" Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
Summa Theologica
" And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation
is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the
patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that
remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and
such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an
operation can be happiness.
Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection;
according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various
degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to
happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very
Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the
happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by
which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of
theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their
present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an
operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can
be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is
multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present
state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore
the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i,
10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes:
"We call men happy, but only as men. " But God has promised us perfect
happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Mat.
22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as
far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so
do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a
participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation
can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i. e. the
contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged
in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since
he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself
otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,
continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are
evident.
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Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the
intellective part only?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of
the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than
that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the
intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot
understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness
consists in an operation of the senses also.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But some
goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.
Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for
happiness.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved
in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby
in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.
Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which
is his last end, as shown above [1005](A[1]): to Which man cannot be
united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because,
as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the
operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says
(Ep. ad Dioscor. ) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point
which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection
(SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united
to God will not depend on the senses.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the
senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be
had in this life.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have,
includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the
universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual
good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those
goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected,
in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from
the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
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Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the
intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the
will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath
placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the
will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the
object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the
will.
Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus
the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the
general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to
operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall
state further on ([1006]Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the
will.
Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be
man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of
the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an
operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).
Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss. " And a
little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well,
whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man
already possesses some good---i. e. a good will. " Therefore happiness
consists in an act of the will.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that
they may know Thee, the only true God. " Now eternal life is the last
end, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists
in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is,
as it were, its proper accident, i. e. the delight connected with it. I
say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible
for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what
has been said ([1007]AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the
attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not
consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the
end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted
by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end
is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end:
while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not
conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights
in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must
be due to something else than an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his
hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got.
And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain
an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us
by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the
end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though
it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and
consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are
removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end:
consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains
at peace, his desire being at rest.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as
neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.
Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as
the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as
its act.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will
does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to
the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the
end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but
knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is
known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain
an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain
a sensible end by an act of sense.
Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because
he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness,
as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among
the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an
inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of
its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality. "
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Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical
intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the
cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect,
which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness
consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the
speculative.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the
practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good,
in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in
reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to
which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of
the speculative.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the
speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man;
whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to
man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather
than of the speculative.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
perfection of our joys. "
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must
needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that
of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest
power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which
is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz.
in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7,
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful
to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God
and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated
in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect
to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing
in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the
likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and
"information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be
answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His
Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which
is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it,
viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole
man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical
intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his
own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions
and passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is
something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an
operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness
consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of
the practical intellect.
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Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. "
And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three
speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which
all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore
man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
sciences.
Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to
be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists
in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality
to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration
of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration
of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration
of these.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is
twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we
are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness;
and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but
partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect
prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while
imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of
prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science
is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the
Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1),
and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the
entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than
knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is
his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For
a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the
lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of
a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the
intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but
inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above
the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the
kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of
itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through
knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown
([1008]FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the
consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of
true and perfect happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above
(A[2], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired,
but also any likeness or participation thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by
the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and
perfect act.
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Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely,
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a
homily (xxvi in Evang. ): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts
of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he
means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels
by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to
be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher
nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the
spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order,
are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.
" Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
I answer that, As stated above [1009](A[6]), man's perfect happiness
consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some
participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is
evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as
the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper
object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of
whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with
its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same
in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by
participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by
participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown
in the [1010]FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him
makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should
not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the
angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative
science.
Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels,
by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be
created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness
should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it
were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in
[1011]FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human
intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the
creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel
enlightens as a minister, as stated in the [1012]FP, Q[111], A[2], ad
2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to
happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two
ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus
man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation
such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the
power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in
which is found the fulness of its formal object.
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Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the
vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that
by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to
something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is
not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the
intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His
Essence.
Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher
nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
does not reach to this, but consists in something less.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall see Him as He
is. "
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i. e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore
an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not
possible to know the essence of the cause, i. e. to know of the cause
"what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply,
although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that
the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it
has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know
about the cause, "what it is. " And this desire is one of wonder, and
causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i,
2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider
that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he
wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this
inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the
cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains
in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect
needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ([1013]AA[1],7;
Q[2], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers
journeying towards happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1014]Q[1], A[8]), the end has a
twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired:
and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the
lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([1015]Q[1],
A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end
of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to
their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of
God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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Whether delight is required for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith. " But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all
goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs
something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of
happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ([1016]Q[3], A[8]);
it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth. "
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is
necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is
necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as
something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for
fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore,
since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign
Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to
anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this
consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion
of reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight.
Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of
the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated
in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care
and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the
attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those
things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we
must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of
opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders
the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the
speculative intellect.
