Womenwere well
instructed
in Philosophy and Learning, is>>e^f?
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Thatwasnotalwaysexactlyobserved:But
at the bottom these Words are determined to this Sense by . their Root.
t For the Law establishes several Corporations that are contrary one to another, whereas Nature unites allthatare or the fame kind. Therefore there is a principle of Union in Humane Nature.
Ss4 to
? ? 280
Protagoras': Or, The Sophist's.
tpitslike. ButtheLaw,whichisaTyrantover Men, forceth and layeth violent hands upon Nature onmanyOccasions. Itwouldbeaveryshameful thing,ifwe,whoknowtheNatureofThingsper fectly, and w h o pass for the ablest a m o n g the Greets, should be come into Athens, which for Sciences ought to be look'd upon as the august Prytanneum of Greece, and should be assembled in the greatest and richest House of the City, to do nothing there worthy of our Reputati6n, and to spend our Time in wrangling and contesting about Trifles, like the
mostignorantofMen: IconjureyouthenProta goras and Socrates, and I adviie you, as if w e were here your Arbitrators, to regulate you, to pitch up
onaTemperamentandaMedium. YouSocrates, don't you stick too rigoroufly to the plain and coi- cise Method of a Dialogue, unless Protagoras will acquiescetherewith. LeavehimsomeLiberty,and slacken the Reins to his Discourse, that it may appear more magnificent and sublime to us. And you, Protagoras, don't swell the Sails of your Elo quence, so as to carry you into the High Sea, and tomakeyoulosethesightoftheShoar. Thereisa Medium between thole two Extremities. There fore if you will give Ear to me, you shall chuse a Moderator, a President who shall oblige you both to keep within Bounds.
ThisExpedientpleas'dalltheCompany. Calliat told me again, that he would not suffer me to go, andtheypressedme tonamethePresident,myself: I declin'd it, saying it would be a shame for us to takeaModeratorofourDiscomses. For,saidI, he whom we shall chuse shall be, either our Infe riororourEqual. IfhebeourInferior,itisnot
just that the most uncapable should -give Laws to the most learned ; and if he be our equal, he will think as well as we, and that choice will become altogether useless.
But, itwillbe said, you shall name who ismore learned than you; it is easie to fay so, but in truth
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 281
truth I don't think it possible to find a more able ManthanProtagorashandifyoushouldchuseone who is not so able as he, and whom you pretend howevertobemoreable,youyourselvesseewhat ' distaste you give to a M a n of that Merit, in subject inghim tosuchaModerator. For,asformy part, that in no ways concerns me, it is not m y Interest that makes me ipeak, I am ready to renew our Conversation to satisfie you. That if Protagoras will not Answer let him Question ; I will answer, and at the same time shall endeavour to show him the manner how I think every Man who is que stioned ought to answer. When I have answered him as often as he shall have thought fit to question
me, hewillgivemeleavetoquestionhiminmy turn, and he will answer me after the lame man ner. That if he scruples to answer me, then you and I will join to beg that favour of him which you desire of me at present, which isnot to break the Conversation, and there is no necessity to name a Moderator for that ^ instead of one w e shall have many, foryoushallallbeso.
Every Body said that this was what ought to be done. Protagoras was not much for itj but in fine, he was obliged to submit, and to promise that he would Question first, and that when he should be weary ofquestioning, he should permit me to do itin my turn, and should answer inhis turn pre cisely to the Question without roaming.
Then he began after this manner.
* Methinks Socrates, that the best part of Erudi tion, consists in being very well versed in reading thePoets. Thatistofay,tounderstandallthey fay so well as to be able to distinguish what is well said and what is ill said j to give Reasons for it,
* The Sophists boasted that they understood all the Poets perfectly well, and we are going to fee the difference in
thatpointbetween aSophistandaManwhoistrulylearn ed--' ? '? - >>.
and
? ? tSz
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists:
and make every Body sensible of it. Don't fear
thatIam goingtoremovemy selffaroffromthe
Subject of our Dispute, m y Question shall run up
onVirtue. Allthedifferencethereshallbetherein,
is that I shall transport you into the Country of
Poetry. Simonidessaysinsomeplace,directinghis
Discourse to Scapas, the Son of Creon. the Theffalo-
man: ' It is very difficult to become truly Virtu-
* ous, and to be in Virtue as a Cube, that is to fay,
* that neither our Carriage, our Actions, nor our
*Thoughtsshallshakeus, andshallneverdrawus * f r o m t h a t s t a t e o f o u r M i n d ? , a n d t h a t t h e y s h a l l
* neither deserve the least reproach nor the least *blame. DoyourememberthatPassage,orshall I relate it to you >
There is no need, said I, I remember it, and have studieditwithgreatpains. ,
You are in the right-, but do you think that Piece iswell or ildone?
. Itseemstome tobeperfectlywelldone, andis of very great Sense.
But would you call that Piece well done, ifthe Poet contradicts himself in it ?
No, without doubt,
Oh! laid he, another time examine Things bet^ ter, and look into them more narrowly.
A s for that, m y dear Protagoras, said I, I believe I have sufficiently examin'd it.
Since you have so well examin'd it, you know then, that he says in the sequel: ' The saying of 1 Pittacus does not please m e at ali, tho' Pittacus
*wasoneoftheSages. Forhefaysthatitisdif- *ficulttobecome Virtuous. Do youcomprehend that the fame M a n said this after what he had said but a little before ?
Yes I do.
And do you find that those two Passages agree ? Yes, Protagoras, said I, and at the same time,
least he should go upon some other Thing, I asked him, Don't you find that they agree?
How
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. i8j
How shouldIfindthataManagreeswithhim selfwhen heblows coldandhot? At firsthefixes this Principle, That it is difficult to become Virtuous. And a minute after he forgets that fine Principlej and in relating the fame Motto spoke in his own fensebyFittacus, Thatitisverydifficulttobecome V i r t u o u s ? , h e b l a m e s h i m , a n d f a y s i n p l a i n t e r m s ,
that that Sentiment does not please him in any wise,andyetitishisown. Thuswhenhecon demns ah Author, who fays nothing but what he had said himself, he manifestly cuts his own Throat, and he must of necessity Ipeak ill either there or here.
He had no sooner spoke, but a great Noise was raised,andtheAuditorsfellapraisingofhim. As
forme, Iconfessit,likeaFencerwho hadreceiv'd
a great blow, I was so stunn'd that I neither saw
nor heard, and my Brains turn'd as well with the
Noise they made, as with what I had heard him
lay. Infine,forImusttellyoutheTruth,togain
time to dive into the meaning of the Poet, I turn'd
my self toward Prodkus, and directing my Dis
c o u r s e t o h i m ? , P r e d i c t s * , l a i d I t o h i m , S i m o n i d e s F o r P r e d i -
is your Country-man ; 'tis therefore just that you cus was *
should come to his Assistance, and I call you to it,cjjjl* as. Homer feigns that the Scamandre being vigorous weu M Si- ly pressed upon by Achilles, calls Simois to his Sue- momdes. cour, in saying to him :
Let you and I repel this terrible Enemy.
I lay the lame to you, let us take care least Simo- nidesbeturn'dtopsieturvybyProtagoras. Thede-. fence of thisPoet depends on your Ability which makes you to distinguish so subtilly between * Will
andDesire,astwoverydifferentthings. Itisthat fame Ability which has . furnished you with so
*DistinctionswerethestrengthoftheSofii/ls. Socratesis goingtoputVrodicusuponittomakesome,andwhilesthe guides him Trodicus speaks to a miracle ; but so soon as he has laid a Snare for him, the Safhijt fails not to fall into it.
many
? ? 184
Protagoras : Or, The Sophists.
jfiwtobc
faistate
manyfinethingsthatyou. justnowtaughtus. See then if you will be of m y Opinion, for. it does not at all appear to me that Simonides contradicts him self. ButtellmefirstIpraywhatyouthinkofit. D o you think, that to be, and to become, are one and the fame thing, or two different things?
A fine Question! two very different Things j as suredly, answered Prodicus.
In the first Verse then, Simonides declares his Thought, in laying, That it is very difficult to be come truly Virtuous,
You fay true, Socrates.
And he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras
thinks, for having laid the'fame thing as he, but for having said something very different from it.
*n cffe^ Pittacus has not said as Simonides did, .
and to be- T/w/ it is difficult to become Virtuous, but to be Vir-
comede-tuous. NowmydearProtagoras,tobeandtobe'
tutuanal-come, are not the fame thing even in the Judgment
JJg-"ofProdicus. Andiftheybenotthefamething, f? %*ne Simonidesdoesinnowifecontradicthimself. Per-
stateto hapsthatPrcdicushimselfandmanyothers,entring mother. -mt0 Simonides Thought, might fay with Hesiod,
Titd"Pas-ThatitisverydifficulttobecomeVirtuous: Forthe sageosHe-Gods have placed Labour beforeVirtue, but when fe>d>>>>hs a ^an js comg t0 tjje pinnacie 0f tne Mountain
IftX where it dwells, then tho' it be very difficult, it is y. 187. eafietopossessit.
Prodicus having heard me speak thus, praised me extreamly. ButProtagorasanswering,said,Socra tes your Explication is still more Vicious than the Text, and the Remedy worse than the Disease.
Then I have done very ill according to your reckoning,Protagoras,answer'dI;andlama plea sant Phisician indeed, seeing that in designing to c u r e a D i s t e m p e r , I m a k e it t o g r o w w o r s e .
ItisjustasItellyou,Socrates. .
Howso?
The Poet, said he, would be Impertinent and Ig
norant, if he had spoke of Virtue as of a thing which
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists.
28 j
which isvile, despicable and naughty, * that it is easie to possess it, for every body agrees that it is very difficult. ;
Being amaz'd at this Quibble-, in truth, said I,
Protagoras,. we are very happy that Prodicus is
presentatourDispute. ForIfancythatyouare
very well persuaded that the Science of Prodicus is
one of the Divine Sciences, that you call those ofr/>>v >> the ancient Times, and which is not only as old as/:"""'<<'*^?
