing about the situation was that an
alliance between any two of them against the third would be only
temporary, and would be dissolved by its own success. In these
circumstances the obvious course for the English was to avoid entan-
glements with any of the parties. But what they did was to ally
themselves first with the Nizam, then with Hyder, and then with a
party of the Marathas, without any clear idea of the responsibilities
to which they were pledging themselves, and without the vigour to
carry out the responsibilities which they had undertaken. But we
must remember that they had certain excuses for the imbecility of
their policy. In the first place their interests were divided between
the rival presidencies of Madras and Bombay; and when under the
Regulating Act the government of Bengal tried to impose on the
subordinate presidencies a common policy, its action was neutralised
by the jealousies of the minor governments for each other and for the
Supreme Government. In the second place the action of the Madras
Presidency was hampered by the conduct of its protégé the nawab
Walajah. He was jealous of the superior rank of the Nizam; he was
jealous of the assumed and (in his eyes) illegitimate rank of Hyder;
he was jealous of the influence which the English claimed to exercise
in his councils in virtue of the military power which alone preserved
his position in the face of an enemy_incomparably his superior in
vigour and talent. So that while the English had imposed on them-
selves the impossible duties of assisting both the Nizam and Hyder
in their various policies, the nawab was always seeking to impose on
them the further duty, hardly more inconsistent with their treaty
obligations, of assisting the Marathas. In the third place the local
governments were always liable to the interference of the home
authorities, sometimes ill-informed, sometimes ill-authorised, but at
this time generally incalculable.
In 1770 this was illustrated by the arrival of a small naval squad-
ron in Indian waters, under the command of Sir John Lindsay, who
proceeded to take an active, authorised, but illegitimate part in the
politics of Madras. His appointment was the result of a series of
intrigues in England in which the ministry was on the whole discre.
1 Dupré to Orme, 10 June, 1769 (Love, Vestiges, 11, 599); Auber, I, 266.


## p. 278 (#306) ############################################

278
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
ditably concerned. The discussions of 1766-7 had left the ministry
decidedly inclined to interfere in the conduct of Indian affairs; and
occasions were not wanting to provide it with excuses. In 1768, on
the news that the government of Bengal had allowed the French at
Chandernagore to mount cannon on their walls contrary to the treaty
of Paris, Shelburne had written with some justification :
I cannot conceal from you His Majesty's surprise that so extraordinary a
transaction with a foreign power, by which the articles of a treaty of peace
have been dispensed with, should have passed in India by the sole authority
of the Company's servants and have received your approbation at home, with-
out your having previously attempted to know His Majesty's opinion or receive
his commands upon so hazardous a concession. . . .
In the following year complaints were received from the ambassador
at Constantinople about the conduct of the Company's servants in
the Persian Gulf;” and at the same time, the Company gave an
opening to the ministry by asking for naval assistance on an alarm
of French preparations. At this moment the Company was proposing
to send three supervisors to India with extraordinary powers.
Grafton, who was now secretary of state, seized, the occasion to try
to secure some controlling share in the proposed commission; he
suggested that the commander of the naval force which the Company
had asked for should be joined with the supervisors. This proposal
was rejected by the Company. About the time that these affairs were
in progress there arrived from Madras John Macpherson on a mission
from the nawab of Arcot. He had gone out as purser on an East-
Indiaman, and had got access to the s3wab on the pretext of showing
him "some electrical experiments and the phenomenon of the magic
lanthorn”. 4 He appears to have persuaded Grafton that the nawab
was a much ill-used person. The result was that, as the Company
would not agree to giving Lindsay the powers that the ministry
demanded, he was sent with a secret commission, which was not
communicated to the Company, empowering him not only to act as
plenipotentiary on behalf of the crown with all the princes of India,
but also to enquire into the relations between the nawab and the
Company's servants on the Coromandel Coast.
3
“As there is great reason to fear”, his secret instructions ran, “that the
Nabob of Arcot has been treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the
friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his favour at the Company's
request (in the Treaty of Paris) . . . it is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that
you make the strictest enquiry into their conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot
since the last peace in order to judge how far it has coincided with His Majesty's
friendly declarations. " J
1 Shelburne to the Company, 21 January, 1768 (Lansdowne House MSS,
No. 99).
2 Michell to Wood, 17 March, 1769 (P. R. O. , C. O. 77-21).
3 Wood to the Chairs, 26 July, 1769 (loc. cit. ).
4 Harland to Rochford, 1 September, 1772 (1. 0. , Hoine Miscellaneous, 110,
6 Weymouth to Lindsay, Secret, 13 September, 1769, (P. R. O. , T. 49-1).
p. 495).


## p. 279 (#307) ############################################

LINDSAY'S MISSION
270
Lindsay arrived at Bombay early in 1770 and after some preliminary
enquiries into the position of the Marathas, sailed for Madras. His
secret mission naturally involved him in disputes with the council,
which knew nothing of it, and had received no instructions to admit
him to a part in its political deliberations. The result was that the
commodore was thrown into the nawab's arms and adopted his
political views. He advocated an alliance with the Marathas and the
abandonment of the treaty with Hyder; and interfered at Bombay
to prevent the council there from entering into a treaty promising
Hyder the same friendship and support that had been promised by
the Treaty of Madras. In the course of the war between Hyder and
Madhu Rao. in 1770-1 Lindsay did his utmost to bring the Com-
pany in on the side of the Marathas; and his successor, Harland, in
1771, actually threatened to enter into negotiations and frame a
treaty with Madhu Rao on his own account. When the council ob.
jected that that would be a violation of its treaty with Hyder,
Harland replied :
Should it be found expedient to enter into an alliance with any Indian power
for the preservation of the Carnatic, for the security of the possessions of the
East India Company in it, and to give a probability of permanency to the British
interests in this country, which may be incompatible with the agreement you
made with Hyder Ally, in 1769, it would be so far from a breach of national
faith that even as private persons you stand exculpated. 1
The threatened treaty was indeed avoided. But backed by the
plenipotentiary on the one side, and the corrupt influences of the
private debt on the other, the nawab became irresistible and exacted
from the council its agreement to the attack and capture of the little
kingdom of Tanjore. Its relations with the nawab were regulated by
a treaty of 1762 which Pigot, the governor, and the council of that time
had forced upon the nawab. It was alleged that the raja had violated
its terms partly by neglect to pay the stipulated tribute, and partly
by hostile intrigues with Hyder 'Ali and with Yusuf Khan, the sepoy
commandant who had rebelled at Madura and whom it had taken
the English long months and considerable efforts to reduce. The first
attack took place in 1771; but on that occasion the raja was allowed
to remain on terms. But two years later he was again attacked, and
this time his kingdom was annexed to the nawab's possessions. About
the same time English expeditions were sent to reduce the two great
southern poligars of Ramnad and Sivaganga.
These acquisitions caused much stir in England. By some, and by
the Burkes in particular, they were attributed to the corrupt intrigues
of the Company's servants. A whole pamphlet literature sprang up
on the subject, fathered by the Burkes and their friends on the one
side, and by the two Macphersons on the other. The truth of the
matter, as distinguished from the mere external facts, remains very
1 Harland to Dupré, etc. , 25 December, 1771 (P. R. O. ; C. O. 77-22).


