Rather, it is the means by which things as a whole, and each
individual
thing, pursue what is beautiful and good.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
.
The connection of things that can be bound.
It is not possible for a bond- ing agent to bind something to himself unless the former is also bound to the latter, for bonds adhere to, and are inserted into, that which is bound; the bonding agent, which may accidentally be bound to another object, must be truly bound to the object which it binds to itself.
However, the bonding agent has an advantage over that which is bound, for he is master over the bonds, and because he is not affected and influenced in the same way.
This notion is supported by the fact that a procurer binds but is not bound, but she who is loved is not bound by her lover unless he is bound by her in the same act of love.
Furthermore, a spiritual and mysterious type of bond occasionally also occurs in which she who is loved is bound by her lover, but she neither knows nor loves him.
This is the type and level of love in which Eros was brought to tears and unhappiness by Anteros.
But at the social level, no one binds unless he is also bound by the same or a similar type of bond either to someone, or at least with someone, whom he desires to bind.
? ? . The truth of that which can be bound. For that which can be bound to be truly bound, a real bond is not required, that is, a bond which is found in things. An apparent bond is enough, for the imagination of what is not true can truly bind, and by means of such an imagination, that which can be
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? bound can be truly bound; even if there were no hell, the thought and imagination of hell without a basis in truth would still really produce a true hell, for fantasy has its own type of truth. It can truly act, and can truly and most powerfully entangle in it that which can be bound, and thus the torments of hell are as eternal as the eternity of thought and faith. As long as the soul, even when stripped of the body, retains these same character- istics, it maintains its unhappy state for ages, and perhaps even more so because of its pleasures and drinking and lack of self-control. The common philosophers did not understand this, and they most stupidly used this teaching to condemn the most ignorant of people. We will not make a big issue of this, except to say the following: when we were children and inex- perienced, we were flooded with the arguments of these philosophers, just as much as the old and the experienced, themselves, had been flooded with the same arguments. Nevertheless, we forgive these elders for these views, just as much as we think that we should be forgiven, since we were just children.
On cupid's bond and on bonds in general
We have claimed in our treatise De naturali magia7 that all bonds are either reduced to the bond of love, depend on the bond of love or are based on the bond of love. An examination of our thirty topics of discussion will easily show that love is the foundation of all feelings, for he who loves nothing has no reason to fear, to hope, to praise, to be proud, to dare, to condemn, to accuse, to excuse, to be humble, to be competitive, to be angered or to be affected in other ways of this sort. Hence, in this section, which we have entitled 'On Cupid's Bond', we have the opportunity to deal with a topic which is very familiar and with considerations and speculations which range very widely. This examination should not be considered to be far removed from public affairs just because it is more important and more wonderful than the field of public affairs.
? . The definition of a bond. According to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, the bond of beauty is said to be a brightness, a beam of light and a certain motion, or at least its shadow and image and trace. It has spread out first into the mind, which it adorns with the order of things; second into the soul, which it brings to completion with the sequence of things;
7 See On Magic, 'On the Analogy of Spirits', #? . ? ? ?
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? third into nature, which it diversifies and sustains with its seeds; and fourth into matter, which it supplies with forms. According to them this beam of light is clearest in the mind, clear in the soul, obscure in nature and most obscure in the material substrate of natural things. It is not a bodily mass, and it has no bulk. Nor can it rotate around a mass and through the whole of space, for not just large things, but also small ones, are seen to be beau- tiful. In the same species, large things are deformed and small things are beautiful, but the opposite also occurs, and it often happens that beauty is lost when something remains the same in quantity, and is preserved when that quantity is changed. The most beautiful baby or child is pleasing but does not bind until he is an adolescent of a certain age. Then he has some size, and this is true even if his form and figure and complexion have not changed at all. From this we conclude that social types of bonding require a degree of size on which the form and the power of the bond depends. It refers, I think, to gestures, words, clothing, habits, sense of humour, and the other signs of human feelings.
? . The origin of a bond. Some Platonists define a bond as arising from a cer- tain proportionality of parts accompanied by a certain pleasantness of colouring. But to those who consider the matter more fully, it is at least as clear that it is not just composite things and things consisting of parts that bind, but that colour alone and sound alone also bind. Furthermore, noth- ing slips away and ages faster than beauty, and nothing changes more slowly than the form and figure which shine forth from the composition of parts. Hence, it seems that the bond of beauty must be sought elsewhere than in the figure and in the proportionality of parts. Indeed, sometimes love passes away after the flowering of the object loved, but the same beauty and figure still remain. As a result, the nature of a bond consists chiefly in a cer- tain mutual orientation between a captor and a captive. Indeed, it some- times happens that even though we have no grounds to complain reason- ably about a girl's beauty, or in a social setting to criticize someone's conversation, speech, habits or actions in general, still they do not please us. On the other hand, something, or even many things, may displease us in someone, yet we still love that person. And, indeed, it would be rather stupid to identify colour as a bond without distinguishing between colour and the things associated with colour. For does colour in itself bind when a brighter colour is displeasing and rejected by an old man, while a duller colour binds and captures a young man? And also if, in a social setting, an
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? adolescent were to give a serious speech about grave matters of state, then no matter how brilliant the speaker's oratory, a man of more mature judge- ment would become indignant because of the speaker's arrogance. Likewise, if an old man were to give a speech full of charming, flattering and flowering words, this would invite contempt, would sometimes pro- voke laughter and would provide an occasion for mockery. Thus, in regard to the body, to words and to behaviour, one thing is fitting for a married woman, another for a virgin; one thing for a girl, another for a boy; one thing for a mature adult, another for an old man; one thing for a soldier, another for a Roman citizen.
? . The indeterminateness of a bond. I believe that it is not as difficult to make and to break bonds as it is to identify a bond in the concrete circumstances in which bonds are referred to the case at hand rather than to nature or to art. For example, a bond which originates from the body has no specific location in the body. Consider the eyes and cheeks and mouth by which a lover feels that he is bound. When these same things are attributed to another subject in the same proportions, it sometimes happens that they do not bind in a similar way, and thus the bonds of Cupid are dissolved or prevented. Why is it that sometimes, when we are consumed by love for a body which we have seen, the bonds of Cupid vanish when we become acquainted with that individual's speech and personality? And thus, you should understand bonds in the same way in a social setting.
