No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is
profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a
Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. " Now the
Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total
of all virtues is contained in mercy.

Objection 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"
according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man
like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being
more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is
it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works,"
and (Lk. 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father
also is merciful. " Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye on . . .
as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc. , adds (Col. 3:14):
"Above all things have charity. " Therefore mercy is not the greatest of
virtues.

I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself,
mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be
bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their
wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is
accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is
declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after
Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,
surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone
above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to
supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is
not strained. /'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned
monarch better than his crown. " Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i. ].
Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him
to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his
neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is
the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to
one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far
as the latter is deficient.

Reply to Objection 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts,
not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in
order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,
whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to
Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according
to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained. "

Reply to Objection 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists
in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,
whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for
our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in
the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God
as regards similarity of works.
__________________________________________________________________

OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1)
Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3)
Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more
closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.
For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
receive of thy hand? " Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

Objection 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But
this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
liberality and not of charity.

Objection 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due,
or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this
respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either
an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of
charity.

On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
([2599]Q[23] , A[1]). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of
friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i. e. being beneficent, "to
one's friends. " Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.

I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above
([2600]Q[23], A[1];[2601] Q[27] , A[2]). Now the will carries into
effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the
result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend.
Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of
friendship or charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior
to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence is an
effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him
by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good
things on us.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs
in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a
man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he
would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection
of his friendship.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to do good to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good
to everyone. " Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible.
Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good,
and receive not a sinner. " But many men are sinners. Therefore we need
not do good to all.

Objection 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4).
Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were
to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding
communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity,
we ought not to do good to all.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have time,
let us work good to all men. "

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1), beneficence is an effect
of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the
inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,
because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in
one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the
love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all,
but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue
must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.

Reply to Objection 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good
to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be
bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds
us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind
to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good
that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in
general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the
faithful.

Reply to Objection 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and
his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the
maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
would be to do evil rather than good.

Reply to Objection 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common
weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them
from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor
lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in
danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress,
unless this be according to the order of justice.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to
us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk.
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen. " Now these are the most closely
united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who
are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those
who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest a
feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.

Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very
great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.

Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who have
been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors
rather than to those who are closely united to us.

Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
children, as stated above ([2602]Q[26], A[9]). Yet a man ought to be
more beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to
lay up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are
not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to
us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since one
cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason
of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more
closely united to us. "

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is
established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as
Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is
an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and
so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways
according to these various connections, because we ought in preference
to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which,
speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may
vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in
hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a
stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is
not in such urgent need.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite
our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they
may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but
of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to
invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be
understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those
rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be
more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help
rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well
as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent
man.

Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the
good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to
endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a
private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a
whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one
which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather
as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may
have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he
has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit
or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes,
rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the
case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another's
property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this
would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case,
however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard
to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into
consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases,
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down
a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity,
as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a
benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore
in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our
parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such
weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the
common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to
account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no
general rule can laid down.

Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's
love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to
honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would
be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents, to
abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we
lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For
precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men
virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Mat. 4:44):
"Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you. " Therefore
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

Objection 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are
opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our
neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
beneficence is a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species:
whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according
to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct
virtue from charity.

On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require
different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external
and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill.
Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither
is beneficence.

I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of
good, as explained above [2603](A[1]). Wherefore beneficence is not a
distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about
acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction,
not of habits, but of acts.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor,
if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced
to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are
to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under
certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
various kinds of benefits.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
__________________________________________________________________

OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

(2) Of the different kinds of alms;

(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?

(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?

(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?

(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?

(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?

(8) Who can give alms?

(9) To whom should we give alms?

(10) How should alms be given ?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
charity, it profiteth me nothing. " Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity.

Objection 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of
satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms. "
Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act
of justice and not of charity.

Objection 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained.
" Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity, but of religion.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, l) that to give
for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: "He that hath the substance
of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his
bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? "

I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the
motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and
for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
([2604]Q[30], AA[1],2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in Greek
{eleemosyne} it is derived from having mercy {eleein} even as the Latin
"miseratio" is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above
([2605]Q[30], A[2], A[3], OBJ[3] ), it follows that almsgiving is an
act of charity through the medium of mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the
habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of reason,
or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing
being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice is to do
what is just, in the same way as a just man, i. e. with readiness and
delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.

Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i. e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one
virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing
it to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as
it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice, and
thus it is commanded by religion.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
them more than one ought.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely,
to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked,
to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to
bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: "To
visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or bury. "

Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant,
to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the
sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy
us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in the following
verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray,"
yet so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.

And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead man
profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken
truly when He said (Mat. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do. " [*The quotation is
from Lk. 12:4. ] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of
mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mat. 25:35,36).
Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [2606](A[1]), the purpose of
giving alms is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs
of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind
man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man
needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.

Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a
defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is
ignorant of what he knows himself.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath
understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath
abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him
who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and
profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking
with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent,
if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor. "
Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of
those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken
from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul,
and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body,
and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either
during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is
either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a
special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first
case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is
twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect
of which we have "to feed the hungry"; while the other is relieved by
liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have "to give drink
to the thirsty. " The common need with regard to external help is
twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have "to clothe
the naked": while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as
to this we have "to harbor the harborless. " Again if the need be
special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness,
and then we have "to visit the sick," or it results from an external
cause, and then we have "to ransom the captive. " After this life we
give "burial to the dead. "

In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
"prayer," whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by "instructing," and
if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by "counselling. "
Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive
power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by "comforting. "
Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may
be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the
sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus
the remedy takes the form of "reproof. " Secondly, in respect of the
person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves,
we apply the remedy by "pardoning the injury," while, if it be
committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to
pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in
respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the
sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his
intention; in which case the remedy is applied by "bearing with him,"
especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to
Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the
weak," and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently
troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any
other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one
another's burdens. "

Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his
body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do"; and
for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the
other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary.
Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body:
both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if
he remain without burial, and as regards a man's fondness for his own
body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should
imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying
the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says
(De Cura pro Mort. iii).

Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for
blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the
blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick.
In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose
of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special
mention of this particular need.

Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of
the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as
to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the
evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to
Prov. 27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful
kisses of an enemy. "

Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when
it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
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Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than
spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who
is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it
relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal
alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by
spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.

Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if
the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich,
lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge,
which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal
almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): "The
bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother. " Now a
corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual
alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual
almsdeeds.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the
words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Mat. 5:42): "You should give
so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what
another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send
him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what
is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly. " Now reproof is a
spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to
corporal almsdeeds.

I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First,
simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place,
for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since
it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to
Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law. " Secondly,
on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent
than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought
to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after
his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the
acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual
acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion,
servile.

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when
some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in
hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher
observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than
philosophy," although the latter is better simply.

Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater
want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better,
and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.

Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and
praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended,
does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin. ),
that "the less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it
is with spiritual almsdeeds.

Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract
from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.

Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in
which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in
which it rests when it is inordinate.
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Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual
effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed
corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought
not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.

Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect.
If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all. "
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man . .
. shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye. "

I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely
a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's corporal
needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in
so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his
neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit,
according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . .
place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall
bring thee more profit than gold. "

Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a
spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above
text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor,
and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil. "

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to
their substance.

Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a
spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual
things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
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Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.
For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a
matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be
acceptable to the King; [Vulg. : 'to thee, and'] redeem thou thy sins
with alms. " Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what
is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an
alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always
be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some
other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful
to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that
almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what
is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.

I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever
is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of
precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only
should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his well-doers,
according to 1 Jn. 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but
in deed, and in truth. " And in order to be a person's well-wisher and
well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all
almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to
virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right
reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the
part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the
part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus,
according to Lk. 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms. " This surplus
is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what
is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of
whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression "necessary to
the person" [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking
the word "person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must
first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has
charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others.
Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for
the upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.

On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need,
else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not
possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not
bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be
succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of
Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him,
thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words,
as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise
almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to
God's Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he
did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of
precept.

Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours
as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us
alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we
have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help. " Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit
to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise---on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in
the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord
forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous
and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.

Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to
the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that thou
mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving.