Wherefore since
concupiscence
is most
incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly
carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which
does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were
unwilling to be content with one wife.
incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly
carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which
does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were
unwilling to be content with one wife.
Summa Theologica
Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any
prohibition thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two
wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two
wives; and so it was lawful.
Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who
are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to
God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one
time it was lawful.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is
said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn
from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary
according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other
circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first
precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only
in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding,
it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine
the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose
authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of
the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to
extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law
prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it
ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like
other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a
dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an
inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and
by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the
aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the
multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God.
For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary
end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might
arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to
be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that
the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above
[5013](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the
same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some
impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at
all times and places the right hand is better than the left according
to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is
ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to
the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
Reply to Objection 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is
asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having
a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the
dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God
has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those
principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority,
as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain
occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of
exception to more frequent occurrences.
Reply to Objection 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality
of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the
heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining
to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by
internal inspiration.
Reply to Objection 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness
of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad
among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the
same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the
worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
Reply to Objection 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage
goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why
it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to
its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept
with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife,
which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which
pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to
the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken
from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor
are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several
wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not
signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the
plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church,
which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the
Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the
union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but
also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn.
19:2].
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Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the
natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law.
But fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with
ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those
who were brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple
fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as
Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by
positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be
sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the
natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is
given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now
one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an
unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not
against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a
time.
Objection 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures
no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her
master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is
not against the natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another.
Now the wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if
his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another
woman without sin.
On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine
are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of
which they are born were naturally shameful.
Further, as stated above ([5014]Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But
this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man
could be united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is
against the natural law to have a concubine.
I answer that, As stated above [5015](A[1]), an action is said to be
against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end
intended by nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the
action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of
the agent, or through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now
the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and
rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it
attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 8). Accordingly to make use of sexual intercourse on account of its
inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature
intended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse
be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for
the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that
which is of most consequence to them, just as the marriage union took
its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is
the end chiefly sought after in marriage, so the name of concubine is
expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for
its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man may seek to have
offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of
the offspring, which signifies not only the begetting of children from
which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by
which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents,
in respect of which three things the parents are bound to their
children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since
the rearing and teaching of the children remain a duty of the parents
during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and
mother to dwell together for a long time, in order that together they
may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together
in rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the
time when they first come together until the young are fully fledged.
Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain
together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is evident that it is
contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman
who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured
in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have
intercourse with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication
as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the
ceremonial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature.
Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication among
that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there was a
difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 2: This law was the result of the darkness just
mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor
to God as stated in Rom. 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of
the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law
was abolished.
Reply to Objection 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a
person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a
time, so that in neither case is the surrender against the natural law.
But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law
forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the
virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat
immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property without
injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's
property that she may serve him, she is not his that she may be his
concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his property.
For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a
union is not directed to its good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not
simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and
consequently she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the
detriment of the good of marriage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have
intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple
fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to
commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying
(Gn. 38:23): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie. " But a lie is not
always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.
Objection 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But
the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine,
save in a certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the
sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride
and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins.
Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less
grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation.
But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since
lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple
fornication a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of
God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor.
6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a
crime according to Tob. 4:13, "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all
fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime. "
Therefore, etc.
I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]),
those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of
friendship between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins
are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul.
Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due
relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in
sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by
its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a
mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an
incentive. Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not
fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it
would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.
Reply to Objection 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is
punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death.
Hence also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are
sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies
to fornication.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal
sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements
of lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage
intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some
movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are
to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their
particular acts.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is the more effective in
aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin.
Hence although fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of
its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a
greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those
things which tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above.
Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a
concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one
wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has
been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to
have a concubine.
Objection 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a
wife; wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq. ) a bondswoman
gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we
read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance
Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore
these were not wives, and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a
concubine.
Objection 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast
out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham
sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she
was not Abraham's wife.
On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were
never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the
decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery. " Therefore it was
never lawful.
Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4):
"What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband. " But it is never
lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse
with another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a
concubine.
I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the
time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument
is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from
mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked
crime (Gn. 37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore
we must say that since it is against the natural law to have a
concubine outside wedlock, as stated above [5016](A[3]), it was never
lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action
improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end
of marriage: and consequently it is against the first precepts of the
natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old
Testament we read of concubines being taken by such men as we ought to
excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been
taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they
had something of the character of a wife and something of the character
of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its principal end,
which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is
indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above
[5017](A[1]), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But in
regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household
and community of works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate:
and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this
respect a dispensation was possible, since it is the secondary end of
marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to
concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several
wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to
have a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the
dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their
bondswomen with the disposition of a husband towards his wife. For
these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage,
but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which
bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and slave.
