No More Learning

Or Chabrias and Diotimos near those ofHadrian?
How ridiculous! [probably because they too were dead].
And even if they were still sitting there, would the dead notice them? And if the dead noticed them, would they derive pleasure om their presence? And if the dead did derive some pleasure, would those who were sitting there be immortal? Has it not been xed by Destiny that those who were sitting there should rst
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become old women and men, and nally die? What will happen to the dead, when those who had been sitting near their ashes are dead too?
This same Book VIII describes analogous situations, in which living people weep r the dead, and are themselves wept over shortly a er­ wards (VIII, 25): Marcus' mother Lucilla, who lost her husband Verus, and then died in turn; Secunda, the wi of Maximus, one of Marcus' friends and teachers, who died after having buried Maximus; Antoninus, Marcus' adoptive ther, who decreed the apotheosis ofhis wi Faustina, and then did not survive her r long. Marcus also evokes Caninius Celer,55 one of his rhetoric teachers, who had been secretary to the emperor Hadrian, and who had perhaps delivered the latter's neral oration. He too was dead by the time Marcus was writing. In this context we also nd a certain Diotimos, no doubt a eedman ofHadrian, and the same person whom Marcus had pictured sitting near Hadrian's neral urn in the description cited above (VIII, 37).
Elsewhere, Marcus again causes all kinds o f characters whom h e has known to come to life be re our eyes; but it is di cult r us to identi them.
It is especially in Book I that Marcus evokes the dead who had been close to him: his parents, his teachers, Antoninus Pius, his adoptive brother Lucius Verus, and the Empress Faustina. There is no melancholy in these pages, which retain only the virtues of the beings whom the Emperor has known and loved. Yet we cannot help eling that the Emperor is thinking nostal cally of those whom he has loved, and whose departure has left him pro undly alone.
The "Confessions" ofMarcus Aurelius
There is a sense in which Book I represents Marcus' "Confessions," in the way that there are " Con ssions " of Saint Augustine: not the more or less indecent confessions ofaJean-Jacques Rousseau, but an act ofthanks r the bene ts one has received om gods and men. 56 The book ends with the llowing rmula:
this requires the help ofthe gods and ofGood Fortune.
This remark refers especially to chapter 17, which enumerates all the special vors which the gods have granted; but it also applies to the
entire book, r it is thanks to the "help of the gods and of Good Fortune" that Marcus thinks he has been lucky enough to have the parents, teachers, and iends that he has had.
Book I has a most peculiar structure. In sixteen chapters of unequal length, the Emperor evokes sixteen people to whom Destiny has related him. They have each been the example r him ofspeci c virtues, either generally or in a given circumstance; or else they have given him a piece of advice which has had a strong in uence upon him. The seventeenth chapter enumerates the bene ts which the gods have showered upon him throughout his life, by making him meet a certain person or experi­ ence a particular event. There is thus often an echo between the rst sixteen chapters and the seventeenth.
The rst chapters provide a sketch, as it were, of the history of a life which has been a spiritual itinerary. First comes childhood, surrounded by the tutelary gures of Marcus' grand ther, Annius Verus; his ther, who died so young; his mother; his great-grand ther, Catilius Severus; his tutor; and a certain Diognetus.
Then we have the discovery ofphilosophy, withJunius Rusticus, and Marcus' teachers Apollonius and Sextus. This part ofhis life is so impor­ tant to Marcus that he inverts chronological order, by placing his gram­ mar teacher, Alexander of Cotiaeum, and his rhetoric teacher, Fronto, after the philosophers. Then Marcus moves on to his iends and loved ones, whom he evokes because they have either been models r him, or philosophy teachers: there was Alexander the Platonist, who was his secretary r Greek correspondence; the Stoic Cinna Catulus; Claudius Severus, of whom Marcus remembers especially what he learned om him about the heroes of Republican Rome; and another statesman, the Stoic Claudius Maximus. Chapter 16 contains a lengthy portrait of the emperor Antoninus Pius. By living with him r twenty-three years­ om the age ofseventeen until he became emperor at the age of rty­ Marcus had been able to observe his adoptive ther at length, and to be pro undly in uenced by him.
In the course of the enumeration in chapter r 7 of the vors which the gods have granted Marcus, some of these characters reappear, especially Antoninus Pius, Marcus' relatives, his mother, and three philosopher­ iends: Apollonius, Rusticus, and Maximus. He also evokes his grand ­ ther's concubine, and two " temptations " named Benedicta and Theodo­ tus; as well as his adoptive brother Lucius Verus, and Marcus' wi , the Empress Faustina.
In all likelihood, other people had also played a crucial role in Marcus'
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li . One thinks, r example, ofHerodes Atticus, the "ancient billion­ aire. "57 This renowned rhetor, such a powerful gure in Athens, had been Marcus' rhetoric teacher; but he does not appear in Book I. In this particular case, there could be two reasons r such silence. In the rst place, Herodes was a shady character. Marcus had a great deal ofa ection r him, and guided him through the two trials in which Herodes was implicated, particularly in 174, when Herodes was summoned to the Emperor's headquarters at Sirmium on charges brought against him by the Athenians. 58 Nevertheless, Marcus could hardly il to recognize that Herodes was scarcely a model r the philosophical life. Another reason r Marcus' silence could possibly be that the Emperor seems to talk only about the dead in Book I, whereas Herodes did not die until 179. We might thus suppose that Book I was written between 176 and 179, perhaps at Rome in 177 or 178.
To understand the way Marcus wrote Book I, it will perhaps be su cient to examine how he evokes the gure of Fronto, his Latin rhetoric teacher. When we read the correspondence exchanged between Fronto and Marcus, we get the impression ofan intimate friendship, with a perpetual exchange of ideas, advice, and vors. Thus, one would expect Book I to contain a lengthy couplet on Marcus' venerated teacher. Yet the Emperor devotes only three lines to him, whereas he uses thirteen lines to speak ofhis debt toward Rusticus. What has Marcus retained om all those years ofworking intimacy with Fronto? Only two things, which have nothing to do with rhetoric (I, 1 1) :
To have learned how tyranny leads to envious evil, to caprices, and to dissimulation; and how, on the whole, those whom we call "patricians " are somehow lacking in a ectionateness.
