No More Learning

Vercinge-
torix might perhaps have even now taken to flight, or at
least have saved himself by the last means open to a free
man ; he did not do so, but declared in a council of war
that, since he had not succeeded in breaking off the alien
yoke, he was ready to give himself up as a victim and to
avert as far as possible destruction from the nation
bringing it on his own head. This was done. The Celtic
officers delivered their general—the solemn choice of the
whole nation —over to the enemy of their country for such
appeared
by
Vercinge- toriz executed.
Five years afterwards he was led in triumph through the streets of the Italian capital, and, while his conqueror was offering solemn thanks to the gods on the summit of the Capitol, Vercingetorix was beheaded at its foot as guilty of high treason against the Roman nation. As after a day of gloom the sun may perhaps break through the clouds at its setting, so destiny may bestow on nations in their decline yet a last great man. Thus Hannibal stands at the close of the Phoenician history, and Vercingetorix at the close of the Celtic. They were not able to save the nations to which they belonged from a foreign yoke, but they spared them the last remaining disgrace — an inglorious fall. Vercingetorix, just like the Carthaginian, was obliged to contend not merely against the public foe, but also and above all against that anti-national opposition of wounded egotists and startled cowards, which regularly accompanies a degenerate civilization ; for him too a place in history is secured, not by his battles and sieges, but by the fact that he was able to furnish in his own person a centre and rallying -point to a nation distracted and ruined by the rivalry of individual interests. And yet there can hardly
be a more marked contrast than between the sober towns man of the Phoenician mercantile city, whose plans were directed towards one great object with unchanging energy throughout fifty years, and the bold prince of the Celtic land, whose mighty deeds and high-minded self-sacrifice fall within the compass of one brief summer. The whole ancient world presents no more genuine knight, whether as regards his essential character or his outward appear ance. But man ought not to be a mere knight, and least
9° THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book »
punishment as might be thought fit. Mounted on his steed and in full armour the king of the Arverni appeared before the Roman proconsul and rode round his tribunal ; then he surrendered his horse and arms, and sat down in
62. silence on the steps at Caesar's feet (702).
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 91
of all the statesman. It was the knight, not the hero, who disdained to escape from Alesia, when for the nation more depended on him than on a hundred thousand ordinary brave men. It was the knight, not the hero, who gave himself up as a sacrifice, when the only thing gained by that sacrifice was that the nation publicly dishonoured itself and with equal cowardice and absurdity employed its last breath in proclaiming that its great historical death- struggle was a crime against its oppressor. How very different was the conduct of Hannibal in similar positions ! It is impossible to part from the noble king of the Arverni without a feeling of historical and human sympathy ; but it is a significant trait of the Celtic nation, that its greatest man was after all merely a knight
The fall of Alesia and the capitulation of the army The last enclosed in it were fearful blows for the Celtic insurrection ; conflicts but blows quite as heavy had befallen the nation and yet
the conflict had been renewed. The loss of Vercingetorix, however, was irreparable. With him unity had come to
the nation; with him it seemed also to have departed. We do not find that the insurgents made any attempt to continue their joint defence and to appoint another general issimo; the league of patriots fell to pieces of itself, and every clan was left to fight or come to terms with the Romans as it pleased. Naturally the desire after rest everywhere prevailed. Caesar too had an interest in bring ing the war quickly to an end. Of the ten years of his governorship seven had elapsed, and the last was called in question by his political opponents in the capital ; he could only reckon with some degree of certainty on two more summers, and, while his interest as well as his honour required that he should hand over the newly-acquired regions to his successor in a condition of tolerable peace and tranquillity, there was in truth but scanty time to bring about such a state of things. To exercise mercy was in
with the
^mmges Camutes,
62-61.
with the Bellovaci,
9a THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
this case still more a necessity for the victor than for the vanquished ; and he might thank his stars that the internal dissensions and tne easy temperament of the Celts met him in this respect half way. Where —as in the two most eminent cantons of central Gaul, those of the Haedui and Arverni — there existed a strong party well disposed to Rome, the cantons obtained immediately after the fall of Alesia a complete restoration of their former relations with Rome, and even their captives, 20,000 in number, were released without ransom, while those of the other clans passed into the hard bondage of the victorious legionaries. The greater portion of the Gallic districts submitted like the Haedui and Arverni to their fate, and allowed their
inevitable punishment to be inflicted without farther resist- ance. But not a few clung in foolish frivolity or sullen despair to the lost cause, till the Roman troops of execution appeared within their borders. Such expeditions were in the winter of 702-703 undertaken against the Bituriges and the Carnutes.
More serious resistance was offered by the Bellovaci, who in the previous year had kept aloof from the relief of Alesia ; they seem to have wished to show that their absence on that decisive day at least did not proceed from want of courage or of love for freedom. The Atrebates, Ambiani, Caletes, and other Belgic cantons took part in this struggle ; the brave king of the Atrebates Commius, whose accession to the insurrection the Romans had least of all forgiven, and against whom recently Labienus had even directed an atrocious attempt at assassination, brought to the Bellovaci 500 German horse, whose value the campaign of the pre vious year had shown. The resolute and talented Bello- vacian Correus, to whom the chief conduct of the war had fallen, waged warfare as Vercingetorix had waged and with no small success. Although Caesar had gradually brought up the greater part of his army, he could neither
it,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 93
bring the infantry of the Bellovaci to a battle, nor even prevent it from taking up other positions which afforded better protection against his augmented forces ; while the Roman horse, especially the Celtic contingents, suffered most severe losses in various combats at the hands of the enemy's cavalry, especially of the German cavalry of Commius. But after Correus had met his death in a skirmish with the Roman foragers, the resistance here too was broken; the victor proposed tolerable conditions, to which the Bellovaci along with their confederates submitted. The Treveri were reduced to obedience by Labienus, and incidentally the territory of the outlawed Eburones was once more traversed and laid waste. Thus the last resist ance of the Belgic confederacy was broken.
The maritime cantons still made an attempt to defend on the
lr8'
themselves against the Roman domination in concert with their neighbours on the Loire. Insurgent bands from the Andian, Carnutic, and other surrounding cantons assembled
on the lower Loire and besieged in Lemonum (Poitiers) the prince of the Pictones who was friendly to the Romans. But here too a considerable Roman force soon appeared against them ; the insurgents abandoned the siege, and retreated with the view of placing the Loire between them selves and the enemy, but were overtaken on the march and defeated; whereupon the Carnutes and the other revolted cantons, including even the maritime ones, sent in their submission.
The resistance was at an end ; save that an isolated
and in leader of free bands still here and there upheld the national lo,^,^
banner. The bold Drappes and the brave comrade in arms of Vercingetorix Lucterius, after the breaking up of the army united on the Loire, gathered together the most resolute men, and with these threw themselves into the strong mountain-town of Uxellodunum on the Lot,1 which
1 This is usually sought at Capdcnac not far from Figeac ; Goler has
94 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
amidst severe and fatal conflicts they succeeded in suffi ciently provisioning. In spite of the loss of their leaders, of whom Drappes had been taken prisoner, and Lucterius had been cut off from the town, the garrison resisted to the uttermost ; it was not till Caesar appeared in person, and under his orders the spring from which the besieged derived their water was diverted by means of subterranean drains, that the fortress, the last stronghold of the Celtic nation, fell. To distinguish the last champions of the cause of freedom, Caesar ordered that the whole garrison should have their hands cut off and should then be dismissed, each one to his home. Caesar, who felt it all-important to put an end at least to open resistance throughout Gaul, allowed king Commius, who still held out in the region of Arras and maintained desultory warfare with the Roman troops
61-60. there down to the winter of 703-704, to make his peace, and even acquiesced when the irritated and justly distrustful man haughtily refused to appear in person in the Roman camp. It is very probable that Caesar in a similar way allowed himself to be satisfied with a merely nominal sub mission, perhaps even with a de facto armistice, in the less accessible districts of the north-west and north-east of Gaul. 1
Gaul subdu .
68-61.
Thus was Gaul—or, in other words, the land west of tne Rhme and n0rth of the Pyrenees —rendered subject after only eight years of conflict (696-703) to the Romans. Hardly a year after the full pacification of the land, at the
49. beginning of 705, the Roman troops had to be withdrawn over the Alps in consequence of the civil war, which had now at length broken out in Italy, and there remained nothing but at the most some weak divisions of recruits in
recently declared himself In favour of Luzech to the west of Cahors, a site which had been previously suggested.
