No More Learning

To understand this it is necessary to review briefly
his relations with the Normans during the past seven years.
The relations of the Pope with the Normans were affected by two
considerations—the protection of papal territory, and the possible need
for their assistance. Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia, Calabria, and
Sicily, who was trying to form a centralised Norman state in South
Italy, had readily done homage to previous Popes in return for the
cession of territory, and had rendered valuable assistance to the Papacy
at Alexander II's accession. Gregory was determined to yield no more ter-
ritory. This and the reconciliation with Henry were the two chief objects
of his attention during the first few months of his papacy. He increased
the area of papal suzerainty by the addition of the lands belonging to
the surviving Lombard rulers in the south, especially Benevento and
Salerno; in return for his protection they surrendered them to the Pope
and received them back again as fiefs from the Papacy. Richard, Prince
of Capua, the only Norman who could rival Robert Guiscard, took the
same step, and Gregory was delighted at the success of his policy, which
was, as he himself declared, to keep the Normans from uniting to the
damage of the Church. Robert Guiscard, desiring to expand his power,
could only do so at the expense of papal territory. This, in spite of his


## p. 77 (#123) #############################################

Alliance of the Pope with Robert Guiscard
77
oath, he did not scruple to do, and was in consequence excommunicated
at the Lenten Synods of 1074 and 1075. But the breach with Henry in
1076 caused the Pope to contemplate the desirability of Norman aid;
Robert made the cession of papal territory a necessary condition, and
negotiations fell through. Moreover Richard of Capua had in the mean-
time broken his allegiance and allied himself with Robert Guiscard, and
together they made a successful attack on various portions of the papal
territory. In Lent 1078 the Pope issued a bull of excommunication against
them once more. Richard died soon afterwards and on his death-bed was
reconciled with the Church; his son Jordan came to Rome and made his
peace with the Pope on the old terms. So once more Gregory had brought
about disunion; and a serious revolt of his vassals against Robert Guiscard,
which it took the latter two years to quell, saved the Pope from further
Norman aggression. The revolt was extinguished by the middle of 1080, at
the very moment that the Pope decided to appeal to Robert for aid. They
met at Ceprano in June. The ban was removed, Robert did fealty to the
Pope, and in return received investiture both of the lands granted him by
Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II and of the territory he had himself
seized, for which he agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Pope. The
Pope thus confirmed what he is careful to call “an unjust tenure," and
to gain Robert's aid sacrificed the principle for which he had stood firm
in 1076. Whether justifiable or not the sacrifice was ineffectual. Robert
Guiscard welcomed the alliance because his ambitions were turned to the
East. Instead of obtaining the immediate help he required, the Pope had
to give his blessing to Robert's expedition against the Eastern Empire.
The duke's absence in Greece gave the opportunity for a renewed outbreak
of revolt among his vassals. This forced him to return and he was not
successful in crushing the revolt until July 1083; it was not till the
following year, when it was as much to his own interest as to the Pope's to
check the successful advance of Henry, that he at last moved to Gregory's
support. Up to this time the alliance, without bringing any advantage
to the Pope, had actually assisted the king. It gained for him two useful
allies, both of whom were anxious to hamper the power of Robert Guis-
card-Jordan of Capua and the Eastern Emperor Alexius. The latter
supplied Henry with large sums of money, intended for use against Robert,
but which the king was eventually to employ with success in his negotia-
tions with the Romans.
Robert Guiscard did at any rate, as previously in 1075, reject Henry's
proposals for an alliance. But he also disregarded the Pope's appeals, and
set sail for the East at the very time that Henry was marching on Rome.
The Pope therefore had to rely on his own resources and the assistance
of Countess Matilda. This did not weaken his determination; convinced
of the righteousness of his cause he was confident of the result. At the
Lenten Synod of 1081 he excommunicated Henry and his followers afresh,
and from this synod he sent his legates directions with regard to the
CH. 11.


## p. 78 (#124) #############################################

78
Siege of Rome by Henry IV
election of a successor to Rudolf. He must not be hastily chosen; the
chief qualifications must be integrity of character and devotion to the
Church. The Pope also sent them the wording of the oath he expected
from the new king—an oath of fealty, promising obedience to the papal
will in all things. This was the practical expression of the theories he
enunciated at the same time in his letter to Bishop Herman of Metz
justifying the excommunication and deposition of Henry. It is important
as marking the culmination of his views, but it was without effect; at the
new election it seems to have been completely disregarded.
The weakness of the opposition in Germany made it possible for
Henry to undertake his Italian expedition. He came to assert his posi-
tion, and to obtain imperial coronation at Rome: by negotiation and
from Gregory, if possible, but if necessary by force and from his anti-Pope.
His first attempt was in May 1081; whether from over-confidence or
necessity he brought few troops with him. He announced his arrival in a
letter to the Romans, recalling them to the allegiance they had promised
to his father. The Romans, however, justified Gregory's confidence in their
loyalty, and Henry was forced to retire after a little aimless plundering
of the suburbs. The situation was not affected by the election of Count
Herman of Salm at the end of 1081 as successor to Rudolf. Henry
could not reduce Saxony to submission, but he could safely ignore
Herman and resume his Italian design. He reappeared before Rome in
February 1082, preceded by a second letter to the Romans; this attempt
was as unsuccessful as the former one, and for the rest of the year
he
occupied with the resistance of the Countess Matilda in northern Italy.
He returned to Rome at the beginning of 1083 and settled down to
besiege the Leonine City, which he finally captured in June, thus gaining
possession of St Peter's and all the region on the right bank of the Tiber
except the castle of Sant'Angelo. This success shewed that the loyalty of
the Romans to Gregory was weakening; they were not equal to the strain
of a long siege, and the money supplied by the Emperor Alexius was
beginning to have its effect. At the same time a moderate party was
being formed within the Curia itself, which managed to obtain the papal
consent to the holding of a synod in November, at which the questions at
issue between Pope and king were to be discussed; Henry's party was
approached and promised a safe-conduct to those who attended the synod.
Thus in both camps there were influences at work to procure a peaceful
settlement. The king himself was not averse to such a settlement. He had
moreover come to a private understanding with the leading Romans on
the matter of greatest importance to himself. Unknown to the Pope they
had taken an oath to Henry to obtain for him imperial coronation at
Gregory's hands, or, failing this, to disown Gregory and recognise the anti-
Pope.
The attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. The Pope issued
his summons to the synod, but the tone of his letters, addressed only to
was


