'Throughout the
Sabouroff
Memoirs?
Robertson - Bismarck
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? APPENDIX
497
Anthony. His Majesty, having
told Count Benedetti that he
was awaiting news from the
Prince, has decided, with refer-
ence to the above demand, on
the suggestion of Count Eulen-
berg and myself, not to receive
Count Benedetti again, but only
to let him be informed through
an aide-de-camp: 'That his
Majesty has now received from
the Prince confirmation of the
news which Benedetti had al-
ready received from Paris, and
had nothing further to say to the
ambassador. ' His Majesty leaves
it to your Excellency to decide
whether Benedetti's fresh de-
mand and its rejection should be
at once communicated to both
our ambassadors, to foreign
nations, and to the Press.
at
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? APPENDIX B
THE REINSURANCE TREATIES OF 1884 AND 1887
The nature and contents of these secret undertakings, which -form
so decisive and interesting a feature of Bismarck's policy from
1883 to his dismissal in March 1890, still remain very obscure.
The texts have never been officially or unofficially published, and
inference from scattered and contradictory statements is all that
is possible. Certain points, however, are quite clear. In 1884
Germany concluded with Russia a specific arrangement; in 1887,
presumably because the arrangement of 1884 had terminated,
Germany concluded a fresh arrangement with Russia. In 1890
the arrangement of 1887 was not renewed by Chancellor Gaprivi.
The public of Europe would probably have never known of the
existence of 'the 1887 Compact' but for Bismarck's deliberate
revelation of its existence and non-renewal in the Hambu get
NachrichUn of October 24, 1896. It is noticeable that the revela-
tion caused much excitement in Germany and a storm of indignant
criticism in Austria. It was very embarrassing to the German
government; whether it was as great a surprise to the Foreign
Office in the Ball-Platz as it obviously was to the Austrian public is
one of the points in controversy, on which precise information is
still lacking. The Austrian public mind, as a study of the Viennese
newspapers of November 1896 proves, was seriously upset, and
there was much excited comment on Bismarck's betrayal of the
Dual Alliance by the secret arrangements with Russia. But the
Austrian government maintained an official discretion and re-
served its indignation, if it felt any, for confidential communica-
tion to the Wilhelmstrasse at Berlin. Nor did the debate in the
Reichstag (November 16, 1896) add anything to our knowledge.
The official Reichsanzeiger had published (October 27) a curt note,
pronouncing the 'revelation' to be a 'violation of the most con-
fidential secrets of State which constituted a blow at the grave
interests of the Empire'; but neither the Chancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, nor Foreign Secretary Baron Marschallv on Bieberstein,
though they spoke at considerable length in reply to the interpella-
tion of Grat Hompesch, gave any new information, except to admit
the bare fact that a compact had been made in 1887 and not re-
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? APPENDIX
499
newed in 1890. Prince Hohenlohe took refuge in the necessity of
official secrecy and reasons of State. The Foreign Secretary indeed
pointed out that a diplomacy which rested on a series of engage-
ments, possibly conflicting in their terms, was of doubtful value,
and that the worth of any single engagement was not increased by
the number of other contracts. What the precise meaning of
this cryptic utterance was, it is impossible to decide; but it clearly
was intended to convey--whether truly or not, we cannot say--
that the German Foreign Office had not docketed in its cupboard
other secret treaties of 'a reinsurance character,' together with
an assurance for the world in general and Vienna in particular,
that the German government of 1896 was, and intended to
remain, free to fulfil loyally the terms of the Dual or Triple
Alliance.
Both ministers, however, also spoke casually of 'negotiations
between 1887 and 189b. ' Negotiations with whom or for what
they did not explain, but presumably they referred to negotiations
with Russia between 1887 and 1890 for the renewal of 'the
Compact of 1887' or a similar treaty. No explanation was
offered of the reasons why Chancellor Caprivi did not renew the
Compact of 1887--e. g. was it, as Hohenlohe suggests in his Diary
(January 14, 1895, ii. 462), ' because the policy it led to was too
complicated,' or because Russia raised her terms, or because the
Emperor had embarked on a serious attempt in 1890 to bring
Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, or because ? the reinsurance'
was judged to be a betrayal of Austria? It is tempting to connect
the non-renewal in 1890 with the dismissal of Bismarck; for we
know that Bismarck's policy was regarded as a betrayal of Austria
by the Emperor and his military entourage. Another inference
is still more tempting. Hohenlohe twice (e. g. ii. 429, and 452)
succinctly states the contents of' the reinsurance' as he understood
them to be (i. e. before he became Chancellor and had free access
to confidential documents, when his silence is instructive):
'When I told him (Caprivi) that Schuvaloff had described him
as a trop honnete homme, he said that was because Bismarck had
concluded a treaty with Russia, under which we guaranteed
Russia a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, while Russia
undertook to observe a neutral attitude in the Franco-GermanWar.
This treaty had lapsed when Caprivi assumed office, and he had
not renewed it, because its publication would have shattered the
Triple Alliance. I fear that Austria will not be grateful to us. '
And to the same effect (ii. 452): with the addition, 'Russia
pledged herself to remain neutral in case of a war with France,
even though Austria should lend a hand in the East-'
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? 500
BISMARCK
These passages are apparently explicit enough; in reality they
are full of difficulties. Caprivi took office in March 1890; if,
as we seem bound to assume, 'the reinsurance' was made in
November 1887, it did not lapse when Caprivi assumed office, but
ten months later. Are we to believe that 'the reinsurance'
lapsed in March 1890, i. e. that it was made in March 1887?
If so, what happened in November 1887? For if the Compact
of 1884 was renewed in the spring of 1887, what is the explanation
of the strained Russo-German relations from March to November
1887, and of the arrangement with the Tsar in that month at
Berlin ? ' The publication' would have 'shattered the Triple
Alliance' (sic)--but who was going to ' publish' it? If it was a
secret treaty, why should it be 'published'? Did Hohenlohe
intend to convey that Austria (as was probable) knew nothing
of the ' reinsurance,' but that if she learned (from Russia or whom? )
of its existence, the Triple Alliance would be shattered? Why
should 'Austria not be grateful? ' Because she had been told
(between 1890 and 1892) that she had been betrayed between
1887 and 1890, but would not be betrayed any more? And how
was ' Austria to lend a hand in the East,' detrimental to Germany?
