_ To the surprise of the consul, this
unexpected
motion passed by
a majority of 370 against 22.
a majority of 370 against 22.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - b
[822]
Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he
was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then
keep the _imperium_ as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702,
would end on the 1st of January, 707. [823] It was evident that he was
unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the
combination established by law, he remained consul till the 1st of
January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and
after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.
In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar
and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in
vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party;
the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the
other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric
current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite
poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, air the passions,
all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future,
are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two
men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.
[Sidenote: Intrigues to deprive Cæsar of his Command. ]
VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful,
though a simple proconsul, had, as we have said before, retired to
Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which
were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going
into Spain to govern his province. [824] At the outset of revolutions,
the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline
always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and
enterprising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is
what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to
carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the
Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to
return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome;
and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled
in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked
why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obliged to give an explanation, he
promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have
the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his
opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive
phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation,
he replied that “everybody ought equally to obey the Senate. ”[825]
Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.
The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of
August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never
found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to
come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question
frankly until they were convinced of Pompey’s consent to the recall of
Cæsar. [826] beforehand the consuls nominated for the following year,
and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had
determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M.
Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment,
exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what
point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls
recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the
question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was
settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every
day, even on those which were called _comitiales_, when any meeting of
that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should
fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The
Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of
interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they
interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as
enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at
the same time, to the Senate and to the people. [827] This motion was
adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a _decision_ or an _opinion_ of
the Senate (_senatus auctoritas_). Four tribunes of the people
interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius
Pansa.
It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar’s command; the
discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or
weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the
minutes of the Senate the following decision: “The Senate will take
into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul
whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient
reasons for being restored to civil life. ” C. Cœlius and C. Vibius
Pansa renewed their opposition. [828]
Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for
the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey
interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without
injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar’s province before the
Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further
inconvenience in it. “What will be done,” asked one of the senators, “if
the decision of the Senate be opposed? ”--“It matters little,” replied
Pompey, “whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people
to intercede. ”--“But,” said another, “if he seeks to be consul, and keep
his army? ”--Pompey only replied with great coolness, “If my son would
beat me with a staff? . . . ” He always, as we see, affected obscurity in
his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the
suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that
the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his
province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and
return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.
The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight
other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among
the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and Pansa made
opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of
giving the provinces at its will. [829] These different measures revealed
sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw
with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.
Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the
exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was
sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. Cicero wrote in vain
that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion
by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with
his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to
undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their
place. [830] They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge
Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which
Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East,
either for Pompey or for Cæsar. [831] Fortunately, the Parthians did not
attack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The
latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician
mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their
fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as
_imperator_. [832] From that time he took this title in the subscription
of his letters. [833]
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Æmilius Paulus, Consuls. ]
I. The year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of
overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the
success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the
chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the
two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of
the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the
same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party,
though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was
expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to
the tribuneship was due to Pompey,[834] he would distribute the lands of
Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which
would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this
property in favour of his veterans. [835] This hope was vain; for already
Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well
informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to
have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703
he could reckon on the Consul Sulpicius and the tribunes Pansa and
Cœlius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If,
subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at
least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.
Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues;[836] but
as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate,
Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments
to his character and his high qualities. [837] Curio had acquired
authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His
father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written
a book,[838] and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were
repeated in Rome. [839] Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued
the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so
easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this
dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.
From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark
Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute
lives; their friendship had never changed. [840] The relationship of Mark
Antony with the Julia family,[841] his connection with Gabinius, and,
above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect
of Cæsar to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial. [842]
Cæsar employed him first as lieutenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose
him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to
soften Curio’s temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if
we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents. [843] It is true that, at
the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus,
without requiring more than his neutrality. [844] We can hardly
understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such
sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To
increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome;[845] to
cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia,
in Italy, a magnificent villa;[846] to send rich presents to distant
towns--such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money
enough from a province exhausted by eight years’ war? The immensity of
his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of
the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to
40,000,000 sestertii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the
sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero
informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sestertii from the captives sold
after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that their
number amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sestertii a
head. Now, in spite of Cæsar’s generosity in often restoring the
captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his
soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that
500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight
years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about
500,000,000 sestertii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was
thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest
part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in
distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign
custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money
which forms the advance for the costs.
The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar was at first kept secret; but,
whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new
tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because
he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the
beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same
thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people.
Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the
circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He
had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order,
probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which
agitated the Senate and the town. [847] His character of pontiff
rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable
utility,[848] it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to
take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate’s refusal as an
offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition. [849] Towards
the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alimentation of
the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles;[850] the other,
on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during
five years. [851] He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay
according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a
word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his
popularity. [852] These last two projects were as ill received as the
first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those
against whom he had hitherto contended.