Marcus' remark about the patricians is indeed attested in his corre­ spondence with Fronto; and this allows us to glimpse that behind each one of Marcus' notes, there is certainly a precise matter of ct. For instance, Fronto writes to the emperor Lucius Verus, in order to recom­ mend to him one of his students, Gavius Clams. He praises Gavius' conscientiousness, modesty, reserve, generosity, simplicity, continence, truth lness, and entirely Roman uprightness:
. . . I don't know ifhis a ectionateness hilostorgia) is Roman, r in all my life at Rome, there is nothing I have und less o en than a man having sincere a ectionateness. I would not be surprised i
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since there is really no one to b e und at Rome who has a ection­ ateness, there is no Latin word to designate this virtue. 59
When he writes to the proconsul Lollianus Avitus to recommend Licinius Montanus to him, Fronto uses an analogous enumeration: "He is sober, honest, tender in his a ections hilosto us) . . . " And he notes once again that there is no Latin word r that quality. 60 When Marcus writes to his teacher in Latin, he addresses him in Greek as philosto e anthrope, as if there were indeed no Latin equivalent r this Greek word. 61 We may wonder whether this remark does not contain a hint of resentment on the part of the provincial homo novus Fronto with regard to the old Roman aristocracy. In any case, Fronto's remark struck Mar­ cus, and we may suppose that he too sensed a lack of tenderness of the heart in the ruling class. In the Meditations, Marcus exhorts himself sev­ eraltimestobea ectionate(VI,30,2;II,5, r;XI,r8,r8),whileinBook I he notes the philosto ia ofhis teacher Sextus.
With regard to Marcus' remarks on tyranny as a corruption ofmonar­ chy which consists in pro ting om power r one's own pleasure: we possess no text by Fronto that might shed light on this allusion. It may have come om a conversation they had, or om a Latin literary text relative to this theme which Marcus had studied together with his teacher. At any rate, the Emperor retained the idea that the egotistical exercise ofpower leads to evil, inconstancy, and dissimulation. As R. B. Ruther rd has rightly pointed out,62 Marcus was particularly a ected by this idea because, as Emperor, he was the precisely the one who could easily become a tyrant. Marcus was a "potential tyrant," and on several occasions the Meditations ask him to question himself in order to see whether he does not have a tyrannical soul. This is particularly the case in IV, 28, which may be understood as a kind ofdescription ofthe tyranni­ cal character:
A dark character: e eminate, harsh, savage, bestial, puerile, cow­ ardly, false, olish, mercenary, and tyrannical.
Elsewhere, such tyrants as Phalaris and Nero appear as yanked about by their disorde y tendencies, like wild, androgynous beasts (III, r 6) .
From his long miliarity with Fronto, then, Marcus either can o r will retain no more than two items of moral instruction. He evokes no virtue or character trait ofFronto's worthy ofbeing mentioned.
This means that Book I is not a collection of recollections in which
Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 2 8 1
the Emperor causes those he has known to live againjust as they were. Rather, it is a kind ofprecise record ofthose who have played a role in his li . The very style ofthe book makes it resemble the inventory ofan inheritance, or an acknowledgement of debt. 63 At the beginning of each chapter, we rst have a kind of label: " From my grand ther Verus . . . , " "From my mother . . . ," "From Sextus . . . ," "From Fronto . . . " Then the qualities Marcus admires are enumerated, as are the teachings he has received and the exemplary actions performed. Grammatically, all this is expressed by neuter adjectives used substantively, or by an in nitive proposition; there are hardly any personally in ected verbs. Marcus does not say, "From my grand ther, I admired . . . ," or "I retained," or "I learned"; but rather "From my grand ther Verus: good character and lack of anger. " Thus, this balance-sheet concerns the virtues which Mar­ cus saw practiced, the advice he heard, speci c actions and signi cant examples which made an impression on him, and nally the bene ts which he received.
In the case of some of the gures Marcus evokes, their personality disappears completely behind the advice they have given to the Emperor. Marcus mentions no particular virtue in the case of his tutor, or of Diognetus, or of Rusticus, or of Fronto. This does not mean that they did not possess any moral qualities, but that it was not by means of such qualities that they in uenced Marcus. What "made" Marcus Aurelius were, r instance, the reprimands about his character addressed to him by Rusticus, or the ct that he communicated to him Epictetus' Dis­ courses.
In the case of some other gures, such as that of his mother, the Emperor evokes only those virtues which were obviously exemplary r him (I, 3):
From my mother: piety; a disposition to give generously; and a horror not only ofdoing evil, but even ofthinking about doing evil. In addition, ugality in my daily routine, r removed om the life-style ofthe rich.
The same holds true r Claudius Maximus, whose entire personality was exemplary r Marcus: self-mastery; peace of mind in adversity; gentleness and dignity; re ection in the carrying out of a project; har­ mony between words, actions, and moral conscience; the quality ofnot being surprised by anything, of aring nothing, and of remaining self-
identical; bene cence; indulgence; veracity; spontaneity in action; and the art ofjoking.
Finally, there are those of whom Marcus has remembered both the teachings and the virtues, such as Severus, who was bene cent, liberal, and ee-speaking, but who also caused Marcus to discover the entire philosophical tradition ofresistance to tyranny.
Through this catalogue of virtues and of teachings, an outline of Marcus' life itself is traced. Thus, thanks to his great-grand ther, he bene ted om instruction at home; thanks to his tutor, he learned not to get caught up in the partisan battles of ns of the Greens and the Whites- ctions of the circus games-and not to get excited about any particular group ofgladiators. Diognetus turned him away om tilities, superstitions, and playing with quails, and instilled in him a taste r a Spartan life-style. Rusticus showed him the need to correct his character: as he taught him philosophy, he also prevented Marcus om getting carried away by enthusiasm r writing theoretical or hortatory philo­ sophical tracts, and om lling into ostentatious asceticism. Rusticus made him give up rhetoric and poetry, and taught him simplicity ofstyle, particula y by the example of a letter he had written to Marcus' mother. He taught Marcus how to read philosophical texts, and, most important, passed on to him some notes taken at the classes ofEpictetus. More than any precise teachings, the Emperor retained the examples ofhow to live given him by his other philosophy teachers, Apollonius and Sextus.
