Thus the wounded and unwounded, the half-dead and the dying, all came
rolling down and perished together by every imaginable kind of death.
rolling down and perished together by every imaginable kind of death.
Tacitus
Bassus, who was either ashamed or uncertain of their
success, awaited developments in his house. Amid great disturbance the
ships' captains attacked the images of Vitellius and cut down the few
men who offered any resistance. The rest of the fleet were glad enough
of a change, and their sympathies soon came round to Vespasian. Then
Lucilius appeared and publicly claimed responsibility. The fleet
appointed Cornelius Fuscus[48] as their admiral, and he came hurrying
on to the scene. Bassus was put under honourable arrest and conveyed
with an escort of Liburnian cruisers[49] to Atria,[50] where he was
imprisoned by Vibennius Rufinus, who commanded a regiment of auxiliary
horse in garrison there. However, he was soon set free on the
intervention of Hormus, one of the emperor's freedmen. For he, too,
ranked as a general.
When the news that the navy had gone over became known, Caecina, 13
carefully selecting a moment when the camp was deserted, and the men
had all gone to their various duties, summoned to head-quarters the
senior centurions and a few of the soldiers. He then proceeded to
praise the spirit and the strength of Vespasian's party: 'they
themselves had been deserted by the fleet; they were cramped for
supplies; Spain and Gaul were against them; Rome could not be
trusted. ' In every way he exaggerated the weakness of Vitellius'
position. Eventually, when some of his accomplices had given the cue
and the rest were dumbfoundered by his change of front, he made them
all swear allegiance to Vespasian. Immediately the portraits[51] of
Vitellius were torn down and messengers dispatched to Antonius.
However, when the treason got abroad in the camp, and the men
returning to head-quarters saw Vespasian's name on the standards and
Vitellius' portraits scattered on the ground, at first there was an
ominous silence: then with one voice they all vented their feelings.
Had the pride of the German army sunk so low that without a battle and
without a blow they should let their hands be shackled and render up
their arms? What had they against them? None but defeated troops. The
only sound legions of Otho's army, the First and the Fourteenth,
Vespasian had not got, and even those they had routed and cut to
pieces on that same field. And all for what? That these thousands of
fighting men should be handed over like a drove of slaves to Antonius,
the convict! [52] 'Eight legions, forsooth, are to follow the lead of
one miserable fleet. Such is the pleasure of Bassus and Caecina. They
have robbed the emperor of his home, his estate, and all his wealth,
and now they want to take away his troops. We have never lost a man
nor shed a drop of blood. The very Flavians will despise us. What
answer can we give when they question us about our victory or our
defeat? '
Thus they shouted one and all as their indignation urged them. Led 14
by the Fifth legion, they replaced the portraits of Vitellius and put
Caecina in irons. They selected Fabius Fabullus, commanding the Fifth
legion, and the camp-prefect, Cassius Longus, to lead them. Some
marines who arrived at this point from three Liburnian cruisers,[53]
quite innocent and unaware of what had happened, were promptly
butchered. Then the men deserted their camp, broke down the
bridge,[54] and marched back to Hostilia, and thence to Cremona to
join the two legions, the First Italian and Twenty-first Rapax, which
Caecina had sent ahead[55] with some of the cavalry to occupy Cremona.
FOOTNOTES:
[47] The narrative is now resumed from the end of Book II.
[48] See ii. 86.
[49] See ii. 16, note 247.
[50] Atri.
[51] i. e. the medallions on the standards.
[52] See ii. 86.
[53] See ii. 16, note 247.
[54] Over the Tartaro (chap. 9).
[55] See ii. 100.
THE ENGAGEMENT NEAR CREMONA
When Antonius heard of this he determined to attack the enemy 15
while they were still at variance and their forces divided. The
Vitellian generals would soon recover their authority and the troops
their discipline, and confidence would come if the two divisions were
allowed to join. He guessed also that Fabius Valens had already
started from Rome and would hasten his march when he heard of
Caecina's treachery. Valens was loyal to Vitellius and an experienced
soldier. There was good reason, besides, to fear an attack on the side
of Raetia from an immense force of German irregulars. Vitellius had
already summoned auxiliaries from Britain, Gaul, and Spain in
sufficient numbers to blight their chances utterly, had not Antonius
in fear of this very prospect forestalled the victory by hurriedly
forcing an engagement. In two days he marched his whole force from
Verona to Bedriacum. [56] On the next day[57] he left his legions
behind to fortify the camp, and sent out his auxiliary infantry into
territory belonging to Cremona, to taste the joys of plundering their
compatriots under pretext of collecting supplies. To secure greater
freedom for their depredations, he himself advanced at the head of
four thousand cavalry eight miles along the road from Bedriacum. The
scouts, as is usual, turned their attention further afield.
About eleven in the morning a mounted scout galloped up with the 16
news that the enemy were at hand; there was a small body in advance of
the rest, but the noise of an army in movement could be heard over the
country-side. While Antonius was debating what he ought to do, Arrius
Varus, who was greedy to distinguish himself, galloped out with the
keenest of the troopers and charged the Vitellians, inflicting only
slight loss; for, on the arrival of reinforcements, the tables were
turned and those who had been hottest in pursuit were now hindmost in
the rout. Their haste had no sanction from Antonius, who had foreseen
what would happen. Encouraging his men to engage with brave hearts, he
drew off the cavalry on to each flank and left a free passage in the
centre to receive Varus and his troopers. Orders were sent to the
legions to arm and signals were displayed to the foraging party,
summoning them to cease plundering and join the battle by the quickest
possible path. Meanwhile Varus came plunging in terror into the middle
of their ranks, spreading confusion among them. The fresh troops were
swept back along with the wounded, themselves sharing the panic and
sorely embarrassed by the narrowness of the road.
In all the confusion of the rout Antonius never for a moment 17
forgot what befitted a determined general and a brave soldier. Staying
the panic-stricken, checking the fugitives, wherever the fight was
thickest, wherever he saw a gleam of hope, he schemed, he fought, he
shouted, always conspicuous to his own men and a mark for the enemy.
At last, in the heat of his impatience, he thrust through with a lance
a standard-bearer, who was in full flight, then seized the standard
and turned it against the enemy. Whereupon for very shame a few of his
troopers, not more than a hundred, made a stand. The nature of the
ground helped them. The road there was narrower; a stream barred their
way, and the bridge was broken; its depth was uncertain and the steep
banks checked their flight. Thus necessity or chance restored their
fallen fortunes. Forming in close order, they received the
Vitellians' reckless and disordered charge, and at once flung them
into confusion. Antonius pressed hard on the fugitives and cut down
all who blocked his path. The others followed each his inclination,
rifling the dead, capturing prisoners, seizing arms and horses.
Meanwhile, summoned by their shouts of triumph, those who had just now
been in full flight across the fields came hurrying back to share the
victory.
Four miles from Cremona they saw the standards of the Rapax and 18
Italian legions gleaming in the sun. They had marched out thus far
under cover of their cavalry's original success. When fortune turned
against them, they neither opened their ranks to receive the routed
troops nor marched out to attack the enemy, who were wearied with
fighting and their long pursuit. While all went well the Vitellians
did not miss their general, but in the hour of danger they realized
their loss. The victorious cavalry came charging into their wavering
line, and at the same time Vipstanus Messala arrived with the Moesian
auxiliaries and a good number of men from the legions, who had kept up
with the pace of their forced march. [58] These combined forces broke
the opposing column, and the proximity of Cremona's sheltering walls
gave the Vitellians more hope of refuge and less stomach for
resistance.
FOOTNOTES:
[56] About thirty-three miles.
[57] October 27.
[58] They would be more heavily laden than the Moesian
auxiliaries.
THE FATE OF CREMONA
Antonius did not follow up his advantage. He realized that, although
the issue had been successful, the battle had long been doubtful, and
had cost the troopers and their horses many wounds and much hard
fighting. As evening fell, the whole strength of the Flavian army 19
arrived. They had marched among heaps of corpses, and the still
reeking traces of slaughter, and now, feeling that the war was over,
they clamoured to advance at once on Cremona and either receive its
submission or take it by storm. This sounded well for public
utterance, but each man in his heart was thinking, 'We could easily
rush a city on the plain. In a night-assault men are just as brave and
have a better chance of plunder. If we wait for day it will be all
peace and petitions, and what shall we get for our wounds and our
labours? A reputation for mercy! There's no money in that. All the
wealth of Cremona will find its way into the officers' pockets. Storm
a city, and the plunder goes to the soldiers: if it surrenders, the
generals get it. ' They refused to listen to their centurions and
tribunes and drowned their voices in a rattle of arms, swearing they
would break their orders unless they were led out. Antonius then 20
went round among the companies, where his authoritative bearing
obtained silence. He assured them that he had no wish to rob them of
the glory and the reward they so well deserved. 'But,' he said, 'an
army and a general have different functions. It is right that soldiers
should be greedy for battle, but the general often does more good not
by temerity but by foresight, deliberation and delay. I have done all
I could to aid your victory with my sword: now I will serve you by the
general's proper arts of calculation and strategy. The risks that face
us are obvious. It is night; we know nothing of the lie of the city;
the enemy are behind the walls; everything favours an ambush. Even if
the gates were open, we cannot safely enter except by day and after
due reconnoitring. Are you going to begin storming the town when you
cannot possibly see where the ground is level and how high the walls
are? How do you know whether to assault it with engines and showers of
missiles, or with penthouses and shelters? '[59] Then he turned to
individuals, asking one after another whether they had brought
hatchets and pick-axes and other implements for storming a town. When
they answered no, 'Well,' he said, 'could any troops possibly break
through walls or undermine them with nothing but swords and javelins?