The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought
new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law,
accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence;
the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery
partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying
excessive severity. He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and
several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian
Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the
Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness. [853]
Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to
efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails. [854] Instead of
remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the
opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater
consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a
bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral
force it has lost.
[Sidenote: Cæsar repairs to the Cisalpine. ]
II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (_Arras_).
“At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy,
in order,” says Hirtius, “to recommend to the municipal towns and
colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood.
Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful
friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive
against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar’s
power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On
his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the
election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the
less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them
for their favourable feeling towards Antony. He sought also to secure
their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that
they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C.
Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on
the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in
spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason
that he was Cæsar’s friend and lieutenant.
“Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible
marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among
them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that
could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his
passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places
and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread
tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each
other in zeal. ” Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph
earnestly desired. [855]
After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at
Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to
strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of
forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions,
who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the
Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This
solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with
whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youngest soldiers
reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or
consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the
glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the
end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, “only moving the
troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers’ health. T.
Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of
securing more votes for Cæsar’s approaching candidateship for the office
of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœvres of
his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause
the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be
prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against
the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the
conscript fathers would do him justice. ”[856] In fact, whenever the
Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority
pronounced in favour of Cæsar.
It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the
question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration
on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that
he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened
then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an
inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless,
there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a
struggle for life: Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his
opposition. [857]
When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against
Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul’s prudence, approved
much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to
disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable
to see Pompey disband his. “Those great generals,” said he, “were
objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the
Republic until both of them should become private men. ”[858] This speech
pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem
for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of
citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they
admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several
occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers
over him “like an athlete,” says Appian, “who had just sustained a
severe and dangerous combat. ”[859]
The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus
proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of
opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their
opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar:
“The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as
a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army
nor his province. ”[860] Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate
have its way.
He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he
affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality,
taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar.
At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to
appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left
his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the
Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them
that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of
the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to
save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting
the term fixed by the law. [861] This letter, studied and artful, was
intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and
that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio
baffled this manœuvre. “If Pompey were sincere,” he said, “he ought
not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long
as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not
be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the
presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his
eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power. ”[862] This
accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen
years--that is to say, since 684, the time of his first
consulship--Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the
_imperium_, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the
pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the
victualling of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch,
“and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring
to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it. ”[863]
[Sidenote: Pompey receives Ovations, and asks Cæsar to return his Two
Legions. ]
III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill, and on his recovery
the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that
“every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for
several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious
enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the
villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and
making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great
number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with
torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the
procession which followed him in his progress offered the most
agreeable and most magnificent spectacle. ”[864] Although these ovations
had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return
to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he
supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar’s power. Thus,
taking for pretext the demands for re-enforcements renewed incessantly
by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to
place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he
represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and
that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was
thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of
considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the
defence of the threatened provinces. A senatus-consultus at once
summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return
the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of
Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last
legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul;
but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the
re-enforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers,
who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225
francs) to be distributed to each legionary. [865]
Appius Claudius, nephew of the censor of the same name, who had left
Rome with the mission of bringing those troops from the Cisalpine into
Italy, reported on his return that the soldiers of Cæsar, weary of their
long campaigns, sighed for repose, and that it would be impossible to
draw them into a civil war; he pretended even that the legions in winter
quarters in Transalpine Gaul would no sooner have passed the Alps than
they would rally to Pompey’s flag. [866] Events in the sequel proved the
falsity of this information, for not only, as will appear hereafter, did
the troops which had remained under Cæsar’s command continue faithful to
him, but those which had been withdrawn from him preserved the
remembrance of their ancient general. In fact, Pompey himself had not
the least confidence in the two legions he had received, and his letter
to Domitius, proconsul at the commencement of the civil war, explains
his inaction by the danger of bringing them into the presence of the
army of Cæsar, so much he fears to see them pass over to the opposite
camp. [867] At Rome, nevertheless, they believed in the reports which
flattered the pretensions of Pompey, although they were contradicted by
other more certain information, which showed Italy, the Cisalpine
provinces, and Gaul itself, equally devoted to Cæsar. Pompey, deaf to
these last warnings, affected the greatest contempt for the forces of
which his adversary could dispose. According to him, Cæsar was ruining
himself, and had no other chance of safety but in a prompt and complete
submission. When he was asked with what troops he would resist the
conqueror of Gaul, in case he were to march upon Rome, he replied, with
an air of confidence, that he had only to strike the soil of Italy with
his foot to make legions start up out of it. [868]
It was natural that his vanity should make him interpret favourably all
that was passing under his eyes. At Rome, the greatest personages were
devoted to him. Italy had shuddered at the news of his illness, and
celebrated his recovery as if it had been a triumph. The army of Gaul,
it was said, was ready to answer to his call.