Simonides, but also much more ancient. You arep " ^ certainlyveryableinmany otherSciences;butas^y^0^. forthat you seem tome to bebutlittleinstructedthebeg*. init. Formy part, Imay faythatIhavesome"'>>? ><<>> tinctureofit,becauseIamoneofProdkuisDis>>? *%? cipleS. + Methinks that you don't comprehend ^;ty0f7he
that Simomdes does not give the word difficult the Sophisi*. sense which you give it. Perhaps it is with that
word |as with those of dreadful, terrible. At all times when I make use of them in a good part,
and
* "Protagoraschanges sides here, according to the good Cu stomoftheSophistsj andinsteadofdemonstrating"thepre tended Contradiction of Simomdes, he throws himself upon tiesiod,who says,thatitiseasietopossessVirtue;andin thatheputsaveryridiculousQuibbleuponhim. Thisthe CharacteroftheSophists. TheywereveryIgnorantatthe bottom; but with some reading, which had spoiled their Minds, and which they supported with abundance of Im pudence, they made themselves to be admired by Fools.
t At alltimes, when a word seems to signifie something contrary to the design of the Poet, all the different Signifi cations that that word can have in the Passage in Question ou^ht to be examin'd into. This Maxim is extraordinary good, and of very great use in Criticism, as Aristotle hath verywellobserved. Socratesmakesuseofithereinappear ance to defend Simonides, and in- effect to make those So
phists perfectly ridiculous.
| Socrates cunningly makes the Impertinence of those So
phists appear here, in the Criticism which they made up on words : For example, upon the word cTs/cor, they would nothaveitusedinagoodSense, becauseitwasneverused but in speaking of Things that are bad, as Poverty, Prison, Sikniss. ButtheseSophistsoughttohaveobservedthisclit- reren:e, that this word isalways truly taken in an illSeme,
when
? ? 286
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
and fay, for example, to praise you, Protagoras n
a terrible Man, Prodicus is always at me for it,
and asks m e if I be not afham'd to call that which is laudable, terrible? , for, fays he, that word is al
waystakeninallSense. Thisissotriie,thatyou shall findno Body who fays, terribleRiches, terri blePeace, terribleHealth:ButeveryBodyfays,a terrible Sickness, a terrible War, a terrible Poverty, that word always denoting Evil but never Good. H o w do you know but that * perhaps by this Epi- thete difficult, Simonides and all the Inhabitants of the Isle of Ceos have a mind to express something that is bad, vexatious, or other thing which we don't understand. Let us ask Prodicus. For it is reasonable to ask him the Explication of the Terms whichSimonidesmadeuseof Tellusthen,Prodi- cus, what would Simonides fay by that word diffi cult.
Hewouldfaybad.
Beholdthen,saidL/my dearProdicus,whySi monides blames Pittacus for having said that it is
when appliedtoinanimateThings, butthatitmay be taken in a good Sense when applied to Persons. Homer, who un derstood and wrote his Language better than all those So phists, has more than once joined ^no< with aifoio;, venera- tle. Asinthebeginningofthe8thBookoftheOdysses, in speaking of vlyffes; for J'stvde, as our word terrible, signifies often, astonishing, extraordinary, and which attracts consi deration, respect.
* The Snare which Socrates lays here for those Sophists would be too plain, if the word -/axi-dt difficult, did never signifiebad,-vexatious, butitistakeninthislastSenseby all thePoets. HomerhimselfhasuseditinthatSense,asiathe beginningofthatfineOde ofAnacreon,yaKitmvii/*>>piMjtrat. It is a vexatious thing not to love. 'Tis that which deceives "Prodicus, whose Ignorance he makes to appear in going about topersuadehim, thatperhapsitwastheInhabitantsofthe IsleofCeos,whousedthatwordinthatSense. Prodicusbe ing deceived, would value himself upon this Remark, and
acting the great Critick, he fays that Simonides reproaches "Pittacus who was a Man of Lesbos, whose Language was gross and barbarous, for having used that word ignorantly. Protagoras is a little more cunning.
difficult
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. zSj
difficult to be Virtuous, imagining, without doubt, that he meant thereby that it is a bad thing to have Virtud
Do you think, Socrates, anfwerM Prodicus, that Simonidesmeantanyotherthing, andthathisaim was not to upbraid Pittacus, who neither knew the force nor the difference of Terms, but * spoke coars- ly, like a Man born at Lesbos, and accustomed to barbarous Language ?
Protagoras, do you understand what Prodicus lays, and have you any thing to answer ?
I a m very far from your Opinion, Prodicus, said Protagoras -, and I take it for a Truth that Simoni des understood nothing more by that word difficulty than what we all understand, and that he meant not that that was bad but that it was not eafie, and that it must be acquirtf with much Pains and Labour.
To tellyou theTruth, Protagoras, Idoubt not in the least but that Prodicus knows very well what Simonides meaning is. But he plays upon you a little, and lays a Snare for you to lee if you will fall into it, or if you have the Cunning to avoid it,andtomaintainyourOpinion. Forhereisan indisputable Proof that Simonides does not call dif
ficult that which is bad, because he adds immedi ately after, And God alone fojseffes that precious Treasure. Forifhehadmeantthat'tisabad thing to be Virtuous, he would never have added that God alone has Virtue, he would have been ve ry wary of making so bad a Present to the Divinity alone. Ifhehaddoneit,Prodicus,fartfromcak lingSimonidesaDivineMan, would notfailtocall
him
*
* The Language of the Lesbians barbarous. The Rude
ness of Language usually accompanies Ciownisliness of Man ners.
?
t Here is a very small fault ; yet it fails not to corrupt the
Textextreamly,andtoaltertheSenseofit. Tofollowthe Letter, w e sliould have reHder'd it, very far fm/n m ^ v j him a Man
? ? >>88
Pr6tagoras: Or, the Sophists,
himaBlasphemerandaProfligate. Butsinceyou are something curious to know if I be well vers'd in that which you call the reading of the Poets, I a m going to tell you the meaning of that small P o e m o f S i m o n i d e s -, o r i f y o u h a d r a t h e r e x p l a i n i t to me, I (hall willingly hearken to you;
Protagoras hearing m e say so, fail'd not to take me at my word, and Prodicus and Hippias, with the rest, besought me not to defer giving them that Satisfaction.
I am going, said I, to endeavour to explain to ys o o u m y S e n t i m e n t s u p o n t h a t P i e c e o f S i m o n i d e s . Yscoumust know then, that Philosophy isveryan: cient among the Greeks, * particularly in Creete andLacedemon. TherearemoreSophiststhere then in all the World beside; but they. conceal themselves, and make as if they were simple and ignorant People, just like the Sophists you spoke of, that it m a y not be discover'd that they surpass all the Greeks in Learning and Science, and that they may be only look'd upon as brave Men who
aManofCeos;fortheGreekfays,x)>>Jty/8{mov,andnot intheleastaManofCeos. Butthereis-noBodybutwill agree that it ought to be readx) idk^tae Shop, and not in the least aDivineMan, forSimonideswascall'dso. WhatfenseWould a Man ofCeos bear in opposition to Blasphemer and Profli gate? Thatwasneverheardofbefore. But'twillbesaid, thePietyoftheMenofCeosmightbesorecommendedand so famous; that perhaps they might fay a Man <</ Ceos, for a pious Man. Itwas quitecontrary. The Inhabitantsofthe Me of Ceoswere an impious People, witness the Law they madetoputtodeathalltheoldMenaboveSixtyYearsof Age; and that when they were besieged by the -Athenians, they put to death all those who were not able to bear
Arms, which struck the. Athenians with so much Horrour, that they raised the Siege to stop the Current of such horri ble Impiety.
* He put Creete with Lacedemon, because tycurgus had brought back from Creete to Lacedemon many of the Laws that were made by Minos, and had drawn from thence the Idea of the Government which he had establifh'd. See the Re marks of Tlutanh upon the Life of Ljcwrg>>i, Tom. i.
p. 199.
arc
? ? Protaig|bras:; Or> The Sophists. ? 29
are superior to others by their Courage and con tempt of Death. *. For they are persuaded that ifthey were known, for what they are, every Body wouldapplythemselvesto"thatStudy; and,theArt wouldbe. nolongervalued. Thusbyconcealing their Ability, they deceive thro5 all the Towns of Greece, those who affect: to follow the Lacedemo
nianwayofliving. Themostpart,inimitationoFTbefillyos
them, cut their Ears, have only a Cord for theirmostofthe Girdle, use the hardest Exercises, and wear theirTowns ? f Gloaths so short that they don't cover half their^^fedf
Body. Fortheypersuadethemselvesthat'tisbypt? dti~
those Austerities that the Lacedemonians have made imitatethe t h e m s e l v e s M a s t e r s o f G r e e c e . * A n d t h e L a c e d e m o - a - f l s r e L i f e niansaresojealousofthe Science,oftheir Sophists,ffe La~_ that When they have a mind to discourse with them ans. em0m~
freely, and are weary of feeing them in secret and
by stealth, t they turn out all those Apes that
counterfeit them 5 that is to fay, all those Strangers
they find in their Towns, and then discourse with
those Sophists without admitting any Stranger to
those Conversations. Neither do they suffer their
young People to travel into other Towns, for fear
they should forget what they have learn'd: And
the same thing is done in Creete. Among those
great Teachers there are not only Men, but also
Women : And a certain mark that I tellyou theforthe
Truth, and . that the Lacedemonians are perfectly.
Womenwere well instructed in Philosophy and Learning, is>>e^f? fM
that if any Body will discourse with the most pir tiful Fellow of the Lacedemonians^ he will at first
* This Passage favours and supports what Thutidides wrote, That Ljcnrgus banished all Foreigners, for fear they should imitate his Policy, and learn to lov& Virtue:And 'tisfor this that vtutarch thought he ought to justifie him. - See the Life of Lycurgm, p. 243.
t Lymrgus shut up the Gates of Sparta against all Strangers whose Curiosity only drove them thither, and cam* not for any Advantage or :Profit; he also forbid Travelling. "Plu tarch gives very fine Reasons for it, />. 148.