Reply to Objection 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by
dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder
(as we shall state further on[5018], Q[67], A[6]), so by the same
dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify
the mystery which the Apostle explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq. ). Again, that
this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the
same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, did not inherit
(Rom. 9:13, seqq. ). In like manner on account of the mystery it came
about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited, as
Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan. ) because "sons and heirs are born to
Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman and of evil
ministers denoted by the bondswoman. "
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OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity
contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having
two successive wives?
(2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at
once?
(3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a
virgin?
(4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
(5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the
bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude
and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not
cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in
being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of
more than one wife, so as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1
Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from the episcopate.
Objection 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women
gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular.
Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
Objection 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either
because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it
is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage
by words of the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of
the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular,
which is against the decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia).
Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man who had
committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which
is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.
I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the
ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a
defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is
not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of
Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore
the perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have
only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently
bigamy, which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are
four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives
successively; the second is when a man has several wives at once, one
in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively,
one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow.
Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.
There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive
the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest
spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the
sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things, and should be
occupied in spiritual matters.
Wherefore since concupiscence is most
incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly
carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which
does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were
unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however is the
better.
Reply to Objection 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time
is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly
inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the
sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several
successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not
entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void
the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required
of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give
proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent
concupiscence, since by fornication one party is not bound to the other
for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity,
because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which
signification is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the
consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both
of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the
decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is
sufficient to cause irregularity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives,
one in law, the other in fact?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from
bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and
one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in
the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law
there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of
Christ with the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result
from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would
seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
Objection 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has
married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a
lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular
by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery.
Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally
the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in
law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or
dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several women either in
law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided
his flesh among several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted
by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of
bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a
certain likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are
secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there
is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness
in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist,
because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification.
Nevertheless if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to
return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular
forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of
imperfect signification.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by
marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater
impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself
who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore
much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.
Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after
corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done
so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind
of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily.
But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for
instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her
carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always
cause irregularity.
Objection 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more
guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been
consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not
become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin.
Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the
debt at her asking, before she is accused and convicted of adultery.
Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not cause
irregularity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee
never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a
bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one
who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do
penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of
subjection. "
I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on
either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the
part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of
sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the
husband it is required that he should not have married another wife,
but not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it
is also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those
versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church
militant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there
are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a
virgin: wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the
part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a
bishop. This reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the
Apostle (Eph. 5:25): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved
the Church," which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the
bridegroom Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): "Because the husband
is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church. "
Wherefore others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and
that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no
stain. Also that the synagogue was first united to Christ as a
concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification if
the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd,
since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the
Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue
belonged to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. Moreover
this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14, Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where
the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she
was not as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this,
fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which
is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the
faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence
we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the
sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs outside
wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the
sacrament on the part of the person corrupted, but it causes a defect
in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage
terminates not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes
its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act, is
the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were
able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes irregular through
marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a
virgin when he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if she
were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer
a virgin when she married ---unless she had been corrupted by reason of
a previous marriage.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however,
more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his
flesh among several women.
Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a
punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not
always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause
irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a
virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.
Reply to Objection 4: If a woman commits fornication after being
married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless
he again knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery,
since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage
act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the
debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled by his own
conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes
irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have
said is more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of
signification only.
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Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the
husband of one wife") that if a man has had several wives before
receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is not a
bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now
Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity.
Therefore it removes irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from
an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient
in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed
to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
Objection 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more
efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of
the Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement
(Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the
sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon
bigamy.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those
understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has
married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at
the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament,
not of a sin. "
Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a
woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after
Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins. " Therefore in like manner
one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.
I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage.
Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be
removed by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
Reply to Objection 1: In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed:
unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation
should be more easily granted.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow that what does a greater
thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not
so in the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal
of an irregularity.
Reply to Objection 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent
upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does
not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the
virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is
effected by virginity or division of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 5: Those irregularities were contracted through
slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by
those sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose,
whereas Baptism is not.
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Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a
dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is
not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could
do so, have taken to themselves a second wife. "
Objection 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the
Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the
Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim.
3:2): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one
wife," it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this
matter.
Objection 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is
essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order
that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is
essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore
he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.