Suppose it proves necessary to construct a mound and to shelter
ourselves with mantlets and fascines,[59] are we going to stand idle
like a lot of helpless idiots, gaping at the height of the enemy's
towers and ramparts? Why not rather wait one night till our
siege-train arrives and then carry the victory by force? ' So saying,
he sent the camp-followers and servants with the freshest of the
troopers back to Bedriacum to bring up supplies and whatever else was
wanted.
The soldiers indeed chafed at this and mutiny seemed imminent, 21
when some of the mounted scouts, who had ridden right up to the walls,
captured a few stragglers from Cremona, and learnt from them that six
Vitellian legions and the whole Hostilia army had that very day
covered thirty miles, and, hearing of their comrades' defeat, were
already arming for battle and would be on them immediately. This
alarming news cured their obstinate deafness to the general's advice.
He ordered the Thirteenth legion to take up their position on the
raised Postumian high-road. In touch with them on the left wing in the
open country were the Seventh Galbian, beside whom stood the Seventh
Claudian, so placed that their front was protected by a ditch. On the
right wing were the Eighth, drawn up along an open cross-road, and
next to them the Third, distributed among some thick clumps of trees.
Such, at any rate, was the order of the eagles and standards. In the
darkness the soldiers were confused and took their places at random.
The band of Guards[60] was next to the Third, and the auxiliaries on
the wings, while the cavalry were disposed in support round the flanks
and the rear. Sido and Italicus with their picked band of Suebi[61]
fought in the front line.
For the Vitellians the right course was to rest at Cremona and 22
recuperate their strength with food and a night's rest, and then on
the next day to crush and rout the Flavians when they were stiff with
cold and weak from hunger. But they had no general;[62] they had no
plan. Though it was nearly nine at night they flung themselves upon
the Flavians, who were standing steady in their places to receive
them. In their fury and the darkness the Vitellian line was so
disordered that one can hardly venture to describe the disposition of
their troops. However, it has been stated that the Fourth Macedonian
legion were on the right flank; in the centre were the Fifth and
Fifteenth with the detachments of the Ninth, the Second and the
Twentieth from Britain; the Sixteenth, the Twenty-second, and the
First formed the left wing. The men of the Rapax and Italian
legions[63] were distributed among all the companies. [64] The cavalry
and auxiliaries picked their own position. All night the battle raged
with varying fortune, never decided, always savagely contested.
Disaster threatened now one side, now the other. Courage, strength
were of little use: their eyes could not even see in front of them.
Both sides were armed alike; the watchwords, constantly demanded, soon
became known; the standards were all in confusion, as they were
captured and carried off from one band to another. The Seventh legion,
raised recently by Galba, suffered most severely. Six of the senior
centurions fell and several standards were lost. They nearly lost
their eagle too, but it was rescued by the bravery of the senior
centurion, named Atilius Verus, who after great slaughter of the enemy
fell finally himself.
Antonius had meanwhile called up the Guards to reinforce his 23
wavering line. Taking up the fight, they repulsed the enemy, only to
be repulsed in their turn. For the Vitellian artillery, which had at
first been scattered all along the line, and had been discharged upon
the bushes without hurting the enemy, was now massed upon the
high-road, and swept the open space in front. One immense engine in
particular, which belonged to the Fifteenth, mowed down the Flavian
line with huge stones. The slaughter thus caused would have been
enormous, had not two of the Flavian soldiers performed a memorable
exploit. Concealing their identity by snatching up shields from among
the enemy's dead,[65] they cut the ropes which suspended the weights
of the engine. They fell immediately, riddled with wounds, and so
their names have perished. But of their deed there is no doubt.
Fortune had favoured neither side when, as the night wore on, the moon
rose and threw a deceptive glamour over the field of battle. Shining
from behind the Flavians the moon was in their favour. It magnified
the shadows of their men and horses so that the enemy took the shadow
for the substance, and their missiles were misdirected and fell
short. The Vitellians, on the other hand, had the moon shining full on
them and were an easy mark for the Flavians, shooting as it were out
of cover. [66]
Thus being enabled to recognize his own men, and to be recognized 24
by them, Antonius appealed to some by taunting their honour, to many
by words of praise and encouragement, to all by promising hope of
reward. He asked the Pannonian legions why they had drawn their swords
again. Here on this field they could regain their glory and wipe out
the stain of their former disgrace. [67] Then turning to the Moesian
troops, who were the chief promoters of the war,[68] he told them it
was no good challenging the Vitellians with verbal threats, if they
could not bear to face them and their blows. Thus he addressed each
legion as he reached it. To the Third he spoke at greater length,
reminding them of their victories both old and new. Had they not under
Mark Antony defeated the Parthians[69] and the Armenians under
Corbulo? [70] Had they not but lately crushed the Sarmatians? [71] Then
he turned in fury on the Guards. 'Peasants that you are,' he shouted,
'have you another emperor, another camp waiting to shelter you, if you
are defeated? There in the enemy's line are your standards and your
arms: defeat means death and--no, you have drained disgrace already to
the dregs. '
These words roused cheers on all sides, and the Third, following the
Syrian custom,[72] saluted the rising sun. Thus arose a casual 25
rumour--or possibly it was suggested by the general's ingenuity--that
Mucianus had arrived, and that the two armies were cheering each
other. On they pressed, feeling they had been reinforced. The
Vitellian line was more ragged now, for, having no general to marshal
them, their ranks now filled, now thinned, with each alternation of
courage and fear. As soon as Antonius saw them waver, he kept
thrusting at them in massed column. The line bent and then broke, and
the inextricable confusion of wagons and siege-engines prevented their
rallying. The victorious troops scattered along the cross-road in
headlong pursuit.
The slaughter was marked by one peculiar horror. A son killed his
father. I give the facts and names on the authority of Vipstanus
Messala. [73] One Julius Mansuetus, a Spaniard who had joined the
legion Rapax, had left a young son at home. This boy subsequently grew
up and enlisted in the Seventh legion, raised by Galba. [74] Chance now
sent his father in his way, and he felled him to the ground. While he
was ransacking the dying man, they recognized each other. Flinging his
arms round the now lifeless corpse, in a piteous voice he implored
his father's spirit to be appeased and not to turn against him as a
parricide. The crime was his country's, he cried; what share had a
single soldier in these civil wars? Meanwhile he lifted the body and
began to dig a grave and perform the last rites for his father. Those
who were nearest noticed this; then the story began to spread, till
there ran through the army astonishment and many complaints and curses
against this wicked war. Yet they never ceased busily killing and
plundering friends and relatives and brothers; and while they talked
of the crime they were committing it themselves.
When they reached Cremona a fresh task of vast difficulty awaited 26
them. During the war with Otho[75] the German army had entrenched
their camp round the walls of Cremona and then erected a rampart round
the camp; and these fortifications had been further strengthened. The
sight of them brought the victors to a halt, and their generals were
uncertain what instructions to give. The troops had had no rest for a
day and a night. To storm the town at once would be an arduous and, in
the absence of reserves, a perilous task. On the other hand, a retreat
to Bedriacum would involve the intolerable fatigue of a long march,
and destroy the value of their victory. Again, it would be dangerous
to entrench themselves so close to the lines of the enemy, who might
at any minute sally forth and rout them while they were dispersed and
digging trenches. The chief anxiety lay in the temper of the men, who
were much more ready to face danger than delay. To them discretion was
disagreeable and hazard spelt hope. Their thirst for plunder
outweighed all fears of wounds and bloodshed.
Antonius also inclined to this view and gave orders for them to 27
surround the rampart. At first they stood back and delivered volleys
of arrows and stones, suffering themselves the severer loss, for a
storm of missiles rained down from the walls. Antonius then told off
each legion to assault a different point of the rampart or one of the
gates, hoping that by thus separating them he could distinguish the
cowards from the brave and inflame them with a spirit of honourable
rivalry. The Third and Seventh took the position nearest the road to
Bedriacum; the Eighth and Seventh Claudian assaulted the right-hand
side of the rampart; the Thirteenth swept up to the Brixian Gate. [76]
A brief delay was caused while some fetched mattocks and pickaxes from
the fields, and others hooks and ladders. Then holding their shields
above their heads in close 'tortoise' formation,[77] they advanced
under the rampart. Both sides employed Roman tactics. The Vitellians
rolled down huge masses of stones, and, as the sheltering cover of
shields parted and wavered, they thrust at it with lances and poles,
until at last the whole structure was broken up and they mowed down
the torn and bleeding soldiers beneath with terrible slaughter.