? . The composition of a bond. The bond of Cupid is inferior to the bonds by which appropriate composite things bind us, and we are in no way forcefully captured by simple and absolute things. There are those who strongly reject these latter bonds. They think that God has no beauty in Himself, since his nature is simple and He does not display any level of composition. However, it is a matter of faith that God is both the author and the goal of all beauty and of every bond. Thus, because of the weakness of their minds, these thinkers have not distinguished between beauty in itself and what is beau- tiful to us. Likewise, at the practical level, they do not discern and distin- guish between what is beautiful and reasonable to all men on the one hand, and what is a matter of custom, practice and opportunity for particular people on the other hand. As a result, they err in their attempts to bind.
? . The number of bonds. To put the matter generally and firmly, bonds are the form, the habits and the motions of a body, the consonance of voice and
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? speech, the harmony of customs and the chance meetings of sympathy by which men are bound to men, animals to animals and even animals to men. Thus, it is clear that the sight of a snake raises a mortal fear in a child, and the sight of a wolf terrifies a lamb, because of a natural prompting and not because of any previous experience or acquaintance, while the sight of a cow or a sheep causes playfulness and enjoyment. There are also various aromas by which men and spirits are bound in various ways. I have known men who were so terribly horrified by the smell of musk, which is sweet for everyone else, that they have even fallen down because their spirit was so disturbed. And I have known one person who was extraordinarily delighted by holding under his nose a bug crushed by his fingers. Thus, different things are bonded in different ways, and not only contrary but even diverse things are bonded to each other. Furthermore, at the social level, it is clear that Germans and Italians do not have the same language, or the same habits of caring for and clothing the body, or the same grace and elegance in their customs. Nevertheless, an individual Italian may diverge from his national norm and be more like a German; vice versa, a German may be more like an Italian. This causes a complication and requires great pru- dence in binding at the social level, especially when the bonds are cast not over a group but over an individual. Indeed, it is easier to bind many rather than only one. A hunter has a greater chance of hitting a bird with an arrow shot into a group of birds than he would have of hitting a particular bird with a more accurate aim.
? . The gates of bonds. The senses are the entrances through which bonds are cast. And vision is the most important of them all. The others are more suitable for different objects and powers: touch is bound by the softness of the flesh, hearing by the harmony of sound, smell by the sweetness of breath, soul by the elegance of customs and intellect by the clarity of proofs. Different bonds enter through different windows; they have different effects in different people, and they please because of different desires in different people, for, indeed, a bond does not arise equally from all things, nor have an effect equally in all things.
? . The types of bonds. We know that there are as many types of bonds as there are types and varieties of beauty. Also, these varieties do not seem to be smaller than the primary varieties of things, that is, the different species. Furthermore, within each species there are different individuals who are bound by different things in different ways. Thus, the hungry are bonded
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? to food, the thirsty to drink, he who is full of semen to Venus; one person to a sensory object and another to an intellectual object; one person to a nat- ural object and another to an artificial one; a mathematician is bonded to abstractions and a man of action to concrete things; a hermit satisfies him- self by a desire for what is absent and a member of a family by what is pre- sent. Different things are bonded by different things in every species, and the same bonds do not of themselves carry the same power when they orig- inate from different sources. Bonds arise when music is played by a boy or an adolescent, but less so if by a girl or a man. Strength in a man is bind- ing because of his great size, but not in a woman. A girl binds through simplicity and honesty, but if an adult has the same influence, bonds are broken and he is more and more displeasing.
? . The measurement of bonds. At the social level, orators, court officials and those who know how to get things done bond more effectively if they secretly conceal their skills when they act, for he who speaks with too much eloquence, or who displays a knowledge too full of trivia, will not be well received. Those who dress too rigidly and too precisely are displeasing, and so is curled hair, and eyes, gestures and motions which always follow a pre- cise format, while he who keeps himself far removed from such things is not displeasing. Public speaking of this type is generally thought to be too affected and too florid. This is due to laziness and to a lack of talent and of good judgement, for to conceal an art while using it is no small part of the art. Thus, he who eloquently displays his knowledge at all times on every topic is not very wise, just as one who has rings and jewels on all of his fin- gers is not well adorned, and one who arrives loaded down with many different necklaces is not well dressed. From this we should especially real- ize that a bright light extinguishes a bright light, and that without darkness, light does not shine, gleam, glitter and please, for an ornament is nothing when it does not complement that which it adorns and shapes. Thus, art is not separated from nature, nor is culture foreign to simplicity.
? . The description of a bond. For Plato, a bond is a type of beauty or agreement of forms; for Socrates, it is the excelling charm of the soul; for Timaeus, the tyranny of the soul; for Plotinus, the private law of nature; for Theophrastus, a secret deception; for Solomon, a hidden fire and furtive waters; for Theocritus, a precious destruction; for Carneades, an agitated ruler; and for me, 'a joyful sorrow, and sorrowful joy'. 8 From what we have said in the 8 In other writings, Bruno uses this phrase to refer to himself.
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? preface to this part of this treatise, these other descriptions of feelings and other types of bonds have an analogy to our notion of feelings and bonds.
? ? . The distribution of bonds. Perfect things are bonded to perfect things; noble things and nobility are bonded to noble things; and things which are imperfect and defective are bonded to things which are imperfect and defective. As a result, it was said above that part of what is in that which is to be bound must be present in the bonding agent. A completely chaste girl, in whom there are no seeds of excitement, is not bound to sensory pleasure by any star or by any artifice if she has not been touched or embraced, that is, (I say) she has not submitted herself to the hand of a bonding agent, and his hand has not reached out to her. I will say nothing about an immature girl, for in all actions there must be some seed, but not all seeds are fruitful everywhere. And whose attempt to entice someone who is ill, or old, or frigid or castrated would not be frustrated (the opposite would apply to those who would not make the attempt)? In regard to social bonds, a proportional judgement is quite easy to make.