Objection 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably
undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation,
it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of
Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector,
dist. 34.
Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a
Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for
it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same
applies if he should be a bigamist. " Therefore he may at least receive
a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by
positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man
be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist
present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the
Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop,
only as regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to
prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards
the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same
difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married
several wives in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does
not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such
cases.
Reply to Objection 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the
natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to
faith. But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since
the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting
down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every signification is essential to a
sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and
this is not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads
"officium," some read "effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best
rendered as above. ]
Reply to Objection 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that
applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is
reasonably established for all, in consideration of what happens in the
majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain
definite case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are
seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?
(2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?
(3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?
(4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?
(5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?
(6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?
(7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of
natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save
Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore
inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But
the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore
it is not of the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly
directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring.
But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that
time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural
law.
Objection 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of
the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot
beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another,
even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore
the indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was
well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of
nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things
according to Mat. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.
Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to
God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to
sunder "what God hath joined together. " Since then the indissolubility
of marriage is gathered from this passage (Mat. 19:6) it would seem
that it is of natural law.
I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the
rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for
their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2
Cor. 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of
husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to
live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of
marriage is of natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's law alone brought mankind "to
perfection" [*Cf. Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the
newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove
all that was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved
exclusively to "the law of the spirit of life" [*Cf. Rom. 8:2].
Reply to Objection 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as
the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church,
and in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to
the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more
directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with
the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently,
as stated above ([5019]Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of
marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the
good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in
so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the
natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.
The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been
said.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good
in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring;
although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of
the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy
for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for
all rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the
indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with
regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the
offspring absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does
not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?
Objection 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to
put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good
of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law,
which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife,
as stated above [5020](A[1]). Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the
fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a
man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his
wife away.
Objection 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as
of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his
wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.
On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a
husband towards his wife, as stated above ([5021]Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3).
Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore
it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.
I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way
are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural
course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change.
First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered
from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by
chance less frequently in nature.
prohibition thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two
wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two
wives; and so it was lawful.
Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who
are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to
God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one
time it was lawful.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is
said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts,
but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn
from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary
according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other
circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first
precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only
in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding,
it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine
the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose
authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of
the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to
extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law
prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it
ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like
other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a
dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an
inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and
by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the
aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the
multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God.
For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary
end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might
arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to
be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that
the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above
[5013](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the
same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some
impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at
all times and places the right hand is better than the left according
to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is
ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to
the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).
Reply to Objection 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is
asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having
a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the
dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God
has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those
principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority,
as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain
occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of
exception to more frequent occurrences.
Reply to Objection 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality
of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the
heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining
to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by
internal inspiration.
Reply to Objection 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness
of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad
among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the
same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the
worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.
Reply to Objection 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage
goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why
it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to
its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept
with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife,
which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which
pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to
the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken
from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor
are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several
wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not
signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the
plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church,
which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the
Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the
union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but
also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn.
19:2].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the
natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law.
But fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with
ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those
who were brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple
fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the
natural law.
Objection 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as
Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by
positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be
sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the
natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is
given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now
one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an
unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not
against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a
time.
Objection 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures
no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her
master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is
not against the natural law to have a concubine.
Objection 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another.
Now the wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if
his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another
woman without sin.
On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine
are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of
which they are born were naturally shameful.
Further, as stated above ([5014]Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But
this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man
could be united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is
against the natural law to have a concubine.
I answer that, As stated above [5015](A[1]), an action is said to be
against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end
intended by nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the
action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of
the agent, or through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now
the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and
rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it
attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.
i, 8). Accordingly to make use of sexual intercourse on account of its
inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature
intended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse
be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for
the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that
which is of most consequence to them, just as the marriage union took
its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is
the end chiefly sought after in marriage, so the name of concubine is
expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for
its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man may seek to have
offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of
the offspring, which signifies not only the begetting of children from
which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by
which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents,
in respect of which three things the parents are bound to their
children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since
the rearing and teaching of the children remain a duty of the parents
during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and
mother to dwell together for a long time, in order that together they
may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together
in rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the
time when they first come together until the young are fully fledged.
Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain
together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is evident that it is
contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman
who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.
Reply to Objection 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured
in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have
intercourse with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication
as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the
ceremonial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature.
Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication among
that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there was a
difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.
Reply to Objection 2: This law was the result of the darkness just
mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor
to God as stated in Rom. 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of
the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law
was abolished.
Reply to Objection 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a
person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a
time, so that in neither case is the surrender against the natural law.
But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument
does not prove.
Reply to Objection 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law
forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the
virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat
immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property without
injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's
property that she may serve him, she is not his that she may be his
concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his property.
For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a
union is not directed to its good, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not
simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and
consequently she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the
detriment of the good of marriage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have
intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple
fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to
commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying
(Gn. 38:23): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie. " But a lie is not
always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.
Objection 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But
the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine,
save in a certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the
sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride
and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins.
Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less
grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation.
But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since
lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple
fornication a mortal sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of
God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor.
6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a
crime according to Tob. 4:13, "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all
fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime. "
Therefore, etc.
I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]),
those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of
friendship between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins
are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul.
Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due
relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in
sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by
its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.
Reply to Objection 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a
mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an
incentive. Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not
fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it
would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.
Reply to Objection 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is
punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death.
Hence also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are
sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies
to fornication.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal
sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements
of lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage
intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some
movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are
to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their
particular acts.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is the more effective in
aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin.
Hence although fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of
its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a
greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those
things which tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above.
Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?
Objection 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a
concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one
wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has
been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to
have a concubine.
Objection 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a
wife; wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq. ) a bondswoman
gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we
read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance
Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore
these were not wives, and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a
concubine.
Objection 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast
out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham
sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she
was not Abraham's wife.
On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were
never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the
decalogue, namely, "Thou shalt not commit adultery. " Therefore it was
never lawful.
Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4):
"What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband. " But it is never
lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse
with another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a
concubine.
I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the
time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion
from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument
is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob's sons from
mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked
crime (Gn. 37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore
we must say that since it is against the natural law to have a
concubine outside wedlock, as stated above [5016](A[3]), it was never
lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action
improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end
of marriage: and consequently it is against the first precepts of the
natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old
Testament we read of concubines being taken by such men as we ought to
excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been
taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they
had something of the character of a wife and something of the character
of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its principal end,
which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is
indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above
[5017](A[1]), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But in
regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household
and community of works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate:
and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this
respect a dispensation was possible, since it is the secondary end of
marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to
concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several
wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to
have a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the
dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their
bondswomen with the disposition of a husband towards his wife. For
these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage,
but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which
bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and slave.
Reply to Objection 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by
dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder
(as we shall state further on[5018], Q[67], A[6]), so by the same
dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify
the mystery which the Apostle explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq. ). Again, that
this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the
same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, did not inherit
(Rom. 9:13, seqq. ). In like manner on account of the mystery it came
about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited, as
Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan. ) because "sons and heirs are born to
Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman and of evil
ministers denoted by the bondswoman. "
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OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity
contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having
two successive wives?
(2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at
once?
(3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a
virgin?
(4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
(5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?
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Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the
bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude
and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not
cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in
being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of
more than one wife, so as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1
Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from the episcopate.
Objection 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women
gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives
successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular.
Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.
Objection 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either
because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it
is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage
by words of the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of
the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular,
which is against the decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia).
Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man who had
committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which
is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.
I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the
ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments
to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a
defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is
not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of
Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore
the perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have
only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently
bigamy, which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are
four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives
successively; the second is when a man has several wives at once, one
in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively,
one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow.
Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.
There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive
the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest
spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the
sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things, and should be
occupied in spiritual matters.
Wherefore since concupiscence is most
incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly
carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which
does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were
unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however is the
better.
Reply to Objection 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time
is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly
inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the
sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several
successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not
entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void
the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required
of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give
proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent
concupiscence, since by fornication one party is not bound to the other
for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity,
because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which
signification is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the
consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both
of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the
decree of Innocent III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is
sufficient to cause irregularity.
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Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives,
one in law, the other in fact?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from
bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and
one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in
the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law
there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of
Christ with the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result
from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would
seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.
Objection 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has
married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a
lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular
by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery.
Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally
the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in
law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or
dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several women either in
law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided
his flesh among several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted
by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.
I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of
bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a
certain likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are
secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there
is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness
in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist,
because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification.
Nevertheless if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to
return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular
forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of
imperfect signification.
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Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by
marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater
impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself
who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore
much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.
Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after
corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular,
since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done
so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind
of bigamy does not cause irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily.
But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for
instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her
carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always
cause irregularity.
Objection 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more
guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been
consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not
become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin.
Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the
debt at her asking, before she is accused and convicted of adultery.
Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not cause
irregularity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): "We command thee
never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a
bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one
who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do
penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of
subjection. "
I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on
either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the
part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of
sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the
husband it is required that he should not have married another wife,
but not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it
is also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those
versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church
militant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there
are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a
virgin: wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the
part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a
bishop. This reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the
Apostle (Eph. 5:25): "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved
the Church," which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the
bridegroom Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): "Because the husband
is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church. "
Wherefore others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and
that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no
stain. Also that the synagogue was first united to Christ as a
concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification if
the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd,
since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the
Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue
belonged to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. Moreover
this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14, Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where
the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she
was not as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this,
fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which
is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the
faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence
we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the
sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs outside
wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the
sacrament on the part of the person corrupted, but it causes a defect
in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage
terminates not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes
its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act, is
the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were
able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes irregular through
marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a
virgin when he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if she
were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer
a virgin when she married ---unless she had been corrupted by reason of
a previous marriage.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however,
more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his
flesh among several women.
Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a
punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not
always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause
irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a
virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.
Reply to Objection 4: If a woman commits fornication after being
married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless
he again knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery,
since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage
act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the
debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled by his own
conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes
irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have
said is more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of
signification only.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
Objection 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, "the
husband of one wife") that if a man has had several wives before
receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is not a
bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.
Objection 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now
Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity.
Therefore it removes irregularity.
Objection 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from
an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient
in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed
to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.
Objection 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more
efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of
the Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master's statement
(Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the
sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon
bigamy.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): "Those
understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has
married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at
the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament,
not of a sin. "
Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) "a
woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after
Baptism be consecrated among God's virgins. " Therefore in like manner
one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.
I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage.
Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be
removed by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).
Reply to Objection 1: In this case Jerome's opinion is not followed:
unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation
should be more easily granted.
Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow that what does a greater
thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not
so in the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal
of an irregularity.
Reply to Objection 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent
upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does
not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the
virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is
effected by virginity or division of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 5: Those irregularities were contracted through
slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by
those sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose,
whereas Baptism is not.
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Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a
dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): "It is
not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could
do so, have taken to themselves a second wife. "
Objection 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the
Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the
Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim.
3:2): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one
wife," it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this
matter.
Objection 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is
essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order
that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is
essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore
he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.
Objection 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably
undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation,
it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of
Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector,
dist. 34.
Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: "If a
Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for
it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same
applies if he should be a bigamist. " Therefore he may at least receive
a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.
I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by
positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man
be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist
present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the
Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop,
only as regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to
prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards
the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same
difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married
several wives in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does
not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such
cases.
Reply to Objection 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the
natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to
faith. But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since
the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting
down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every signification is essential to a
sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and
this is not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads
"officium," some read "effectum"; the meaning is the same, and is best
rendered as above. ]
Reply to Objection 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that
applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is
reasonably established for all, in consideration of what happens in the
majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain
definite case.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are
seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?
(2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?
(3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?
(4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?
(5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?
(6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?
(7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of
natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save
Christ's has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore
inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.
Objection 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But
the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore
it is not of the natural law.
Objection 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly
directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring.
But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that
time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural
law.
Objection 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of
marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of
the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot
beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another,
even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore
the indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was
well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of
nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things
according to Mat. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.
Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to
God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to
sunder "what God hath joined together. " Since then the indissolubility
of marriage is gathered from this passage (Mat. 19:6) it would seem
that it is of natural law.
I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the
rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for
their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs (2
Cor. 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of
husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to
live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of
marriage is of natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's law alone brought mankind "to
perfection" [*Cf. Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the
newness of nature. Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove
all that was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved
exclusively to "the law of the spirit of life" [*Cf. Rom. 8:2].
Reply to Objection 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as
the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church,
and in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to
the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more
directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with
the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently,
as stated above ([5019]Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of
marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the
good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in
so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the
natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.
The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been
said.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good
in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring;
although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of
the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy
for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for
all rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the
indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with
regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the
offspring absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does
not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?
Objection 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to
put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good
of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law,
which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife,
as stated above [5020](A[1]). Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the
fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a
man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his
wife away.
Objection 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as
of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his
wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.
On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a
husband towards his wife, as stated above ([5021]Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3).
Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore
it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.
I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way
are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural
course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change.
First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered
from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by
chance less frequently in nature.
