ixty talents may be granted to each, and twelve
trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty
talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for
three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for
each, and four trierarchs.
trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty
talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for
three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for
each, and four trierarchs.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
ORATION ON THE CLASSES 233
than to do the due honour to those on whom they
lavish their applause. As they attempt to speak of
actions which no words can worthily describe, the
illustrious subject adonis their speech and gives
them the praise of eloquence; while their hearers
are made to think of the virtues of those heroes
with much less elevation than these virtues of them-
selves inspire. To me, time itself seems to be the
noblest witness to their glory. A series of so many
years hath now passed over, and still no men have yet
appeared whose actions could surpass those patterns
of perfection. It shall be my part, therefore, solely
to endeavour to point out the means which may enable
you most effectually to prepare for war: for, in fact,
were all our speakers to proceed in a pompous dis-
play of their abilities, such parade and ostentation
could not possibly prove of the least advantage to
the public; but if any man whatever will appear,
and can explain to your full satisfaction what "kind
of armament, how great, and how supported, may
choose it, according to the order of their age. " ^Eschines cites it in the
name words against Qtesiphon. No mention is here made of thirty
years. Such of the citizens as were in their twentieth year might
attend the assembly, and had their names enrolled. That they had a
share, in the administration, and might speak in public at this age, is
confirmed by Lucian in his Jupiter Tragcedus, where Momus thus ad-
dresses Apollo :--" You are now become a legal speaker, having long
since left the class of young men, and enrolled your name in the books
of the duodecemvm. " Now that the citizens were considered as having
arrived at the age of manhood in their eighteenth year we learn from
Demosthenes in his oration against Aphobus; for his father died when
he was but seven years old, and he remained for ten years under the
care of his guardian, at which time, being released from his hands, he
pleaded his own cause against him. Now his father had given direc-
tions that he should be under a guardian till he had arrived at the age of
manhood, and this he did as soon lis he had reached bis eighteenth year;
all which is collected from his own words. These circumstances con-
sidered, it is very easy to suppose that Demosthenes spoke in public, as
he really did, in his eight-and-twentieth year. Nor does any manner
of difficulty arise from what he says himself in his oration for the
Crown: U When the Phocian war was raised, &c. for I had then no
hand in the administration;" that war being begun in the second year
of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, under the archonship of Cailistratus,
at a time when our orator was only in the twenty-seventh year <if
bis *ge i
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? 234 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
serve the present exigences of the state, then all
these alarms must instantly be dispelled. This I
shall endeavour to the utmost of my abilities, having
first briefly declared my opinion of our situation with
respect to the king.
I do regard the king as the common enemy of all
the Greeks:1 but I cannot for that reason advise that
we should be the only people to undertake a war
against him; for I do not find the Greeks themselves
united to each other in sincere affection :* nay, some
1 The commentators who endeavour to account for this assertion by
considering the present state of Greece, or any late transactions with
Persia, seem to examine the orator too rigidly, and with too much cold-
ness and abstraction. It is by no means the result of any recent events.
It had been the language of Greece for ages; the language of poets,
historians, and orators. Even in those times of corruption the popular
leaders seldom ventured to Vise any other, particularly"in an assembly
where national vanity was so predominant as in that of Athens. What-
ever treaties had been made with the King of Persia, however peace
might have now subsisted between him and the Greeks, still he was their
natural enemy.
8 The sacred war now raged in Greece. The Phocians, Lacedae-
monians, and Athenians were engaged on one side; the Boeotians, Thes-
salians, Locrians, and some other inferior states on the other: each party
was harassed and exhausted by the war. The Phocians had reason to
complain of the Athenians, who proved a useless and inactive ally.
Whatever connexions had lately subsisted between Athens and Sparta,
this latter state still hated its ancient rival, and was impatient to recover
its former splendour and power. A prospect of assistance from Persia
must have at once determined the Lacedaemonians to detach themselves
from the confederacy, and to act against the Athenians; particularly if
any plausible pretence could be alleged for uniting with the Persian.
The Phocians, who were not always influenced by the most religious
engagements, might fairly be suspected of making ao scruple of accept-
ing effectual assistance from the great king, and at once renouncing
their alliance with the Athenians. The Italian commentator supposes
that the orator expresses his apprehensions only of the Lacedemonians,
and that they are particularly pointed out as the men who have more
confidence In the Persian than in their own brethren, and who would
sacrifice every consideration to the support of their wars with the
Greeks. The Phocians, he observes, could not possibly unite with the
Persians, on account of the former injuries they had received from them
as well as of their invariable union with Athens. But a view of the
politics of Greece, and indeed of the politics of all ages and nations, may
convince us that too much stress is not to be laid on such an argument
Nor was there less to fear from the confederates on the other side. They
fought with an inveterate and implacable rancour, and all their efforts
were scarcely sufficient to support the quarrel. Their strength was con
Usually wasting, and their treasures were quite exhausted; the most
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 235
among them seem to have more confidence in him
than in certain of their own body. In such circum-
stances, I account it of the utmost moment that we
should be strictly attentive to the origin of this war,
that it may be free from every imputation of injus-
tice. Let our armament be carried on with vigour;
but let us carefully adhere to the principles of equity:
for, in my opinion, Athenians, the states of Greece
(if it be once evident and incontestable that the king
makes attempts against them) will instantly unite
and express the most ardent gratitude to those who
arose before them, who, with them, still stand faith-
fully and bravely to repel these attempts. But while
this is yet uncertain, should you begin hostilities, I
fear we may be obliged to fight against an enemy
reinforced by those very men for whose interests
we were so forward to express our zeal. Yes! he
will suspend his designs (if he hath really designs
against the Greeks): his gold will be dispersed
liberally among them; his promises of friendship
will be lavished on them; while they, distressed in
their private wars, and attentive only to support them,
will disregard the general welfare of the nation.
Into such confusion, into such weak measures let
us not precipitate the state. With respect to the
king, you cannot pursue the same counsels with
some others of the Greeks. Of these many might,
without the charge of inconsistency, neglect the rest
of Greece, while engaged in the pursuit of private
interest; but of you it would be unworthy, even
though directly injured, to inflict so severe a punish-
ment on the guilty as to abandon them to the power
of the Barbarian.
favourable occasion for the great king to gain tbem to his purposes.
The speaker indeed declares, in another part of this oration, that the
Thebans would not concur with the Persian in any design confessedly
formed against the nation of Greece. Yet still they might, in their pres
ent circumstances, and in a cause which they affected to consider as the
cause of the nation, accept of his assistance. They actually did accept
of it in the course of this war.
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? 236 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Thos are we circumstanced; and let us then be
careful that we do not engage in this war upon un-
equal terms; that he whom we suppose to entertain
designs against the Greeks may not recommend him-
self to their confidence so as to be deemed their
friend. And how shall these things be effected ? By
giving public proof that the forces of this state are
well appointed and complete for action; but that in
this our procedure we are determined to adhere in-
violably to justice.
Let the bold and hazardous, who are vehement in
urging you to war, attend to this. It is not difficult
when an assembly is convened to acquire the reputa-
tion of courage: no; nor when dangers are actually
impending to speak with an impassioned boldness;
but it is truly difficult, and it is our duty in the time
of danger, to support the character of superior
bravery; in our councils, to display the same supe-
riority of wisdom.
I, on my part, ye men of Athens, think that a war
with the king may prove dangerous; in a battle, the
consequence of such a war, 1 see ,no danger. And
why? Because wars of every kind require many
advantages of naval force, of money, and of places.