The men would certainly have hesitated, had not the generals,
realizing that they were really too tired to respond to any other form
of encouragement, pointed significantly to Cremona. Whether this 28
was Hormus's idea, as Messala[78] records, or whether we should rather
follow Caius Pliny, who accuses Antonius, it is not easy to determine.
This one may say, that, however abominable the crime, yet in
committing it neither Antonius nor Hormus belied the reputation of
their lives. After this neither wounds nor bloodshed could stay the
Flavian troops. They demolished the rampart, shook the gates, climbed
up on each other's shoulders, or over the re-formed 'tortoise', and
snatched away the enemy's weapons or caught hold of them by the arms.
Thus the wounded and unwounded, the half-dead and the dying, all came
rolling down and perished together by every imaginable kind of death.
The fight raged thickest round the Third and Seventh legions, and 29
the general, Antonius, came up with a picked band of auxiliaries to
support their assault. The Vitellians, finding themselves unable to
resist the attack of troops thus stubbornly vying with each other, and
seeing their missiles all glide off the shelter of shields, at last
sent their engine of war crashing down upon their heads. For the
moment it scattered and crushed beneath it the men on whom it fell,
but it dragged with it some of the battlements and the top of the
rampart. At the same moment one of the towers on the rampart gave way
under a shower of stones. While the men of the Seventh struggled up to
the breach in close column,[79] the Third hewed down the gate with
hatchets and swords. All the authorities[80] agree that Caius Volusius
of the Third legion was the first man in. Emerging on the top of the
rampart, he hurled down those who barred his path, and from this
conspicuous position waved his hand and shouted that the camp was
taken. The others poured through, while the Vitellians in panic flung
themselves down from the rampart, and the whole space between the camp
and the walls became a seething scene of carnage.
Here, again, was a new type of task for the Flavians. Here were 30
high walls, stone battlements, iron-barred gates, and soldiers hurling
javelins. The citizens of Cremona were numerous and devoted to the
cause of Vitellius, and half Italy had gathered there for the Fair
which fell just at that time. Their numbers were a help to the
defenders, but the prospect of plundering them offered an incentive to
their assailants. Antonius ordered his men to bring fire and apply it
to the most beautiful of the buildings outside the walls, hoping that
the loss of their property might induce the citizens to turn traitor.
The houses that stood nearest to the walls and overtopped them he
crowded with his bravest troops, who dislodged the defenders with
showers of beams and tiles and flaming torches. Meanwhile, some of 31
the legionaries began to advance in 'tortoise' formation,[81] while
others kept up a steady fire of javelins and stones.
Gradually the spirit of the Vitellians ebbed. The higher their rank,
the more easily they gave way to misfortune. For they were afraid that
if Cremona too[82] was demolished, there would be no hope of pardon;
the victors' fury would fall not on the common poor but on the
tribunes and centurions, whom it would pay to kill. The common
soldiers felt safe in their obscurity, and, careless of the future,
continued to offer resistance. They roamed the streets or hid
themselves in houses, and though they had given up the war, refused
even so to sue for peace. Meanwhile the tribunes and centurions did
away with the name and portraits of Vitellius. [83] They released
Caecina, who was still in irons,[84] and begged his help in pleading
their cause. When he turned from them in haughty contempt they
besought him with tears. It was, indeed, the last of evils that all
these brave men should invoke a traitor's aid. They then hung veils
and fillets[85] out on the walls, and when Antonius had given the
order to cease firing, they carried out their standards and eagles,
followed by a miserable column of disarmed soldiers, dejectedly
hanging their heads. The victors had at first crowded round, heaping
insults on them and threatening violence, but when they found that the
vanquished had lost all their proud spirit, and turned their cheeks
with servile endurance to every indignity, they gradually began to
recollect that these were the men who had made such a moderate use of
their victory at Bedriacum. [86] But when the crowd parted, and Caecina
advanced in his consular robes, attended by his lictors in full state,
their indignation broke into flame. They charged him with insolence
and cruelty, and--so hateful is crime--they even flung his treachery
in his teeth. [87] Antonius restrained them and sent Caecina under
escort to Vespasian.
Meanwhile the citizens of Cremona suffered sorely from the 32
violence of the troops, and only the entreaties of their generals
could withhold them from a general massacre. Antonius summoned a mass
meeting and delivered a eulogy upon his victorious army, promising
mercy to the vanquished and speaking of Cremona in ambiguous terms.
Besides their natural passion for plunder, there was an old grudge
which urged them to sack Cremona. The town was believed to have given
assistance to the Vitellian cause before this in the war with
Otho;[88] and again, when the Thirteenth had been left behind to
build an amphitheatre,[89] the populace had shown its town-bred
impertinence by assailing them with insolent ridicule. Other causes
increased this bad feeling: it was here that Caecina had given his
show of gladiators:[89] the town had become for a second time the
theatre of the war: the citizens had conveyed food to the Vitellians
during the battle: some women had been killed, whose enthusiasm for
the cause had led them to take part in the fight. Besides all this,
the Fair had filled the rich city with an even greater display of
wealth than usual. All eyes were now centred on Antonius, whose fame
and good fortune overshadowed all the other generals. It so happened
that he hurried off to the baths to wash off the stains of blood.
Finding fault with the temperature of the water, he received the
answer, 'It will not be long before it is hot,' and this phrase was
caught up. The attendant's words were repeated, and brought all the
odium on Antonius, who was thus believed to have given the signal to
set fire to Cremona, which was already in flames. [90]
Thus forty thousand soldiers burst into the town with a yet larger 33
crowd of servants and sutlers, even more depraved than the soldiers in
their readiness for cruelty and lust. Without any respect for age or
for authority they added rape to murder and murder to rape. Aged men
and decrepit old women, who were worthless as booty, were hustled off
to make sport for them. If some grown girl or a handsome youth fell
into their clutches, they would be torn to pieces in the struggle for
possession, while the plunderers were left to cut each other's
throats. Whoever carried off money or any of the solid gold offerings
in the temples was liable to be cut to pieces, if he met another
stronger than himself. Some, disdaining easy finds, hunted for hidden
hoards, and dug out buried treasure, flogging and torturing the
householders. They held torches in their hands and, having once
secured their prize, would fling them wantonly into an empty house or
some dismantled temple. Composed as the army was of citizens, allies,
and foreign troops, differing widely in language and customs, the
objects of the soldiers' greed differed also. But while their views of
what was right might vary, they all agreed in thinking nothing wrong.
Cremona lasted them four days. While all other buildings sacred and
secular sank in the flames, only the temple of Mefitis outside the
walls was left standing, saved either by its position or the power of
the presiding deity. [91]
Such was the end of Cremona two hundred and eighty-six years after 34
its foundation. It had been originally built in the consulship of
Tiberius Sempronius and Publius Cornelius, while Hannibal was
threatening to invade Italy, to serve as a bulwark against the Gauls
beyond the Po,[92] and to resist any other power that might break in
over the Alps. And so it grew and flourished, aided by its large
number of settlers, its conveniently situated rivers,[93] the
fertility of its territory, and its connexion through alliance and
intermarriage with other communities. Foreign invasions had left it
untouched only to become the victim of civil war. Antonius, ashamed of
his crime, and realizing his growing disfavour, proclaimed that no
citizen of Cremona was to be kept as a prisoner of war; and, indeed,
the unanimous feeling in Italy against buying such slaves had already
frustrated the soldiers' hope of profit. So they began to kill their
captives, whose relatives and friends, when this became known,
covertly bought their release. After a while, the rest of the
inhabitants returned, and the squares and temples were rebuilt by the
munificence of the burghers and under Vespasian's direct patronage.
However, the soil was so foully infected by the reek of blood that 35
it was impossible for the Flavians to encamp for long on the ruins of
this buried city. They advanced along the road to the third milestone,
and mustered the Vitellians, still straggling and panic-stricken, each
under his own standard. The defeated legions were then distributed
through Illyricum, for the civil war was still in progress and their
fidelity could not be relied on. They then dispatched couriers to
carry the news to Britain and the Spanish provinces. To Gaul they sent
an officer named Julius Calenus, to Germany Alpinius Montanus, who had
commanded an auxiliary cohort. Montanus was a Treviran and Calenus an
Aeduan; both had fought for Vitellius and thus served to advertise
Vespasian's victory. At the same time garrisons were sent to hold the
passes of the Alps, for fear that Germany might rise in support of
Vitellius.
FOOTNOTES:
[59] See ii. 21.
[60] i. e. the band of Otho's old Guards whom Vitellius had
disbanded and Vespasian re-enlisted (see ii. 67, 82).
