Objection
2: Further, shame is a part of temperance.
Summa Theologica
xxii, 9] on the passage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck. " But some have not
suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting
them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made
in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not
bound to confession.
Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not
bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
confession.
On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and
contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore
all are bound to confession also.
Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii),
where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their
sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion. "
I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the
Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this
way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into
mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and
in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the
general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order
that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have
sinned and need the grace of God" (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist
may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish
priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal
life, to avoid shipwreck, i. e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which
also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance,
and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to
Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the
latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the
superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is
the minister of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in
virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and
that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others,
answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those
who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it
orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins,
because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who
has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins,
but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church
that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be
unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin
which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is
the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is
none. " Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself
of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he
is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous
sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be
mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as
mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a
man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an
untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a
crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man
ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state
known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does
not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his
confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words
must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what
is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may
be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the
act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an
erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.
Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the
saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act
which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus
it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works. " Wherefore it is also
the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words
of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a
just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had
committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those
things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that
which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm
that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and
what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one is bound to confess at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For
Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is
inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay. " But everyone
is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as
soon as possible.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual
disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body
were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his
health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's
health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one
at hand.
Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man
owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at
once.
On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the
Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
De Poenit. et Remiss. ). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive
the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he
does not confess before that time.
Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to
do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so,
with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner
at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal
sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a
man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger
of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be
forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be
bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess
or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to
have the purpose of confessing.
But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First,
accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do
without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for
then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the
Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin,
without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no
urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess
once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a
year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that
time.
Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the
same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism,
because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to
receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so
he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is
there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur
a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer
doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if
the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it,
e. g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like
motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same
seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that
are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he
is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to
receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time
the commandment about making confession and that about receiving
Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable
of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it
is dangerous to delay.
Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once,
as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it
matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession,
because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect
involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who
delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from
punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time.
But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at
once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient
to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms
of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would
commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves
urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first
opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even
though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on
account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at
once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that
before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.
Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before
Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are
bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for
penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no
obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as
they are bound to by vow.
Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the
physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being
healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.
Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the
owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and
for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate
restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not
bound to fulfill it at once.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one can be dispensed from confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing
his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to
dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as
appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be
dispensed from confession.
Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was
instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by
God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another. "
Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the
apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also
dispense a man from confessing.
On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary
sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church
which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation
is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded
on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power
to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are
already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those
that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which
belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.
Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be
saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so
far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however,
dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of
the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession
longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less
than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is
possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive
Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted
by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was
instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it
was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their
sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and
though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood
of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession
unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the
hidden disease by the hope of pardon. " For the disease against which
confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest.
Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a
"hidden" disease.
Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession
is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set
down as the cause of confession.
Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid
bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the
seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but
closed up.
Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from
the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang. ) that confession is "the
uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound. " Others say that
"confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a
priest. " Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental
self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the
keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to
perform the penance imposed on him. " Therefore it seems that the
definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all
that these include.
I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act
of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is
a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin;
thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest;
fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz.
release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the
other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine,
indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the
matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"---its
cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions
include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have
knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he
is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him
by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in
the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act,
is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us
life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition
that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is
previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than
by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of
confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the
priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should
include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this
reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one
cause, and some that indicate another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are naturally
capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But
confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an
act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is
innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is
the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an
innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs
somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But
confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But
confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is
meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the Master says
(Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS,
Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to
belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply
some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not
include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name
implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience:
for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips
what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a
fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a
condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing
generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it
be devoid of other due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man
to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he
ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the
natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the
confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that
the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all
matters belonging to the positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of
the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act,
so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of
which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man,
though it is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from
the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence
there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far
as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a
sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a
remedy for sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue
of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now
the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the
definition given above [4842](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is an
act of hope and not of penance.
Objection 2: Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession
arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1],
OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.
Objection 3: Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But
confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which
is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 4: Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the
Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which
is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon.
Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man
shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which
is called truth, and not of penance.
On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now
confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.
I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a
special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the
object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the
expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the
ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality,
as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession
of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely,
yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong
to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of
justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God's
favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so
too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not
the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue
of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in
so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting
but as commanding.
Reply to Objection 2: In that definition shame is not mentioned as the
cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of
confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment
(because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the
Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.
Reply to Objection 3: By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can
be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may
correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for
evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of
the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it
entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders
the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of
Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
Reply to Objection 4: Since confession results from hope rather than
from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article
about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article
about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its
aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been
said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there
are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
(2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
(3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can
hear the confession of venial sins?
(4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?
(5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own
priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior?
(6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any
priest?
(7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to
the sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a
priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its
Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us
(James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another," where there is no
mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a
priest.
Objection 2: Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also
Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its
necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession
should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to
confess to anyone.
Objection 3: Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure
of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes
another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in
imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is
not necessary to confess to a priest.
Objection 4: Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order
that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a
rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not
always be made to a priest.
On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which
he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the
keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus
to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus
(Jn. 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends
from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a
ministry over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments,
wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can
consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the
sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the
sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made
to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.
Reply to Objection 1: James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine
institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God
to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the
apostles, to forgive sins, as related in Jn. 20:23, we must take the
words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than
Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes
Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the
case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this
cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but
adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and
the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting
death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In satisfaction we must consider not only the
quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part
of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments,
though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a
priest.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be necessary for two reasons to know the
sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's
flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral
charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not
priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for
their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man,
i. e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to
health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things.
It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to
another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as
appears from the definition given above ([4843]Q[7], A[1]). But the
dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a
sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it
seems that confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 2: Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained
to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if
pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should
be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge
is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing.
Therefore confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 3: Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize,
if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should
not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a
case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest,
when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not
be made to a layman in a case of necessity.
On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance.
And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold
minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office,
viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is
committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of
Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made,
is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the
place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.
Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Penance there is not only
something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and
imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the
recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition
and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far
as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the
fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when
possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should
fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can;
and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill
the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is
supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman,
through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a
perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs
to the priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition
reads "through desire for a priest". ]
Reply to Objection 2: Although a layman is not the judge of the person
who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the
place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the
penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.
Reply to Objection 3: By means of the sacraments man must needs be
reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be
reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him.
In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the
element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by "the word of
life" (Eph. 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a
man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized
again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church
reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is
no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which
grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of
necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from
God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose
which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is not yet
reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments,
unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received
the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he
must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and
the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was
not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by
receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful
effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the
sacrament of Penance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear
the confession of venial sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one
but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the
dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of
necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary.
Therefore it is not committed to a layman.
Objection 2: Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin,
just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as
appears from James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial
sins be made to a layman.
On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James 5:16, "Confess . .
. one to another") quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from
the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any
further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be
reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess
his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a
sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it
proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as
the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf.
[4844]TP, Q[87], A[3]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no
need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a
sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy
for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's
own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says: "By
our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have
decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the
apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose
penances, and absolve from sins. " Now monks are not the proper priests
of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore
confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be
made to any priest.
Objection 2: Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as
also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.
Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore
there is no need to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 3: Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it
is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left
to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text
(Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work
of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to
find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind. "
Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 4: Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to
have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are
bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to
his own priest.
Objection 5: Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of
charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (De
Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the
sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to
confess to any particular priest: e. g. if the sinner know that his own
priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to
the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected
of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a
sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need
not always confess to one's own priest.
Objection 6: Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary
for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it
seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one
particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession,
through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore,
since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be
straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their
own priest.
On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth
Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed "all of either sex to confess
once a year to their own priest. "
Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish.
Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas
ix[4845], Q[2]; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi[4846], Q[5]), for a bishop
to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is
not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another's
parishioner.
I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the
recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with
regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is
required as removing an obstacle, i. e. insincerity, in order that he
may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of
his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches
the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since
contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the
penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their
origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their
command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must
be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not
competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him.
Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the
minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but
also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no
jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is
not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest,
but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man
except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by
his command, can bind the penitent to do something.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of those monks who have
jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had
maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not
absolve or impose penance, which is false.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require
the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated
above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest,
although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.
Reply to Objection 3: The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us
in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the
permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens
to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.
Reply to Objection 4: Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the
sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by
law (De Poenit. et Remiss. , Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest
for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior;
even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a
patient.
Reply to Objection 5: In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to
fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing
to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask
permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails
to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no
priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to
him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the
precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the
lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is
charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on
the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the
power intrusted to him.
Reply to Objection 6: The necessity of confessing to one's own priest
does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently.
A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission
to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather
die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those
priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects
by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and
consequently for themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest,
in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess
to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or
command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that
wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject's own
priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be
allowed by a superior's privilege, permission, or command.
Objection 2: Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine
command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man.
Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the
countenance of their own cattle" (Prov. 27:23); and this is hindered if
another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore
this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.
Objection 3: Further, he that hears another's confession is the
latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man
cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be
bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands
were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another
than one's own priest, even with the superior's permission.
Objection 4: Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least
useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has
confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own
priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved
from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect.
Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his
own priest.
On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute
the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck. " But some have not
suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting
them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of
Penance.
Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made
in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not
bound to confession.
Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not
bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to
confession.
On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and
contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore
all are bound to confession also.
Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii),
where it is stated that "all of either sex are bound to confess their
sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion. "
I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the
Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this
way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into
mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and
in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the
general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order
that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because "all have
sinned and need the grace of God" (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist
may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish
priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal
life, to avoid shipwreck, i. e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot
avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which
also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance,
and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to
Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the
latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the
superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is
the minister of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in
virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and
that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others,
answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those
who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it
orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins,
because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who
has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins,
but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church
that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be
unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin
which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), "it is
the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is
none. " Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself
of those sins which one has not committed.
Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than
another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised.
But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he
is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous
sin than one has.
Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be
mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as
mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a
man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore
he can also confess a sin which he has not done.
On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an
untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every
untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has
not committed.
Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a
crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the
witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man
ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.
I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state
known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other
than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does
not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his
confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words
must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what
is on his conscience.
Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may
be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the
act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an
erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done.
Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the
saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act
which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus
it is written (Job 9:28): "I feared all my works. " Wherefore it is also
the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words
of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.
From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a
just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had
committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those
things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be
mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt,
because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while
doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to
chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that
which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm
that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to
the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and
what is not.
Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making
satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone
confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he
mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he
does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession
thereof tally with his conscience.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one is bound to confess at once?
Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For
Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): "The contempt of confession is
inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay. " But everyone
is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as
soon as possible.
Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual
disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body
were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his
health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man's
health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one
at hand.
Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man
owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at
once.
On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the
Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus:
De Poenit. et Remiss. ). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive
the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he
does not confess before that time.
Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to
do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so,
with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner
at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal
sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.
I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a
man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition,
viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger
of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be
forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be
bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess
or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to
have the purpose of confessing.
But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First,
accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do
without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for
then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the
Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin,
without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no
urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess
once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a
year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that
time.
Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the
same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism,
because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to
receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so
he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is
there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur
a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal
sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since,
as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer
doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if
the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it,
e. g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like
motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same
seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism.
Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that
are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he
is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to
receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time
the commandment about making confession and that about receiving
Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable
of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it
is dangerous to delay.
Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once,
as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it
matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession,
because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect
involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who
delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from
punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would
not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time.
But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at
once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient
to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms
of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would
commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves
urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first
opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even
though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent
for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on
account of the Church's indulgence that he is not bound to confess at
once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that
before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.
Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before
Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are
bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for
penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no
obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as
they are bound to by vow.
Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this
sacrament.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the
physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being
healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.
Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another's property against the
owner's will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and
for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate
restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative
precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not
bound to fulfill it at once.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one can be dispensed from confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing
his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to
dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as
appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be
dispensed from confession.
Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was
instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by
God, but by a man (James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another. "
Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the
apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also
dispense a man from confessing.
On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary
sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed
from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.
I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church
which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the
Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation
is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded
on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power
to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are
already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those
that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which
belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church.
Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be
saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so
far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however,
dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of
the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession
longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.
Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less
than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is
possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive
Divine law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted
by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was
instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it
was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being
prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their
sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and
though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood
of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?
(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession
unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the
hidden disease by the hope of pardon. " For the disease against which
confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest.
Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a
"hidden" disease.
Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession
is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set
down as the cause of confession.
Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid
bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the
seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but
closed up.
Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from
the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang. ) that confession is "the
uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound. " Others say that
"confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a
priest. " Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental
self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the
keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to
perform the penance imposed on him. " Therefore it seems that the
definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all
that these include.
I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act
of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is
a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin;
thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest;
fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz.
release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the
other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine,
indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"---the
matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"---its
cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions
include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have
knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of
Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he
is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him
by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in
the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act,
is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us
life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition
that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is
previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than
by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of
confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the
priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.
Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should
include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this
reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one
cause, and some that indicate another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since "we are naturally
capable of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But
confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an
act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is
innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is
the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an
innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs
somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But
confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of
virtue.
On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But
confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.
Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is
meritorious, for "it opens the gate of heaven," as the Master says
(Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS,
Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to
belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply
some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not
include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name
implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience:
for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips
what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a
fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one's thoughts is a
condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing
generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it
be devoid of other due circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man
to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he
ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the
natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the
circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the
confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that
the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine
law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all
matters belonging to the positive law.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of
the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act,
so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of
which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man,
though it is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from
the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence
there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far
as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a
sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a
remedy for sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue
of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now
the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the
definition given above [4842](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is an
act of hope and not of penance.
Objection 2: Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession
arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1],
OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.
Objection 3: Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But
confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which
is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 4: Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the
Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the
origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which
is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon.
Therefore it is not an act of penance.
Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man
shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he
goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which
is called truth, and not of penance.
On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now
confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.
I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a
special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the
object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the
expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the
ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality,
as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession
of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely,
yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong
to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7)
that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of
justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God's
favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so
too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not
the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue
of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in
so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many
virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting
but as commanding.
Reply to Objection 2: In that definition shame is not mentioned as the
cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of
confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment
(because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the
Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.
Reply to Objection 3: By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can
be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may
correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for
evil---confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of
the truth---and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it
entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders
the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of
Penance as a whole, as of contrition.
Reply to Objection 4: Since confession results from hope rather than
from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article
about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article
about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its
aspect of contrition, is the opposite.
The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been
said.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there
are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
(2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
(3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can
hear the confession of venial sins?
(4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?
(5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own
priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior?
(6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any
priest?
(7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to
the sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a
priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its
Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us
(James 5:16): "Confess your sins, one to another," where there is no
mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a
priest.
Objection 2: Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also
Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its
necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession
should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to
confess to anyone.
Objection 3: Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure
of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes
another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in
imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is
not necessary to confess to a priest.
Objection 4: Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order
that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a
rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not
always be made to a priest.
On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which
he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the
keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus
to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus
(Jn. 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.
I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends
from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a
ministry over Christ's true body is a minister of the sacraments,
wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can
consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the
sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the
sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made
to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.
Reply to Objection 1: James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine
institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God
to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the
apostles, to forgive sins, as related in Jn. 20:23, we must take the
words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.
Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than
Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes
Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the
case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this
cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but
adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and
the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting
death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.
Reply to Objection 3: In satisfaction we must consider not only the
quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part
of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments,
though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a
priest.
Reply to Objection 4: It may be necessary for two reasons to know the
sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ's
flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral
charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not
priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for
their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man,
i. e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to
health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things.