With less blindness, Pompey might have discerned the true reason of the
enthusiasm of which he had been the object. He would have understood
that this enthusiasm was much less addressed to his person than to the
depositary of an authority which alone then seemed capable of saving the
Republic: he would have understood that, the day another general should
appear under the same conditions of fame and power as himself, the
people, with its admirable discernment, would at once side with him who
should best identify himself with their interests.
To understand the public opinion correctly, he ought not, though this
might have been a difficult thing to the chief of the aristocratic
cause, to have confined himself solely to the judgment of the official
world, but he should have interrogated the sentiments of those whose
position brought them nearest to the people. Instead of believing the
reports of Appius Claudius, and reckoning on the discontent of certain
of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who, like Labienus, already showed hostile
tendencies, Pompey ought to have meditated upon that exclamation of a
centurion, who, placed at the door of the Senate, when that assembly
rejected the just reclamations of the conqueror of Gaul, exclaimed,
putting his hand to his sword, “This will give him what he asks. ”[869]
The fact is that, in civil commotions, each class of society divines, as
by instinct, the cause which responds to its aspirations, and feels
itself attracted to it by a secret affinity. Men born in the superior
classes, or brought to their level by honours and riches, are always
drawn towards the aristocracy, whilst men kept by fortune in the
inferior ranks remain the firm supports of the popular cause. Thus, at
the return from the isle of Elba, most of the generals of the Emperor
Napoleon, loaded with wealth like the lieutenants of Cæsar,[870] marched
openly against him; but in the army all up to the rank of colonel said,
after the example of the Roman centurion, pointing to their weapons,
“This will place him on the throne again! ”
[Sidenote: The Senate votes impartially. ]
IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius
and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to
the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part
of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate
into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of
that body, _noted_ Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list;
but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he
confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he
could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested
with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus,
who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who
reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to
both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he
protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate,
and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having
always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence
his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could
have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio;[871] but this
incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political
situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: _Ought Cæsar to be
superseded in his province? _ He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators
having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense
majority declared for the affirmative. The same majority pronounced for
the negative on a second question of Marcellus: _Ought Pompey to be
superseded? _ But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many
times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar,
demanded a vote upon a third question: _Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to
disarm?
_ To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by
a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate,
saying with bitterness, “You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for
master. ”[872] He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well.
Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified
Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and
if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no
longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared:
Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each
with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently
without the means of disturbing the Republic.
[Sidenote: Violent Measures adopted against Cæsar. ]
V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty
passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to
destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in
Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should
be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East
should be brought from Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio
protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his
quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus
exclaimed, “Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone
take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility! ” He then
hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him
with a sword, addressed him in these words: “I summon you to take the
command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take
the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic. ” Pompey accepted
this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders
of the consuls, “if, at least, there was nothing better to do. ” This
prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of
the man. [873] M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his
conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following
year (705); even before they entered upon office,[874] which was to take
place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated
the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their
magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius
Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name,
both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to
support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had
taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey
who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.
Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having
the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked
before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to
obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of
the law. [875]
[Sidenote: State of Public Opinion. ]
VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the
judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September,
704:--
“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck
with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two
men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is
decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army
and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for
him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition
of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of
tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden
animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know
which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this
perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of
gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I
hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic
dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer
the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two camps are in
presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is
safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate
and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to
fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are
concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the
respective forces, and to make our choice. ”[876] Cœlius was not long
in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar. [877]
This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great
number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to
side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy,[878] had
the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he
on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a
considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse. [879]
After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war
against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a
civil war which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his
arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent
four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in
the citadel of Athens. [880] When at last he had returned to Italy, he
congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a
triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed
him from declaring for either of the two rivals.
He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the
influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but
Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in
Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his
support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character.
Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter
the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his
assistance, and blame Cato’s severity. [881]
Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive himself as to the
resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance
of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own
meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.
“To-day,” he wrote, “Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot
the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which
he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan
towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all
the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious
name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to
combat. [882] This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in
abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather
than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much
the more is it not to be feared for us! ”[883]
As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: “What do
you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I
know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for
individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil
strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the
Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces
without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up
their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of the kind,
and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights
who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely
devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only
ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one
single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long
as they are quiet? ”[884]
The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined
towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome
for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the
tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked
him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of
Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a
visit. [885] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been
generally blamed,[886] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.