[61] See chap. 5.
[62] Caecina was under arrest, Valens still on his way from
Rome (see chaps. 14, 15).
[63] XXI and I.
[64] Because they had already suffered heavy losses earlier
in the day (see chap. 18).
[65] These shields would have Vitellius' name on them, and
thus conceal their identity.
[66] Dio asserts that the moon was 'black and bloody, and
gave off other fearsome hues'.
[67] i. e. at the first battle of Bedriacum (see ii. 43).
[68] See ii. 85.
[69] 36 B. C.
[70] A. D. 63.
[71] i. e. the Rhoxolani (cp. i. 79).
[72] They had served recently in Syria under Corbulo (see above).
[73] An eyewitness (see note 39).
[74] In Spain.
[75] i. e. at the time of the first battle of Bedriacum in April.
[76] i. e. the gate giving on to the road to Brescia.
[77] In this famous formation the front-rank men kept close
together and covered their bodies with long, concave shields,
while the others, holding flat shields over their heads and
pressing them one against another, formed a protecting roof.
They could thus approach the walls under cover.
[78] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.
[79] For the term (_cuneus_) here used, see note on ii. 42.
[80] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.
[81] See note 77.
[82] As well as the buildings outside the walls.
[83] i. e. tore them off the standards and shields, and broke
the statues at head-quarters.
[84] See chap. 14.
[85] Cp. i. 66.
[86] Cp. ii. 45.
[87] i. e. even though it was in their own interest.
[88] Cp. ii. 70.
[89] Cp. ii. 67.
[90] The words were either attributed wrongly to Antonius or
were supposed to be spoken in answer to his question, 'Are
the furnaces not lit? ' In either case they were taken to
apply not to the heating of the baths but to the burning of
the town.
[91] i. e. the goddess of malaria, who reigned in terror by
the swampy banks of the Po.
[92] Cremona was founded in 218 B. C. as a Latin colony,
together with Placentia, to keep the Gallic tribes of North
Italy in check.
[93] The Po, Adda, and Oglio.
VITELLIUS
When Caecina had left Rome,[94] Vitellius, after an interval of a 36
few days, sent Fabius Valens hurrying to the front, and then proceeded
to drown his cares in self-indulgence. He neither made any provision
for the war, nor tried to increase the efficiency of his troops either
by haranguing or by drilling them. He did not keep himself in the
public eye, but retired into the pleasant shade of his gardens,
regarding past, present, and future with equal indifference, like one
of those listless animals which lie sluggish, and torpid so long as
you supply them with food. While he thus loitered languid and indolent
in the woods of Aricia,[95] he received the startling news of Lucilius
Bassus' treachery and the disaffection of the fleet at Ravenna. [96]
Soon afterwards he heard with mixed feelings of distress and
satisfaction that Caecina had deserted him and had been imprisoned by
the army. On his insensate nature joy had more effect than trouble.
He returned in triumph to Rome and at a crowded meeting praised the
devotion of the troops in extravagant terms. He gave orders for the
imprisonment of Publilius Sabinus, the prefect of the Guards, on the
ground of his intimacy with Caecina, and appointed Alfenus Varus[97]
in his place.
He next delivered a pompous and elaborate speech in the senate, 37
where he was loaded with far-fetched compliments by the members.
Lucius Vitellius rose to propose a harsh sentence against Caecina. The
rest of the house inveighed with assumed indignation against the
consul who had betrayed his country, the general who had betrayed his
commander-in-chief, the friend who had betrayed his benefactor to whom
he owed all his riches and distinction. But their protestations of
sympathy with Vitellius really voiced their personal vexation. [98]
None of the speeches contained any criticism of the Flavian generals.
They threw the blame on the misguided and impolitic action of the
armies, and with cautious circumlocution avoided all direct mention of
Vespasian. Caecina's consulship[99] had still one day to run, and
Rosius Regulus actually made humble petition for this one day's
office, Vitellius' offer and his acceptance exciting universal
derision. Thus he entered and abdicated his office on the same day,
the last of October. Men who were learned in constitutional history
pointed out that no one before had ever been elected to fill a
vacancy without the passing of a bill or some act of deprivation,
although there was precedent for the one day consulship in the case of
Caninius Rebilus when Caius Caesar was dictator and the civil war
necessitated prompt rewards. [100]
It was at this time that the news of the death of Junius 38
Blaesus[101] gave rise to much talk. I give the story as I find it.
When Vitellius was lying seriously ill at his house in the Servilian
Park, he noticed that a neighbouring mansion was brilliantly
illuminated at night. On asking the reason, he was told that Caecina
Tuscus[102] was giving a large dinner-party, at which Junius Blaesus
was the chief guest. He further received an exaggerated account of
their extravagance and dissipation. Some of his informants even made
specific charges against Tuscus and others, but especially accused
Blaesus for spending his days in revelry while his emperor lay ill.
There are people who keep a sharp eye on every sign of an emperor's
displeasure. They soon made sure that Vitellius was furious and that
Blaesus' ruin would be an easy task, so they cast Lucius Vitellius for
the part of common informer. He had a mean and jealous dislike for
Blaesus, whose spotless reputation far outshone his own, which was
tainted with every kind of infamy. Bursting into the emperor's
apartment, he caught up Vitellius' young son in his arms and fell at
his feet. When asked the reason of this excitement, he said it was due
to no anxiety for himself; all his suit and all his prayers were for
his brother and his brother's children. Their fears of Vespasian were
idle: between him and Vitellius lay all the legions of Germany, all
those brave and loyal provinces, and an immeasurable space of land and
sea. 'It is here in Rome,' he cried, 'in the bosom of our household
that we have an enemy to fear, one who boasts the Junii and Antonii as
his ancestors, one who shows himself affable and munificent to the
troops, posing as a descendant of imperial stock. [103] It is to him
that Rome's attention turns, while you, Sire, careless who is friend
or foe, cherish in your bosom a rival, who sits feasting at his table
and watches his emperor in pain. You must requite his unseasonable
gaiety with a night of deadly sorrow, in which he may both know and
feel that Vitellius lives and is his emperor, and, if anything should
happen, has a son to be his heir. '
Vitellius hesitated anxiously between his criminal desires and his 39
fear that, if he deferred Blaesus' death, he might hasten his own
ruin, or by giving official orders for it might raise a storm of
indignation. He decided to proceed by poison. The suspicion against
him he confirmed by going to see Blaesus and showing obvious
satisfaction. Moreover, he was heard to make the savage boast that he
had, to quote his own words, 'feasted his eyes on his enemy's
deathbed. '
Blaesus, besides his distinguished origin and refined character, was
steadfastly loyal. Even before the decline of Vitellius' cause he had
been canvassed by Caecina and other party leaders, who were turning
against the emperor, and had met them with a persistent refusal. He
was a man of quiet and blameless life, with no ambition for the
principate or, indeed, for any sudden distinction, but he could not
escape the danger of being considered worthy of it.
Meanwhile Fabius Valens, encumbered by a long train of harlots and 40
eunuchs, was conducting a leisurely advance, most unlike a march to
the front, when couriers arrived post-haste with the news that
Lucilius Bassus had surrendered the Ravenna fleet. [104] If he had
hurried forward on his march he might have been in time to save
Caecina's faltering loyalty, or to have joined the legions before the
critical engagement was fought. Many, indeed, advised him to avoid
Ravenna and to make his way by obscure by-roads to Hostilia or
Cremona. Others wanted him to send to Rome for the Guards and to break
through the enemy's lines with a strong force. Valens himself, with
helpless indecision, let the time for action go by while he took
advice; and then rejecting the advice he was offered, chose the middle
course, which is always the worst in a crisis, and thus failed both in
courage and in caution.
He wrote to Vitellius demanding reinforcements, and there arrived 41
three cohorts of Guards and a regiment of cavalry from Britain, too
many to slip through unobserved and too few to force a passage. But
even in such a crisis as this Valens' reputation was as unsavoury as
ever. He was still believed to use violence in the pursuit of illicit
pleasures, and to betray the confidence of his hosts by seducing their
wives and families. He had money and authority to help him, and the
feverish impatience of one whose star is on the wane. At last the
arrival of the reinforcements revealed the perversity of his strategy.
He had too few men to assume the offensive, even if they had been
unquestionably loyal, and their loyalty was under grave suspicion.
However, their sense of decency and respect for the general restrained
them for a while, though such ties are soon broken when troops are
disinclined for danger and indifferent to disgrace. [105] Fearing
trouble, he sent the Guards forward to Ariminum[106] with the cavalry
to secure the rear. Valens himself, with a few companions, whose
loyalty had survived misfortune, turned off into Umbria and thence to
Etruria, where he learnt the result of the battle of Cremona.