'T t take
? ? apo Protagoras; Or, The Sophists]
rbeyacm- take him for an Idiot-, but in the sequel of the
children's*Conversation, that Idiot will find means pertinently
makl'quTck*? P^ace a ^10rt and quick Repartee, and full of
and (harp Sense and Strength, which he will shoot like an Ar- Hepanees,r0woutofaBow. Insomuchthathewhohadso
<<f? 3 ? bad an ? Pinion ofhim> wil1 find himself but a
"Le"/"Childincomparisontohim. Alsoabundanceof
Senseina People in bur Age, and the Ages past, have con- fewwords,ceivedthattoLaconize, ismoretostudyPhiloso-
f>hythantowork, beingwellpersuaded, andjust- y,thatitbelongsonlytoaManwho iswellin structed and well educated to speak such fine Sen
tences. OfthisnumberwereTbalesofMiletum, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, our Solon, CleobulusofLynde, Myson ofChen, aTown ofLa- coma, and Cbilon of Lacedemon. All those Sages were zealous Followers of the Lacedemonian Learn ing, as appears still by some of their good Senten ces that have been preserved. Being one day all together, they consecrated to Apollo, as the first Fruits of their Wisdom, those two Sentences which are in every Body's Mouth, and caused them to be wrote in Letters of Gold upon the Portal of the TemplesofDel-pbos:Knowthyself,andKnowno thing too much.
Why isitthatIrelatetoyouthosePiecesofAn tiquity > It is to let you see the W a y and Character of the Philosophy of the Ancients was a certain La- conickBrevity. Now oneofthebestSentencesthat was attributed to Pittacus, and that the Sages most boasted of, is deservedly this, It is difficult to be come Virtuous. Simonides then, as Emulating Pit- tacusinthatcarreerofWisdom, conceivedthatif he could overthrow this fine Sentence, and triumph over it'as over a Champion of Reputation, who had carried away the Acclamations of every Body, he would thereby acquire an immortal Renown. It is then this Sentence he only carps at, and 'tis with a design to destroy it, that he hath composed thiswhole Poem, atleastIbelieveitso$ letusex
amine
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 251
amine him together, to fee if I be in the right.
First, the beginning of this Poem would be sense less,iftoexpressonly, Thatitisdifficulttobecome Virtuous, thePoetshouldlay,Itisdifficult,1con
fess, to become Virtuous ; for that word, I confess, is added without any fort of Reason, unless we suppose that Simonides had considered the Sentence of Pittacus to quarrel with it. Pittacus having laid, That it is difficult to be Virtuous. Simonides op- ? oseth that, and corrects that Principle in faying,
''batitisdifficulttobecomeVirtuous, andthatthat is truly difficult,. For observe well, that he does, notfaythatitisdifficulttobecome trulyVirtuousj as Ifamong the Viftuous there might be some who were truly virtuous, and others who were Virtuous without being truly so^ that would be the Dis courseofaFool,andnotofawiseMan, asSimo
nides. ThereforetheremustneedsbeaTransposi tion in this Verse, and the word truly must be tran- spos'd and put out of itsplace to answer Pittacus. For 'tis as if,there was a kind of Dialogue there between Simonides and Pittacus. The latter fays immediately, M y friends, it is difficult to be Virtu ous : And Simonides answers-, Pittacus, you advance a false Principle there, for it is not difficult to be Vir tuous,itisyetworse: Butitisdifficult,Iconfess, to become Virtuous, so as not to be shaken, and to be firminVirtueas a CubeonitsBasis; andthatnei^
ther our Carriage, our Thoughts, nor our Aii'tqns, can draim upon us the least reproach or blame -,'that it is truly difficult. At this rate 'tis plain that he hasReasontoputthisword,Iconfess,there. And
that the word truly is very well placed at the end. The whole sequel of the Poem proves that this is thetrueSense? ,anditwouldbeeasietomateit
appear that all its parts agree together^ that tftey areperfectlywellcomposed, andthatallpo^iio GraceandEleganceisfoundinthem,wkh abund ance of Strength and Sense j but that vo'idou'y
? Tt a
? 29*
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
us too far to run it all over, let us content out selvestoexamine theIdeaofthePoem iaGeneral, and the Aim of the Poet, to make it appear that he only proposes to himself by all that Poem, to refute that Sentence of Pittacus.
This is so true, that a little after, as if it were to give a Reason for what he had said, That to be come Virtuous is a thing truly difficult? he adds, -
Howeverthatitispossibleforsometime-, butaster oneisbecomeso, topersistinthatState,andtobe Virtuous, as you fay, Pittacus, that's impossible and above the Strength os M a n : This happy Privilege is onlyfor God alone, and it is not humanly poffiblefor aMan nottobecomewickedwhenan insurmountable Calamity falls upon his Head. *
Heisgoing gutwhatsortofPeoplearetheythatinsuppor-
tLf/>>4<< table Calamities afflict, so as that they are no thing"ricelongerthemselves>Forexample, among thosewho
supposes sitattheHelmofaShip>Itisevidentthatthey astateof are not tne Ignorantand the Idiots5for thelgno-
whkhpre-rantarecaftdownevenmaCalm. Asonedoes
ceied. It notthrowtotheGroundaMan thatislyinguponit ? veyre- butonethatisstandingupright;soCalamitiesonly
markMe deject: and change an able Man, and they never Truth. change one who is Ignorant. A terrible Tempest
which turns the Sea topfie turvy all of a sudden, astonishes and overcomes a Pilot; irregular and stormy Seasons astonish and overcome the Husband
man ; a wise Phisician isconfounded by Accidents, that he could not foresee with all his Art of Phi- sick;inaword,'tistheGoodthathappentobe come Wicked, as another Poet testifies in this Verse, The Good aresometimes Good and sometimes
Wicked.
But it never happens to the Wicked to become
Wicked,heisalwaysso. ItisonlytheLearned$ theGood,andtheWise,towhomithappenstobe Wicked when a frightful and sudden Calamity over throwsthem. Anditishumanlyimpossiblethatit can be otherwise. And you, Pittacus, you lay,
Thai
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists.
291
That it is difficult to be Good; fay rather, That it is
difficult to become so, and that yet it is possible 5
but to persist in that State, is what is impossible ;
fbryoumustagreethateveryManwho doesGood
is good, and that every M a n w h o does ill is wicked.
WhatisitthentodoGood,fbrexample,inLearn
ing, and whoistheMan thatyou callGood in
that? Isitnothewho has Knowledge and who
isLearned? What isitthatmakesa goodPhysician?
Isitnot the Knowledge to cure or to comfort the
Sick ? And is not that which makes a,g ill Physici
anhiswantofskilltocure? Whom thenshallwe
callabadPhysician? IsitnotevidentthataMan
must in the first place be a Physician, before w e can
give him that Name, and that in the second place
he must be a good Physician, for it is only the good
w h o is capable of becoming a bad Physician ? In
effect:we who are ignorant inPhysickthough we
should commit Faults in that Art, yet we should
never become bad Physicians, seeing we are not
Physicians our selves. HethatdoesnotknowwhatArchitectureis,can
never properly be what is called a bad Architect,
forhe isno Architectatall: And soinallother
Arts. EveryManthen,whoisnoPhysicianwhatever
faults he commits inactingthe Phyfician,isnot howe
ver in astrictSense a bad Physician. Itisthefame of
the Virtuous Man, he may become Vicious, with
out Contest, whether it be by Age, Labour, Sick
ness, or by any other Accidentj but he can't be
/ ?
comeVitiousunlesshewasVirtuousbefore. There-ThisVrin- fore the only Scope of the Poet in this Work, isc? e >>/&>?
tomakeitappearthatitisnotpossibletobe, andcratesf"^ n Ar, . . nr , . . . naturallyto
to persevere always in thatState;butthatitistj,istTO/,
possibleto become Virtuous, as it is possible tothatall becomeVicious. TheVirtuousareabsolutelythoseMmbeinS
whom theGodsloveandfavour. Now theSequeljj^? ? of the Poem makes itplainly appears that allms? ,? */<<>>> thisissaidagainstPittaws. Forheadds: cWhere-original,
ifore'Ishallnotfateaguemy selftoseekthat T-tj 'which
? ? 2^4 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
\ which is impossible to find, and I shall not con-
We mustnot1 fume m y Life in flattering m y self with the vain bopttofind<? Hopes offeeinga Man without Blame, and in-
ManZ'oT ' tirely innocent amongst us Mortals who live upon Earthwith-'wriattheEarthpresentstous. IfIwere happy
outfit non ' enough to find him, I should quickly tell it you. esthomo And inallhisPoem hecarpssomuch at thisSen-
ter'" Ee- tenCC ? * P'ttacus-> tnat ne % s a tittle affer- ' ^01 des. 7. 21. cmY Part, every Man who does not ashameful
"c Action, voluntarily I praise him, I love him. I do
' not speak of Necessity, . that is stronger tharl the 4Godsthemselves, allthisisalsospokeagainstPit- tacus. IneffectS'monides. wastoowelltaughtto refer this Voluntarily to him, who commits fhame-
rherewas fUI Actions, as if there were People who did ill
new a Voluntarily. For I am perfwaded that of all the 'PhilosopherPhilosophersthereisnotonetobefound whofays
ZfcrtthLthatthereareMenwhofinVoluntarily. Theyall mZfinnedknowthatthosewhocommitCrimes,committhem voluntarily,whethertheywillornot. ThereforeSimonidesdoes
not fay that he will praise him who does not com mit Crimes Voluntarily; hut this Voluntarily has referencehimself. Hefaysthathewillpraisehim
Voluntarily and with all his Heart : For he was rhereare perfwadedthatitfrequentlyhappensthatanhonest certainVeo- an(j a g00cj j^an js force(j to love and to praise cer
ate*? 't2-mPe? ple- ForExample, aMan hasaveryun- TMaysto reasonableFatherandMother,anunjustandcruel
praiseand Country, or some other such like thing. If that iw what- happens to a wicked Man, what does he? First
\Tiefth% ne1SvervS^ ? flhanc*afcerwardshischiefcare do>>s. Ml is to complain publickly and to make the ill Hu-
tbatSocra- mour of his Father and Mother and the Injustice of tessays hisCountryknowneverywhereinordertherebyto d'e'rfriW"n~^reehTM^ fr? mtneJu^Reproachesthatmight
be made against him for the little care he has of them and for having abandoned them ; and under this very Notion he multiplies the Subjects of his Complaint, and adds a voluntary Hatred to that forcedEnmity. TheConductofanhonestMan if
far
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists. 295s
fitdifferentinsuchOccasions: Hissolecareisto hide and to cover the Faults of his Father and Coun try ; far from complaining of them, he hath so much command of himself as always to speak well ofthem. ThatifanycryingInjusticehathforced him to be angry with them, he himself is their Mediator to himself, he argues with himself for them, and tells to himself all the Reasons they can bring to appease him and to bring him back to his Duty;and heisnever at peacewith himself till that being Master of his Resentment, he has restor edthemhisLoveandpraisedthemasbefore. I am perfwaded that Simonides himself *,has fre quently found himself under an Obligation to praise a Tyrant, or some other considerable Person. He has done it + but he did it in spight of himself This then is the Language he speaks to Pittacus.