Here he is superior to the state. In abattle, nothing
is so necessary to ensure success as valiant troops;
and of these we and our confederates can boast the
greater number. For this reason I earnestly recom-
mend to you by no means to be the first to enter on
a war; but for an engagement I think you should be
effectually prepared. Were there one method of
preparing to oppose Barbarians, and another for en-
gaging with Greeks, then we might expect with
reason that any hostile intentions against the Persian
must be at once discovered: but as in every arma-
ment the manner is the same, the general provisions
equally the same, whether our enemies are to be at-
tacked, or our allies to be protected and our rights
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
237
defended; why, when we have avowed enemies,'
should we seek for others 1 Shall we not prepare
against the one, and be ready to oppose the other,
should he attempt to injure us ? --Call now on the
Greeks to unite with you. --But suppose you should
not readily concur with them in all their measures
(as some are by no means favourably inclined to
this state), can it be imagined that they will obey
your summons? --"Certainly; for we shall convince
them that the king forms designs against their inter-
ests which they do not foresee. "--Ye powers! is it
possible that you can be thus persuaded ? Yes ; I
know you are: but whatever apprehensions you may
raise, they must influence these Greeks less forcibly
than their disputes with you and with each other;
and therefore the remonstrances of your ambassa-
dors will but appear like the tales of idle wanderers. *
If, on the other hand, you pursue the measures now
proposed, there is not a single state of Greece that
will hesitate a moment to come in and to solicit
your alliance when they see our thousand horse,3 our
1 The Bceotians, Thessalians, &c. were the avowed enemies of
Athens, in ? consequence of the attachment of this state to Fhocis; and
the King of Macedon, by his invasions of their settlements in Thrace,
and other acts of hostility.
2 In the original, ovStv ovv aXX' v PA^SIAHEOYSIN o! npccffeis
ittotiovrts. It was urged by the speakers on the other side that ambas-
sadors should be sent through Greece to represent thedangerous designs
of the Persian, and to exhort the several states to suspend their private
animosities, and to unite with the Athenians against the common enemy.
The orator, who is endeavouring to represent the useless and ineffectual
nature of such a measure, compares these ambassadors to the ancient
rhapsodists, or bards, whose lives were spent in travelling, and amusing
their entertainers with songs and poems. And this similitude seems to
arise not only from their repeating the same declarations, but from the
circumstance of going from city to city, and exciting curiosity by their
speeches, without any other effect.
3 At first sight it may appear extraordinary that the orator should
speak in high terms of such a body as one thousand horse. But we
must consider that Attica was a mountainous country, and therefore
unfit for breeding horses. In the infancy of the state, when Athens was
governed by kings, their cavalry amounted to no more than ninety-six,
each vavKpapiai or twelfth part of a tribe, furnishing two. But the
number of such divisions was then but forty-eight, as the tribes were
orginally but four This small body was at first an object of derlsiou
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? 238 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
infantry as numerous as could be wished, our three
hundred ships; an armament which they must
regard as their surest refuge and defence. Should
you apply for their assistance, you must appear as
supplicants; should they refuse it, you incur the
shame of a repulse: but if, while your forces are
completed, you suspend your operations, the protec-
tion you then grant to them must appear as the con-
sequence of their request; and be assured they will
all fly to you for this protection. '
With these and the like reflections deeply im-
pressed on my mind, I have not laboured to prepare
a bold, vain, tedious harangue. No, my fellow-citi-
zens! our preparations have been the sole object of
my thoughts, and the manner of conducting them
with effect and expedition. Grant me your attention,
and if my sentiments be approved, confirm them by
your voices.
It is, then, the first and most important part of prepa-
ration to possess your minds with due resolution,
so that every citizen when called to action may
exert himself with alacrity and zeal. You know
that in every instance where, having first resolved
on your designs in concert, every single member
deemed it incumbent on him to labour vigorously in
the execution, you have never once proved unsuc-
cessful : but whenever we have first decreed, fand
then each man hath turned his eyes on others, fondly
imagining that he himself need not act, that his
to the Persians at Marathon, bnt afterward proved formidable and dan
gerous. After the defeat of the Persians the city began to increase in
power, and was enabled to raise a body of three hundred horse, which
in the time of the Peloponnesian war was augmented to twelve hundred
(as we learn from Thucyd. lib ii. and #3schines Ilapajr. ). This was the
greatest body of cavalry the Athenians ever possessed, which seems by
the distresses of the staie to have been reduced to a thousand in the tima
of Demosthenes, as he mentions no greater number, though it was
his business rather to magnify their force in this passage than to ex-
tenuate it. The equestrian order was a rank of dignity at Athens as
among the Romans. But in latter times the citizens were allowed
to keep this rank and to 'substitute others to serve in their stead --
lAtcchetini.
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
230
neighbour would do all, our designs have never once
been executed.
With these sentiments, and these vigorous resolu-
tions, 1 recommend that you should proceed to the
appointment of your twelve hundred, and raise them
to two thousand, by a further addition of eight hun-
dred. Thus, when all necessary deductions are
made of those who by their condition' are excused
from contributing, or by any circumstances are un-
able to contribute, still the original number of twelve
hundred will remain complete. These I would have
formed into twenty classes, each consisting of sixty
citizens, agreeably to the present constitution. And
it is my opinion, that of these classes each should
be divided into five parts, consisting of twelve
persons, ever attending to a just and equal distri-
bution of the richer with the poorer. Thus should
our citizens be arranged: the reason will appear
when the whole scheme of the regulation hath been
explained.
But our ships; how are they to be appointed 1 Let
their whole number be fixed to three hundred, divided
by fifteenth parts into twenty portions. Of the first
hundred, let five such parts, of the second hundred,
five parts; and of the third hundred, five be ap-
1 Those who by their condition, Ac. ]--These are particularly specified
In the original, eirutXriaiav, maiden-heiresses; opQavwv, orphans of the
other sex ; kKtipovxikuiVj men appointed to form a colony; and Kotviavr
kwv, men incorporated into certain societies which were exempted from
contributing. From whence it seems evident that the duty and honour
of composing the twelve hundred, who were to supply the exigences of
the state, must have been annexed to certain families, and con inued to
them when time and various circumstances might have produced altera-
tions of fortune in many. The inconveniences which arose from hence
were partly removed by the avritioaus, or exchanges of fortunes (of
which see note 2, p. 53), and by allowing exemptions to persons in certain
circumstances: yet both these expedients must have occasioned delays,
and retarded the business of the public. Hence the orator recommends
the appointment of the additional eight hundred.
2 Of the first hundred,let five such parts, &cl--It should seem, from
this passage, that each century of the three hundred ships were to be of
a different rate and order, by this minute specification of " five of tha . -
first hundred, five of the second," 4c.
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? 240
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
pointed to each class. Thus shall a fifteenth of the
whole be allotted to every class; three ships to each
subdivision.
When these establishments are made, I propose,1
as the revenue arising from our lands amounts to
six thousand talents, that in order to have our funds
duly regulated, this sum may be divided into a hun-
dred parts of sixty talents each: that five of these
parts may be assigned to each of the twenty great
classes; which may thus give severally to each of
their divisions a single part of sixty talents. So
that, if we should have occasion for a hundred ships,*
l When and tn what manner this estimate of the lands was made, we
lean; from Polybius, lib. ii. , whose words shall" be quoted immediately.
That the barren lands of Attica should produce such a revenue (amount-
ing, according to Arbuthnot's computation, to 1,162,500/. ) seems wonder-
ful; especially as the lower ranks of citizens held their lands free from
all taxation. The soil of Athens itself was. celebrated by Homer for its
fertility. But this is of little moment when the barrenness of the Attic
territory in general is considered. But what says Polybius? Tij yap
hwcp AurivaiDv ovx loTopriiu diort Kad' ovs Kaipovs nera Qiifiaiuiv us TOV
Kpos rouf AaKcSaiiioviovi; avcfiaivov iroXtiiov, Kai iivpiovs utv-. c%cirtinrov
CTpartiiiTasi ikutov 6e cirXiipovV Tptiipcis, Irt ToTc kpivavres airo Ttis a? iaff
irotciodut ras us TOViroXtiiOV us 0opaf, CTiuricavro ttiv tc xwpais Kai Tt)V
XTrtKr}v, &naaav, Kai ras otKias, buoaas 6e Kai Tiiv Xoiirriv ovctav. AM'
biiuis to aviiirav rtixriiia rris a\ias tveXt-ire rwv t\aKia%iXitiiv SiaKoctots Kai
Ktvr^Kovra raXavrots; " What historian hath not informed us that the
Athenians, at the time when they engaged in war, on the part of Thebes
against the Lacedaemonians sent ten thousand men to the field, and
manned a hundred ships; that the Athenians, I say, in order to make a
just estimate of the subsidy they might properly grant for this war, then
proceeded to a general valuation of their lands, of ihe whole territory
of Attica, their houses, and all their effects? And yet the whole
valuation fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty. *
Which agrees pretty exactly with this passage of Demosthenes. --
Lucckesini.
