No More Learning

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
workers of iniquity. " Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved.
Therefore God does not love all things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that
are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. "

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things,
in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is
itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it
has been shown above ([147]Q[19], A[4]) that God's will is the cause of
all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or
any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every
existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love
anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is
manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love.
Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but
is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to
anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its
goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we
will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the
good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the
love of God infuses and creates goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to
pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for
his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the
truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of
all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside
Himself by His providence for all existing things. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from
eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from
eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for
that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within
us, know things existing in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational
creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one
with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or
ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them
is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures
cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and
beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not
love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were
with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational
creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in
need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services
they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for
ourselves.

Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being
loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves
sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence
and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God loves all things equally?

Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is
said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence
over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He
loves all things equally.

Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence
does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not
therefore love some things more than others.

Objection 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do
His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither
therefore does He love some things more than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all
things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son
Himself. "

I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold
way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the
act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God
does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things
by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In
another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the
beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another,
for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense.
In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than
others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has
been said [148](A[2]), no one thing would be better than another, if
God did not will greater good for one than for another.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not
because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He
administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love
on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But
the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.
Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.

Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone,
and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which
God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with
respect to God's love.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God always loves more the better things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better
things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He
loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered
Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more
the better things.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said
of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6).
But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said:
"Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He
taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the
better things.

Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ
more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these? " Yet Christ loved
John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the
words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me? ": "By this very mark is
John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him
only, but that He loved him more than the rest. " Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.

Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant,
since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa. ), "a second plank
after shipwreck. " But God loves the penitent more than the innocent;
since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that
there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,
more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Lk. 15:7).
Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the
predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He
wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.

On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from
(Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like. " Now the better a thing
is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
loved by God.

I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said
before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown
([149]AA[2],3), that God's loving one thing more than another is
nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater
good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the
whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:
because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that
is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of
His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the
salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious
conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according to
Is. 9:6.

Reply to Objection 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of
God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the
Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with
the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of
glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an
angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found
nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to
natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not
assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more;
but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a
house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not
give to his own son in sound health.

Reply to Objection 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been
solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says
that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the
contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently
desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves
more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does
not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was
loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the
Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved
more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care.
Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with
the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more
and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is
said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor;
but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of
familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on
account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved
Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more,
from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the
better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better,
and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass
judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).

Reply to Objection 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as
exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the
better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal,
innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to
rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often
penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence
Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev. ) says that, "In
battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and
bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has
never done a brave deed. "

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are
more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as
conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a
hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a
king.

Reply to Objection 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in
things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned
according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine
goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by
the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is
better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because
even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
__________________________________________________________________

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and
mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is justice in God?

(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?

(3) Whether there is mercy in God?

(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is justice in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
neither therefore does justice.

Objection 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11). Therefore
justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Objection 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God
is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom. ): "Good regards
the essence; justice the act. " Therefore justice does not belong to
God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice. "

I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business.
This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath
first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? " (Rom. 11:35).
The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice;
whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As
then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of
multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of
the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of
will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He
gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each;
and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that
properly belong to it. "

Reply to Objection 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with
the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above
([150]Q[20], A[1] ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive
appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the
subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are
concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice,
liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive
faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our
attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in
such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political
virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the
object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what
His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
God is a law unto Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that
which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns
the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own
cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has
to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is
directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance,
and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created
things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be
regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in
either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be
fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what
manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what
befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself.
It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is
ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other
animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He
gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This
debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each
thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And
although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not
the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other
things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the
fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of
merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):
"When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with
their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just;
since it befits Thy goodness. "

Reply to Objection 4: Although justice regards act, this does not
prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the
essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not
always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect
to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason
it is said (De Hebdom. ) that the good is related to the just, as the
general to the special.
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Whether the justice of God is truth?

Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice
resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a
rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does
not appertain to truth.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not
appertain to the idea of justice.

On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met each
other": where truth stands for justice.

I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as
said above ([151]Q[16], A[1]). Now the mind, that is the cause of the
thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse
is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When
therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves.
For
according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it
are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things,
truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the
work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
art.

Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related
to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which
establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom,
which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also
in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in
the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are
governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in
this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and
deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the
sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its
cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether mercy can be attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy
is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But
there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot
remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): "If
we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself. " But He
would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words.
Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.