## p. 79 (#125) #############################################

His victory.
The Norman sack of Rome V
79
those who were not under excommunication, shewed that he would not
compromise his views or negotiate with the impenitent. The king, who
had been further irritated by what he regarded as the treachery of certain
of the Romans in demolishing some fortifications he had constructed,
adopted an attitude equally intransigeant. He deliberately prevented
Gregory's chief supporters from coming to the synod, and actually took
prisoner a papal legate, the Cardinal-bishop Otto of Ostia. The synod,
therefore, was poorly attended and entirely without result. But the
secret negotiations of Henry were more successful. He was about to leave
Rome, in despair of attaining his object, when a deputation arrived
promising him instant possession of the main city. With some hesitation
he retraced his steps to find the promise genuine and his highest hopes
unexpectedly fulfilled. On 21 March 1084 he entered Rome in triumph
with his anti-Pope. A council of his supporters decreed anew the deposition
of Pope Gregory VII, and on Palm Sunday Guibert was enthroned as
Pope Clement III. On Easter Day the new Pope crowned Henry and
Bertha as Emperor and Empress, and Henry's chief object was attained.
He had followed in the footsteps of his father--the deposition of Pope
Gregory, the appointment of Pope Clement, the imperial coronation and
felt that he had restored the relations of Empire and Papacy as they existed
in 1046.
The Emperor proclaimed his triumph far and wide, and his partisans
celebrated it in exultant pamphlets. But their rejoicing was premature
and short-lived. Gregory VII was still holding the castle of Sant'Angelo
and other of the fortified positions in Rome, his determination unmoved
by defeat. And at last his appeals to Robert Guiscard were heeded. The
Norman duke at the head of a large army advanced on Rome. As he
approached, Henry, who was not strong enough to oppose him, retreated,
and by slow stages made his way back to Germany, leaving the anti-Pope
at Tivoli. His immediate purpose had been achieved, and he had to
abandon Rome to its fate. He could not, like his father, take the deposed
Pope with him to Germany; the degradation of Gregory VII was to be
the work of the man who came to his rescue. The brutal sack of Rome by
the Normans lasted for three days, and put in the shade the damage done
to the city in former days by Goths and Vandals. When Robert Guiscard
returned south he took with him the Pope, whom he could not have left
to the mercy of the infuriated populace. Gregory would fain have found
a refuge at Monte Cassino; but his rescuer, now his master, hurried him
on (as if to display to him the papal territory that had been the price of
this deliverance), first to Benevento and then to Salerno. In June they
arrived at the latter place, where Gregory was to spend the last year
of
his life, while the anti-Pope was able quietly to return to Rome and
celebrate Christmas there. At Salerno the Pope held his last synod,
It added to the weakness of Guibert's position that the functions of the cardinal-
bishops at this ceremony were usurped by the Bishops of Modena and Arezzo.
CH. II.


## p. 80 (#126) #############################################

80
Death of Pope Gregory VII
repeated once more his excommunication of Henry and his supporters, and
dispatched his final letter of justification and appeal to the Christian
world. The bitterness of failure hung heavily upon him. He, who had
prayed often that God would release him from this life if he could not be
of service to the Church', had now no longer any desire to live. He
passed away on 25 May 1085, and the anguish of his heart found expres-
sion in his dying words: “I have loved righteousness and hated iniquity? ;
therefore I die in exile. "
The emphasis was on righteousness to the last. And it was justified.
Had he consented to compromise his principles and to come to terms with
Henry he could have maintained himself unchallenged on the papal throne.
The rough hand of the Norman had made his residence at Rome im-
possible; but without Norman aid it would have been equally impossible.
The Romans had deserted him; the king was master of the city. His end
might even have been more terrible, though it could not have been more
tragic. What impresses one most of all is not his temporary defeat,
but the quenching of his spirit. The old passionate confidence has gone;
though still convinced of the righteousness of his cause, he has lost
all hope of its victory on earth. “The devil,” he wrote, “has won no
such victory since the days of the great Constantine; the nearer the day
of Anti-Christ approaches, the more vigorous are the efforts he is making.
His vision was dimmed by the gloom of the moment, and this gave
him
a pessimistic outlook that was unnatural to him and was not justified by
facts. (The Papacy had vindicated its independence, had taken the lead in
Church reform, and had established the principles for which the reformers
had been fighting. It had also asserted its authority as supreme within
the ecclesiastical department, and exercised a control unknown before and
not to be relaxed in the future. This was largely the work of Gregory VII.
The great struggle too in which he was engaged with Henry IV was to
end eventually in a complete victory for the Papacy; his antagonist was
to come to an end even more miserable than his own. The great theories
which he had evolved in the course of this struggle were not indeed to be
in practice by his immediate successors. But he left a great
cause behind him, and his claims were repeated and defended in the
pamphlet-warfare that followed his death. Later they were to be
revived again and to raise the Papacy to its greatest height; but they were
to lead to eventual disaster, as the ideal which had inspired them was for-
gotten. They were with Gregory VII the logical expression of his great
ideal—the rule of righteousness upon earth. He had tried to effect this
with the aid of the temporal ruler; when that was proved impossible, he
tried to enforce it against him. The medieval theory of the two equal and
independent powers had proved impracticable; Gregory inaugurated the
new papal theory that was to take its place. )
followed up
I As he tells Hugh of Cluny in 1075.
2 Psalm xlv. 8.