? ? . The degrees of bonds. Things in the universe are so ordered that they constitute one definite co-ordination in which there can occur a transition from all things to all things in one continuous flow. Some of these things are immediately related to others, for example, the natural propagation of individuals of the same species, and in these cases the bonds are blood related, familiar and easy. Other things are interrelated through various intermediaries, and all of these intermediaries must be crossed over and penetrated so that bonds are stretched across from the bonding agent to that which is bound. Thus, by their generosity to things and by their good- will in sharing with these intermediaries, spirits influence inferior, and even the lowest, things and bind them to themselves. On the other hand, lower things are raised up with a certain reverence through a natural or rational sequence so that, through the free consent of higher things, they can bind to themselves superior things located far above them. And just as there are various species of things and differences between them, they also have var- ious times, places, intermediaries, pathways, instruments and functions. It is very easy to see this and to understand it for all types of bonds and things that can be bound.
? ? . The size of a bond. In all things there is a divine force, that is, love, the father himself, the source, the Amphitrite of bonds. Thus, Orpheus and
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? Mercury were not wrong when they called this the great demon, for this bond is indeed the entire substance, constitution, and (if I may say so) the hypostasis of things. We come to know this greatest and most important bond when we turn our eyes to the order of the universe. By this bond, higher things take care of lower ones, lower things are turned toward higher ones, equal things associate with each other and lastly, the perfection of the universe is revealed in the knowledge of its form.
? ? . The principal effect of a bond. If there were only one love, and thus only one bond, all things would be one. But there are many different character- istics in different things. Hence, the same thing binds different things in different ways. As a result, Cupid is said to be both above and below, both the newest and the oldest, both blind and most observant. Cupid made all things in such a way that, for the preservation of their species, they remain firm in their powers or in themselves and are not separated from them- selves. But then, in regard to the changes which occur in individual things, he arranged it so that they would be separated from themselves in a certain sense when the lover eagerly desires to be completely transported into the loved one; and also that they would be unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide open when the lover desires to embrace and to devour the loved one completely. Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere and to have what they do not possess. This is due to a sense of complacency with what is possessed, to a desire and an appetite for what is absent but possessable, and to a love for all things. A particular and finite good and truth is not sufficient for an individual appetite and intellect, which have as their objects what is universally good and universally true. From this it follows that a finite potency in some definite material body simultaneously experiences the effects both of being drawn together and of being pulled apart, dispersed and scattered by the same bond. This gen- eral characteristic of a bond is to be found in each individual type of bond.
? ? . The quality of a bond. In itself, a bond is neither beautiful nor good.
Rather, it is the means by which things as a whole, and each individual thing, pursue what is beautiful and good. It connects that which receives with that which is received, that which gives with that which is given, that which can be bound with a bonding agent, that which is desired with the one who desires. Indeed, that which desires the beautiful and the good
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? lacks these qualities insofar as it desires them. Thus, to that degree it is neither beautiful nor good. Hence, one of the Peripatetics was wrong in his statement about matter when he concluded that matter is ugly and evil, because the desire for the good and beautiful is itself evidence that matter lacks these properties. Aristotle said more carefully that matter is not 'ugly' or 'evil' as such. 9 Rather, the actual truth is that that which, like matter, tends and moves equally towards goodness and evil, ugliness and beauty, is in itself neither ugly nor beautiful, neither evil nor good. If matter were evil, it would be contrary to its nature to desire the good; the same would be true if it were naturally ugly. And if it were evil by analogy, then it would also analogously possess a contrary which does not desire, but, rather, excludes and rejects, the other contary. The more profound philosophers understand this as we have declared elsewhere. That is, matter itself, in its bosom, is the beginning of all forms, such that all things originate and are produced from it; it is not a pure negation, as if all things originated from the outside as foreigners; indeed, outside of the bosom of matter there are no forms; rather, all forms are both latent within it and are derived from it. Consequently for anyone who considers bonds at the social level and in their full meaning, it should be clear that in every material thing or part of matter, in every individual or particular thing, all seeds are contained within and lie hidden there, and, as a result, the inclinations of all bonds can be actuated by a skilful effort. In one of our 'Thirty Small Signs',10 we have explained in general how such an inclination and its transformation take place.
? ? . The generality or universality of a bond. From what has just been said, it follows that the love by which we love, and the tendency by which all things desire, are intermediaries between good and evil, between the ugly and the beautiful (not themselves being ugly or beautiful). And so they are good and beautiful because of a sort of sharing and participation, for the bond of love has a nature which is both active and passive. And by this, things act, or are acted upon, or both, as they desire to be ordered, joined, united and completed, insofar as it is within the nature of each thing to be occupied with order, joining, union and completion. Without this bond there is nothing, just as without nature there is nothing. Because of this, therefore, love is not a sign of imperfection when it is considered in matter and in the
9 See Physics, ? , ? (? ? ? . a. ? ? ).
10 See Part ? , 'On Bonding Agents in General', Article ? ? , 'No one particular thing can bind every-
thing'.
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? chaos before things were produced. For indeed, anything which is con- sidered in the chaos and in brute matter, and is also said to be love, is simultaneously said to be a perfection. And whatever is said to be imper- fect, disordered and not to be, is understood not to be love. Thus, it is estab- lished that love is everywhere a perfection, and this bond of love gives witness everywhere to perfection. When an imperfect thing desires to be perfected, this, indeed, takes place in something which is imperfect, but not because it is imperfect. Rather, this happens because of a participation in a perfection and in a divine light and in an object having a more eminent nature, which it desires more strongly inasmuch as the object is more viva- cious. That which is more perfect burns with greater love for the highest good than does that which is imperfect. Therefore, that principle is most perfect which wishes to become all things, and which is not oriented to any particular form but to a universal form and universal perfection. And this is universal matter, without which there is no form, in whose power, desire and disposition all forms are located, and which receives all forms in the development of its parts, even though it cannot receive two forms at the same time. Hence, matter is in a sense divine, just as a form, which is either a form of matter or nothing, is also in a sense divine. There is nothing out- side of matter or without matter, otherwise the power to make and the power to be made would be one and the same thing, and would be grounded in one undivided principle, because the power to make anything and the power of anything to be made would be either present or absent together. There is only one potency taken absolutely and in itself (what- ever it may be in particulars, in composites and when taken accidentally, a question which dominated the thinking and the minds of the Peripatetics and their monkish followers). I have said this in many places in my De infinito et universo and more precisely in my De principio et uno11, where I conclude that it is not a foolish opinion which was defended by David of Dinant and by Avicebron in his Fons vitae, who cited the Arabs who also ventured to assert that God is matter.
? ? . The comparison of bonds. The most important of all bonds is the bond of Venus and of love in general, and that which is primarily and most power- fully the opposite of love's unity and evenness is the bond of hate. Indeed, to the degree that we love one of two opposites and contraries of any type,
? 11 For the former (De l'infinito universo e mondi), see G. Bruno, Dialoghi italiani, ed. by G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? -? ; for the latter (De la causa, principio, e uno) see Ibid. , pp. ? ? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? . (above, pp. ? , ? ? , ? ? )
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? then to that same degree we hate and reject the other. These two feelings, or rather, in the last analysis, this one feeling of love (whose substance includes hate) dominates all things, is lord over all things, and elevates, arranges, rules and moderates all things. This bond dissolves all the other bonds. For example, female animals who are restrained by the bond of Venus do not get along well with other females, and males do not tolerate rival male suitors. They neglect food and drink and even life itself, not giv- ing up even when conquered. Rather, the more they are worn out, the more they press on, fearing neither storms nor the cold. Because of this argu- ment, Aristippus decided that the highest good is bodily, and especially sexual, pleasure, but he held before his eyes a rather animalistic view of man as a result of his own conclusion. But still, it is true that the more skilful and clever bonding agent, who uses things which the one to be bound or tied loves and hates, expands his pathway to the bonds of the other feelings. For indeed, love is the bond of bonds.
? ? . The time and place of bonds. Even though the best seed is sown, the gen- eration of new things does not occur always and everywhere. Likewise, bonds are not effective always and everywhere in capturing an object, but only at the proper time and with the appropriate disposition of the object.
? ? . The distinction of bonds. There are no purely natural or purely voluntary bonds (in the sense in which people commonly distinguish between the natural and the voluntary). The will acts with the participation of the intel- lect, while the intellect is not limited by the will but acts everywhere, except where nothing exists. We have proven this in other places, and thus it would be useless to discuss the matter further here. According to our understanding, there are three different types of bonds: the natural, the rational and the voluntary (even though all things are based on one natural foundation). Consequently, to some degree we cannot set boundaries between one type of bond and another. Thus, the laws of prudence do not prohibit love, but love beyond reason. And the deceivers of the foolish pre- scribe without reason limits to reason, and condemn the laws of nature. And the most corrupt say that nature is corrupt, because humans are not raised above nature like heroes but are degraded like beasts as against nature and are beneath all dignity.
? ? . The development and stages of a bond. According to the Platonists, the construction of the bond of Cupid occurs as follows. First, some type of
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? beauty or goodness, or some such thing, is brought into the external senses. Second, it is taken on to the centre of the senses, that is, to the common sense; then, third, into the imagination; and fourth, into the memory. Then the soul, by its own power, desires first that it be moved, redirected and captured; second, once redirected and captured, it is enlightened by a ray of the beautiful or the good or the true; third, once enlightened and illu- minated, it is inflamed by sensory desire; fourth, once inflamed, it desires to be united to the thing loved; fifth, once united, it is absorbed and incor- porated; sixth, once incorporated, it then loses its previous form and in a sense abandons itself and takes on an alien quality; seventh, it, itself, is transformed by the qualities of the object through which it has moved and has thus been affected. The Platonists call the responses to the initial motions Cupid's preparation; the redirecting, Cupid's birth; the illumina- tion, Cupid's nourishment; the inflaming, Cupid's growth; the union, Cupid's attack; the incorporation, Cupid's domination; and the transfor- mation, Cupid's victory or completion.
? ? . The foundation of the stages of bonds. You can now see how this scale is based on its individual stages. Cupid's birth issues first from the body's nourishment, sensitivity and sexual expression, and second from the soul or spirit because of its charm, or playfulness, or contemplation, which is worthy of a better name, in which beauty is joined with pleasantness. Cupid's food, which prevents the newborn from expiring, is the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's growth is due to a lingering reflection on the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's attack consists in the fact that the soul slides and spreads from one part to all parts of the beloved so that it can inflame the whole. Cupid's domination is grounded in the action by which the soul of the lover, having abandoned his own body, lives and acts in the other. Cupid's transformation occurs when the lover, having died to himself, lives another life in such a way that he lives there as in his own house rather than in someone else's house. Thus, it is said that Jupiter was transformed into a bull, Apollo into a shepherd, Saturn into a horse and the other gods into other forms. Likewise, the soul is transformed by the motion or disturbance of its feelings from one form and type of bond to another.
? ? . The condition of bonds. There are some external things which bind, for example, gifts, acts of deference, honours and favours. But these truly bind when they are not given in such a way as to earn a favour in return. And
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? thus, bonds based on commercial transactions are ignoble and merely utilitarian, and are held in low esteem.
? ? . The appropriateness of bonds. The bonds which are most powerful and appropriate are those which occur through close contact with a contrary in a way which can be better explained here by examples rather than by a def- inition or by a name (which is unfamiliar. ) Thus, consider the case in which a humble and honourable person binds a proud soul. The proud person loves those whom he perceives to praise him, and the greater the praise, the greater the love. And, in fact, the praise of a great man is more significant than that of unimportant persons, whose praise we even sometimes reject. So the one who binds carefully observes the ways in which the proud man is praised. Again, consider soldiers who wish to be known primarily for their physical strength and courage, and, as a result, are little concerned if they are not noted primarily for their wisdom and influence over things. Again, consider philosophers who glory in their knowledge of things, but are little concerned if they are not praised for their heartfelt courage. The same judgement applies to the casting of other bonds.
