Four
external
dhatus cut, are cut;
Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.
Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Thus the nose and tongue exist in Rupadhatu, although the prgans which correspond to them are lacking.
Thus there are only twelve dhdtus in Rupadhatu
2. [Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] But an organ can arise without having any use, for example the organs of beings destined to perish in the womb.
Agreed! The arising of an organ can be without usefulness: but it is never without a cause. What is the cause of the arising of an organ, if not a certain act commanded by a desire relative to this organ? Now whoever is without attachment to the object, odor, is also without attachment to the organ, the organ of smell. Thus there is no reason for the organs of smell and taste to appear among beings who are reborn in Rupadhatu, since these beings are detached from odors and tastes. Otherwise, why is the sexual organ lacking in Rupadhatu?
Reply of the Vaibhasikas. The sexual organ is a cause of ugliness (ii. 12).
Is it not beautiful among beings who possess the marks of the Mahapurusas? Moreover, it is not by reason of its utility that the sexual organ arises, but rather by reason of its cause. Given its cause, it will arise, even if it is ugly.
? 3. [Argument from authority. ] According to the Vaibhasikas, to
maintain that the organs of smell and taste are lacking in Rupadhatu is
133
to contradict the Sutra. The Sutra teaches that beings of Rupadhatu
possess, complete, all the organs: they are never one-eyed, or only one-eared (iii. 98a).
This text teaches that beings of Rupadhatu possess, complete, the organs that exist in Rupadhatu. If the Vaibhasikas do not understand it thus, they must then attribute the sexual organ to those beings.
[4. Reply and conclusion of the Vaibhasikas. ]
Although odor and taste are lacking there, the organs of smell and taste exist in Rupadhatu.
In fact, a person who is detached from odors keeps his attachement with respect to the organ of smell which is part of his person. Thirst (=desire) enters into action with regard to these six organs of consciousness, not by reason of the object of these six organs, but by reason of the person himself. Thus the arising of the organs of smell
and taste has a cause, even if one were detached from odors and tastes. But the same does not hold for the sexual organ. Attachment relative to this organ has for its principle attachment to the tactile conscious- ness of sexual union. Now beings who will be reborn in Rupadhatu are detached from this consciousness; thus they have not accomplished actions commanded by a desire relative to the sexual organ; thus this
134 organ is lacking in Rupadhatu.
31a-b. In Arupyadhatu, there is a mental organ, an object of the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
Beings detached from matter arise in Arupyadhatu, thus the ten dhatus which are material, namely the five organs and their objects, and the five consciousnesses which have for their point of support and for their objects a material dhatu (viii. 3c), are lacking in Arupyadhatu.
***
How many dhatus are impure? How many are pure?
31c-d. The three dhatus which have just been named can be
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pure or impure.
They are pure when they form part of the Truth of the Path or of unconditioned things; in the opposite case they are impure (i. 4).
3 Id. The others are impure.
The other dhatus, fifteen in number, are solely impure.
***
How many dhtitus are associated with vitarka and with victim, free from vitarka and associated with vicara, or free from both vitarka and
136
victim!
32a-b. Five consciousnesses always include vitarka and vicara.
They are always associated with vitarka and with victim, for they are gross, being turned towards externals. The word hi, "always," indicates restriction; they are exclusively dharmas which include vitarka and victim.
32c. The last three dhatus are of three types.
These dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental con- sciousness, and the mental consciousness.
1. In Kamadhatu and in the First Dhyana (viii. 7, 11), (1) the manodhtitu, (2) manovijntinadhtitu, and (3) that part of the dharma- dhtiytu which is associated with the mind (ii. 23), with the exception of vitarka and victim themselves, are associated with vitarka and victim.
2. In the intermediary dhytina (dhytintintara, viii. 22d), these same are free from vitarka, but associated with victim.
3. In the higher stages up to and including the last stage, these same are free from both vitarka and victim (viii. 23c-d).
4. The part of the dharmadhtitu which is disassociated from the mind (ii. 35) and the victim of the intermediary dhytina are free from both vitarka and victim.
5. As for vitarka, it is always accompanied by victim', it is always free from vitarka, since two simultaneous vitarkas are impossible. But
1? 5
? the vicdra of Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana are not placed within any of the three categories: in fact, it is always associated with vitarka, and it is never accompanied by vicdra, two simultaneous vicdras being impossible.
We therefore say that, in the stages which include vitarka and vicdra (viii. 7), there are four categories: 1. The dharmas associated with the mind, with the exception of vitarka and vicdra, are accom- panied by vitarka and vicdra. 2. Vitarka is free from vitarka, but accompanied by vicdra. 3. The dharmas disassociated from the mind are free from vitarka and vicdra. 4. Vicdra is free from vicdra, and is accompanied by vitarka.
32d. The other dhatus are free from the one and the other. The other dhatus are the ten material dhatus. Not being associated
with the mind, they are free from both vitarka and vicdra. ##*
But, if the five sense consciousnesses are always accompanied by vitarka and vicdra, how are they defined as free from vikalpa?
33a-b. They are free from vikalpa to the extent that they are
137 free from nirupandvikalpa and from anusmaranavikalpa.
138
According to the Vaibhasikas, vikalpa is of three types: vikalpa
in and of itself or by definition, vikalpa consisting of examination, and 139
vikalpa consisting of remembering. The five sense consciousnesses
include the first type of vikalpa but not the other two.
one says that they are free from vikalpa, in the same way that when a
This is why horse has only one foot, one says that it does not have any feet.
%%
on the mental states (ii. 33). As for the other two vikalpas:
Vikalpa by definition" is vitarka, which we shall study in the chapter
33c-d. They are dispersed mental prajna, mental memory whatever it may be.
Mental prajna, that is, the discernment of the dharmas associated with the mental consciousness, but dispersed, that is to say, not
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concentrated, not in the state of absorption (viii. 1), is either vikalpa of examination or by definition. All mental memory, concentrated or not
141 concentrated, is vikalpa of remembering.
