No More Learning

Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But
one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith. "

I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it
is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be
believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to
something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ([2321]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It
is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.

Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not
from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have
mentioned above ([2322]FS, Q[103], A[4]; [2323]FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of
faith.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether faith is the first of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude
is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is
founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that
hope "leads on to faith. " Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state
further on ([2324]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated above [2325](A[2]) that the
intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent
to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is
not the first virtue.

Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation,
as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi. ].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above [2326](A[3]). Therefore
it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first
part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.

Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of
acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected
by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for. " Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above ([2327]FS, Q[13], A[3]; [2328]FS, Q[34], A[4],
ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end,
must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will,
since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it
is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in
the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first
of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural
knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is
the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles
to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders
faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself
to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues,
although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as
Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one
cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this
possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above
([2329]FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by
hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in
this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes
the inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way
it is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;
since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as
stated above ([2330]FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for
faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the
commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue,
and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he
obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God
is his superior, Whom he must obey.

Reply to Objection 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to
come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the
building: since the building would not be founded on it unless the
other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual
edifice is charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things
have charity which is the bond of perfection. " Consequently faith
without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow
that charity precedes faith.

Reply to Objection 5: Some act of the will is required before faith,
but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act
presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect
love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science
and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude,
wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less
doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an
admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free
of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes
suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore
faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
science and understanding are more certain than faith.

Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the
more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith
is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The
Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall not
understand [Vulg. : 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1)
that "faith is strengthened by science. " Therefore it seems that
science or understanding is more certain than faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i. e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of
God. " Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

I answer that, As stated above ([2331]FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In
English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above ([2332]FS,
Q[57], A[5], ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note
that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its
cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more
certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues,
because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three
virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be
considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man's
intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way,
faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human
intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not.
Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but
relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject,
it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more
certain relatively, i. e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as
gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to
their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way,
faith is more certain.

Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of
faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of
faith with our intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain
than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he
hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of
conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as
science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are
based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original
state?

(2) Whether the demons have faith?

(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in
others?

(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the
angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in
his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things
that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation. " Now the
angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in
grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation,
since "they saw things in the Word," according to Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence,
seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says
(De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not
by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration,
not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him
clearly present to their contemplation. " Therefore there was no faith
in the angels and man in their original state.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,
according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner. " Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in
the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore
there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
state.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . .
cometh by hearing. " Now this could not apply to angels and man in their
original state; for then they could not hear anything from another.
Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the
angels.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe. " Now the original state of angels and man was one of
approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.

I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine
things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that appear
not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith we
believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan. ;
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which
renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the
principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives
the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as
the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did
not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is
evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude
faith.

It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.
And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as
some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold
that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in
grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses
not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.

Since, however, we stated in the [2333]FP, Q[62], A[3]; [2334]FP,
Q[95], A[1] that man and the angels were created with the gift of
grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of
hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet
consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q[4], A[7]).
Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that
in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely
the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and
something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering
to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the
happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by
adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which
are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one,
and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have
shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2). In this respect, too, it
may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before
sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine
mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are
those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be
said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly
contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were
confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of
a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to
God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and
mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so
that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of
wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was
not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the
original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural
obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every
creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.

Reply to Objection 3: In the original state there was no hearing
anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring
inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: "I
will hear what the Lord God will speak in me. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether in the demons there is faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine
says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's
will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in
God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated
above ([2335]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5), it seems that in the demons there
is no faith.

Objection 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to
Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the
gift of God. " Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to
strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their
gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
after they sinned.

Objection 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins,
as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan. ) on Jn. 15:22, "If I had
not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have
no excuse for their sin. " Now the sin of unbelief is in some men.
Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a
sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore
in the demons there is no faith.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble. "

I answer that, As stated above ([2336]Q[1], A[4];[2337] Q[2], A[1]),
the believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because
he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident
principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now,
that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes.
First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to
believe is a praiseworthy action.
Secondly, because the intellect is
convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction
is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching
the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign,
by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be
convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was
speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in
itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.

Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but
only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they
recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do
not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance
that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe,
by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for
their belief.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to
believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that
faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not
a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their
natural intellectual acumen.

Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so
evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to
them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith
in the other articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article
of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a
catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith
in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems
that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of
lifeless faith.

Objection 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess
the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be
ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some
articles of faith without believing the others.

Objection 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles
of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a
man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can
believe some articles, and disbelieve others.

On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does
not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith,
after a man disbelieves one article.

I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic
who disbelieves one article of faith.

The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which
proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the
habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by
faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but
merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to
the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to
whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the
Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses
to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an
infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a
heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not
prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he
is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article
has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in
accordance with his own will.