From Alexander the grammarian, Marcus learned the art of repri­ manding people without annoying them, and of making them aware of their ults indirectly. By equenting Alexander " the Platonist, " his sec­ retary r Greek correspondence, the Emperor learned not to try to get out ofhis duties toward other people by claiming that one has no time to reply to letters. In the case ofMarcus' three friends Catulus, Severus, and Maximus, it was especially their virtues which were exemplary; but Marcus owed Severus the discovery of an entire political attitude: the monarchy's respect r the eedom ofits subjects. I shall return to this point.
Fina y, there was the encounter with Antoninus, who, in his entire behavior, revealed to the ture Emperor the features ofthe ideal ruler.
Chapter 1 7, which celebrates the bene ts which the gods have show­ ered upon him, gives Marcus the opportunity to go over the stages ofhis life once again. After the death of his ther, the young Marcus lived brie y in the house of his grand ther, Annius Verus. It seems that this was a time of temptations r Marcus, and he thanks the gods r
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not having been brought up r too long with my grand ther's concubine; r having been able to maintain the bloom of my youth; r not having reached manhood too soon, but having even gone past the time r that.
Then comes youth, the time of Marcus' adoption by the emperor Antoninus Pius, at the age of seventeen (in 1 3 8) . Once again, the main discovery which Marcus made then was that ofsimplicity (I, 17, 5):
to have been subject to a ruler who was to take away om me every trace of pride, and give me the idea that it was possible to live at court without any bodyguards, nor conspicuous dress, nor the lamps and statues which go along with it; nor in general with any of this kind of pomp; but that one may very well restrict oneself to a kind of life very close to that of a private citizen, without thereby becoming base or indi erent toward devoting oneselflike a sover­ eign to what must be done r the public good.
His adoption would give Marcus an adoptive brother, Lucius Verus (I, l 7, 6) ; and Marcus thanks the gods r having made him meet
such a brother, who, by his character, could awaken me to take care of mysel and who, at the same time, made me happy by his deference and his a ection.
Soon would come Marcus' marriage to Faustina (in 145), which Mar­ cus mentions rther on. At the moment, he thinks ofhis children, "who were neither ungi ed nor misshapen. "
This was also the time of his rhetorical studies with Pronto and Herodes Atticus, but Marcus makes no allusion to them in this chapter. Too much success in this eld would have taken him away om philoso­ phy, but here again the gods were watch l (I, 17, 8):
Not to have made too much progress in rhetoric, poetry, and the other occupations, by which I might have been caught up, if I had felt that I was making good progress in them.
In any case, Marcus has, thanks to the gods, done everything to repay his teachers (I, 17, 9):
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To have hurried to establish my teachers in the honori c positions which it seemed to me they wanted, and not to have le them in the mere hope that I would do it later, since they were still young.
Finally comes the main point: philosophy and its practice (I, 17, rn):
To have known Apollonius, Rusticus, and Maximus. To have had clear and equent representations ofthe "li according to nature," so that, inso r as it depends on the gods and on the communica­ tions, assistance, and inspirations which come om above, nothing now prevents me om living "according to nature"; but I am r om that point by my own ult, because I pay no attention to the reminders, or rather to the teachings, which come om the gods.
Thus, divine graces helped Marcus to practice philosophy, and also to resist the temptations ofluxuriousness and anger, as well as the tigue of the imperial life (I, 17, 12):
That my body has resisted such a life r so long.
This brief remark perhaps allows us to glimpse the hardships which Marcus endured while on the Danubian campaign.
Not to have touched Benedicta or Theodotus; and later on, when I did fall prey to erotic passions, that I was cured.
Marcus was not the impassive Stoic that many have imagined. There were, ofcourse, his youth l in tuations with Benedicta and Theodotus, about whom we know nothing; perhaps Marcus met them while living with his grand ther. But there were also more mature passions, om which he was able to be cured. We should recall, moreover, that a er the death of Faustina, Marcus took in a concubine, with whom he lived r the last three years ofhis life. 64
Although I often got angry with Rusticus, that I did not do any­ thing extreme, which I would later have regretted.
There were thus stormy relations between the disciple and his director of conscience; but Marcus does not say whether they were limited to the period ofhis youth and philosophical education, or whether they contin-
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ued a er he became Emperor, when Rusticus became a highly in uen­ tial counselor to Marcus.
It was also a blessing om the gods that his mother, who died young, was able to live with him r the last years of her li , at the court of Antoninus. Another was that he was always able to help the needy. It was another blessing r Marcus to have had such a wife, in the person ofthe Empress Faustina, "so sweet, so a ectionate, so lacking in arti ce. " Fi­ nally, it was a blessing that he was able to provide his children with a good education.
Marcus then evokes the remedies against spitting blood and dizziness, which were revealed to him in dreams.
Finally, Marcus returns to a theme he has already mentioned when speaking ofRusticus: not the least ofthe gods' blessings was the ct that he did not become interested in abstract philosophical discourse, either logical or concerning the study ofnature. Rather, we are to understand that Marcus learned, above all, to live in a philosophical way. " this," Marcus concludes, "requires the help ofthe gods and ofFortune. " In the last analysis, "all this" is the entire content of the Meditations: all those relatives, teachers, and iends who showered him with examples and advice; but also the divine inspirations which helped him in his physical and spiritual life. I have spoken earlier ofthe two viewpoints ofthe Stoic conception ofprovidence, and I have said that these two viewpoints-a general law of the universe, indi erent to individual beings, and a par­ ticular action on the part of the gods, which takes care of individuals­ were not mutually exclusive. Book I can obviously be classi ed under the second perspective: that ofparticular providence. In this book, Mar­ cus sees his entire life in the peace l light ofthe gods' solicitude r him.