'WhenIblameyouPittacus, itisnotbecauseI eam naturallyinclinedto blame, on the contrary,
1 it suffices m e that a M a n is not wicked and use-
'fuitonogoodpurpose,nobodyshalleverseeme
' quarrel with any Person, who may be of any
*usetohisCountry. Idonotlovetofindfault,
'fortheRaceofFoolsissonumerousthatifany
* Man should take upon him to reprehend them he
' should never have done. W e must take all that
'forgood andfine,whereinwe findnoshamefulmix-
'ture, or scandalous Blot. When he fays, We
4 must take all that for Good, &c. It is not the
fameasifhesaid,'We musttakeallthatfor c white wherein we find no mixture of black, for
thatwould bealtogetherridiculous. Buthewould ?
* He speaks this, because Simonides had kept a very good correspondence with Tausanlas King of Lacedemon, w h o gained the Battle of Tlatees, and with Hiero the wisest of all the Ancient Tyrants.
4. Thatistofay,thathediditinobediencetotheLawof Nature, confirmed-by the written Law, and which he called by the Name of Necessity.
Tt4 have
? ? aa6
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/,
have them to understand that he contents himself with a Mediocrity, and that, hej reprehends' and blames nothing wherein this ,Mediocrity is found. For we must not hope to meet with perfection in this World. ? ' Wherefore, faith he, I don't look
' for a M a n w h o is altogether innocent a m o n g all
' those who are nourished by the product of the
'Earth. WereIhappyenoughtofindhim,Ishould
1 not hide him' from you, but should quickly shew
'himtoyou. Tillthen,IshallpraisenoManas cbeingperfect. -It"sufficethme thataMan be in
' this laudable Mediocrity, and- that he do no ill.
1ThosearethePeoplewhom IIftveandpraise. And
'as he speaks to Pittacus who is of Mitylene, he ? ? "? speaksintheLanguageoftheMityknes,Voluntari
lyIpraisethem-. andIiovethem. This Word Vo
luntarilyhasnoreferencetowhatprecedes, but to
whatfollows. Hemeansthatlfc&praisesthosePeo^
pie of his own accord, whereas there are others whomhepraisesofNecessity. cThusthen,Pitta-
cus, continues he, if you'^ad kept your self in that Mediocrity, and told us things that were pro bable, I should never have reprehended you-, but inlieu thereofyou impose upon us, forTruths, Principles that are manifestly false, and which is worse, about very essential Things -, wherefore I contradict you. Behold, my dear Prodicus and
my dear Protagoras, what in my Opinion is the meaning and the Scope of this Poem of Simo- nides. . .
Then Hippias answering said, Indeed Socrates you have perfectly well explained the hidden meaning ofthatPoem:IhavealsoashortSpeechtomake toyoutoconfirmyourExplication. Ifyouplease Iwillcommunicatemy Discoveriestoyou.
That isverywell, saidAlcibiades^interruptinghim, but-itmustbeanothertime. Atpresentitis. rea sonable that Protagoras and Socrates make an end of their Dispute, and that they stand to the Treaty they have made. If Protagoras inclines still to
? ,. Questi-
? ? Protagoras : Or,, %he Sopfcists. 2^7
Question,Socratesmustanswer; andifhehasa mind tp answer in his turn, Socrates must question. IleaverittoProtagoras'sChoice, saidI,lethimfee which jsmostagreeabletohim. Butifhe would be advised by me, we should leave oifthe Poets and Poetry, I confess, Protagoras, that I should be wonderfully well pleased to dive with you into the depthofthefirstQuestionIproposed, forincon
versing thus of Poetry, we do as the ignorant and common People, when theyfeastone another, * for not being able to discourse among themselves of
1fine things, and to maintain Conversation, they are silent, and borrow Voices to entertain one another j they hire at a great charge Singers and Players up on Flutes to supply their Ignorance and Clownish- ness. Whereas when honest Men who have been well Educated and Instructed, eat together, they don'tsendforSingersDancersand Players on the
Flute; they find no trouble to entertain one another withoutallthoseFopperies and vain Amusements
that are only pardonable in Children : But they
speak and-hear one another reciprocally with Decen
cy and good Behaviour, even when they excite one another^ the most ;o drink, and they prefer the Harmony oftheirDiscoursetpallyokesandFlutes.
It ought to be the fame in this'kind of Conversa
tion, especially w h e n it is between such People as Gooi Con_
mostofthosewho areherevaluethemselvestobe;y^tilT.
they haveno occasion for strangeVoices, nor forpreferable Poets, ofwhom theycannotaskareasonforwhat*15'*? mofi
they fay, and to w h o m most of those w h o cite t h e m ^ f ^ * ' attribute some one Sense, some another, without beingeverabletoconvinceoneanotherorto come toanagreement. That'sthereasonwhyableMen
ought to let alone those Dissertations upon the Poets
* The Musicians and Players upon Instruments were in troduced to Feasts by clownisti People'who were incapable ofentertainingthemselves. DoesnottheViolentPassion t h a t is o b s e r v e d n o w a d a y s f o r M u s t e k p r o c e e d f r o m t h e f a m e RefectI Perhapswelingonlybecausewecannotdiscourse.
;. <,? " ? . *' ':'*"and
? ? 2^8
Protagoras: Or, the Sophist*:
and to entertain themselves together, in founding and examining one another by their Discourse, to give a Proof of the Progress they have made in the StudyofWisdom. That'stheexamplewhichme- thinksyouandIoughtrathertofollow. Letting the Bets alone then, let us Discourse together, or if Imayfayso,letusfencetogethertofeehowfar weareintheright. Ifyouhaveamindtoque stionme,1amreadytoansweryou* ifnot,give me leave to propose the Question to you, and let us indeavour to bring the Inquiry which we have interrupted, to a happy issue.
When I had spoke thus, Protagoras knew not whichParttotake,andmadenoanswer. Where fore Alcibiades turning towards Cal/ias, said he, that Protagoras does well in not declaring what he will do, whether he will Answer or Propound.
No, without doubt, said Callias-, let him enter the List then, or else let him tell why he will not, that we may know his Reasons, and that thereup on Socrates may dispute with some other, or that
some one of the Company may dispute with the firstwho shallofferhimself.
Then Protagoras being asham'd, as I thought, to hearAlcibiadestalkso, andtoseehimselfsollicited by Callias, and almost by allthose who were present, at last, resolved with much difficulty*, to enter into Dispute,anddesiredme toproposeQuestionstohim.
Presently I began to fay to him, Protagoras, do not think that I will converse with you upon any other design than to search into the bottom of some M a t t e r s w h e r e o f I s t i l l d a i l y d o u b t ? , f o r I a m p e r suaded thatHomer hathverywellsaid, Two Men
intintenthwho go togetherfee things best, for onefees what the vf>A^hls otherfees not. In effect, we poor Mortals, all of
' us whatever, when we are together, we have a greater Felicity for all that we have a mind to fay, do,orthink? ,whereasoneManalone,tho'never
so able and witty, seeks always some Body to com municate his Thoughts, and to conform himself 'till
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 199
till such time as he has found what he fought. Behold also why I converse more willingly with you than with another, being very well persuaded thatyouhavebetterexamin'dthananotherMan aU the Matters that an honest Man ought in duty to search into the bottom of, and particularly all that relatestoVirtue. Alas! to whom could one ad dress himself rather than to you ? First you value your self on being a very honest Man -, and besides that, you have an Advantage that most honest Men have not, that is, that being Virtuous you can alsomakethoseVirtuouswhofrequentyourCom pany : You are so sure of doing it, and rely so much upon your Wisdom, that whereas the other Sophists hide and disguise their Art, you make publick Profession of it, by posting it up, if I m a y say so, in all the Cities of Greece, that you are a Sophist; you give yourselfout publicklytobe a Master in the Sciences and in Virtue -, and you are the first who have set a value upon your self, and put a price upon your Precepts : W h y then should wenotcallyoutotheExaminationofThingsthat Weenquireafter,andthatyouknowsowell? Why should not we be impatient to ask you Questions, and to communicate our Doubts to you? For my part, I can't refrain it, and I die with Desire
thatyouwouldmakemeremembertheThingsthat I have already asked you, and that you would ex plain to m e those which I have still to ask.
The firstQuestionIask'dyou,ifIrememberit
well, is, if Science, Temperance, Valour, Justice, and Sanctity ? I fay, if these five Names are appli
cable to one only and the fame Subject, or if every one of those denotes a particular Essence, a Thing which has its distinct Properties, and is different from the other four. "You answer'd me, that these Names were not applicable to one only and the fame Subject, but that each of them served to de note a Thing separate and distinct, and that they
were all parts of Virtue, not similar parts as thole {". ,? ',. -? ? ? -. :,.
at the bottom these Words are determined to this Sense by . their Root.
t For the Law establishes several Corporations that are contrary one to another, whereas Nature unites allthatare or the fame kind. Therefore there is a principle of Union in Humane Nature.