By tearing up the Triple Alliance and attacking Germany? By
making an alliance with France or how? Without the text of the
document it is impossible to answer these and other conundrums.
But if Hohenlohe is correct, the inference is certain that (a) ' the
reinsurance' of 1887 at least was concluded behind Austria's
back; (b) that its contents gravely imperilled the Dual and Triple
Alliances; and (c) that the policy involved was condemned in 1890
and renounced.
What was that policy? Clearly ' a free hand for Russia' in the
Near East, and Bismarck said as much in his big speeches in 1887
and 1888, as noted in the text (see p. 446). That such' a free hand'
was in conflict with Austrian ambitions is no less certain. But,
in 1890, the inference is irresistible that the Kaiser had already
embarked on the Weltpolitik which aimed ? not at a free hand for
Russia in Bulgaria and Constantinople' but 'at a free hand for
Germany. ' The heir to Constantinople, with Bulgaria as his
washpot, was to be the German Emperor, not the Emperor of
Russia; while, concurrently, Austria was to throw the Habsburg
shoe over Serbia, the valleys of the Morava and Vardar and
Salonica, meeting on a Macedonian frontier, to be delimited later,
the Kaiser's brother-in-law, the Duke of Sparta, the 'Tino' of
imperial telegrams and recent history. The non-renewal of * the
reinsurance' was the categorical pre-condition of such a policy,
with which the Kaiser, flushed with super-Teutonic ambitions,
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? APPENDIX
5oi
returned from his pilgrimage in the East, to pledge himself to
Austria and to dismiss Bismarck, who regarded ' the new course'
as midsummer madness. It is at any rate very noticeable that
in 1896 neither Hohenlohe nor Baron Marschall attempted to
meet the challenge of the Hamburger Nachrichten, that the Kaiser's
and Caprivi's policy had driven Russia into the arms of France,
and that the authors of the Franco-Russian alliance were the men
who broke with Russia and supported Austria, coute que coute.
It is no less certain that the non-renewal of the ' reinsurance' was
made with the full knowledge and approval of the Kaiser.
A writer, M. Andre Mevil, in the Revue Hebdomadaire for June
1907 gives a very confident and detailed account of the ' reinsur-
ance' treaties. He does not give his authorities, but he writes as if
he had had access to information that could not be precisely stated.
Briefly, according to M. Mevil, the first secret treaty was made
at Berlin on February 2\, 1884, and was verbally ratified (and not
in writing, as not being necessary) in September 15, 1884, at
Skierniewice. The contents were known to Austria, or Austria was
a party to it. The Pan-Slav party under Katkoff worked un-
ceasingly to prevent the renewal of the agreement, and in 1887
it was not renewed. This coincided with a dangerous crisis in
Franco-German relations. Alexander declined to give a pledge
to remain neutral in case of a war on the Rhine, and M. Mevil
thinks that 'the Schnaebele incident' was closed by Bismarck
because he could not rely on Russian neutrality. Subsequently,
when Bismarck had exposed certain forgeries misrepresenting
Germany's policy in Bulgaria, the Tsar, when in Berlin, November
18, 1887, concluded the 'reinsurance' which was not renewed in
1890. The agreement pledged Russia or Germany to neutrality
in the event of either being attacked by a third party {i. e. pre-
sumably a Franco-German, or an Austro-German war). M. Mevil
draws a clear distinction between the Compact of 1884, to which
Austria was a party, and that of 1887, to which she was not. He
asserts that it was Russia's unwillingness in 1887 to include Austria
in the renewal that caused the Compact of 1884 to be dropped.
Hohenlohe spoke in the debate of November 16, 1896, 'of 1887
when Boulangism reached its height, and threatened a danger
that disappeared with the disappearance of Boulangism,' i. e. a
clear suggestion that the raison d'etre of 'the reinsurance' was
the possibility of a Franco-German war, and the urgent desirability
of securing Russia's neutrality against that eventuality (as was
done by Bismarck in 1870).
The Hamburger Nachrichten also suggested (October 24, 1896)
that the agreement was for six years, and M. Mevil seems to
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? 502
BISMARCK
support this. But in view of the assertion in the same paper,
that it had not been renewed in 1890, this seems impossible,
unless it is meant that it was the treaty of 1884 which was for
six years and that the agreement of 1887 was a separate convention,
wholly independent of that of 1884--a hypothesis that only opens
up fresh queries and difficulties.
Marschall and Hohenlohe positively asserted that the agreement,
that was not renewed, was a secret one, to be kept secret. Against
this the Hamburger Nachrichten of November I, 1896, asserted
that its tenor had been communicated both to Austria and to
Italy! How in that case it could be a secret arrangement, and
what value it would have, and why its non-renewal should have
been such a grave blunder, and why the revelation of what was
known both by the Austrian and Italian governments, as well as
by the Russian government, should have caused the flurry of
excitement in 1896 and been denounced as equivalent to a lese-
majestk, I confess I cannot understand.
In conclusion, I am driven to infer that: (1) the agreement of
1884 was for three years; (2) Austria may have been a party to it;
(3) it pledged the signatories, possibly of three States, i. e. Bismarck,
Szechenyi, and Sabouroff to a benevolent neutrality in the case of
any of the three being attacked; (4) this tripartite arrangement
lapsed in 1887; (5) Bismarck, behind the back of Austria, con-
cluded a secret and private 'reinsurance' with Russia in 1887;
(6) this 'reinsurance' was for three years, and pledged each
signatory to neutrality in the event of either being attacked by
a third party, i. e. France or Austria; (7) this was not renewed by
Caprivi in 1890; (8) in consequence Russia felt isolated and
gradually drifted into an entente and then an alliance with France.
It is noticeable, further, that the British Standard and the
German Zukunft in 1884 duly notified their readers with the
information that Germany had come to an understanding with
Russia. So far as I know, no other newspaper discovered or pub-
lished the fact. But the information passed practically unnoticed
in 1884.