The reader may be surprised that the author of the Meditations, reign­ ing over an immense empire, overwhelmed with worries, but also used to elevating himself to grandiose visions which embraced the immensity of space and time, would thank the gods r things which may seem mundane or even trivial, such as the ct that he did not make progress in rhetoric. Other subjects r thanks do not rise above the level of the aspirations of an ordinary man: to raise his children well; to be in good health; to have good parents and a loving wife.
Perhaps we are touching here upon a particular aspect of Marcus' psychology. Thanks to his study of Epictetus and the Stoics, Marcus is quite capable ofmeditating, in a remarkable style, upon highly elevated themes. From his mother, however, as well as om Rusticus and Anton­ inus, he learned to live at court the life of an ordinary man; r instance,
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as we know om his correspondence with Fronto, he helped the rm workers with the grape harvest. We do not nd in Marcus an aristocratic or rhetorical search r "great elings" or geopolitical perspectives; in­ stead, we nd a highly characteristic attention paid to the realities ofdaily li . This was, moreover, also the lesson taught by Epictetus. In order to show that you are a human being, the latter used to say, "eat like a human being; drink like a human being; get married; have children" (III, 21, 4-6). In Marcus' case, we may add to the equation a certain candor, naivete, and simplicity, which made him search, in the pitiless world of the Roman aristocracy, r tenderness, a ection, and warmth offeelings, and the authenticity ofsimple human relations.
In the remaining books of the Meditations, we nd only a very small number of autobiographical references. There are a w allusions to Marcus' name and his position as Emperor, and to his adoptive ther, Antoninus Pius, of whom Marcus traces a brief portrait (VI, 30) which seems to be a sketch r the one that can now be read in Book I. There are also a few words on Marcus' old age (II, 2, 4; II, 6); on his di culty in getting up in the morning (V, l; VIII, 12); and on the repugnance he els r life at court (VIII, 9) and r the games ofthe circus (VI, 46).
What is completely remarkable, both in Book I and throughout the Meditations, is Marcus' consciousness ofhis own fallibility65-to the point that his "Confessions" are also a kind ofconfession ofhis ults. This is an eminently Stoic attitude (Epictetus, II, ll, l):
The starting-point ofphilosophy is our consciousness ofour weak­ ness and our incapacity with regard to necessary things.
For Marcus, however, this attitude perhaps comes naturally. In the rst place, he admits that he has not really succeeded so r in living like a philosopher (VII, l); that his soul is not yet in the dispositions ofpeace and love in which it should be (X, l); that, despite reprieves and warn­ ings om the gods, it is his ult that he does not yet live "according to Nature," that is, according to Reason (I, 17, I I). What is more, he perceives within himselfa disposition to commit errors (I, 17, 2; XI, 18, 7); and ifhe does not com t a given error, it is only out offear and of what others will say. Basically, however, he is no di erent om those whom he criticizes (XI, 18, 7). He also admits that he can be wrong, and he accepts that his errors must be corrected (VI, 21; VIII, 16). He knows that he runs the risk of seeing de cts where there are in ct none (IX,
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38; XII, 16); and he willingly accepts assistance, like a lame soldier inca­ pable ofclimbing up a wall (VII, 7; VII, 5).
Marcus is, moreover, perfectly aware of the limits of his intelligence (V, 5, r):
They can hardly admire your quickness ofmind. So be it! But there are many other things about which you cannot say, "I am not gifted. " Show us, then, these things that depend entirely on you: being without duplicity, being serious . . . being ee . . .
To be sure, we do not nd in Marcus the ndness r self-accusation which we nd in Augustine, who is persuaded a p o of the corruption of human nature. It does seem, however, that Marcus was gifted by nature with an acute self-consciousness, and a considerable capacity r self-criticism; or rather with the ability ofexamining himselfwith objec­ tivity, in which he recognized his ults, but also his qualities. The l­ lowing briefremark is noteworthy (VIII, 42):
I don't deserve to be ashamed ofmyself, r I have never voluntarily harmed anyone.
Near to death, Marcus makes a summation ofhis life which is, in the last analysis, con dent and positive (V, 3 1 , 2) :
Remind yourself of what kinds of things you have gone through, and what you have been able to bear. The story ofyour life is ll, and your service is complete. Remember all the ne things you have seen; all the pleasures and su erings you have overcome; all the motives r glory which you have despised; all the ingrates to whom you have been benevolent.
Renan66 was critical of Marcus' " Confessions, " especially as they ap­ pear in Book I:
He could see the baseness ofhumanity, but he did not admit it to himself This way of voluntarily blinding oneself is the defect of elite hearts. Since the world is not the way they would like it to be, they lie to themselves, in order to see it as other than it is. The result of this is a certain conventionality of judgment. In Marcus, this conventionality is sometimes annoying: ifwe were to believe him,
288 THE INNER CITADEL his teachers-several of whom were irly mediocre men-would
all, without exception, have been superior beings.
This judgment is r o the mark. In the rst place, Marcus tried to render to each person exactly what he or she was owed, and no more; we have seen this in the case of Fronto. Let us also note what he says about his adoptive brother, Lucius Verus-who, although his exact per­ sonality is di cult to determine, can at least be said to have been ex­ tremely di erent om Marcus. Marcus does not say that Verus was perfect; on the contrary, when he saw Verus' life-style, Marcus was led to watch himself so as not to imitate him. In the end, Verus' bad example was a blessing om the gods; and all Marcus adds is that his brother showed deference and a ection r him. It also seems as though Marcus made a care l choice of whom to mention and whom, since they had not contributed anything to him, he could ignore.
Book I is simultaneously an act of thanksgiving and a confession; a balance sheet of divine action and of Marcus' own resistance to divine action. For Marcus, this action took place in the only important area: that of moral value and virtue. He does not thank the gods r having ele­ vated him to the Empire, nor r having granted him victory over the Germans, but r having guided him toward the philosophical life, with the help ofa few men who were sent to him providentially.
Verus or ctus: "sincere" or "a ected"
A passage om the L e Marcus Aurelius contained in the Historia Augusta shows us that the Emperor's contemporaries wondered what his real personality was:
Some also complained that he was a ected ctus) and not so simple (simplex) as he seemed, or as Antoninus Pius and Verus had been. 67
A play on words is involved here: Marcus' original name was Annius Verus, and the word verus evokes sincerity.