## p. 81 (#127) #############################################

Gregory's relations with France
81
The main interest of Gregory VII's papacy is concentrated on the
great struggle with the Empire and the theories and claims that arose out
of it. If his relations with the other countries of Europe are of minor
interest, they are of almost equal importance in completing our under-
standing of the Pope. He was dealing with similar problems, and he
applied the same methods to their solution; the enforcement of his
decrees, the recognition of his supreme authority in the ecclesiastical
department, co-operation with the secular authority, are his principal
objects. Conditions differed widely in each country; he was keenly alive
to these differences, shrewd and practical in varying his policy to suit
them. He had frequently to face opposition, but in no case was he
driven into open conflict with the secular authority. This must be borne
in mind in considering the claims which he advanced against the Empire,
which were the result of his conflict with the temporal ruler; where no
such conflict occurred, these claims did not emerge. Evidently then they
must not be taken to represent his normal attitude; they denote
rather the extreme position into which he was forced by determined
opposition.
Gregory had himself been employed as papal legate to enforce the
reform decrees in France, and had thus been able to familiarise himself with
the ecclesiastical situation. The king, Philip I, had little real authority
in temporal matters, but exercised considerable influence in ecclesiastical,
as also did the leading nobles! . The alliance of monarchy and episcopate,
a legacy to the Capetians from the Carolingians, was of importance to the
king, both politically and financially. The rights of regalia and spolia,
and the simoniacal appointments to bishoprics, provided an impor-
tant source of revenue, which the king would not willingly surrender; he
was therefore definitely antagonistic to the reform movement. The
simoniacal practices of the king and his plundering of Church property
naturally provoked papal intervention. Remonstrance and warning were
of no effect, until at the Lenten Synod of 1075 a decree was passed
threatening Philip with excommunication if he failed to give satisfaction
to the papal legates. The threat was apparently sufficient. Philip was
not strong enough openly to defy the Pope and risk excommunication.
Co-operation of the kind that Gregory desired was impossible, but
Philip was content with a defensive attitude, which hindered the progress
of the papal movement but did not finally prevent it. ) At any rate there
is no further reference to papal action against the king, who seems to have
made a show of compliance with the Pope's wishes in 1080, when Gregory
wrote to him, imputing his former moral and ecclesiastical offences to
youthful folly and sending him precepts for his future conduct. The
1 In France, unlike Germany, the lay control complained of was exercised as much
by the uobles as by the king. Gregory, who knew the local conditions, recognised that
it was often not the king but a noble, such as the Count of Flanders, whose influence
had to be counteracted.
6
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. II.


## p. 82 (#128) #############################################

82
Relations with France
episcopate adopted an attitude similar to that of the king. The lay
influence at elections, the prevalence of simony and of clerical marriage,
had created an atmosphere which made the work of reform peculiarly
difficult. The bishops, supporting and supported by the king, were
extremely averse to papal control, but owing to the strength of the
feudal nobility they lacked the territorial power and independence of the
German bishops. They had to be content therefore, like the king, with a
shifty and defensive attitude; they resisted continually, but only half-
heartedly.
In Gregory VII's correspondence with the French Church there are
two striking features. In the first place his letters to France are, at every
stage of his papacy, more than twice as numerous as his letters to Ger-
many. These letters reveal the laxity prevailing in the Church, and the
general disorder of the country owing to the weakness of the central
government; they also shew the timidity of the opposition which made it
possible for the Pope to interfere directly, not only in matters affecting the
ecclesiastical organisation as a whole but also in questions of detail con-
cerning individual churches and monasteries. Secondly, while the Pope's
correspondence with Germany was mainly concerned with the great
questions of his reform policy, his far more numerous letters to France
have hardly any references to these questions. His methods were the
same in both countries: in 1074 he sent papal legates to France, as to
Germany, to inaugurate a great campaign against simony and clerical
marriage. The legates in Germany had met with determined resistance,
but those in France had pursued their work with such ardour and success
that the Pope established them eventually as permanent legates in France
-Bishop Hugh of Die being mainly concerned with the north and
centre, Bishop Amatus of Oloron with Aquitaine and Languedoc. To
them he left the task of enforcing compliance with the papal decrees; hence
the silence on these matters in his own correspondence. The legates,
especially Bishop Hugh, were indefatigable. They held numerous synods",
publishing the papal decrees and asserting their own authority. Inevit-
ably they provoked opposition, especially from the lower clergy to the
enforcement of clerical celibacy, and their lives were sometimes in danger;
at the Council of Poictiers in 1078 there was even a popular riot against
them. The archbishops were naturally reluctant to submit to their
authority, but had to be content with a passive resistance. They refused
to appear at the synods, or questioned the legatine authority. The sen-
tence of interdict, which Hugh never failed to employ, usually brought
them to a reluctant submission. Only Manasse, Archbishop of Rheims, for
whose character no writer has a good word, took a decided stand. He
refused to appear at the synods when summoned, and appealed against
the Pope's action in giving full legatine authority to non-Romans. As he
1 Hugh of Flavigny (MGH, Script. viii, pp. 412 sqq. ) gives an account of several
of these synods.