Secondly,German public criticism in 1896 represented Bismarck's
'reinsurance' of 1887 as a masterpiece of German statecraft--
that is to say, German public opinion hailed with enthusiasm
the conclusion of a secret understanding by Germany with Russia,
at the expense and behind the back of their ally, Austria; and it
regretted that Caprivi had failed to continue this Bismarckian
method of pledging his country to one ally, while the value of the
pledge was being secretly whittled away in favour of that ally's
avowed enemy. Such a mental attitude is instructive in the
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? APPENDIX
thoroughness with which the German public had assimilated
Bismarckian principles. What would German public opinion
have said had Austria behind the back of Germany, and in violation
of the Dual Alliance, made a secret reinsurance with Russia to the
detriment of Germany? Would that have been Austrian 'per-
fidy ' or a masterpiece of Austrian statecraft?
The articles in the Hamburger Nachrichten and other papers, and
a full report of the Debate of November 16, 1896, will be found in
Penzler, Bismarck nach seiner Entlassung, vol. vii. and in vol. iii.
of the Bismarck Jabrbuch. While this book was in the press,
Professor Simpson's second article (Nineteenth Century, January
1918) on the Sabouroff Papers became available. Professor Simpson,
unfortunately, does not throw any more light on the secret agree-
ment of 1884, or of 1887--except to say (p. 75): 'as a matter of
fact the understanding became closer with Germany, especially
as Bismarck was endeavouring to negotiate a "reinsurance"
treaty with Russia, unknown to Austria, providing for neutrality
in case either Power was attacked by a third. In this he succeeded.
"Then came Caprivi in place of Bismarck"--the words are
M. SabourofPs--" and said that it was not necessary to make
a separate treaty with Russia, because Germany was on good
relations with her. Then followed still other councillors who
began to smile towards France, but whether it began with Russia
or with France I do not know. "'
The main thesis of Professor Simpson's article is to summarise
from the Sabouroff MSS. the negotiations by which Austria,
Germany, and Russia came to conclude a treaty in 1881, arranging
for an agreed policy in the Near East. This treaty was signed on
June 18,1881: in 1884 'it was renewed for a further term of three
years, subject to one slight modification,' but not renewed in 1887.
The whole article with the preceding one" (Nineteenth Century,
December 1917) fully bears out the general line of interpretation
of Bismarck's policy and methods maintained in the text (chapter vi.
? ? 3, 5, and 6)- Some quotations are so relevant as to justify their
presence here. 'Bismarck was a rough man even in politics, but
his conservative convictions were very sincere; he was opposed to
Liberalism in any form. "There are five great Powers; I must
always strive," Bismarck said, "to be one of three against two. "
Gortschakov in 1870 " consulted the Emperor to take immediate
steps, whatever the risk, to annul the clauses of the Treaty of
Paris rather than wait the definitive victory of Prussia before doing
so. " In 1875 d props of "the crisis" in May--" I confess that
all my admiration went to Prince Gortschakov; he showed himself
superior in self-command, courtesy, precise and, I ought to add,
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? BISMARCK
breadth of view. " The Grand Duke Nicholas in 1877 "did not
occupy Constantinople in accordance with the instructions tele-
graphed to him, and the Emperor never forgave him. " In 1880,
Bismarck said: "Thus at last we shall be able to form that solid
monarchical bloc, and feel no longer any concern about the internal
convulsions with which the Western Powers may be troubled.
The three Emperors are strong enough to defy all the agitations
abroad, and sufficiently great lords to live content with the patri-
mony of their ancestors. "'
Bismarck said on two occasions to M. Sabouroff: 'I do not
share the prejudices of the other cabinets on the subject of the
danger of handing over Constantinople to Russia': and again:
'1 flatter myself that I was the first in Europe to break with the
old tradition with which the Westerners inoculated all the Cabinets,
viz. , that a Russian Constantinople would be a European danger. ' As
to these utterances it is relevant to point out that Bismarck's obiter
dicta and ' confessions' are always interesting, but generally, unless
confirmed by specific acts, wholly untrustworthy. Bismarckian
thinking aloud, in the presence of another person, had invariably
a concealed objective. Had Bismarck carried out all the 'con-
fessions' and 'thinking aloud' that he made to Napoleon III.
between 1858 and 1867, Central Europe would never have been
reconstructed as it actually was. Napoleon, Lord Ampthill,
M. Sabouroff, and many others learned that between Bismarck's
ideas and confessions and Bismarck's acts there lay a substantial
world of difference. Words with Bismarck were generally in-
tended to mask his own, or unmask the thoughts of those with
whom he conversed, and his alluring geniality was one of his
finest and most deceptive diplomatic gifts. Hohenlohe records
how Alexander in. after 1890 said that in doing business with
Bismarck, even when the arrangement was satisfactory, he always
felt' qu'il me tricherait. '
Austria required much pressure in 1881 to come into the pro-
posed arrangement.
'Throughout the Sabouroff Memoirs? writes
Professor Simpson, 'nothing"is so obvious as the disdain that
both the negotiators feel for "the ramshackle Empire," and yet
it is always Bismarck who says the really brutal things. ' 'It is
abundantly clear, however, that the vital significance of the Dual
Alliance had not been disclosed to the Tsar. ' The arrangement
of 1881 was for three years. 'When Austria,' Bismarck said,
with one of his usual vivid touches, 'has worn that flannel
next her skin for three whole years, she won't be able to take
it off without running the risk of catching cold. ' That was
what happened in 1890 in the matter- of the reinsurance treaties.
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? APPENDIX
Caprivi threw off the flannel that Bismarck had made Germany
wear next her skin for six years--and Germany caught cold. One
other Bismarckian touch is too deliriously characteristic to be
omitted.
'We shall make a mistake if we keep Austria from compromising
herself by committing to writing these demands of hers (i. e. the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the Sandjak of Novi
Bazar and some other acquisitions of a like character), which will
only embroil her with the Western Powers, and furnish proofs
of complicity with us in any future Eastern crisis. '
The negotiator who had lured Benedetti to state his proposals in
writing, and then published them in The Times, knew well the
value of promissory notes with the signature of the promissor
attached. Bismarck liked a cupboard full of such compromising
stuff--to be revealed, when he chose--and he took good care
to leave as little of his own 'paper' in other persons' hands as
possible. In Bismarckian ethics the morality of the betrayal of a
confidence was decided by the difference between the betrayer and
the betrayed. If you were the former, reason of State could ad-
minister a plenary absolution; but if you were the latter, then let the
welkin ring with the iniquity of the act. But the best comment
on Bismarckian methods and all of the same character was supplied
by Bismarck himself to his wife, when he first became initiated in
the grand diplomacy at Frankfort: 'Not even the most scoun-
drelly democrat or sceptic could conceive the charlatanry and
fraud that lies in this diplomacy. '
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? BIBLIOGRAPHY
This Bibliographical Appendix is not, nor does it profess to be,
a bibliography of German history for the period of Bismarck's
lifetime. Such would require a separate volume. Nor does it
profess to be an exhaustive bibliography of the historical literature
on Bismarck himself. Attention here is necessarily confined to the
chief original sources available, together with the leading secondary
authorities, and brief critical comments based on the author's
study. For a more complete catalogue reference should be made
to Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte (8th
edition, ed. Ko? hler, 1912), and R. Charmatz, Wegweiser durch
die Literatur der Osterreichischen Geschichte (1912), also to the
bibliographies in vols, x. , xi. , and xii. of The Cambridge Modern
History; and to the bibliographies in Sir A. Ward's History of
Germany (vols i. and ii. ), the third volume of which, dealing with
the period from 1871 onwards, has still to be published.