The emperor Hadrian, who had known Marcus in his childhood, had even given him the nickname Verissimus, "the very sincere. " Some ofMarcus' detractors, then, appar­ ently said that he should have been called not rus but Fictus-that is, not "Sincere" but "A ected. " This criticism probably came om the historian Marius Maximus,68 who had begun his political career in the
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last years of Marcus' reign. Maximus collected all the current gossip about the imperial mily, and the Historia Augusta o en echoes him.
Cassius Dio, a historian who was more or less contemporary with Marius Maximus, maintains a position that is diametrically opposed:
He obviously did nothing out of a ectation rospoietos), but every­ thing out of virtue . . . he remained the same through eve thing, and did not change on any point. To such an extent was he a truly good man, and there was nothing a ected about him. 69
To reproach Marcus with a ectation was in ct to reproach him with being a philosopher. The philosophical life he led caused him to have a strange attitude, which was di erent om that of other people, and there re " a ected, " in their view.
Cassius Dio, r instance, who recognized the Emperor's sincerity, was astonished at the extraordinary clemency which he showed on the occa­ sion ofthe rebellion by Avidius Cassius: "Nothing could rce him to do anything alien to his own character: not the idea of making an example of someone, nor the magnitude of the crime. "70
In ct, however, we must go rther, and recognize the genuine di culty of moral li . Whoever tries to control himsel to practice spiritual exercises, to trans rm himsel and to act with conscientiousness and re ection gives the impression of lacking spontaneity and of being calculating. Here we con ont the eternal problem ofmoral e ort, and of work by oneself upon oneself We know, r example, that Marcus, in order to correct his own conduct, had investigations made concerning what the public was saying about him; when the criticisms werejusti ed, he modi ed his behavior. 71
The Emperor was quite conscious ofthis danger, which may be insur­ mountable. In Book I, he expresses his admiration r Claudius Maximus, because he gave the impression of being a man who was naturally "straight" and not one who has corrected or "straightened" himself (I, I 5, 8). The same theme is present in other books of the Meditations:
One must be straight, and not straightened (III, 5, 4; VII, 12).
When Marcus praises sincerity (XI, 15), he criticizes people who begin by saying "I shall speak ankly to you," and then obviously do nothing of the kind. Frankness, says Marcus, is written on one's ce; it
resonates in the voice and shines in the eyes. It is perceived immediately, as the beloved perceives love in the eyes of his lover. Good, simple, and benevolent people have their qualities in their eyes: they do not remain hidden. Marcus demanded that moral action be perfectly natural, as ifit were unconscious, without any return upon itsel(
It is possible that the gods, to whom Marcus addresses his thanks at the end of Book I, did not bestow upon him the supreme blessing, in the sense of supreme ease and beauty: the ability to make others believe that one does good deeds by nature. I think, however, that no one can deny the good will and scrupulous conscientiousness with which Marcus at­ tempted to do good. In this point, at least, he was scrupulously sincere.
The solitude of the emperor and of the philosopher
In the mous portrait of the philosopher which he sketches m the Theaetetus (174e), Plato did not rget to mention what the philosopher thinks ofkings and tyrants. What is a king? What is a tyrant? A shepherd or a cowherd, who is happy ifhe can squeeze lots ofmilk om his herd. In ct, however, he is not as rtunate as he seems, r the beasts he must milk and pasture are much more unpleasant, di cult, sneaky, and treach­ erous than those of a simple shepherd. Moreover, absorbed by the cares ofgoverning these disagreeable beasts called men, he has no more mental eedom, and he is just as rough and uncultivated as the shepherds, " once he has surrounded himself with an enclosure around his animal pen in
the mountains. "
This is precisely what Marcus the philosopher te s Marcus the em­
peror: wherever he goes, he will be enclosed in the prison of power­ alone, without any leisure, and con onted by the sneaky beasts men­ tioned by Plato (X, 23):
Let it always be clear to you that your countryside is the place where you are living at this moment, and that everything here is identical to what is on a high mountain or on the seashore, or wherever you like; you'll immediately nd there what Plato talks about: "Surrounding himselfwith a pen in the mountains," he says, and "milking his ocks. "
What Marcus means is the llowing: wherever you go, you will nd the prison of power and the solitude in which you are enclosed by your position as shepherd of men. Wherever you go, however, it will be
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Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations
within you and only within you that you will nd that countryside, seashore, or mountain which can liberate you om the prison you nd everywhere (c£ IV, 3, l). In other words, it is the emperor's inner dispositions that will decide if he is imprisoned within his mountain enclosure, like Plato's king, or if he will nd pleasure and relaxation in the mountains or the countryside, as he would like. No matter where we go, we nd-according to our wishes-servitude or eedom.
"Mountain" here has two meanings: it is the symbol ofthe enclosure within which the tyrant/king lives as a prisoner together with the ock ofanimals he exploits; but it is also the symbol ofretreat within ourselves and the inner eedom which we can nd anywhere, as long as we want it (X, 15, 2):
Live as if you were on a mountain. It doesn't matter whether one lives in one place or another, as long as one lives everywhere as within one's own City, which is the World.
And yet the philosopher's inner retreat, which is his philosophical li in con rmity with Stoicism, will provoke another solitude and rupture between the ock and its shepherd: a serious disparity between the values ofboth parties.
This uneasiness explains Marcus' repugnance with regard to life at court, which he compares to a stepmother (VI, 12), whereas his true mother is philosophy, which allows him to put up with the court, and to make himselfbearable to those who live at court. Yet he blames himself r this attitude (VIII, 9):
Let no one hear you blame the life people lead at court any longer! Let not you yourselfhear yourselfdoing it!
Here we encounter once again what we could call the theme oflife on a mountain: wherever one can live, one can live well; that is to say, philosophically. But it is possible to live at court; there re, it is possible to live well there (V, 16, 2). Marcus gives this argument as an example of the way in which the soul can su use itselfwith speci c representations.