###
How many dhatus "have an object," that is to say, are the subject of consciousness?
142 34a-b. The seven dhatus which are mind have an object.
Only the dhatus of visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness have an object, because they always grasp their spheres.
34b. And also one part of the dharmadhatu.
That part which consists of the dharmas associated with the mind (ii. 23). The other dhatus, namely the ten material dhatus and the part of the dharmadhatu which is not associated with the mind (ii. 35), do not have an object.
***
How many dhatus are non-appropriated? How many are appropriated?
34c. Nine are non-appropriated.
What are these nine? The seven that have been mentioned which have an object, together with one-half of the eighth.
34c. The eight that have been mentioned, and sound.
These nine are never appropriated: the seven dhatus of mind
(i. l6c), the dharmadhatu (i. l5c), and sound are never appropriated. 34d. The other nine are of two types.
They are sometimes appropriated, sometimes non-appropriated.
? 1. The five organs of sense consciousness (caksurdhatu, etc), of the present time, are appropriated They are not appropriated in the future and in the past.
Four objects,--visible matter, odor, taste, and tangible things,--are appropriated when they are present, when they are an integral part of the organs. Every other visible matter, every other odor, every other taste, and every other tangible is not appropriated: for example, the physical matter,--cofor and shape--, of hair, body hair, nails and teeth,--with the exception of their roots, which are bound to the body or to the organ of touch; color and shape of excrement, urine, saliva, mucus, blood, etc. ; the color and shape of earth, water, fire, etc.
2. What is the meaning of the expression "appropriated? " That
which the mind and the mental states grasp and appropriate to
themselves in the quality of a support is called "appropriated" Organic
matter, that is to say matter which constitutes the five organs of
consciousness, as well as matter not separable from organic matter, is
"appropriated," is "made one's own," by the mind: this results from
the fact that, in the case of well-being or illness, there is a reciprocal
reaction between the mind and this matter. Matter that the Abhi-
dharma calls "appropriated," is called in common language, sacetand or 143
***
How many dhatus are primary matter, or the great, primary elements? How many are secondary matter, matter derived from the
144 primary elements?
35a. The tangible is of two types.
Tangibles are (1) the four primary elements, solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion (i. 12); and (2) sevenfold secondary matter, the soft, the hard, etc. (i. lOd).
35b. The other nine material dhatus are solely secondary matter.
sensitive matter.
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The other material dhdtus, the five organs and the objects of the first four organs, are solely secondary matter.
145 35c. As is the part of the dharmadhdbu which is material.
The same for avijnapti (i. ll), which forms part of the dharma- dhdtu (i. l5c-d).
The dhdtus of mind (i. l6c) are neither primary matter nor secondary matter; the same for the dharmadhdtu, with the exception of avijnapti.
i. According to the Bhadanta Buddhadeva, the ten ayatanas, that is, the five organs of consciousness and their objects, are solely primary
146 matter.
An inadmissible opinion. The Sutra teaches, in a limited manner,
that there are four primary elements, and it defines them in a limited
manner as being solidity, fludity, etc. , (i. l2d). Now solidity, fluidity, etc. ,
are tangibles and solely tangibles: solidity is not preceived by the organ
of sight. Furthermore, each organ attains to the secondary matter
which is appropriate to it: color is not preceived by the organ of
147 touch.
Further, that the tangible is primary matter and secondary matter, and that the nine other materials ayatanas are solely secondary matter, results from the same words of the Sutra: "Oh Bhik? us, the eye, the internal source of consciousness (i. 39), a subtle matter derived from the primary elements, material sources, invisible, capable of being struck," and so on with respect to the four other material organs which are described in the same terms. With respect to the first four objects: "The visible matter is an external sources of consciousness, deriving from the primary elements, material, visible, capable of being struck. " The same with respect to odor and taste. But, with respect to the tangible: "Tangibles are an external source of consciousness, the four primary elements and matter deriving from the four primary elements . . . "
ii. One can maintain that the five organs are primary matter, for the Sutra (Samyukta, 11. 1) says: "Everything that is in the eye, a ball of flesh, is solid, resistant. . . "
? Reply. Here the Sutra refers to the ball of flesh which is not separable from the organ of sight, and not to the organ itself.
So be it. But, according to the Garbhdvakrdntisutra (note 120) "a person is the six dhdtus** the primary element of earth, the primary element of water, the primary element of fire, the primary element of wind, the space element and the vijndna element. Thus, in the embryonic state, the body is made up of primary matter, not secondary matter.
No. For in this first phrase, "a person is the six dhdtus** the Sutra
148
give an exhaustive definition. In fact, the Sutr& then says that a person
means to describe the essence of a person,
is the six points of support of the mental dharma called contact (ii. 24),
149
that is to say, the six organs.
"a person is the six dhdtus** one would infer the non-existence of the mental states (caitta, ii. 24, 34), for the mental states are not included within vijndnadhdtu, which is the mind
Would one maintain that the mental states are the mind, and as a consequence are included within vijndnadhdtu?
One cannot, for the Sutra says "Sensation and ideas are dharmas which are mental states, dharmas associated with the mind, having the mind for their point of support;" and the Sutra speaks of a "mind possessing desire;" thus desire, which is a mental state, is not the mind (vii. lld).
15 It is thus proven that our definition (i. 35a-c) is correct. ?
***
How many dhdtus are agglomerations? How many are not agglomerations?
151 35d. The ten material dhdtus are agglomerations.
The five organs of sense consciousness, and their objects, are agglomerations of atoms (ii. 22).
The Dhdtus 101
and it does not pretend to
Further, to take this definition literally:
***
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Among the eighteen dhatus, how many cut, and how many are cut; how many burn, and how many are burned; and how many weigh, and how many are weighed?
36e.
Four external dhatus cut, are cut;
Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.
What is the dharma that is called "to cut? "
To cut is to produce the sectioning of the procress of an agglomeration the nature of which is to continue itself in an uninterrupted series. The axe cuts a piece of wood which is a series, and makes of it two series which exist and which develop separately.
The organs cannot be cut off. For example, when all of the parts of the organ of touch or the body are cut off, they are not, for all this, multiple: the members which have been cut, that is to say, seperated from the trunk, do not possess touch.
The organs themselves do not cut, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
36b. The same are burned and weighed.
The same holds for being burned and weigh as for cutting off and being cut off. Four external dhatus alone are burned. They weigh, for example, when they constitute a scales. Not the organs, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
Sound does not cut off, is not cut off, is not burned, and does not weigh, for it does not exist in a series.
36c-d. There is no agreement with respect to that which is
152 burned and weighed.
There is no agreement with respect to what burns and what is weighed. According to some, the same four external dhatus burn and are weighed. According to others, only the primary element of fire burns, when it manifests its own manner of being in the flame; only weight, which is one type of secondary matter (i. l0d), is weighed: lightweight things, light, etc. , where nevertheless rupa manifests its
? own manner of being, are not weighed ***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are fruition, accumulation, or outflowing? How many are conjoined with material substances? And how many are momentary?
37a. Five internal dhatus are of fruition and accumulation.
i. Definitions.
1. Vipdkaja, "of fruition," or literally, "arisen from fruition" instead of "arisen from the cause of fruition" {vipdkahetuja, ii. 54), by ommis- sion of the middle word, the same way that one says "ox-cart" for "ox-drawn cart. "
Or else, in the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from vipdka" the word vipdka designates not the fruition, but the ripened action, the action
153
arriving at the time period when it gives forth its fruit. That which
arises from ripened action, namely the fruit of retribution, is called
"arisen from vipdka! * The fruit is furthermore also called vipdka, 154
because it is cooked (=done).
Or else the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from fruition," signifies
"arisen from the causes of fruition," but one should not say that the word "cause" is omitted. In fact, a cause is often designated by the name of its effect, the same way that an effect is often designated by the name of its cause: "The present six organs are past action" (Ekottara, p. 9a7; Samyutta, ii. 65, iv. 132; below ii. 28).
2. Aupacayika, "of accumulation," that is to say "that which is
accumulated nearby" through certain foods (iii. 39), certain actions
(bathing, etc. ), certain sleep, or certain absorptions (iv. 6c). According
155
to one opinion, chastity is also a cause of accumulation; but in reality,
chastity causes there to be no diminution; it is not a cause of accumulation.
Matter "of accumulation" protects the matter "of retribution" as a wall does, by surrounding it.
3. Naisyandika, "of outflowing," that is to say, nisyandaphala
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(ii. 57), "that which is produced by a cause similar to its effect. "
ii. Five organs or internal dhatus, with the exclusion of the mental organ, are of fruition and accumulation. They are not outflowing, for
156 they are outflowing only when they are fruition and accumulation.
iii. Sound is accumulation, for the voice is in a weak state when the
157
body is emaciated. It is also outflowing. It is not a cause of fruition,
158 for the voice proceeds from a desire for action {chanda, ii. 24).
37b. Sound is not of retribution.
Objection. The Prajnaptisastra says, "This mark of the Maha- purusa (iii. 98) which is called 'the voice of Brahma* results from the
159 perfect practice of abstaining from harmful language (iv. 76c). " Thus
sound is fruition.
Etiology of sound. First opinion. One should distinguish three
moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements arising from this action which are of retribution; and (3) sound, which arises from the primary elements.
Second opinion. One should distinguish five moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements of retribution; (3) primary elements of accumu- lation; (4) primary elements of outflowing; and (5) sound. Thus sound is not retribution, because it does not immediately proceed from action.
Objection. To reason thus, bodily sensation (ii. 7), not being produced immediately through action but being immediately produced through the primary elements arisen from action (iii. 32), will not be retribution.
Reply. But sensation is not provoked by a desire to experience such a sensation, whereas sound is provoked by a desire to speak. If it were provoked by desire, it would not be retribution.
37c-d. The eight dhatus free from resistance are of outflowing and also of fruition.
iv. The eight dhatus not capable of resistance (i. 29b), namely the seven dhatus of mind and the dharmadhatu, are outflowing and retribution; they are outflowing when they are produced by similar causes (sabhagahetu, ii. 52) or universal causes (sarvatragahetu, ii. 54),
? retribution when they are produced by retributive causes (vipdkahetu, ii. 54c). They are not accumulation, because the non-material dhatus have nothing in common with agglomeration.
38a. The others are of three types.
v. The other dhatus, that is, the four not mentioned above,--visible matter, smell, taste, and tangibles,--are of three types: retribution, when they are not separable from organic matter (i. 34); accumulation and outflowing.
***
38a. A single dhatu "is real. "
The unconditioned, being permanent, is a "real thing. " The unconditioned forms part of the dharmadhdtu (i. 15); the dharmadhdtu is thus the single dhatu which "contains a real thing. "
***
38b. The last three dhatus are momentary.
The last three dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
In the dharmas of the moment called duhkhe dharmajndnaksanti, which is the first moment in the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi. 25) and as a consequence the first moment which is pure, these three dhatus are "not produced by a cause similar to its effect" (sabhagahetu, ii. 52), for, in the series which constitutes the person under consideration, a pure dharma has not yet appeared which would be a "cause similar to its effect" of duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti. This is why these three dhatus are called momentary, because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this type of cause.
In the group under consideration, the mind to which the ksanti is associated is manodhdtu and manovijnanadhdtu\ the dharmas which coexist with this mind are dharmadhdtu'. pure discipline (iv. ! 3c);
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sensations, ideas, volition and other mental states; plus the praptis (ii. 36) and the samskrtalaksanas (ii. 46).
***
There is a problem to be examined. Does he who obtains possession of the organ of sight where he had previously been lacking it, also obtain possession of the visual consciousness? And does he who obtains possession of the visual consciousness where he was previously lacking it, also obtain possession of the organ of sight?
38c-d. He can obtain the organ of sight and the visual
160 consciousness either separately or together.
1. A person lacking the organ of sight takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the visual consciousness: (a) a being of Kamadhatu whose organs progressively appear (ii. 14), for, before the organ of sight appears within him, he is already in possession of his past and future visual consciousness (in the inter- mediary state, iii. 14; on "possession," ii. 36b); and (b) a being who dies in Arupyadhatu and who is reborn in the heavens of the three higher Dhyanas, where the visual consciousness is lacking although the organ of sight exists there (viii. l3a-c).
2. A person devoid of the visual consciousness takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the organ of sight: (a) abeingborninaheavenofthethreehigherDhyanas canmanifesta visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana (viii. 13): he does not take possession of the organ of sight which he possesses already; and (b) a being who falls from one of the three higher Dhyanas and who is reborn in a lower sphere.
3. A person devoid of the two takes possession of the two: a being who falls from Arupyadhatu and who is reborn either in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana (world of Brahma).
We have up to now understood the term that the stanza employs, "to obtain" (labha) in the sense of pratilambha, taking possession; but one can also understand it in the sense of prapti, possession (ii. 36b).
? The question is thus posed: Is one who is endowed with the visual organ also endowed with visual consciousness? Four cases are possible: (a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyanas necessarily possesses the visual organ, but possesses only the visual
consciousness if he manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana;
(b) a being in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of the visual organ in the course of his embryonic life or who becomes blind: he remains in possession of the visual consciousness acquired in the course of his intermediary existence (iii. 14) or at conception;
(c) a being in Kamadhatu who has taken possession of the organ of sight and who has not lost it, a being born in the heaven of the First Dhyana, a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyana who manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyanas: these three categories of beings are endowed with both the organ and the consciousness;
(d) all other beings,--beings of Arupyadhatu,--are devoid of both the organ of sight and visual consciousness.
The taking possession of and possession, simultaneous or not, of the organ of sight and visible matter, of the visual consciousness and visible matter, of the organ of hearing and sound, etc. , shall be defined, as fitting, in each case.
How many are external? 39a. Twelve are personal
What are these twelve?
39b. With the exception of visible matter, etc.
Twelve dhatus are personal, the six organs and the six conscious- nesses; six dhatus are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc.
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But how can one speak of personal dhdtus, or of external dhdtus, since there is no dtmari?
The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons
falsely grasp for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the
name of dtman. Compare, for example, these two line of Scripture:
is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings happiness. " Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to which one gives the name of atman: they are in fact the point of support of them; then one qualifies them as "internal," or "personal," whereas the visible and the other objects of the consciousness are held to be "external. "
But can one say that the six consciousnesses are the point of support of the mind?
They are the point of support of the mind only when, having perished, they acquire the quality of mental organ (i. 17). Thus they are not personal.
This objection is worthless. When the consciousnesses, having perished, becomes the point of support of the mind, it is indeed these consciousnesses themselves which become the point of support; thus, before becoming a point of support, they are not foreign to the quality of point of support. They are thus personal by reason of their future quality of point of support. If it were otherwise, the mental organ would be solely past; it would be neither present nor future. Now it is well understood that the eighteen dhdtus belong to the three time periods. Moreover, if the present or future consciousness does not have the characteristic of manodhdtu, it is absurd to attribute this character- istic to it once it is past. For a dharma does not change its characterstics in the course of time (v. 25; Vibbdsd, TD 27, p. 109al8, p. 200b2).
***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are sabhdga, "active" or "in mutual assistance? " How many are tatsabhaga, "analogous to sabhdga? "
'The sage obtains heaven, by means of a well subdued atman" and "It 162
? 163 39b-c. The dhdtu called dharmas is sabhaga.
An object of consciousness is qualified as sabhaga when the consciousness which constitutes its proper sphere arises or is destined to arise with respect to it.
Now there is no dharma with respect to which an unlimited mental consciousness has not arisen or is destined to arise. All the Saints in fact necessarily produce the thought "All dharma are impersonal" (vii. l3a). It is true that this thought bears neither on itself, nor on the dharmas which are coexistent with it (sahabhu, ii. 50b); but this thought and the dharmas which are coexistent with it are the object of a second moment of a thought of universal impersonality; all the dharmas are thus included within the objea of these two moments of thought (vii. l8c-d). Therefore the dharma- dhatu, the proper objea of the mental consciousness, is, in its totality, sabhaga, aaive as an object.
39c-d. The other dhdtus are also tatsabhdga.
The word "also" shows that they are both sabhaga and tatsabhdga.
When are they tatsabhdga^
39d. When they do not do their proper work.
This implies the definition: they are sabhaga when they do their proper work.
1. The organ of sight which has seen, does now see or shall see visible matter, is termed sabhaga. The same with respea to the other organs, by indicating for each its own object and its own operation (karitra, ii. 58).
2. According to the Vaibhasikas of Kasmir, the organ of sight is tatsabhdga in four cases: the organ of sight which has perished, which is now perishing, which will perish without having seen, and the organ of sight destined to arise (anutpattidharman, v. 24). According to the Westerners, the organ of sight not destined to arise constitutes two categories depending on whether it is accompanied by visual con- sciousness or not.
The same with respect to the other organs of sense consciousness.
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The mental organ is tatsabhaga only when it is not destined to 164
arise; in fact, when it arises, it always has an object.
3. Visible matter, which has been seen, which is now seen, or
which will be seen by the organ of sight, is sabhdga.
It is tatsabhaga when it has perished, is now perishing or shall
perish without having seen, or when it is not destined to arise.
The same with respect to the other objects of sense consciousness
by indicating for each organ the function which corresponds to it.
4. The organ of sight which is sabhdga or tatsabhaga is such for
everyone, for the person to whom this organ belongs, and for other persons. The same for the other organs. But a certain visible thing is sabhdga for the person who sees it.