The chief original authorities that are indispensable are:
Bismarck Briefe (ed. Kohl), 1836-1872.
Neue Bismarckbriefe (ed. Poschinger).
Fu? rst Bismarck's Briefe an seine Braut u. Gattin (ed. H. von
Bismarck) (Eng. transl. , 1901).
Die Politischen Reden (ed. H. Kohl, 14 vols).
Briefwechsel zwischen Kaiser Wilhelm und Fu? rst Bismarck.
Briefwechsel mit dem Freiherrn von Steinitz.
Briefwechsel mit Leopold von Gerlach.
Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman (Eng. transl. of the
Gedanken und Erinnerungen, cited as The Memoirs in the text).
The German edition contains an' Anhang' in two volumes. I. Of
Letters to the Emperor William. 2. Of other Letters and docu-
ments. This ' Anhang' has not been translated.
Preussen in Bundestag (4 vols. ). These contain the dispatches
from Frankfurt, 1851-1859. They have been translated into
French (ed. Funck-Brentano) but not into English.
Neue Berichte aus Frankfurt (ed. Poschinger. A supplement
to the above).
The following also edited by Poschinger are collections of
original sources:
60<<
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? BIBLIOGRAPHY
507
Fu? rst Bismarck und der Bundesrat (2 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck und die Diplomaten (2 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier (3 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck als Volkswirt (5 vols. , 2 of which are documents).
None of these have been translated.
The documents and letters in the Bismarck Jahrbuch (ed. H.
Kohl, 6 vols. ), collected from many stray sources, make a valuable
collection. The various books by M. Busch are full of curious
information: Tagebuchbla? tter (3 vols. ); Bismarck, Some Secret
Pages of his History (3 vols. Eng. transl. ); Unser Reichskanzler,
(2 vols. Eng. transl. ); Bismarck in the Franco-German War
(Eng. transl. 2 vols. ). The official publication of original docu-
mentary material can be found in: JBgidi, L. K. and A. Klauhold.
Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstu? cke, continued by L. Worthmann
and other editors (34 vols. ). H. Kohl's Fu? rst Bismarck Regesten
zu einer wissenschaftlichen Bibliographie (2 vols. ) is an indis-
pensable aid to Bismarck's life.
Some very convenient monographs on sources are to be found
in the Quellen Sammlung zur Deutschen Geschichte, edited by
E. Brandenburger: e. g. Briefe und Aktenstu? cke zur Geschichte
der Gru? ndung des Deutschen Reiches (ed. Brandenburger, 2 vols. );
Die Deutschen Parteiprogramme, 1844-1900 (ed. F. Salomon, 2 vols. );
Briefe u. s. w. zur Geschichte der Hohenzoll. Kandidatur (ed. R. Fester,
2 vols. ): with this latter should be placed R. Fester's Neue Beitra? ge
zur Geschichte der Hohenz. Thronkandidatur; E. Marcks, Bismarck
und die Hohenzollern Kandidatur; and Delbru? ck's essay on the
subject in Preuss. Jahrbu? cher, vol. 82.
Of the numerous Biographies, that by E. Marcks will probably
be, when finished, the most complete; but so far only one volume
(to 1848) has appeared. It contains much new and valuable
information with excerpts from many unpublished letters and docu-
ments. L. Hahn's Biography in five volumes is enriched with much
original documentary material, but is not very readable. M. Lenz's
Bismarck in one volume (a reprint of the article in the Allgemeine
Deutsche Biographie) is a masterly piece of work, but not very full
for the period after 1871. G. Egelhaaf's Biography, in one volume,
is a scholarly study, and much fuller on the period after 1871, but
not so well written as Lenz's book. Of the others, D. Klein-
Hattingen, Bismarck und seine Welt, is well worth reading. But the
best biography so far is that by P. Matter (in French, 3 vols. ),
whose knowledge of the sources is complete--a book marked
by French artistry and scholarship and very judicial in tone and
judgment. In English there is a one volume biography by
G. W. Headlam, admirable, but unhappily not very full on the
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? 508
BISMARCK
period after 1871. The biography in two volumes by C. Lowe is
readable, but not very critical, and now out of date.
For some other aspects of Bismarck's work: A. Singer, Bismarck
in der Literatur is indispensable. (This is a yearly register and
catalogue of all the contemporary pamphlets, satires, and books
bearing on Bismarck. ) York, Graf von Wartenburg, Bismarcks
a? ussere Erscheinung in Wort und. Bild (with ninety portraits) is an
interesting study of the portraits, etc. Grand-Carteret, Bismarck
en caricatures (a study of the caricature literature); and with this
should be examined G. Hochstetten, Bismarck, Historische Kari-
katuren (with text by Max. Harden); Senfft von Pilsach, Aus
Bismarck's Werkstatt (a critical and stimulating study of Bis-
marckian principles); W. Blume, Von Politik u. Strategie, Bis-
marck und Moltke (a valuable study by a Prussian General of
Bismarck's principles of policy in relation to strategy).