Marcus' repugnance r life at court was not, however, mere su­ per cial annoyance: rather, the discord ran extremely deep. As he con­ tinues this meditation on life "on a mountain"-that is to say, within the City of the World-Marcus allows us to glimpse just how deep this discord and this rupture go (X, l5, 3):
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Let people see and discover what a man who truly lives in accord­ ance with nature is like! Ifthey can't put up with you, then let them kill you! That would be better than to live like them!
The con ict is situated in the pro und di erence between the two parties' principles of li , and it is summarized by Marcus in a lapidary rmula which opposes the two Greek words homothamnein and homodog­ matein (XI, 8, 6):
Grow on the same trunk, but don't profess the same principles.
These two duties are hard to reconcile: on the one hand, our duty to love other human beings, with whom we rm one single body, tree, or city; on the other, our duty not to let ourselves be cajoled into adopting their lse values and maxims ofli .
This is the drama ofMarcus' li . He loves mankind, and wants to love them; but he hates what they love. Only one thing counts r him: the search r virtue and the purity ofmoral intention. This human world­ om which this unique value is absent-provokes in Marcus an intense reprobation and lassitude; yet he gets hold of himself, and attempts to reintroduce gentleness and indulgence within himself
This disgust and lassitude make Marcus long r death, and he knows that this is wrong. We know how important a part is played in the Meditations by the "helps," or arguments r preparing oneself r death. Some are entirely philosophical, as r instance those which teach us to consider death as a particular case ofuniversal metamorphosis, or a mys­ tery ofnature (II, 12, 3; IV, 5; IX, 3, 1-4). Some ofthem, however, are not philosophical, but are coarse (idiotika) and vulgar, although highly e ective: r instance, those which consist in making a list ofpeople who hung on desperately to li , unwilling to let go, and who nevertheless died (IV, 50). A similar consideration, which Marcus admits (IX, 3, 5) is also completely unphilosophical (idiotikon), but which touches the heart, consists in telling oneself that, in the last analysis, what one is leaving is not really worth much. This method consists in
care lly examining the kinds of objects om which you are about to separate yoursel and with what bad characters your soul will no longer be mixed. To be sure, you must by no means be disgusted by them; on the contrary, you must be lled with solicitude r them, and put up with them gently. Nevertheless, you must also remem-
Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 293
her that you must take leave of people who do not share your principles. Ifit were possible, the only thing which could push you back in the other direction and maintain you in life, would be ifit were possible r you to live in a society ofpeople who had adopted the same principles as you.
As things are, however, you can see how much you are ed with lassitude at the discords of social life; to the point where you say: "Hurry up, 0 Death, lest I too rget mysel£"
One thinks ofBaudelaire's cry, so expressive of tigue with terrestrial li and an aspiration r the in nite: "0 Death, old captain . . . this land is boring! Let us cast o ! " Yet ifMarcus calls on Death to come quickly, it is less out oflassitude than out offear ofbecoming similar to those who rget themselves and live in a state ofunconsciousness.
The disgust which Marcus els r his entourage is certai y surpris­ ing. Did he not surround himselfwith iends and counselors who were also philosophers, like his beloved Rusticus and all those whom we were able to glimpse thanks to the testimony of Galen? It could be supposed that, by these last years of Marcus' life, his iends had disappeared, and that he now misses the be nning of his reign. And yet we know om Cassius Dio72 that Marcus admitted that no one could be perfect:
He used to say that it is impossible to create people as one would like them to be, but that each one had to be utilized in the task which he was capable ofaccomplishing.
He used to praise them r the service they had rendered, and he paid no attention to the rest oftheir behavior.
Are we to suppose that he had become more intransigent in his old age? Alternatively, can we perceive in these lines the disappointment Marcus felt as he saw the development ofthe character ofCommodus? This was the view of Renan, especially a propos of another passage (X, 36), which is also very striking in its expression oflassitude and disap­ pointment:
No one is so well- vored by Destiny that, at the moment of his death, he is not surrounded by people who rejoice at this sad event. The dead man was conscientious and well-behaved; yet someone nally turn up to say, "This schoolteacher aidagogos)
294 THE INNER CITADEL will now nally let us breathe. To be sure, he was not harsh with
any of us; but I could el that he was condemning us in silence. "
Later on in the text, Marcus opposes the case of this good man to his own situation. In a sense, however, when he speaks ofthis good man, he is already thinking about himsel r he is well aware ofthe ct that not only those around him, but also the entire Empire, knew that he was trying to be a philosopher. An apocryphal letter om Lucius Verus to his adoptive brother, preserved by the Historia Augusta, may re ect an opin­ ion widespread in Marcus' time: it warns Marcus that Avidius Cassius, who was to revolt against him near the end of Marcus' reign, spoke of him as an " old woman who plays at being a philosopher. "73 Many people must have had similar views of the Emperor; perhaps they had even nicknamed him "the pedagogue. " In any case, Marcus uses this descrip­ tion of the death of a good man as an a fortiori argument: if such a man must expect such an end, then all the more must Marcus himself expect similar reactions at the moment ofhis own death:
This is what people will say about a good man. In my case, how­ ever, how many more reasons there are r there to be many people to want to get rid ofme. You'll have to think ofthat when you die. You will leave li more easily, if you think: the life that I am leaving is one in which my associates (koinonoi), r whom I have ught so hard and prayed so much, r whom I have had so much concern, want me to go away. Perhaps they hope r some relief om my disappearance.
Who were these associates or companions (koinonoi)? They could have been the Emperor's counselors, who made up the imperial council and who, in the words ofthe Emperor's contemporary Aelius Aristides, were participants in power. Yet the expressions "I have ught so hard" and "I have prayed so much" imply a very special relationship between the Emperor and these "associates. " It is hard not to think, with Renan, of Commodus, Marcus' young son, who had been given imperial power in 177, three years be re the Emperor's death, and who was probably already manifesting the disastrous tendencies that would develop during his reign.
Be that as it may, Marcus trans s his meditation on the ingratitude of others into a preparation r death. Unlike the preparation mentioned above, this one is not philosophical, since it sins against the discipline of action, which requires us to love our fellow human beings. Nevertheless,
Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 295 it is powerfully e ective, since it di nishes the anguish and su ering
caused by the loss oflife:
Why should we try to prolong our stay in this place?