Ss4 to
? ? 280
Protagoras': Or, The Sophist's.
tpitslike. ButtheLaw,whichisaTyrantover Men, forceth and layeth violent hands upon Nature onmanyOccasions. Itwouldbeaveryshameful thing,ifwe,whoknowtheNatureofThingsper fectly, and w h o pass for the ablest a m o n g the Greets, should be come into Athens, which for Sciences ought to be look'd upon as the august Prytanneum of Greece, and should be assembled in the greatest and richest House of the City, to do nothing there worthy of our Reputati6n, and to spend our Time in wrangling and contesting about Trifles, like the
mostignorantofMen: IconjureyouthenProta goras and Socrates, and I adviie you, as if w e were here your Arbitrators, to regulate you, to pitch up
onaTemperamentandaMedium. YouSocrates, don't you stick too rigoroufly to the plain and coi- cise Method of a Dialogue, unless Protagoras will acquiescetherewith. LeavehimsomeLiberty,and slacken the Reins to his Discourse, that it may appear more magnificent and sublime to us. And you, Protagoras, don't swell the Sails of your Elo quence, so as to carry you into the High Sea, and tomakeyoulosethesightoftheShoar. Thereisa Medium between thole two Extremities. There fore if you will give Ear to me, you shall chuse a Moderator, a President who shall oblige you both to keep within Bounds.
ThisExpedientpleas'dalltheCompany. Calliat told me again, that he would not suffer me to go, andtheypressedme tonamethePresident,myself: I declin'd it, saying it would be a shame for us to takeaModeratorofourDiscomses. For,saidI, he whom we shall chuse shall be, either our Infe riororourEqual. IfhebeourInferior,itisnot
just that the most uncapable should -give Laws to the most learned ; and if he be our equal, he will think as well as we, and that choice will become altogether useless.
But, itwillbe said, you shall name who ismore learned than you; it is easie to fay so, but in truth
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 281
truth I don't think it possible to find a more able ManthanProtagorashandifyoushouldchuseone who is not so able as he, and whom you pretend howevertobemoreable,youyourselvesseewhat ' distaste you give to a M a n of that Merit, in subject inghim tosuchaModerator. For,asformy part, that in no ways concerns me, it is not m y Interest that makes me ipeak, I am ready to renew our Conversation to satisfie you. That if Protagoras will not Answer let him Question ; I will answer, and at the same time shall endeavour to show him the manner how I think every Man who is que stioned ought to answer. When I have answered him as often as he shall have thought fit to question
me, hewillgivemeleavetoquestionhiminmy turn, and he will answer me after the lame man ner. That if he scruples to answer me, then you and I will join to beg that favour of him which you desire of me at present, which isnot to break the Conversation, and there is no necessity to name a Moderator for that ^ instead of one w e shall have many, foryoushallallbeso.
Every Body said that this was what ought to be done. Protagoras was not much for itj but in fine, he was obliged to submit, and to promise that he would Question first, and that when he should be weary ofquestioning, he should permit me to do itin my turn, and should answer inhis turn pre cisely to the Question without roaming.
Then he began after this manner.
* Methinks Socrates, that the best part of Erudi tion, consists in being very well versed in reading thePoets. Thatistofay,tounderstandallthey fay so well as to be able to distinguish what is well said and what is ill said j to give Reasons for it,
* The Sophists boasted that they understood all the Poets perfectly well, and we are going to fee the difference in
thatpointbetween aSophistandaManwhoistrulylearn ed--' ? '? - >>.
and
? ? tSz
Protagoras: Or, The Sophists:
and make every Body sensible of it. Don't fear
thatIam goingtoremovemy selffaroffromthe
Subject of our Dispute, m y Question shall run up
onVirtue. Allthedifferencethereshallbetherein,
is that I shall transport you into the Country of
Poetry. Simonidessaysinsomeplace,directinghis
Discourse to Scapas, the Son of Creon. the Theffalo-
man: ' It is very difficult to become truly Virtu-
* ous, and to be in Virtue as a Cube, that is to fay,
* that neither our Carriage, our Actions, nor our
*Thoughtsshallshakeus, andshallneverdrawus * f r o m t h a t s t a t e o f o u r M i n d ? , a n d t h a t t h e y s h a l l
* neither deserve the least reproach nor the least *blame. DoyourememberthatPassage,orshall I relate it to you >
There is no need, said I, I remember it, and have studieditwithgreatpains. ,
You are in the right-, but do you think that Piece iswell or ildone?
. Itseemstome tobeperfectlywelldone, andis of very great Sense.
But would you call that Piece well done, ifthe Poet contradicts himself in it ?
No, without doubt,
Oh! laid he, another time examine Things bet^ ter, and look into them more narrowly.
A s for that, m y dear Protagoras, said I, I believe I have sufficiently examin'd it.
Since you have so well examin'd it, you know then, that he says in the sequel: ' The saying of 1 Pittacus does not please m e at ali, tho' Pittacus
*wasoneoftheSages. Forhefaysthatitisdif- *ficulttobecome Virtuous. Do youcomprehend that the fame M a n said this after what he had said but a little before ?
Yes I do.
And do you find that those two Passages agree ? Yes, Protagoras, said I, and at the same time,
least he should go upon some other Thing, I asked him, Don't you find that they agree?
How
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. i8j
How shouldIfindthataManagreeswithhim selfwhen heblows coldandhot? At firsthefixes this Principle, That it is difficult to become Virtuous. And a minute after he forgets that fine Principlej and in relating the fame Motto spoke in his own fensebyFittacus, Thatitisverydifficulttobecome V i r t u o u s ? , h e b l a m e s h i m , a n d f a y s i n p l a i n t e r m s ,
that that Sentiment does not please him in any wise,andyetitishisown. Thuswhenhecon demns ah Author, who fays nothing but what he had said himself, he manifestly cuts his own Throat, and he must of necessity Ipeak ill either there or here.
He had no sooner spoke, but a great Noise was raised,andtheAuditorsfellapraisingofhim. As
forme, Iconfessit,likeaFencerwho hadreceiv'd
a great blow, I was so stunn'd that I neither saw
nor heard, and my Brains turn'd as well with the
Noise they made, as with what I had heard him
lay. Infine,forImusttellyoutheTruth,togain
time to dive into the meaning of the Poet, I turn'd
my self toward Prodkus, and directing my Dis
c o u r s e t o h i m ? , P r e d i c t s * , l a i d I t o h i m , S i m o n i d e s F o r P r e d i -
is your Country-man ; 'tis therefore just that you cus was *
should come to his Assistance, and I call you to it,cjjjl* as. Homer feigns that the Scamandre being vigorous weu M Si- ly pressed upon by Achilles, calls Simois to his Sue- momdes. cour, in saying to him :
Let you and I repel this terrible Enemy.
I lay the lame to you, let us take care least Simo- nidesbeturn'dtopsieturvybyProtagoras. Thede-. fence of thisPoet depends on your Ability which makes you to distinguish so subtilly between * Will
andDesire,astwoverydifferentthings. Itisthat fame Ability which has . furnished you with so
*DistinctionswerethestrengthoftheSofii/ls. Socratesis goingtoputVrodicusuponittomakesome,andwhilesthe guides him Trodicus speaks to a miracle ; but so soon as he has laid a Snare for him, the Safhijt fails not to fall into it.
many
? ? 184
Protagoras : Or, The Sophists.
jfiwtobc
faistate
manyfinethingsthatyou. justnowtaughtus. See then if you will be of m y Opinion, for. it does not at all appear to me that Simonides contradicts him self. ButtellmefirstIpraywhatyouthinkofit. D o you think, that to be, and to become, are one and the fame thing, or two different things?
A fine Question! two very different Things j as suredly, answered Prodicus.
In the first Verse then, Simonides declares his Thought, in laying, That it is very difficult to be come truly Virtuous,
You fay true, Socrates.
And he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras
thinks, for having laid the'fame thing as he, but for having said something very different from it.
*n cffe^ Pittacus has not said as Simonides did, .
and to be- T/w/ it is difficult to become Virtuous, but to be Vir-
comede-tuous. NowmydearProtagoras,tobeandtobe'
tutuanal-come, are not the fame thing even in the Judgment
JJg-"ofProdicus. Andiftheybenotthefamething, f? %*ne Simonidesdoesinnowifecontradicthimself. Per-
stateto hapsthatPrcdicushimselfandmanyothers,entring mother. -mt0 Simonides Thought, might fay with Hesiod,
Titd"Pas-ThatitisverydifficulttobecomeVirtuous: Forthe sageosHe-Gods have placed Labour beforeVirtue, but when fe>d>>>>hs a ^an js comg t0 tjje pinnacie 0f tne Mountain
IftX where it dwells, then tho' it be very difficult, it is y. 187. eafietopossessit.
Prodicus having heard me speak thus, praised me extreamly. ButProtagorasanswering,said,Socra tes your Explication is still more Vicious than the Text, and the Remedy worse than the Disease.
Then I have done very ill according to your reckoning,Protagoras,answer'dI;andlama plea sant Phisician indeed, seeing that in designing to c u r e a D i s t e m p e r , I m a k e it t o g r o w w o r s e .
ItisjustasItellyou,Socrates. .
Howso?
The Poet, said he, would be Impertinent and Ig
norant, if he had spoke of Virtue as of a thing which
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists.
28 j
which isvile, despicable and naughty, * that it is easie to possess it, for every body agrees that it is very difficult. ;
Being amaz'd at this Quibble-, in truth, said I,
Protagoras,. we are very happy that Prodicus is
presentatourDispute. ForIfancythatyouare
very well persuaded that the Science of Prodicus is
one of the Divine Sciences, that you call those ofr/>>v >> the ancient Times, and which is not only as old as/:"""'<<'*^?