Apart from the criticism in the standard biographies, three
monographs by well-known German historians on the historical
value of Bismarck's reminiscences are real contributions to know-
ledge and scholarship: G. Ka? mmel, Kritische Studien zu Fu? rst
Bismarck's Gedanken; M. Lenz, Zur Kritik der Gedanken, u. s. w. :
E. Marcks, Versuch einer kritischen Wu?
? APPENDIX
497
Anthony. His Majesty, having
told Count Benedetti that he
was awaiting news from the
Prince, has decided, with refer-
ence to the above demand, on
the suggestion of Count Eulen-
berg and myself, not to receive
Count Benedetti again, but only
to let him be informed through
an aide-de-camp: 'That his
Majesty has now received from
the Prince confirmation of the
news which Benedetti had al-
ready received from Paris, and
had nothing further to say to the
ambassador. ' His Majesty leaves
it to your Excellency to decide
whether Benedetti's fresh de-
mand and its rejection should be
at once communicated to both
our ambassadors, to foreign
nations, and to the Press.
at
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? APPENDIX B
THE REINSURANCE TREATIES OF 1884 AND 1887
The nature and contents of these secret undertakings, which -form
so decisive and interesting a feature of Bismarck's policy from
1883 to his dismissal in March 1890, still remain very obscure.
The texts have never been officially or unofficially published, and
inference from scattered and contradictory statements is all that
is possible. Certain points, however, are quite clear. In 1884
Germany concluded with Russia a specific arrangement; in 1887,
presumably because the arrangement of 1884 had terminated,
Germany concluded a fresh arrangement with Russia. In 1890
the arrangement of 1887 was not renewed by Chancellor Gaprivi.
The public of Europe would probably have never known of the
existence of 'the 1887 Compact' but for Bismarck's deliberate
revelation of its existence and non-renewal in the Hambu get
NachrichUn of October 24, 1896. It is noticeable that the revela-
tion caused much excitement in Germany and a storm of indignant
criticism in Austria. It was very embarrassing to the German
government; whether it was as great a surprise to the Foreign
Office in the Ball-Platz as it obviously was to the Austrian public is
one of the points in controversy, on which precise information is
still lacking. The Austrian public mind, as a study of the Viennese
newspapers of November 1896 proves, was seriously upset, and
there was much excited comment on Bismarck's betrayal of the
Dual Alliance by the secret arrangements with Russia. But the
Austrian government maintained an official discretion and re-
served its indignation, if it felt any, for confidential communica-
tion to the Wilhelmstrasse at Berlin. Nor did the debate in the
Reichstag (November 16, 1896) add anything to our knowledge.
The official Reichsanzeiger had published (October 27) a curt note,
pronouncing the 'revelation' to be a 'violation of the most con-
fidential secrets of State which constituted a blow at the grave
interests of the Empire'; but neither the Chancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, nor Foreign Secretary Baron Marschallv on Bieberstein,
though they spoke at considerable length in reply to the interpella-
tion of Grat Hompesch, gave any new information, except to admit
the bare fact that a compact had been made in 1887 and not re-
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? APPENDIX
499
newed in 1890. Prince Hohenlohe took refuge in the necessity of
official secrecy and reasons of State. The Foreign Secretary indeed
pointed out that a diplomacy which rested on a series of engage-
ments, possibly conflicting in their terms, was of doubtful value,
and that the worth of any single engagement was not increased by
the number of other contracts. What the precise meaning of
this cryptic utterance was, it is impossible to decide; but it clearly
was intended to convey--whether truly or not, we cannot say--
that the German Foreign Office had not docketed in its cupboard
other secret treaties of 'a reinsurance character,' together with
an assurance for the world in general and Vienna in particular,
that the German government of 1896 was, and intended to
remain, free to fulfil loyally the terms of the Dual or Triple
Alliance.
Both ministers, however, also spoke casually of 'negotiations
between 1887 and 189b. ' Negotiations with whom or for what
they did not explain, but presumably they referred to negotiations
with Russia between 1887 and 1890 for the renewal of 'the
Compact of 1887' or a similar treaty. No explanation was
offered of the reasons why Chancellor Caprivi did not renew the
Compact of 1887--e. g. was it, as Hohenlohe suggests in his Diary
(January 14, 1895, ii. 462), ' because the policy it led to was too
complicated,' or because Russia raised her terms, or because the
Emperor had embarked on a serious attempt in 1890 to bring
Great Britain into the Triple Alliance, or because ? the reinsurance'
was judged to be a betrayal of Austria? It is tempting to connect
the non-renewal in 1890 with the dismissal of Bismarck; for we
know that Bismarck's policy was regarded as a betrayal of Austria
by the Emperor and his military entourage. Another inference
is still more tempting. Hohenlohe twice (e. g. ii. 429, and 452)
succinctly states the contents of' the reinsurance' as he understood
them to be (i. e. before he became Chancellor and had free access
to confidential documents, when his silence is instructive):
'When I told him (Caprivi) that Schuvaloff had described him
as a trop honnete homme, he said that was because Bismarck had
concluded a treaty with Russia, under which we guaranteed
Russia a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, while Russia
undertook to observe a neutral attitude in the Franco-GermanWar.
This treaty had lapsed when Caprivi assumed office, and he had
not renewed it, because its publication would have shattered the
Triple Alliance. I fear that Austria will not be grateful to us. '
And to the same effect (ii. 452): with the addition, 'Russia
pledged herself to remain neutral in case of a war with France,
even though Austria should lend a hand in the East-'
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? 500
BISMARCK
These passages are apparently explicit enough; in reality they
are full of difficulties. Caprivi took office in March 1890; if,
as we seem bound to assume, 'the reinsurance' was made in
November 1887, it did not lapse when Caprivi assumed office, but
ten months later. Are we to believe that 'the reinsurance'
lapsed in March 1890, i. e. that it was made in March 1887?
If so, what happened in November 1887? For if the Compact
of 1884 was renewed in the spring of 1887, what is the explanation
of the strained Russo-German relations from March to November
1887, and of the arrangement with the Tsar in that month at
Berlin ? ' The publication' would have 'shattered the Triple
Alliance' (sic)--but who was going to ' publish' it? If it was a
secret treaty, why should it be 'published'? Did Hohenlohe
intend to convey that Austria (as was probable) knew nothing
of the ' reinsurance,' but that if she learned (from Russia or whom? )
of its existence, the Triple Alliance would be shattered? Why
should 'Austria not be grateful? ' Because she had been told
(between 1890 and 1892) that she had been betrayed between
1887 and 1890, but would not be betrayed any more? And how
was ' Austria to lend a hand in the East,' detrimental to Germany?