It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to
another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as
appears from the definition given above ([4843]Q[7], A[1]). But the
dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a
sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it
seems that confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 2: Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained
to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if
pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should
be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge
is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing.
Therefore confession should be made to no one else.
Objection 3: Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize,
if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should
not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a
case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest,
when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not
be made to a layman in a case of necessity.
On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance.
And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold
minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office,
viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is
committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of
Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made,
is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the
place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.
Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Penance there is not only
something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and
imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the
recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition
and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far
as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the
fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when
possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should
fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can;
and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill
the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is
supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman,
through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a
perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs
to the priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition
reads "through desire for a priest". ]
Reply to Objection 2: Although a layman is not the judge of the person
who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the
place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the
penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.
Reply to Objection 3: By means of the sacraments man must needs be
reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be
reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him.
In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the
element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by "the word of
life" (Eph. 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a
man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized
again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church
reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is
no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which
grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of
necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from
God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose
which he conceived in accordance with God's command, he is not yet
reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments,
unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received
the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he
must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and
the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was
not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by
receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful
effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the
sacrament of Penance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear
the confession of venial sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one
but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the
dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of
necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary.
Therefore it is not committed to a layman.
Objection 2: Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin,
just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as
appears from James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial
sins be made to a layman.
On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James 5:16, "Confess . .
. one to another") quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).
I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from
the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any
further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be
reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess
his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a
sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it
proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as
the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf.
[4844]TP, Q[87], A[3]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no
need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a
sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.
Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy
for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's
own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says: "By
our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have
decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the
apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose
penances, and absolve from sins. " Now monks are not the proper priests
of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore
confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be
made to any priest.
Objection 2: Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as
also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist.
Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore
there is no need to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 3: Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it
is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left
to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text
(Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work
of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to
find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind. "
Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.
Objection 4: Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to
have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are
bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to
his own priest.
Objection 5: Further, "That which is instituted for the sake of
charity, does not militate against charity," as Bernard observes (De
Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the
sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to
confess to any particular priest: e. g. if the sinner know that his own
priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to
the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected
of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a
sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need
not always confess to one's own priest.
Objection 6: Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary
for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it
seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one
particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession,
through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore,
since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be
straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their
own priest.
On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth
Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed "all of either sex to confess
once a year to their own priest. "
Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish.
Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas
ix[4845], Q[2]; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi[4846], Q[5]), for a bishop
to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is
not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another's
parishioner.
I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the
recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with
regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is
required as removing an obstacle, i. e. insincerity, in order that he
may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of
his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches
the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since
contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the
penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their
origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their
command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must
be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not
competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him.
Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the
minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but
also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no
jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is
not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest,
but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man
except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by
his command, can bind the penitent to do something.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of those monks who have
jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had
maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not
absolve or impose penance, which is false.
Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require
the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated
above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest,
although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.
Reply to Objection 3: The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us
in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the
permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens
to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.
Reply to Objection 4: Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the
sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by
law (De Poenit. et Remiss. , Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest
for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior;
even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a
patient.
Reply to Objection 5: In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to
fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing
to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask
permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails
to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no
priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to
him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the
precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the
lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is
charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on
the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the
power intrusted to him.
Reply to Objection 6: The necessity of confessing to one's own priest
does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently.
A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission
to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather
die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those
priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects
by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and
consequently for themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest,
in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess
to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or
command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that
wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject's own
priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be
allowed by a superior's privilege, permission, or command.
Objection 2: Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine
command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man.
Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to "know the
countenance of their own cattle" (Prov. 27:23); and this is hindered if
another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore
this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.
Objection 3: Further, he that hears another's confession is the
latter's own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man
cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be
bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands
were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another
than one's own priest, even with the superior's permission.
Objection 4: Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least
useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has
confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own
priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved
from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect.
Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his
own priest.
On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute
the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order.
