No More Learning

In some other it
is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring
about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other
remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at
first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or
cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most
prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our
mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with
that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well
expressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the
occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit
or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions
that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not
occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please
the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake:
which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with
the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which
Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut
exercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ_;
_ut quæipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi
cogantur_. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly
and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own
plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very
imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in
the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of
secrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French
calleth _sourdes menées_, when men set things in work without opening
themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many
times _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum
illaqueant_. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a
natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a
kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they
stood his friends or enemies. ” So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul,
made no scruple to profess “that he had rather be first in a village than
second at Rome. ” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what
Cicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of Cæsar) _non recusat_, _sed
quodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_. So we
may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his
very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in
his harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi
liceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he
would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected
in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, “Is it possible? ”
or, “Did you ever hear the like? ” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he
did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous:
whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and
dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_,
wherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his
design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute
anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for
necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and
he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that
point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could
make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain
in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by
colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and
unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus
made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in
regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to
Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti
simulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of
dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly
politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our
minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and
are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not
superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of
some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they
can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison,
preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and
effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular
fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in
many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some
measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which
are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must
needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato
the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to
no great purpose, _Hæc omnia magno studio agebat_. So in most things men
are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best,
when it should be the fittest.

(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune,
as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the
amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the impediments of the
mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune
will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down
wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because
of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions.
But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that
other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the
true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant,
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of
Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him,
that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his
gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that
are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In
the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides
and currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are
seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of
reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any
of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased
by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in
matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of
the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend
their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come
on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to
instance; not observing the good precept, _Quod nunc instat agamus_.

(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters
which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding
in a man’s ears, _Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus_: and that
is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions
of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not
commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their
ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait
occasions, and to devise plots.

(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth
nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his
business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally
intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the
motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he
cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a
second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he
purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot
make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat
in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it,
yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact
an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand
amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is
more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth
so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more
proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than
for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be
perfect in that rule, _Hæc oportet facere_, _et illa non imittere_.

(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s self
peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever
to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom
in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash
was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit,
because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other
answered, “True, but if it do, how shall we get out again? ”

(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias,
construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and
moderation, _Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus_.
For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far
into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and
humorous envies or emulations.

(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I
would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought
things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of,
but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made than a
beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I
mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but
only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will
think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I
know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good
fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping
themselves from gross errors.

(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator,
doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a
prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those
subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of
the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that
it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic
for his own fortune.

(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we
have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called _Bonæ
Artes_. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that
principle of Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but
the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but
the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his principles, “That he
presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear;
and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in
straits,” which the Italians call _seminar spine_, to sow thorns: or that
other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, _Cadant
amici_, _dummodo inimici intercidant_, as the triumvirs, which sold every
one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies:
or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their
fortunes, _Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium_, _id non
aqua sed ruina restinguam_: or that other principle of Lysander, “That
children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:” and the
like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are
more in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from
the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be
more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the
shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not
much about.

(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain
themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of
ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their
eyes not only that general map of the world, “That all things are vanity
and vexation of spirit,” but many other more particular cards and
directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, and
the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded
and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith
excellently:

“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis
Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii _moresque_ dabunt vestri. ”

And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the
Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom
of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, “He hath
conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing. ” And although
men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this
incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute
which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our
substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to
small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual
grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, _Atque
affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ_. And if any man flatter himself
that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as
was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That
either they should never have been born, or else they should never have
died,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their
greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these
compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be
purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards
their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is
elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V. , in his instructions to the
king his son, “That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that
if she he too much wooed she is the farther off. ” But this last is but a
remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon
that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy,
wherein they join close, namely that same _Primum quærite_. For divinity
saith, _Primum quærite regnum Dei_, _et ista omnia adjicientur vobis_:
and philosophy saith, _Primum quærite bona animi_; _cætera aut aderunt_,
_aut non oberunt_. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of
the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,

“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;”

yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a
taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired
in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things
are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not
fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:

“Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. ”

Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God
over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much
irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul in moving the
body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be
reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows
whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next
unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth detest
the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant
of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses
of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.

(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things
ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and
revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the
government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady
body, is in the view of God as crystal: _Et in conspectu sedis tanquam
mare vitreum simile crystallo_. So unto princes and states, and
specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions
of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and
combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard
of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,
and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part
clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king
that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it
decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the
certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being
silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by
speech, desired it might be certified for his part, “That there was one
that knew how to hold his peace. ”

(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is
laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those
which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as
lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make
imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as
the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the
lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is
received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker
is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain
fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams;
and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through
which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and
governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same
fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a
platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into
consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the
causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what
means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the
impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws
touching private right of _meum_ and _tuum_ have into the public state,
and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and
delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with preambles or
without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and
what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume, or too
full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when
upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses
and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be
pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity
and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be
mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how
the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and
governed; and many other points touching the administration and (as I may
term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I
purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in
aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for
deficient.

(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much of their
dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the
civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law was _nonhos
quæsitum munus in usus_; it was not made for the countries which it
governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter
of action with matter of general learning.

XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil
knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and
with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some
pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth
to me (_si nunquam fallit imago_), as far as a man can judge of his own
work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while
they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear,
but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been
content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that
have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of
these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit
in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits
of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of
ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of
all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath
disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the
leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in
civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their
popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their
monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to
peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of
religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the
perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which as a phœnix may call whole
volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time,
which is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to
this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of
the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength
and their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of
invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition
of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and
employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to
things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man
shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall
make that ancient and patient request, _Verbera_, _sed audi_: let men
reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful
(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of
men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off.
Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so
blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of
all men’s labours and peregrinations.

XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the
will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a
reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a
reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is
agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to the
author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and
discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for
righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein
was an image of natural reason.

(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to
believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind
suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as
it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the
worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then
faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.

(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we
call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not
upon the light of nature: for it is written, _Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei_;
but it is not written, _Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei_: but of that it is
said, _Ad legem et testimonium_: _si non fecerint secundum verbum istud_,
&c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the
great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but
likewise those which concern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your
enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father,
that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust. ” To this it
ought to be applauded, _Nec vox hominem sonat_: it is a voice beyond the
light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a
libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if
they were opposite and malignant to nature: _Et quod natura remittit_,
_invida jura negant_. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s
messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of
the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that
they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and
veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed
that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the
light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have,
by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and
vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of
nature is used in two several senses: the one, that which springeth from
reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and
earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an
inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle
of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is
participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the
moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the
duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is
not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God.

(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the
latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing
that the apostle calleth religion “our reasonable service of God;”
insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of
reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and
magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most
specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to
be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this
point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have
embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no
constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and
the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument
altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of
imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with
difference.

(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in
the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;
the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction
thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by
way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth
indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth
to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort as
may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine
upon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our
understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the
latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and
respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles
and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of
reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences
from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In
nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by
induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those
principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which
draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not
in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller
nature, namely, wherein there are not only _posita_ but _placita_; for in
such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in
games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the
game are positive, but how? merely _ad placitum_, and not examinable by
reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to
win the game is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many
grounds and maxims which are _placita juris_, positive upon authority,
and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most
just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that
affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary
reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the
_placets_ of God.

(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to
my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and
use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which
for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of
true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that
which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and
contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort falling
into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible
than it pleaseth God to reveal them, _Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit
senex_? The other sort into the error of the disciples, which were
scandalised at a show of contradiction, _Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis_?
_Modicum et non videbitis me_; _et iterum_, _modicum_, _et videbitis me_,
&c.

(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and
blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in
my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of
curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of
controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open
men’s eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which
is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon
weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men
would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles,
would be carried thus, _ego_, _non dominus_; and again, _secundum
consilium meum_, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and
oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, _non ego_,
_sed dominus_; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and
denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have
not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that “The causeless curse shall
not come. ”

(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed,
and the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter we
will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now
last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three
branches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the
information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the
limits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth
particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is
inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof I
have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong
two considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what
perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and
the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to
the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief.

(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient,
that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only,
ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to
much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to
abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of
many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian
fight, he did not say, “Why strive you? ” but drew his sword and slew the
Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, “You are
brethren, why strive you? ” If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it
must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it
be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive you? ” We see of
the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, “He that is
not with us is against us;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that
is not against us is with us. ” So we see the coat of our Saviour was
entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself;
but the garment of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided.
We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear,
but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it
is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those
points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the
Church of God.

(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and
sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the
water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts:
methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which
excelleth so much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same
kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it
is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived
for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels
immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem
to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt.
This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical
divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a
cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived
from thence.

(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted
strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to
find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in
all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to
dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the
obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large
commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast
than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we
see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings
of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or
collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the
civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian
compiled the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that
which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity,
and more base in substance.

(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact
methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and
sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial, like
unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more
subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several
parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede
from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the more
you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do
incur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures
by inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your
positions.

(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be
sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect.
For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and
uniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded
with this: _O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei_! _quam
incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus_, _et non investigabiles viæ ejus_.
So again the apostle saith, _Ex parte scimus_: and to have the form of a
total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies
by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude that the true
use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions
preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to
handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences
prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.

(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large,
there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather
curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much
must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and
not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, which
by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor.
For the Inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to
know; which are—the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of
the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future
succession of all ages. For as to the first it is said, “He that
presseth into the light shall be oppressed of the glory. ” And again, “No
man shall see My face and live. ” To the second, “When He prepared the
heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the deep. ” To
the third, “Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to Him of
man, for He knew well what was in man. ” And to the last, “From the
beginning are known to the Lord all His works. ”

(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and
expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds
of sobriety—the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to
the former, man is not to prevent his time: _Videmus nunc per speculum in
ænigmate_, _tunc autem facie ad faciem_; wherein nevertheless there
seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this
glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. But to press too far
into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of
man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into
it—aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the
nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; medicine is that which is
partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is
that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any
part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at
all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a
dissolution of the mind and understanding.

(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time
by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find
the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalising and
traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is
no such enmity between God’s Word and His works; neither do they give
honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For to
seek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said, “Heaven and
earth shall pass, but My word shall not pass,” is to seek temporary
things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek
the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek
the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place
was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place
of all where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope
or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in
the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s
capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule,
_Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas_. For it were a strange
conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration
sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of
a basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that
therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof
positively to be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations,
the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical,
which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and
cabalists, are to be confined with a _a noli akryn sapere_, _sed time_.

(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching
the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth make a just
and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the
Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which
hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the
questions which were propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to
the state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not
being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing
man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered their words, but their
thoughts. Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being
written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a
foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the
Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted
only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and
respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were
uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or
after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have
in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in
clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the
Church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were,
the main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the
allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not
that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in
allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the
Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a
profane book.

(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report
no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In perusing
books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and many of
commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an
art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon
the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances. But that form of
writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and
precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of
Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not
chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing
abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which
will remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded,
and I may speak it with an _absit invidia verbo_, and nowise in
derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and
the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts
of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this
your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space of these forty years and
more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications
thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work
in divinity which had been written since the Apostles’ times.

(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief
and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also
judged and directed by the former—the one being as the internal soul of
religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And, therefore,
the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole
religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no certainty
of belief or confession: as a man may well think, considering the chief
doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was because the
heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into
part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of
heart, so they might have external honour and rites.

(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of
divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth the
doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works
of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of
Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or
respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the
creation and that of the redemption; and both these works, as in total
they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer
to the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to
the Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the
continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that
of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the
whole act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the
Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by
the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we
consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the
reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.

(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which
discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition
thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and
according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and
commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided
according to the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the
three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more
special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose
attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose
attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to
the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and
libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth
liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the
degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or
act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to
cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not
exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both
these doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of the
heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation,
Christian resolution, and the like.

(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts
between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the
word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the
visible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and
under the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions:
but now the adoration being _in spiritu et veritate_, there remaineth
only _vituli labiorum_; although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and
retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.

(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimony
of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the offices and
jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church directing the
whole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the
other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.
(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of
truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from
religion, besides the privative, which is atheism and the branches
thereof, are three—heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we
serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false
gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false
gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth
excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And
yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are
all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for
so he saith, _Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare_, _et quasi scelus
idololatriæ nolle acquiescere_.

(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no
deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth
vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent have men been
either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.

* * * * *

Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as
truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of
those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well
converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded
from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of
proceeding in _melius_, and not _in aliud_; a mind of amendment and
proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true
and constant to the argument I handle if I were not willing to go beyond
others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again:
which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions
naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s
judgments by confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am
in good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second
reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I
am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which
certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add
authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well
invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on
the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and
challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due _tanquam
adeps sacrificii_, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine
Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.




FOOTNOTES.


{39} Stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold. Ovid. Metam, x.
667.