By tearing up the Triple Alliance and attacking Germany? By
making an alliance with France or how? Without the text of the
document it is impossible to answer these and other conundrums.
But if Hohenlohe is correct, the inference is certain that (a) ' the
reinsurance' of 1887 at least was concluded behind Austria's
back; (b) that its contents gravely imperilled the Dual and Triple
Alliances; and (c) that the policy involved was condemned in 1890
and renounced.
What was that policy? Clearly ' a free hand for Russia' in the
Near East, and Bismarck said as much in his big speeches in 1887
and 1888, as noted in the text (see p. 446). That such' a free hand'
was in conflict with Austrian ambitions is no less certain. But,
in 1890, the inference is irresistible that the Kaiser had already
embarked on the Weltpolitik which aimed ? not at a free hand for
Russia in Bulgaria and Constantinople' but 'at a free hand for
Germany. ' The heir to Constantinople, with Bulgaria as his
washpot, was to be the German Emperor, not the Emperor of
Russia; while, concurrently, Austria was to throw the Habsburg
shoe over Serbia, the valleys of the Morava and Vardar and
Salonica, meeting on a Macedonian frontier, to be delimited later,
the Kaiser's brother-in-law, the Duke of Sparta, the 'Tino' of
imperial telegrams and recent history. The non-renewal of * the
reinsurance' was the categorical pre-condition of such a policy,
with which the Kaiser, flushed with super-Teutonic ambitions,
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? APPENDIX
5oi
returned from his pilgrimage in the East, to pledge himself to
Austria and to dismiss Bismarck, who regarded ' the new course'
as midsummer madness. It is at any rate very noticeable that
in 1896 neither Hohenlohe nor Baron Marschall attempted to
meet the challenge of the Hamburger Nachrichten, that the Kaiser's
and Caprivi's policy had driven Russia into the arms of France,
and that the authors of the Franco-Russian alliance were the men
who broke with Russia and supported Austria, coute que coute.
It is no less certain that the non-renewal of the ' reinsurance' was
made with the full knowledge and approval of the Kaiser.
A writer, M. Andre Mevil, in the Revue Hebdomadaire for June
1907 gives a very confident and detailed account of the ' reinsur-
ance' treaties. He does not give his authorities, but he writes as if
he had had access to information that could not be precisely stated.
Briefly, according to M. Mevil, the first secret treaty was made
at Berlin on February 2\, 1884, and was verbally ratified (and not
in writing, as not being necessary) in September 15, 1884, at
Skierniewice. The contents were known to Austria, or Austria was
a party to it. The Pan-Slav party under Katkoff worked un-
ceasingly to prevent the renewal of the agreement, and in 1887
it was not renewed. This coincided with a dangerous crisis in
Franco-German relations. Alexander declined to give a pledge
to remain neutral in case of a war on the Rhine, and M. Mevil
thinks that 'the Schnaebele incident' was closed by Bismarck
because he could not rely on Russian neutrality. Subsequently,
when Bismarck had exposed certain forgeries misrepresenting
Germany's policy in Bulgaria, the Tsar, when in Berlin, November
18, 1887, concluded the 'reinsurance' which was not renewed in
1890. The agreement pledged Russia or Germany to neutrality
in the event of either being attacked by a third party {i. e. pre-
sumably a Franco-German, or an Austro-German war). M. Mevil
draws a clear distinction between the Compact of 1884, to which
Austria was a party, and that of 1887, to which she was not. He
asserts that it was Russia's unwillingness in 1887 to include Austria
in the renewal that caused the Compact of 1884 to be dropped.
Hohenlohe spoke in the debate of November 16, 1896, 'of 1887
when Boulangism reached its height, and threatened a danger
that disappeared with the disappearance of Boulangism,' i. e. a
clear suggestion that the raison d'etre of 'the reinsurance' was
the possibility of a Franco-German war, and the urgent desirability
of securing Russia's neutrality against that eventuality (as was
done by Bismarck in 1870).
The Hamburger Nachrichten also suggested (October 24, 1896)
that the agreement was for six years, and M. Mevil seems to
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? 502
BISMARCK
support this. But in view of the assertion in the same paper,
that it had not been renewed in 1890, this seems impossible,
unless it is meant that it was the treaty of 1884 which was for
six years and that the agreement of 1887 was a separate convention,
wholly independent of that of 1884--a hypothesis that only opens
up fresh queries and difficulties.
Marschall and Hohenlohe positively asserted that the agreement,
that was not renewed, was a secret one, to be kept secret. Against
this the Hamburger Nachrichten of November I, 1896, asserted
that its tenor had been communicated both to Austria and to
Italy! How in that case it could be a secret arrangement, and
what value it would have, and why its non-renewal should have
been such a grave blunder, and why the revelation of what was
known both by the Austrian and Italian governments, as well as
by the Russian government, should have caused the flurry of
excitement in 1896 and been denounced as equivalent to a lese-
majestk, I confess I cannot understand.
In conclusion, I am driven to infer that: (1) the agreement of
1884 was for three years; (2) Austria may have been a party to it;
(3) it pledged the signatories, possibly of three States, i. e. Bismarck,
Szechenyi, and Sabouroff to a benevolent neutrality in the case of
any of the three being attacked; (4) this tripartite arrangement
lapsed in 1887; (5) Bismarck, behind the back of Austria, con-
cluded a secret and private 'reinsurance' with Russia in 1887;
(6) this 'reinsurance' was for three years, and pledged each
signatory to neutrality in the event of either being attacked by
a third party, i. e. France or Austria; (7) this was not renewed by
Caprivi in 1890; (8) in consequence Russia felt isolated and
gradually drifted into an entente and then an alliance with France.
It is noticeable, further, that the British Standard and the
German Zukunft in 1884 duly notified their readers with the
information that Germany had come to an understanding with
Russia. So far as I know, no other newspaper discovered or pub-
lished the fact. But the information passed practically unnoticed
in 1884.
Secondly,German public criticism in 1896 represented Bismarck's
'reinsurance' of 1887 as a masterpiece of German statecraft--
that is to say, German public opinion hailed with enthusiasm
the conclusion of a secret understanding by Germany with Russia,
at the expense and behind the back of their ally, Austria; and it
regretted that Caprivi had failed to continue this Bismarckian
method of pledging his country to one ally, while the value of the
pledge was being secretly whittled away in favour of that ally's
avowed enemy. Such a mental attitude is instructive in the
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? APPENDIX
thoroughness with which the German public had assimilated
Bismarckian principles. What would German public opinion
have said had Austria behind the back of Germany, and in violation
of the Dual Alliance, made a secret reinsurance with Russia to the
detriment of Germany? Would that have been Austrian 'per-
fidy ' or a masterpiece of Austrian statecraft?