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Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before
vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But
perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks
before the operation of the intellect, i. e. vision.
Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is
yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those
operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual
and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.
Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the
intellect, which is vision.
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or
enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks
before vision.
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is
the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the
operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus
the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved
above ([1017]Q[1], A[1], ad 2;[1018] Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at
rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently
it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before
the resting of the will therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight
perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of
youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but
not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to
the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful.
And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in
animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the
intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the
operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according
to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the
sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in
the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity
as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to
charity.
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Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
xxxciii De Verb. Dom. ]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to
comprehend Him is impossible. " Therefore happiness is without
comprehension.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect
is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to
vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']. " But happiness is the goal of the
spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest
there is laid up for me a crown of justice. " Therefore comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible
end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through
his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is
the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real
relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be
threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and
then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But
sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the
capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and
this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there
are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of
the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end
corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present
results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these
three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect
knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies
presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of
the lover in the object beloved.
Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say
'catch. '] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension
is necessary for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to
the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
therein.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from
vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore
even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is
the object of comprehension.
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Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary
for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of
the intellect, as stated above ([1019]Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the
will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not
necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine
says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O
God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For
it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many
truths. " Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows.
But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will.
Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect,
does not depend on rectitude of the will.
Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is
not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of
virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness
once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with
all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God. "
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to
matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be
duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly
ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above
([1020]Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will
of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he
loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not
God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common
notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the
will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a
right will.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of
the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of
the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect
which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is
required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a
right course in order to strike the target.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end,
ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves
imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are
no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to
the end is necessary.
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Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness.
For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of
nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace.
is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the
patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that
remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and
such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an
operation can be happiness.
Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection;
according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various
degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to
happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very
Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the
happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by
which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of
theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their
present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an
operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can
be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is
multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present
state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore
the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i,
10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes:
"We call men happy, but only as men. " But God has promised us perfect
happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Mat.
22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by
one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as
far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so
do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a
participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation
can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i. e. the
contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged
in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since
he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself
otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,
continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are
evident.
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Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the
intellective part only?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of
the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than
that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the
intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot
understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness
consists in an operation of the senses also.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is
"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But some
goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.
Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for
happiness.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved
in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby
in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive
operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.
On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.
Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.
I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which
is his last end, as shown above [1005](A[1]): to Which man cannot be
united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because,
as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the
operation of the senses.
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in
that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the
resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," as Augustine says
(Ep. ad Dioscor. ) "the body and the bodily senses will receive a
certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations"; a point
which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection
(SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man's mind is united
to God will not depend on the senses.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the
senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be
had in this life.
Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have,
includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the
universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual
good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those
goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.
Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected,
in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in
the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from
the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.
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Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the
intellect or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the
will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man's happiness
consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): "Who hath
placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace pertains to the
will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the
object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the
will.
Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus
the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the
general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to
operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall
state further on ([1006]Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the
will.
Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be
man's most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of
the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an
operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).
Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.
Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is
he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss. " And a
little further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well,
whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man
already possesses some good---i. e. a good will. " Therefore happiness
consists in an act of the will.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that
they may know Thee, the only true God. " Now eternal life is the last
end, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man's happiness consists
in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for
happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is,
as it were, its proper accident, i. e. the delight connected with it. I
say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible
for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what
has been said ([1007]AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the
attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not
consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the
end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted
by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end
is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end:
while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not
conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights
in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must
be due to something else than an act of the will.
This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the
acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man
would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the
moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his
hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got.
And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain
an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us
by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the
end when attained.
So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the
intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the
will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is
"joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of
happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though
it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and
consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are
removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end:
consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains
at peace, his desire being at rest.
Reply to Objection 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as
neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.
Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as
the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as
its act.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will
does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to
the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the
end, viz. delight or enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but
knowledge precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is
known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain
an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain
a sensible end by an act of sense.
Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because
he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness,
as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among
the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an
inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of
its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality. "
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Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical
intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming
like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the
cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect,
which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man's happiness
consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the
speculative.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the
practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good,
in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in
reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to
which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of
the speculative.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the
speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man;
whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to
man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather
than of the speculative.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation is
promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting
perfection of our joys. "
I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative
rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three
reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, it must
needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation is that
of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest
power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which
is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect.
Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz.
in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each
man's self, which is best in him," according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7,
therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful
to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is
not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very
actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the
last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God
and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to
come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such
as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of
the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated
in Ethic. x, 7,8.
Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect
to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing
in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the
likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and
"information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be
answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His
Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which
is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it,
viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole
man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical
intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his
own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions
and passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is
something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an
operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness
consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of
the practical intellect.