## p. 83 (#129) #############################################

Relations with England
83
continued obstinate in his refusal to appear before the legates, he was
deposed in 1080 and a successor appointed in his place; not even the
king's support availed to save him. The action of the papal legates was
often violent and ill-considered. (Hugh in particular was a man of rigid
and narrow outlook whose sentences never erred on the side of leniency.
The Pope repeatedly reminded him of the virtues of mercy and discretion,
and frequently reversed his sentences. The legate was aggrieved at the
Pope's leniency. He complained bitterly that his authority was not being
upheld by the Pope; offenders had only to run to Rome to obtain
immediate pardon. In the Pope's mind, however, submission to Rome
outweighed all else; when that was obtained, he readily dispensed with
the penalties of his subordinates. An important step towards the strength-
ening of the papal authority was taken in 1079, when he made the
Archbishop of Lyons primate of the four provinces of Lyons, Rouen, Tours,
and Sens, subject of course to the immediate control of the Papacy; and
in 1082 the legate Hugh was, practically by the Pope's orders, promoted
Archbishop of Lyons. The Pope, in his decree, spoke of the restoration
of the ancient constitution, but the Archbishop of Sens had by custom
held the primacy, and Lyons was now rather imperial than French in its
allegiance. A consideration of this nature was not likely to weigh with
the Pope; it was against the idea of national and independent churches,
which monarchical control was tending to produce, that he was directing
his efforts. If he was not able definitely to prevent lay control of elections
in France, he had firmly established papal authority over the French
Church. If his decrees were not carefully obeyed, the principles of the
reform movement were accepted; in the critical years that followed his
death, France was to provide many of the chief supporters of the papal
policy.
The situation with regard to England was altogether different.
Gregory's friendship with King William I was of long standing. His had X
been the influence that had induced Alexander II to give the papal
blessing to the Norman Duke's conquest of England. William had
recognised the obligation and made use of his friendship. On Gregory's
accession he wrote expressing his keen satisfaction at the event. William
was a ruler of the type of the Emperor Henry III. Determined to be
master in Church and State alike, he was resolved to establish good order
and justice in ecclesiastical as well as in secular affairs. He was therefore
in sympathy with Church reform and the purity of Church discipline and
government. He was fortunate in his Archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc,
whose legal mind shared the same vision of royal autocracy; content
to be subject to the king he would admit no ecclesiastical equal, and
successfully upheld the primacy of his see against the independent claims
of York. The personnel of the episcopate, secularised and ignorant,
needed drastic alteration; William was careful to refrain from simony
and to make good appointments, but he was equally careful to keep the
CH. II.
6--2


## p. 84 (#130) #############################################

84
Relations with England
appointments in his own hands. He took a strong line against the
immorality and ignorance of the lower clergy, and promoted reform by
the encouragement he gave to regulars. Frequent Church councils were
held, notably at Winchester in 1076, where decrees were passed against
clerical marriage, simony, and the holding of tithes by laymen; but the
decrees were framed by the king, and none could be published without his
sanction. The work of Church reform was furthered, as Gregory wished,
by the active co-operation of the king; the separation of the ecclesiastical
from the civil courts, creating independent Church government, was also
a measure after Gregory's heart. The Pope frequently expressed his
gratification; the work of purifying the Church, so much impeded else-
where, was proceeding apace in England without the need of his interven-
tion. Disagreement arose from William's determination to be master in
his kingdom, in ecclesiastical affairs as well as in secular; he made this
clear by forbidding papal bulls to be published without his permission,
and especially by refusing to allow English bishops to go to Rome. The
Pope bitterly resented the king's attitude; a novel and formidable obstacle
confronted him in the one quarter where he had anticipated none.
Matters were not improved by the papal decree of 1079, subjecting the
Nornian archbishopric of Rouen to the primacy of the Archbishop of
Lyons. So for a time relations were much strained, but an embassy from
William in 1080 seems to have restored a better understanding, and even
to have encouraged Gregory to advance the striking claim that William
should do fealty to the Papacy for his kingdom. There is good reason to
believe that the claim was made in 1080, and that it took the form of a
message entrusted to the legate Hubert with the letter he brought to
William in May 10801. The king abruptly dismissed the claim on the
ground that there was no precedent to justify it.
The Pope yielded to
this rebuff and made no further attempt, nor did William's refusal inter-
fere with the restored harmony. Gregory was sensible, as he wrote in
1081, of the many exceptional merits in William, who moreover had
refused to listen to the overtures of the Pope's enemies. And in one respect
William made a concession. He allowed Lanfranc to visit Rome at the
end of 1082, the first visit that is recorded of any English bishop during
Gregory's papacy? . It was only a small concession. For, while the reform
movement was directly furthered by royal authority in England, the
Church remained quasi-national under royal control; the introduction of
papal authority was definitely resisted.
In the remaining parts of Europe the Pope's efforts were mainly
directed towards three objects +missionary work, uniformity of ritual, and
the extension of the temporal power of the Papacy! With backward
1
1 Cf. EHR, XXVI, pp. 225 sqq.
2 Ordericus Vitalis
says
that Lanfranc went to Rome in 1076. The statements in
Gregory's letters, Reg. vi, 30 (1079) and vili, 43 (1082), are sufficient contradiction
of this.


## p. 85 (#131) #############################################

Relations with other states
85
countries such as Norway and Sweden, where the difficulty of the language
was an obstacle to the sending of Roman missionaries, he urged that
young men should be sent to Rome for instruction, so that they might
return to impart it to their fellow-countrymen. In Poland it was the
undeveloped ecclesiastical organisation that called for his attention; it
possessed no metropolitan and hardly any bishops, and he sent legates to
introduce the necessary reforms. The question of uniformity of ritual
arose with regard to the territory recently recovered to Christianity from
the Saracens, especially in Spain. The acceptance by the Spanish Church
of the Ordo Romanus was an event of great importance for Catholicism in
the future. Over Spain, and on the same grounds over Corsica and Sardinia
as well, the Pope claimed authority temporal as well as spiritual. They
were all, he declared, in former times under the jurisdiction of St Peter,
but the rights of the Papacy had long been in abeyance owing to the
negligence of his predecessors or the usurpation of the Saracens. Though
he does not state the ground for his assertion, it is doubtless the (forged)
Donation of Constantine to Pope Sylvester I that he had in his mind'.
He was more precise in his claims over Hungary. St Stephen had handed
over his kingdom to St Peter, as the Emperor Henry III recognised after
his victory over Hungary, when he sent a lance and crown to St Peter.
King Salomo, despising St Peter, had received his kingdom as a fief
from King Henry IV; later he had been expelled by his cousin Géza.
This was God's judgment for his impiety. In these cases Gregory was
trying to establish claims based on former grants. He was equally anxious
to extend papal dominion by new grants. ) He readily acceded to the
request of Dmitri that the kingdom of Russia might be taken under papal
protection and held as a fief from the Papacy; the King of Denmark had
made a similar suggestion to his predecessor, which Gregory tried to
persuade the next king to confirm.
His positive success in this policy was slight. The interest lies rather
in the fact that he rested all these claims on grants from secular rulers ;
in no case does he assert that the ruler should do fealty to him in virtue
of the overlordship of the spiritual power over all earthly rulers. This
was a claim he applied to the Empire alone, his final remedy to cure the
sickness of the world, and to prevent a recurrence of the great conflict in
which he was engaged. He seems to have been loth to resort to this
remedy until open defiance drove him to its use. It is not unlikely,
however, that he did contemplate the gradual extension over Western
Christendom of papal overlordship; but he conceived of this overlordship
as coming into being in the normal feudal manner, established by consent
and on a constitutional basis. In this way, when he could compel obedience
even from temporal rulers to the dictates of the moral law, his dream of
the rule of righteousness would at last be fulfilled.
1 Urban II in 1091 directly quotes Constantine's Donation as the source of the
authority he claims over Corsica and Lipara.
CH. II.


## p. 86 (#132) #############################################

86
Pope Victor III
II.
Gregory VII was dead, but his personality continued to dominate the
Church, his spirit lived on in the enthusiasm of his followers. The great
pamphlet-warfare, already in existence, became fuller and more bitter
over his final claims against the Empire. But his immediate successors
were concerned with the practical danger that threatened the Papacy.
They had to fight not for its supremacy so much as for the continued exis-
tence of its independence, once more threatened with imperial control.
With Henry, endeavouring to establish a Pope amenable to his wishes,
there could be no accommodation. Until his death in 1106 everything had
to be subordinated to the immediate necessities of a struggle for existence.
But in the rest of Europe the situation is entirely different. Nowhere was
Henry's candidate recognised as Pope, and outside imperial territory the
extreme claims of Gregory VII had not been put forward. In these
countries, therefore, the policy of Gregory VII was continued and de-
veloped, and, considering the extent to which the Papacy was hampered
by its continual struggle with the Emperor, the advance it was able to
make was remarkable, and not without effect on its attitude to the Empire
when communion was restored on the succession of Henry V to the throne.
When Gregory VII died, in exile and almost in captivity, the position
of his supporters was embarrassing in the extreme, and it was not until
a year had passed that a successor to him was elected. Nor was the
election of Abbot Desiderius of Monte Cassino as Pope Victor III of
hopeful augury for the future. Desiderius was above all things a peace-
maker, inclined thereto alike by temperament and by the position of
his abbey, which lay in such dangerous proximity to the encroaching
Normans. He had acted as peace-maker between Robert Guiscard and
Richard of Capua in 1075, and thereby assisted in thwarting the policy
of Gregory VII; in 1080 he had made amends by effecting the alliance
of Gregory with Robert Guiscard at Ceprano. But in 1082 he had even
entered into peace negotiations with Henry IV and assisted the alliance
of the latter with Jordan of Capua; hence for a year he was under the
papal ban. Possibly his election was a sign that the moderate party,
anxious for peace, had won the ascendency. More probably it indicates
the continued dominance of Norman influence. Robert Guiscard, indeed,
had died shortly after Gregory VII, but his sons Roger and Bohemond
in South Italy and his brother Roger in Sicily continued his policy,
affording the papal party their protection and in return enforcing their
will. And for this purpose Desiderius was an easy tool. The unfortunate
Pope knew himself to be unequal to the crisis, and made repeated attempts
to resign the office he had so little coveted. It was, therefore, a cruel
addition to his misfortunes that he was violently attacked by the more
extreme followers of Gregory VII, especially by the papal legates in


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Election of Pope Urban II
87
France and Spain, Archbishop Hugh of Lyons and Abbot Richard of
Marseilles, who accused him of inordinate ambition and an unworthy use
of Norman assistance to obtain his election. Perhaps it was this opposi-
tion that stiffened his resolution and decided him at last in March 1087
at Capua, fortified by Norman support, to undertake the duties of his
office. He went to Rome, and on 9 May was consecrated in St Peter's by
the cardinal-bishops, whose action was in itself an answer to his traducers.
But his reign was to be of short duration. Unable to maintain himself
in Rome, he soon retired to Monte Cassino, his real home, where he died
on 16 September. The only noteworthy act of his papacy was the holding
of a synod at Benevento in August, at which he issued a decree against
lay investiture, passed sentence of anathema on the anti-Pope, and excom-
municated Archbishop Hugh and Abbot Richard for the charges they
had presumed to bring against him.
For six months the papal throne was again vacant. At last, on
12 March 1088, the cardinals met at Terracina, and unanimously elected
Otto, Cardinal-bishop of Ostia, as Pope Urban II. The three years of
weakness and confusion were at an end, and a worthy leader had been
found. On the day following his election he wrote a letter to his sup-
porters in Germany, stating his determination to follow in the steps of
Gregory VII, and affirming solemnly his complete adhesion to all the acts
and aspirations of his dead master. To this declaration he consistently
adhered; it was in fact the guiding principle of his policy. Yet in other
respects he presents a complete antithesis to Gregory VII. He was a
Frenchman of noble parentage, born (about 1042) near Rheims, educated
at the cathedral school, and rising rapidly in ecclesiastical rank. Suddenly
he abandoned these prospects and adopted the monastic profession at
Cluny, where about 1076 he was appointed prior. Some two years later,
the Abbot Hugh was requested by Pope Gregory VII to send some of his
monks to work under im at Rome. Otto was one of those selected, and
he was made Cardinal-bishop of Ostia in 1078. From this time he seems
to have been attached to the person of the Pope as a confidential adviser,
and he was occasionally employed on important missions. He was taken
prisoner by Henry IV when on his way to the November synod of 1083.
Released the next year, he went as legate to Germany, where he worked
untiringly to strengthen the papal party. In 1085 he was present at a
conference for peace between the Saxons and Henry's supporters and, after
the failure of this conference, at the Synod of Quedlinburg, where the
excommunication of Henry, Guibert, and their supporters was again
promulgated. On the death of Gregory VII he returned to Italy, and
was the candidate of a section of the Curia to succeed Gregory, who had
indeed mentioned his name on his death-bed. He loyally supported
Victor III, and in 1088 was unanimously elected to succeed him. Tall
and handsome, eloquent and learned, his personality was as different from
that of Gregory VII as his early career had been. In his case it was the
CH. II.


## p. 88 (#134) #############################################

88
Extension of the work of Gregory VII
gentleness and moderation of his nature that won admiration; we are told
that he refused at the price of men's lives even to recover Rome. His
learning, especially his training in Canon Law, was exactly what was
required in the successor of Gregory VII. He was well qualified to work
out in practice the principles of Church government inherited from his
predecessor, and to place the reconstructed Church on a sound constitu-
tional basis. The continual struggle with the Empire, which outlasted
his life, robbed him of the opportunity, though much that he did was to
be of permanent effect. It was in his native country, France, that his
talents were to be employed with the greatest success.
It is mainly in connexion with France, therefore, that we can trace
his general ideas of Church government, his view of papal authority and
its relations with the lay power. There is no divergence from the stand-
point of Gregory VII; he was content to carry on the work of his pre-
decessor, following the same methods and with the same objects in view.
Papal control was maintained by the system of permanent legates, and
Urban continued to employ Archbishop Hugh of Lyons, and Amatus
who now became Archbishop of Bordeaux. The former he had pardoned
for his transgression against Victor III and he had confirmed him as legate.
Hugh's fellow-offender, Abbot Richard of Marseilles, was also pardoned
and was soon promoted to the archbishopric of Narbonne. But he was
not employed again as legate in Spain; this function was attached to the
archbishopric of Toledo. Germany too was now given a permanent legate
in the person of Bishop Gebhard of Constance. These legates were em-
powered to act with full authority on the Pope's behalf, were kept informed
of his wishes, and were made responsible for promoting the papal
policy.
Urban's ultimate object was undoubtedly the emancipation of the
Church from the lay control that was responsible for its secularisation
and loss of spiritual ideals. He had to combat the idea inherent in feudal
society that churches, bishoprics, and abbeys were in the private gift of
the lord in whose territory they were situated. To this he opposed the
papal view that the laity had the duty of protecting the Church but no
right of possession or authority over it. Free election by clergy and people
had been the programme of the reform party for half a century, and even
more than Gregory VII did Urban II pay attention to the circumstances
attending appointments to bishoprics and abbeys. At several synods he
repeated decrees against lay investiture, and forbade the receiving of any
ecclesiastical dignity or benefice from a layman. At the Council of
Clermont in 1095 he went further, prohibiting a bishop or priest from
doing homage to a layman. According to Bishop Ivo of Chartres, Urban
recognised the right of the king to take part in elections “as head of the
people,” that is to say the right of giving, but not of refusing, assent. He
also allowed the king's right to “concede” the regalia—the temporal
possessions of the see that had come to it by royal grant; here again


## p. 89 (#135) #############################################

The organisation of the Church
89
the right of refusing “concession” is not implied. Ivo of Chartres was
prepared to allow the king a much larger part in elections than the Pope
conceded, and his interpretation of Urban's decrees is, from the point of
view of the king, the most favourable that could be put upon them.
The Pope was undoubtedly advancing in theory towards a condition of
complete independence, but his decrees are rather an expression of his
ideal than of his practice.
In practice he was, like Gregory VII, much more moderate, and when
good appointments were made was not disposed to quarrel with lay
influence. His temperament, as well as the political situation, deterred
him from drastic action, for instance, in dealing with the Kings of England
and France. He tried every means of persuasion before issuing a decree
of excommunication against Philip I in the matter of his divorce; and
though he took Anselm
under his protection, he never actually pronounce
sentence against William II. It was a difficult position to maintain.
His legates, especially the violent Hugh, followed the exact letter of the
decrees, and by their ready use of the penal clauses often caused embar-
rassment to the Pope. On the other hand, the bishops and secular clergy,
as was shewn in France over the royal divorce question, were too com-
plaisant to the king and could not be trusted. On the regular clergy he
could place more reliance, and it is to them that he particularly looked
for support. It is remarkable how large a proportion of the docu-
ments that issued from Urban's Chancery were bulls to monasteries,
confirming their privileges and possessions, exempting them sometimes
from episcopal control, and taking them under papal protection (always
with the proviso that they shall pay an annual census to the papal
treasury); the extension of Cluniac influence with Urban's approval
naturally had the same effect. Nor was his interest confined to Benedictine
monasteries; he gave a ready encouragement to the new orders in process
of formation, especially to the regular canons who traced their rule to
St Augustine. And so, at the same time that he was trying to secure for
the bishops freedom of election and a loosening of the yoke that bound
them to the lay power, he was narrowing the range of their spiritual
authority. Indirectly too the authority of the metropolitans was
diminishing; it was becoming common for bishops to obtain confirmation
of their election from the Pope, and in some cases consecration as well,
while the practice of direct appeal to Rome was now firmly established.
Moreover, the appointment of primates, exalting some archbishops at the
expense of others, introduced a further grading into the hierarchy, and
at the same time established responsibility for the enforcement of papal
decrees. The primacy of Lyons, created by Gregory VII, was confirmed
by Urban in spite of the protests of Archbishop Richer of Sens, who
refused to recognise the authority of Lyons; his successor Daimbert was
for a time equally obstinate, but had to submit in order to obtain conse-
cration. Urban extended the system by creating the Archbishop of Rheims
CH. II.


## p. 90 (#136) #############################################

90
Reduction of papal claims to temporal authority
primate of Belgica Secunda', the Archbishop of Narbonne primate over
Aix, and the Archbishop of Toledo primate of all Spain. The Pope,
therefore, was modelling the ecclesiastical constitution so as to make his
authority effective throughout. A natural consequence of this was his
zeal for uniformity. He was anxious, as he had been as legate, to get rid
of local customs and to produce a universal conformity to the practice
of the Roman Church. This is evident in many of his decretals, those,
for instance, that regulated ordinations and ecclesiastical promotions or
that prescribed the dates of the fasts quattuor temporum.
While Urban II undoubtedly increased the spiritual authority of the
Papacy, he was far less concerned than Gregory VII with its temporal
authority. He certainly made use of the Donation of Constantine to assert
his authority in Corsica and Lipara, but he did not revive Gregory VII's
claims to Hungary, nor did he demand from England anything more than
the payment of Peter's Pence. It was not until 1095 that he received the
recognition of William II, and his mild treatment of that king, in spite
of William's brutality to Archbishop Anselm, has already been mentioned.
In Spain and Sicily he was mainly concerned with the congenial task of
re-creating bishoprics and rebuilding monasteries in the districts recently
won from the infidel; he was careful to make papal authority effective,
and to introduce uniformity to Roman practice by the elimination of
local uses. One great extension of temporal authority he did not disdain.
In 1095 King Peter of Aragon, in return for the payment of an annual
tribute, obtained the protection of the Holy See, and acknowledged his
subordination to its authority. Papal overlordship was recognised also by
the Normans in South Italy, and Roger, Robert Guiscard's son, was
invested by Urban with the duchy of Apulia. The Normans, however,
were vassals only in name, and never allowed their piety to interfere with
their interests. In 1098 Urban was a helpless witness of the siege and
capture of Capua, and the same year Count Roger of Sicily obtained for
himself and his heirs a remarkable privilege. No papal legate, unless sent
a latere, was to enter his territory. The count himself was to hold the
position of papal legate, and, in the case of a papal summons to a Roman
Council, was allowed to decide which of his bishops and abbots should go
and which should remain. Urban owed much to Norman protection, but
he had to pay the price.
At any rate, at the time of his accession, Urban was safe only in
Norman territory. Guibert held Rome, and Urban's adherents in the city
were few and powerless. Countess Matilda was loyal as ever, but all her
resources were needed for her own security. Lombardy was still strongly
anti-papal, while in Germany (apart from Saxony) there were hardly
half-a-dozen bishops who upheld the papal cause, and the rebel nobles
were absorbed in their own defence. But in North Italy the tide soon
1 The old Roman province. This gave the archbishop the title of primate, but
nothing more.


## p. 91 (#137) #############################################

Papal victory in North Italy
91
began to turn. Already in 1088 the Archbishop of Milan had renounced
allegiance to Henry and had become reconciled with the Pope, who par-
doned his offence of having received royal investiture. There followed in
1089 the marriage of the younger Welf with the ageing Countess Matilda
of Tuscany, truly (as the chroniclers relate) not prompted by any weak-
ness of the flesh, but a political move which reflected little credit on either
party; the Duke of Bavaria, at any rate, was completely outwitted, but
the Papacy gained the immediate help it required. It brought Henry into
Italy to wage a campaign that was for two years successful, culminating in
the capture of Mantua, and a signal victory over Matilda's troops at
Tricontai, in 1091, but he was now fighting to maintain his authority
in Lombardy, where it had previously been unchallenged. The final blow
came with the revolt of his son Conrad in 1093. Conrad, bringing with
him stories of fresh crimes to blacken his father's name, was welcomed
by the papal party with open arms, and crowned (he had already been
crowned King of Germany) with the iron crown of Lombardy. A regular
Lombard League sprang into being with Milan at its head. The un-
fortunate father was in very evil plight, almost isolated at Verona,
unable, as his enemies held the passes, even to escape into Germany until
1097.
Success in North Italy reacted on Urban's authority elsewhere. The
winter of 1088-1089 he had indeed spent in Rome, but in wretched cir-
cumstances, living on the island in the Tiber under the direction of the
Pierleoni, and obtaining the necessities of life from the charity of a few
poor women. Later in 1089 the expulsion of Guibert from Rome improved
the Pope's position, but it was only a temporary improvement. The
hostile element (probably the recollection of 1084 was still smarting) was
too strong for him, and he had to retire south in the summer of 1090.
Though he managed to celebrate Christmas both in 1091 and 1092 in
the suburbs, he was not able to enter the city again until Christmas 1093.
Refusing to allow bloodshed to secure his position, he adopted the safer
method of winning the Romans by gold, instituting collections for this
purpose, especially in France. In 1094 Abbot Geoffrey of Vendôme, on
a visit to the Pope, found him living in mean state in the house of John
Frangipani, and supplied him with money with which he purchased the
Lateran from a certain Ferruchius left in charge of it by Guibert. From
this time Urban's fortunes began to mend, and only the castle of Sant'
Angelo remained in the hands of the Guibertines. But his tenure of
Rome was insecure; papal authority within the city was not popular,
while outside his enemies made the approaches dangerous for those who
came to visit the Pope. It was not surprising, then, that he took the
opportunity of the success of his cause in North Italy to commence the
northern tour which was to have such important results.
In Germany progress was made with difficulty. The bishops as a
whole were too deeply implicated in the schism to withdraw, and the
CH. II.


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92
Little headway in Germany
papal legate, Bishop Gebhard of Constance, in spite of his undoubted
zeal, could make little headway. The deaths of Bishops Herman of
Metz and Adalbero of Würzburg in 1090, and of Abbot William of
Hirschau and Bishop Altmann of Passau in 1091, robbed the papal
party of its staunchest supporters. But Henry's absence in Italy and the
revolt of Conrad gave an opportunity to the two sections of opposition to
Henry in South Germany to unite for concerted action. At an assembly
held at Ulm in 1093 all present pledged themselves by oath to accept
Bishop Gebhard as the spiritual head, and his brother Duke Berthold as
the temporal leader, of the party; further, Dukes Berthold and Welf. did
homage as vassals to the papal legate and thus recognised the overlord-
ship of the Pope. At the same time, the leading bishops in Lorraine
renounced obedience to the excommunicated Archbishop of Trèves and
brought a welcome reinforcement to the papal party. The improvement
in the situation is shewn by the largely-attended synod presided over by
Gebhard at Constance in the following Lent. Shortly afterwards Europe
was devastated by a pestilence, which was particularly severe in Germany.
The fear of death had a considerable effect in withdrawing adherents
from an excommunicated king, and the increasing sentiment in favour of
the lawful Pope was heightened by the commencement of the crusading
movement. The political situation, however, was less satisfactory than
the ecclesiastical. Duke Welf, foiled in his expectations of the results of
his son's marriage with Matilda, reverted to Henry's allegiance in 1095,
and Henry's return to Germany in 1097 prevented the revolt against him
from assuming greater proportions.
The reconciliation with the Church of so many that had been in
schism before made it urgently necessary to find an answer to the
question—in what light were to be regarded the orders of those who
received ordination from schismatics or simonists? Ever since the war on
simony began, the question of ordinations by simonists had agitated
the Church. Peter Damian had argued for their validity. Cardinal
Humbert had been emphatic against, and Popes Nicholas II and
Gregory VII had practically adopted his opinion. On one thing all alike
were agreed—there could be no such thing as reordination. In Hum-
bert's view, simonists were outside the pale of the Church, and could
confer nothing sacramental; those who received ordination from them in
effect received nothing, and so, unless they afterwards received Catholic or-
dination, they had no orders at all. Urban was obviously at a loss for some
time, and his rulings were of a contradictory nature. He uses the
language of Humbert when he says in 1089 that he himself ordained
Daimbert, Bishop-elect of Pisa, as deacon, because Daimbert had
previously been ordained by Archbishop Werner of Mayence, heretic and
excommunicate, and “qui nihil habuit, nil dare potuit”; and again in
1091 when he ruled that Poppo, Bishop-elect of Metz, must be ordained
deacon by a Catholic bishop if his previous ordination had been simoniacal,


## p. 93 (#139) #############################################

The question of schismatic ordinations
93
because in that case it would be null'. But circumstances were too strong
for him, and even in 1089 he gave permission to his legate in Germany
to allow the retention of their orders to those who without simony had
received ordination from schismatic bishops, provided the latter had
themselves received Catholic ordination. It was at the great Council of
Piacenza in 1095 that he at last issued authoritative decrees on this
subject. Those ordained by schismatic bishops, who had themselves
received Catholic ordination, might retain their orders, if and when they
returned to the unity of the Church. Also those who had been ordained
by schismatics or simonists might retain their orders if they could prove
their ignorance of the excommunication or simony of their ordainers.
But in all cases where such ignorance was not alleged the orders were
declared to be altogether of no effect (omnino irritae). The meaning of
this is not clear, but evidently the validity of such orders is in fact recog-
nised, as the validity of the sacrament could not depend on the knowledge
or ignorance of the ordinand. Some light is thrown by a letter of uncertain
date to one Lucius, provost of St Juventius. After having declared
the validity of the orders and sacraments of criminous clergy, provided
they are not schismatics, he goes on to say that the schismatics have the
forma but not the virtutis effectus of the sacraments, unless and until they
are received into the Catholic communion by the laying-on of hands.
This then was the bridge by which the penitent schismatic might pass into
the Catholic fold, and the ceremony of reconciliation, which included
the performance of all the rites of ordination save that of unction, was
laid down by him in letters written both in 1088 and 1097.