In the
collective
process of adaptation and systema tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
.
.
Finality in reason is
an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant at tempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason ;--for Life would then become too obscure,--too unequal.
The categories are " truths " only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth. " (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one idiosyn crasy alone among many others. . .
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of
concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we are almost this instinct. . . . But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth! . . . The inability to
contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth. "
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least " necessary," but only a sign ofinaoility.
pre-existing
? ? ? ? _.
have mere world of appearance as its first condition. As matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endless
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
If, according to Aristotle, the princzpium contra dictwnzls the most certain of all principles;
the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; the principle of every other
axiom lie within' it: then one should
all the more severely, in order to discover how
many assumptions already lie at its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as these had become known in some other sphere--that to say, as were impossible to ascribe the opposite attributes to or the proposi tion means: that the opposites should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not directed at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world which must seem true to us.
In short, the question debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can create realities, or the concept " reality "P In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require previous knowledge of Being; which certainly not the case. The pro
position therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A
identical with itself, as every logical
(and proposition presupposes, and that
mathematical)
A in itself an appearance, then logic would
analyse
31
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is if
is a
if
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a
is a
if it
. . .
it ;
it
is
if it
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THE WILL TO POWER.
empiricism which seems to confirm it every minute. The " thing "--that is the real sub stratum of A; our belief in things is the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic
is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the "thing. " . . . By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion of real being, we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc. , as realities--that is to say, the conception of a metaphysical world or a " real world " (--this however, once more the world of appearance .
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of thing for true, and the holding of thing for not true,--in so far as they do not only presuppose mere habit, but the very right 'to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by belief, that there such a thing as knowledge for us, and that judgments can really hit the truth: in short, logic never doubts that able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that to say, that to the thing which in itself true, no _opposite attributes can
be ascribed).
In this belief there reigns the sensual and coarse
prejudice that our sensations teach us truths concerning things,--that cannot at the same
? moment of time say of one and the same
that hard and soft. (The instinctive proof, " cannot have two opposite sensations at once,"
quite coarse and false. ) ,
That all contradiction in concepts should be
thing
? ? is I
is
it is
it
is
is I
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.
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
forbidden, the result of belief, that we are able to form concepts, that concept not only character ises but also holds the essence of thing. . . . As matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of assumed existences which we have
created. Logic the attempt on our part to under stand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised ourselves or, more exactly, our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own
purposes.
517
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, necessary to acknowledge that
~which exists: logic only deals with formula: for things which are constant. That why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which " part of our optics. The "ego" regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
The assumed world of subject, substance, "reason,"etc. , necessary: an adjusting, simplify ing, falsifying, artificially-separating power resides in us. " Truth " the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness;
in the " true nature " of things
Becoming not susceptible of formulation;
~ " false " and " contradicts itself. " Knowledge and
VOL. II.
regard
phenomena
The character of the world in the process of
as real).
(we
33
? the will to classify phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief
? ? C
is is
;
a
a
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is
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it is
it
is
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it . is
by
is
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'_. . _
,_ ,____. . __r-. . -'-_.
a
a
? 34
THE WILL TO POWER.
the process of evolution exclude each other.
must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create
Consequently, knowledge the illusion of Being.
518.
If our " ego " is the only form of Being, accord ing to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether an illusion of perspective were not active here--the apparent unity which every thing assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which is richer and more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, know ledge is onlypossible when based on a belief in Being.
519.
If there is " only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: in addition, the "ego" shown to
be something that evolving: then--
? ? ? if, is
is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
35
_ 520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc. ; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should know no thing of time or of movement, in rough way, We did not believe we saw things " standing still " behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space " we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity based on the
"fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. Strictly speaking, would not be possible to " understand " and " know " an evolving world something which called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the " understanding " and " knowing " intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of host of mere appearances, but become fixed to the extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent " knowledge " possible--that to say, as measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
521.
Concerning "logical appearance. "---The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "Species" only expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their
? ? ? _. \_e\~'--
is
a
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;
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if, a
? 36
THE WILL TO POWER.
further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium seem to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the error of supposing that an actual goal has been reached--and that evolution had a goal . .