2. [Answer of the Vaibhasikas:] But an organ can arise without having any use, for example the organs of beings destined to perish in the womb.
Agreed! The arising of an organ can be without usefulness: but it is never without a cause. What is the cause of the arising of an organ, if not a certain act commanded by a desire relative to this organ? Now whoever is without attachment to the object, odor, is also without attachment to the organ, the organ of smell. Thus there is no reason for the organs of smell and taste to appear among beings who are reborn in Rupadhatu, since these beings are detached from odors and tastes. Otherwise, why is the sexual organ lacking in Rupadhatu?
Reply of the Vaibhasikas. The sexual organ is a cause of ugliness (ii. 12).
Is it not beautiful among beings who possess the marks of the Mahapurusas? Moreover, it is not by reason of its utility that the sexual organ arises, but rather by reason of its cause. Given its cause, it will arise, even if it is ugly.
? 3. [Argument from authority. ] According to the Vaibhasikas, to
maintain that the organs of smell and taste are lacking in Rupadhatu is
133
to contradict the Sutra. The Sutra teaches that beings of Rupadhatu
possess, complete, all the organs: they are never one-eyed, or only one-eared (iii. 98a).
This text teaches that beings of Rupadhatu possess, complete, the organs that exist in Rupadhatu. If the Vaibhasikas do not understand it thus, they must then attribute the sexual organ to those beings.
[4. Reply and conclusion of the Vaibhasikas. ]
Although odor and taste are lacking there, the organs of smell and taste exist in Rupadhatu.
In fact, a person who is detached from odors keeps his attachement with respect to the organ of smell which is part of his person. Thirst (=desire) enters into action with regard to these six organs of consciousness, not by reason of the object of these six organs, but by reason of the person himself. Thus the arising of the organs of smell
and taste has a cause, even if one were detached from odors and tastes. But the same does not hold for the sexual organ. Attachment relative to this organ has for its principle attachment to the tactile conscious- ness of sexual union. Now beings who will be reborn in Rupadhatu are detached from this consciousness; thus they have not accomplished actions commanded by a desire relative to the sexual organ; thus this
134 organ is lacking in Rupadhatu.
31a-b. In Arupyadhatu, there is a mental organ, an object of the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
Beings detached from matter arise in Arupyadhatu, thus the ten dhatus which are material, namely the five organs and their objects, and the five consciousnesses which have for their point of support and for their objects a material dhatu (viii. 3c), are lacking in Arupyadhatu.
***
How many dhatus are impure? How many are pure?
31c-d. The three dhatus which have just been named can be
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pure or impure.
They are pure when they form part of the Truth of the Path or of unconditioned things; in the opposite case they are impure (i. 4).
3 Id. The others are impure.
The other dhatus, fifteen in number, are solely impure.
***
How many dhtitus are associated with vitarka and with victim, free from vitarka and associated with vicara, or free from both vitarka and
136
victim!
32a-b. Five consciousnesses always include vitarka and vicara.
They are always associated with vitarka and with victim, for they are gross, being turned towards externals. The word hi, "always," indicates restriction; they are exclusively dharmas which include vitarka and victim.
32c. The last three dhatus are of three types.
These dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental con- sciousness, and the mental consciousness.
1. In Kamadhatu and in the First Dhyana (viii. 7, 11), (1) the manodhtitu, (2) manovijntinadhtitu, and (3) that part of the dharma- dhtiytu which is associated with the mind (ii. 23), with the exception of vitarka and victim themselves, are associated with vitarka and victim.
2. In the intermediary dhytina (dhytintintara, viii. 22d), these same are free from vitarka, but associated with victim.
3. In the higher stages up to and including the last stage, these same are free from both vitarka and victim (viii. 23c-d).
4. The part of the dharmadhtitu which is disassociated from the mind (ii. 35) and the victim of the intermediary dhytina are free from both vitarka and victim.
5. As for vitarka, it is always accompanied by victim', it is always free from vitarka, since two simultaneous vitarkas are impossible. But
1? 5
? the vicdra of Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana are not placed within any of the three categories: in fact, it is always associated with vitarka, and it is never accompanied by vicdra, two simultaneous vicdras being impossible.
We therefore say that, in the stages which include vitarka and vicdra (viii. 7), there are four categories: 1. The dharmas associated with the mind, with the exception of vitarka and vicdra, are accom- panied by vitarka and vicdra. 2. Vitarka is free from vitarka, but accompanied by vicdra. 3. The dharmas disassociated from the mind are free from vitarka and vicdra. 4. Vicdra is free from vicdra, and is accompanied by vitarka.
32d. The other dhatus are free from the one and the other. The other dhatus are the ten material dhatus. Not being associated
with the mind, they are free from both vitarka and vicdra. ##*
But, if the five sense consciousnesses are always accompanied by vitarka and vicdra, how are they defined as free from vikalpa?
33a-b. They are free from vikalpa to the extent that they are
137 free from nirupandvikalpa and from anusmaranavikalpa.
138
According to the Vaibhasikas, vikalpa is of three types: vikalpa
in and of itself or by definition, vikalpa consisting of examination, and 139
vikalpa consisting of remembering. The five sense consciousnesses
include the first type of vikalpa but not the other two.
one says that they are free from vikalpa, in the same way that when a
This is why horse has only one foot, one says that it does not have any feet.
%%
on the mental states (ii. 33). As for the other two vikalpas:
Vikalpa by definition" is vitarka, which we shall study in the chapter
33c-d. They are dispersed mental prajna, mental memory whatever it may be.
Mental prajna, that is, the discernment of the dharmas associated with the mental consciousness, but dispersed, that is to say, not
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concentrated, not in the state of absorption (viii. 1), is either vikalpa of examination or by definition. All mental memory, concentrated or not
141 concentrated, is vikalpa of remembering.
###
How many dhatus "have an object," that is to say, are the subject of consciousness?
142 34a-b. The seven dhatus which are mind have an object.
Only the dhatus of visual, auditory, olfactory, taste, touch, and mental consciousness have an object, because they always grasp their spheres.