“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the
Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone
from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of
agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in
a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it.
He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having
dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is,
moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures
against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he
will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger
would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend
themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, _Mars has equal
chances for everybody_, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in
hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a
politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the
speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from
beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from
his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands;
he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar
not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without
wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner? ’ In short, far
from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps
because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is,
that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all
the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful
to remain the debtor of a political adversary. ”[887] By this declaration
Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and
rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more
precision.
Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just
demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil
war.
He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases
overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling,
and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703,
when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the
Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the
day,[888] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination
not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had
rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of
March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable
to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until
the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many
hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their
armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become
inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes
intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without
obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the
consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of
the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the
law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls. ]
I. In the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had
returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the
north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew
that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that
the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival,
for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not
even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel. [889] In the winter
between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there,
according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at
Ravenna, the last town in his command. [890] He had only the 13th legion
at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[891]
nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in
winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy. [892]
It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in
December, 704,[893] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms,
thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the
measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other
legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did
not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come
to an understanding. He engaged his friends[894] at Rome to propose a
plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero,
and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up
Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions,
until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be
satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion. [895] “He made the greatest
efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[896] “to maintain peace: the friends
of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals. ” “The appearance of
justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar. ” When the
negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter
full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to
Cicero;[897] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to
draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side. [898]
Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days,
re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the
new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them,
according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear
that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed
the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark
Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much
energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse. [899]
Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic,
justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his
enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that
he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his
army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It
could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his
enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of
submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the
consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should
keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the
letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it
that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by
revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression,
which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in
the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation
rose to the greatest height. [900] No deliberation could be obtained on
any of his propositions.
[Sidenote: Lentulus carries the Senate against Cæsar. ]
II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to
show more courage and firmness: he promised to support it, and defend
the Republic: “If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical
moment, was wanting in energy--if, as in the past, it meant to spare
Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its
authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from
it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might
gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar. ” Scipio spoke in the same
spirit: “Pompey,” said he, “will not fail the Republic, if he is
followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness,
the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain. ” This language of
Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at
the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also
offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the
Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order
to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed
that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive
for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two
legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of
Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus
immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter
speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the
proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his
motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so
common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of
Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror
inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an
irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of
themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that “if Cæsar did
not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an
enemy of the Republic. ”[901]
Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this
decree. [902] A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking
the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are
proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar
applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators
in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages
some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a
great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He
addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed
part of Cæsar’s army. [903]
The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims
the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the
consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against
Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their
clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision.
The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the
prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to inform him of what is going on;
they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be
charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.
All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in
violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his
recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with
debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he
will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire. [904] Scipio
flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey,
who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly
of his conduct,[905] and this prop of the Republic assumes the title,
like Agamemnon, of king of kings. [906]
The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to
strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country
is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no
attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning
attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the
other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of
veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no
longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their
complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation
to be taken against their opposition. Mark Antony is the most
audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him
to leave the curia, “where,” he says, “his sacred character will not
preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of
hostility towards the Republic. ” Mark Antony thereupon, rising
impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the
tribune’s power are violated in his person. “We are insulted,” exclaims
he; “we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres,
conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon
your own heads! ” Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had
always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia,
followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Cœlius. [907] It was time: the
curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops,
which were already approaching. [908] All four left Rome in the night
between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an
ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar’s quarters. [909]
The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats
there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and
firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten
legions--six in Spain, and four in Italy. [910] According to his
conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in
his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single legion,
to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon
his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have
assembled a formidable army. [911] Then the Senate declares the country
in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure
reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the
Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the
prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party,
whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fell
upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so
many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands,[912] which
the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent,
chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius
Libo is sent to Etruria,[913] P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of
Picenum,[914] P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum,[915] and Q.
Minucius Thermus to Umbria. [916] By a false interpretation of the law
which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have
resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian
provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio,
Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius
Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta, Africa to L.
Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextius. [917] The obligation of a
curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their
names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the
established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and
till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the
usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till
then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in
Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and
ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to
the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the
civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources
of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money
preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the
property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of
the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and
human are equally trampled under foot. [918] And yet a few days had
scarcely passed “when the Senate,” says Appian, “regretted not having
accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a
moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit
to the counsels of wisdom. ”[919]
[Sidenote: Cæsar harangues his Troops. ]
III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his
party, underwent its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of
himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the
thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his
firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark
Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to
him. [920] At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the
other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting
for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the
Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and
the recent injustices of which he is the victim.
Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he
was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then
keep the _imperium_ as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702,
would end on the 1st of January, 707. [823] It was evident that he was
unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the
combination established by law, he remained consul till the 1st of
January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and
after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.
In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar
and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in
vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party;
the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the
other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric
current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite
poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, air the passions,
all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future,
are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two
men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.
[Sidenote: Intrigues to deprive Cæsar of his Command. ]
VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful,
though a simple proconsul, had, as we have said before, retired to
Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which
were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going
into Spain to govern his province. [824] At the outset of revolutions,
the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline
always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and
enterprising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is
what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to
carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the
Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to
return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome;
and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled
in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked
why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obliged to give an explanation, he
promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have
the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his
opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive
phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation,
he replied that “everybody ought equally to obey the Senate. ”[825]
Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.
The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of
August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never
found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to
come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question
frankly until they were convinced of Pompey’s consent to the recall of
Cæsar. [826] beforehand the consuls nominated for the following year,
and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had
determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M.
Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment,
exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what
point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls
recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the
question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was
settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every
day, even on those which were called _comitiales_, when any meeting of
that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should
fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The
Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of
interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they
interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as
enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at
the same time, to the Senate and to the people. [827] This motion was
adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a _decision_ or an _opinion_ of
the Senate (_senatus auctoritas_). Four tribunes of the people
interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius
Pansa.
It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar’s command; the
discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or
weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the
minutes of the Senate the following decision: “The Senate will take
into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul
whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient
reasons for being restored to civil life. ” C. Cœlius and C. Vibius
Pansa renewed their opposition. [828]
Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for
the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey
interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without
injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar’s province before the
Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further
inconvenience in it. “What will be done,” asked one of the senators, “if
the decision of the Senate be opposed? ”--“It matters little,” replied
Pompey, “whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people
to intercede. ”--“But,” said another, “if he seeks to be consul, and keep
his army? ”--Pompey only replied with great coolness, “If my son would
beat me with a staff? . . . ” He always, as we see, affected obscurity in
his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the
suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that
the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his
province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and
return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.
The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight
other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among
the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and Pansa made
opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of
giving the provinces at its will. [829] These different measures revealed
sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw
with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.
Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the
exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was
sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. Cicero wrote in vain
that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion
by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with
his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to
undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their
place. [830] They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge
Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which
Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East,
either for Pompey or for Cæsar. [831] Fortunately, the Parthians did not
attack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The
latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician
mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their
fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as
_imperator_. [832] From that time he took this title in the subscription
of his letters. [833]
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Æmilius Paulus, Consuls. ]
I. The year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of
overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the
success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the
chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the
two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of
the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the
same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party,
though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was
expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to
the tribuneship was due to Pompey,[834] he would distribute the lands of
Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which
would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this
property in favour of his veterans. [835] This hope was vain; for already
Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well
informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to
have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703
he could reckon on the Consul Sulpicius and the tribunes Pansa and
Cœlius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If,
subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at
least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.
Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues;[836] but
as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate,
Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments
to his character and his high qualities. [837] Curio had acquired
authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His
father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written
a book,[838] and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were
repeated in Rome. [839] Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued
the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so
easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this
dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.
From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark
Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute
lives; their friendship had never changed. [840] The relationship of Mark
Antony with the Julia family,[841] his connection with Gabinius, and,
above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect
of Cæsar to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial. [842]
Cæsar employed him first as lieutenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose
him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to
soften Curio’s temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if
we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents. [843] It is true that, at
the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus,
without requiring more than his neutrality. [844] We can hardly
understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such
sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To
increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome;[845] to
cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia,
in Italy, a magnificent villa;[846] to send rich presents to distant
towns--such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money
enough from a province exhausted by eight years’ war? The immensity of
his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of
the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to
40,000,000 sestertii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the
sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero
informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sestertii from the captives sold
after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that their
number amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sestertii a
head. Now, in spite of Cæsar’s generosity in often restoring the
captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his
soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that
500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight
years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about
500,000,000 sestertii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was
thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest
part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in
distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign
custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money
which forms the advance for the costs.
The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar was at first kept secret; but,
whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new
tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because
he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the
beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same
thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people.
Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the
circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He
had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order,
probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which
agitated the Senate and the town. [847] His character of pontiff
rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable
utility,[848] it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to
take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate’s refusal as an
offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition. [849] Towards
the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alimentation of
the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles;[850] the other,
on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during
five years. [851] He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay
according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a
word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his
popularity. [852] These last two projects were as ill received as the
first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those
against whom he had hitherto contended.