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form attained," does not signify that
the same form,--because something new always appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of " form. " As type had to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose--the same fault
made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving false realism to piece of fiction: as all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit--an artificial distinction here made between that which acts and that which
I
? action (but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not " facts
We should not interpret this constraint in our selves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("a world of identical cases as we were in position to construct real world; butias
guides
? ? a if
if a
a
").
it it
") if
(5
is
a
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it is
. ). is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
constraint to adjust world by means of which our existence will be ensured: we thereby create
world which determinable, simplified, com
etc. , for us.
The very same constraint active in the
functions of the senses which support the reason--- by means of simplification, coarsening, accentua tion, and interpretation whereon all " recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance " always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of reality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic,
expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing
save introduce its postulates into the nature things: now we find ourselves in their presence,-- we can no longer help it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint guarantee of " truth. " We was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the ob
ject,the substance,and the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplify ing as far as possible. The world seems logical to us, because we have already made logical.
522.
Fundamental solution. --We believe in reason: 'this however, the philosophy of colourless concepts. Language built upon the most naif
prejudices.
prehensible,
37
? of
? ? is
is ;a
is,
it
it
. . . w,_vWN_
is a
is aa
is
? ' THE WILL TO POWER.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to think only in the form of language--we also believe in the " eternal truth " of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc. )
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt con cerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
(f) CONSCIOUSNESS.
523
There is no greater error than that of making
psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "substance" is utterly useless as a means of explana tion. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, prob
ably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism--
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the
38
? Of the inner mind we draw conclufions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation
were adequate for the purpose.
appearance
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
For this inner world we have no finer organs,
and that why complexity which
reaches our consciousness as simple entity, and we invent process ofcausation in despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with chain of causes
not worthy of belief: consciousness never com municates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
The part " consciousness " plays. ---It essential that one should not mistake the part that "con sciousness" plays: our relation to the outer world; was the outer world that developed it. On the other hand, the direction--that to say, the care and cautiousness which concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does not enter into our consciousness any more than does the storing activity of the intellect: that there
superior controlling force at work these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing com mittee, in which the various leading desires make their votes and their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are also acts of will and ideas.
In short: That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does
thousandfold
39
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is a
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40
not signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it is so apparently, however, in the highest degree. We have hased the whole of our notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. , upon this apparent truth (all these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then projected the latter into and behind all things!
As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the in terests of intercourse. . . . " Intercourse " is under; stood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world upon us and our necessary response to as also our actual influence upon the outer world. It not the conducting force, but an organ of the latter.
525.
My principle, compressed into formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, " God spirit," God as perfection denied. . . .
526.
Wherever people have observed certain unity in the grouping of things, spirit has always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lack ing. Why should the idea of a complex fact be
one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should
? ? ? a
a
is
it, is
is
? TIIE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining finality by the spirit : there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar of organising and systematising. The
power
domain of the nervous system is much more ex tensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded.
In the collective process of adaptation and systema tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527
like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases in value in proportion as
it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the first order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value determined P--In regard to the discharge of will-power the most superficial and most simple thought is the most useful--it might therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives
latter is led by the deeper instinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower hind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our con
wfl'" *--
41
? over).
Physiologists,
. Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted and often uncertain judgments of caution: the
sciousness and which is therefore nhrrure
? ? ? 42
THE WILL TO POWER.
that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact
that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness
529
The great misapprehensions :--
(I) The senseless overestimation of consciousness, its elevation to the dignity of an entity: " a spirit," " a soul," something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a cause, especially where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
'
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as " God ";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The " real world " regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by means of the facts of con sciousness ;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences :--
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon the passions and senses--
as a state of animalism. . .
Man approaches reality and " real being "
through dialectics: man departs from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism.
To convert man into spirit, would mean to make god of him: spirit, will, goodness--all one.
? -
? ? a
a
. ).
.
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
43
All goodness must take its root in spirituality, must be fact of consciousness.
Every step made towards something better can be only step forward in consciousness.
TRUE--FALSE.
530
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmat
ism,his moraloutlook,ruled,guided,and directed him.
The 'n'pc'b'Tov \Ireii'o'oq: how the fact knowledge
(g) JUDGMENT.
Is knowledge fact at all? What knowledge? we do not know what knowledge we cannot possibly reply to the question, " Is
there such a thing as knowledge? "--Veryfine-l But do not already " know " whether there or can be, such thing as knowledge, cannot reason ably ask the question, " What knowledge ? " Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: What he requires
" piece of naivete': the knowledge of knowledge! Knowledge judgment. " But judgment
belief that something this or that! And not knowledge! " All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments " which have the character of being universally true (the fact so in all cases, and does not change), and which have the character of being necessary (the reverse of the proposition
'
cannot be imagined to exist).