Yet Marcus corrects himselfimmediately (X, 36, 6):
And yet, don't go away r that reason less well-disposed toward them. Rather, you must remain ith l to your own character, and be iendly, benevolent, and merci l toward them.
This is the disposition in which we should always remain. Yet lassitude and disappointment sometimes win the day, and Marcus implicitly rec­ ognizes that they are not philosophical, but are a weakness, and perhaps even a pass10n.
Such a complex sentiment appears to consist of several elements. In the rst place, we nd in it a view ofhuman ailty that is ee ofillusion. Marcus had a sharp and highly realistic sense of both his own llibility and that of others, which sometimes went so r as to consider these others incorrigible (VIII, 4):
They'll still do the same things, even ifit kills you!
As W. Williams has shown, this is why Marcus was always care l to dot the i's and cross the t's ofthe o cial documents which expressed his decisions. He seems to have ared that his subordinates might il to understand his orders, or re se to carry them out in the way he wanted. For instance, in one case a slave was set ee by a will, but this might have been contested because ofthe rm ofthe will. Marcus, however, was in vor of the " cause of eedom, " and always tended to make en anchise­
ment easier; thus he took the trouble to speci that his decision should be not left as a dead letter, by bringing up some other motive, such as the ct that the Treasury might claim the property left by the testator. As Marcus writes,
Those who have our interests at heart must know that the cause of eedom is to be placed be re nancial advantage. 74
One the one hand, we can perceive here the importance of the hu­ man, moral point of view r Marcus. On the other hand, we can also impse a certain lack ofcon dence in the intellectual and moral qualities
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ofhis subordinates. These di culties with his entourage, moreover, took on greater proportions as a result of Marcus' undeniable propensity to­ ward anger, which the Emperor made no attempt to conceal; he was aware that becoming angry constituted a weakness (XI, 9, 2).
The main cause ofMarcus' lassitude, however, was his passionate love r moral good. A world in which this absolute value was not recognized seemed to him an empty world, in which life no longer had any mean­ ing. As he grew old in such an enormous empire, in the huge crowds which surrounded and acclaimed him, in the atrocious Danubian war as well as in the triumphal parades of the city of Rome, he felt himself alone. Marcus felt a void around himsel since he could not realize his ideal (IX, 3 , 7) : to live in community with others, in search of the only thing necessary.
Political models
Marcus does not propose any speci c governmental program in the Meditations. This should not su rise us, r he is less concerned with what must be done than with how it must be done. Nevertheless, Book I does contain some allusions to political practice. Through Claudius Severus, Marcus writes (I, 14), he has come to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dio, and Brutus. This list of names has a quite precise meaning. 75
Paetus Thrasea was the mous senator who, in the year 66, was rced to commit suicide because of his outspoken opposition to the emperor Nero. Helvidius Priscus, Thrasea's son-in-law, was assassinated in the reign ofVespasian, probably in the year 75. Both were opponents ofthe emperors, and this attitude was a kind of mily tradition, in which the women also often took part. The portraits of these martyrs were kept within the great aristocratic milies, and their biographies were written. Under some emperors, however, writing such works also meant risking death. At the beginning ofhis L e ofAgricola, Tacitus evokes the happi­ ness which the emperor Nerva brought to Rome by establishing a reign which, says Tacitus, reconciled monarchy and eedom. Under Nerva's predecessor Domitian, by contrast, it had been rbidden to write the biographies ofopponents ofthe emperor.
Arulenus Rusticus wrote a panegyric ofPaetus Thrasea, and Heren­ nius Senecion wrote one ofHelvidius Priscus: both paid with their lives . . . It was thought that the voice of the Roman people, the
Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 297 ee speech �ibertas) of the Senate, and the conscience of the human
race could be sti ed.
It was almost fty years a er these events that Marcus Aurelius, through the intermediary of Claudius Severus, discovered this tradition of opposition. In turn, however, these opponents of the Empire had maintained the cult of other, older martyrs, who had lived in the last stages of the Republic, under Caesar. When Juvenal, a contemporary of Tacitus, speaks in his Satires , 36) of the high quality of a wine, he writes that it is similar to that which Paetus Thrasea and Helvidius Priscus drank on the birthdays ofBrutus and Cassius, the murderers ofCaesar.
According to Marcus, Claudius Severus had also told him about the gure ofBrutus, who lived in the rst century B. C. (85-42), and about Cato. The gure in question is obviously Cato ofUtica (95-46), who, as an opponent of Caesar, committed suicide upon the approach of the latter's troops.
Did Claudius Severus provide Marcus with the biographies of Thrasea, Helvidius Priscus, Brutus, and Cato? Thrasea had written a life of Cato, and Helvidius a li of Thrasea, while Herennius Senecion had composed a li of Helvidius. Did Claudius also have Marcus read the parallel lives of Brutus and Dio of Syracuse, written by Plutarch, who had also composed the parallel lives ofPhocion and Cato ofUtica? It is in any case surprising to see, in the list ofRomans enumerated by Claudius Severus, a Greek, who lived om about 409 to 354 B. c. : namely Dio, who deposed the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius, but who was in tu him­ selfassassinated. 76 It is hi ly unlikely that the Dio mentioned here could be Dio Chrysostom, the rhetor and philosopher who was exiled under Domitian but later recovered imperial vor. The rest of the list consists of only statesmen, so that Dio Chrysostom would be an exception, and he was not really a "martyr" ofopposition to the Empire.
Claudius Severus may very well have spoken of these gures in a conversation in which he emphasized the common element that linked them all together: the link between philosophy and a speci c conception ofpolitics; that is to say, the hatred oftyranny. Dio had been a disciple of Plato, and according to Plutarch,77 he practiced the philosophical virtues of ankness of speech, greatness of soul, gravity, clemency toward his enemies, and frugality. By deposing Dionysius, Dio brought eedom back to Syracuse and abolished the tyranny, but he supported a middle path between tyranny and democracy: a monarchy subject to laws,
which is the governmental program set rth in the Eighth Letter, attrib­ uted to Plato.