2 One hundred ships seem to have been the ordinary marine establish-
ment at Athens; and to this the ordinary revenues seem to have been
proportioned. When it was necessary' to fit out an extraordinary number
the additicnal charge was answered by ah extraordinary taxation on the
richer members of the state. The passage before us is indeed concisely
expressed, as became a speaker who addressed himself to persons to
whom the least hint was sufficient. But the full meaning of it I take
to be this: "If we have occasion but for a hundred ships, the charge of
furnishing each may be divided among twelve trierarchs, who are to be
supplied for the expense of this and other preparations with sixty
talents. If for two hundred, these twelve trierarchs must provide two
ships; if for three hundred, three. In every case the revenues of the
otate are to be equally divided among them. But the greater the force
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
241
?
ixty talents may be granted to each, and twelve
trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty
talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for
three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for
each, and four trierarchs.
In like manner, my fellow-citizens, on a due esti-
mate of the stores necessary for our ships, I propose
that, agreeably to the present scheme, they should
be divided into twenty parts: that one good and
effectual part should be assigned to each of the great
classes, to be distributed among the small divisions
in the just proportion. Let the twelve, in every such
division, demand their respective shares; and let
them have those ships which it is their lot to provide
thoroughly and expeditiously equipped. Thus may
our supplies, our ships, our trierarehs, our stores, be
best provided and supplied. --And now I am to lay
before you a plain and easy method of completing
this scheme.
I say, then, that your generals should proceed to
mark out ten dock-yards, as contiguous as may be
to each other, and capable of containing thirty ves-
sels each. When this is done, they should assign
two Masses, and thirty ships to each of these docks.
Among these also they should divide the tribes and
the respective trierarehs; so that two classes, thirty
ships, and one tribe may be assigned to each. Let
then each tribe divide its allotted station into three
parts, and the ships in like manner. Let these third
required, the greater mast be the burden on the trierarehs, who are to be
taxed for the additional expense, if any such may be required for fitting
out the fleet, and completing the other parts of the intended armament. "
This iatter part, indeed, is not expressed, or insinuated; but I take it to
be understood. But, if my explanation should not be entirely consonant
to the sentiments of the learned reader, who may have the curiosity to
examine this part of the oration with accuracy, I must endeavour to
screen myself from the severity of his censure by subscribing to the
following ingenious declaration of Wolfius: " Whatever is here said of
fleets, stores, armaments, and supplies must, to us, who never saw a
fleet, or war, and never were conversant in affairs of state, be attended
with considerable obscurity. " *
De-m. Vol. I. --X
-
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? 242 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
parts be distributed by lot. Thus shall one tribe
preside over one entire division of your shipping,
and each third of a tribe take care of one-third of
such division; and thus shall you know at all times,
first, where each tribe is stationed; then, wheie each;
Nurd; then, who are the trierarchs; and, lastly, the
number of your ships. Let affairs be once set in
motion after this manner; and if any thing hath
been omitted (as it is by no means easy to provide
accurately for every circumstance), the execution
will itself discover it: and thus may your whole
marine and all its several parts be uniformly and
exactly regulated.
And now, as to money, as to any immediate sup-
plies ; sensible as I am that the opinion I am now to
declare must appear extraordinary, yet I will declare
it; for I trust, that when duly weighed it will be
found the only one which reason can recommend,
and which must be approved by the event. I say,
then, that at this time we should not speak at all of
money: we have a fund, if occasions call for it,--a
great, and honourable, and an equitable fund. Should
you attempt to raise it now, far from succeeding in
such an attempt, you could not depend on gaining it
when really wanted; but suspend your inquiries, and
you will secure it. What fund is this which now
hath no being, yet will be found hereafter 1 This ap-
pears a kind of mystery; but I shall explain it. Cast
your eyes round through all this city. Within these
walls, Athenians, there are treasures--I had almost
said, equal to those of all other states. But such is
the disposition of their possessors, that if all our
speakers were to rise with the most alarming decla-
rations, " that the king was marching against us; that
he was at our gates; that the danger did not admit of
any possibility of doubt--if with these speakers as *
many ministers of heaven were to rise, and pronounce
the same declarations as the warning of the gods; so
far would these men be from contributing, that they
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
24J
would not even discover their riches; they would not
acknowledge the possession of them. But should it
once appear that all those dangers denounced with
so much terror were really and in fact impending,
where is the wretch that would not give freely, that
would not urge to be admitted to contribute ? For
who would choose to abandon his life and fortune to
the fury of an enemy rather than give up a small por-
tion of his abundance for the safety of himself and all
the rest of his possessions ? Thus shall we find trea-
sures when occasions really demand them, but not
till then. Let us not, therefore, inquire for them
now. Suppose that we were now strictly to exact
the subsidies from all our citizens, the utmost we
should raise would be more contemptible than none.
Imagine the experiment made: it is proposed to exact
a hundredth part of the revenue arising from our
lands. Well, then, this makes just sixty talents.
" Nay, but we will raise a fiftieth part. " This doubles
the sum: we have then one hundred and twenty
talents. But what is this to those hundreds or those
thousands of camels which, they assure us, are em-
ployed to carry the king's money ? But suppose it
were agreed to raise a twelfth part, amounting to five
hundred talents. This, in the first place, would be too
great a burden, and, if imposed, still the fund pro-
duced would be insufficient for the war. Let, then,
all our other preparations be completed; but as to
money, let the possessors keep it, and never can they
keep it for a nobler public service. When their coun-
try calls for it, then shall they freely and zealously
contribute. ,
This, my fellow-citizens, is a practicable scheme--
a scheme highly honourable and advantageous, wor-
thy of this state to be reported to the king, and which
must strike him with no small terror. He knows,
that by three hundred vessels, of which one hundred
only were supplied by us, his ancestors lost a thou-
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? 244 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
sand ships. 1 He will hear, that now we have our-
selves equipped three hundred. He cannot, then. --if
he hath not lost all reason,--he cannot deem it a
trivial matter to make this state his enemy. If from
a dependence on his treasures he is tempted to enter-
tain proud thoughts, he will find this but a vain
dependence when compared with your resources. "
They tell us he is coming with heaps of gold; but
when these are once dispersed he must look for new
supplies. Not the richest streams, not the deepest
sources but must at length be totally exhausted when
we copiously and constantly drain away their waters.
But we, he will be told, have a perpetual resource in
our lands--a fund of six thousand talents. And with
what spirit we defend these lands against invaders
his ancestors who fought at Marathon could best
inform him. Let us continue to conquer, and our
treasures cannot ever fail.
Nor yet do I think their terrors justly founded who
apprehend that he may employ his gold in raising a
large army of mercenaries. I do indeed believe, that
in an expedition against Egypt, against Orontes,3 or
1 Whoever consults Herodotus will find that Demosthenes is by no
means exact in his account either of the Athenian or Persian fleets ; but
we are not to expect historical precision from the orator. His repre-
sentations are suited to delight and animate his hearers ; and probably
his success was too great to give them leisure to attend to any inaccuracy
in his account.
? It is just now the orator has represented the wealth of Athens as
contemptible, that of Persia as magnificent and great. Now, en the
contrary, the resources of Persia are neither solid nor permanent; the
riches of Athens great and inexhaustible. Various aie the instances of
this artifice in Demosthenes, which the judicious reader cannot fail to
observe without the direction of the annotator.
3 Two of this name are mentioned in history. The first was put te
death by the younger Cyrus on account of a conspiracy. The other,
whom Demosthenes points out, was a satrap of Mysia, and served in the
army which Artaxerxes sent against Cyprus, under the command of
Terinazus. On this occasion he attempted to ruin the reputation of his
general, was detected and disgraced, and, in revenge, joined with the
rebels of Egypt, Caria, and Phrygia, and headed the army they had raised
against the king. But, in hopes of recovering his credit at the Persian
court, and of gaining the command of some maritime towns, he betrayed
the forces, &c. of the rebels into the hands of the king's lieutenants
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 245
any of the other Barbarians, there are many of the
Greeks that would gladly receive his pay, not from
any zeal for aggrandizing him, but each in order to
obtain such a supply as might relieve their present
necessities. But I never can persuade myself that
any one Greek would assist him to conquer Greece.