? ? . The gratitude of bonds. Bonds create a desire for some sort of gratitude. To give an example from one type of bond, quarrels arise between lovers when it is taken for granted that each has an obligation to the other. The lover thinks that the beloved is obliged to turn over to him her stolen soul where he, who has died in his own body, lives in another body. If the lover is less flattering to his beloved, she complains that he cares less for her. The lover complains to the beloved if . . .
(Bruno's text ends abruptly here in mid-sentence. )
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accident and substance ? , ? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ?
? ? . The truth of that which can be bound. For that which can be bound to be truly bound, a real bond is not required, that is, a bond which is found in things. An apparent bond is enough, for the imagination of what is not true can truly bind, and by means of such an imagination, that which can be
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? bound can be truly bound; even if there were no hell, the thought and imagination of hell without a basis in truth would still really produce a true hell, for fantasy has its own type of truth. It can truly act, and can truly and most powerfully entangle in it that which can be bound, and thus the torments of hell are as eternal as the eternity of thought and faith. As long as the soul, even when stripped of the body, retains these same character- istics, it maintains its unhappy state for ages, and perhaps even more so because of its pleasures and drinking and lack of self-control. The common philosophers did not understand this, and they most stupidly used this teaching to condemn the most ignorant of people. We will not make a big issue of this, except to say the following: when we were children and inex- perienced, we were flooded with the arguments of these philosophers, just as much as the old and the experienced, themselves, had been flooded with the same arguments. Nevertheless, we forgive these elders for these views, just as much as we think that we should be forgiven, since we were just children.
On cupid's bond and on bonds in general
We have claimed in our treatise De naturali magia7 that all bonds are either reduced to the bond of love, depend on the bond of love or are based on the bond of love. An examination of our thirty topics of discussion will easily show that love is the foundation of all feelings, for he who loves nothing has no reason to fear, to hope, to praise, to be proud, to dare, to condemn, to accuse, to excuse, to be humble, to be competitive, to be angered or to be affected in other ways of this sort. Hence, in this section, which we have entitled 'On Cupid's Bond', we have the opportunity to deal with a topic which is very familiar and with considerations and speculations which range very widely. This examination should not be considered to be far removed from public affairs just because it is more important and more wonderful than the field of public affairs.
? . The definition of a bond. According to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, the bond of beauty is said to be a brightness, a beam of light and a certain motion, or at least its shadow and image and trace. It has spread out first into the mind, which it adorns with the order of things; second into the soul, which it brings to completion with the sequence of things;
7 See On Magic, 'On the Analogy of Spirits', #? . ? ? ?
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? third into nature, which it diversifies and sustains with its seeds; and fourth into matter, which it supplies with forms. According to them this beam of light is clearest in the mind, clear in the soul, obscure in nature and most obscure in the material substrate of natural things. It is not a bodily mass, and it has no bulk. Nor can it rotate around a mass and through the whole of space, for not just large things, but also small ones, are seen to be beau- tiful. In the same species, large things are deformed and small things are beautiful, but the opposite also occurs, and it often happens that beauty is lost when something remains the same in quantity, and is preserved when that quantity is changed. The most beautiful baby or child is pleasing but does not bind until he is an adolescent of a certain age. Then he has some size, and this is true even if his form and figure and complexion have not changed at all. From this we conclude that social types of bonding require a degree of size on which the form and the power of the bond depends. It refers, I think, to gestures, words, clothing, habits, sense of humour, and the other signs of human feelings.
? . The origin of a bond. Some Platonists define a bond as arising from a cer- tain proportionality of parts accompanied by a certain pleasantness of colouring. But to those who consider the matter more fully, it is at least as clear that it is not just composite things and things consisting of parts that bind, but that colour alone and sound alone also bind. Furthermore, noth- ing slips away and ages faster than beauty, and nothing changes more slowly than the form and figure which shine forth from the composition of parts. Hence, it seems that the bond of beauty must be sought elsewhere than in the figure and in the proportionality of parts. Indeed, sometimes love passes away after the flowering of the object loved, but the same beauty and figure still remain. As a result, the nature of a bond consists chiefly in a cer- tain mutual orientation between a captor and a captive. Indeed, it some- times happens that even though we have no grounds to complain reason- ably about a girl's beauty, or in a social setting to criticize someone's conversation, speech, habits or actions in general, still they do not please us. On the other hand, something, or even many things, may displease us in someone, yet we still love that person. And, indeed, it would be rather stupid to identify colour as a bond without distinguishing between colour and the things associated with colour. For does colour in itself bind when a brighter colour is displeasing and rejected by an old man, while a duller colour binds and captures a young man? And also if, in a social setting, an
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? adolescent were to give a serious speech about grave matters of state, then no matter how brilliant the speaker's oratory, a man of more mature judge- ment would become indignant because of the speaker's arrogance. Likewise, if an old man were to give a speech full of charming, flattering and flowering words, this would invite contempt, would sometimes pro- voke laughter and would provide an occasion for mockery. Thus, in regard to the body, to words and to behaviour, one thing is fitting for a married woman, another for a virgin; one thing for a girl, another for a boy; one thing for a mature adult, another for an old man; one thing for a soldier, another for a Roman citizen.
? . The indeterminateness of a bond. I believe that it is not as difficult to make and to break bonds as it is to identify a bond in the concrete circumstances in which bonds are referred to the case at hand rather than to nature or to art. For example, a bond which originates from the body has no specific location in the body. Consider the eyes and cheeks and mouth by which a lover feels that he is bound. When these same things are attributed to another subject in the same proportions, it sometimes happens that they do not bind in a similar way, and thus the bonds of Cupid are dissolved or prevented. Why is it that sometimes, when we are consumed by love for a body which we have seen, the bonds of Cupid vanish when we become acquainted with that individual's speech and personality? And thus, you should understand bonds in the same way in a social setting.
