No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, no tie of relationship results from persons
conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the
conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from
adoption.

Objection 3: Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly
in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely
by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary
succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is
contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education,
else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters,
which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.

Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to
human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie
contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind
of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection
arising out of adoption. " Therefore adoption results in a tie which is
an impediment to marriage.

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those
persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse,
there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which
marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house
of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws
forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this
prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption
is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the
first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a
cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they
do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: The prohibition of a human law would not suffice
to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church
intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father
and the adopted child?

Objection 1: It would seem that a relationship of this kind is
contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the
adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in
spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between
them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides
the adopter and adopted.

Objection 2: Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a
perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted;
because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or
when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he
was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying
her.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person
incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad
2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.

Objection 4: Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal.
But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
therefore, does legal relationship.

On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal
union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual
relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship
does so also.

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in
the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on;
the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten
child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the
adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise
between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments
to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted
person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when
the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.

Reply to Objection 1: By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn
from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does
not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father
and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual
relationship.

Reply to Objection 2: Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage
on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for
dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie
cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same
father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain
authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie
between them remains.

Reply to Objection 3: Even a woman can adopt by permission of the
sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover
the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized
person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because
he is not a fit subject of spirituality.

Reply to Objection 4: By spiritual relationship the son is not placed
under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship:
because it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under
the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the
children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted
are adopted also.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND
DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the
impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and
defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

(2) Whether a spell is?

(3) Whether frenzy or madness is?

(4) Whether incest is?

(5) Whether defective age is?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to
marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow.
But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation.
Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.

Objection 2: Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so
does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to
marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.

Objection 3: Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can
marry. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she
marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in
itself, is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to
carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is
therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may
move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but
insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem
that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
an impediment absolutely.

Objection 6: Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man.
But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men
be debarred on account of frigidity.

On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic. , cap.
Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit
for the marriage contract. " Now persons affected with frigidity are the
like. Therefore, etc.

Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man
binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that
he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid
person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.

I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to
pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give
or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who
cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general
name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an
intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause,
for instance spell, of which we shall speak later [4984](A[2]). If it
be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it
is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of
time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then
it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment
remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry
to whom she will . . . in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to
ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has
appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a
practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties
have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the
marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be
dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because
three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be
perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken,
seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal
copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the
former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter
has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is seldom
necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising
from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations
of non-consummated marriages. " Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article
Canonical Impediments. ]

Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of carnal copulation is not
essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because
marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other's body
in relation to marital intercourse.

Reply to Objection 2: Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual
impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital
intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual.
Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
(for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the
members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an
impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced
to frigidity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although old people have not sufficient calidity
to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are
allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy,
although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.

Reply to Objection 4: In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that
anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a
contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this
inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to fulfill
the obligation "de jure," and such inability renders the contract
altogether void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows of this
or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill "de facto"; and then
if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding,
enters the contract, this shows that the latter seeks some other end
from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of
it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which causes such an
impotence that a man cannot "de facto" pay the marriage debt, as also
the condition of slavery, whereby a man cannot "de facto" give his
service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party
does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an
impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage debt "de jure," for
instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other
party knows of it or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv,
D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not
altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry.

Reply to Objection 5: A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment
in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot
fulfill the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not
a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical instrument,
and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to
nature, for it would be done not for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike
for a woman is not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause:
and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about
spells, of which we shall speak further on [4985](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 6: The male is the agent in procreation, and the
female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the
male than in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity
which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there
may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and
then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of
frigidity in the man.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to
marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of
demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act
than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they
would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the
like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage by spells.

Objection 2: Further, God's work is stronger than the devil's. But a
spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage
which is the work of God.

Objection 3: Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the
marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment, for
since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will
be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the
exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the
demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage.

Objection 4: Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless
there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle.
But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women.
Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman
without being so also in respect of all.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap.
iv): "If by sorcerers or witches . . . ," and further on, "if they be
incurable, they must be separated. "

Further, the demons' power is greater than man's: "There is no power
upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one"
(Job 41:24). Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered
incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration; and this
is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by
the power of a demon.

I answer that, Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the
world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural
effects the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the
authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men's
bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means
wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion grows from the root of
unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that demons exist
save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the
demon the terrors which a man conjures from his thoughts, and because,
owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his
thoughts become apparent to the senses, and then he believes that he
sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith
whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons
exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to do
many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such
things are called wizards.

Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an
impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment is
perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say
that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But this is contrary to
actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.