Whither should he turn after such an event 1 Would
he go and be a slave in Phrygia ? He must know
that when we take up arms against the Barbarian, we
take them up for our country, for our lives, for our
customs, for our liberty, and all such sacred rights.
Who, then, could be so base as to sacrifice himself,
his parents, the sepulchres of his ancestors, his coun-
try, to a trifling pittance ? Surely, no man. 1
Nor is it the interest of the Persian that his mer-
cenaries should subdue the Greeks; for they who can
conquer us must first prove superior to him. And it
is by no means his scheme, by destroying us, to lose
his own empire. His wishes are to command all; if
this cannot be obtained, at least he would secure his
power over his own slaves.
If, then, it be imagined that the Thebanswill unite
with him,2 it is a hard part to speak of Thebes in this
assembly; for such is your aversion to this people,
History speaks no farther of this Orontes ; but as in this year (the eighth
from the time of his revolt) Demosthenes mentions him as an enemy to
the Persian, we may conjecture that his last services bad been disre-
garded, and that he iiad again taken up arms. --Lvcchesini.
t I cannot persuade myself that there is occasion to point out to the
reader the three and pertinency of this argument, although it be ellipti-
ettlly expressed. To be assured of the true signification of the phrase
rpoi Tov PapfSaoav, we need but cast our eyes to a sentence a little far-
ther on--ck ptv ye ruiv IIP02 rovs iavrov irpoyovous iroXeirnv--from the
weTs waged against his ancestors.
* The history of both nations accounts for the detestation With which
the Athenians are supposed to hear the name of the Thebans ; and per-
haps it were impossible that two nations so different in genius and man-
ners ever should entertain any sentiments of friendship and esteem for
each other. Our orator, however, was far superior to vulgar national
prejudices. He considered without partiality the real interests of his
country, whose welfare should be a statesman's passion. Yet his regard
for the people of Thebes was numbered by ^Dschines among his crimes.
The error which, he says, they would if possible redeem, was their
joining with Xerxes in his invasion of Greece. --Francis
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? ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
that you will not hear the voice of truth itself if it
seems at all to favour them. However, it is the duty
of those who debate on great affairs by no means, and
on no pretence whatever, to suppress any argument
which may prove of use. I say, then, that so far are
the Thebans from ever at any time uniting with the
king against the Greeks, that they would freely give
the greatest treasures, were they possessed of them,
to purchase a fair occasion of atoning for their an-
cient errors with respect to Greece. But let the
Thebans be ever so unhappily disposed, still we must
all be sensible, that if they unite with him, their ene-
mies must necessarily unite with the Greeks. And I
trust that the cause of justice and the friends to this
cause will ever prove superior to traitors and to all
the force of the Barbarian. Let us not, then, yield to
these extravagant alarms, nor rashly brave all conse-
quences by being first to take up arms.
Nor do I think that any other of the Grecian states
should look on this war with terror. ' Is there a man
among them who is not sensible, that while they
regarded the Persian as their common enemy and
maintained a firm union with each other, their fortune
was completely happy; but when, by a fatal reliance
on his friendship, they were betrayed into contests
and dissensions among themselves, their calamities
were so great as to exceed all the imprecations which
the most inveterate malice could invent* And shall
that man, whom fortune, whom Heaven itself pro-
nounces as a friend unprofitable, as an enemy of ad-
vantage,--shall he, I say, be feared ? By no means.
Yet let us have the due regard to ourselves; let us
have the due attention to the disorders and suspicions
of the rest of Greece; and let us not incur the charge
1 The well-known and great events described in the taistory of Greece
confirm these observations of the orator fully with respect to all the
Grecian states. Yet we may concur with the Italian commentator in
supposing that they had the Lacedaemonians particularly In view; to
whom they are, indeed, eminently applicable. '
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 247
of injustice. Could we, indeed, with all the Greeks
united firmly on our side, attack him single and un-
supported, I would not then suppose that you could
be charged with injustice. But, as this is not to be
expected, let us be cautious; let us afford him no pre-
tence of appearing to assert the rights of the other
Greeks. If we continue quiet, his applications to
them will be suspicious; if we are the first to take up
arms, he will seem justified by our hostilities in his
attempts to gain their friendship.
Do not, then, discover to the world the melancholy
state of Greece, by inviting those to an alliance whom
you cannot gain, and by engaging in a war which you
cannot support. Be quiet; be resolute; be prepared.
Let not the emissaries of Persia report to their king
that Greece and Athens are distracted in their coun-
cils, are confounded by their fears, are torn by dissen-
sions. No; let them rather tell him, that if it were
not equally shameful for the Greeks to violate their
honour and their oaths as it is to him matter of tri-
umph, they would have long since marched against
him, and that if you now do not march, you are re-
strained solely by a regard to your own dignity; that
it is your prayer to all the gods that he may be seized
with the infatuation which once possessed his ances-
tors, and then he would find no defect of vigour in
your measures. He knows that by our wars with
his ancestors this state became happy and powerful;
that by our peaceful demeanour before these wars we
acquired a superiority over the other Grecian states
never more observable than at present. He knows
that the affairs of Greece require some power to be
either voluntarily or accidentally the instrument of a
general peace. He knows that he himself must prove
that instrument if he once attempts to raise a war;
and, therefore, these informations will have their due
weight and credit.
That I may not longer abuse your patience, I shall
repeat the sum of my advice, and then descend.
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? 248 ORATIONS OV DEMOSTHENES.
You should prepare your force against your pres-
ent enemies; you should use this force against the
king, against any power that may attempt to injure
you; but never be the first to break through the
bounds of justice either in council or in action. You
should be solicitous, not that our speeches, but tha
our conduct may be worthy of our illustrious descent.
Act thus, and you will serve, not yourselves only, but
the men who oppose these measures; for they will
not feel your resentment hereafter if they be not
suffered to mislead you now. 1
l What effect this oration had on the people we may learn from a pas-
sage in the oration for the Rhodians, of which the following is a transla-
tion :--"There are some among you who may remember,'that at the
time when the affairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations, I
was the first, the only, or (Jmost the only, one to recommend it as the
wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive of
your armament; to make your preparations against your avowed adver-
saries, and to employ them even against him should he attempt to injure
you. Nor did I urge these things without your full concurrence: the*
were received with applause. "
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF EUDEMUS, TUX FOURTH YEAR OF
THE HUNDRED AND SIXTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
In order to prepare the reader for the perusal of the following oration,
it is necessary to recall to his view some of the late important transac-
tions in Greece. He is not to be informed of the flourishing condition of
Sparta after the famous Peloponnesian war, the immoderate ambition of
that state, and the war in which the Spartans were consequently involved
with Thebes. The conduct and vigour of Eparninondas the Theban
proved fatal to Sparta, and the battle of Leuctra put an end to the tyran
nical dominion which this state had long exercised in Peloponnesus.
Immediately after this battle, several of the Peloponnesian states re-
volted from the Lacedemonians. The Messenians, their ancient rivals,
. were restored to their original settlement by the Theban arms, after
many ages of dispersion. The Arcadians and Argives asserted their
independence, and, assisted by the Thebans, took up arms against their
former sovereigns. The Spartans now seemed on the point of having
their ruin completed. They were reduced to fortify their city, whose
defenceless condition had been so long their boast; they armed six hun-
dred of their slaves, and sent a deputation to Athens humbly to solicit
the assistance of their old rivals in this their state of extremity.
The Athenians, who began to conceive a jealousy of the rising power
. of Thebes, readily consented to join with Ihe Lacedaemonians. Iphi-
crates was sent with twelve thousand men to their relief; and on advice
received that Eparninondas was marching against Lacedasmon at the
bead of the Thebans, Argives, and Arcadians, Chabrias was despatched
with another reinforcement to join the Spartans and thetr confederates.
It is not to the present purpose to mention particularly the several
events in the course of this war. It is only necessary to observe, that
the Arcadians, in order the better to secure that liberty for which they
now contended, determined to collect all their force into one body, brought
the detached settlements of their countrymen to a union, and fixed their
common residence in a city built by the advice and assistance of Eparni-
nondas (if we may believe Pausanias), and called Megalopolis, or the
Great City. This was one considerable barrier against the Lacedceino-
nian power in Peloponnesus, which still subsisted, together with the
other equitable regulations of Eparninondas for securing the liberty of
the Peloponnesians.
i
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than to do the due honour to those on whom they
lavish their applause. As they attempt to speak of
actions which no words can worthily describe, the
illustrious subject adonis their speech and gives
them the praise of eloquence; while their hearers
are made to think of the virtues of those heroes
with much less elevation than these virtues of them-
selves inspire. To me, time itself seems to be the
noblest witness to their glory. A series of so many
years hath now passed over, and still no men have yet
appeared whose actions could surpass those patterns
of perfection. It shall be my part, therefore, solely
to endeavour to point out the means which may enable
you most effectually to prepare for war: for, in fact,
were all our speakers to proceed in a pompous dis-
play of their abilities, such parade and ostentation
could not possibly prove of the least advantage to
the public; but if any man whatever will appear,
and can explain to your full satisfaction what "kind
of armament, how great, and how supported, may
choose it, according to the order of their age. " ^Eschines cites it in the
name words against Qtesiphon. No mention is here made of thirty
years. Such of the citizens as were in their twentieth year might
attend the assembly, and had their names enrolled. That they had a
share, in the administration, and might speak in public at this age, is
confirmed by Lucian in his Jupiter Tragcedus, where Momus thus ad-
dresses Apollo :--" You are now become a legal speaker, having long
since left the class of young men, and enrolled your name in the books
of the duodecemvm. " Now that the citizens were considered as having
arrived at the age of manhood in their eighteenth year we learn from
Demosthenes in his oration against Aphobus; for his father died when
he was but seven years old, and he remained for ten years under the
care of his guardian, at which time, being released from his hands, he
pleaded his own cause against him. Now his father had given direc-
tions that he should be under a guardian till he had arrived at the age of
manhood, and this he did as soon lis he had reached bis eighteenth year;
all which is collected from his own words. These circumstances con-
sidered, it is very easy to suppose that Demosthenes spoke in public, as
he really did, in his eight-and-twentieth year. Nor does any manner
of difficulty arise from what he says himself in his oration for the
Crown: U When the Phocian war was raised, &c. for I had then no
hand in the administration;" that war being begun in the second year
of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, under the archonship of Cailistratus,
at a time when our orator was only in the twenty-seventh year <if
bis *ge i
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? 234 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
serve the present exigences of the state, then all
these alarms must instantly be dispelled. This I
shall endeavour to the utmost of my abilities, having
first briefly declared my opinion of our situation with
respect to the king.
I do regard the king as the common enemy of all
the Greeks:1 but I cannot for that reason advise that
we should be the only people to undertake a war
against him; for I do not find the Greeks themselves
united to each other in sincere affection :* nay, some
1 The commentators who endeavour to account for this assertion by
considering the present state of Greece, or any late transactions with
Persia, seem to examine the orator too rigidly, and with too much cold-
ness and abstraction. It is by no means the result of any recent events.
It had been the language of Greece for ages; the language of poets,
historians, and orators. Even in those times of corruption the popular
leaders seldom ventured to Vise any other, particularly"in an assembly
where national vanity was so predominant as in that of Athens. What-
ever treaties had been made with the King of Persia, however peace
might have now subsisted between him and the Greeks, still he was their
natural enemy.
8 The sacred war now raged in Greece. The Phocians, Lacedae-
monians, and Athenians were engaged on one side; the Boeotians, Thes-
salians, Locrians, and some other inferior states on the other: each party
was harassed and exhausted by the war. The Phocians had reason to
complain of the Athenians, who proved a useless and inactive ally.
Whatever connexions had lately subsisted between Athens and Sparta,
this latter state still hated its ancient rival, and was impatient to recover
its former splendour and power. A prospect of assistance from Persia
must have at once determined the Lacedaemonians to detach themselves
from the confederacy, and to act against the Athenians; particularly if
any plausible pretence could be alleged for uniting with the Persian.
The Phocians, who were not always influenced by the most religious
engagements, might fairly be suspected of making ao scruple of accept-
ing effectual assistance from the great king, and at once renouncing
their alliance with the Athenians. The Italian commentator supposes
that the orator expresses his apprehensions only of the Lacedemonians,
and that they are particularly pointed out as the men who have more
confidence In the Persian than in their own brethren, and who would
sacrifice every consideration to the support of their wars with the
Greeks. The Phocians, he observes, could not possibly unite with the
Persians, on account of the former injuries they had received from them
as well as of their invariable union with Athens. But a view of the
politics of Greece, and indeed of the politics of all ages and nations, may
convince us that too much stress is not to be laid on such an argument
Nor was there less to fear from the confederates on the other side. They
fought with an inveterate and implacable rancour, and all their efforts
were scarcely sufficient to support the quarrel. Their strength was con
Usually wasting, and their treasures were quite exhausted; the most
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 235
among them seem to have more confidence in him
than in certain of their own body. In such circum-
stances, I account it of the utmost moment that we
should be strictly attentive to the origin of this war,
that it may be free from every imputation of injus-
tice. Let our armament be carried on with vigour;
but let us carefully adhere to the principles of equity:
for, in my opinion, Athenians, the states of Greece
(if it be once evident and incontestable that the king
makes attempts against them) will instantly unite
and express the most ardent gratitude to those who
arose before them, who, with them, still stand faith-
fully and bravely to repel these attempts. But while
this is yet uncertain, should you begin hostilities, I
fear we may be obliged to fight against an enemy
reinforced by those very men for whose interests
we were so forward to express our zeal. Yes! he
will suspend his designs (if he hath really designs
against the Greeks): his gold will be dispersed
liberally among them; his promises of friendship
will be lavished on them; while they, distressed in
their private wars, and attentive only to support them,
will disregard the general welfare of the nation.
Into such confusion, into such weak measures let
us not precipitate the state. With respect to the
king, you cannot pursue the same counsels with
some others of the Greeks. Of these many might,
without the charge of inconsistency, neglect the rest
of Greece, while engaged in the pursuit of private
interest; but of you it would be unworthy, even
though directly injured, to inflict so severe a punish-
ment on the guilty as to abandon them to the power
of the Barbarian.
favourable occasion for the great king to gain tbem to his purposes.
The speaker indeed declares, in another part of this oration, that the
Thebans would not concur with the Persian in any design confessedly
formed against the nation of Greece. Yet still they might, in their pres
ent circumstances, and in a cause which they affected to consider as the
cause of the nation, accept of his assistance. They actually did accept
of it in the course of this war.
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? 236 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Thos are we circumstanced; and let us then be
careful that we do not engage in this war upon un-
equal terms; that he whom we suppose to entertain
designs against the Greeks may not recommend him-
self to their confidence so as to be deemed their
friend. And how shall these things be effected ? By
giving public proof that the forces of this state are
well appointed and complete for action; but that in
this our procedure we are determined to adhere in-
violably to justice.
Let the bold and hazardous, who are vehement in
urging you to war, attend to this. It is not difficult
when an assembly is convened to acquire the reputa-
tion of courage: no; nor when dangers are actually
impending to speak with an impassioned boldness;
but it is truly difficult, and it is our duty in the time
of danger, to support the character of superior
bravery; in our councils, to display the same supe-
riority of wisdom.
I, on my part, ye men of Athens, think that a war
with the king may prove dangerous; in a battle, the
consequence of such a war, 1 see ,no danger. And
why? Because wars of every kind require many
advantages of naval force, of money, and of places.