The articles in the Hamburger Nachrichten and other papers, and
a full report of the Debate of November 16, 1896, will be found in
Penzler, Bismarck nach seiner Entlassung, vol. vii. and in vol. iii.
of the Bismarck Jabrbuch. While this book was in the press,
Professor Simpson's second article (Nineteenth Century, January
1918) on the Sabouroff Papers became available. Professor Simpson,
unfortunately, does not throw any more light on the secret agree-
ment of 1884, or of 1887--except to say (p. 75): 'as a matter of
fact the understanding became closer with Germany, especially
as Bismarck was endeavouring to negotiate a "reinsurance"
treaty with Russia, unknown to Austria, providing for neutrality
in case either Power was attacked by a third. In this he succeeded.
"Then came Caprivi in place of Bismarck"--the words are
M. SabourofPs--" and said that it was not necessary to make
a separate treaty with Russia, because Germany was on good
relations with her. Then followed still other councillors who
began to smile towards France, but whether it began with Russia
or with France I do not know. "'
The main thesis of Professor Simpson's article is to summarise
from the Sabouroff MSS. the negotiations by which Austria,
Germany, and Russia came to conclude a treaty in 1881, arranging
for an agreed policy in the Near East. This treaty was signed on
June 18,1881: in 1884 'it was renewed for a further term of three
years, subject to one slight modification,' but not renewed in 1887.
The whole article with the preceding one" (Nineteenth Century,
December 1917) fully bears out the general line of interpretation
of Bismarck's policy and methods maintained in the text (chapter vi.
? ? 3, 5, and 6)- Some quotations are so relevant as to justify their
presence here. 'Bismarck was a rough man even in politics, but
his conservative convictions were very sincere; he was opposed to
Liberalism in any form. "There are five great Powers; I must
always strive," Bismarck said, "to be one of three against two. "
Gortschakov in 1870 " consulted the Emperor to take immediate
steps, whatever the risk, to annul the clauses of the Treaty of
Paris rather than wait the definitive victory of Prussia before doing
so. " In 1875 d props of "the crisis" in May--" I confess that
all my admiration went to Prince Gortschakov; he showed himself
superior in self-command, courtesy, precise and, I ought to add,
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? BISMARCK
breadth of view. " The Grand Duke Nicholas in 1877 "did not
occupy Constantinople in accordance with the instructions tele-
graphed to him, and the Emperor never forgave him. " In 1880,
Bismarck said: "Thus at last we shall be able to form that solid
monarchical bloc, and feel no longer any concern about the internal
convulsions with which the Western Powers may be troubled.
The three Emperors are strong enough to defy all the agitations
abroad, and sufficiently great lords to live content with the patri-
mony of their ancestors. "'
Bismarck said on two occasions to M. Sabouroff: 'I do not
share the prejudices of the other cabinets on the subject of the
danger of handing over Constantinople to Russia': and again:
'1 flatter myself that I was the first in Europe to break with the
old tradition with which the Westerners inoculated all the Cabinets,
viz. , that a Russian Constantinople would be a European danger. ' As
to these utterances it is relevant to point out that Bismarck's obiter
dicta and ' confessions' are always interesting, but generally, unless
confirmed by specific acts, wholly untrustworthy. Bismarckian
thinking aloud, in the presence of another person, had invariably
a concealed objective. Had Bismarck carried out all the 'con-
fessions' and 'thinking aloud' that he made to Napoleon III.
between 1858 and 1867, Central Europe would never have been
reconstructed as it actually was. Napoleon, Lord Ampthill,
M. Sabouroff, and many others learned that between Bismarck's
ideas and confessions and Bismarck's acts there lay a substantial
world of difference. Words with Bismarck were generally in-
tended to mask his own, or unmask the thoughts of those with
whom he conversed, and his alluring geniality was one of his
finest and most deceptive diplomatic gifts. Hohenlohe records
how Alexander in. after 1890 said that in doing business with
Bismarck, even when the arrangement was satisfactory, he always
felt' qu'il me tricherait. '
Austria required much pressure in 1881 to come into the pro-
posed arrangement.
'Throughout the Sabouroff Memoirs? writes
Professor Simpson, 'nothing"is so obvious as the disdain that
both the negotiators feel for "the ramshackle Empire," and yet
it is always Bismarck who says the really brutal things. ' 'It is
abundantly clear, however, that the vital significance of the Dual
Alliance had not been disclosed to the Tsar. ' The arrangement
of 1881 was for three years. 'When Austria,' Bismarck said,
with one of his usual vivid touches, 'has worn that flannel
next her skin for three whole years, she won't be able to take
it off without running the risk of catching cold. ' That was
what happened in 1890 in the matter- of the reinsurance treaties.
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? APPENDIX
Caprivi threw off the flannel that Bismarck had made Germany
wear next her skin for six years--and Germany caught cold. One
other Bismarckian touch is too deliriously characteristic to be
omitted.
'We shall make a mistake if we keep Austria from compromising
herself by committing to writing these demands of hers (i. e. the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus the Sandjak of Novi
Bazar and some other acquisitions of a like character), which will
only embroil her with the Western Powers, and furnish proofs
of complicity with us in any future Eastern crisis. '
The negotiator who had lured Benedetti to state his proposals in
writing, and then published them in The Times, knew well the
value of promissory notes with the signature of the promissor
attached. Bismarck liked a cupboard full of such compromising
stuff--to be revealed, when he chose--and he took good care
to leave as little of his own 'paper' in other persons' hands as
possible. In Bismarckian ethics the morality of the betrayal of a
confidence was decided by the difference between the betrayer and
the betrayed. If you were the former, reason of State could ad-
minister a plenary absolution; but if you were the latter, then let the
welkin ring with the iniquity of the act. But the best comment
on Bismarckian methods and all of the same character was supplied
by Bismarck himself to his wife, when he first became initiated in
the grand diplomacy at Frankfort: 'Not even the most scoun-
drelly democrat or sceptic could conceive the charlatanry and
fraud that lies in this diplomacy. '
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? BIBLIOGRAPHY
This Bibliographical Appendix is not, nor does it profess to be,
a bibliography of German history for the period of Bismarck's
lifetime. Such would require a separate volume. Nor does it
profess to be an exhaustive bibliography of the historical literature
on Bismarck himself. Attention here is necessarily confined to the
chief original sources available, together with the leading secondary
authorities, and brief critical comments based on the author's
study. For a more complete catalogue reference should be made
to Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte (8th
edition, ed. Ko? hler, 1912), and R. Charmatz, Wegweiser durch
die Literatur der Osterreichischen Geschichte (1912), also to the
bibliographies in vols, x. , xi. , and xii. of The Cambridge Modern
History; and to the bibliographies in Sir A. Ward's History of
Germany (vols i. and ii. ), the third volume of which, dealing with
the period from 1871 onwards, has still to be published.