We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate
caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it voids marriage, or
it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to
put this to practical proof the Church has fixed the space of three
years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity
[4986](A[1]). There is, however this difference between a spell and
frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigidity is equally
impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the
marriage is dissolved, he is not permitted to marry another woman.
whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation
to one woman and not to another, and consequently when the Church
adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek
another partner in marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: The first corruption of sin whereby man became
the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the
generative power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise
his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the
power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other
animals according to Gn. 3, since the devil tempted the woman through a
serpent.

Reply to Objection 2: God's work may be hindered by the devil's work
with God's permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to
destroy His works by violence.

Reply to Objection 3: Some spells are so perpetual that they can have
no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the
demon, or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it
does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft can
be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use
witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be reckoned to be
perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon's help by
witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on
account of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the sin,
because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been
removed. And again, the exorcisms of the Church do not always avail to
repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will
it so, but they always avail against those assaults of the demons
against which they are chiefly instituted.

Reply to Objection 4: Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in
relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil
is a voluntary cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the
impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression made
by the demon on a man's imagination, whereby he is deprived of the
concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular woman and not to
another.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that madness is not an impediment to
marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more
excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized.
Therefore they can also marry.

Objection 2: Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it
impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore
neither is marriage impeded thereby.

Objection 3: Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual
impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual
impediment. Therefore it does not void marriage.

Objection 4: Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are
sufficiently contained in the verses given above ([4987]Q[50]). But
they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Madness removes the use of reason more than error
does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is
also.

Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is
a contract. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The madness is either previous or subsequent to
marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be
previous, then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he
has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that
interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if
he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or
marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent
without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as
its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the
comparison fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad
persons ([4988]TP, Q[68], A[12]).

Reply to Objection 2: Madness impedes marriage on the part of the
latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the
act as frigidity does. Yet the Master treats of it together with
frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).

Reply to Objection 3: A passing impediment which hinders the cause of
marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an
impediment that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to
void the marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: This impediment is reducible to error, since in
either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his
wife's sister?

Objection 1: It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband
committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should not be
punished for her husband's sin.
Yet she would be punished if the
marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative,
than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not an
impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.

Objection 3: Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin,
it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's
death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.

Objection 4: Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those
enumerated above ([4989]Q[50]). Therefore it does not void the marriage
contract.

On the contrary, By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity,
with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the
aforesaid incest does also.

Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished.
Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he ought to be punished
by being deprived of marriage.

I answer that, If a man has connection with the sister or other
relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his
betrothal, the marriage should be broken off on account of the
resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the
marriage has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be
altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital
intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it
if asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's
sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without any
hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his
frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry
without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church,
but his marriage is not for this reason to be annulled. This suffices
for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an
impediment to marriage not so much for its being a sin as on account of
the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with
the other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to
marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care of a
guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that
before that age their reason is not sufficiently mature to give
consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for
marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. Therefore
lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is
the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non Solum,
De regular. et transeunt. ) no one can be professed before the
fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person marry if
defective age were an impediment.

Objection 3: Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the
part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman can
marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.

Objection 4: Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and
not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is neither
perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid
impediments ([4990]Q[50]), and consequently would seem not to be an
impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic. )
says that "a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to
marry. " But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt
before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc.

Further, "There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in
nature" according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4): and consequently
it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age
by defect of which it is impeded.

I answer that, Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it
comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts.
Consequently according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub. ) it is
determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of
discretion when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about
marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that
marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age
is the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but
since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what happens
in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection
before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently
developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled.
Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age of puberty have
marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none
the less perpetually indissoluble.

Reply to Objection 1: In matters to which nature inclines there is not
required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in
other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to
consent to marriage before one is able to manage one's own affairs in
other matters without a guardian.

Reply to Objection 2: The same answer applies, since the religious vow
is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer
greater difficulty than marriage.

Reply to Objection 3: It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty
sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel
between the two.

Reply to Objection 4: In this case there is an impediment not only as
to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the
reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which
is to endure in perpetuity.

Reply to Objection 5: The impediment arising from defective age, like
that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of
error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.
__________________________________________________________________

OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

(2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?

(3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his
wife if she be unwilling to be converted?

(4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?

(5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?

(6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins
as he may for unbelief?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

Objection 1: It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For
Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus: and in
both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an
unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship
previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New.
But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer
and an unbeliever, as evidenced by Dt. 21:10 seqq. : "If thou go out to
the fight . . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful
woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife . . . thou shalt go in
unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife. "
Therefore it is lawful also under the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can
be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a
condition is made of the latter's future conversion. Therefore under
the same condition there can be marriage between them.