Here he is superior to the state. In abattle, nothing
is so necessary to ensure success as valiant troops;
and of these we and our confederates can boast the
greater number. For this reason I earnestly recom-
mend to you by no means to be the first to enter on
a war; but for an engagement I think you should be
effectually prepared. Were there one method of
preparing to oppose Barbarians, and another for en-
gaging with Greeks, then we might expect with
reason that any hostile intentions against the Persian
must be at once discovered: but as in every arma-
ment the manner is the same, the general provisions
equally the same, whether our enemies are to be at-
tacked, or our allies to be protected and our rights
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
237
defended; why, when we have avowed enemies,'
should we seek for others 1 Shall we not prepare
against the one, and be ready to oppose the other,
should he attempt to injure us ? --Call now on the
Greeks to unite with you. --But suppose you should
not readily concur with them in all their measures
(as some are by no means favourably inclined to
this state), can it be imagined that they will obey
your summons? --"Certainly; for we shall convince
them that the king forms designs against their inter-
ests which they do not foresee. "--Ye powers! is it
possible that you can be thus persuaded ? Yes ; I
know you are: but whatever apprehensions you may
raise, they must influence these Greeks less forcibly
than their disputes with you and with each other;
and therefore the remonstrances of your ambassa-
dors will but appear like the tales of idle wanderers. *
If, on the other hand, you pursue the measures now
proposed, there is not a single state of Greece that
will hesitate a moment to come in and to solicit
your alliance when they see our thousand horse,3 our
1 The Bceotians, Thessalians, &c. were the avowed enemies of
Athens, in ? consequence of the attachment of this state to Fhocis; and
the King of Macedon, by his invasions of their settlements in Thrace,
and other acts of hostility.
2 In the original, ovStv ovv aXX' v PA^SIAHEOYSIN o! npccffeis
ittotiovrts. It was urged by the speakers on the other side that ambas-
sadors should be sent through Greece to represent thedangerous designs
of the Persian, and to exhort the several states to suspend their private
animosities, and to unite with the Athenians against the common enemy.
The orator, who is endeavouring to represent the useless and ineffectual
nature of such a measure, compares these ambassadors to the ancient
rhapsodists, or bards, whose lives were spent in travelling, and amusing
their entertainers with songs and poems. And this similitude seems to
arise not only from their repeating the same declarations, but from the
circumstance of going from city to city, and exciting curiosity by their
speeches, without any other effect.
3 At first sight it may appear extraordinary that the orator should
speak in high terms of such a body as one thousand horse. But we
must consider that Attica was a mountainous country, and therefore
unfit for breeding horses. In the infancy of the state, when Athens was
governed by kings, their cavalry amounted to no more than ninety-six,
each vavKpapiai or twelfth part of a tribe, furnishing two. But the
number of such divisions was then but forty-eight, as the tribes were
orginally but four This small body was at first an object of derlsiou
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? 238 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
infantry as numerous as could be wished, our three
hundred ships; an armament which they must
regard as their surest refuge and defence. Should
you apply for their assistance, you must appear as
supplicants; should they refuse it, you incur the
shame of a repulse: but if, while your forces are
completed, you suspend your operations, the protec-
tion you then grant to them must appear as the con-
sequence of their request; and be assured they will
all fly to you for this protection. '
With these and the like reflections deeply im-
pressed on my mind, I have not laboured to prepare
a bold, vain, tedious harangue. No, my fellow-citi-
zens! our preparations have been the sole object of
my thoughts, and the manner of conducting them
with effect and expedition. Grant me your attention,
and if my sentiments be approved, confirm them by
your voices.
It is, then, the first and most important part of prepa-
ration to possess your minds with due resolution,
so that every citizen when called to action may
exert himself with alacrity and zeal. You know
that in every instance where, having first resolved
on your designs in concert, every single member
deemed it incumbent on him to labour vigorously in
the execution, you have never once proved unsuc-
cessful : but whenever we have first decreed, fand
then each man hath turned his eyes on others, fondly
imagining that he himself need not act, that his
to the Persians at Marathon, bnt afterward proved formidable and dan
gerous. After the defeat of the Persians the city began to increase in
power, and was enabled to raise a body of three hundred horse, which
in the time of the Peloponnesian war was augmented to twelve hundred
(as we learn from Thucyd. lib ii. and #3schines Ilapajr. ). This was the
greatest body of cavalry the Athenians ever possessed, which seems by
the distresses of the staie to have been reduced to a thousand in the tima
of Demosthenes, as he mentions no greater number, though it was
his business rather to magnify their force in this passage than to ex-
tenuate it. The equestrian order was a rank of dignity at Athens as
among the Romans. But in latter times the citizens were allowed
to keep this rank and to 'substitute others to serve in their stead --
lAtcchetini.
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
230
neighbour would do all, our designs have never once
been executed.
With these sentiments, and these vigorous resolu-
tions, 1 recommend that you should proceed to the
appointment of your twelve hundred, and raise them
to two thousand, by a further addition of eight hun-
dred. Thus, when all necessary deductions are
made of those who by their condition' are excused
from contributing, or by any circumstances are un-
able to contribute, still the original number of twelve
hundred will remain complete. These I would have
formed into twenty classes, each consisting of sixty
citizens, agreeably to the present constitution. And
it is my opinion, that of these classes each should
be divided into five parts, consisting of twelve
persons, ever attending to a just and equal distri-
bution of the richer with the poorer. Thus should
our citizens be arranged: the reason will appear
when the whole scheme of the regulation hath been
explained.
But our ships; how are they to be appointed 1 Let
their whole number be fixed to three hundred, divided
by fifteenth parts into twenty portions. Of the first
hundred, let five such parts, of the second hundred,
five parts; and of the third hundred, five be ap-
1 Those who by their condition, Ac. ]--These are particularly specified
In the original, eirutXriaiav, maiden-heiresses; opQavwv, orphans of the
other sex ; kKtipovxikuiVj men appointed to form a colony; and Kotviavr
kwv, men incorporated into certain societies which were exempted from
contributing. From whence it seems evident that the duty and honour
of composing the twelve hundred, who were to supply the exigences of
the state, must have been annexed to certain families, and con inued to
them when time and various circumstances might have produced altera-
tions of fortune in many. The inconveniences which arose from hence
were partly removed by the avritioaus, or exchanges of fortunes (of
which see note 2, p. 53), and by allowing exemptions to persons in certain
circumstances: yet both these expedients must have occasioned delays,
and retarded the business of the public. Hence the orator recommends
the appointment of the additional eight hundred.
2 Of the first hundred,let five such parts, &cl--It should seem, from
this passage, that each century of the three hundred ships were to be of
a different rate and order, by this minute specification of " five of tha . -
first hundred, five of the second," 4c.
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? 240
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
pointed to each class. Thus shall a fifteenth of the
whole be allotted to every class; three ships to each
subdivision.
When these establishments are made, I propose,1
as the revenue arising from our lands amounts to
six thousand talents, that in order to have our funds
duly regulated, this sum may be divided into a hun-
dred parts of sixty talents each: that five of these
parts may be assigned to each of the twenty great
classes; which may thus give severally to each of
their divisions a single part of sixty talents. So
that, if we should have occasion for a hundred ships,*
l When and tn what manner this estimate of the lands was made, we
lean; from Polybius, lib. ii. , whose words shall" be quoted immediately.
That the barren lands of Attica should produce such a revenue (amount-
ing, according to Arbuthnot's computation, to 1,162,500/. ) seems wonder-
ful; especially as the lower ranks of citizens held their lands free from
all taxation. The soil of Athens itself was. celebrated by Homer for its
fertility. But this is of little moment when the barrenness of the Attic
territory in general is considered. But what says Polybius? Tij yap
hwcp AurivaiDv ovx loTopriiu diort Kad' ovs Kaipovs nera Qiifiaiuiv us TOV
Kpos rouf AaKcSaiiioviovi; avcfiaivov iroXtiiov, Kai iivpiovs utv-. c%cirtinrov
CTpartiiiTasi ikutov 6e cirXiipovV Tptiipcis, Irt ToTc kpivavres airo Ttis a? iaff
irotciodut ras us TOViroXtiiOV us 0opaf, CTiuricavro ttiv tc xwpais Kai Tt)V
XTrtKr}v, &naaav, Kai ras otKias, buoaas 6e Kai Tiiv Xoiirriv ovctav. AM'
biiuis to aviiirav rtixriiia rris a\ias tveXt-ire rwv t\aKia%iXitiiv SiaKoctots Kai
Ktvr^Kovra raXavrots; " What historian hath not informed us that the
Athenians, at the time when they engaged in war, on the part of Thebes
against the Lacedaemonians sent ten thousand men to the field, and
manned a hundred ships; that the Athenians, I say, in order to make a
just estimate of the subsidy they might properly grant for this war, then
proceeded to a general valuation of their lands, of ihe whole territory
of Attica, their houses, and all their effects? And yet the whole
valuation fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty. *
Which agrees pretty exactly with this passage of Demosthenes. --
Lucckesini.