The chief original authorities that are indispensable are:
Bismarck Briefe (ed. Kohl), 1836-1872.
Neue Bismarckbriefe (ed. Poschinger).
Fu? rst Bismarck's Briefe an seine Braut u. Gattin (ed. H. von
Bismarck) (Eng. transl. , 1901).
Die Politischen Reden (ed. H. Kohl, 14 vols).
Briefwechsel zwischen Kaiser Wilhelm und Fu? rst Bismarck.
Briefwechsel mit dem Freiherrn von Steinitz.
Briefwechsel mit Leopold von Gerlach.
Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman (Eng. transl. of the
Gedanken und Erinnerungen, cited as The Memoirs in the text).
The German edition contains an' Anhang' in two volumes. I. Of
Letters to the Emperor William. 2. Of other Letters and docu-
ments. This ' Anhang' has not been translated.
Preussen in Bundestag (4 vols. ). These contain the dispatches
from Frankfurt, 1851-1859. They have been translated into
French (ed. Funck-Brentano) but not into English.
Neue Berichte aus Frankfurt (ed. Poschinger. A supplement
to the above).
The following also edited by Poschinger are collections of
original sources:
60<<
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? BIBLIOGRAPHY
507
Fu? rst Bismarck und der Bundesrat (2 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck und die Diplomaten (2 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier (3 vols).
Fu? rst Bismarck als Volkswirt (5 vols. , 2 of which are documents).
None of these have been translated.
The documents and letters in the Bismarck Jahrbuch (ed. H.
Kohl, 6 vols. ), collected from many stray sources, make a valuable
collection. The various books by M. Busch are full of curious
information: Tagebuchbla? tter (3 vols. ); Bismarck, Some Secret
Pages of his History (3 vols. Eng. transl. ); Unser Reichskanzler,
(2 vols. Eng. transl. ); Bismarck in the Franco-German War
(Eng. transl. 2 vols. ). The official publication of original docu-
mentary material can be found in: JBgidi, L. K. and A. Klauhold.
Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstu? cke, continued by L. Worthmann
and other editors (34 vols. ). H. Kohl's Fu? rst Bismarck Regesten
zu einer wissenschaftlichen Bibliographie (2 vols. ) is an indis-
pensable aid to Bismarck's life.
Some very convenient monographs on sources are to be found
in the Quellen Sammlung zur Deutschen Geschichte, edited by
E. Brandenburger: e. g. Briefe und Aktenstu? cke zur Geschichte
der Gru? ndung des Deutschen Reiches (ed. Brandenburger, 2 vols. );
Die Deutschen Parteiprogramme, 1844-1900 (ed. F. Salomon, 2 vols. );
Briefe u. s. w. zur Geschichte der Hohenzoll. Kandidatur (ed. R. Fester,
2 vols. ): with this latter should be placed R. Fester's Neue Beitra? ge
zur Geschichte der Hohenz. Thronkandidatur; E. Marcks, Bismarck
und die Hohenzollern Kandidatur; and Delbru? ck's essay on the
subject in Preuss. Jahrbu? cher, vol. 82.
Of the numerous Biographies, that by E. Marcks will probably
be, when finished, the most complete; but so far only one volume
(to 1848) has appeared. It contains much new and valuable
information with excerpts from many unpublished letters and docu-
ments. L. Hahn's Biography in five volumes is enriched with much
original documentary material, but is not very readable. M. Lenz's
Bismarck in one volume (a reprint of the article in the Allgemeine
Deutsche Biographie) is a masterly piece of work, but not very full
for the period after 1871. G. Egelhaaf's Biography, in one volume,
is a scholarly study, and much fuller on the period after 1871, but
not so well written as Lenz's book. Of the others, D. Klein-
Hattingen, Bismarck und seine Welt, is well worth reading. But the
best biography so far is that by P. Matter (in French, 3 vols. ),
whose knowledge of the sources is complete--a book marked
by French artistry and scholarship and very judicial in tone and
judgment. In English there is a one volume biography by
G. W. Headlam, admirable, but unhappily not very full on the
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BISMARCK
period after 1871. The biography in two volumes by C. Lowe is
readable, but not very critical, and now out of date.
For some other aspects of Bismarck's work: A. Singer, Bismarck
in der Literatur is indispensable. (This is a yearly register and
catalogue of all the contemporary pamphlets, satires, and books
bearing on Bismarck. ) York, Graf von Wartenburg, Bismarcks
a? ussere Erscheinung in Wort und. Bild (with ninety portraits) is an
interesting study of the portraits, etc. Grand-Carteret, Bismarck
en caricatures (a study of the caricature literature); and with this
should be examined G. Hochstetten, Bismarck, Historische Kari-
katuren (with text by Max. Harden); Senfft von Pilsach, Aus
Bismarck's Werkstatt (a critical and stimulating study of Bis-
marckian principles); W. Blume, Von Politik u. Strategie, Bis-
marck und Moltke (a valuable study by a Prussian General of
Bismarck's principles of policy in relation to strategy).
Apart from the criticism in the standard biographies, three
monographs by well-known German historians on the historical
value of Bismarck's reminiscences are real contributions to know-
ledge and scholarship: G. Ka? mmel, Kritische Studien zu Fu? rst
Bismarck's Gedanken; M. Lenz, Zur Kritik der Gedanken, u. s. w. :
E. Marcks, Versuch einer kritischen Wu?