The validity of a belief in knowledge always
taken for granted; as also the validity of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here moral ontology the ruling bias.
possible?
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
The conclusion, therefore, is: (I) there are pro positions which we believe to be universally true and necessary.
(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring from experience.
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, but upon something else; it must be derived from another source of knowledge!
(Kant concludes (1) that there are some pro positions which hold good only on one condition ;
44
this condition is that they do not spring from experience, but. from pure reason. )
Thus, the question whence do we derive our reasons for believing in the truth of such proposi tions? No, whence does our belief get its cause? But the origin of a belief, of strong conviction,
a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience frequently brings about such belief! It already presupposes that there are not only " data a posteriori " but also " data a priori "-- that to say, "previous to experience. " Neces
sary and universal truth cannot be given by experi ence: therefore quite clear that has come to us without experience at all?
There no such thing as an isolated judgment!
An isolated judgment never " true," never knowledge; only in connection with, and when
related to, many other judgments, of its truth forthcoming.
(2)
? What the difference between true and false belief? What knowledge? _He "knows " that heavenly!
Necessary and universal truth cannot be given
guarantee
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is isis
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? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
45
by experience! It therefore independent of ex perience, of all experience The view which comes quite a priori, and therefore independent of all ex perience, merely outof reason, " pure knowledge "
" The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of contradiction, are examples of pure know ledge, because they precede all experience. "--But these principles are not cognitions, but regulatioe
articles of faith.
In order to establish the a priori character
(the pure rationality) of mathematical axioms, space
must be conceived as form ofpure reason.
Hume had declared that there were no apriori
synthetic judgments. Kant says there are--the mathematical ones! And there are such judg ments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and knowledge of things by means of pure reason
Mathematics possible under conditions which are not allowed to metaphysics. All human know ledge either experience or mathematics.
A judgment synthetic--that to say, co ordinates various ideas. It a priori--that to say, this co-ordination universally true and necessary, and arrived at, not by sensual experi ence, but by pure reason.
If there are such things as a priori judgments, then reason must be able to co-ordinate: co-ordination form. Reason must possess a formative faculty.
531.
judging our oldest faith; our habit of believing this to be true or false, of asserting or
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? 46
THE WILL TO POWER.
denying, our certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really " know "-- what is believed to be true in all judgments?
What are attributes P--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as " things in themselves," which are strange to us, and which we only "perceive"; and we did not class them as phenomena, but as Being, as " attributes " ; and in addition we invented a creature to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the ej'ect the working cause, and the latter we made Being. But
even in this plain statement, the concept " effect " is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves are not the cause, we still argue that they must be effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that " every change must have its author " ;---but this belief in itself is already mythology; for it separates the working cause from the cause in work. When I say the " lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a
thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with but which stable, which and does not "cbme. "--To make the phenomenon the working cause, and to make the efect into a thing
----into Being: this the double error, or interpreta tion, of which we are guilty.
532.
The judgment--that the faith: "This and this so. " In every judgment, therefore, there lies
? ? ? is
is
it, is
is
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the admission that an " identical case " has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for granted, with the help of the memory. judg ment does not create the idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that it actu ally perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much older function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc. " That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal to that other thing ": but what is that called which makes sensations equal, which regards them as equal P--There could be no judg ments if a sort of equalising process were not active
,within all sensations: memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed, the process of assimilation must already'have been completed: thus, even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimila
tion, rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out frhm the body
and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accur ate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly established than the belief in spirit.
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
47
? ? ? 48
THE WILL TO POWER.
o
" However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no criterion of its truth. " But what is truth? Perhaps it-is a form of faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then strength would certainly be a criterion; for in stance, in regard to causality.
533
Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion of truth (" omne illud verum est, quad clare et distincte percwitur. "--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of the world becomes desirable and credible.
But this is gross confusion: like simplex sigillum verz'. Whence comes the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in this relation to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of power and security, is preferred, valued, and marked as true ? ---The intellect sets its freest and strongest facultyl and ability as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is true. . .