Brutus, a Roman, was also a Platonist. He llowed the tendency which was shionable in his time: that ofAntiochus ofAscalon, strongly tinged with Stoicism. Brutus had written treatises entitled "On Duty," "On Patience," and "On Virtue. " He was both the assassin ofCaesar and the man who killed himself a er having been defeated in the civil war which llowed Caesar's assassination. Like Dio, Brutus was an enemy of tyranny, and he ught r public liberty.
In the eyes of Seneca, Cato was one of the rare incarnations of the ideal of the Stoic Sage. 78 Be re his suicide, Cato discussed the Stoic paradox according to which only the Sage is ee. Then, he read Plato's Phaedo. 79 His whole way ofli was that ofa philosopher, who tried at the same time to revive the rigorous li ofthe ancient Romans. He trained himself r physical endurance, traveled on ot, went against current shions, a ected disdain r money, and re sed any rm of connivery or complicity with the exactions carried out by powerful Romans.
Brutus and Cato were republicans. Freedom, r them, was above all that of the Senate: in other words, the right to govern of a ruling class which opposed the arbitrariness of the tyranny of one man. Cato also wished to introduce moral or philosophical rigor into the senatorial class.
Under the Empire, Thrasea and Helvidius dreamed of a return to the ancient institutions ofthe Roman Republic; in other words, they wished to restore political authority to the Senate. Both were Stoics, and within the Stoic tradition-particularly in Epictetus80-they would remain as examples of constancy, mental rmness, and indi erence to indi erent things. Epictetus himselfknew this opposition to imperial power well, thanks to his teacher Musonius Ru s, who had been closely linked to Thrasea.
All these memories were awakened by the reign and the persecutions ofDomitian, as we can see om the numerous allusions to this somber period which can be und in the letters ofPliny the Younger. With the total change of atmosphere brought about by the accession of the em­ peror Nerva, which was prolonged under his successors Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus, both Senators and philosophers had the impression that the Empire had somehow become reconciled with the spirit of these supporters of the republican ideal and of Stoicism. This is certainly the meaning of the remarks by Claudius Severus on the martyrs who gave their lives in the ght against tyranny. 81
By evoking these almost legendary gures, Claudius Severus gave
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Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 299 Marcus a glimpse ofthe principles ofpolitical conduct (I, 14, 2). It is to
Claudius, writes Marcus, that he owes the
ct of having had a representation of a State oliteia) in which the laws are equal r , administered on the basis of equality and eedom of speech, and of a monarchy which respects the eedom ofits subjects above all else.
The idea of a law that is equal r goes back to the Eighth Letter, attributed to Plato. The equality in question is geometrical, and it distrib­ utes bene ts to each person in accordance with his or her merit. This is precisely the Aristotelian and Stoic de nition ofjustice: it accords advan­ tages in proportion to merit.
The ideas of equal rights, of equal rights to speech, and of eedom had been extremely closely linked since the most ancient period of Greek democracy. However, when Tacitus, writing under the Empire, spoke of the reconciliation between monarchy and eedom brought about by Nerva, the idea of eedom had lost much of its content. It no longer meant the citizen's possibility to participate unhindered in political li . Rather, it included such notions as the protection and safety ofindividu­ als, and individual eedom (the right to express oneself, r example, or to move eely). For the cities, it meant the possibility ofpreserving their traditions and a certain degree ofmunicipal autonomy; but above , r the Senate, it meant the ability to in uence the Emperor's decisions to a greater or lesser extent.
Claudius Severus taught the ture sovereign that eedom is compat­ ible with monarchy, if one understands by "monarchy" a regime that respects the laws and the citizens. In ct, since he was so close to the Emperor Antoninus, who exercised this kind of moderate power him­ sel Marcus could not il to be miliar with this way of governing. Claudius Severus thus did not cause Marcus to discover it; instead, he probably revealed to him the historical roots of this conception of mon­ archy: the opposition to tyranny ofthe philosopher-martyrs.
Claudius thus made Marcus aware of the principles of conduct that must guide an enlightened monarch: respect r the law, recognition of the rights of the Senate, attendance at its sessions, participation in its deliberations, and recognition of the right to speak, not only r the prince's council or the Senate, but also r simple citizens, when they addressed the Emperor.
The ancient historians have given us some examples of the way Mar-
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cus applied these principles. In order to nance the Danubian war, he took the trouble to ask the public treasu r nds. It was not, as Cassius Dio notes, 82 as if these nds were not at the Emperor's disposition; yet Marcus insisted on acknowledging that they belonged to the Senate and the Roman People. Speaking to the Senate, Marcus said:
We possess nothing ofour own, and it is in your house that we live.
According to the Historia Augusta,83 Marcus always deliberated with his council be re undertaking anything, whether in war or in peace; r his motto was:
It is morejust r me to llow the advice ofmy friends, than that the multitude ofmy friends should llow my will alone.
Marcus was extremely care l to take the Senate's opinion into con­ sideration. He let the mime-writers criticize him openly. The historian Herodian speci es that Marcus entertained all requests, and rbade his guards to bar the way to people who wished to approach him. 84 The Historia Augusta sums up Marcus' entire attitude in the llowing terms:
Toward the people, he behaved exactly as ifhe were acting in a ee State. 85
The portrait ofAntoninus Pius which Marcus gives in Book I serves in part to illustrate these principles ofgovernment. In a sense, it sketches the atures of the ideal prince, with whom the Emperor would like to identi himsel We nd a trace of this portrait in the Meditations I, 30), where Marcus exhorts himselfnot to become "Caesarized" and not to let the imperial purple rub o on him: instead, he is to become a true disciple ofAntoninus. Marcus takes particular care to describe the moral qualities that Antoninus showed in his way of governing, which Marcus intended to imitate. When, a er due re ection, Antoninus had made a decision, he held rmly to it: he was identical in every circumstance. He never abandoned a question without having examined it thoroughly. He put up with people who reproached him unjustly. He never hurried, did not listen to calumnies, and could thom people's morals and actions with penetrating acuity. He did not seek to humiliate; neither did he fear nor scorn anyone. Nor was he a sophist: he led a simple li , and was content with little with regard to his lodging, his clothing, his od, and his household servants. He was patient and hardworking, loyal and con-
Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations 301
stant in his iendships.