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Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. "
And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three
speculative virtues---"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which
all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore
man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative
sciences.
Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to
be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative
sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire
to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative
sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists
in the consideration of speculative sciences.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality
to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration
of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration
of these sciences, man's final happiness consists.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man glory
in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration
of these.
I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man's happiness is
twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we
are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness;
and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but
partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect
prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while
imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed
of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of
prudence.
Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the
consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe
that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond
the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science
is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the
Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1),
and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the
entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than
knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final happiness, which is
his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For
a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the
lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of
a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the
intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but
inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above
the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the
kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of
itself. Therefore man's final perfection must needs be through
knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown
([1008]FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the
knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect.
Consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the
consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the
consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of
true and perfect happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above
(A[2], ad 4).
Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired,
but also any likeness or participation thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by
the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and
perfect act.
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Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely,
angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a
homily (xxvi in Evang. ): "It avails nothing to take part in the feasts
of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by which he
means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels
by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final happiness
consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to
be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect
figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of
human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human
intellect consists in contemplating the angels.
Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher
nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the
spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order,
are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
is to be united to the angels by contemplation.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth,
glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.
" Therefore man's
final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.
I answer that, As stated above [1009](A[6]), man's perfect happiness
consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some
participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is
evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as
the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper
object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of
whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with
its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same
in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by
participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by
participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown
in the [1010]FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him
makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should
not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the
angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative
science.
Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels,
by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be
created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness
should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it
were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in
[1011]FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human
intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the
creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel
enlightens as a minister, as stated in the [1012]FP, Q[111], A[2], ad
2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to
happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two
ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus
man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation
such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the
power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in
which is found the fulness of its formal object.
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Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the
vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that
by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to
something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is
not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the
intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His
Essence.
Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher
nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect
does not reach to this, but consists in something less.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): "When He shall appear, we
shall be like to Him; and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall see Him as He
is. "
I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points
must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as
something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the
perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i. e. the essence of a
thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains
perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore
an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not
possible to know the essence of the cause, i. e. to know of the cause
"what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply,
although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that
the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it
has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know
about the cause, "what it is. " And this desire is one of wonder, and
causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i,
2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider
that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he
wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this
inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the
cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of that
intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains
in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet
perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect
needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in
which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above ([1013]AA[1],7;
Q[2], A[8]).
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers
journeying towards happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1014]Q[1], A[8]), the end has a
twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired:
and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the
lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([1015]Q[1],
A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end
of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to
their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of
God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
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OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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Whether delight is required for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith. " But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all
goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs
something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of
happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ([1016]Q[3], A[8]);
it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth. "
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is
necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is
necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from
without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as
something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for
fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is
caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore,
since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign
Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to
anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this
consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion
of reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight.
Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.
Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of
the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated
in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care
and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the
operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the
attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those
things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we
must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of
opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders
the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the
speculative intellect.
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Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before
vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But
perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks
before the operation of the intellect, i. e. vision.
Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is
yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the
delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those
operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual
and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.
Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the
intellect, which is vision.
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or
enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks
before vision.
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is
the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the
operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus
the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved
above ([1017]Q[1], A[1], ad 2;[1018] Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at
rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently
it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before
the resting of the will therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight
perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of
youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but
not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to
the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful.
And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in
animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the
intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the
operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according
to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the
sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in
the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity
as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to
charity.
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Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm.
xxxciii De Verb. Dom. ]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to
comprehend Him is impossible. " Therefore happiness is without
comprehension.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect
is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal
objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to
vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']. " But happiness is the goal of the
spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest
there is laid up for me a crown of justice. " Therefore comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible
end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through
his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is
the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real
relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be
threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and
then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is
impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But
sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the
capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and
this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and
this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there
are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of
the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end
corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present
results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these
three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect
knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies
presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of
the lover in the object beloved.
Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say
'catch. '] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension
is necessary for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to
the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes
therein.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from
vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore
even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is
the object of comprehension.
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Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary
for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of
the intellect, as stated above ([1019]Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the
will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not
necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine
says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O
God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For
it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many
truths. " Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows.
But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will.
Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect,
does not depend on rectitude of the will.
Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is
not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,
after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of
virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness
once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with
all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God. "
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to
matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be
duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly
ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without
rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above
([1020]Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will
of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he
loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not
God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common
notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the
will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a
right will.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of
the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of
the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect
which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is
required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a
right course in order to strike the target.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end,
ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves
imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are
no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to
the end is necessary.
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Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness.
For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of
nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace.