Reply to Objection 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of
faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the
faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because
in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he
holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: The various conclusions of a science have their
respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without
another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without
knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles
of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth
proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church
who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this
mean is altogether lacking in faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred
either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept
without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience
to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment,
according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is
become guilty of all. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than
in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now
whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by
failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above
[2338](A[3]). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one
than in another.

Objection 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme
cannot be "more" or "less. " Now faith consists in something supreme,
because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all
things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less. "

Objection 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the
understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles
of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown
above ([2339]Q[1], A[7]). Now the understanding of principles is
possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in
equal degree by all the faithful.

On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more
or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our
Lord said to Peter (Mat. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst
thou doubt? " And to the woman he said (Mat. 15: 28): "O woman, great is
thy faith! " Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.

I answer that, As stated above ([2340]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [2341]FS,
Q[112], A[4]), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two
points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part
of its participation by the subject.

Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material
object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith
is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above ([2342]Q[1],
A[1]). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among
believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above
([2343]Q[4], A[6]). But the things which are proposed as the matter of
our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in
this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another,
so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more
explicit.

If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its
participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act
of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated
above ([2344]Q[2], AA[1],2;[2345] Q[4], A[2]). Consequently a man's
faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his
intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater
promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

Reply to Objection 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is
of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not
explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that
habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the
part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated
above.

Reply to Objection 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the
first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some
submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in
this way faith is greater in one than in another.

Reply to Objection 3: The understanding of principles results from
man's very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith
results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as
explained above ([2346]FS, Q[112], A[4]). Hence the comparison fails.

Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?

(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether faith is infused into man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and
nourishes, defends and strengthens it. " Now those things which science
begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith
does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

Objection 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,
seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing
miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn.
4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus
said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole
house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing. "
Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

Objection 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be
acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according
to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired
by man.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory .
. . for it is the gift of God. "

I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary
in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing
requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which
are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith
must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass
human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God
reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as
those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to
some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith,
according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent? "

As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such
as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the
faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see
the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some
do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man
inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is
from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to
assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith
is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this
is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised
above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural
principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as
regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving
man inwardly by grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of
external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause
of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument again refers to the cause that
proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to
believe by words or deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the
believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in
order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as
stated above ([2347]Q[2] , A[3]).
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Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.
For it is written (Dt. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect. " Now
lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of
God.

Objection 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through
lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when
it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from
God, as stated above ([2348]FS, Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Therefore neither
is lifeless faith from God.

Objection 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is
written (Jn. 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day,
that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I
have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day? " Now faith heals man from
unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at
the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by
living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and
consequently lifeless faith is not from God.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which
lacks charity is a gift of God. " Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore
lifeless faith is a gift of God.

I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that
privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it
is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper
species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is
essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential
to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we
assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that
thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not
the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to
which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we
cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the
cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of
a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness,
which is not essential to the diaphanous body.

Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith,
since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form,
as stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith
is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is
God, as stated above [2349](A[1]). It follows, therefore, that lifeless
faith is a gift of God.

Reply to Objection 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect
with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a
perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's
species, considered as a moral act, as stated above ([2350]FP, Q[48],
A[1], ad 2; [2351]FS, Q[18], A[5]): for an act is said to be deformed
through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due
commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God
is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its
deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.

We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due
form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared
to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act
is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is
from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened
by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.

Reply to Objection 3: He who receives faith from God without charity,
is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous
unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing
from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a
man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to
desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the
instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted
by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of
charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some
without charity.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are
two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
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Whether fear is an effect of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an
effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is
written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him. "
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above ([2352]FS, Q[23],
A[2]): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mat. 1:2.
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the
object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object
of fear is an evil, as stated above ([2353]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Again,
acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated
above ([2354]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble. "

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated
above ([2355]FS, Q[41], A[1]). Now the principle of all appetitive
movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the
principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an
apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension
of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the
Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear
whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated
from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and
holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an
unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest
evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first
fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living
faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes
man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith,
because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and
punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear
Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles
of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear
follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect to God,
so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted
continues: "And your reward shall not be made void. "

Reply to Objection 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be
the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith
begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which
God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it
makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
sinners.

Reply to Objection 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the
good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith
includes also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either
not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners
will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of
fear.
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Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For
purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying
the heart.

Objection 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible
with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may
be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not
purify the heart.

Objection 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any
way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not
purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.
Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith. "

I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things:
for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters
it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the
rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal
creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to
transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational
creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by
tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of
this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God must believe that
He is," according to Heb.