Thereupon he formed a plan, which was far from cowardly and might have
had alarming consequences, if it had succeeded. He was to seize ships
and cross to some point on the coast of Narbonnese Gaul, whence he
could rouse the provinces of Gaul and the native German tribes, and
thus raise forces for a fresh outbreak of war.
success, awaited developments in his house. Amid great disturbance the
ships' captains attacked the images of Vitellius and cut down the few
men who offered any resistance. The rest of the fleet were glad enough
of a change, and their sympathies soon came round to Vespasian. Then
Lucilius appeared and publicly claimed responsibility. The fleet
appointed Cornelius Fuscus[48] as their admiral, and he came hurrying
on to the scene. Bassus was put under honourable arrest and conveyed
with an escort of Liburnian cruisers[49] to Atria,[50] where he was
imprisoned by Vibennius Rufinus, who commanded a regiment of auxiliary
horse in garrison there. However, he was soon set free on the
intervention of Hormus, one of the emperor's freedmen. For he, too,
ranked as a general.
When the news that the navy had gone over became known, Caecina, 13
carefully selecting a moment when the camp was deserted, and the men
had all gone to their various duties, summoned to head-quarters the
senior centurions and a few of the soldiers. He then proceeded to
praise the spirit and the strength of Vespasian's party: 'they
themselves had been deserted by the fleet; they were cramped for
supplies; Spain and Gaul were against them; Rome could not be
trusted. ' In every way he exaggerated the weakness of Vitellius'
position. Eventually, when some of his accomplices had given the cue
and the rest were dumbfoundered by his change of front, he made them
all swear allegiance to Vespasian. Immediately the portraits[51] of
Vitellius were torn down and messengers dispatched to Antonius.
However, when the treason got abroad in the camp, and the men
returning to head-quarters saw Vespasian's name on the standards and
Vitellius' portraits scattered on the ground, at first there was an
ominous silence: then with one voice they all vented their feelings.
Had the pride of the German army sunk so low that without a battle and
without a blow they should let their hands be shackled and render up
their arms? What had they against them? None but defeated troops. The
only sound legions of Otho's army, the First and the Fourteenth,
Vespasian had not got, and even those they had routed and cut to
pieces on that same field. And all for what? That these thousands of
fighting men should be handed over like a drove of slaves to Antonius,
the convict! [52] 'Eight legions, forsooth, are to follow the lead of
one miserable fleet. Such is the pleasure of Bassus and Caecina. They
have robbed the emperor of his home, his estate, and all his wealth,
and now they want to take away his troops. We have never lost a man
nor shed a drop of blood. The very Flavians will despise us. What
answer can we give when they question us about our victory or our
defeat? '
Thus they shouted one and all as their indignation urged them. Led 14
by the Fifth legion, they replaced the portraits of Vitellius and put
Caecina in irons. They selected Fabius Fabullus, commanding the Fifth
legion, and the camp-prefect, Cassius Longus, to lead them. Some
marines who arrived at this point from three Liburnian cruisers,[53]
quite innocent and unaware of what had happened, were promptly
butchered. Then the men deserted their camp, broke down the
bridge,[54] and marched back to Hostilia, and thence to Cremona to
join the two legions, the First Italian and Twenty-first Rapax, which
Caecina had sent ahead[55] with some of the cavalry to occupy Cremona.
FOOTNOTES:
[47] The narrative is now resumed from the end of Book II.
[48] See ii. 86.
[49] See ii. 16, note 247.
[50] Atri.
[51] i. e. the medallions on the standards.
[52] See ii. 86.
[53] See ii. 16, note 247.
[54] Over the Tartaro (chap. 9).
[55] See ii. 100.
THE ENGAGEMENT NEAR CREMONA
When Antonius heard of this he determined to attack the enemy 15
while they were still at variance and their forces divided. The
Vitellian generals would soon recover their authority and the troops
their discipline, and confidence would come if the two divisions were
allowed to join. He guessed also that Fabius Valens had already
started from Rome and would hasten his march when he heard of
Caecina's treachery. Valens was loyal to Vitellius and an experienced
soldier. There was good reason, besides, to fear an attack on the side
of Raetia from an immense force of German irregulars. Vitellius had
already summoned auxiliaries from Britain, Gaul, and Spain in
sufficient numbers to blight their chances utterly, had not Antonius
in fear of this very prospect forestalled the victory by hurriedly
forcing an engagement. In two days he marched his whole force from
Verona to Bedriacum. [56] On the next day[57] he left his legions
behind to fortify the camp, and sent out his auxiliary infantry into
territory belonging to Cremona, to taste the joys of plundering their
compatriots under pretext of collecting supplies. To secure greater
freedom for their depredations, he himself advanced at the head of
four thousand cavalry eight miles along the road from Bedriacum. The
scouts, as is usual, turned their attention further afield.
About eleven in the morning a mounted scout galloped up with the 16
news that the enemy were at hand; there was a small body in advance of
the rest, but the noise of an army in movement could be heard over the
country-side. While Antonius was debating what he ought to do, Arrius
Varus, who was greedy to distinguish himself, galloped out with the
keenest of the troopers and charged the Vitellians, inflicting only
slight loss; for, on the arrival of reinforcements, the tables were
turned and those who had been hottest in pursuit were now hindmost in
the rout. Their haste had no sanction from Antonius, who had foreseen
what would happen. Encouraging his men to engage with brave hearts, he
drew off the cavalry on to each flank and left a free passage in the
centre to receive Varus and his troopers. Orders were sent to the
legions to arm and signals were displayed to the foraging party,
summoning them to cease plundering and join the battle by the quickest
possible path. Meanwhile Varus came plunging in terror into the middle
of their ranks, spreading confusion among them. The fresh troops were
swept back along with the wounded, themselves sharing the panic and
sorely embarrassed by the narrowness of the road.
In all the confusion of the rout Antonius never for a moment 17
forgot what befitted a determined general and a brave soldier. Staying
the panic-stricken, checking the fugitives, wherever the fight was
thickest, wherever he saw a gleam of hope, he schemed, he fought, he
shouted, always conspicuous to his own men and a mark for the enemy.
At last, in the heat of his impatience, he thrust through with a lance
a standard-bearer, who was in full flight, then seized the standard
and turned it against the enemy. Whereupon for very shame a few of his
troopers, not more than a hundred, made a stand. The nature of the
ground helped them. The road there was narrower; a stream barred their
way, and the bridge was broken; its depth was uncertain and the steep
banks checked their flight. Thus necessity or chance restored their
fallen fortunes. Forming in close order, they received the
Vitellians' reckless and disordered charge, and at once flung them
into confusion. Antonius pressed hard on the fugitives and cut down
all who blocked his path. The others followed each his inclination,
rifling the dead, capturing prisoners, seizing arms and horses.
Meanwhile, summoned by their shouts of triumph, those who had just now
been in full flight across the fields came hurrying back to share the
victory.
Four miles from Cremona they saw the standards of the Rapax and 18
Italian legions gleaming in the sun. They had marched out thus far
under cover of their cavalry's original success. When fortune turned
against them, they neither opened their ranks to receive the routed
troops nor marched out to attack the enemy, who were wearied with
fighting and their long pursuit. While all went well the Vitellians
did not miss their general, but in the hour of danger they realized
their loss. The victorious cavalry came charging into their wavering
line, and at the same time Vipstanus Messala arrived with the Moesian
auxiliaries and a good number of men from the legions, who had kept up
with the pace of their forced march. [58] These combined forces broke
the opposing column, and the proximity of Cremona's sheltering walls
gave the Vitellians more hope of refuge and less stomach for
resistance.
FOOTNOTES:
[56] About thirty-three miles.
[57] October 27.
[58] They would be more heavily laden than the Moesian
auxiliaries.
THE FATE OF CREMONA
Antonius did not follow up his advantage. He realized that, although
the issue had been successful, the battle had long been doubtful, and
had cost the troopers and their horses many wounds and much hard
fighting. As evening fell, the whole strength of the Flavian army 19
arrived. They had marched among heaps of corpses, and the still
reeking traces of slaughter, and now, feeling that the war was over,
they clamoured to advance at once on Cremona and either receive its
submission or take it by storm. This sounded well for public
utterance, but each man in his heart was thinking, 'We could easily
rush a city on the plain. In a night-assault men are just as brave and
have a better chance of plunder. If we wait for day it will be all
peace and petitions, and what shall we get for our wounds and our
labours? A reputation for mercy! There's no money in that. All the
wealth of Cremona will find its way into the officers' pockets. Storm
a city, and the plunder goes to the soldiers: if it surrenders, the
generals get it. ' They refused to listen to their centurions and
tribunes and drowned their voices in a rattle of arms, swearing they
would break their orders unless they were led out. Antonius then 20
went round among the companies, where his authoritative bearing
obtained silence. He assured them that he had no wish to rob them of
the glory and the reward they so well deserved. 'But,' he said, 'an
army and a general have different functions. It is right that soldiers
should be greedy for battle, but the general often does more good not
by temerity but by foresight, deliberation and delay. I have done all
I could to aid your victory with my sword: now I will serve you by the
general's proper arts of calculation and strategy. The risks that face
us are obvious. It is night; we know nothing of the lie of the city;
the enemy are behind the walls; everything favours an ambush. Even if
the gates were open, we cannot safely enter except by day and after
due reconnoitring. Are you going to begin storming the town when you
cannot possibly see where the ground is level and how high the walls
are? How do you know whether to assault it with engines and showers of
missiles, or with penthouses and shelters? '[59] Then he turned to
individuals, asking one after another whether they had brought
hatchets and pick-axes and other implements for storming a town. When
they answered no, 'Well,' he said, 'could any troops possibly break
through walls or undermine them with nothing but swords and javelins?
Suppose it proves necessary to construct a mound and to shelter
ourselves with mantlets and fascines,[59] are we going to stand idle
like a lot of helpless idiots, gaping at the height of the enemy's
towers and ramparts? Why not rather wait one night till our
siege-train arrives and then carry the victory by force? ' So saying,
he sent the camp-followers and servants with the freshest of the
troopers back to Bedriacum to bring up supplies and whatever else was
wanted.
The soldiers indeed chafed at this and mutiny seemed imminent, 21
when some of the mounted scouts, who had ridden right up to the walls,
captured a few stragglers from Cremona, and learnt from them that six
Vitellian legions and the whole Hostilia army had that very day
covered thirty miles, and, hearing of their comrades' defeat, were
already arming for battle and would be on them immediately. This
alarming news cured their obstinate deafness to the general's advice.
He ordered the Thirteenth legion to take up their position on the
raised Postumian high-road. In touch with them on the left wing in the
open country were the Seventh Galbian, beside whom stood the Seventh
Claudian, so placed that their front was protected by a ditch. On the
right wing were the Eighth, drawn up along an open cross-road, and
next to them the Third, distributed among some thick clumps of trees.
Such, at any rate, was the order of the eagles and standards. In the
darkness the soldiers were confused and took their places at random.
The band of Guards[60] was next to the Third, and the auxiliaries on
the wings, while the cavalry were disposed in support round the flanks
and the rear. Sido and Italicus with their picked band of Suebi[61]
fought in the front line.
For the Vitellians the right course was to rest at Cremona and 22
recuperate their strength with food and a night's rest, and then on
the next day to crush and rout the Flavians when they were stiff with
cold and weak from hunger. But they had no general;[62] they had no
plan. Though it was nearly nine at night they flung themselves upon
the Flavians, who were standing steady in their places to receive
them. In their fury and the darkness the Vitellian line was so
disordered that one can hardly venture to describe the disposition of
their troops. However, it has been stated that the Fourth Macedonian
legion were on the right flank; in the centre were the Fifth and
Fifteenth with the detachments of the Ninth, the Second and the
Twentieth from Britain; the Sixteenth, the Twenty-second, and the
First formed the left wing. The men of the Rapax and Italian
legions[63] were distributed among all the companies. [64] The cavalry
and auxiliaries picked their own position. All night the battle raged
with varying fortune, never decided, always savagely contested.
Disaster threatened now one side, now the other. Courage, strength
were of little use: their eyes could not even see in front of them.
Both sides were armed alike; the watchwords, constantly demanded, soon
became known; the standards were all in confusion, as they were
captured and carried off from one band to another. The Seventh legion,
raised recently by Galba, suffered most severely. Six of the senior
centurions fell and several standards were lost. They nearly lost
their eagle too, but it was rescued by the bravery of the senior
centurion, named Atilius Verus, who after great slaughter of the enemy
fell finally himself.
Antonius had meanwhile called up the Guards to reinforce his 23
wavering line. Taking up the fight, they repulsed the enemy, only to
be repulsed in their turn. For the Vitellian artillery, which had at
first been scattered all along the line, and had been discharged upon
the bushes without hurting the enemy, was now massed upon the
high-road, and swept the open space in front. One immense engine in
particular, which belonged to the Fifteenth, mowed down the Flavian
line with huge stones. The slaughter thus caused would have been
enormous, had not two of the Flavian soldiers performed a memorable
exploit. Concealing their identity by snatching up shields from among
the enemy's dead,[65] they cut the ropes which suspended the weights
of the engine. They fell immediately, riddled with wounds, and so
their names have perished. But of their deed there is no doubt.
Fortune had favoured neither side when, as the night wore on, the moon
rose and threw a deceptive glamour over the field of battle. Shining
from behind the Flavians the moon was in their favour. It magnified
the shadows of their men and horses so that the enemy took the shadow
for the substance, and their missiles were misdirected and fell
short. The Vitellians, on the other hand, had the moon shining full on
them and were an easy mark for the Flavians, shooting as it were out
of cover. [66]
Thus being enabled to recognize his own men, and to be recognized 24
by them, Antonius appealed to some by taunting their honour, to many
by words of praise and encouragement, to all by promising hope of
reward. He asked the Pannonian legions why they had drawn their swords
again. Here on this field they could regain their glory and wipe out
the stain of their former disgrace. [67] Then turning to the Moesian
troops, who were the chief promoters of the war,[68] he told them it
was no good challenging the Vitellians with verbal threats, if they
could not bear to face them and their blows. Thus he addressed each
legion as he reached it. To the Third he spoke at greater length,
reminding them of their victories both old and new. Had they not under
Mark Antony defeated the Parthians[69] and the Armenians under
Corbulo? [70] Had they not but lately crushed the Sarmatians? [71] Then
he turned in fury on the Guards. 'Peasants that you are,' he shouted,
'have you another emperor, another camp waiting to shelter you, if you
are defeated? There in the enemy's line are your standards and your
arms: defeat means death and--no, you have drained disgrace already to
the dregs. '
These words roused cheers on all sides, and the Third, following the
Syrian custom,[72] saluted the rising sun. Thus arose a casual 25
rumour--or possibly it was suggested by the general's ingenuity--that
Mucianus had arrived, and that the two armies were cheering each
other. On they pressed, feeling they had been reinforced. The
Vitellian line was more ragged now, for, having no general to marshal
them, their ranks now filled, now thinned, with each alternation of
courage and fear. As soon as Antonius saw them waver, he kept
thrusting at them in massed column. The line bent and then broke, and
the inextricable confusion of wagons and siege-engines prevented their
rallying. The victorious troops scattered along the cross-road in
headlong pursuit.
The slaughter was marked by one peculiar horror. A son killed his
father. I give the facts and names on the authority of Vipstanus
Messala. [73] One Julius Mansuetus, a Spaniard who had joined the
legion Rapax, had left a young son at home. This boy subsequently grew
up and enlisted in the Seventh legion, raised by Galba. [74] Chance now
sent his father in his way, and he felled him to the ground. While he
was ransacking the dying man, they recognized each other. Flinging his
arms round the now lifeless corpse, in a piteous voice he implored
his father's spirit to be appeased and not to turn against him as a
parricide. The crime was his country's, he cried; what share had a
single soldier in these civil wars? Meanwhile he lifted the body and
began to dig a grave and perform the last rites for his father. Those
who were nearest noticed this; then the story began to spread, till
there ran through the army astonishment and many complaints and curses
against this wicked war. Yet they never ceased busily killing and
plundering friends and relatives and brothers; and while they talked
of the crime they were committing it themselves.
When they reached Cremona a fresh task of vast difficulty awaited 26
them. During the war with Otho[75] the German army had entrenched
their camp round the walls of Cremona and then erected a rampart round
the camp; and these fortifications had been further strengthened. The
sight of them brought the victors to a halt, and their generals were
uncertain what instructions to give. The troops had had no rest for a
day and a night. To storm the town at once would be an arduous and, in
the absence of reserves, a perilous task. On the other hand, a retreat
to Bedriacum would involve the intolerable fatigue of a long march,
and destroy the value of their victory. Again, it would be dangerous
to entrench themselves so close to the lines of the enemy, who might
at any minute sally forth and rout them while they were dispersed and
digging trenches. The chief anxiety lay in the temper of the men, who
were much more ready to face danger than delay. To them discretion was
disagreeable and hazard spelt hope. Their thirst for plunder
outweighed all fears of wounds and bloodshed.
Antonius also inclined to this view and gave orders for them to 27
surround the rampart. At first they stood back and delivered volleys
of arrows and stones, suffering themselves the severer loss, for a
storm of missiles rained down from the walls. Antonius then told off
each legion to assault a different point of the rampart or one of the
gates, hoping that by thus separating them he could distinguish the
cowards from the brave and inflame them with a spirit of honourable
rivalry. The Third and Seventh took the position nearest the road to
Bedriacum; the Eighth and Seventh Claudian assaulted the right-hand
side of the rampart; the Thirteenth swept up to the Brixian Gate. [76]
A brief delay was caused while some fetched mattocks and pickaxes from
the fields, and others hooks and ladders. Then holding their shields
above their heads in close 'tortoise' formation,[77] they advanced
under the rampart. Both sides employed Roman tactics. The Vitellians
rolled down huge masses of stones, and, as the sheltering cover of
shields parted and wavered, they thrust at it with lances and poles,
until at last the whole structure was broken up and they mowed down
the torn and bleeding soldiers beneath with terrible slaughter.