2 One hundred ships seem to have been the ordinary marine establish-
ment at Athens; and to this the ordinary revenues seem to have been
proportioned. When it was necessary' to fit out an extraordinary number
the additicnal charge was answered by ah extraordinary taxation on the
richer members of the state. The passage before us is indeed concisely
expressed, as became a speaker who addressed himself to persons to
whom the least hint was sufficient. But the full meaning of it I take
to be this: "If we have occasion but for a hundred ships, the charge of
furnishing each may be divided among twelve trierarchs, who are to be
supplied for the expense of this and other preparations with sixty
talents. If for two hundred, these twelve trierarchs must provide two
ships; if for three hundred, three. In every case the revenues of the
otate are to be equally divided among them. But the greater the force
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
241
?
ixty talents may be granted to each, and twelve
trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty
talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for
three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for
each, and four trierarchs.
In like manner, my fellow-citizens, on a due esti-
mate of the stores necessary for our ships, I propose
that, agreeably to the present scheme, they should
be divided into twenty parts: that one good and
effectual part should be assigned to each of the great
classes, to be distributed among the small divisions
in the just proportion. Let the twelve, in every such
division, demand their respective shares; and let
them have those ships which it is their lot to provide
thoroughly and expeditiously equipped. Thus may
our supplies, our ships, our trierarehs, our stores, be
best provided and supplied. --And now I am to lay
before you a plain and easy method of completing
this scheme.
I say, then, that your generals should proceed to
mark out ten dock-yards, as contiguous as may be
to each other, and capable of containing thirty ves-
sels each. When this is done, they should assign
two Masses, and thirty ships to each of these docks.
Among these also they should divide the tribes and
the respective trierarehs; so that two classes, thirty
ships, and one tribe may be assigned to each. Let
then each tribe divide its allotted station into three
parts, and the ships in like manner. Let these third
required, the greater mast be the burden on the trierarehs, who are to be
taxed for the additional expense, if any such may be required for fitting
out the fleet, and completing the other parts of the intended armament. "
This iatter part, indeed, is not expressed, or insinuated; but I take it to
be understood. But, if my explanation should not be entirely consonant
to the sentiments of the learned reader, who may have the curiosity to
examine this part of the oration with accuracy, I must endeavour to
screen myself from the severity of his censure by subscribing to the
following ingenious declaration of Wolfius: " Whatever is here said of
fleets, stores, armaments, and supplies must, to us, who never saw a
fleet, or war, and never were conversant in affairs of state, be attended
with considerable obscurity. " *
De-m. Vol. I. --X
-
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? 242 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
parts be distributed by lot. Thus shall one tribe
preside over one entire division of your shipping,
and each third of a tribe take care of one-third of
such division; and thus shall you know at all times,
first, where each tribe is stationed; then, wheie each;
Nurd; then, who are the trierarchs; and, lastly, the
number of your ships. Let affairs be once set in
motion after this manner; and if any thing hath
been omitted (as it is by no means easy to provide
accurately for every circumstance), the execution
will itself discover it: and thus may your whole
marine and all its several parts be uniformly and
exactly regulated.
And now, as to money, as to any immediate sup-
plies ; sensible as I am that the opinion I am now to
declare must appear extraordinary, yet I will declare
it; for I trust, that when duly weighed it will be
found the only one which reason can recommend,
and which must be approved by the event. I say,
then, that at this time we should not speak at all of
money: we have a fund, if occasions call for it,--a
great, and honourable, and an equitable fund. Should
you attempt to raise it now, far from succeeding in
such an attempt, you could not depend on gaining it
when really wanted; but suspend your inquiries, and
you will secure it. What fund is this which now
hath no being, yet will be found hereafter 1 This ap-
pears a kind of mystery; but I shall explain it. Cast
your eyes round through all this city. Within these
walls, Athenians, there are treasures--I had almost
said, equal to those of all other states. But such is
the disposition of their possessors, that if all our
speakers were to rise with the most alarming decla-
rations, " that the king was marching against us; that
he was at our gates; that the danger did not admit of
any possibility of doubt--if with these speakers as *
many ministers of heaven were to rise, and pronounce
the same declarations as the warning of the gods; so
far would these men be from contributing, that they
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
24J
would not even discover their riches; they would not
acknowledge the possession of them. But should it
once appear that all those dangers denounced with
so much terror were really and in fact impending,
where is the wretch that would not give freely, that
would not urge to be admitted to contribute ? For
who would choose to abandon his life and fortune to
the fury of an enemy rather than give up a small por-
tion of his abundance for the safety of himself and all
the rest of his possessions ? Thus shall we find trea-
sures when occasions really demand them, but not
till then. Let us not, therefore, inquire for them
now. Suppose that we were now strictly to exact
the subsidies from all our citizens, the utmost we
should raise would be more contemptible than none.
Imagine the experiment made: it is proposed to exact
a hundredth part of the revenue arising from our
lands. Well, then, this makes just sixty talents.
" Nay, but we will raise a fiftieth part. " This doubles
the sum: we have then one hundred and twenty
talents. But what is this to those hundreds or those
thousands of camels which, they assure us, are em-
ployed to carry the king's money ? But suppose it
were agreed to raise a twelfth part, amounting to five
hundred talents. This, in the first place, would be too
great a burden, and, if imposed, still the fund pro-
duced would be insufficient for the war. Let, then,
all our other preparations be completed; but as to
money, let the possessors keep it, and never can they
keep it for a nobler public service. When their coun-
try calls for it, then shall they freely and zealously
contribute. ,
This, my fellow-citizens, is a practicable scheme--
a scheme highly honourable and advantageous, wor-
thy of this state to be reported to the king, and which
must strike him with no small terror. He knows,
that by three hundred vessels, of which one hundred
only were supplied by us, his ancestors lost a thou-
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? 244 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
sand ships. 1 He will hear, that now we have our-
selves equipped three hundred. He cannot, then. --if
he hath not lost all reason,--he cannot deem it a
trivial matter to make this state his enemy. If from
a dependence on his treasures he is tempted to enter-
tain proud thoughts, he will find this but a vain
dependence when compared with your resources. "
They tell us he is coming with heaps of gold; but
when these are once dispersed he must look for new
supplies. Not the richest streams, not the deepest
sources but must at length be totally exhausted when
we copiously and constantly drain away their waters.
But we, he will be told, have a perpetual resource in
our lands--a fund of six thousand talents. And with
what spirit we defend these lands against invaders
his ancestors who fought at Marathon could best
inform him. Let us continue to conquer, and our
treasures cannot ever fail.
Nor yet do I think their terrors justly founded who
apprehend that he may employ his gold in raising a
large army of mercenaries. I do indeed believe, that
in an expedition against Egypt, against Orontes,3 or
1 Whoever consults Herodotus will find that Demosthenes is by no
means exact in his account either of the Athenian or Persian fleets ; but
we are not to expect historical precision from the orator. His repre-
sentations are suited to delight and animate his hearers ; and probably
his success was too great to give them leisure to attend to any inaccuracy
in his account.
? It is just now the orator has represented the wealth of Athens as
contemptible, that of Persia as magnificent and great. Now, en the
contrary, the resources of Persia are neither solid nor permanent; the
riches of Athens great and inexhaustible. Various aie the instances of
this artifice in Demosthenes, which the judicious reader cannot fail to
observe without the direction of the annotator.