? . The composition of a bond. The bond of Cupid is inferior to the bonds by which appropriate composite things bind us, and we are in no way forcefully captured by simple and absolute things. There are those who strongly reject these latter bonds. They think that God has no beauty in Himself, since his nature is simple and He does not display any level of composition. However, it is a matter of faith that God is both the author and the goal of all beauty and of every bond. Thus, because of the weakness of their minds, these thinkers have not distinguished between beauty in itself and what is beau- tiful to us. Likewise, at the practical level, they do not discern and distin- guish between what is beautiful and reasonable to all men on the one hand, and what is a matter of custom, practice and opportunity for particular people on the other hand. As a result, they err in their attempts to bind.
? . The number of bonds. To put the matter generally and firmly, bonds are the form, the habits and the motions of a body, the consonance of voice and
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? speech, the harmony of customs and the chance meetings of sympathy by which men are bound to men, animals to animals and even animals to men. Thus, it is clear that the sight of a snake raises a mortal fear in a child, and the sight of a wolf terrifies a lamb, because of a natural prompting and not because of any previous experience or acquaintance, while the sight of a cow or a sheep causes playfulness and enjoyment. There are also various aromas by which men and spirits are bound in various ways. I have known men who were so terribly horrified by the smell of musk, which is sweet for everyone else, that they have even fallen down because their spirit was so disturbed. And I have known one person who was extraordinarily delighted by holding under his nose a bug crushed by his fingers. Thus, different things are bonded in different ways, and not only contrary but even diverse things are bonded to each other. Furthermore, at the social level, it is clear that Germans and Italians do not have the same language, or the same habits of caring for and clothing the body, or the same grace and elegance in their customs. Nevertheless, an individual Italian may diverge from his national norm and be more like a German; vice versa, a German may be more like an Italian. This causes a complication and requires great pru- dence in binding at the social level, especially when the bonds are cast not over a group but over an individual. Indeed, it is easier to bind many rather than only one. A hunter has a greater chance of hitting a bird with an arrow shot into a group of birds than he would have of hitting a particular bird with a more accurate aim.
? . The gates of bonds. The senses are the entrances through which bonds are cast. And vision is the most important of them all. The others are more suitable for different objects and powers: touch is bound by the softness of the flesh, hearing by the harmony of sound, smell by the sweetness of breath, soul by the elegance of customs and intellect by the clarity of proofs. Different bonds enter through different windows; they have different effects in different people, and they please because of different desires in different people, for, indeed, a bond does not arise equally from all things, nor have an effect equally in all things.
? . The types of bonds. We know that there are as many types of bonds as there are types and varieties of beauty. Also, these varieties do not seem to be smaller than the primary varieties of things, that is, the different species. Furthermore, within each species there are different individuals who are bound by different things in different ways. Thus, the hungry are bonded
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? to food, the thirsty to drink, he who is full of semen to Venus; one person to a sensory object and another to an intellectual object; one person to a nat- ural object and another to an artificial one; a mathematician is bonded to abstractions and a man of action to concrete things; a hermit satisfies him- self by a desire for what is absent and a member of a family by what is pre- sent. Different things are bonded by different things in every species, and the same bonds do not of themselves carry the same power when they orig- inate from different sources. Bonds arise when music is played by a boy or an adolescent, but less so if by a girl or a man. Strength in a man is bind- ing because of his great size, but not in a woman. A girl binds through simplicity and honesty, but if an adult has the same influence, bonds are broken and he is more and more displeasing.
? . The measurement of bonds. At the social level, orators, court officials and those who know how to get things done bond more effectively if they secretly conceal their skills when they act, for he who speaks with too much eloquence, or who displays a knowledge too full of trivia, will not be well received. Those who dress too rigidly and too precisely are displeasing, and so is curled hair, and eyes, gestures and motions which always follow a pre- cise format, while he who keeps himself far removed from such things is not displeasing. Public speaking of this type is generally thought to be too affected and too florid. This is due to laziness and to a lack of talent and of good judgement, for to conceal an art while using it is no small part of the art. Thus, he who eloquently displays his knowledge at all times on every topic is not very wise, just as one who has rings and jewels on all of his fin- gers is not well adorned, and one who arrives loaded down with many different necklaces is not well dressed. From this we should especially real- ize that a bright light extinguishes a bright light, and that without darkness, light does not shine, gleam, glitter and please, for an ornament is nothing when it does not complement that which it adorns and shapes. Thus, art is not separated from nature, nor is culture foreign to simplicity.
? . The description of a bond. For Plato, a bond is a type of beauty or agreement of forms; for Socrates, it is the excelling charm of the soul; for Timaeus, the tyranny of the soul; for Plotinus, the private law of nature; for Theophrastus, a secret deception; for Solomon, a hidden fire and furtive waters; for Theocritus, a precious destruction; for Carneades, an agitated ruler; and for me, 'a joyful sorrow, and sorrowful joy'. 8 From what we have said in the 8 In other writings, Bruno uses this phrase to refer to himself.
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? preface to this part of this treatise, these other descriptions of feelings and other types of bonds have an analogy to our notion of feelings and bonds.
? ? . The distribution of bonds. Perfect things are bonded to perfect things; noble things and nobility are bonded to noble things; and things which are imperfect and defective are bonded to things which are imperfect and defective. As a result, it was said above that part of what is in that which is to be bound must be present in the bonding agent. A completely chaste girl, in whom there are no seeds of excitement, is not bound to sensory pleasure by any star or by any artifice if she has not been touched or embraced, that is, (I say) she has not submitted herself to the hand of a bonding agent, and his hand has not reached out to her. I will say nothing about an immature girl, for in all actions there must be some seed, but not all seeds are fruitful everywhere. And whose attempt to entice someone who is ill, or old, or frigid or castrated would not be frustrated (the opposite would apply to those who would not make the attempt)? In regard to social bonds, a proportional judgement is quite easy to make.