The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought
new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law,
accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence;
the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery
partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying
excessive severity. He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and
several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian
Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the
Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness. [853]
Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to
efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails. [854] Instead of
remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the
opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater
consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a
bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral
force it has lost.
[Sidenote: Cæsar repairs to the Cisalpine. ]
II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (_Arras_).
“At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy,
in order,” says Hirtius, “to recommend to the municipal towns and
colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood.
Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful
friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive
against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar’s
power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On
his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the
election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the
less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them
for their favourable feeling towards Antony. He sought also to secure
their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that
they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C.
Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on
the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in
spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason
that he was Cæsar’s friend and lieutenant.
“Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible
marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among
them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that
could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his
passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places
and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread
tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each
other in zeal. ” Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph
earnestly desired. [855]
After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at
Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to
strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of
forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions,
who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the
Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This
solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with
whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youngest soldiers
reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or
consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the
glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the
end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, “only moving the
troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers’ health. T.
Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of
securing more votes for Cæsar’s approaching candidateship for the office
of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœvres of
his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause
the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be
prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against
the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the
conscript fathers would do him justice. ”[856] In fact, whenever the
Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority
pronounced in favour of Cæsar.
It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the
question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration
on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that
he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened
then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an
inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless,
there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a
struggle for life: Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his
opposition. [857]
When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against
Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul’s prudence, approved
much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to
disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable
to see Pompey disband his. “Those great generals,” said he, “were
objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the
Republic until both of them should become private men. ”[858] This speech
pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem
for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of
citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they
admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several
occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers
over him “like an athlete,” says Appian, “who had just sustained a
severe and dangerous combat. ”[859]
The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus
proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of
opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their
opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar:
“The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as
a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army
nor his province. ”[860] Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate
have its way.
He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he
affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality,
taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar.
At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to
appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left
his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the
Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them
that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of
the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to
save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting
the term fixed by the law. [861] This letter, studied and artful, was
intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and
that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio
baffled this manœuvre. “If Pompey were sincere,” he said, “he ought
not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long
as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not
be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the
presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his
eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power. ”[862] This
accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen
years--that is to say, since 684, the time of his first
consulship--Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the
_imperium_, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the
pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the
victualling of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch,
“and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring
to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it. ”[863]
[Sidenote: Pompey receives Ovations, and asks Cæsar to return his Two
Legions. ]
III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill, and on his recovery
the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that
“every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for
several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious
enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the
villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and
making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great
number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with
torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the
procession which followed him in his progress offered the most
agreeable and most magnificent spectacle. ”[864] Although these ovations
had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return
to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he
supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar’s power. Thus,
taking for pretext the demands for re-enforcements renewed incessantly
by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to
place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he
represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and
that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was
thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of
considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the
defence of the threatened provinces. A senatus-consultus at once
summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return
the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of
Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last
legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul;
but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the
re-enforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers,
who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225
francs) to be distributed to each legionary. [865]
Appius Claudius, nephew of the censor of the same name, who had left
Rome with the mission of bringing those troops from the Cisalpine into
Italy, reported on his return that the soldiers of Cæsar, weary of their
long campaigns, sighed for repose, and that it would be impossible to
draw them into a civil war; he pretended even that the legions in winter
quarters in Transalpine Gaul would no sooner have passed the Alps than
they would rally to Pompey’s flag. [866] Events in the sequel proved the
falsity of this information, for not only, as will appear hereafter, did
the troops which had remained under Cæsar’s command continue faithful to
him, but those which had been withdrawn from him preserved the
remembrance of their ancient general. In fact, Pompey himself had not
the least confidence in the two legions he had received, and his letter
to Domitius, proconsul at the commencement of the civil war, explains
his inaction by the danger of bringing them into the presence of the
army of Cæsar, so much he fears to see them pass over to the opposite
camp. [867] At Rome, nevertheless, they believed in the reports which
flattered the pretensions of Pompey, although they were contradicted by
other more certain information, which showed Italy, the Cisalpine
provinces, and Gaul itself, equally devoted to Cæsar. Pompey, deaf to
these last warnings, affected the greatest contempt for the forces of
which his adversary could dispose. According to him, Cæsar was ruining
himself, and had no other chance of safety but in a prompt and complete
submission. When he was asked with what troops he would resist the
conqueror of Gaul, in case he were to march upon Rome, he replied, with
an air of confidence, that he had only to strike the soil of Italy with
his foot to make legions start up out of it. [868]
It was natural that his vanity should make him interpret favourably all
that was passing under his eyes. At Rome, the greatest personages were
devoted to him. Italy had shuddered at the news of his illness, and
celebrated his recovery as if it had been a triumph. The army of Gaul,
it was said, was ready to answer to his call.