34b. And also one part of the dharmadhatu.
That part which consists of the dharmas associated with the mind (ii. 23). The other dhatus, namely the ten material dhatus and the part of the dharmadhatu which is not associated with the mind (ii. 35), do not have an object.
***
How many dhatus are non-appropriated? How many are appropriated?
34c. Nine are non-appropriated.
What are these nine? The seven that have been mentioned which have an object, together with one-half of the eighth.
34c. The eight that have been mentioned, and sound.
These nine are never appropriated: the seven dhatus of mind
(i. l6c), the dharmadhatu (i. l5c), and sound are never appropriated. 34d. The other nine are of two types.
They are sometimes appropriated, sometimes non-appropriated.
? 1. The five organs of sense consciousness (caksurdhatu, etc), of the present time, are appropriated They are not appropriated in the future and in the past.
Four objects,--visible matter, odor, taste, and tangible things,--are appropriated when they are present, when they are an integral part of the organs. Every other visible matter, every other odor, every other taste, and every other tangible is not appropriated: for example, the physical matter,--cofor and shape--, of hair, body hair, nails and teeth,--with the exception of their roots, which are bound to the body or to the organ of touch; color and shape of excrement, urine, saliva, mucus, blood, etc. ; the color and shape of earth, water, fire, etc.
2. What is the meaning of the expression "appropriated? " That
which the mind and the mental states grasp and appropriate to
themselves in the quality of a support is called "appropriated" Organic
matter, that is to say matter which constitutes the five organs of
consciousness, as well as matter not separable from organic matter, is
"appropriated," is "made one's own," by the mind: this results from
the fact that, in the case of well-being or illness, there is a reciprocal
reaction between the mind and this matter. Matter that the Abhi-
dharma calls "appropriated," is called in common language, sacetand or 143
***
How many dhatus are primary matter, or the great, primary elements? How many are secondary matter, matter derived from the
144 primary elements?
35a. The tangible is of two types.
Tangibles are (1) the four primary elements, solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion (i. 12); and (2) sevenfold secondary matter, the soft, the hard, etc. (i. lOd).
35b. The other nine material dhatus are solely secondary matter.
sensitive matter.
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The other material dhdtus, the five organs and the objects of the first four organs, are solely secondary matter.
145 35c. As is the part of the dharmadhdbu which is material.
The same for avijnapti (i. ll), which forms part of the dharma- dhdtu (i. l5c-d).
The dhdtus of mind (i. l6c) are neither primary matter nor secondary matter; the same for the dharmadhdtu, with the exception of avijnapti.
i. According to the Bhadanta Buddhadeva, the ten ayatanas, that is, the five organs of consciousness and their objects, are solely primary
146 matter.
An inadmissible opinion. The Sutra teaches, in a limited manner,
that there are four primary elements, and it defines them in a limited
manner as being solidity, fludity, etc. , (i. l2d). Now solidity, fluidity, etc. ,
are tangibles and solely tangibles: solidity is not preceived by the organ
of sight. Furthermore, each organ attains to the secondary matter
which is appropriate to it: color is not preceived by the organ of
147 touch.
Further, that the tangible is primary matter and secondary matter, and that the nine other materials ayatanas are solely secondary matter, results from the same words of the Sutra: "Oh Bhik? us, the eye, the internal source of consciousness (i. 39), a subtle matter derived from the primary elements, material sources, invisible, capable of being struck," and so on with respect to the four other material organs which are described in the same terms. With respect to the first four objects: "The visible matter is an external sources of consciousness, deriving from the primary elements, material, visible, capable of being struck. " The same with respect to odor and taste. But, with respect to the tangible: "Tangibles are an external source of consciousness, the four primary elements and matter deriving from the four primary elements . . . "
ii. One can maintain that the five organs are primary matter, for the Sutra (Samyukta, 11. 1) says: "Everything that is in the eye, a ball of flesh, is solid, resistant. . . "
? Reply. Here the Sutra refers to the ball of flesh which is not separable from the organ of sight, and not to the organ itself.
So be it. But, according to the Garbhdvakrdntisutra (note 120) "a person is the six dhdtus** the primary element of earth, the primary element of water, the primary element of fire, the primary element of wind, the space element and the vijndna element. Thus, in the embryonic state, the body is made up of primary matter, not secondary matter.
No. For in this first phrase, "a person is the six dhdtus** the Sutra
148
give an exhaustive definition. In fact, the Sutr& then says that a person
means to describe the essence of a person,
is the six points of support of the mental dharma called contact (ii. 24),
149
that is to say, the six organs.
"a person is the six dhdtus** one would infer the non-existence of the mental states (caitta, ii. 24, 34), for the mental states are not included within vijndnadhdtu, which is the mind
Would one maintain that the mental states are the mind, and as a consequence are included within vijndnadhdtu?
One cannot, for the Sutra says "Sensation and ideas are dharmas which are mental states, dharmas associated with the mind, having the mind for their point of support;" and the Sutra speaks of a "mind possessing desire;" thus desire, which is a mental state, is not the mind (vii. lld).
15 It is thus proven that our definition (i. 35a-c) is correct. ?
***
How many dhdtus are agglomerations? How many are not agglomerations?
151 35d. The ten material dhdtus are agglomerations.
The five organs of sense consciousness, and their objects, are agglomerations of atoms (ii. 22).
The Dhdtus 101
and it does not pretend to
Further, to take this definition literally:
***
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Among the eighteen dhatus, how many cut, and how many are cut; how many burn, and how many are burned; and how many weigh, and how many are weighed?
36e.
Four external dhatus cut, are cut;
Visible matter, smell, taste and tangible cut, when they bear the name of axe, etc; they are cut, when they bear the name of wood, etc.
What is the dharma that is called "to cut? "
To cut is to produce the sectioning of the procress of an agglomeration the nature of which is to continue itself in an uninterrupted series. The axe cuts a piece of wood which is a series, and makes of it two series which exist and which develop separately.
The organs cannot be cut off. For example, when all of the parts of the organ of touch or the body are cut off, they are not, for all this, multiple: the members which have been cut, that is to say, seperated from the trunk, do not possess touch.
The organs themselves do not cut, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
36b. The same are burned and weighed.
The same holds for being burned and weigh as for cutting off and being cut off. Four external dhatus alone are burned. They weigh, for example, when they constitute a scales. Not the organs, by reason of their translucidity, like the sparkle of a jewel.
Sound does not cut off, is not cut off, is not burned, and does not weigh, for it does not exist in a series.
36c-d. There is no agreement with respect to that which is
152 burned and weighed.
There is no agreement with respect to what burns and what is weighed. According to some, the same four external dhatus burn and are weighed. According to others, only the primary element of fire burns, when it manifests its own manner of being in the flame; only weight, which is one type of secondary matter (i. l0d), is weighed: lightweight things, light, etc. , where nevertheless rupa manifests its
? own manner of being, are not weighed ***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are fruition, accumulation, or outflowing? How many are conjoined with material substances? And how many are momentary?
37a. Five internal dhatus are of fruition and accumulation.
i. Definitions.
1. Vipdkaja, "of fruition," or literally, "arisen from fruition" instead of "arisen from the cause of fruition" {vipdkahetuja, ii. 54), by ommis- sion of the middle word, the same way that one says "ox-cart" for "ox-drawn cart. "
Or else, in the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from vipdka" the word vipdka designates not the fruition, but the ripened action, the action
153
arriving at the time period when it gives forth its fruit. That which
arises from ripened action, namely the fruit of retribution, is called
"arisen from vipdka! * The fruit is furthermore also called vipdka, 154
because it is cooked (=done).
Or else the expression vipdkaja, "arisen from fruition," signifies
"arisen from the causes of fruition," but one should not say that the word "cause" is omitted. In fact, a cause is often designated by the name of its effect, the same way that an effect is often designated by the name of its cause: "The present six organs are past action" (Ekottara, p. 9a7; Samyutta, ii. 65, iv. 132; below ii. 28).
2. Aupacayika, "of accumulation," that is to say "that which is
accumulated nearby" through certain foods (iii. 39), certain actions
(bathing, etc. ), certain sleep, or certain absorptions (iv. 6c). According
155
to one opinion, chastity is also a cause of accumulation; but in reality,
chastity causes there to be no diminution; it is not a cause of accumulation.
Matter "of accumulation" protects the matter "of retribution" as a wall does, by surrounding it.
3. Naisyandika, "of outflowing," that is to say, nisyandaphala
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(ii. 57), "that which is produced by a cause similar to its effect. "
ii. Five organs or internal dhatus, with the exclusion of the mental organ, are of fruition and accumulation. They are not outflowing, for
156 they are outflowing only when they are fruition and accumulation.
iii. Sound is accumulation, for the voice is in a weak state when the
157
body is emaciated. It is also outflowing. It is not a cause of fruition,
158 for the voice proceeds from a desire for action {chanda, ii. 24).
37b. Sound is not of retribution.
Objection. The Prajnaptisastra says, "This mark of the Maha- purusa (iii. 98) which is called 'the voice of Brahma* results from the
159 perfect practice of abstaining from harmful language (iv. 76c). " Thus
sound is fruition.
Etiology of sound. First opinion. One should distinguish three
moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements arising from this action which are of retribution; and (3) sound, which arises from the primary elements.
Second opinion. One should distinguish five moments: (1) action; (2) primary elements of retribution; (3) primary elements of accumu- lation; (4) primary elements of outflowing; and (5) sound. Thus sound is not retribution, because it does not immediately proceed from action.
Objection. To reason thus, bodily sensation (ii. 7), not being produced immediately through action but being immediately produced through the primary elements arisen from action (iii. 32), will not be retribution.
Reply. But sensation is not provoked by a desire to experience such a sensation, whereas sound is provoked by a desire to speak. If it were provoked by desire, it would not be retribution.
37c-d. The eight dhatus free from resistance are of outflowing and also of fruition.
iv. The eight dhatus not capable of resistance (i. 29b), namely the seven dhatus of mind and the dharmadhatu, are outflowing and retribution; they are outflowing when they are produced by similar causes (sabhagahetu, ii. 52) or universal causes (sarvatragahetu, ii. 54),
? retribution when they are produced by retributive causes (vipdkahetu, ii. 54c). They are not accumulation, because the non-material dhatus have nothing in common with agglomeration.
38a. The others are of three types.
v. The other dhatus, that is, the four not mentioned above,--visible matter, smell, taste, and tangibles,--are of three types: retribution, when they are not separable from organic matter (i. 34); accumulation and outflowing.
***
38a. A single dhatu "is real. "
The unconditioned, being permanent, is a "real thing. " The unconditioned forms part of the dharmadhdtu (i. 15); the dharmadhdtu is thus the single dhatu which "contains a real thing. "
***
38b. The last three dhatus are momentary.
The last three dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
In the dharmas of the moment called duhkhe dharmajndnaksanti, which is the first moment in the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi. 25) and as a consequence the first moment which is pure, these three dhatus are "not produced by a cause similar to its effect" (sabhagahetu, ii. 52), for, in the series which constitutes the person under consideration, a pure dharma has not yet appeared which would be a "cause similar to its effect" of duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti. This is why these three dhatus are called momentary, because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this type of cause.
In the group under consideration, the mind to which the ksanti is associated is manodhdtu and manovijnanadhdtu\ the dharmas which coexist with this mind are dharmadhdtu'. pure discipline (iv. ! 3c);
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sensations, ideas, volition and other mental states; plus the praptis (ii. 36) and the samskrtalaksanas (ii. 46).
***
There is a problem to be examined. Does he who obtains possession of the organ of sight where he had previously been lacking it, also obtain possession of the visual consciousness? And does he who obtains possession of the visual consciousness where he was previously lacking it, also obtain possession of the organ of sight?