The men would certainly have hesitated, had not the generals,
realizing that they were really too tired to respond to any other form
of encouragement, pointed significantly to Cremona. Whether this 28
was Hormus's idea, as Messala[78] records, or whether we should rather
follow Caius Pliny, who accuses Antonius, it is not easy to determine.
This one may say, that, however abominable the crime, yet in
committing it neither Antonius nor Hormus belied the reputation of
their lives. After this neither wounds nor bloodshed could stay the
Flavian troops. They demolished the rampart, shook the gates, climbed
up on each other's shoulders, or over the re-formed 'tortoise', and
snatched away the enemy's weapons or caught hold of them by the arms.
Thus the wounded and unwounded, the half-dead and the dying, all came
rolling down and perished together by every imaginable kind of death.
The fight raged thickest round the Third and Seventh legions, and 29
the general, Antonius, came up with a picked band of auxiliaries to
support their assault. The Vitellians, finding themselves unable to
resist the attack of troops thus stubbornly vying with each other, and
seeing their missiles all glide off the shelter of shields, at last
sent their engine of war crashing down upon their heads. For the
moment it scattered and crushed beneath it the men on whom it fell,
but it dragged with it some of the battlements and the top of the
rampart. At the same moment one of the towers on the rampart gave way
under a shower of stones. While the men of the Seventh struggled up to
the breach in close column,[79] the Third hewed down the gate with
hatchets and swords. All the authorities[80] agree that Caius Volusius
of the Third legion was the first man in. Emerging on the top of the
rampart, he hurled down those who barred his path, and from this
conspicuous position waved his hand and shouted that the camp was
taken. The others poured through, while the Vitellians in panic flung
themselves down from the rampart, and the whole space between the camp
and the walls became a seething scene of carnage.
Here, again, was a new type of task for the Flavians. Here were 30
high walls, stone battlements, iron-barred gates, and soldiers hurling
javelins. The citizens of Cremona were numerous and devoted to the
cause of Vitellius, and half Italy had gathered there for the Fair
which fell just at that time. Their numbers were a help to the
defenders, but the prospect of plundering them offered an incentive to
their assailants. Antonius ordered his men to bring fire and apply it
to the most beautiful of the buildings outside the walls, hoping that
the loss of their property might induce the citizens to turn traitor.
The houses that stood nearest to the walls and overtopped them he
crowded with his bravest troops, who dislodged the defenders with
showers of beams and tiles and flaming torches. Meanwhile, some of 31
the legionaries began to advance in 'tortoise' formation,[81] while
others kept up a steady fire of javelins and stones.
Gradually the spirit of the Vitellians ebbed. The higher their rank,
the more easily they gave way to misfortune. For they were afraid that
if Cremona too[82] was demolished, there would be no hope of pardon;
the victors' fury would fall not on the common poor but on the
tribunes and centurions, whom it would pay to kill. The common
soldiers felt safe in their obscurity, and, careless of the future,
continued to offer resistance. They roamed the streets or hid
themselves in houses, and though they had given up the war, refused
even so to sue for peace. Meanwhile the tribunes and centurions did
away with the name and portraits of Vitellius. [83] They released
Caecina, who was still in irons,[84] and begged his help in pleading
their cause. When he turned from them in haughty contempt they
besought him with tears. It was, indeed, the last of evils that all
these brave men should invoke a traitor's aid. They then hung veils
and fillets[85] out on the walls, and when Antonius had given the
order to cease firing, they carried out their standards and eagles,
followed by a miserable column of disarmed soldiers, dejectedly
hanging their heads. The victors had at first crowded round, heaping
insults on them and threatening violence, but when they found that the
vanquished had lost all their proud spirit, and turned their cheeks
with servile endurance to every indignity, they gradually began to
recollect that these were the men who had made such a moderate use of
their victory at Bedriacum. [86] But when the crowd parted, and Caecina
advanced in his consular robes, attended by his lictors in full state,
their indignation broke into flame. They charged him with insolence
and cruelty, and--so hateful is crime--they even flung his treachery
in his teeth. [87] Antonius restrained them and sent Caecina under
escort to Vespasian.
Meanwhile the citizens of Cremona suffered sorely from the 32
violence of the troops, and only the entreaties of their generals
could withhold them from a general massacre. Antonius summoned a mass
meeting and delivered a eulogy upon his victorious army, promising
mercy to the vanquished and speaking of Cremona in ambiguous terms.
Besides their natural passion for plunder, there was an old grudge
which urged them to sack Cremona. The town was believed to have given
assistance to the Vitellian cause before this in the war with
Otho;[88] and again, when the Thirteenth had been left behind to
build an amphitheatre,[89] the populace had shown its town-bred
impertinence by assailing them with insolent ridicule. Other causes
increased this bad feeling: it was here that Caecina had given his
show of gladiators:[89] the town had become for a second time the
theatre of the war: the citizens had conveyed food to the Vitellians
during the battle: some women had been killed, whose enthusiasm for
the cause had led them to take part in the fight. Besides all this,
the Fair had filled the rich city with an even greater display of
wealth than usual. All eyes were now centred on Antonius, whose fame
and good fortune overshadowed all the other generals. It so happened
that he hurried off to the baths to wash off the stains of blood.
Finding fault with the temperature of the water, he received the
answer, 'It will not be long before it is hot,' and this phrase was
caught up. The attendant's words were repeated, and brought all the
odium on Antonius, who was thus believed to have given the signal to
set fire to Cremona, which was already in flames. [90]
Thus forty thousand soldiers burst into the town with a yet larger 33
crowd of servants and sutlers, even more depraved than the soldiers in
their readiness for cruelty and lust. Without any respect for age or
for authority they added rape to murder and murder to rape. Aged men
and decrepit old women, who were worthless as booty, were hustled off
to make sport for them. If some grown girl or a handsome youth fell
into their clutches, they would be torn to pieces in the struggle for
possession, while the plunderers were left to cut each other's
throats. Whoever carried off money or any of the solid gold offerings
in the temples was liable to be cut to pieces, if he met another
stronger than himself. Some, disdaining easy finds, hunted for hidden
hoards, and dug out buried treasure, flogging and torturing the
householders. They held torches in their hands and, having once
secured their prize, would fling them wantonly into an empty house or
some dismantled temple. Composed as the army was of citizens, allies,
and foreign troops, differing widely in language and customs, the
objects of the soldiers' greed differed also. But while their views of
what was right might vary, they all agreed in thinking nothing wrong.
Cremona lasted them four days. While all other buildings sacred and
secular sank in the flames, only the temple of Mefitis outside the
walls was left standing, saved either by its position or the power of
the presiding deity. [91]
Such was the end of Cremona two hundred and eighty-six years after 34
its foundation. It had been originally built in the consulship of
Tiberius Sempronius and Publius Cornelius, while Hannibal was
threatening to invade Italy, to serve as a bulwark against the Gauls
beyond the Po,[92] and to resist any other power that might break in
over the Alps. And so it grew and flourished, aided by its large
number of settlers, its conveniently situated rivers,[93] the
fertility of its territory, and its connexion through alliance and
intermarriage with other communities. Foreign invasions had left it
untouched only to become the victim of civil war. Antonius, ashamed of
his crime, and realizing his growing disfavour, proclaimed that no
citizen of Cremona was to be kept as a prisoner of war; and, indeed,
the unanimous feeling in Italy against buying such slaves had already
frustrated the soldiers' hope of profit. So they began to kill their
captives, whose relatives and friends, when this became known,
covertly bought their release. After a while, the rest of the
inhabitants returned, and the squares and temples were rebuilt by the
munificence of the burghers and under Vespasian's direct patronage.
However, the soil was so foully infected by the reek of blood that 35
it was impossible for the Flavians to encamp for long on the ruins of
this buried city. They advanced along the road to the third milestone,
and mustered the Vitellians, still straggling and panic-stricken, each
under his own standard. The defeated legions were then distributed
through Illyricum, for the civil war was still in progress and their
fidelity could not be relied on. They then dispatched couriers to
carry the news to Britain and the Spanish provinces. To Gaul they sent
an officer named Julius Calenus, to Germany Alpinius Montanus, who had
commanded an auxiliary cohort. Montanus was a Treviran and Calenus an
Aeduan; both had fought for Vitellius and thus served to advertise
Vespasian's victory. At the same time garrisons were sent to hold the
passes of the Alps, for fear that Germany might rise in support of
Vitellius.
FOOTNOTES:
[59] See ii. 21.
[60] i. e. the band of Otho's old Guards whom Vitellius had
disbanded and Vespasian re-enlisted (see ii. 67, 82).
[61] See chap. 5.
[62] Caecina was under arrest, Valens still on his way from
Rome (see chaps. 14, 15).