With less blindness, Pompey might have discerned the true reason of the
enthusiasm of which he had been the object. He would have understood
that this enthusiasm was much less addressed to his person than to the
depositary of an authority which alone then seemed capable of saving the
Republic: he would have understood that, the day another general should
appear under the same conditions of fame and power as himself, the
people, with its admirable discernment, would at once side with him who
should best identify himself with their interests.
To understand the public opinion correctly, he ought not, though this
might have been a difficult thing to the chief of the aristocratic
cause, to have confined himself solely to the judgment of the official
world, but he should have interrogated the sentiments of those whose
position brought them nearest to the people. Instead of believing the
reports of Appius Claudius, and reckoning on the discontent of certain
of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who, like Labienus, already showed hostile
tendencies, Pompey ought to have meditated upon that exclamation of a
centurion, who, placed at the door of the Senate, when that assembly
rejected the just reclamations of the conqueror of Gaul, exclaimed,
putting his hand to his sword, “This will give him what he asks. ”[869]
The fact is that, in civil commotions, each class of society divines, as
by instinct, the cause which responds to its aspirations, and feels
itself attracted to it by a secret affinity. Men born in the superior
classes, or brought to their level by honours and riches, are always
drawn towards the aristocracy, whilst men kept by fortune in the
inferior ranks remain the firm supports of the popular cause. Thus, at
the return from the isle of Elba, most of the generals of the Emperor
Napoleon, loaded with wealth like the lieutenants of Cæsar,[870] marched
openly against him; but in the army all up to the rank of colonel said,
after the example of the Roman centurion, pointing to their weapons,
“This will place him on the throne again! ”
[Sidenote: The Senate votes impartially. ]
IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius
and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to
the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part
of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate
into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of
that body, _noted_ Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list;
but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he
confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he
could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested
with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus,
who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who
reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to
both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he
protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate,
and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having
always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence
his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could
have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio;[871] but this
incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political
situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: _Ought Cæsar to be
superseded in his province? _ He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators
having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense
majority declared for the affirmative. The same majority pronounced for
the negative on a second question of Marcellus: _Ought Pompey to be
superseded? _ But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many
times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar,
demanded a vote upon a third question: _Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to
disarm?
_ To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by
a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate,
saying with bitterness, “You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for
master. ”[872] He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well.
Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified
Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and
if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no
longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared:
Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each
with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently
without the means of disturbing the Republic.
[Sidenote: Violent Measures adopted against Cæsar. ]
V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty
passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to
destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in
Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should
be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East
should be brought from Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio
protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his
quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus
exclaimed, “Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone
take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility! ” He then
hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him
with a sword, addressed him in these words: “I summon you to take the
command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take
the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic. ” Pompey accepted
this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders
of the consuls, “if, at least, there was nothing better to do. ” This
prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of
the man. [873] M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his
conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following
year (705); even before they entered upon office,[874] which was to take
place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated
the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their
magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius
Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name,
both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to
support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had
taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey
who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.
Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having
the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked
before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to
obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of
the law. [875]
[Sidenote: State of Public Opinion. ]
VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the
judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September,
704:--
“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck
with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two
men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is
decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army
and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for
him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition
of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of
tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden
animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know
which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this
perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of
gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I
hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic
dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer
the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two camps are in
presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is
safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate
and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to
fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are
concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the
respective forces, and to make our choice. ”[876] Cœlius was not long
in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar. [877]
This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great
number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to
side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy,[878] had
the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he
on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a
considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse. [879]
After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war
against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a
civil war which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his
arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent
four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in
the citadel of Athens. [880] When at last he had returned to Italy, he
congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a
triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed
him from declaring for either of the two rivals.
He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the
influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but
Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in
Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his
support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character.
Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter
the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his
assistance, and blame Cato’s severity. [881]
Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive himself as to the
resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance
of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own
meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.
“To-day,” he wrote, “Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot
the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which
he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan
towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all
the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious
name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to
combat. [882] This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in
abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather
than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much
the more is it not to be feared for us! ”[883]
As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: “What do
you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I
know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for
individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil
strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the
Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces
without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up
their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of the kind,
and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights
who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely
devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only
ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one
single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long
as they are quiet? ”[884]
The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined
towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome
for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the
tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked
him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of
Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a
visit. [885] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been
generally blamed,[886] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.