## p. 280 (#308) ############################################

280
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
obscure. It is certain that the presidents, Bouchier and Wynch, were
exceedingly averse to these extensions of the nawab's power; and these
events were associated with and followed by furious disputes between
the nawab and the Madras authorities. Matters became worse when
the Company sent orders that Tanjore was to be given back to the
raja. George Pigot, who had so distinguished himself in the Seven
Years' War and had bought himself an Irish barony, returned as
governor for a second term to put these orders into execution. This
brought him into violent collision not only with the nawab but also
with the creditors, Benfield at their head, who had acquired interests
in Tanjore which were injured by the orders for its retrocession. They
were supported by a majority of the council and by the commander-
in-chief, Sir Robert Fletcher, who had formerly displayed his talent
for intrigue in the officers' mutiny in Bengal. Pigot claimed, as did
Hastings in like case, to have the power of adjourning the council at
his pleasure and of refusing to put motions of which he disapproved.
But unlike Hastings, he attempted to establish his claims by moving
the suspension of his principal opponents, and thus excluding them
from the council. This measure was countered by a conspiracy, in
which Benfield and the nawab were much concerned, having for its
object the seizure of his person and the overthrow of his government. '
The conspirators were assisted by the second-in-command, Colonel
James Stuart, who condescended to act as their decoy; and Pigot was
seized as he drove from the fort to the governor's garden house one
evening in August, 1776, and hurried off into military confinement
at the Mount. He died in the following year while still in confine-
ment.
This event marked the apogee of the nawab's power. He had not
only evaded all attempts to establish the Company's influence in his
territories or to control his administration, but he had also brought
to condign punishment a governor who had ventured to thwart his
will, even though that governor was acting under the explicit orders
of the Company. Indeed this series of events at Madras illustrates
quite as clearly as the simultaneous events in Bengal how far the ill-
judged interference from England had weakened the stability of the
English government in India. Nor was the balance to be restored
until Pitt's India Act had re-established one effective control over
Indian affairs. In the present case although the guilty members of
the council were recalled and tried before the Court of King's Bench,
their punishment was lmiited to fines of £1000 each; and although
for the moment Benfield was recalled, he was allowed to return to
the scene of his intrigues in 1781.
After a short interregnum Sir Thomas Rumbold was appointed
governor and sent out to Madras, with Sir Hector Munro, the hero
of Baksar, as commander-in-chief. Rumbold, against whom at a later
1 See Palk MSS, p. 289.


## p. 281 (#309) ############################################

RUMBOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS
281
date was exhibited a bill of pains and penalties, was accused of having
a
displayed great corruption in his administration. But the principal
evidence of his having done so consists in his having summoned the
zamindars of the Northern Sarkars down to Madras in order to make
a settlement with them. This was taking that very profitable business
out of the hands of the local chiefs, and probably explains why such
an outcry was raised against what may well have been a perfectly
innocent and even meritorious action.
But Rumbold's political conduct was more open to criticism. He
was reluctant to follow the lead of the government of Bengal, and
succeeded in provoking the resentment of the Nizam at the very time
when the war with the Marathas made good relations with the other
powers of India of supreme importance. Under the treaty of 1766
as revised in 1768 the Company held the Northern Sarkars on con-
dition of paying an annual tribute of nine lakhs of rupees. As the
sarkar of Guntoor had been granted for life to Nizam 'Ali's brother,
Basalat Jang, a deduction of two lakhs was made on that account;
so that in fact the Company only held four out of the five sarkars and
owed a tribute of seven lakhs. This was a heavy burden; and Basalat
Jang had used his liberty to entertain a body of French troops on
whom the English naturally looked with suspicion. In these circum-
stances war with the French broke out in 1778 and was followed by
the immediate reduction of Pondichery by Munro. So far all was
well. But Rumbold proceeded to attempt to secure the sarkar of
Guntoor by direct negotiations with Basalat Jang. In this he suc-
ceeded; and at once the district was leased to Walajah. To the Nizam,
ruffled by such conduct, he then proposed that the Company should
discontinue its payment of tribute. His reasoning on this head is
difficult to understand. He argued that the Nizam had broken the
treaty of 1768 by taking into his service the French troops who had
been driven from that of Basalat Jang; that this of itself relieved the
Company from any obligations which it had under the treaty; and
that the Nizam was likely to recognise this and acquiesce in the
abandonment of tribute, if he were civilly asked to do so. To Hastings
the proposals seemed big with mischief. He at once intervened,
diplomatically representing the Madras proposals as proceeding from
the unauthorised action of the Madras envoy; and, when the Madras
Government refused to accept his decision, and recalled the Madras
servant, Hollond, whom it had sent to Hyderabad, he appointed
him to act as Resident with the Nizam on behalf of the Bengal Gov-
ernment. The matter led to a most unedifying dispute between the
two governments. Rumbold held that the Supreme Government had
exceeded its powers under the act in writing direct to the Nizam
and Hollond.
The manner in which they took up our proceedings . . . and the manner
in which they interfered to put a stop to them . . . too plainly indicate that the