38c-d. He can obtain the organ of sight and the visual
160 consciousness either separately or together.
1. A person lacking the organ of sight takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the visual consciousness: (a) a being of Kamadhatu whose organs progressively appear (ii. 14), for, before the organ of sight appears within him, he is already in possession of his past and future visual consciousness (in the inter- mediary state, iii. 14; on "possession," ii. 36b); and (b) a being who dies in Arupyadhatu and who is reborn in the heavens of the three higher Dhyanas, where the visual consciousness is lacking although the organ of sight exists there (viii. l3a-c).
2. A person devoid of the visual consciousness takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the organ of sight: (a) abeingborninaheavenofthethreehigherDhyanas canmanifesta visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana (viii. 13): he does not take possession of the organ of sight which he possesses already; and (b) a being who falls from one of the three higher Dhyanas and who is reborn in a lower sphere.
3. A person devoid of the two takes possession of the two: a being who falls from Arupyadhatu and who is reborn either in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana (world of Brahma).
We have up to now understood the term that the stanza employs, "to obtain" (labha) in the sense of pratilambha, taking possession; but one can also understand it in the sense of prapti, possession (ii. 36b).
? The question is thus posed: Is one who is endowed with the visual organ also endowed with visual consciousness? Four cases are possible: (a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyanas necessarily possesses the visual organ, but possesses only the visual
consciousness if he manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana;
(b) a being in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of the visual organ in the course of his embryonic life or who becomes blind: he remains in possession of the visual consciousness acquired in the course of his intermediary existence (iii. 14) or at conception;
(c) a being in Kamadhatu who has taken possession of the organ of sight and who has not lost it, a being born in the heaven of the First Dhyana, a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyana who manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyanas: these three categories of beings are endowed with both the organ and the consciousness;
(d) all other beings,--beings of Arupyadhatu,--are devoid of both the organ of sight and visual consciousness.
The taking possession of and possession, simultaneous or not, of the organ of sight and visible matter, of the visual consciousness and visible matter, of the organ of hearing and sound, etc. , shall be defined, as fitting, in each case.
How many are external? 39a. Twelve are personal
What are these twelve?
39b. With the exception of visible matter, etc.
Twelve dhatus are personal, the six organs and the six conscious- nesses; six dhatus are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc.
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But how can one speak of personal dhdtus, or of external dhdtus, since there is no dtmari?
The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons
falsely grasp for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the
name of dtman. Compare, for example, these two line of Scripture:
is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings happiness. " Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to which one gives the name of atman: they are in fact the point of support of them; then one qualifies them as "internal," or "personal," whereas the visible and the other objects of the consciousness are held to be "external. "
But can one say that the six consciousnesses are the point of support of the mind?
They are the point of support of the mind only when, having perished, they acquire the quality of mental organ (i. 17). Thus they are not personal.
This objection is worthless. When the consciousnesses, having perished, becomes the point of support of the mind, it is indeed these consciousnesses themselves which become the point of support; thus, before becoming a point of support, they are not foreign to the quality of point of support. They are thus personal by reason of their future quality of point of support. If it were otherwise, the mental organ would be solely past; it would be neither present nor future. Now it is well understood that the eighteen dhdtus belong to the three time periods. Moreover, if the present or future consciousness does not have the characteristic of manodhdtu, it is absurd to attribute this character- istic to it once it is past. For a dharma does not change its characterstics in the course of time (v. 25; Vibbdsd, TD 27, p. 109al8, p. 200b2).
***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are sabhdga, "active" or "in mutual assistance? " How many are tatsabhaga, "analogous to sabhdga? "
'The sage obtains heaven, by means of a well subdued atman" and "It 162
? 163 39b-c. The dhdtu called dharmas is sabhaga.
An object of consciousness is qualified as sabhaga when the consciousness which constitutes its proper sphere arises or is destined to arise with respect to it.
Now there is no dharma with respect to which an unlimited mental consciousness has not arisen or is destined to arise. All the Saints in fact necessarily produce the thought "All dharma are impersonal" (vii. l3a). It is true that this thought bears neither on itself, nor on the dharmas which are coexistent with it (sahabhu, ii. 50b); but this thought and the dharmas which are coexistent with it are the object of a second moment of a thought of universal impersonality; all the dharmas are thus included within the objea of these two moments of thought (vii. l8c-d). Therefore the dharma- dhatu, the proper objea of the mental consciousness, is, in its totality, sabhaga, aaive as an object.
39c-d. The other dhdtus are also tatsabhdga.
The word "also" shows that they are both sabhaga and tatsabhdga.
When are they tatsabhdga^
39d. When they do not do their proper work.
This implies the definition: they are sabhaga when they do their proper work.
1. The organ of sight which has seen, does now see or shall see visible matter, is termed sabhaga. The same with respea to the other organs, by indicating for each its own object and its own operation (karitra, ii. 58).
2. According to the Vaibhasikas of Kasmir, the organ of sight is tatsabhdga in four cases: the organ of sight which has perished, which is now perishing, which will perish without having seen, and the organ of sight destined to arise (anutpattidharman, v. 24). According to the Westerners, the organ of sight not destined to arise constitutes two categories depending on whether it is accompanied by visual con- sciousness or not.
The same with respect to the other organs of sense consciousness.
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The mental organ is tatsabhaga only when it is not destined to 164
arise; in fact, when it arises, it always has an object.
3. Visible matter, which has been seen, which is now seen, or
which will be seen by the organ of sight, is sabhdga.
It is tatsabhaga when it has perished, is now perishing or shall
perish without having seen, or when it is not destined to arise.
The same with respect to the other objects of sense consciousness
by indicating for each organ the function which corresponds to it.
4. The organ of sight which is sabhdga or tatsabhaga is such for
everyone, for the person to whom this organ belongs, and for other persons. The same for the other organs. But a certain visible thing is sabhdga for the person who sees it.