" True "--from the standpoint of sentiment-'45 that which most provokes senti
ment ("I");
from the standpoint of thought--is
that which gives thought the
greatest sensation of strength; from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that which' calls
forth the greatest resistance.
? '
? ? ? THE WILL T0 POWER m scnzncs.
Thus the highest degrees of activity which awaken belief in regard to the object, in regard to its " reality. " The sensations of strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there something which being resisted.
534
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.
535
According to my way of thinking, " truth " does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas
"other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard of those other " tyrants," could even be laid aside and " refuted. "
Why should an irrefutable assumption neces
sarily be "true "? This question may exasperate
the logicians who limit things according to the
limitations they find in themselves: but have
long since declared war with this logician's
Everything simple simply imaginary, but not
" true. " neither
v0L. it.
That which real and true however,
unity nor reducible to unity.
D
'
49
? optimism. "
536
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it is
a
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is is
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. v-dMW'_
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is
is
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THE WILL TO POWER.
537
What is truth ? ---Inertia ; that hypothesis which brings satisfaction, the smallest expense of intel lectual strength, etc.
538.
First proposition. The easier way of thinking always triumphs over the more difficult way ;-- dogmatically: simplex sigillum 11eri. ---Dico: to sup pose that clearness is any proof of truth, is absolute
I
childishness. .
Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of
things, and of all those constant entities, is a hun dred times more easy than the teaching of Becoming and of evolution. . . .
? Third proposition.
method of facilitating
sion,--not truth. . . . Later on it got to act like truth. . . .
Logic was intended to be a thought: a means of expres
539
Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent" ;---we are at the other extreme, and say, "That of which a concept can be formed, is certainly fictional. "
540
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there must be many kinds of " truths," and consequently there can be no truth.
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant at tempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason ;--for Life would then become too obscure,--too unequal.
The categories are " truths " only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth. " (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one idiosyn crasy alone among many others. . .
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of
concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we are almost this instinct. . . . But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth! . . . The inability to
contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth. "
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least " necessary," but only a sign ofinaoility.
pre-existing
? ? ? ? _.
have mere world of appearance as its first condition. As matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endless
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
If, according to Aristotle, the princzpium contra dictwnzls the most certain of all principles;
the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; the principle of every other
axiom lie within' it: then one should
all the more severely, in order to discover how
many assumptions already lie at its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as these had become known in some other sphere--that to say, as were impossible to ascribe the opposite attributes to or the proposi tion means: that the opposites should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not directed at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world which must seem true to us.
In short, the question debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can create realities, or the concept " reality "P In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require previous knowledge of Being; which certainly not the case. The pro
position therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A
identical with itself, as every logical
(and proposition presupposes, and that
mathematical)
A in itself an appearance, then logic would
analyse
31
? ? ? a
is
is
is if
is a
if
____. ~_,' _
a
is a
if it
. . .
it ;
it
is
if it
? 32
THE WILL TO POWER.
empiricism which seems to confirm it every minute. The " thing "--that is the real sub stratum of A; our belief in things is the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic
is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the "thing. " . . . By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion of real being, we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc. , as realities--that is to say, the conception of a metaphysical world or a " real world " (--this however, once more the world of appearance .
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of thing for true, and the holding of thing for not true,--in so far as they do not only presuppose mere habit, but the very right 'to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by belief, that there such a thing as knowledge for us, and that judgments can really hit the truth: in short, logic never doubts that able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that to say, that to the thing which in itself true, no _opposite attributes can
be ascribed).
In this belief there reigns the sensual and coarse
prejudice that our sensations teach us truths concerning things,--that cannot at the same
? moment of time say of one and the same
that hard and soft. (The instinctive proof, " cannot have two opposite sensations at once,"
quite coarse and false. ) ,
That all contradiction in concepts should be
thing
? ? is I
is
it is
it
is
is I
a
a
is
a
a
.
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
forbidden, the result of belief, that we are able to form concepts, that concept not only character ises but also holds the essence of thing. . . . As matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of assumed existences which we have
created. Logic the attempt on our part to under stand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised ourselves or, more exactly, our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own
purposes.
517
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, necessary to acknowledge that
~which exists: logic only deals with formula: for things which are constant. That why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which " part of our optics. The "ego" regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
The assumed world of subject, substance, "reason,"etc. , necessary: an adjusting, simplify ing, falsifying, artificially-separating power resides in us. " Truth " the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness;
in the " true nature " of things
Becoming not susceptible of formulation;
~ " false " and " contradicts itself. " Knowledge and
VOL. II.
regard
phenomena
The character of the world in the process of
as real).