“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the
Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone
from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of
agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in
a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it.
He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having
dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is,
moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures
against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he
will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger
would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend
themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, _Mars has equal
chances for everybody_, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in
hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a
politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the
speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from
beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from
his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands;
he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar
not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without
wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner? ’ In short, far
from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps
because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is,
that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all
the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful
to remain the debtor of a political adversary. ”[887] By this declaration
Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and
rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more
precision.
Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just
demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil
war.
He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases
overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling,
and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703,
when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the
Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the
day,[888] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination
not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had
rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of
March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable
to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until
the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many
hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their
armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become
inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes
intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without
obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the
consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of
the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the
law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls. ]
I. In the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had
returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the
north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew
that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that
the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival,
for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not
even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel. [889] In the winter
between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there,
according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at
Ravenna, the last town in his command. [890] He had only the 13th legion
at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[891]
nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in
winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy. [892]
It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in
December, 704,[893] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms,
thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the
measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other
legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did
not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come
to an understanding. He engaged his friends[894] at Rome to propose a
plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero,
and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up
Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions,
until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be
satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion. [895] “He made the greatest
efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[896] “to maintain peace: the friends
of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals. ” “The appearance of
justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar. ” When the
negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter
full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to
Cicero;[897] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to
draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side. [898]
Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days,
re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the
new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them,
according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear
that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed
the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark
Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much
energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse. [899]
Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic,
justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his
enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that
he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his
army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It
could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his
enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of
submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the
consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should
keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the
letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it
that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by
revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression,
which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in
the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation
rose to the greatest height. [900] No deliberation could be obtained on
any of his propositions.
[Sidenote: Lentulus carries the Senate against Cæsar. ]
II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to
show more courage and firmness: he promised to support it, and defend
the Republic: “If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical
moment, was wanting in energy--if, as in the past, it meant to spare
Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its
authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from
it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might
gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar. ” Scipio spoke in the same
spirit: “Pompey,” said he, “will not fail the Republic, if he is
followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness,
the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain. ” This language of
Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at
the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also
offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the
Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order
to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed
that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive
for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two
legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of
Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus
immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter
speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the
proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his
motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so
common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of
Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror
inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an
irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of
themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that “if Cæsar did
not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an
enemy of the Republic. ”[901]
Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this
decree. [902] A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking
the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are
proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar
applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators
in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages
some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a
great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He
addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed
part of Cæsar’s army. [903]
The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims
the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the
consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against
Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their
clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision.
The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the
prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to inform him of what is going on;
they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be
charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.
All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in
violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his
recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with
debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he
will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire. [904] Scipio
flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey,
who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly
of his conduct,[905] and this prop of the Republic assumes the title,
like Agamemnon, of king of kings. [906]
The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to
strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country
is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no
attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning
attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the
other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of
veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no
longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their
complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation
to be taken against their opposition. Mark Antony is the most
audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him
to leave the curia, “where,” he says, “his sacred character will not
preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of
hostility towards the Republic. ” Mark Antony thereupon, rising
impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the
tribune’s power are violated in his person. “We are insulted,” exclaims
he; “we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres,
conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon
your own heads! ” Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had
always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia,
followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Cœlius. [907] It was time: the
curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops,
which were already approaching. [908] All four left Rome in the night
between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an
ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar’s quarters. [909]
The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats
there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and
firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten
legions--six in Spain, and four in Italy. [910] According to his
conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in
his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single legion,
to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon
his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have
assembled a formidable army. [911] Then the Senate declares the country
in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure
reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the
Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the
prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party,
whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fell
upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so
many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands,[912] which
the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent,
chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius
Libo is sent to Etruria,[913] P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of
Picenum,[914] P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum,[915] and Q.
Minucius Thermus to Umbria. [916] By a false interpretation of the law
which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have
resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian
provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio,
Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius
Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta, Africa to L.
Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextius. [917] The obligation of a
curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their
names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the
established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and
till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the
usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till
then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in
Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and
ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to
the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the
civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources
of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money
preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the
property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of
the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and
human are equally trampled under foot. [918] And yet a few days had
scarcely passed “when the Senate,” says Appian, “regretted not having
accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a
moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit
to the counsels of wisdom. ”[919]
[Sidenote: Cæsar harangues his Troops. ]
III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his
party, underwent its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of
himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the
thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his
firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark
Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to
him. [920] At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the
other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting
for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the
Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and
the recent injustices of which he is the victim.