## p. 282 (#310) ############################################

282
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
design was not to serve any interest of the Company as to exercise
an act
of authority with a view of raising their authority at the expense of ours. . . . l
Madras dismissed Hollond for having communicated his instructions
to Bengal and having obeyed the orders of that government; but in
the long run was obliged to yield so far as to restore Guntoor to
Basalat Jang, although that was deferred until the opening of the
Second Mysore War had robbed this action of all appearance of grace
or goodwill. The net result was that the Nizam was seriously indis-
posed against the English at the very moment when his goodwill
would have been more valuable than at any time since the last war
with Hyder.
Hyder too was alienated from them at the same time and in part
by the same train of events. He had long had his eye on the sarkar of
Guntoor and was much offended at the English attempts to gain
possession of it. By way of signifying his annoyance he prevented
the English troops marching to occupy it from moving through his
territories. The war with the French gave him further motives for
anger. By reason of his conquests on the Malabar Coast he claimed
full sovereignty over the whole area, including the European settle-
ments. The Europeans had never acknowledged this claim; the
English in particular had rejected it; and now, in defiance of his warn-
ing that he regarded the French factory of Mahé as lying under his
protection, the Madras council dispatched an expedition which
besieged and captured it. But in all probability what indisposed him
much more than either of these circumstances was the fact that he
had been wholly unable to induce them to renew that treaty of offen-
sive and defensive alliance which they had concluded in 1769 but never
carried out. He had made more than one overture with that end
in view, one of them so late as 1778;. but while they were ready
enough to make declarations of friendship, which in fact would have
committed them to nothing, they had evaded his principal demand.
He had therefore made up his mind that nothing was to be gained
from their alliance; and turned his attention to the French. The
outbreak of the Maratha War gave him a further opening, of which
he was not slow to avail himself; and the quarrel between Rumbold
and the Nizam freed him from every anxiety for his northern fron-
tiers. These reasons, one presumes, impelled him to decide to attack
his life-long enemy Walajah and the latter's English protectors, in the
middle of 1780.
His hostility of feeling though not his intention of war was well
known at the beginning of the year. In 1779 the missionary Swartz
was sent to Hyder to sound his intentions and got nothing from him
but threatening messages. In January, 1780, George Grey, a Com-
1 Military dispatch from Madras to the Company, 3 April, 1780.
2 Runbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 4 July, 1778.
3 Idem, 23 October, 1779.