[63] XXI and I.
[64] Because they had already suffered heavy losses earlier
in the day (see chap. 18).
[65] These shields would have Vitellius' name on them, and
thus conceal their identity.
[66] Dio asserts that the moon was 'black and bloody, and
gave off other fearsome hues'.
[67] i. e. at the first battle of Bedriacum (see ii. 43).
[68] See ii. 85.
[69] 36 B. C.
[70] A. D. 63.
[71] i. e. the Rhoxolani (cp. i. 79).
[72] They had served recently in Syria under Corbulo (see above).
[73] An eyewitness (see note 39).
[74] In Spain.
[75] i. e. at the time of the first battle of Bedriacum in April.
[76] i. e. the gate giving on to the road to Brescia.
[77] In this famous formation the front-rank men kept close
together and covered their bodies with long, concave shields,
while the others, holding flat shields over their heads and
pressing them one against another, formed a protecting roof.
They could thus approach the walls under cover.
[78] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.
[79] For the term (_cuneus_) here used, see note on ii. 42.
[80] Cp. ii. 101, note 459.
[81] See note 77.
[82] As well as the buildings outside the walls.
[83] i. e. tore them off the standards and shields, and broke
the statues at head-quarters.
[84] See chap. 14.
[85] Cp. i. 66.
[86] Cp. ii. 45.
[87] i. e. even though it was in their own interest.
[88] Cp. ii. 70.
[89] Cp. ii. 67.
[90] The words were either attributed wrongly to Antonius or
were supposed to be spoken in answer to his question, 'Are
the furnaces not lit? ' In either case they were taken to
apply not to the heating of the baths but to the burning of
the town.
[91] i. e. the goddess of malaria, who reigned in terror by
the swampy banks of the Po.
[92] Cremona was founded in 218 B. C. as a Latin colony,
together with Placentia, to keep the Gallic tribes of North
Italy in check.
[93] The Po, Adda, and Oglio.
VITELLIUS
When Caecina had left Rome,[94] Vitellius, after an interval of a 36
few days, sent Fabius Valens hurrying to the front, and then proceeded
to drown his cares in self-indulgence. He neither made any provision
for the war, nor tried to increase the efficiency of his troops either
by haranguing or by drilling them. He did not keep himself in the
public eye, but retired into the pleasant shade of his gardens,
regarding past, present, and future with equal indifference, like one
of those listless animals which lie sluggish, and torpid so long as
you supply them with food. While he thus loitered languid and indolent
in the woods of Aricia,[95] he received the startling news of Lucilius
Bassus' treachery and the disaffection of the fleet at Ravenna. [96]
Soon afterwards he heard with mixed feelings of distress and
satisfaction that Caecina had deserted him and had been imprisoned by
the army. On his insensate nature joy had more effect than trouble.
He returned in triumph to Rome and at a crowded meeting praised the
devotion of the troops in extravagant terms. He gave orders for the
imprisonment of Publilius Sabinus, the prefect of the Guards, on the
ground of his intimacy with Caecina, and appointed Alfenus Varus[97]
in his place.
He next delivered a pompous and elaborate speech in the senate, 37
where he was loaded with far-fetched compliments by the members.
Lucius Vitellius rose to propose a harsh sentence against Caecina. The
rest of the house inveighed with assumed indignation against the
consul who had betrayed his country, the general who had betrayed his
commander-in-chief, the friend who had betrayed his benefactor to whom
he owed all his riches and distinction. But their protestations of
sympathy with Vitellius really voiced their personal vexation. [98]
None of the speeches contained any criticism of the Flavian generals.
They threw the blame on the misguided and impolitic action of the
armies, and with cautious circumlocution avoided all direct mention of
Vespasian. Caecina's consulship[99] had still one day to run, and
Rosius Regulus actually made humble petition for this one day's
office, Vitellius' offer and his acceptance exciting universal
derision. Thus he entered and abdicated his office on the same day,
the last of October. Men who were learned in constitutional history
pointed out that no one before had ever been elected to fill a
vacancy without the passing of a bill or some act of deprivation,
although there was precedent for the one day consulship in the case of
Caninius Rebilus when Caius Caesar was dictator and the civil war
necessitated prompt rewards. [100]
It was at this time that the news of the death of Junius 38
Blaesus[101] gave rise to much talk. I give the story as I find it.
When Vitellius was lying seriously ill at his house in the Servilian
Park, he noticed that a neighbouring mansion was brilliantly
illuminated at night. On asking the reason, he was told that Caecina
Tuscus[102] was giving a large dinner-party, at which Junius Blaesus
was the chief guest. He further received an exaggerated account of
their extravagance and dissipation. Some of his informants even made
specific charges against Tuscus and others, but especially accused
Blaesus for spending his days in revelry while his emperor lay ill.
There are people who keep a sharp eye on every sign of an emperor's
displeasure. They soon made sure that Vitellius was furious and that
Blaesus' ruin would be an easy task, so they cast Lucius Vitellius for
the part of common informer. He had a mean and jealous dislike for
Blaesus, whose spotless reputation far outshone his own, which was
tainted with every kind of infamy. Bursting into the emperor's
apartment, he caught up Vitellius' young son in his arms and fell at
his feet. When asked the reason of this excitement, he said it was due
to no anxiety for himself; all his suit and all his prayers were for
his brother and his brother's children. Their fears of Vespasian were
idle: between him and Vitellius lay all the legions of Germany, all
those brave and loyal provinces, and an immeasurable space of land and
sea. 'It is here in Rome,' he cried, 'in the bosom of our household
that we have an enemy to fear, one who boasts the Junii and Antonii as
his ancestors, one who shows himself affable and munificent to the
troops, posing as a descendant of imperial stock. [103] It is to him
that Rome's attention turns, while you, Sire, careless who is friend
or foe, cherish in your bosom a rival, who sits feasting at his table
and watches his emperor in pain. You must requite his unseasonable
gaiety with a night of deadly sorrow, in which he may both know and
feel that Vitellius lives and is his emperor, and, if anything should
happen, has a son to be his heir. '
Vitellius hesitated anxiously between his criminal desires and his 39
fear that, if he deferred Blaesus' death, he might hasten his own
ruin, or by giving official orders for it might raise a storm of
indignation. He decided to proceed by poison. The suspicion against
him he confirmed by going to see Blaesus and showing obvious
satisfaction. Moreover, he was heard to make the savage boast that he
had, to quote his own words, 'feasted his eyes on his enemy's
deathbed. '
Blaesus, besides his distinguished origin and refined character, was
steadfastly loyal. Even before the decline of Vitellius' cause he had
been canvassed by Caecina and other party leaders, who were turning
against the emperor, and had met them with a persistent refusal. He
was a man of quiet and blameless life, with no ambition for the
principate or, indeed, for any sudden distinction, but he could not
escape the danger of being considered worthy of it.
Meanwhile Fabius Valens, encumbered by a long train of harlots and 40
eunuchs, was conducting a leisurely advance, most unlike a march to
the front, when couriers arrived post-haste with the news that
Lucilius Bassus had surrendered the Ravenna fleet. [104] If he had
hurried forward on his march he might have been in time to save
Caecina's faltering loyalty, or to have joined the legions before the
critical engagement was fought. Many, indeed, advised him to avoid
Ravenna and to make his way by obscure by-roads to Hostilia or
Cremona. Others wanted him to send to Rome for the Guards and to break
through the enemy's lines with a strong force. Valens himself, with
helpless indecision, let the time for action go by while he took
advice; and then rejecting the advice he was offered, chose the middle
course, which is always the worst in a crisis, and thus failed both in
courage and in caution.
He wrote to Vitellius demanding reinforcements, and there arrived 41
three cohorts of Guards and a regiment of cavalry from Britain, too
many to slip through unobserved and too few to force a passage. But
even in such a crisis as this Valens' reputation was as unsavoury as
ever. He was still believed to use violence in the pursuit of illicit
pleasures, and to betray the confidence of his hosts by seducing their
wives and families. He had money and authority to help him, and the
feverish impatience of one whose star is on the wane. At last the
arrival of the reinforcements revealed the perversity of his strategy.
He had too few men to assume the offensive, even if they had been
unquestionably loyal, and their loyalty was under grave suspicion.
However, their sense of decency and respect for the general restrained
them for a while, though such ties are soon broken when troops are
disinclined for danger and indifferent to disgrace. [105] Fearing
trouble, he sent the Guards forward to Ariminum[106] with the cavalry
to secure the rear. Valens himself, with a few companions, whose
loyalty had survived misfortune, turned off into Umbria and thence to
Etruria, where he learnt the result of the battle of Cremona.
Thereupon he formed a plan, which was far from cowardly and might have
had alarming consequences, if it had succeeded. He was to seize ships
and cross to some point on the coast of Narbonnese Gaul, whence he
could rouse the provinces of Gaul and the native German tribes, and
thus raise forces for a fresh outbreak of war.