(we
33
? the will to classify phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief
? ? C
is is
;
a
a
is
. .
is
it
is is
it is
it
is
is
it . is
by
is
is
'_. . _
,_ ,____. . __r-. . -'-_.
a
a
? 34
THE WILL TO POWER.
the process of evolution exclude each other.
must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create
Consequently, knowledge the illusion of Being.
518.
If our " ego " is the only form of Being, accord ing to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether an illusion of perspective were not active here--the apparent unity which every thing assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which is richer and more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, know ledge is onlypossible when based on a belief in Being.
519.
If there is " only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: in addition, the "ego" shown to
be something that evolving: then--
? ? ? if, is
is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
35
_ 520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc. ; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should know no thing of time or of movement, in rough way, We did not believe we saw things " standing still " behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space " we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity based on the
"fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. Strictly speaking, would not be possible to " understand " and " know " an evolving world something which called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the " understanding " and " knowing " intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of host of mere appearances, but become fixed to the extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent " knowledge " possible--that to say, as measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
521.
Concerning "logical appearance. "---The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "Species" only expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their
? ? ? _. \_e\~'--
is
a
is
is
it
a
;
is
if, a
? 36
THE WILL TO POWER.
further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium seem to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the error of supposing that an actual goal has been reached--and that evolution had a goal . .
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form attained," does not signify that
the same form,--because something new always appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of " form. " As type had to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose--the same fault
made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving false realism to piece of fiction: as all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit--an artificial distinction here made between that which acts and that which
I
? action (but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not " facts
We should not interpret this constraint in our selves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("a world of identical cases as we were in position to construct real world; butias
guides
? ? a if
if a
a
").
it it
") if
(5
is
a
a
is
it is
. ). is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
constraint to adjust world by means of which our existence will be ensured: we thereby create
world which determinable, simplified, com
etc. , for us.
The very same constraint active in the
functions of the senses which support the reason--- by means of simplification, coarsening, accentua tion, and interpretation whereon all " recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance " always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of reality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic,
expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing
save introduce its postulates into the nature things: now we find ourselves in their presence,-- we can no longer help it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint guarantee of " truth. " We was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the ob
ject,the substance,and the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplify ing as far as possible. The world seems logical to us, because we have already made logical.
522.
Fundamental solution. --We believe in reason: 'this however, the philosophy of colourless concepts. Language built upon the most naif
prejudices.
prehensible,
37
? of
? ? is
is ;a
is,
it
it
. . . w,_vWN_
is a
is aa
is
? ' THE WILL TO POWER.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to think only in the form of language--we also believe in the " eternal truth " of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc. )
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt con cerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
(f) CONSCIOUSNESS.
523
There is no greater error than that of making
psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "substance" is utterly useless as a means of explana tion. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, prob
ably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism--
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the
38
? Of the inner mind we draw conclufions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation
were adequate for the purpose.
appearance
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
For this inner world we have no finer organs,
and that why complexity which
reaches our consciousness as simple entity, and we invent process ofcausation in despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with chain of causes
not worthy of belief: consciousness never com municates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
The part " consciousness " plays. ---It essential that one should not mistake the part that "con sciousness" plays: our relation to the outer world; was the outer world that developed it. On the other hand, the direction--that to say, the care and cautiousness which concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does not enter into our consciousness any more than does the storing activity of the intellect: that there
superior controlling force at work these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing com mittee, in which the various leading desires make their votes and their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are also acts of will and ideas.
In short: That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does
thousandfold
39
? ? ? -_. _. 4
sw-"_. __
_, _
is a
is
in
is
is
a
a
is
it
a
is a
it is
is
is
it,
? THE WILL TO POWER.
40
not signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it is so apparently, however, in the highest degree. We have hased the whole of our notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. , upon this apparent truth (all these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then projected the latter into and behind all things!
As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the in terests of intercourse. . . . " Intercourse " is under; stood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world upon us and our necessary response to as also our actual influence upon the outer world. It not the conducting force, but an organ of the latter.
525.
My principle, compressed into formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, " God spirit," God as perfection denied. . . .
526.