? ? . The degrees of bonds. Things in the universe are so ordered that they constitute one definite co-ordination in which there can occur a transition from all things to all things in one continuous flow. Some of these things are immediately related to others, for example, the natural propagation of individuals of the same species, and in these cases the bonds are blood related, familiar and easy. Other things are interrelated through various intermediaries, and all of these intermediaries must be crossed over and penetrated so that bonds are stretched across from the bonding agent to that which is bound. Thus, by their generosity to things and by their good- will in sharing with these intermediaries, spirits influence inferior, and even the lowest, things and bind them to themselves. On the other hand, lower things are raised up with a certain reverence through a natural or rational sequence so that, through the free consent of higher things, they can bind to themselves superior things located far above them. And just as there are various species of things and differences between them, they also have var- ious times, places, intermediaries, pathways, instruments and functions. It is very easy to see this and to understand it for all types of bonds and things that can be bound.
? ? . The size of a bond. In all things there is a divine force, that is, love, the father himself, the source, the Amphitrite of bonds. Thus, Orpheus and
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? Mercury were not wrong when they called this the great demon, for this bond is indeed the entire substance, constitution, and (if I may say so) the hypostasis of things. We come to know this greatest and most important bond when we turn our eyes to the order of the universe. By this bond, higher things take care of lower ones, lower things are turned toward higher ones, equal things associate with each other and lastly, the perfection of the universe is revealed in the knowledge of its form.
? ? . The principal effect of a bond. If there were only one love, and thus only one bond, all things would be one. But there are many different character- istics in different things. Hence, the same thing binds different things in different ways. As a result, Cupid is said to be both above and below, both the newest and the oldest, both blind and most observant. Cupid made all things in such a way that, for the preservation of their species, they remain firm in their powers or in themselves and are not separated from them- selves. But then, in regard to the changes which occur in individual things, he arranged it so that they would be separated from themselves in a certain sense when the lover eagerly desires to be completely transported into the loved one; and also that they would be unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide open when the lover desires to embrace and to devour the loved one completely. Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere and to have what they do not possess. This is due to a sense of complacency with what is possessed, to a desire and an appetite for what is absent but possessable, and to a love for all things. A particular and finite good and truth is not sufficient for an individual appetite and intellect, which have as their objects what is universally good and universally true. From this it follows that a finite potency in some definite material body simultaneously experiences the effects both of being drawn together and of being pulled apart, dispersed and scattered by the same bond. This gen- eral characteristic of a bond is to be found in each individual type of bond.
? ? . The quality of a bond. In itself, a bond is neither beautiful nor good.
Rather, it is the means by which things as a whole, and each individual thing, pursue what is beautiful and good. It connects that which receives with that which is received, that which gives with that which is given, that which can be bound with a bonding agent, that which is desired with the one who desires. Indeed, that which desires the beautiful and the good
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? lacks these qualities insofar as it desires them. Thus, to that degree it is neither beautiful nor good. Hence, one of the Peripatetics was wrong in his statement about matter when he concluded that matter is ugly and evil, because the desire for the good and beautiful is itself evidence that matter lacks these properties. Aristotle said more carefully that matter is not 'ugly' or 'evil' as such. 9 Rather, the actual truth is that that which, like matter, tends and moves equally towards goodness and evil, ugliness and beauty, is in itself neither ugly nor beautiful, neither evil nor good. If matter were evil, it would be contrary to its nature to desire the good; the same would be true if it were naturally ugly. And if it were evil by analogy, then it would also analogously possess a contrary which does not desire, but, rather, excludes and rejects, the other contary. The more profound philosophers understand this as we have declared elsewhere. That is, matter itself, in its bosom, is the beginning of all forms, such that all things originate and are produced from it; it is not a pure negation, as if all things originated from the outside as foreigners; indeed, outside of the bosom of matter there are no forms; rather, all forms are both latent within it and are derived from it. Consequently for anyone who considers bonds at the social level and in their full meaning, it should be clear that in every material thing or part of matter, in every individual or particular thing, all seeds are contained within and lie hidden there, and, as a result, the inclinations of all bonds can be actuated by a skilful effort. In one of our 'Thirty Small Signs',10 we have explained in general how such an inclination and its transformation take place.
? ? . The generality or universality of a bond. From what has just been said, it follows that the love by which we love, and the tendency by which all things desire, are intermediaries between good and evil, between the ugly and the beautiful (not themselves being ugly or beautiful). And so they are good and beautiful because of a sort of sharing and participation, for the bond of love has a nature which is both active and passive. And by this, things act, or are acted upon, or both, as they desire to be ordered, joined, united and completed, insofar as it is within the nature of each thing to be occupied with order, joining, union and completion. Without this bond there is nothing, just as without nature there is nothing. Because of this, therefore, love is not a sign of imperfection when it is considered in matter and in the
9 See Physics, ? , ? (? ? ? . a. ? ? ).
10 See Part ? , 'On Bonding Agents in General', Article ? ? , 'No one particular thing can bind every-
thing'.
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? chaos before things were produced. For indeed, anything which is con- sidered in the chaos and in brute matter, and is also said to be love, is simultaneously said to be a perfection. And whatever is said to be imper- fect, disordered and not to be, is understood not to be love. Thus, it is estab- lished that love is everywhere a perfection, and this bond of love gives witness everywhere to perfection. When an imperfect thing desires to be perfected, this, indeed, takes place in something which is imperfect, but not because it is imperfect. Rather, this happens because of a participation in a perfection and in a divine light and in an object having a more eminent nature, which it desires more strongly inasmuch as the object is more viva- cious. That which is more perfect burns with greater love for the highest good than does that which is imperfect. Therefore, that principle is most perfect which wishes to become all things, and which is not oriented to any particular form but to a universal form and universal perfection. And this is universal matter, without which there is no form, in whose power, desire and disposition all forms are located, and which receives all forms in the development of its parts, even though it cannot receive two forms at the same time. Hence, matter is in a sense divine, just as a form, which is either a form of matter or nothing, is also in a sense divine. There is nothing out- side of matter or without matter, otherwise the power to make and the power to be made would be one and the same thing, and would be grounded in one undivided principle, because the power to make anything and the power of anything to be made would be either present or absent together. There is only one potency taken absolutely and in itself (what- ever it may be in particulars, in composites and when taken accidentally, a question which dominated the thinking and the minds of the Peripatetics and their monkish followers). I have said this in many places in my De infinito et universo and more precisely in my De principio et uno11, where I conclude that it is not a foolish opinion which was defended by David of Dinant and by Avicebron in his Fons vitae, who cited the Arabs who also ventured to assert that God is matter.
? ? . The comparison of bonds. The most important of all bonds is the bond of Venus and of love in general, and that which is primarily and most power- fully the opposite of love's unity and evenness is the bond of hate. Indeed, to the degree that we love one of two opposites and contraries of any type,
? 11 For the former (De l'infinito universo e mondi), see G. Bruno, Dialoghi italiani, ed. by G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? -? ; for the latter (De la causa, principio, e uno) see Ibid. , pp. ? ? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? . (above, pp. ? , ? ? , ? ? )
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? then to that same degree we hate and reject the other. These two feelings, or rather, in the last analysis, this one feeling of love (whose substance includes hate) dominates all things, is lord over all things, and elevates, arranges, rules and moderates all things. This bond dissolves all the other bonds. For example, female animals who are restrained by the bond of Venus do not get along well with other females, and males do not tolerate rival male suitors. They neglect food and drink and even life itself, not giv- ing up even when conquered. Rather, the more they are worn out, the more they press on, fearing neither storms nor the cold. Because of this argu- ment, Aristippus decided that the highest good is bodily, and especially sexual, pleasure, but he held before his eyes a rather animalistic view of man as a result of his own conclusion. But still, it is true that the more skilful and clever bonding agent, who uses things which the one to be bound or tied loves and hates, expands his pathway to the bonds of the other feelings. For indeed, love is the bond of bonds.
? ? . The time and place of bonds. Even though the best seed is sown, the gen- eration of new things does not occur always and everywhere. Likewise, bonds are not effective always and everywhere in capturing an object, but only at the proper time and with the appropriate disposition of the object.
? ? . The distinction of bonds. There are no purely natural or purely voluntary bonds (in the sense in which people commonly distinguish between the natural and the voluntary). The will acts with the participation of the intel- lect, while the intellect is not limited by the will but acts everywhere, except where nothing exists. We have proven this in other places, and thus it would be useless to discuss the matter further here. According to our understanding, there are three different types of bonds: the natural, the rational and the voluntary (even though all things are based on one natural foundation). Consequently, to some degree we cannot set boundaries between one type of bond and another. Thus, the laws of prudence do not prohibit love, but love beyond reason. And the deceivers of the foolish pre- scribe without reason limits to reason, and condemn the laws of nature. And the most corrupt say that nature is corrupt, because humans are not raised above nature like heroes but are degraded like beasts as against nature and are beneath all dignity.
? ? . The development and stages of a bond. According to the Platonists, the construction of the bond of Cupid occurs as follows. First, some type of
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? beauty or goodness, or some such thing, is brought into the external senses. Second, it is taken on to the centre of the senses, that is, to the common sense; then, third, into the imagination; and fourth, into the memory. Then the soul, by its own power, desires first that it be moved, redirected and captured; second, once redirected and captured, it is enlightened by a ray of the beautiful or the good or the true; third, once enlightened and illu- minated, it is inflamed by sensory desire; fourth, once inflamed, it desires to be united to the thing loved; fifth, once united, it is absorbed and incor- porated; sixth, once incorporated, it then loses its previous form and in a sense abandons itself and takes on an alien quality; seventh, it, itself, is transformed by the qualities of the object through which it has moved and has thus been affected. The Platonists call the responses to the initial motions Cupid's preparation; the redirecting, Cupid's birth; the illumina- tion, Cupid's nourishment; the inflaming, Cupid's growth; the union, Cupid's attack; the incorporation, Cupid's domination; and the transfor- mation, Cupid's victory or completion.
? ? . The foundation of the stages of bonds. You can now see how this scale is based on its individual stages. Cupid's birth issues first from the body's nourishment, sensitivity and sexual expression, and second from the soul or spirit because of its charm, or playfulness, or contemplation, which is worthy of a better name, in which beauty is joined with pleasantness. Cupid's food, which prevents the newborn from expiring, is the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's growth is due to a lingering reflection on the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's attack consists in the fact that the soul slides and spreads from one part to all parts of the beloved so that it can inflame the whole. Cupid's domination is grounded in the action by which the soul of the lover, having abandoned his own body, lives and acts in the other. Cupid's transformation occurs when the lover, having died to himself, lives another life in such a way that he lives there as in his own house rather than in someone else's house. Thus, it is said that Jupiter was transformed into a bull, Apollo into a shepherd, Saturn into a horse and the other gods into other forms. Likewise, the soul is transformed by the motion or disturbance of its feelings from one form and type of bond to another.
? ? . The condition of bonds. There are some external things which bind, for example, gifts, acts of deference, honours and favours. But these truly bind when they are not given in such a way as to earn a favour in return. And
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? thus, bonds based on commercial transactions are ignoble and merely utilitarian, and are held in low esteem.
? ? . The appropriateness of bonds. The bonds which are most powerful and appropriate are those which occur through close contact with a contrary in a way which can be better explained here by examples rather than by a def- inition or by a name (which is unfamiliar. ) Thus, consider the case in which a humble and honourable person binds a proud soul. The proud person loves those whom he perceives to praise him, and the greater the praise, the greater the love. And, in fact, the praise of a great man is more significant than that of unimportant persons, whose praise we even sometimes reject. So the one who binds carefully observes the ways in which the proud man is praised. Again, consider soldiers who wish to be known primarily for their physical strength and courage, and, as a result, are little concerned if they are not noted primarily for their wisdom and influence over things. Again, consider philosophers who glory in their knowledge of things, but are little concerned if they are not praised for their heartfelt courage. The same judgement applies to the casting of other bonds.
? ? . The gratitude of bonds. Bonds create a desire for some sort of gratitude. To give an example from one type of bond, quarrels arise between lovers when it is taken for granted that each has an obligation to the other. The lover thinks that the beloved is obliged to turn over to him her stolen soul where he, who has died in his own body, lives in another body. If the lover is less flattering to his beloved, she complains that he cares less for her. The lover complains to the beloved if . . .
(Bruno's text ends abruptly here in mid-sentence. )
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