No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state
of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent
manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this
life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then
does hope remain.

Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after
this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in the
lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can
remain.

Objection 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now
in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of
the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to
Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink
me, shall yet thirst," and 1 Pet. 1:12: "On Whom the angels desire to
look. " Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after
this life is past.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for? " But the Blessed see that which is the object of
hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.

I answer that, As stated above [1643](A[3]), that which, in its very
nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the
opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement
of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is
"the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that
as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases;
for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made
white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed,
as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope
(Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for,
viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its
object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not
incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is;
except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do
not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect
of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in
our actual possession.

Reply to Objection 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall
state further on ([1644]SS, Q[19], A[2]). Servile fear regards
punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there
will no longer be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two
acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act,
it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God,
and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from
God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there,
according to Prov. 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear
of evils. " Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil,
as stated above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear
which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there
can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed.
Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that
the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of
fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its
being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither
past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking,
neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]),
fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such
hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking
in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called
fear.

Reply to Objection 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no
desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future,
for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to
be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is
said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there
can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly
speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God,
and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the
object of hope is something difficult, as stated above ([1645]Q[40],
A[1]): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not
compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not,
properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like
manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking,
said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it.
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Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in
glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there
remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you
take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living,
there remains being. " Now in faith there is something that it has in
common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to
it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore,
the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.

Objection 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according
to Eph. 1:17,18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the
knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the
light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we
shall see light. " Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light
supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays
appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with
the light of glory.

Objection 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through
the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of
liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the
act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore
when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still
remain.

On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either
withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not
remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above [1646](A[3]), it
seems that it is withdrawn entirely.

I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but
that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains
in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be
understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but
generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus,
viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not
of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the
enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.

But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith
remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because
when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does
not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference
constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain
identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time
whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not
related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the
genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as
the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is
changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else
they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species
denotes the whole, i. e. the compound of matter and form in material
things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus
denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference,
by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both.
Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual
nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature,
rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that
which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three,
but not under the same aspect.

It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference
is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of
the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not
remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is
impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure,
to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven,
nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same,
but only generically.

Reply to Objection 1: If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining
"living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as
stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to
the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:
whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are
opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they
are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the
air.

Reply to Objection 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose
the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the
habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is
the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even
its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss:
and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.
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Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this
life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which is
perfect is come, that which is in part," i. e. that which is imperfect,
"shall be done away. " Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect.
Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is
attained.

Objection 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their
objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore
the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of
the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.

Objection 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from
imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of
the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven,
however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of
the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): "Charity never falleth
away. "

I answer that, As stated above [1647](A[3]), when the imperfection of a
thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to
hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection,
even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now
charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection,
since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed,
either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the
perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.

Reply to Objection 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it;
because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now
although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the
substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away,
charity itself is not done away.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if
it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the
charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the
same, viz. God Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot
attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on
the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in
Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we
love Him.
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OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?

(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?

(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?

(4) Which, and how many are they?

(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?

(6) Whether they remain in heaven?

(7) Of their comparison with one another;

(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.
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Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the
virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him
seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when
through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the
Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of Is. 11:2,3:
"And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.
where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Mat. 12:45, "Then he
goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc. , says (De Quaest.
Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of
the Holy Ghost," i. e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are
opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts
do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.

Objection 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are
themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts;
for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good
life," etc. [*Cf. [1648] Q[55], A[4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift
can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable
giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the
virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.

Objection 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are
virtues: for, as stated above ([1649]Q[57], A[2]), wisdom,
understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains
to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral
virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the
virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts,
which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three
daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts
from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the
four corners of the house.

I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion
conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them.
Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in
relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from
which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from
one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as
we have already stated ([1650]Q[63], A[3]) that some virtues are
infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot
differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the
gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains
no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some
virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there
are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.

Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as
being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable
reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either
to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For,
seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom,
knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz.
fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the
free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues
perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two
virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others
being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction
were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all
the gifts in the reason.

Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of
the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence,
temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it
against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the
virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we
may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient.
Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the
sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists
its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of
which it is written (Cant 8:7): "Many waters cannot quench charity. "

Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as
having been in Christ, according to Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues
are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to
conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was
then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither
does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord
Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and
meekness, according to Mat. 11:29: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and
humble of heart," and in charity, according to Jn. 15:12: "Love one
another, as I have loved you. " Moreover, these virtues were especially
resplendent in Christ's Passion.

Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we
must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we
find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift. " For
thus it is written (Is. 11:2,3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of
understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. : from which words we are
clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as
being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from
without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle
of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to
him, viz. God, as stated above ([1651]Q[9], AA[4],6): moreover the
Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem.
vii, 8).
Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its
mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a
disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence
the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition
whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that
a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a
higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues
perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his
reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet
higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These
perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God,
but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the
Divine inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened
my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back. " Even the
Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. , vii, 8)
that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to
take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner
promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human
reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for
acts which are higher than acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the
broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and
above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are
Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of
"heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of
which some men are called "divine. "

Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far
as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are
opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine
instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
whose light flows from God.

Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its
general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as
distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we
lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is
measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from
infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to
His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
promptings of God.

Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far
as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift,
according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same
applies to the other virtues.
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Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the
precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to
man for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave
well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's
behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues;
and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are
not necessary to man for salvation.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost
gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance,
piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride. " But a
sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues.
Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that
dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without
fear cannot be justified. " Therefore the other gifts that are placed
between these are also necessary for salvation.

I answer that, As stated above [1652](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings
of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,
there is, in consequence, need for a gift.

Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above ([1653]Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is
greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more
perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full
possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love
and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a
nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to
them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly
in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a
nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless
it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly,
can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light
imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows
the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is
not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive
instructions from him.

Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the
acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in
matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves
him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost,
according toRom. 8:14, 17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10:
"Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit,
none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he
be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to
accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the
Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the
virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.

Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not
so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual
need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for
the reason already given.

Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in
its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it
does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is
unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection.
God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by
His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind
and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given
as remedies to these defects.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as
"a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27):
"The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He
dwells always in the Mediator. " Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according
as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ([1654]AA[1],2).
But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like
an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is
befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit:
for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts
of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you. "
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His
gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but
abiding habits.

I answer that, As stated above [1655](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy
Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4];
Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power
according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as
it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.
Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy
Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in
comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now
the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are
disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by
saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the
Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts. "
Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above
[1656](A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever
abides in holy men.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument
which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man
is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy
Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.
Therefore he needs a habit.

Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
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Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down
corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding,
knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual
virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz.
piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance.
Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.

Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of
fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself.
Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.

Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us
to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by
God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological
virtues, should have been included.

Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of
love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions
condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so
ought the other three.

Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.
Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).

I answer that, As stated above [1657](A[3]), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy
Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that
they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive
powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human
actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues;
and such powers are the reason and appetite.

Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel. " In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by
"knowledge. " The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,"
and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid
of Thy judgments. " Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.

Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in
matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such
matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the
right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of
the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance:
for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain
man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason,
so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil
pleasures through fear of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the
reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the
name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to
our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is
also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore
the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all,
is fittingly called piety.

Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost,
unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not
moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of
union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith,
hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to
the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to
these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.

Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object.
Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions
are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On
the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from
certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its
name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from
evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.

Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the
affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to
wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the
gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a
consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the
word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the
same Spirit. " Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to
divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of
the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith. " But some of
the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it
seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and
the same man.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small
account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.

On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another. " Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.

I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge. "

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another. " We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations. " Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is.