Objection 4: Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way
contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since
marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses.
Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even
between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism,
a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it
is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not
an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 6:14): "What concord hath light
with darkness? [*Vulg. : 'What fellowship hath light with darkness? And
what concord hath Christ with Belial? ']" Now there is the greatest
concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of
faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.

Further, it is written (Malachi 2:11): "Juda hath profaned the holiness
of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange
god. " But such had not been the case if they could have married
validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.

I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be
brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of
father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child
to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently if
they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary
to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a fitting
marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to
marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.

Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with
certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however
especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan,
both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of
their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest
to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their
children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites
and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard
to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their
being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married
unbelievers. But under the New Law which is spread throughout the whole
world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers.
Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its
being contracted and voids the contract.

Reply to Objection 2: This law either refers to other nations with whom
they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was
willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Present is related to present in the same way as
future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the
present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so
in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it
suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.

Reply to Objection 4: It has been made clear that disparity of worship
is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good
of the offspring.

Reply to Objection 5: Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as
the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with
regard to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with
regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not
called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns
outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9[4991], Q[1], A[1],
qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the
marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to
be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate
woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other
hand if a catechumen having right faith but not having been baptized
were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no marriage between
unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism is
the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not
baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than
one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage.
Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there
can be no marriage between unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, just as there is disparity of worship between
believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for
instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of
worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above [4992](A[1]).
Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers
of different worship.

Objection 4: Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according
to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity
between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the
Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim. ). Neither therefore is there a
true marriage.

Objection 5: Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from
sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since
"the whole life of unbelievers is a sin," as a gloss observes on Rom.
14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin. " Therefore there is no true
marriage between unbelievers.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:12): "If any brother hath a
wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not
put her away. " But she is not called his wife except by reason of
marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.

Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of
what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office of nature, which
precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore
unbelief does not prevent the existence of marriage between
unbelievers.

I answer that, Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the
offspring, not only as to its begetting---since this can be effected
even without marriage---but also as to its advancement to a perfect
state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to
perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the
offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the
body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the
natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former
perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter.
Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are
proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first
perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which
tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be
common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to
believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage
indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is
between believers.

Reply to Objection 1: Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament,
but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is
not competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the
dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent to
them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this
kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, although it is not
actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the Church.

Reply to Objection 2: Disparity of worship is an impediment to
marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference
of faith. For disparity of worship hinders not only the second
perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents
endeavor to draw their children in different directions, which is not
the case when both are unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage
between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of
nature. Now those things that pertain to the natural law are
determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among
unbelievers forbid the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a
different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their
intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because
before God, however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no
difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden by
any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.

Reply to Objection 4: The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are
said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue,
which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has
not the effect of wine.

Reply to Objection 5: An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse
with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the
offspring, or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is
an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance
in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of
other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole life of
unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every act, but
because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which
they do.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife
is she be unwilling to be converted?

Objection 1: It would seem that when a husband is converted to the
faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is
unwilling to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an
unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take the same
precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for
fear of being turned away from the faith. Since then if the believer
remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the danger
is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted
than those who have been brought up in the faith, it would seem that a
believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.

Objection 2: Further, "An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who
has been received into the Christian faith" (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1,
can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does
not believe.

Objection 3: Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more
perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers
marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is
void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing
husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an
unbeliever he married her within the forbidden degrees.

Objection 4: Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives
recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he
married while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his
conversion he can retain several wives.

Objection 5: Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife
he has married a second, and that he is converted during this latter
marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot
remain with this second wife.

On the contrary, The Apostle counsels him to remain (1 Cor. 7:12).

Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves
it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both unbelievers.
Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled
on that account; and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain
together.

I answer that, The faith of a married person does not dissolve but
perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between
unbelievers, as stated above (A[2], ad 1), the marriage tie is not
broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith, but
sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as
to cohabitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and adultery
are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring.
Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving
wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or
to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an
adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be
obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her
disgrace; although even if there be hope of her amendment he is free to
put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may
remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see
that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in
remaining with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the
Apostle counsels (1 Cor. 7:12).

Reply to Objection 1: It is easier to prevent a thing being done than
to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede
the contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless
cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with affinity
([4993]Q[55], A[6]): and it is the same with disparity of worship.

Reply to Objection 2: In the early Church at the time of the apostles,
both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and
consequently the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope
for his wife's conversion, even though she did not promise to be
converted. Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more
obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued to
come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at the
time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for
a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there
hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife.