vii, 6)
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a
defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man.
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a
defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man.
Summa Theologica
Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending
his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,
but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
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Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or a
supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest
perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee. "
Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above
(A[1] ). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in
money for pleading.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with
temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual
good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is
not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
Objection 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs
towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the
judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad
Macedon. ), "the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness
true evidence. " Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon. ) that "an
advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice. "
I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is
not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always
bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes.
Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against
justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person
to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a
moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in
hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If,
however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against
justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon. ) that "it is
customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by
a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with
a commendable custom. "
Reply to Objection 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he
can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything,
since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does
give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine
reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause
of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and
yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.
Reply to Objection 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual,
the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body:
hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no
craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.
Reply to Objection 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either
party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the
witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to
one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out
of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive
their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for
their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they
are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charge [*Vulg. : 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the
other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully
accept fee from the party he assists.
__________________________________________________________________
OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3)
tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is reviling?
(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
(4) Of the origin of reviling.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling consists in words?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.
Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a
kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's
neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore
reviling does not consist in words.
Objection 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can
be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it
seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing
or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.
Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now
reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I heard
reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side. " Therefore reviling
consists in words.
I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this
happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one
person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for
which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have
spoken above (Q[64], seqq. ). Secondly, when a man publishes something
against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the
latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done
I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are very few, for words
have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing
whatever the mind conceives. " Hence reviling, properly speaking
consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler
[contumeliosus] "is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words. "
Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this
account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling
in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30,
"contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or
deed revile and shame others. "
Reply to Objection 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence,
i. e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the
ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs
conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds
of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor,
or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater
if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may
still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the
speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
Reply to Objection 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as
such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's
honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some
other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66):
where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have
the significant force of words.
Reply to Objection 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as
reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the
detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is
the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly,
there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by
"taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken of in
connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man
says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not
revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only
taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his
inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any
kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly
speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has
succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15):
"He will give a few things and upbraid much. " Nevertheless these terms
are sometimes employed one for the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal
sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a
virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. [2945]FS, Q[60], A[5]] to
which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and
yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the
Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians! ," and our Lord said
(Lk. 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe! " Therefore
railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of
its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its
genus cannot become venial, as stated above ([2946]FS, Q[88], AA[4],6).
Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance
to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who
utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.
Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its
genus.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment
of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell,
according to Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou
fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. " Therefore railing or reviling
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2947](A[1]), words are injurious to
other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification
depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it
seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are
uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a
dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other
man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or
reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since
a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other
hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the
intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him
or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally
and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as
he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be
sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all.
Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one
should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so
grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person
against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal
sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as
were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in
fun, he would not be without blame.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight
mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the
object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and
this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the
other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object
of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,
as stated in the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or
damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too,
for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person
whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples
"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless. " Yet, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when
it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so
as to urge God's service, not our own. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on
the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it
be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and
be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such
a word to give but little pain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the
reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to
suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
Objection 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now
one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger. "
Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
Objection 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it
is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now
by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to
Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom. ): "If thou wilt be revenged, be
silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow. " Therefore one ought not by
silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to
me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a
deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth. "
I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so
do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in
those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind,
according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on
our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
also the other" [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of
Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to
do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually:
since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He
said: "Why strikest thou Me? " (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same
applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are
bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should
be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand
against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the
good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that
he may not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool
according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise. " Secondly,
for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue
on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super
Ezech. ): "Those who are so placed that their life should be an example
to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their
preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they
continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life. "
Reply to Objection 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be
checked with moderation, i. e. as a duty of charity, and not through
lust for one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not
a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him. "
Reply to Objection 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled
there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a
man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to
proceed from a sense of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence
with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be
praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue,
and heap not wood upon his fire. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling arises from anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For
it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be
reviling [Douay: 'reproach']. " But anger is a vice distinct from pride.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are
meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']. " Now folly is a vice
opposed to wisdom, as stated above ([2948]Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger
is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is
a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise
to revilings. "
I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it
is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with
its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is
revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on
another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride
which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who
think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict
injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming
it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their
will.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 6)
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a
defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence
reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with
anger.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an
angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about
this. " Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger
rather than to hatred.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) What is backbiting?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's
character by secret words?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some
[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii. ], "the blackening of
another's good name by words uttered in secret. " For "secretly" and
"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin,
because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few.
Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not
belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition.
Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it
should be done by secret words.
Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known
to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
openly.
Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish
something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is
blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when
one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore
not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in
silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth. "
I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above ([2949]Q[72], A[1])---and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but
his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for
his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person
against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims
at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from
reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are
uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter
secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i. e. as regards the injury
inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring
his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced
all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and
by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; [2950]FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).
Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret,
not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore
if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case
of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present:
although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he
destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another,
not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly,
in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly,
by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing
something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a
bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good,
or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no
act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which
pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the
virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order
that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man
accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice. "
But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in
all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory
[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought. " But this
pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
deemed a slight sin because it consists in words. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2951]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by
its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good
name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from
doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15):
"Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than
a thousand treasures precious and great. " Therefore backbiting,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes
that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and
yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting
strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as
it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some
necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not
a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of
lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal
sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the
words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his
good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the
manner stated above ([2952]Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of
restitution.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a
man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
accuse him for the good of public justice.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there
are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is
written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man. "
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
was soon to rise again. " From this it seems to follow that backbiting
is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than
reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret
backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery,
because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling
severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more
grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against
his neighbor, adultery is most grave.
Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting
arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity
of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into
their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they
see of the truth? " Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin
committed against one's neighbor.
On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But
backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins
of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins
committed against one's neighbor.
I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one's
neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is
thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good
taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold,
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of
external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all,
cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for
instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the
other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external
things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the
body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a
man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external
things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's
neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the
life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is
contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters
upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's
good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to
spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is
better than great riches. " Therefore backbiting according to its genus
is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or
adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances.
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the
sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he
sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word
have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a
slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith
of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our
faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting,
in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ([2953]Q[66],
A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies,
but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is
not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only
the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so
far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part
severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not
forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer
"occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for
hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the
Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers,"
i. e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer"
(1 Jn. 3:15).
Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes
place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but
rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's
glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous
than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just
as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
depends on its inclination to an end, i. e. on the thing to which the
sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
from.
Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his
mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves
and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate
of one's neighbor.
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Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to
others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his
own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we
ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by
their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater. "
Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
backbite others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
against the truth. " Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.
Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to
others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten:
for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus.
vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
humbled by backbiting. " Therefore one ought not to withstand
backbiters.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
others nor listen to backbiters. "
I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them. " Now this happens in two ways. First,
directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin
is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not
withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not
because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes
a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at
least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of
the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes
more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to
say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens
to backbiting. " If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails
to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he
sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially.
Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his
official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some
consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human
fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ([2954]Q[19],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a
man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is
possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ([2955]Q[72],
A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as
he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence
he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same
reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying
"underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that
he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words,
for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because
according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a
sad countenance a backbiting tongue. "
Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is
due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
__________________________________________________________________
OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i. e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from
backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes
his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not
to the face but into the ear. " But to speak of another disparagingly
belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
from backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
among the people. " But an informer is apparently the same as a
backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed. " But a
double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
backbiter.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters
[Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord
among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points. "
I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and
also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly
of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used
one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a
tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i. e.
his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,
but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or a
supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest
perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee. "
Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated above
(A[1] ). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in
money for pleading.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with
temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a spiritual
good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law. Therefore it is
not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.
Objection 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs
towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the
judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad
Macedon. ), "the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness
true evidence. " Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon. ) that "an
advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice. "
I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is
not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always
bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's causes.
Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against
justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person
to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a
moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in
hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If,
however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against
justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon. ) that "it is
customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by
a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with
a commendable custom. "
Reply to Objection 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he
can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything,
since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does
give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine
reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause
of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and
yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.
Reply to Objection 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual,
the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body:
hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no
craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.
Reply to Objection 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either
party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the
witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to
one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out
of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive
their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for
their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they
are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charge [*Vulg. : 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the
other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully
accept fee from the party he assists.
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OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3)
tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is reviling?
(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?
(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?
(4) Of the origin of reviling.
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Whether reviling consists in words?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.
Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a
kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's
neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore
reviling does not consist in words.
Objection 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can
be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it
seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing
or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.
Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now
reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I heard
reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side. " Therefore reviling
consists in words.
I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this
happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one
person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for
which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have
spoken above (Q[64], seqq. ). Secondly, when a man publishes something
against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the
latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done
I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are very few, for words
have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing
whatever the mind conceives. " Hence reviling, properly speaking
consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler
[contumeliosus] "is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words. "
Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this
account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling
in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30,
"contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or
deed revile and shame others. "
Reply to Objection 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence,
i. e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the
ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs
conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds
of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor,
or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater
if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may
still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the
speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
Reply to Objection 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as
such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's
honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some
other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66):
where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have
the significant force of words.
Reply to Objection 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as
reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the
detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is
the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly,
there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by
"taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken of in
connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man
says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not
revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only
taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his
inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any
kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly
speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has
succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15):
"He will give a few things and upbraid much. " Nevertheless these terms
are sometimes employed one for the other.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal
sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a
virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. [2945]FS, Q[60], A[5]] to
which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and
yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the
Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians! ," and our Lord said
(Lk. 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe! " Therefore
railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of
its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its
genus cannot become venial, as stated above ([2946]FS, Q[88], AA[4],6).
Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance
to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who
utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.
Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its
genus.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment
of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell,
according to Mat. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou
fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. " Therefore railing or reviling
is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [2947](A[1]), words are injurious to
other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification
depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it
seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are
uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a
dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other
man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or
reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since
a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other
hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the
intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him
or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally
and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as
he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be
sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all.
Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one
should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so
grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person
against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal
sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as
were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in
fun, he would not be without blame.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight
mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the
object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and
this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the
other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object
of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,
as stated in the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or
damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too,
for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person
whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples
"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless. " Yet, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when
it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so
as to urge God's service, not our own. "
Reply to Objection 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on
the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it
be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and
be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such
a word to give but little pain.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the
reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to
suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
Objection 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now
one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger. "
Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
Objection 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it
is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now
by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to
Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom. ): "If thou wilt be revenged, be
silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow. " Therefore one ought not by
silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to
me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a
deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth. "
I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so
do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in
those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind,
according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on
our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
also the other" [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of
Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to
do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually:
since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He
said: "Why strikest thou Me? " (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same
applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are
bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should
be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand
against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the
good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that
he may not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool
according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise. " Secondly,
for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue
on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super
Ezech. ): "Those who are so placed that their life should be an example
to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their
preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they
continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life. "
Reply to Objection 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be
checked with moderation, i. e. as a duty of charity, and not through
lust for one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not
a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him. "
Reply to Objection 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled
there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a
man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to
proceed from a sense of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence
with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be
praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is
written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue,
and heap not wood upon his fire. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether reviling arises from anger?
Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For
it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be
reviling [Douay: 'reproach']. " But anger is a vice distinct from pride.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are
meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']. " Now folly is a vice
opposed to wisdom, as stated above ([2948]Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger
is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
Objection 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is
a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise
to revilings. "
I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it
is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with
its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is
revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on
another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.
Reply to Objection 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride
which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who
think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict
injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming
it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their
will.
Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 6)
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a
defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence
reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with
anger.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an
angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about
this. " Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger
rather than to hatred.
__________________________________________________________________
OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) What is backbiting?
(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(3) Of its comparison with other sins;
(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
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Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's
character by secret words?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some
[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii. ], "the blackening of
another's good name by words uttered in secret. " For "secretly" and
"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin,
because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few.
Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not
belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition.
Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it
should be done by secret words.
Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known
to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
openly.
Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish
something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is
blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when
one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore
not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in
silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth. "
I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways---openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence---and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways---in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above ([2949]Q[72], A[1])---and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but
his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for
his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person
against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims
at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from
reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are
uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter
secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i. e. as regards the injury
inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring
his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced
all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and
by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; [2950]FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).
Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret,
not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore
if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case
of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present:
although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he
destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another,
not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly,
in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly,
by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing
something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a
bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good,
or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.
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Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no
act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which
pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the
virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order
that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man
accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice. "
But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in
all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory
[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought. " But this
pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
deemed a slight sin because it consists in words. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2951]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should
be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by
its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good
name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from
doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15):
"Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than
a thousand treasures precious and great. " Therefore backbiting,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes
that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and
yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting
strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as
it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some
necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not
a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of
lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal
sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the
words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his
good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the
manner stated above ([2952]Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of
restitution.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a
man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
accuse him for the good of public justice.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there
are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is
written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man. "
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
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Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's
neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
was soon to rise again. " From this it seems to follow that backbiting
is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.
Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than
reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret
backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery,
because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling
severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more
grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against
his neighbor, adultery is most grave.
Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting
arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity
of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into
their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they
see of the truth? " Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin
committed against one's neighbor.
On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But
backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins
of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins
committed against one's neighbor.
I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one's
neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is
thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good
taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold,
namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of
external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all,
cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for
instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the
other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external
things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the
body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a
man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external
things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's
neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the
life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is
contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters
upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man's
good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to
spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is
better than great riches. " Therefore backbiting according to its genus
is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or
adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances.
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the
sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he
sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word
have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a
slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith
of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our
faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting,
in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ([2953]Q[66],
A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies,
but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is
not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only
the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so
far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part
severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not
forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer
"occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for
hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the
Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers,"
i. e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer"
(1 Jn. 3:15).
Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes
place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but
rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's
glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous
than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just
as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
depends on its inclination to an end, i. e. on the thing to which the
sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
from.
Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his
mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves
and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate
of one's neighbor.
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Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?
Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to
others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his
own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we
ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by
their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater. "
Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
backbite others.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
against the truth. " Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.
Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to
others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten:
for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus.
vi, qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
humbled by backbiting. " Therefore one ought not to withstand
backbiters.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
others nor listen to backbiters. "
I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them. " Now this happens in two ways. First,
directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin
is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not
withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not
because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes
a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at
least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of
the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes
more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to
say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens
to backbiting. " If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails
to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he
sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially.
Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his
official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some
consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human
fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ([2954]Q[19],
A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a
man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is
possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ([2955]Q[72],
A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as
he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence
he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same
reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying
"underneath his burden," as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].
Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that
he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words,
for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained
demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because
according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a
sad countenance a backbiting tongue. "
Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is
due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
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OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i. e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
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Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from
backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The susurro [tale-bearer] takes
his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not
to the face but into the ear. " But to speak of another disparagingly
belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
from backbiting.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']
among the people. " But an informer is apparently the same as a
backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed. " But a
double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
backbiter.
On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, "Tale-bearers, backbiters
[Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow discord
among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good points. "
I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and
also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly
of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used
one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be not called a
tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i. e.