On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and gracious
Lord. "

I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in
its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it
must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors],
as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected
with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence
it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if
it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore,
over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly
belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by
that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of
some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as
shown above ([152]Q[6] , A[4]). It must, however, be considered that to
bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also
to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The
communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to
goodness, as shown above ([153]Q[6], AA[1],4); in so far as perfections
are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to
justice, as has been already said [154](A[1]); in so far as God does
not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness,
it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by
God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an
affection of passion.

Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against
His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who
pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one
hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence
committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a
gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear
that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness
thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement"
(James 2:13).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?

Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and
justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the
justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation
of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God
do mercy and justice appear.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews
to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).
Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Objection 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world;
which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and
mercy.

Objection 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but
of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.
Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are
mercy and truth. "

I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's
works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not
every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect
in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to
happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt
paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to
some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work
of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His
wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that
anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created
things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein
consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's
works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of
mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures,
except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this
is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that
precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to
something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will---which
is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is
due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is
due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the
divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source,
there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains,
and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first
cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does
God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due
to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since
less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the
divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness
there can be no proportion.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and
certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly
and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is
seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates,
in punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits
sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that
love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she
hath loved much" (Lk. 7:47).

Reply to Objection 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the
conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice
appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the
conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account
of the promises made to the fathers.

Reply to Objection 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the
just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.
As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us
in this world force us to go to God. "

Reply to Objection 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the
universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In
this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the
production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom
and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change
of creatures from non-existence to existence.
__________________________________________________________________

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now
proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and
the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things;
predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these
acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For
in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the
consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong.
Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?

(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?

(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?

(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things
foreseen?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For
providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence.
But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18),
it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt
for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to
God.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is
not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are
not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore
there is no providence in God.

Objection 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence
seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect
and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest
all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father,
governeth it. ']. "

I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all
the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
shown above ([155]Q[6], A[4]). In created things good is found not only
as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an
end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the
divine goodness ([156]Q[21], A[4]). This good of order existing in
things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the
cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone
before ([157]Q[19], A[4]), it is necessary that the type of the order
of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and
the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking,
providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
parts are directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding
of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and
the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the
future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in
regard to oneself---as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who
orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others
subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said
(Mat. 24:45), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath
appointed over his family. " In this way prudence or providence may
suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing
ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in
things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence
Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type
itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which
disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards
an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10),
"Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has
rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. [158]FS, Q[57],
A[6]]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from
the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,
nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an
end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,
according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
away. " In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.
Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things
to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those
who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all
things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).

Reply to Objection 2: Two things pertain to the care of
providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence
and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed
government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply to Objection 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but
presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about
things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence
presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence
has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not
affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
are one and the same thing, as we have said above [159](Q[19]).
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Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Objection 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as
far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many
evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Objection 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent
concerning which there is counsel and choice. " Since, then, many things
happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.

Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to
the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in
accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left
him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly
in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of
their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to
divine providence.

Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care
for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen? ']": and we may say the
same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the
care of divine providence.

On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to
end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only
were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our
things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven. " Rabbi Moses,
however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on
account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in
reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion
of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence,
not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is
made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering
of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the
first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent
something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because
the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of
the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to
all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also
as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible,
but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in
whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as
the Apostle says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered
[*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt,
a Deo ordinatae sunt. ' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and
invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. ']" (Rom. 13:1).
Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the
type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it
necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in
existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also
been shown ([160]Q[14], AA[6],11) that God knows all things, both
universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to
the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art,
all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things
wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.

Reply to Objection 1: There is a difference between universal and
particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause;
but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order
of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented
from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes
are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect
should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far
then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said
to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard
the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is
said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants,
although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully
foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one
place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.

Reply to Objection 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a
particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a
particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his
care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows
some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be
hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to
be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to
the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption
of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a
species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for
all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in
particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be
hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent
from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying
of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no
tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty
God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were
so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil. " It would
appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have
just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible
things---e. g. casual and evil things---as removed from the care of
divine providence.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses
natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who
withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
others of the ancients.

Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that God left man to himself,
this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but
merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only
the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted
upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these
are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly
said: "In the hand of his own counsel. " But since the very act of free
will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that
everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to
divine providence. For human providence is included under the
providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God,
however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more
excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that
love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from the
fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is
said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence
from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not
preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had
weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence
human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply to Objection 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free
will, control over its actions, as was said above ([161]Q[19], A[10]),
it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that
something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is
given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this
way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however,
that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine
providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
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Whether God has immediate providence over everything?