Wherever people have observed certain unity in the grouping of things, spirit has always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lack ing. Why should the idea of a complex fact be
one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should
? ? ? a
a
is
it, is
is
? TIIE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining finality by the spirit : there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar of organising and systematising. The
power
domain of the nervous system is much more ex tensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded.
In the collective process of adaptation and systema tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527
like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases in value in proportion as
it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the first order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value determined P--In regard to the discharge of will-power the most superficial and most simple thought is the most useful--it might therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives
latter is led by the deeper instinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower hind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our con
wfl'" *--
41
? over).
Physiologists,
. Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted and often uncertain judgments of caution: the
sciousness and which is therefore nhrrure
? ? ? 42
THE WILL TO POWER.
that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact
that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness
529
The great misapprehensions :--
(I) The senseless overestimation of consciousness, its elevation to the dignity of an entity: " a spirit," " a soul," something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a cause, especially where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
'
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as " God ";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The " real world " regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by means of the facts of con sciousness ;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences :--
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon the passions and senses--
as a state of animalism. . .
Man approaches reality and " real being "
through dialectics: man departs from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism.
To convert man into spirit, would mean to make god of him: spirit, will, goodness--all one.
? -
? ? a
a
. ).
.
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
43
All goodness must take its root in spirituality, must be fact of consciousness.
Every step made towards something better can be only step forward in consciousness.
TRUE--FALSE.
530
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmat
ism,his moraloutlook,ruled,guided,and directed him.
The 'n'pc'b'Tov \Ireii'o'oq: how the fact knowledge
(g) JUDGMENT.
Is knowledge fact at all? What knowledge? we do not know what knowledge we cannot possibly reply to the question, " Is
there such a thing as knowledge? "--Veryfine-l But do not already " know " whether there or can be, such thing as knowledge, cannot reason ably ask the question, " What knowledge ? " Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: What he requires
" piece of naivete': the knowledge of knowledge! Knowledge judgment. " But judgment
belief that something this or that! And not knowledge! " All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments " which have the character of being universally true (the fact so in all cases, and does not change), and which have the character of being necessary (the reverse of the proposition
'
cannot be imagined to exist).
The validity of a belief in knowledge always
taken for granted; as also the validity of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here moral ontology the ruling bias.
possible?
? ? ? is
a
is
is
. e. . . __. _. aM_
w_-,,-,-w_. _'_. _-_-\,. __-
__ _
is is
a
a
a
is
is
is
is,
a is
If
is
is
I
if I
a
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER.
The conclusion, therefore, is: (I) there are pro positions which we believe to be universally true and necessary.
(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring from experience.
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, but upon something else; it must be derived from another source of knowledge!
(Kant concludes (1) that there are some pro positions which hold good only on one condition ;
44
this condition is that they do not spring from experience, but. from pure reason. )
Thus, the question whence do we derive our reasons for believing in the truth of such proposi tions? No, whence does our belief get its cause? But the origin of a belief, of strong conviction,
a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience frequently brings about such belief! It already presupposes that there are not only " data a posteriori " but also " data a priori "-- that to say, "previous to experience. " Neces
sary and universal truth cannot be given by experi ence: therefore quite clear that has come to us without experience at all?
There no such thing as an isolated judgment!
An isolated judgment never " true," never knowledge; only in connection with, and when
related to, many other judgments, of its truth forthcoming.
(2)
? What the difference between true and false belief? What knowledge? _He "knows " that heavenly!
Necessary and universal truth cannot be given
guarantee
'
? ? is
is isis
is
is
it,
a
is a
it
is
it is
it
is
a
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
45
by experience! It therefore independent of ex perience, of all experience The view which comes quite a priori, and therefore independent of all ex perience, merely outof reason, " pure knowledge "
" The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of contradiction, are examples of pure know ledge, because they precede all experience. "--But these principles are not cognitions, but regulatioe
articles of faith.
In order to establish the a priori character
(the pure rationality) of mathematical axioms, space
must be conceived as form ofpure reason.
Hume had declared that there were no apriori
synthetic judgments. Kant says there are--the mathematical ones! And there are such judg ments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and knowledge of things by means of pure reason
Mathematics possible under conditions which are not allowed to metaphysics. All human know ledge either experience or mathematics.
A judgment synthetic--that to say, co ordinates various ideas. It a priori--that to say, this co-ordination universally true and necessary, and arrived at, not by sensual experi ence, but by pure reason.