Simonides, but also much more ancient. You arep " ^ certainlyveryableinmany otherSciences;butas^y^0^. forthat you seem tome to bebutlittleinstructedthebeg*. init. Formy part, Imay faythatIhavesome"'>>? ><<>> tinctureofit,becauseIamoneofProdkuisDis>>? *%? cipleS. + Methinks that you don't comprehend ^;ty0f7he
that Simomdes does not give the word difficult the Sophisi*. sense which you give it. Perhaps it is with that
word |as with those of dreadful, terrible. At all times when I make use of them in a good part,
and
* "Protagoraschanges sides here, according to the good Cu stomoftheSophistsj andinsteadofdemonstrating"thepre tended Contradiction of Simomdes, he throws himself upon tiesiod,who says,thatitiseasietopossessVirtue;andin thatheputsaveryridiculousQuibbleuponhim. Thisthe CharacteroftheSophists. TheywereveryIgnorantatthe bottom; but with some reading, which had spoiled their Minds, and which they supported with abundance of Im pudence, they made themselves to be admired by Fools.
t At alltimes, when a word seems to signifie something contrary to the design of the Poet, all the different Signifi cations that that word can have in the Passage in Question ou^ht to be examin'd into. This Maxim is extraordinary good, and of very great use in Criticism, as Aristotle hath verywellobserved. Socratesmakesuseofithereinappear ance to defend Simonides, and in- effect to make those So
phists perfectly ridiculous.
| Socrates cunningly makes the Impertinence of those So
phists appear here, in the Criticism which they made up on words : For example, upon the word cTs/cor, they would nothaveitusedinagoodSense, becauseitwasneverused but in speaking of Things that are bad, as Poverty, Prison, Sikniss. ButtheseSophistsoughttohaveobservedthisclit- reren:e, that this word isalways truly taken in an illSeme,
when
? ? 286
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
and fay, for example, to praise you, Protagoras n
a terrible Man, Prodicus is always at me for it,
and asks m e if I be not afham'd to call that which is laudable, terrible? , for, fays he, that word is al
waystakeninallSense. Thisissotriie,thatyou shall findno Body who fays, terribleRiches, terri blePeace, terribleHealth:ButeveryBodyfays,a terrible Sickness, a terrible War, a terrible Poverty, that word always denoting Evil but never Good. H o w do you know but that * perhaps by this Epi- thete difficult, Simonides and all the Inhabitants of the Isle of Ceos have a mind to express something that is bad, vexatious, or other thing which we don't understand. Let us ask Prodicus. For it is reasonable to ask him the Explication of the Terms whichSimonidesmadeuseof Tellusthen,Prodi- cus, what would Simonides fay by that word diffi cult.
Hewouldfaybad.
Beholdthen,saidL/my dearProdicus,whySi monides blames Pittacus for having said that it is
when appliedtoinanimateThings, butthatitmay be taken in a good Sense when applied to Persons. Homer, who un derstood and wrote his Language better than all those So phists, has more than once joined ^no< with aifoio;, venera- tle. Asinthebeginningofthe8thBookoftheOdysses, in speaking of vlyffes; for J'stvde, as our word terrible, signifies often, astonishing, extraordinary, and which attracts consi deration, respect.
* The Snare which Socrates lays here for those Sophists would be too plain, if the word -/axi-dt difficult, did never signifiebad,-vexatious, butitistakeninthislastSenseby all thePoets. HomerhimselfhasuseditinthatSense,asiathe beginningofthatfineOde ofAnacreon,yaKitmvii/*>>piMjtrat. It is a vexatious thing not to love. 'Tis that which deceives "Prodicus, whose Ignorance he makes to appear in going about topersuadehim, thatperhapsitwastheInhabitantsofthe IsleofCeos,whousedthatwordinthatSense. Prodicusbe ing deceived, would value himself upon this Remark, and
acting the great Critick, he fays that Simonides reproaches "Pittacus who was a Man of Lesbos, whose Language was gross and barbarous, for having used that word ignorantly. Protagoras is a little more cunning.
difficult
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. zSj
difficult to be Virtuous, imagining, without doubt, that he meant thereby that it is a bad thing to have Virtud
Do you think, Socrates, anfwerM Prodicus, that Simonidesmeantanyotherthing, andthathisaim was not to upbraid Pittacus, who neither knew the force nor the difference of Terms, but * spoke coars- ly, like a Man born at Lesbos, and accustomed to barbarous Language ?
Protagoras, do you understand what Prodicus lays, and have you any thing to answer ?
I a m very far from your Opinion, Prodicus, said Protagoras -, and I take it for a Truth that Simoni des understood nothing more by that word difficulty than what we all understand, and that he meant not that that was bad but that it was not eafie, and that it must be acquirtf with much Pains and Labour.
To tellyou theTruth, Protagoras, Idoubt not in the least but that Prodicus knows very well what Simonides meaning is. But he plays upon you a little, and lays a Snare for you to lee if you will fall into it, or if you have the Cunning to avoid it,andtomaintainyourOpinion. Forhereisan indisputable Proof that Simonides does not call dif
ficult that which is bad, because he adds immedi ately after, And God alone fojseffes that precious Treasure. Forifhehadmeantthat'tisabad thing to be Virtuous, he would never have added that God alone has Virtue, he would have been ve ry wary of making so bad a Present to the Divinity alone. Ifhehaddoneit,Prodicus,fartfromcak lingSimonidesaDivineMan, would notfailtocall
him
*
* The Language of the Lesbians barbarous. The Rude
ness of Language usually accompanies Ciownisliness of Man ners.
?
t Here is a very small fault ; yet it fails not to corrupt the
Textextreamly,andtoaltertheSenseofit. Tofollowthe Letter, w e sliould have reHder'd it, very far fm/n m ^ v j him a Man
? ? >>88
Pr6tagoras: Or, the Sophists,
himaBlasphemerandaProfligate. Butsinceyou are something curious to know if I be well vers'd in that which you call the reading of the Poets, I a m going to tell you the meaning of that small P o e m o f S i m o n i d e s -, o r i f y o u h a d r a t h e r e x p l a i n i t to me, I (hall willingly hearken to you;
Protagoras hearing m e say so, fail'd not to take me at my word, and Prodicus and Hippias, with the rest, besought me not to defer giving them that Satisfaction.
I am going, said I, to endeavour to explain to ys o o u m y S e n t i m e n t s u p o n t h a t P i e c e o f S i m o n i d e s . Yscoumust know then, that Philosophy isveryan: cient among the Greeks, * particularly in Creete andLacedemon. TherearemoreSophiststhere then in all the World beside; but they. conceal themselves, and make as if they were simple and ignorant People, just like the Sophists you spoke of, that it m a y not be discover'd that they surpass all the Greeks in Learning and Science, and that they may be only look'd upon as brave Men who
aManofCeos;fortheGreekfays,x)>>Jty/8{mov,andnot intheleastaManofCeos. Butthereis-noBodybutwill agree that it ought to be readx) idk^tae Shop, and not in the least aDivineMan, forSimonideswascall'dso. WhatfenseWould a Man ofCeos bear in opposition to Blasphemer and Profli gate? Thatwasneverheardofbefore. But'twillbesaid, thePietyoftheMenofCeosmightbesorecommendedand so famous; that perhaps they might fay a Man <</ Ceos, for a pious Man. Itwas quitecontrary. The Inhabitantsofthe Me of Ceoswere an impious People, witness the Law they madetoputtodeathalltheoldMenaboveSixtyYearsof Age; and that when they were besieged by the -Athenians, they put to death all those who were not able to bear
Arms, which struck the. Athenians with so much Horrour, that they raised the Siege to stop the Current of such horri ble Impiety.
* He put Creete with Lacedemon, because tycurgus had brought back from Creete to Lacedemon many of the Laws that were made by Minos, and had drawn from thence the Idea of the Government which he had establifh'd. See the Re marks of Tlutanh upon the Life of Ljcwrg>>i, Tom. i.
p. 199.
arc
? ? Protaig|bras:; Or> The Sophists. ? 29
are superior to others by their Courage and con tempt of Death. *. For they are persuaded that ifthey were known, for what they are, every Body wouldapplythemselvesto"thatStudy; and,theArt wouldbe. nolongervalued. Thusbyconcealing their Ability, they deceive thro5 all the Towns of Greece, those who affect: to follow the Lacedemo
nianwayofliving. Themostpart,inimitationoFTbefillyos
them, cut their Ears, have only a Cord for theirmostofthe Girdle, use the hardest Exercises, and wear theirTowns ? f Gloaths so short that they don't cover half their^^fedf
Body. Fortheypersuadethemselvesthat'tisbypt? dti~
those Austerities that the Lacedemonians have made imitatethe t h e m s e l v e s M a s t e r s o f G r e e c e . * A n d t h e L a c e d e m o - a - f l s r e L i f e niansaresojealousofthe Science,oftheir Sophists,ffe La~_ that When they have a mind to discourse with them ans. em0m~
freely, and are weary of feeing them in secret and
by stealth, t they turn out all those Apes that
counterfeit them 5 that is to fay, all those Strangers
they find in their Towns, and then discourse with
those Sophists without admitting any Stranger to
those Conversations. Neither do they suffer their
young People to travel into other Towns, for fear
they should forget what they have learn'd: And
the same thing is done in Creete. Among those
great Teachers there are not only Men, but also
Women : And a certain mark that I tellyou theforthe
Truth, and . that the Lacedemonians are perfectly.
Womenwere well instructed in Philosophy and Learning, is>>e^f? fM
that if any Body will discourse with the most pir tiful Fellow of the Lacedemonians^ he will at first
* This Passage favours and supports what Thutidides wrote, That Ljcnrgus banished all Foreigners, for fear they should imitate his Policy, and learn to lov& Virtue:And 'tisfor this that vtutarch thought he ought to justifie him. - See the Life of Lycurgm, p. 243.
t Lymrgus shut up the Gates of Sparta against all Strangers whose Curiosity only drove them thither, and cam* not for any Advantage or :Profit; he also forbid Travelling. "Plu tarch gives very fine Reasons for it, />. 148.
'T t take
? ? apo Protagoras; Or, The Sophists]
rbeyacm- take him for an Idiot-, but in the sequel of the
children's*Conversation, that Idiot will find means pertinently
makl'quTck*? P^ace a ^10rt and quick Repartee, and full of
and (harp Sense and Strength, which he will shoot like an Ar- Hepanees,r0woutofaBow. Insomuchthathewhohadso
<<f? 3 ? bad an ? Pinion ofhim> wil1 find himself but a
"Le"/"Childincomparisontohim. Alsoabundanceof
Senseina People in bur Age, and the Ages past, have con- fewwords,ceivedthattoLaconize, ismoretostudyPhiloso-
f>hythantowork, beingwellpersuaded, andjust- y,thatitbelongsonlytoaManwho iswellin structed and well educated to speak such fine Sen
tences. OfthisnumberwereTbalesofMiletum, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, our Solon, CleobulusofLynde, Myson ofChen, aTown ofLa- coma, and Cbilon of Lacedemon. All those Sages were zealous Followers of the Lacedemonian Learn ing, as appears still by some of their good Senten ces that have been preserved. Being one day all together, they consecrated to Apollo, as the first Fruits of their Wisdom, those two Sentences which are in every Body's Mouth, and caused them to be wrote in Letters of Gold upon the Portal of the TemplesofDel-pbos:Knowthyself,andKnowno thing too much.
Why isitthatIrelatetoyouthosePiecesofAn tiquity > It is to let you see the W a y and Character of the Philosophy of the Ancients was a certain La- conickBrevity. Now oneofthebestSentencesthat was attributed to Pittacus, and that the Sages most boasted of, is deservedly this, It is difficult to be come Virtuous. Simonides then, as Emulating Pit- tacusinthatcarreerofWisdom, conceivedthatif he could overthrow this fine Sentence, and triumph over it'as over a Champion of Reputation, who had carried away the Acclamations of every Body, he would thereby acquire an immortal Renown. It is then this Sentence he only carps at, and 'tis with a design to destroy it, that he hath composed thiswhole Poem, atleastIbelieveitso$ letusex
amine
? ? Protagoras: Or, the Sophists. 251
amine him together, to fee if I be in the right.
First, the beginning of this Poem would be sense less,iftoexpressonly, Thatitisdifficulttobecome Virtuous, thePoetshouldlay,Itisdifficult,1con
fess, to become Virtuous ; for that word, I confess, is added without any fort of Reason, unless we suppose that Simonides had considered the Sentence of Pittacus to quarrel with it. Pittacus having laid, That it is difficult to be Virtuous. Simonides op- ? oseth that, and corrects that Principle in faying,
''batitisdifficulttobecomeVirtuous, andthatthat is truly difficult,. For observe well, that he does, notfaythatitisdifficulttobecome trulyVirtuousj as Ifamong the Viftuous there might be some who were truly virtuous, and others who were Virtuous without being truly so^ that would be the Dis courseofaFool,andnotofawiseMan, asSimo
nides. ThereforetheremustneedsbeaTransposi tion in this Verse, and the word truly must be tran- spos'd and put out of itsplace to answer Pittacus. For 'tis as if,there was a kind of Dialogue there between Simonides and Pittacus. The latter fays immediately, M y friends, it is difficult to be Virtu ous : And Simonides answers-, Pittacus, you advance a false Principle there, for it is not difficult to be Vir tuous,itisyetworse: Butitisdifficult,Iconfess, to become Virtuous, so as not to be shaken, and to be firminVirtueas a CubeonitsBasis; andthatnei^
ther our Carriage, our Thoughts, nor our Aii'tqns, can draim upon us the least reproach or blame -,'that it is truly difficult. At this rate 'tis plain that he hasReasontoputthisword,Iconfess,there. And
that the word truly is very well placed at the end. The whole sequel of the Poem proves that this is thetrueSense? ,anditwouldbeeasietomateit
appear that all its parts agree together^ that tftey areperfectlywellcomposed, andthatallpo^iio GraceandEleganceisfoundinthem,wkh abund ance of Strength and Sense j but that vo'idou'y
? Tt a
? 29*
Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
us too far to run it all over, let us content out selvestoexamine theIdeaofthePoem iaGeneral, and the Aim of the Poet, to make it appear that he only proposes to himself by all that Poem, to refute that Sentence of Pittacus.
This is so true, that a little after, as if it were to give a Reason for what he had said, That to be come Virtuous is a thing truly difficult? he adds, -
Howeverthatitispossibleforsometime-, butaster oneisbecomeso, topersistinthatState,andtobe Virtuous, as you fay, Pittacus, that's impossible and above the Strength os M a n : This happy Privilege is onlyfor God alone, and it is not humanly poffiblefor aMan nottobecomewickedwhenan insurmountable Calamity falls upon his Head. *
Heisgoing gutwhatsortofPeoplearetheythatinsuppor-
tLf/>>4<< table Calamities afflict, so as that they are no thing"ricelongerthemselves>Forexample, among thosewho
supposes sitattheHelmofaShip>Itisevidentthatthey astateof are not tne Ignorantand the Idiots5for thelgno-
whkhpre-rantarecaftdownevenmaCalm. Asonedoes
ceied. It notthrowtotheGroundaMan thatislyinguponit ? veyre- butonethatisstandingupright;soCalamitiesonly
markMe deject: and change an able Man, and they never Truth. change one who is Ignorant. A terrible Tempest
which turns the Sea topfie turvy all of a sudden, astonishes and overcomes a Pilot; irregular and stormy Seasons astonish and overcome the Husband
man ; a wise Phisician isconfounded by Accidents, that he could not foresee with all his Art of Phi- sick;inaword,'tistheGoodthathappentobe come Wicked, as another Poet testifies in this Verse, The Good aresometimes Good and sometimes
Wicked.
But it never happens to the Wicked to become
Wicked,heisalwaysso. ItisonlytheLearned$ theGood,andtheWise,towhomithappenstobe Wicked when a frightful and sudden Calamity over throwsthem. Anditishumanlyimpossiblethatit can be otherwise. And you, Pittacus, you lay,
Thai
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists.
291
That it is difficult to be Good; fay rather, That it is
difficult to become so, and that yet it is possible 5
but to persist in that State, is what is impossible ;
fbryoumustagreethateveryManwho doesGood
is good, and that every M a n w h o does ill is wicked.
WhatisitthentodoGood,fbrexample,inLearn
ing, and whoistheMan thatyou callGood in
that? Isitnothewho has Knowledge and who
isLearned? What isitthatmakesa goodPhysician?
Isitnot the Knowledge to cure or to comfort the
Sick ? And is not that which makes a,g ill Physici
anhiswantofskilltocure? Whom thenshallwe
callabadPhysician? IsitnotevidentthataMan
must in the first place be a Physician, before w e can
give him that Name, and that in the second place
he must be a good Physician, for it is only the good
w h o is capable of becoming a bad Physician ? In
effect:we who are ignorant inPhysickthough we
should commit Faults in that Art, yet we should
never become bad Physicians, seeing we are not
Physicians our selves. HethatdoesnotknowwhatArchitectureis,can
never properly be what is called a bad Architect,
forhe isno Architectatall: And soinallother
Arts. EveryManthen,whoisnoPhysicianwhatever
faults he commits inactingthe Phyfician,isnot howe
ver in astrictSense a bad Physician. Itisthefame of
the Virtuous Man, he may become Vicious, with
out Contest, whether it be by Age, Labour, Sick
ness, or by any other Accidentj but he can't be
/ ?
comeVitiousunlesshewasVirtuousbefore. There-ThisVrin- fore the only Scope of the Poet in this Work, isc? e >>/&>?
tomakeitappearthatitisnotpossibletobe, andcratesf"^ n Ar, . . nr , . . . naturallyto
to persevere always in thatState;butthatitistj,istTO/,
possibleto become Virtuous, as it is possible tothatall becomeVicious. TheVirtuousareabsolutelythoseMmbeinS
whom theGodsloveandfavour. Now theSequeljj^? ? of the Poem makes itplainly appears that allms? ,? */<<>>> thisissaidagainstPittaws. Forheadds: cWhere-original,
ifore'Ishallnotfateaguemy selftoseekthat T-tj 'which
? ? 2^4 Protagoras: Or, the Sophists.
\ which is impossible to find, and I shall not con-
We mustnot1 fume m y Life in flattering m y self with the vain bopttofind<? Hopes offeeinga Man without Blame, and in-
ManZ'oT ' tirely innocent amongst us Mortals who live upon Earthwith-'wriattheEarthpresentstous. IfIwere happy
outfit non ' enough to find him, I should quickly tell it you. esthomo And inallhisPoem hecarpssomuch at thisSen-
ter'" Ee- tenCC ? * P'ttacus-> tnat ne % s a tittle affer- ' ^01 des. 7. 21. cmY Part, every Man who does not ashameful
"c Action, voluntarily I praise him, I love him. I do
' not speak of Necessity, . that is stronger tharl the 4Godsthemselves, allthisisalsospokeagainstPit- tacus. IneffectS'monides. wastoowelltaughtto refer this Voluntarily to him, who commits fhame-
rherewas fUI Actions, as if there were People who did ill
new a Voluntarily. For I am perfwaded that of all the 'PhilosopherPhilosophersthereisnotonetobefound whofays
ZfcrtthLthatthereareMenwhofinVoluntarily. Theyall mZfinnedknowthatthosewhocommitCrimes,committhem voluntarily,whethertheywillornot. ThereforeSimonidesdoes
not fay that he will praise him who does not com mit Crimes Voluntarily; hut this Voluntarily has referencehimself. Hefaysthathewillpraisehim
Voluntarily and with all his Heart : For he was rhereare perfwadedthatitfrequentlyhappensthatanhonest certainVeo- an(j a g00cj j^an js force(j to love and to praise cer
ate*? 't2-mPe? ple- ForExample, aMan hasaveryun- TMaysto reasonableFatherandMother,anunjustandcruel
praiseand Country, or some other such like thing. If that iw what- happens to a wicked Man, what does he? First
\Tiefth% ne1SvervS^ ? flhanc*afcerwardshischiefcare do>>s. Ml is to complain publickly and to make the ill Hu-
tbatSocra- mour of his Father and Mother and the Injustice of tessays hisCountryknowneverywhereinordertherebyto d'e'rfriW"n~^reehTM^ fr? mtneJu^Reproachesthatmight
be made against him for the little care he has of them and for having abandoned them ; and under this very Notion he multiplies the Subjects of his Complaint, and adds a voluntary Hatred to that forcedEnmity. TheConductofanhonestMan if
far
? ? Protagoras : Or, The Sophists. 295s
fitdifferentinsuchOccasions: Hissolecareisto hide and to cover the Faults of his Father and Coun try ; far from complaining of them, he hath so much command of himself as always to speak well ofthem. ThatifanycryingInjusticehathforced him to be angry with them, he himself is their Mediator to himself, he argues with himself for them, and tells to himself all the Reasons they can bring to appease him and to bring him back to his Duty;and heisnever at peacewith himself till that being Master of his Resentment, he has restor edthemhisLoveandpraisedthemasbefore. I am perfwaded that Simonides himself *,has fre quently found himself under an Obligation to praise a Tyrant, or some other considerable Person. He has done it + but he did it in spight of himself This then is the Language he speaks to Pittacus.
'WhenIblameyouPittacus, itisnotbecauseI eam naturallyinclinedto blame, on the contrary,
1 it suffices m e that a M a n is not wicked and use-
'fuitonogoodpurpose,nobodyshalleverseeme
' quarrel with any Person, who may be of any
*usetohisCountry. Idonotlovetofindfault,
'fortheRaceofFoolsissonumerousthatifany
* Man should take upon him to reprehend them he
' should never have done. W e must take all that
'forgood andfine,whereinwe findnoshamefulmix-
'ture, or scandalous Blot. When he fays, We
4 must take all that for Good, &c. It is not the
fameasifhesaid,'We musttakeallthatfor c white wherein we find no mixture of black, for
thatwould bealtogetherridiculous. Buthewould ?
* He speaks this, because Simonides had kept a very good correspondence with Tausanlas King of Lacedemon, w h o gained the Battle of Tlatees, and with Hiero the wisest of all the Ancient Tyrants.
4. Thatistofay,thathediditinobediencetotheLawof Nature, confirmed-by the written Law, and which he called by the Name of Necessity.
Tt4 have
? ? aa6
Protagoras: Or, The Sophist/,
have them to understand that he contents himself with a Mediocrity, and that, hej reprehends' and blames nothing wherein this ,Mediocrity is found. For we must not hope to meet with perfection in this World. ? ' Wherefore, faith he, I don't look
' for a M a n w h o is altogether innocent a m o n g all
' those who are nourished by the product of the
'Earth. WereIhappyenoughtofindhim,Ishould
1 not hide him' from you, but should quickly shew
'himtoyou. Tillthen,IshallpraisenoManas cbeingperfect. -It"sufficethme thataMan be in
' this laudable Mediocrity, and- that he do no ill.
1ThosearethePeoplewhom IIftveandpraise. And
'as he speaks to Pittacus who is of Mitylene, he ? ? "? speaksintheLanguageoftheMityknes,Voluntari
lyIpraisethem-. andIiovethem. This Word Vo
luntarilyhasnoreferencetowhatprecedes, but to
whatfollows. Hemeansthatlfc&praisesthosePeo^
pie of his own accord, whereas there are others whomhepraisesofNecessity. cThusthen,Pitta-
cus, continues he, if you'^ad kept your self in that Mediocrity, and told us things that were pro bable, I should never have reprehended you-, but inlieu thereofyou impose upon us, forTruths, Principles that are manifestly false, and which is worse, about very essential Things -, wherefore I contradict you. Behold, my dear Prodicus and
my dear Protagoras, what in my Opinion is the meaning and the Scope of this Poem of Simo- nides. . .
Then Hippias answering said, Indeed Socrates you have perfectly well explained the hidden meaning ofthatPoem:IhavealsoashortSpeechtomake toyoutoconfirmyourExplication. Ifyouplease Iwillcommunicatemy Discoveriestoyou.
That isverywell, saidAlcibiades^interruptinghim, but-itmustbeanothertime. Atpresentitis. rea sonable that Protagoras and Socrates make an end of their Dispute, and that they stand to the Treaty they have made. If Protagoras inclines still to
? ,. Questi-
? ? Protagoras : Or,, %he Sopfcists. 2^7
Question,Socratesmustanswer; andifhehasa mind tp answer in his turn, Socrates must question. IleaverittoProtagoras'sChoice, saidI,lethimfee which jsmostagreeabletohim. Butifhe would be advised by me, we should leave oifthe Poets and Poetry, I confess, Protagoras, that I should be wonderfully well pleased to dive with you into the depthofthefirstQuestionIproposed, forincon
versing thus of Poetry, we do as the ignorant and common People, when theyfeastone another, * for not being able to discourse among themselves of
1fine things, and to maintain Conversation, they are silent, and borrow Voices to entertain one another j they hire at a great charge Singers and Players up on Flutes to supply their Ignorance and Clownish- ness. Whereas when honest Men who have been well Educated and Instructed, eat together, they don'tsendforSingersDancersand Players on the
Flute; they find no trouble to entertain one another withoutallthoseFopperies and vain Amusements
that are only pardonable in Children : But they
speak and-hear one another reciprocally with Decen
cy and good Behaviour, even when they excite one another^ the most ;o drink, and they prefer the Harmony oftheirDiscoursetpallyokesandFlutes.
It ought to be the fame in this'kind of Conversa
tion, especially w h e n it is between such People as Gooi Con_
mostofthosewho areherevaluethemselvestobe;y^tilT.
they haveno occasion for strangeVoices, nor forpreferable Poets, ofwhom theycannotaskareasonforwhat*15'*? mofi
they fay, and to w h o m most of those w h o cite t h e m ^ f ^ * ' attribute some one Sense, some another, without beingeverabletoconvinceoneanotherorto come toanagreement. That'sthereasonwhyableMen
ought to let alone those Dissertations upon the Poets
* The Musicians and Players upon Instruments were in troduced to Feasts by clownisti People'who were incapable ofentertainingthemselves. DoesnottheViolentPassion t h a t is o b s e r v e d n o w a d a y s f o r M u s t e k p r o c e e d f r o m t h e f a m e RefectI Perhapswelingonlybecausewecannotdiscourse.
;. <,? " ? . *' ':'*"and
? ? 2^8
Protagoras: Or, the Sophist*:
and to entertain themselves together, in founding and examining one another by their Discourse, to give a Proof of the Progress they have made in the StudyofWisdom. That'stheexamplewhichme- thinksyouandIoughtrathertofollow. Letting the Bets alone then, let us Discourse together, or if Imayfayso,letusfencetogethertofeehowfar weareintheright. Ifyouhaveamindtoque stionme,1amreadytoansweryou* ifnot,give me leave to propose the Question to you, and let us indeavour to bring the Inquiry which we have interrupted, to a happy issue.
When I had spoke thus, Protagoras knew not whichParttotake,andmadenoanswer. Where fore Alcibiades turning towards Cal/ias, said he, that Protagoras does well in not declaring what he will do, whether he will Answer or Propound.
No, without doubt, said Callias-, let him enter the List then, or else let him tell why he will not, that we may know his Reasons, and that thereup on Socrates may dispute with some other, or that
some one of the Company may dispute with the firstwho shallofferhimself.
Then Protagoras being asham'd, as I thought, to hearAlcibiadestalkso, andtoseehimselfsollicited by Callias, and almost by allthose who were present, at last, resolved with much difficulty*, to enter into Dispute,anddesiredme toproposeQuestionstohim.
Presently I began to fay to him, Protagoras, do not think that I will converse with you upon any other design than to search into the bottom of some M a t t e r s w h e r e o f I s t i l l d a i l y d o u b t ? , f o r I a m p e r suaded thatHomer hathverywellsaid, Two Men
intintenthwho go togetherfee things best, for onefees what the vf>A^hls otherfees not. In effect, we poor Mortals, all of
' us whatever, when we are together, we have a greater Felicity for all that we have a mind to fay, do,orthink? ,whereasoneManalone,tho'never
so able and witty, seeks always some Body to com municate his Thoughts, and to conform himself 'till
? ? Protagoras : Or, the Sophists. 199
till such time as he has found what he fought. Behold also why I converse more willingly with you than with another, being very well persuaded thatyouhavebetterexamin'dthananotherMan aU the Matters that an honest Man ought in duty to search into the bottom of, and particularly all that relatestoVirtue. Alas! to whom could one ad dress himself rather than to you ? First you value your self on being a very honest Man -, and besides that, you have an Advantage that most honest Men have not, that is, that being Virtuous you can alsomakethoseVirtuouswhofrequentyourCom pany : You are so sure of doing it, and rely so much upon your Wisdom, that whereas the other Sophists hide and disguise their Art, you make publick Profession of it, by posting it up, if I m a y say so, in all the Cities of Greece, that you are a Sophist; you give yourselfout publicklytobe a Master in the Sciences and in Virtue -, and you are the first who have set a value upon your self, and put a price upon your Precepts : W h y then should wenotcallyoutotheExaminationofThingsthat Weenquireafter,andthatyouknowsowell? Why should not we be impatient to ask you Questions, and to communicate our Doubts to you? For my part, I can't refrain it, and I die with Desire
thatyouwouldmakemeremembertheThingsthat I have already asked you, and that you would ex plain to m e those which I have still to ask.
The firstQuestionIask'dyou,ifIrememberit
well, is, if Science, Temperance, Valour, Justice, and Sanctity ? I fay, if these five Names are appli
cable to one only and the fame Subject, or if every one of those denotes a particular Essence, a Thing which has its distinct Properties, and is different from the other four. "You answer'd me, that these Names were not applicable to one only and the fame Subject, but that each of them served to de note a Thing separate and distinct, and that they
were all parts of Virtue, not similar parts as thole {". ,? ',. -? ? ? -. :,.