1 This indeed, as may readily be conceived, is not recorded by Caesar himself , but an intelligible hint on this subject is given by Sallust (Hist. i. 9 Kriu), although he too wrote as a partisan of Caesar. Further proofs are furnished by the coins.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 95
Gaul. Nevertheless the Celts did not again rise against the foreign yoke ; and, while in all the old provinces of the empire there was fighting against Caesar, the newly-acquired country alone remained continuously obedient to its con
Even the Germans did not during those decisive years repeat their attempts to conquer new settlements on the left bank of the Rhine. As little did there occur in Gaul any national insurrection or German invasion during the crises that followed, although these offered the most favourable opportunities. If disturbances broke out any where, such as the rising of the Bellovaci against the Romans in 708, these movements were so isolated and so 48 unconnected with the complications in Italy, that they were suppressed without material difficulty by the Roman governors. Certainly this state of peace was most probably, just as was the peace of Spain for centuries, purchased by
provisionally allowing the regions that were most remote and most strongly pervaded by national feeling — Brittany, the districts on the Scheldt, the region of the Pyrenees—to withdraw themselves de facto in a more or less definite manner from the Roman allegiance. Nevertheless the build ing of Caesar—however scanty the time which he found for it amidst other and at the moment still more urgent labours, however unfinished and but provisionally rounded off he may have left it—in substance stood the test of this fiery
trial, as respected both the repelling of the Germans and the subjugation of the Celts.
As to administration in chief, the territories newly Organla- acquired by the governor of Narbonese Gaul remained for uon"
the time being united with the province of Narbo ; it was
not till Caesar gave up this office (710) that two new 44. governorships —Gaul proper and Belgica —were formed out
of the territory which he conquered. That the individual cantons lost their political independence, was implied in the very nature of conquest. They became throughout tributary
queror.
Roman
to the Roman community. Their system of tribute however was, of course, not that by means of which the nobles and financial aristocracy turned Asia to profitable account ; but, as was the case in Spain, a tribute fixed once for all was imposed on each individual community, and the levying of it was left to itself. In this way forty million sesterces (^400,000) flowed annually from Gaul into the chests of the Roman government ; which, no doubt, undertook in return the cost of defending the frontier of the Rhine. Moreover, the masses of gold accumulated in the temples of the gods and the treasuries of the grandees found their way, as a matter of course, to Rome ; when Caesar offered his Gallic gold throughout the Roman empire and brought such masses of it at once into the money market that gold as compared with silver fell about 25 per cent, we may guess what sums Gaul lost through the war.
The former cantonal constitutions with their hereditary kings, or their presiding feudal-oligarchies, continued in the main to subsist after the conquest, and even the system of clientship, which made certain cantons dependent on others more powerful, was not abolished, although no doubt with the loss of political independence its edge was taken off. The sole object of Caesar was, while making use of the existing dynastic, feudalist, and hegemonic divisions, to arrange matters in the interest of Rome, and to bring everywhere into power the men favourably disposed to the foreign rule. Caesar spared no pains to form a Roman party in Gaul ; extensive rewards in money and specially in confiscated estates were bestowed on his adherents, and places in the common council and the first offices of state in their cantons were procured for them by Caesar's influence Those cantons in which a sufficiently strong and trustworthy Roman party existed, such as those of the Remi, the Lingones, the Haedui, were favoured by the bestowal of a freer communal constitution —the right of alliance, as it
96
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
Indulgence
^kting arrange- menu.
chaf. vh THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 97
was called — and by preferences in the regulation of the matter of hegemony. The national worship and its priests seem to have been spared by Caesar from the outset as far as possible ; no trace is found in his case of measures such as were adopted in later times by the Roman rulers against the Druidical system, and with this is probably connected the fact that his Gallic wars, so far as we see, do not at all bear the character of religious warfare after the fashion which formed so prominent a feature of the Britannic wars subsequently.
While Caesar thus showed to the conquered nation
every allowable consideration and spared their national, political, and religious institutions as far as was at all com-
patible with their subjection to Rome, he did so, not as cou,m* renouncing the fundamental idea of his conquest, the Romanization of Gaul, but with a view to realize it in the
most indulgent way. He did not content himself with
letting the same circumstances, which had already in great
part Romanized the south province, produce their effect likewise in the north; but, like a genuine statesman, he
sought to stimulate the natural course of development and, moreover, to shorten as far as possible the always painful
period of transition. To say nothing of the admission of a number of Celts of rank into Roman citizenship and even
of several perhaps into the Roman senate, it was probably
Caesar who introduced, although with certain restrictions,
the Latin instead of the native tongue as the official language
within the several cantons in Gaul, and who introduced the Roman instead of the national monetary system on the
footing of reserving the coinage of gold and of denarii to
the Roman authorities, while the smaller money was to be
coined by the several cantons, but only for circulation within
the cantonal bounds, and this too in accordance with the
Roman standard. We may smile at the Latin
which the dwellers by the Loire and the Seine henceforth
Introdno-
Roman. Wng of th«
jargon, vol. v 140
The cats.
the Celtic nation.
98 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
employed in accordance with orders ; 1 but these barbarisms were pregnant with a greater future than the correct Latin of the capital. Perhaps too, if the cantonal constitution in Gaul afterwards appears more closely approximated to the Italian urban constitution, and the chief places of the canton as well as the common councils attain a more marked prominence in it than was probably the case in the original Celtic organization, the change may be referred to Caesar. No one probably felt more than the political heir of Gaius Gracchus and of Marius, how desirable in a military as well as in a political point of view it would have been to establish a series of Transalpine colonies as bases of support for the new rule and starting-points of the new civilization. If nevertheless he confined himself to the settlement of his Celtic or German horsemen in Noviodunum (p. 45) and to that of the Boii in the canton of the Haedui 44) — which latter settlement already rendered quite the services of— Roman colony in the war with Vercingetorix 79) the reason was merely that his farther plans did not permit him to put the plough instead of the sword into the hands of his legions. What he did in later years for the old Roman province in this respect, will be explained in its own place probable that the want of time alone prevented him from extending the same system to the regions which he had recently subdued.
All was over with the Celtic nation. Its political dissolution had been completed Caesar; its national dissolution was begun and in course of regular progress. This was no accidental destruction, such as destiny some times prepares even for peoples capable of development, but self-incurred and in some measure historically necessary
Thus we read on a semis which a Vergobretus of the Lexovii (I. isieux, dep. Calvados) caused to be struck, the following inscription Cisiambos Cattos vercobreto; simissos (sic) publicos Lixovio. The often scarcely legible writing and the incredibly wretched stamping of these coins are excellent harmony with their stammering Latin.
is
:
1
a
by
it is
;
(p. (p.
a
CHAR tru THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 99
catastrophe. The very course of the last war proves this, whether we view it as a whole or in detail. When the establishment of the foreign rule was in contemplation, only single districts —mostly, moreover, German or half-German —offered energetic resistance. When the foreign rule was actually established, the attempts to shake it off were either undertaken altogether without judgment, or they were to an undue extent the work of certain prominent nobles, and were therefore immediately and entirely brought to an end with the death or capture of an Indutiomarus, Camulogenus, Vercingetorix, or Correus. The sieges and guerilla warfare, in which elsewhere the whole moral depth of national struggles displays itself, were throughout this Celtic struggle of a peculiarly pitiable character. Every page of Celtic history confirms the severe saying of one of the few Romans who had the judgment not to despise the so-called bar barians—that the Celts boldly challenge danger while future, but lose their courage before its presence. In the mighty vortex of the world's history, which inexorably crushes all
peoples that are not as hard and as flexible as steel, such a
nation could not permanently maintain itself; with reason
the Celts of the continent suffered the same fate at the
hands of the Romans, as their kinsmen in Ireland suffer
down to our own day at the hands of the Saxons—the fate
of becoming merged as a leaven of future development in a
politically superior nationality. On the eve of parting from Traits
this remarkable nation we may be allowed to call attention """""J" to
Celts on the Loire and Seine we find almost every one of the characteristic traits which we are accustomed to recognize as marking the Irish. Every feature reappears : the laziness in the culture of the fields; the delight in tippling and brawling; the ostentation —we may recall that sword of Caesar hung up in the sacred grove of the Arverni after the victory of Gergovia, which its alleged former owner
the Celts to the fact, that in the accounts of the ancients as to the and Irish.
.
ioo THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
viewed with a smile at the consecrated spot and ordered the sacred property to be carefully spared ; the language full of comparisons and hyperboles, of allusions and quaint turns ; the droll humour —an excellent example of which was the rule, that if any one interrupted a person speaking in public, a substantial and very visible hole should be cut, as a measure of police, in the coat of the disturber of the peace ; the hearty delight in singing and reciting the deeds of past ages, and the most decided gifts of rhetoric and poetry ; the curiosity —no trader was allowed to pass, before he had told in the open street what he knew, or did not know, in the shape of news —and the extravagant credulity which acted on such accounts, for which reason in the better regulated cantons travellers were prohibited on pain of severe punishment from communicating unauthenticated reports to others than the public magistrates ; the childlike piety, which sees in the priest a father and asks for his counsel in all things ; the unsurpassed fervour of national feeling, and the closeness with which those who are fellow- countrymen cling together almost like one family in
to strangers ; the inclination to rise in revolt under the first chance-leader that presents himself and to form bands, but at the same time the utter incapacity to preserve a self-reliant courage equally remote from presump tion and from pusillanimity, to perceive the right time for waiting and for striking a blow, to attain or even barely to tolerate any organization, any sort of fixed military or political discipline. It and remains, at all times and all places the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid, inquisitive, credulous, amiable, clever, but — in political point of view — thoroughly useless nation and therefore its fate has been always and everywhere the same.
opposition
But the fact that this great people was ruined by the
The
of ko^aSc Transalpine wars of Caesar, was not the most important
develop- result of that grand enterprise far more momentous than monta
;
;
a
is,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 101
the negative was the positive result It hardly admits of a doubt that, if the rule of the senate had prolonged its semblance of life for some generations longer, the migration of peoples, as it is called, would have occurred four hundred years sooner than it did, and would have occurred at a time when the Italian civilization had not become naturalized either in Gaul, or on the Danube, or in Africa and Spain. Inasmuch as the great general and statesman of Rome with sure glance perceived in the German tribes the rival antagonists of the Romano-Greek world ; inas much as with firm hand he established the new system of aggressive defence down even to its details, and taught men to protect the frontiers of the empire by rivers or artificial ramparts, to colonize the nearest barbarian tribes along the frontier with the view of warding off the more remote, and to recruit the Roman army by enlistment from the enemy's country; he gained for the Hellenico- Italian culture the interval necessary to civilize the west just as it had already civilized the east Ordinary men see the fruits of their action ; the seed sown by men of genius germinates slowly. Centuries elapsed before men under stood that Alexander had not merely erected an ephemeral kingdom in the east, but had carried Hellenism to Asia ; centuries again elapsed before men understood that Caesar had not merely conquered a new province for the Romans, but had laid the foundation for the Romanizing of the
of the west It was only a late posterity that
regions
perceived
and Germany, so inconsiderate in a military point of view,
and so barren of immediate result An immense circle of peoples, whose existence and condition hitherto were known barely through the reports — mingling some truth with much fiction —of the mariner and the trader, was disclosed by this means to the Greek and Roman world. "Daily," it is said in a Roman writing of May 698, "the so.
the meaning of those expeditions to England
The
on the Danube,
103 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
letters and messages from Gaul are announcing names of peoples, cantons, and regions hitherto unknown to us. " This enlargement of the historical horizon by the expedi tions of Caesar beyond the Alps was as significant an event in the world's history as the exploring of America by European bands. To the narrow circle of the Mediter ranean states were added the peoples of central and northern Europe, the dwellers on the Baltic and North seas ; to the old world was added a new one, which thence forth was influenced by the old and influenced it in turn. What the Gothic Theodoric afterwards succeeded in, came very near to being already carried out by Ariovistus. Had it so happened, our civilization would have hardly stood in any more intimate relation to the Romano-Greek than to the Indian and Assyrian culture. That there is a
bridge connecting the past glory of Hellas and Rome with the prouder fabric of modern history ; that Western Europe is Romanic, and Germanic Europe classic ; that the names of Themistocles and Scipio have to us a very different sound from those of Asoka and Salmanassar ; that Homer and Sophocles are not merely like the Vedas and Kalidasa attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our own garden — all this is the work of Caesar; and, while the creation of his great predecessor in the east has been almost wholly reduced to ruin by the tempests of the Middle Ages, the structure of Caesar has outlasted those thousands of years which have changed religion and polity for the human race and even shifted for it the centre of civilization itself, and it stands erect for what we may designate as eternity.
To complete the sketch of the relations of Rome to the peoples of the north at this period, it remains that we cast a glance at the countries which stretch to the north of the Italian and Greek peninsulas, from the sources of the Rhine to the Black Sea. It is true that the torch of
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 103
nistory does not illumine the mighty stir and turmoil of peoples which probably prevailed at that time there, and the solitary gleams of light that fall on this region are, like a faint glimmer amidst deep darkness, more fitted to be wilder than to enlighten. But it is the duty of the historian to indicate also the gaps in the record of the history of nations ; he may not deem it beneath him to mention, by the side of Caesar's magnificent system of defence, the paltry arrangements by which the generals of the senate professed to protect on this side the frontier of the empire.
North-eastern Italy was still as before (iii. 424) left ex- Alpine posed to the attacks of the Alpine tribes. The strong peopes- Roman army encamped at Aquileia in 695, and the 69. triumph of the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Lucius Afranius,
lead us to infer, that about this time an expedition to the
Alps took place, and it may have been in consequence of
this that we find the Romans soon afterwards in closer connection with a king of the Noricans. But that even subsequently Italy was not at all secure on this side, is
shown by the sudden assault of the Alpine barbarians on
the nourishing town of Tergeste in 702, when the Trans- 63. alpine insurrection had compelled Caesar to divest upper
Italy wholly of troops.
The turbulent peoples also, who had possession of the niyrta. district along the Illyrian coast, gave their Roman masters constant employment The Dalmatians, even at an earlier period the most considerable people of this region, en
larged their power so much by admitting their neighbours into their union, that the number of their townships rose from twenty to eighty. When they refused to give up once more the town of Promona (not far from the river Kerka), which they had wrested from the Liburnians, Caesar after the battle of Pharsalia gave orders to march against them; but the Romans were in the first instance
Mace-
104 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book *
worsted, and in consequence of this Dalmatia became for some time a rendezvous of the party hostile to Caesar, and the inhabitants in concert with the Pompeians and with the pirates offered an energetic resistance to the generals of Caesar both by land and by water.
Lastly Macedonia along with Epirus and Hellas lay in greater desolation and decay than almost any other part of the Roman empire. Dyrrhachium, Thessalonica, and By zantium had still some trade and commerce; Athens attracted travellers and students by its name and its philo sophical school; but on the whole there lay over the formerly populous little towns of Hellas, and her seaports once swarming with men, the calm of the grave. But if the Greeks stirred not, the inhabitants of the hardly accessible Macedonian mountains on the other hand con tinued after the old fashion their predatory raids and feuds ; for instance about 697-698 Agraeans and Dolopians over- ran the Aetolian towns, and in 700 the Pirustae dwelling in the valleys of the Drin overran southern Illyria. The neighbouring peoples did likewise. The Dardani on the northern frontier as well as the Thracians in the east had no doubt been humbled by the Romans in the eight years' conflicts from 676 to 683; the most powerful of the Thracian princes, Cotys, the ruler of the old Odrysian kingdom, was thenceforth numbered among the client kings of Rome. Nevertheless the pacified land had still as before to suffer invasions from the north and east The governor Gaius Antonius was severely handled both by the Dardani and by the tribes settled in the modern Dobrudscha, who, with the help of the dreaded Bastamae brought up from the left bank of the Danube, inflicted
67-66. 64.
78-71.
62-«l. on him an important defeat (692—693) at Istropolis (Istere, not far from Kustendji). Gaius Octavius fought with better
80. fortune against the Bessi and Thracians (694). Marcus 67-66. Piso again (697—698) as general-in-chief wretchedly mis
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 105
managed matters ; which was no wonder, seeing that for money he gave friends and foes whatever they wished. The Thracian Dentheletae (on the Strymon) under his
Macedonia far and wide, and even stationed their posts on the great Roman military
road leading from Dyrrhachium to Thessalonica ; the people in Thessalonica made up their minds to stand a
from them, while the strong Roman army in the province seemed to be present only as an onlooker when the inhabitants of the mountains and neighbouring peoples levied contributions from the peaceful subjects of Rome.
Such attacks could not indeed endanger the power of The new Rome, and a fresh disgrace had long ago ceased to occasion j^^om. concern. But just about this period a people began to
acquire political consolidation beyond the Danube in the
wide Dacian steppes —a people which seemed destined to
play a different part in history from that of the Bessi and
the Dentheletae. Among the Getae or Dacians in primeval
'times there had been associated with the king of the people a holy man called Zalmoxis, who, after having explored the ways and wonders of the gods in distant travel in foreign lands, and having thoroughly studied in particular the wisdom of the Egyptian priests and of the Greek Pytha goreans, had returned to his native country to end his life as a pious hermit in a cavern of the "holy mountain. " He remained accessible only to the king and his servants, and gave forth to the king and through him to the people his oracles with reference to every important undertaking. He was regarded by his countrymen at first as priest of the supreme god and ultimately as himself a god, just as it is said of Moses and Aaron that the Lord had made Aaron the prophet and Moses the god of the prophet This had become a permanent institution ; there was regularly associated with the king of the Getae such a god, from whose mouth everything which the king ordered proceeded
governorship plundered
siege
io6 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
or appeared to proceed. This peculiar constitution, in which the theocratic idea had become subservient to the apparently absolute power of the king, probably gave to the kings of the Getae some such position with respect to their subjects as the caliphs had with respect to the Arabs ; and one result of it was the marvellous religious-political reform of the nation, which was carried out about this time by the king of the Getae, Burebistas, and the god Dekaeneos. The people, which had morally and politically fallen into utter decay through unexampled drunkenness, was as it were metamorphosed by the new gospel of temperance and valour; with his bands under the influ ence, so to speak, of puritanic discipline and enthusiasm king Burebistas founded within a few years a mighty kingdom, which extended along both banks of the Danube and reached southward far into Thrace, Illyria, and Noricum. No direct contact with the Romans had yet taken place, and no one could tell what might come out of this singular state, which reminds us of the early times of Islam ; but this much it needed no prophetic gift to foretell, that proconsuls like Antonius and Piso were not called to
contend with gods.
chap, via RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
107
CHAPTER VIII
THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
Among the democratic chiefs, who from the time of the Pompeim consulate of Caesar were recognized officially, so to speak, TMjuj^" as the joint rulers of the commonwealth, as the governing position.
" triumvirs," Pompeius according to public opinion occupied decidedly the first place. It was he who was called by the Optimates the "private dictator"; it was before him that Cicero prostrated himself in vain ; against him were directed the sharpest sarcasms in the wall-placards of Bibulus, and the most envenomed arrows of the talk in the saloons of the
This was only to be expected. According to the facts before the public Pompeius was indisputably the first general of his time; Caesar was a dexterous party- leader and party-orator, of undeniable talents, but as notoriously of unwarlike and indeed of effeminate tempera ment. Such opinions had been long current; it could not be expected of the rabble of quality that it should trouble itself about the real state of things and abandon once established platitudes because of obscure feats of heroism on the Tagus. Caesar evidently played in the league the mere part of the adjutant who executed for his chief the work which Flavius, Afranius, and other less capable instruments had attempted and not performed. Even his governorship seemed not to alter this state of things. Afranius had but recently occupied a very similar
opposition.
Pompeiuj and the capital.
Anarchy.
THE JOINT RULE OF BOOK ▼
position, without thereby acquiring any special importance ; several provinces at once had been of late years repeatedly placed under one governor, and often far more than four legions had been united in one hand; as matters were again quiet beyond the Alps and prince Ariovistus was recognized by the Romans as a friend and neighbour, there was no prospect of conducting a war of any moment there. It was natural to compare the position which Pompeius had obtained by the Gabinio-Manilian law with that which Caesar had obtained by the Vatinian ; but the comparison did not turn out to Caesar's advantage. Pompeius ruled over nearly the whole Roman empire ; Caesar over two provinces. Pompeius had the soldiers and the treasures of the state almost absolutely at his disposal ; Caesar had only the sums assigned to him and an army of 34,000 men. It was left to Pompeius himself to fix the point of time for his retirement ; Caesar's command was secured to him for a long period no doubt, but yet only for a limited term. Pompeius, in fine, had been entrusted with the most important undertakings by sea and land ; Caesar was sent to the north, to watch over the capital from upper Italy and to take care that Pompeius should rule it undis turbed.
But when Pompeius was appointed by the coalition to be ruler of the capital, he undertook a task far exceeding his powers. Pompeius understood nothing further of ruling than may be summed up in the word of command. The waves of agitation in the capital were swelled at once by past and by future revolutions; the problem of ruling this city—which in every respect might be compared to the Paris of the nineteenth century — without an armed force was infinitely difficult, and for that stiff and stately pattern -soldier altogether insoluble. Very soon matters reached such a pitch that friends and foes, both equally inconvenient to him, could, so far as he was concerned, do
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
109
what they pleased; after Caesar's departure from Rome the coalition ruled doubtless still the destinies of the world, but not the streets of the capital. The senate too, to whom there still belonged a sort of nominal government, allowed things in the capital to follow their natural course ; partly because the section of this body controlled by the coalition lacked the instructions of the regents, partly because the angry opposition kept aloof out of indifference or pessimism, but chiefly because the whole aristocratic corporation began to feel at any rate, if not to comprehend, its utter impotence. For the moment therefore there was nowhere at Rome any power of resistance in any sort of
nowhere a real authority. Men were living in an interregnum between the ruin of the aristocratic, and the rise of the military, rule ; and, if the Roman common wealth has presented all the different political functions and organizations more purely and normally than any other in ancient or modern times, it has also exhibited political disorganization —anarchy —with an unenviable clearness. It is a strange coincidence that in the same years, in which Caesar was creating beyond the Alps a work to last for ever, there was enacted in Rome one of the most extra vagant political farces that was ever produced upon the
government,
of the world's history. The new regent of the commonwealth did not rule, but shut himself up in his house and sulked in silence. The former half- deposed government likewise did not rule, but sighed, sometimes in private amidst the confidential circles of the villas, sometimes in chorus in the senate-house. The portion of the burgesses which had still at heart freedom and order was disgusted with the reign of confusion, but
without leaders and counsel it maintained a passive attitude —not merely avoiding all political activity, but keeping aloof, as far as possible, from the political Sodom itself.
On the other hand the rabble of every sort never had
stage
utterly
The
no THE JOINT RULE OF book v
better days, never found a merrier arena. The number of little great men was legion. Demagogism became quite a trade, which accordingly did not lack its professional insignia — the threadbare mantle, the shaggy beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice ; and not seldom it was a trade with golden soil. For the standing declama tions the tried gargles of the theatrical staff were an article in much request ; 1 Greeks and Jews, freed men and slaves, were the most regular attenders and the loudest criers in the public assemblies ; frequently, even when it came to a vote, only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses constitutionally entitled to do so. " Next time," it is said in a letter of this period, " we may expect our lackeys to outvote the emancipation-tax. " The real powers of the day were the compact and armed bands, the battalions of anarchy raised by adventurers of rank out of gladiatorial slaves and blackguards. Their possessors had from the outset been mostly numbered among the popular party ; but since the departure of Caesar, who alone understood how to impress the democracy, and alone knew how to
all discipline had departed from them and every partisan practised politics at his own hand. Even now, no doubt, these men fought with most pleasure under the banner of freedom; but, strictly speaking, they were neither of democratic nor of anti-democratic views; they inscribed on the — in itself indispensable — banner, as happened, now the name of the people, anon that of the senate or that of party-chief; Clodius for
instance fought or professed to fight in succession for the ruling democracy, for the senate, and for Crassus. The leaders of these bands kept to their colours only so far as they inexorably persecuted their personal enemies—as in the case of Clodius against Cicero and Milo against
This IS the meaning of cantorum convitio tantiemes ctkbrart (Cic fro Stst. 55, 118).
manage
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a
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Clodius—while their partisan position served them merely as a handle in these personal feuds. We might as well seek to set a charivari to music as to write the history of this political witches' revel ; nor is it of any moment to enumerate all the deeds of murder, besiegings of houses, acts of incendiarism and other scenes of violence within a great capital, and to reckon up how often the gamut was traversed from hissing and shouting to spitting on and trampling down opponents, and thence to throwing stones and drawing swords.
The principal performer in this theatre of political ciodiun rascality was that Publius Clodius, of whose services, as
already mentioned (iv. 517), the regents availed themselves against Cato and Cicero. Left to himself, this influential, talented, energetic and — in his trade — really exemplary partisan pursued during his tribunate of the people (696) 58.
an ultra-democratic policy, gave the citizens corn gratis, restricted the right of the censors to stigmatize immoral burgesses, prohibited the magistrates from obstructing the course of the comitial machinery by religious formalities,
set aside the limits which had shortly before (690), for the 64. purpose of checking the system of bands, been imposed on
the right of association of the lower classes, and re established the " street-clubs " (collegia compitalicid) at that time abolished, which were nothing else than a formal organization —subdivided according to the streets, and with
an almost military arrangement—of the whole free or slave proletariate of the capital. If in addition the further law, which Clodius had likewise already projected and purposed
to introduce when praetor in 702, should give to freedmen 62.
and to slaves living in de facto possession of freedom the same political rights with the freeborn, the author of all these brave improvements of the constitution might declare
his work complete, and as a second Numa of freedom and equality might invite the sweet rabble of the capital to see
Quarrel of Pompehu with Clodiuv
only
113 THE JOINT RULE OF BOOK V
him celebrate high mass in honour of the arrival of the democratic millennium in the temple of Liberty which he had erected on the site of one of his burnings at the Palatine. Of course these exertions in behalf of freedom did not exclude a traffic in decrees of the burgesses ; like Caesar himself, Caesar's ape kept governorships and other posts great and small on sale for the benefit of his fellow- citizens, and sold the sovereign rights of the state for the benefit of subject kings and cities.
At all these things Pompeius looked on without stirring. If he did not perceive how seriously he thus compromised himself, his opponent perceived it. Clodius had the hardihood to engage in a dispute with the regent of Rome on a question of little moment, as to the sending back of
a captive Armenian prince ; and the variance soon became a formal feud, in which the utter helplessness of Pompeius was displayed. The head of the state knew not how to meet the partisan otherwise than with his own weapons,
wielded with far less dexterity. If he had been tricked by Clodius respecting the Armenian prince, he offended him in turn by releasing Cicero, who was pre eminently obnoxious to Clodius, from the exile into which Clodius had sent him; and he attained his object so
that he converted his opponent into an implacable foe. If Clodius made the streets insecure with his bands, the victorious general likewise set slaves and pugilists to work; in the frays which ensued the general naturally was worsted by the demagogue and defeated in the street, and Gaius Cato was kept almost constantly under siege in his garden by Clodius and his comrades. It is not the least remarkable feature in this remarkable
thoroughly,
that the regent and the rogue amidst their quarrel vied in courting the favour of the fallen govern ment ; Pompeius, partly to please the senate, permitted Cicero's recall, Clodius on the other hand declared the
spectacle,
chap, VIII POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
113
Julian laws null and void, and called on Marcus Bibulus publicly to testify to their having been unconstitutionally passed.
Naturally no positive result could issue from this imbroglio of dark passions ; its most distinctive character was just its utterly ludicrous want of object. Even a man of Caesar's genius had to learn by experience that demo cratic agitation was completely worn out, and that even the way to the throne no longer lay through demagogism.
It was nothing more than a historical makeshift, if now, in the interregnum between republic and monarchy, some whimsical fellow dressed himself out with the prophet's mantle and staff which Caesar had himself laid aside, and the great ideals of Gaius Gracchus came once more upon the stage distorted into a parody ; the so-called party from which this democratic agitation proceeded was so little such in reality, that afterwards it had not even a part falling to it in the decisive struggle. It cannot even be asserted that by means of this anarchical state of things the desire after a strong government based on military power had been vividly kindled in the minds of those who were indifferent to politics. Even apart from the fact that such neutral burgesses were chiefly to be sought outside of Rome, and thus were not directly affected by the rioting in the capital, those minds which could be at all influenced by such motives had been already by their former experiences, and especially by the Catilinarian conspiracy, thoroughly converted to the principle of authority; but those that were really alarmed were affected far more emphatically by a dread of the gigantic crisis inseparable from an overthrow of the constitution, than by dread of the mere continuance of the — at bottom withal very superficial —anarchy in the capital. The only result of it which historically deserves notice was the painful position in which Pompeius was placed by the attacks of the
VOL. V
141
Pompefas
to the Gallic
Cemx,
114 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
Clodians, and which had a material share in determining his farther steps.
Little as Pompeius liked and understood taking the initiative, he was yet on this occasion compelled by the change of his position towards both Clodius and Caesar to depart from his previous inaction. The irksome and disgraceful situation to which Clodius had reduced him, could not but at length arouse even his sluggish nature to
hatred and anger. But far more important was the change which took place in his relation to Caesar. While, of the two confederate regents, Pompeius had utterly failed in the functions which he had undertaken, Caesar had the skill to turn his official position to an account which left all calculations and all fears far behind. Without much inquiry as to permission, Caesar had doubled his army by levies in his southern province inhabited in great measure by Roman burgesses ; had with this army crossed the Alps instead of keeping watch over Rome from Northern Italy ; had crushed in the bud a new Cimbrian invasion, and
68, 67. within two years (696, 697) had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel. In presence of such facts even the aristocratic tactics of ignoring and disparaging were baffled. He who had often been scoffed at as effeminate was now the idol of the army, the celebrated victory-crowned hero, whose fresh laurels outshone the faded laurels of Pompeius, and to whom even the senate
67. as early as 697 accorded the demonstrations of honour usual after successful campaigns in richer measure than had ever fallen to the share of Pompeius. Pompeius stood towards his former adjutant precisely as after the Gabinio-Manilian laws the latter had stood towards him. Caesar was now the hero of the day and the master of the most powerful Roman army; Pompeius was an ex- general who had once been famous. It is true that no collision had yet occurred between father-in-law and son
CHAP, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
115
in-law, and the relation was externally undisturbed ; but every political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the relative proportions of the power of the parties are materi ally altered. While the quarrel with Clodius was merely annoying, the change in the position of Caesar involved a very serious danger for Pompeius ; just as Caesar and his confederates had formerly sought a military support against him, he found himself now compelled to seek a military support against Caesar, and, laying aside his haughty privacy, to come forward as a candidate for some extra ordinary magistracy, which would enable him to hold his place by the side of the governor of the two Gauls with equal and, if possible, with superior power. His tactics, like his position, were exactly those of Caesar during the Mithra- datic war. To balance the military power of a superior but still remote adversary by the obtaining of a similar command, Pompeius required in the first instance the official machinery of government. A year and a half ago this had been absolutely at his disposal. The regents then ruled the state both by the comitia, which absolutely obeyed them as the masters of the street, and by the senate, which was energetically overawed by Caesar ; as representative of the coalition in Rome and as its ac knowledged head, Pompeius would have doubtless ob tained from the senate and from the burgesses any decree
which he wished, even if it were against Caesar's interest. But by the awkward quarrel with Clodius, Pompeius had lost the command of the streets, and could not expect to carry a proposal in his favour in the popular assembly. Things were not quite so unfavourable for him in the senate ; but even there it was doubtful whether Pompeius after that long and fatal inaction still held the reins of the majority firmly enough in hand to procure such a decree as he needed.
The position of the senate also, or rather of the nobility
116 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
The generally, had meanwhile undergone a change. From the opposition vei7 fact of *ts complete abasement it drew fresh energy,
among the In the coalition of 694 various things had come to light,
** &
wn'ch were by no means as yet ripe for it The banish 60. ment of Cato and Cicero—which public opinion, however much the regents kept themselves in the background and even professed to lament referred with unerring tact to its real authors — and the marriage- relationship formed
between Caesar and Pompeius suggested to men's minds with disagreeable clearness monarchical decrees of banish ment and family alliances. The larger public too, which stood more aloof from political events, observed the foundations of the future monarchy coming more and more distinctly into view. From the moment when the public perceived that Caesar's object was not modification of the republican constitution, but that the question at stake was the existence or non-existence of the republic, many of the best men, who had hitherto reckoned them selves of the popular party and honoured in Caesar its head, must infallibly have passed over to the opposite side. Itwas no longer in the saloons and the country houses of the governing nobility alone that men talked of the
"three dynasts," of the "three-headed monster. " The dense crowds of people listened to the consular orations of Caesar without sound of acclamation or approval not hand stirred to applaud when the democratic consul entered the theatre. But they hissed when one of the tools of the regents showed himself in public, and even staid men applauded when an actor uttered an anti- monarchic sentence or an allusion against Pompeius. Nay, when Cicero was to be banished, great number of burgesses — said twenty thousand —mostly of the middle classes, put on mourning after the example of the senate. "Nothing " now more popular," said in letter this period, than hatred of the popular
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II?
The regents dropped hints, that through such opposi- Attempt* tion the equites might easily lose their new special places regentJ w in the theatre, and the commons their bread-corn ; people check it were therefore somewhat more guarded perhaps in the expression of their displeasure, but the feeling remained
the same. The lever of material interests was applied with
better success. Caesar's gold flowed in streams. Men of
seeming riches whose finances were in disorder, influential
ladies who were in pecuniary embarrassment, insolvent
young nobles, merchants and bankers in difficulties, either
went in person to Gaul with the view of drawing from the fountain-head, or applied to Caesar's agents in the capital ;
and rarely was any man outwardly respectable—Caesar
avoided dealings with vagabonds who were utterly lost—
rejected in either quarter. To this fell to be added the enormous buildings which Caesar caused to be executed
on his account in the capital—and by which a countless
number of men of all ranks from the consular down to the
common porter found opportunity of profiting —as well as
the immense sums expended for public amusements.
Fompeius did the same on a more limited scale ; to him
the capital was indebted for the first theatre of stone, and
he celebrated its dedication with a magnificence never seen
before. Of course such distributions reconciled a number
of men who were inclined towards opposition, more especially in the capital, to the new order of things up to a
certain extent ; but the marrow of the opposition was not
to be reached by this system of corruption. Every day
more and more clearly showed how deeply the existing constitution had struck root among the people, and how
little, in particular, the circles more aloof from direct party- agitation, especially the country towns, were inclined
towards monarchy or even simply ready to let it take its
course.
If Rome had had a representative constitution, the
Increasing
of the
Il8 THE JOINT RULE OF book »
discontent of the burgesses would have found its natural °* expression in the elections, and have increased by so ex pressing itself; under the existing circumstances nothing
was left for those true to the constitution but to place themselves under the senate, which, degraded as it was, still appeared the representative and champion of the legitimate republic. Thus it happened that the senate, now when it had been overthrown, suddenly found at its disposal an army far more considerable and far more earnestly faithful, than when in its power and splendour it overthrew the Gracchi and under the protection of Sulla's sword restored the state. The aristocracy felt this; it began to bestir itself afresh. J ust at this time Marcus Cicero, after having bound himself to join the obsequious party in the senate and not only to offer no opposition, but to work with all his might for the regents, had obtained from them permission to return. Although Pompeius in this matter only made an incidental concession to the oligarchy, and intended first of all to play a trick on Clodius, and secondly to acquire in the fluent consular a tool rendered pliant by sufficient blows, the opportunity afforded by the return of Cicero was embraced for republican demonstra tions, just as his banishment had been a demonstration against the senate. With all possible solemnity, protected moreover against the Clodians by the band of Titus Annius Milo, the two consuls, following out a resolution of the senate, submitted a proposal to the burgesses to permit the return of the consular Cicero, and the senate called on all burgesses true to the constitution not to be absent from the vote. An unusual number of worthy men, especially from the country towns, actually assembled in Rome on
•7. the day of voting (4 Aug. 697). The journey of the con sular from Brundisium to the capital gave occasion to a series of similar, but not less brilliant manifestations of public feeling. The new alliance between the senate and
cha». v1i1 POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
119
the burgesses faithful to the constitution was on this occasion as it were publicly proclaimed, and a sort of review of the latter was held, the singularly favourable result of which contributed not a little to revive the sunken courage of the aristocracy.
The helplessness of Pompeius in presence of these daring HdpkM- demonstrations, as well as the undignified and almost ^sso{. ridiculous position into which he had fallen with reference
to Clodius, deprived him and the coalition of their credit ;
and the section of the senate which adhered to the regents, demoralized by the singular inaptitude of Pompeius
and helplessly left to itself, could not prevent the republican- aristocratic party from regaining completely the ascendency
in the corporation. The game of this party really at that time (697) was still by no means desperate for a courageous 67. and dexterous player. It had now — what it had not possessed for a century past — a firm support in the people ;
if it trusted the people and itself, it might attain its object in the shortest and most honourable way. Why not attack the regents openly and avowedly? Why should not a resolute and eminent man at the head of the senate cancel the extraordinary powers as unconstitutional, and summon all the republicans of Italy to arms against the tyrants and their following ? It was possible perhaps in this way once more to restore the rule of the senate. Certainly the republicans would thus play a bold game ; but perhaps in this case, as often, the most courageous resolution
might have been at the same time the most prudent Only, it is
true, the indolent aristocracy of this period was scarcely capable of so simple and bold a resolution. There was however another way perhaps more sure, at any rate better adapted to the character and nature of these constitu tionalists ; they might labour to set the two regents at variance and through this variance to attain ultimately to the helm themselves. The relations between the two men
Attempts of Pompeius
130 THE JOINT RULE OF BOOK v
ruling the state had become altered and relaxed, now that Caesar had acquired a standing of preponderant power by the side of Pompeius and had compelled the latter to canvass for a new position of command ; it was probable that, if he obtained there would arise in one way or other rupture and struggle between them. If Pompeius remained un supported in this, his defeat was scarcely doubtful, and the constitutional party would in that event find themselves after the close of the conflict under the rule of one master instead of two. But the nobility employed against Caesar the same means by which the latter had won his previous victories, and entered into alliance with the weaker competitor, victory would probably, with general like Pompeius, and with an army such as that of the constitu tionalists, fall to the coalition and to settle matters with Pompeius after the victory could not — judging from the proofs of political incapacity which he had already given— appear specially difficult task.
Things had taken such turn as naturally to suggest an
understanding between Pompeius and the republican party.
to obtain a Whether such an approximation was to take place, and what
command through the senate.
shape the mutual relations of the two regents and of the aristocracy, which had become utterly enigmatical, were next to assume, fell necessarily to be decided, when in the
57. autumn of 697 Pompeius came to the senate with the proposal to entrust him with extraordinary official power. He based his proposal once more on that which he had eleven years before laid the foundations of his power, the
Adminis
tration
of the
supplies of price of bread in the capital, which had just then—as
previously to the Gabinian law — reached an oppressive height Whether had been forced up special machinations, such as Clodius imputed sometimes to Pompeius, sometimes to Cicero, and these in their turn charged on Clodius, cannot be determined; the continuance of piracy, the emptiness of the public chest, and the
it
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;
if
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chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 121
negligent and disorderly supervision of the supplies of com
by the government were already quite sufficient of them selves, even without political forestalling, to produce scarcities of bread in a great city dependent almost solely
on transmarine supplies. The plan of Pompeius was to get
the senate to commit to him the superintendence of the matters relating to corn throughout the whole Roman empire, and, with a view to this ultimate object, to entrust him on
the one hand with the unlimited disposal of the Roman state-treasure, and on the other hand with an army and fleet, as well as a command which not only stretched over the whole Roman empire, but was superior in each province
to that of the governor —in short he designed to institute
an improved edition of the Gabinian law, to which the conduct of the Egyptian war just then pending (iii. 451) would therefore quite as naturally have been annexed as
the conduct of the Mithradatic war to the razzia against the pirates. However much the opposition to the new dynasts had gained ground in recent years, the majority of the senate was still, when this matter came to be discussed in Sept. 697, under the constraint of the terror excited by 67. Caesar. It obsequiously accepted the project in principle,
and that on the proposition of Marcus Cicero, who was ex pected to give, and gave, in this case the first proof of the pliableness learned by him in exile. But in the settlement of the details very material portions were abated from the original plan, which the tribune of the people Gaius Messius submitted. Pompeius obtained neither free control over the treasury, nor legions and ships of his own, nor even an authority superior to that of the governors ; but they contented themselves with granting to him, for the purpose of his organizing due supplies for the capital, considerable sums, fifteen adjutants, and in all affairs relating to the supply of grain full proconsular power throughout the Roman dominions for the next five years, and with having
Egyptian expedition.
less.
Pompeius was nevertheless glad to have found at any
rate a serious employment, and above all a fitting pretext for leaving the capital. He succeeded, moreover, in pro viding it with ampler and cheaper supplies, although not without the provinces severely feeling the reflex effect But he had missed his real object ; the proconsular title, which he had a right to bear in all the provinces, remained an empty name, so long as he had not troops of bis own at his disposal. Accordingly he soon afterwards got a second proposition made to the senate, that it should confer on him the charge of conducting back the expelled king of Egypt, if necessary by force of arms, to his home. But the more that his urgent need of the senate became evident, the senators received his wishes with a less pliant and less respectful spirit It was immediately discovered in the
122 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
this decree confirmed by the burgesses. There were many different reasons which led to this alteration, almost equivalent to a rejection, of the original plan : a regard to Caesar, with reference to whom the most timid could not but have the greatest scruples in investing his colleague not merely with equal but with superior authority in Gaul itself; the concealed opposition of Pompeius' hereditary enemy and reluctant ally Crassus, to whom Pompeius himself attributed or professed to attribute primarily the failure of his plan ; the antipathy of the republican opposi tion in the senate to any decree which really or nominally enlarged the authority of the regents ; lastly and mainly, the incapacity of Pompeius himself, who even after having been compelled to act could not prevail on himself to acknowledge his own action, but chose always to bring forward his real design as it were in incognito by means of his friends, while he himself in his well-known
modesty declared his willingness to be content with even less. No wonder that they took him at his word, and gave him the
chap, viii POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
123
Sibylline oracles that it was impious to send a Roman
to Egypt; whereupon the pious senate almost unanimously resolved to abstain from armed intervention.
army
was already so humbled, that he would have accepted the mission even without an army; but in his incorrigible dissimulation he left this also to be declared merely by his friends, and spoke and voted for the despatch of another senator. Of course the senate rejected a pro
which wantonly risked a life so precious to his country ; and the ultimate issue of the endless discussions was the resolution not to interfere in Egypt at all (Jan. 698).
These repeated repulses which Pompeius met with in
the senate and, what was worse, had to acquiesce in with-
out retaliation, were naturally regarded—come from what restoration. side they would — by the public at large as so many
victories of the republicans and defeats of the regents
generally ; the tide of republican opposition was accord
on the increase. Already the elections for 698 had gone but partially according to the minds of 68. the dynasts ; Caesar's candidates for the praetorship, Publius Vatinius and Gaius Alfius, had failed, while two decided adherents of the fallen government, Gnaeus Lentulus Marcellinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, had been elected, the former as consul, the latter as praetor.
But for 699 there even appeared as candidate for the 66. consulship Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, whose election
it was difficult to prevent owing to his influence in the capital and his colossal wealth, and who, it was sufficiently well known, would not be content with a concealed opposi tion. The comitia thus rebelled ; and the senate chimed
in. It solemnly deliberated over an opinion, which Etruscan soothsayers of acknowledged wisdom had fur nished respecting certain signs and wonders at its special request. The celestial revelation announced that through
the dissension of the upper classes the whole power over
Pompeius
posal
68. Attempt at. an
ingly always
Attack on
124 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
the army and treasure threatened to pass to one ruler, and the state to incur loss of freedom—it seemed that the gods pointed primarily at the proposal of Gaius Messius. The re- publicans soon descended from heaven to earth. The law as to the domain of Capua and the other laws issued by Caesar as consul had been constantly described by them as null and void, and an opinion had been expressed in the senate
Conference
regents at Luca.
show their colours when they think that they can do so with safety. Evidently the aristocracy held that the moment had come for beginning the struggle not with Pompeius against Caesar, but against the iyrannis gener ally. What would further follow might easily be seen. Domitius made no secret that he intended as consul to propose to the burgesses the immediate recall of Caesar from Gaul. An aristocratic restoration was at work ; and with the attack on the colony of Capua the nobility threw down the gauntlet to the regents.
Caesar, although receiving from day to day detailed accounts of the events in the capital and, whenever military considerations allowed, watching their progress from as near a point of his southern province as possible, had not hitherto, visibly at least, interfered in them. But now war had been declared against him as well as his colleague, in fact against him especially ; he was compelled to act, and he acted quickly. He happened to be in the very neigh bourhood ; the aristocracy had not even found it advisable to delay the rupture, till he should have again crossed the
67. as early as Dec. 697 that it was necessary to cancel them 66. on account of their informalities. On the 6th April 698 the consular Cicero proposed in a full senate to put the consideration of the Campanian land distribution in the order of the day for the 15 th May. It was the formal declaration of war ; and it was the more significant, that it came from the mouth of one of those men who only
66. Alps. In the beginning of April 698 Crassus left the
chap, VIII POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
MS
capital, to concert the necessary measures with his more powerful colleague ; he found Caesar in Ravenna. Thence
both proceeded to Luca, and there they were joined by Pompeius, who had departed from Rome soon after Crassus
(1 1 April), ostensibly for the purpose of procuring supplies
of grain from Sardinia and Africa. The most noted ad
herents of the regents, such as Metellus Nepos the pro
consul of Hither Spain, Appius Claudius the propraetor
of Sardinia, and many others, followed them ; a hundred
and twenty lictors, and upwards of two hundred senators
were counted at this conference, where already the new monarchical senate was represented in contradistinction to
the republican. In every respect the decisive voice lay
with Caesar. He used it to re-establish and consolidate
the existing joint rule on a new basis of more equal dis tribution of power. The governorships of most importance
in a military point of view, next to that of the two Gauls,
were assigned to his two colleagues — that of the two Spains
to Pompeius, that of Syria to Crassus; and these offices
were to be secured to them by decree of the people for
five years (700-704), and to be suitably provided for in a military and financial point of view. On the other hand
Caesar stipulated for the prolongation of his command,
which expired with the year 700, to the close of 705, as 64. 40 well as for the prerogative of increasing his legions to ten
and of charging the pay for the troops arbitrarily levied by him on the state-chest Pompeius and Crassus were more over promised a second consulship for the next year (699) 65. before they departed for their governorships, while Caesar kept it open to himself to administer the supreme magis tracy a second time after the termination of his governor
ship in 706, when the ten years' interval legally requisite 48 between two consulships should have in his case elapsed. The military support, which Pompeius and Crassus required
for regulating the affairs of the capital all the more that the
64 60.
Designs of
126 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
legions of Caesar originally destined for this purpose could not now be withdrawn from Transalpine Gaul, was to be found in new legions, which they were to raise for the Spanish and Syrian armies and were not to despatch from Italy to their several destinations until it should seem to themselves convenient to do so. The main questions were thus settled ; subordinate matters, such as the settlement of the tactics to be followed against the opposition in the capital, the regulation of the candidatures for the ensuing years, and the like, did not long detain them. The great master of mediation composed the personal differences which stood in the way of an agreement with his wonted ease, and compelled the most refractory elements to act in concert. An understanding befitting colleagues was re established, externally at least, between Pompeius and Crassus. Even Publius Clodius was induced to keep himself and his pack quiet, and to give no farther annoy ance to Pompeius —not the least marvellous feat of the
mighty magician.
That this whole settlement of the pending questions
this^r- " proceeded, not from a compromise among independent
rmngement
and rival regents meeting on equal terms, but solely from the good will of Caesar, is evident from the circumstances. Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful position of a powerless refugee, who comes to ask aid from his opponent Whether Caesar chose to dismiss him and to declare the coalition dissolved, or to receive him and to let the league continue just as it stood — Pompeius was in either view
annihilated. If he did not in this case break with Caesar, he became the powerless client of his con federate. If on the other hand he did break with Caesar and, which was not very probable, effected even now a coalition with the aristocracy, this alliance between op ponents, concluded under pressure of necessity and at the last moment, was so little formidable that it was hardly for
politically
chap, vixi POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
127
the sake of averting it that Caesar agreed to those conces sions. A serious rivalry on the part of Crassus with Caesar was utterly impossible. It is difficult to say what motives induced Caesar to surrender without necessity his superior position, and now voluntarily to concede — what he had refused to his rival even on the conclusion of the league
of 694, and what the latter had since, with the evident •* design of being armed against Caesar, vainly striven in different ways to attain without, nay against, Caesar's will —the second consulate and military power. Certainly it was not Pompeius alone that was placed at the head of an army, but also his old enemy and Caesar's ally throughout many years, Crassus ; and undoubtedly Crassus obtained
his respectable military position merely as a counterpoise to the new power of Pompeius. Nevertheless Caesar was a great loser, when his rival exchanged his former power- lessness for an important command. It is possible that Caesar did not yet feel himself sufficiently master of his soldiers to lead them with confidence to a warfare against the formal authorities of the land, and was therefore anxious not to be forced to civil war now by being recalled from Gaul ; but whether civil war should come or not, depended at the moment far more on the aristocracy of the capital than on Pompeius, and this would have been at most a reason for Caesar not breaking openly with Pompeius, so that the opposition might not be emboldened by this breach, but not a reason for conceding to him what he did concede. Purely personal motives may have con tributed to the result ; it may be that Caesar recollected how he had once stood in a position of similar powerless- ness in presence of Pompeius, and had been saved from destruction only by his — pusillanimous, it is true, rather than magnanimous —retirement ; it is probable that Caesar hesitated to break the heart of his beloved daughter who was sincerely attached to her husband—in his soul there
66.
The aristocracy
•
128 THE JOINT RULE OF book v
was room for much besides the statesman. But the decisive reason was doubtless the consideration of Gaul. Caesar —differing from his biographers —regarded the sub jugation of Gaul not as an incidental enterprise useful to him for the gaining of the crown, but as one on which depended the external security and the internal reorganiza tion, in a word the future, of his country. That he might be enabled to complete this conquest undisturbed and might not be obliged to take in hand just at once the extrication of Italian affairs, he unhesitatingly gave up his superiority over his rivals and granted to Pompeius suffi cient power to settle matters with the senate and its adherents. This was a grave political blunder, if Caesar had no other object than to become as quickly as possible king of Rome ; but the ambition of that rare man was not confined to the vulgar aim of a crown. He had the bold ness to prosecute side by side, and to complete, two labours equally vast —the arranging of the internal affairs of Italy, and the acquisition and securing of a new and fresh soil for Italian civilization. These tasks of course interfered with each other ; his Gallic conquests hindered much more than helped him on his way to the throne. It was fraught to him with bitter fruit that, instead of settling the Italian revolution in 698, he postponed it to 706. But as a states man as well as a general Caesar was a peculiarly daring player, who, confiding in himself and despising his op ponents, gave them always great and sometimes extravagant odds.
It was now therefore the turn of the aristocracy to make g00d their high gage, and to wage war as boldly as they had boldly declared it But there is no more pitiable spectacle than when cowardly men have the misfortune to take a bold resolution. They had simply exercised no foresight at alL It seemed to have occurred to nobody that Caesar would possibly stand on his defence, or that
48.
chap, vii1 POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
139
even now Pompeius and Crassus would combine with him afresh and more closely than ever. This seems incredible ;
but it becomes intelligible, when we glance at the persons who then led the constitutional opposition in the senate. Cato was still absent ; 1 the most influential man in the senate at this time was Marcus Bibulus, the hero of passive resistance, the most obstinate and most stupid of all con- sulars. They had taken up arms only to lay them down,
so soon as the adversary merely put his hand to the sheath ;
the bare news of the conferences in Luca sufficed to suppress
all thought of a serious opposition and to bring the mass
of the timid — that the immense majority of the senate — back to their duty as subjects, which in an unhappy hour they had abandoned. There was no further talk of the appointed discussion to try the validity of the Julian laws
the legions raised Caesar on his own behalf were charged
by decree of the senate on the public chest the attempts
on occasion of regulating the next consular provinces to take away both Gauls or one of them by decree from Caesar were rejected the majority (end of May 698). Thus M. the corporation did public penance. In secret the indi vidual lords, one after another, thoroughly frightened at their own temerity, came to make their peace and vow unconditional obedience —none more quickly than Marcus Cicero, who repented too late of his perfidy, and in respect
of the most recent period of his life clothed himself with titles of honour which were altogether more appropriate than flattering. * Of course the regents agreed to be pacified;
Cato was not yet in Rome when Cicero spoke on nth March 698 in 66 favour of Sestius (Pro Sat. 28, 60) and when the discussion took place in
the senate in consequence of the resolutions of Luca respecting Caesar's legions (Plut Caes, ai) not till the discussions at the beginning of
699 that we find him once more busy, and, as he travelled in winter (Plut 66, Cato Min. 38), he thus returned to Rome in the end of 698. He cannot 60. therefore, as has been mistakenly inferred from Asconius (p. 35, 53), have defended Milo in Feb. 698. 66.
Aft annum gerwianum fuiut (Ad Alt. It. 3), VOL
143
'1 V
5,
; it is
by
by
is,
;
;
Settlement of the new monarch ical rule.
i30 THE JOINT RULE OF BOOK V
they refused nobody pardon, for there was nobody who was worth the trouble of making him an exception. That we may see how suddenly the tone in aristocratic circles changed after the resolutions of Luca became known, it is worth while to compare the pamphlets given forth by Cicero shortly before with the palinode which he caused to be issued to evince publicly his repentance and his good intentions. 1
The regents could thus arrange Italian affairs at their pleasure and more thoroughly than before. Italy and the capital obtained practically a garrison although not as sembled in arms, and one of the regents as commandant Of the troops levied for Syria and Spain by Crassus and Pompeius, those destined for the east no doubt took their departure ; but Pompeius caused the two Spanish provinces to be administered by bis lieutenants with the garrison hitherto stationed there, while he dismissed the officers and soldiers of the legions which were newly raised—nominally for despatch to Spain — on furlough, and remained himself with them in Italy.
Doubtless the tacit resistance of public opinion increased, the more clearly and generally men perceived that the regents were working to put an end to the old constitution and with as much gentleness as possible to accommodate the existing condition of the government and administration to the forms of the monarchy ; but they submitted, because they were obliged to submit First of all, all the more important affairs, and particularly aU that related to military matters and external relations, were disposed of without
1 This palinode is the still extant oration on the Provinces to be assigned to the consuls of 699. It was delivered in the end of May 698. The pieces contrasting with it are the orations for Scstius and against Vatinius and that upon the opinion of the Etruscan soothsayers, dating from the months of March and April, in which the aristocratic regime is glorified to the best of his ability and Caesar in particular is treated in a very cavalier tone. It was but reasonable that Cicero should, as he himself confesses (Ad Att. iv. 5, 1 ), be ashamed to transmit even to intimate friends that attestation of his resumed allegiance.
Nk SO.
CHAP, vii1 POMPEIUS AND CAESAR
131
consulting the senate upon them, sometimes by decree of the people, sometimes by the mere good pleasure of the rulers. The arrangements agreed on at Luca respecting the military command of Gaul were submitted directly to the burgesses by Crassus and Pompeius, those relating to Spain and Syria by the tribune of the people Gaius Tre- bonius, and in other instances the more important governor ships were frequently filled up by decree of the people. That the regents did not need the consent of the authorities to increase their troops at pleasure, Caesar had already sufficiently shown : as little did they hesitate mutually to borrow troops ; Caesar for instance received such col legiate support from Pompeius for the Gallic, and Crassus from Caesar for the Parthian, war. The Transpadanes, who possessed according to the existing constitution only
Latin rights, were treated by Caesar during his administra tion practically as full burgesses of Rome. 1 While formerly
1 This is not stated by our authorities. But the view that Caesar levied no soldiers at all from the Latin communities, that is to say from by far the greater part of his province, is in itself utterly incredible, and is directly refuted by the fact that the opposition-party slightingly designates the force levied by Caesar as "for the most part natives of the Transpadane colonies" (Caes. B.