If there are such things as a priori judgments, then reason must be able to co-ordinate: co-ordination form. Reason must possess a formative faculty.
531.
judging our oldest faith; our habit of believing this to be true or false, of asserting or
? ? ? is
it is
is
_. _. _. __. . _-
_,_. '_w_. _
m >>>>.
[~1
is : a
is
is
is
is
is
! is
is it
a is
a if
is
! !
? 46
THE WILL TO POWER.
denying, our certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really " know "-- what is believed to be true in all judgments?
What are attributes P--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as " things in themselves," which are strange to us, and which we only "perceive"; and we did not class them as phenomena, but as Being, as " attributes " ; and in addition we invented a creature to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the ej'ect the working cause, and the latter we made Being. But
even in this plain statement, the concept " effect " is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced we ourselves are not the cause, we still argue that they must be effects: and this is in accordance with the belief that " every change must have its author " ;---but this belief in itself is already mythology; for it separates the working cause from the cause in work. When I say the " lightning flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and a second time as a subject acting; and thus a
thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with but which stable, which and does not "cbme. "--To make the phenomenon the working cause, and to make the efect into a thing
----into Being: this the double error, or interpreta tion, of which we are guilty.
532.
The judgment--that the faith: "This and this so. " In every judgment, therefore, there lies
? ? ? is
is
it, is
is
is,
? ? 0"
the admission that an " identical case " has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for granted, with the help of the memory. judg ment does not create the idea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that it actu ally perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that there are such things as identical cases. But what is that much older function called, which must have been active much earlier, and which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that second function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc. " That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal to that other thing ": but what is that called which makes sensations equal, which regards them as equal P--There could be no judg ments if a sort of equalising process were not active
,within all sensations: memory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has already been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed, the process of assimilation must already'have been completed: thus, even here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does not enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimila
tion, rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out frhm the body
and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accur ate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly established than the belief in spirit.
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
47
? ? ? 48
THE WILL TO POWER.
o
" However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no criterion of its truth. " But what is truth? Perhaps it-is a form of faith, which has become a condition of existence? Then strength would certainly be a criterion; for in stance, in regard to causality.
533
Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion of truth (" omne illud verum est, quad clare et distincte percwitur. "--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of the world becomes desirable and credible.
But this is gross confusion: like simplex sigillum verz'. Whence comes the knowledge that the real nature of things stands in this relation to our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this, that the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of power and security, is preferred, valued, and marked as true ? ---The intellect sets its freest and strongest facultyl and ability as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is true. . .
" True "--from the standpoint of sentiment-'45 that which most provokes senti
ment ("I");
from the standpoint of thought--is
that which gives thought the
greatest sensation of strength; from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that which' calls
forth the greatest resistance.
? '
? ? ? THE WILL T0 POWER m scnzncs.
Thus the highest degrees of activity which awaken belief in regard to the object, in regard to its " reality. " The sensations of strength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there something which being resisted.
534
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.
535
According to my way of thinking, " truth " does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas
"other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard of those other " tyrants," could even be laid aside and " refuted. "
Why should an irrefutable assumption neces
sarily be "true "? This question may exasperate
the logicians who limit things according to the
limitations they find in themselves: but have
long since declared war with this logician's
Everything simple simply imaginary, but not
" true. " neither
v0L. it.
That which real and true however,
unity nor reducible to unity.
D
'
49
? optimism. "
536
? ? a
it is
a
is,
is is
I
. v-dMW'_
'
is
is
? 50
THE WILL TO POWER.
537
What is truth ? ---Inertia ; that hypothesis which brings satisfaction, the smallest expense of intel lectual strength, etc.
538.
First proposition. The easier way of thinking always triumphs over the more difficult way ;-- dogmatically: simplex sigillum 11eri. ---Dico: to sup pose that clearness is any proof of truth, is absolute
I
childishness. .
Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of
things, and of all those constant entities, is a hun dred times more easy than the teaching of Becoming and of evolution. . . .
? Third proposition.
method of facilitating
sion,--not truth. . . . Later on it got to act like truth. . . .
Logic was intended to be a thought: a means of expres
539
Parmenides said: "One can form no concept of the non-existent" ;---we are at the other extreme, and say, "That of which a concept can be formed, is certainly fictional. "
540
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there must be many kinds of " truths," and consequently there can be no truth.
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