## p. 283 (#311) ############################################

OUTBREAK OF WAR
283
pany's servant, was sent with a similar intention; but Hyder refused
to accept the presents with which he was charged. In ordinary
circumstances this would have been warning sufficient. But un-
luckily about this time a regiment of king's troops Macleod's
Highlanders arrived at Madras; and the council easily persuaded
itself that Hyder would not dare to attack the English now that they
had received this accession of strength. Early in April Rumbold,
whose health had been for some time but indifferent, sailed for
England, without any real apprehensions of the storm that was
overhanging the presidency. After the event his contemporary
enemies accused him of having known of Hyder's intentions and fled
from the dangers which he had brought about. But in fact he does
not seem to have displayed more than that very ordinary degree of
blindness which all but men of extraordinary gifts display in the face
of the future, Rumbold's own talents were not such as to make his
presence or absence a matter of great concern. But unhappily he
left the chair to a man, John Whitehill, who in many ways recalls
the character of Foote's Nabob, Sir Matthew Mite. To mediocre
talent he joined a passionate acquisitive temperament, impatient of
opposition, incapable of cool judgment. He was believed to have
shared in the corruption which had distinguished the revenue collec-
tions in the sarkars, and to have been concerned in the equipment of a
French privateer. Unluckily too the commander-in-chief, Munro, was
a man whose best days were long past; personally honest, he was also
slow-minded, irresolute in an emergency, unable to profit by the ideas
of other people. He could see no reason for opposing the governor so
long as the latter did not interfere with his military plans. Rumbold's
departure left the Select Committee, to which was entrusted the
conduct of political affairs, reduced to four members; so that the
governor and commander-in-chief, so long as they agreed, had full,
control of the situation. At an earlier time the disputes between
those high personages had almost brought Madras to ruin; but now
their agreement went nearer still to produce the same unhappy end.
Despite the warnings they received of Hyder's preparations, they were
united in a foolish optimism which they did not abandon till they
received the news (23 July) that his horse was already ravaging the
Carnatic.
Even then they did not realise, the seriousness of the position.
With that contempt of the enemy, which, as Macleod observed, gene-
rally leads to "a damned rap over the knuckles”,3 Munro resolved to
concentrate his forces at Conjeeveram instead of near Madras, with
the result that the active Hyder intercepted and destroyed at Polilur
a detachment marching under Colonel Baillie from the northward.
3
1 Grey's Journal, 1. o. , Home Miscellaneous, 250, pp. 1-19.
2 Rumbold's minute, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 1 April, 1780, p. 440.
3 Hook, Life of Baird, 1, 17.


## p. 284 (#312) ############################################

284
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
The action passed so close to the main body of the English that they
heard the guns firing, and, had Munro moved resolutely towards
Baillie, the courage and confidence of his troops might have carried
the day even against Hyder's superiority of force. But the campaign
had been begun hastily, without due preparation, and without the
necessary supplies or transport. That, and Munro's blind confidence
in the English success, prevented him from making any decisive
movement. On learning what had actually occurred, his confidence
gave way to panic, and he retired hurriedly, losing much of his
baggage, to Chingleput, and then to Madras.
The material loss had been considerable, but it was unimportant
compared with the loss of moral which accompanied this disastrous
opening of the war. The nawab's garrisons at Arcot and elsewhere
surrendered, as they had done in the last war, after but the feeblest
of defences, except at Wandiwash, where Lieutenant William Flint,
of the Company's service, arrived just in time to take the command
out of the hands of the nawab's killadar and inspire the garrison with
such confidence in his leadership as secured a long and successful
defence. At Madras, meanwhile, Whitehill and the Select Committee
could find no prospect of successfully carrying on the war but in
obtaining help at the earliest moment from Bengal. The news reached
that presidency on 23 September. Hastings rose to the occasion. On
.
13 October the commander-in-chief, Coote, sailed to assume the
command, with nearly 600 Europeans and fifteen lakhs of rupees;
a considerable body of sepoys set out overland; and orders were
issued for the suspension of the governor, Whitehill, on the ground
of disobedience to the orders of the Supreme Government in the
matter of Guntoor. The monsoon months were occupied in putting
these orders into execution and preparing to take the field, and at
last on 17 January, 1781, Coote marched from St Thomas Mount.
The campaign which followed closely resembled that of Joseph
Smith in the First Mysore War. Coote lacked cavalry to meet that
of the enemy; he lacked transport, partly owing to the lack of pre-
parations before war broke out, partly owing to the systematic
ravaging of the country by Hyder; and his movements were further
hampered by a great train of artillery, which he probably needed to
keep the enemy horse at a respectful distance, and by enormous
hordes of camp-followers, whom he would not take adequate measures
to reduce. In these circumstances, due partly to the inefficient
government which had been in control, partly to the defects of the
military system which had grown up, and partly to the vigorous,
conduct of his adversary, Coote never succeeded in commanding a
greater extent of territory than was covered by his guns. He won a
considerable tactical victory at Porto Novo (1 July, 1781), where
Hyder committed himself more closely to action than he ventured to
do again; and at Polilur, the scene of Baillie's destruction (7 August),
and Sholinghur (27 September) he drove the enemy from the field


## p. 285 (#313) ############################################

SUFFREN
285
of battle; but although these successes restored the English confidence
in themselves and their leader, such a war of attrition would exhaust
them sooner than the enemy; and neither in this year nor in 1782
did Coote make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of the
nawab's possessions, while the English resources and finances steadily
decayed.
Meanwhile a French squadron had appeared in the Indian waters,
under the command of a leader of transcendent abilities. Early in
1782 Suffren, who had succeeded to the command of the French
squadron by the death of d'Orves, announced his arrival by the
capture of grain vessels bound for Madras from the northward. At
this time the English men-of-war were under the command of Sir
Edward Hughes, a stout fighter, but without the spark of genius.
In the previous year he had actively co-operated in the capture of
Negapatam from the Dutch, and had then sailed to Ceylon, where
he had taken Trinkomali. He had under his command nine ships
of the line, of which six had been in the East for some time, with the
result that their bottoms were foul and their crews depleted. Against
them Suffren could place twelve ships in the line. In the course of
1782 four actions took place between the two squadrons-17 February,
11 April, 5 July, and 3 September. From the first the English began
to get rather the worst of it, in consequence of the superior numbers
and superior tactical skill of the French leader. Twice he succeeded
in bringing the greater part of his squadron to bear on a small part
of ours, but on the whole the English held their own by a stubborn
resistance against superior concentrations. In February the French
landed somė 2000 men under the command of Du Chemin; but
luckily he proved not nearly so competent a leader as Suffren, and
his junction with Hyder led to no change in the military situation.
On 31 August Trinkomali surrendered to Suffren, Hughes having
failed to refit himself in time to relieve it.
On the whole the campaign against Hyder in the Carnatic seems
to have been conceived on false lines. The easiest way to drive him
out was not to accept battle in the nawab's territory but to carry the
war into the enemy's dominions, which lay exposed to attack fron
the sea all along the Malabar Coast. Then he would have been
obliged to decide whether to ravage his own country or to allow the
enemy to make war in it at ease. In either case he would early have
become disgusted with a war carried on to his own evident detriment.
This was self-evident, and, as soon as Bombay had been relieved by
the progress of Hastings's negotiations from the pressure of the
Maratha War, the Supreme Government urged upon that presidency
the necessity of taking measures for an expedition against Hyder's
western provinces. The Madras Government had constantly urged
1 Bengal to Madras, 16 May, ap. Madras Mil. Consultations, 5 June, 1782.
p. 1710.


## p. 286 (#314) ############################################

286
THE CARNATIC, 1761-84
the same point, much to Coote's indignation, who thought that the
principal forces should be concentrated in the Carnatic under his
own command. However, a body of reinforcements from Europe
had been landed at Calicut, and the royal officer in command, Colonel
Humberstone, had assumed command of the Bombay troops there
and moved inland, a threat which had compelled Hyder to send his
son Tipu with a part of his army to repulse the invaders. Humber-
stone had been too weak to do more than make a demonstration and
had had to fall back before Tipu's advance; but in the beginning of
1783 the Bombay Government equipped an expedition, under the
command of one of its own officers, Brigadier Mathews, to attack
Mangalore and the province of Bednur. His success was unexpect-
edly rapid. Mangalore was carried, the passage up the ghats was
forced with ease; and the capital of the province surrendered almost
at once. But this success was due rather to the weakness of the enemy
than to the skill of the English. The Mysorean commander, Aiyaz
Khan, was disaffected to Tipu, who had then just succeeded his father,
and surrendered the capital of the province, Bednur, on condition of
retaining the management of the country under the new masters.