3 Two of this name are mentioned in history. The first was put te
death by the younger Cyrus on account of a conspiracy. The other,
whom Demosthenes points out, was a satrap of Mysia, and served in the
army which Artaxerxes sent against Cyprus, under the command of
Terinazus. On this occasion he attempted to ruin the reputation of his
general, was detected and disgraced, and, in revenge, joined with the
rebels of Egypt, Caria, and Phrygia, and headed the army they had raised
against the king. But, in hopes of recovering his credit at the Persian
court, and of gaining the command of some maritime towns, he betrayed
the forces, &c. of the rebels into the hands of the king's lieutenants
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 245
any of the other Barbarians, there are many of the
Greeks that would gladly receive his pay, not from
any zeal for aggrandizing him, but each in order to
obtain such a supply as might relieve their present
necessities. But I never can persuade myself that
any one Greek would assist him to conquer Greece.
Whither should he turn after such an event 1 Would
he go and be a slave in Phrygia ? He must know
that when we take up arms against the Barbarian, we
take them up for our country, for our lives, for our
customs, for our liberty, and all such sacred rights.
Who, then, could be so base as to sacrifice himself,
his parents, the sepulchres of his ancestors, his coun-
try, to a trifling pittance ? Surely, no man. 1
Nor is it the interest of the Persian that his mer-
cenaries should subdue the Greeks; for they who can
conquer us must first prove superior to him. And it
is by no means his scheme, by destroying us, to lose
his own empire. His wishes are to command all; if
this cannot be obtained, at least he would secure his
power over his own slaves.
If, then, it be imagined that the Thebanswill unite
with him,2 it is a hard part to speak of Thebes in this
assembly; for such is your aversion to this people,
History speaks no farther of this Orontes ; but as in this year (the eighth
from the time of his revolt) Demosthenes mentions him as an enemy to
the Persian, we may conjecture that his last services bad been disre-
garded, and that he iiad again taken up arms. --Lvcchesini.
t I cannot persuade myself that there is occasion to point out to the
reader the three and pertinency of this argument, although it be ellipti-
ettlly expressed. To be assured of the true signification of the phrase
rpoi Tov PapfSaoav, we need but cast our eyes to a sentence a little far-
ther on--ck ptv ye ruiv IIP02 rovs iavrov irpoyovous iroXeirnv--from the
weTs waged against his ancestors.
* The history of both nations accounts for the detestation With which
the Athenians are supposed to hear the name of the Thebans ; and per-
haps it were impossible that two nations so different in genius and man-
ners ever should entertain any sentiments of friendship and esteem for
each other. Our orator, however, was far superior to vulgar national
prejudices. He considered without partiality the real interests of his
country, whose welfare should be a statesman's passion. Yet his regard
for the people of Thebes was numbered by ^Dschines among his crimes.
The error which, he says, they would if possible redeem, was their
joining with Xerxes in his invasion of Greece. --Francis
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? ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
that you will not hear the voice of truth itself if it
seems at all to favour them. However, it is the duty
of those who debate on great affairs by no means, and
on no pretence whatever, to suppress any argument
which may prove of use. I say, then, that so far are
the Thebans from ever at any time uniting with the
king against the Greeks, that they would freely give
the greatest treasures, were they possessed of them,
to purchase a fair occasion of atoning for their an-
cient errors with respect to Greece. But let the
Thebans be ever so unhappily disposed, still we must
all be sensible, that if they unite with him, their ene-
mies must necessarily unite with the Greeks. And I
trust that the cause of justice and the friends to this
cause will ever prove superior to traitors and to all
the force of the Barbarian. Let us not, then, yield to
these extravagant alarms, nor rashly brave all conse-
quences by being first to take up arms.
Nor do I think that any other of the Grecian states
should look on this war with terror. ' Is there a man
among them who is not sensible, that while they
regarded the Persian as their common enemy and
maintained a firm union with each other, their fortune
was completely happy; but when, by a fatal reliance
on his friendship, they were betrayed into contests
and dissensions among themselves, their calamities
were so great as to exceed all the imprecations which
the most inveterate malice could invent* And shall
that man, whom fortune, whom Heaven itself pro-
nounces as a friend unprofitable, as an enemy of ad-
vantage,--shall he, I say, be feared ? By no means.
Yet let us have the due regard to ourselves; let us
have the due attention to the disorders and suspicions
of the rest of Greece; and let us not incur the charge
1 The well-known and great events described in the taistory of Greece
confirm these observations of the orator fully with respect to all the
Grecian states. Yet we may concur with the Italian commentator in
supposing that they had the Lacedaemonians particularly In view; to
whom they are, indeed, eminently applicable. '
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 247
of injustice. Could we, indeed, with all the Greeks
united firmly on our side, attack him single and un-
supported, I would not then suppose that you could
be charged with injustice. But, as this is not to be
expected, let us be cautious; let us afford him no pre-
tence of appearing to assert the rights of the other
Greeks. If we continue quiet, his applications to
them will be suspicious; if we are the first to take up
arms, he will seem justified by our hostilities in his
attempts to gain their friendship.
Do not, then, discover to the world the melancholy
state of Greece, by inviting those to an alliance whom
you cannot gain, and by engaging in a war which you
cannot support. Be quiet; be resolute; be prepared.
Let not the emissaries of Persia report to their king
that Greece and Athens are distracted in their coun-
cils, are confounded by their fears, are torn by dissen-
sions. No; let them rather tell him, that if it were
not equally shameful for the Greeks to violate their
honour and their oaths as it is to him matter of tri-
umph, they would have long since marched against
him, and that if you now do not march, you are re-
strained solely by a regard to your own dignity; that
it is your prayer to all the gods that he may be seized
with the infatuation which once possessed his ances-
tors, and then he would find no defect of vigour in
your measures. He knows that by our wars with
his ancestors this state became happy and powerful;
that by our peaceful demeanour before these wars we
acquired a superiority over the other Grecian states
never more observable than at present. He knows
that the affairs of Greece require some power to be
either voluntarily or accidentally the instrument of a
general peace. He knows that he himself must prove
that instrument if he once attempts to raise a war;
and, therefore, these informations will have their due
weight and credit.
That I may not longer abuse your patience, I shall
repeat the sum of my advice, and then descend.
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? 248 ORATIONS OV DEMOSTHENES.
You should prepare your force against your pres-
ent enemies; you should use this force against the
king, against any power that may attempt to injure
you; but never be the first to break through the
bounds of justice either in council or in action. You
should be solicitous, not that our speeches, but tha
our conduct may be worthy of our illustrious descent.
Act thus, and you will serve, not yourselves only, but
the men who oppose these measures; for they will
not feel your resentment hereafter if they be not
suffered to mislead you now. 1
l What effect this oration had on the people we may learn from a pas-
sage in the oration for the Rhodians, of which the following is a transla-
tion :--"There are some among you who may remember,'that at the
time when the affairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations, I
was the first, the only, or (Jmost the only, one to recommend it as the
wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive of
your armament; to make your preparations against your avowed adver-
saries, and to employ them even against him should he attempt to injure
you. Nor did I urge these things without your full concurrence: the*
were received with applause. "
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF EUDEMUS, TUX FOURTH YEAR OF
THE HUNDRED AND SIXTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
In order to prepare the reader for the perusal of the following oration,
it is necessary to recall to his view some of the late important transac-
tions in Greece. He is not to be informed of the flourishing condition of
Sparta after the famous Peloponnesian war, the immoderate ambition of
that state, and the war in which the Spartans were consequently involved
with Thebes. The conduct and vigour of Eparninondas the Theban
proved fatal to Sparta, and the battle of Leuctra put an end to the tyran
nical dominion which this state had long exercised in Peloponnesus.
Immediately after this battle, several of the Peloponnesian states re-
volted from the Lacedemonians. The Messenians, their ancient rivals,
. were restored to their original settlement by the Theban arms, after
many ages of dispersion. The Arcadians and Argives asserted their
independence, and, assisted by the Thebans, took up arms against their
former sovereigns. The Spartans now seemed on the point of having
their ruin completed. They were reduced to fortify their city, whose
defenceless condition had been so long their boast; they armed six hun-
dred of their slaves, and sent a deputation to Athens humbly to solicit
the assistance of their old rivals in this their state of extremity.
The Athenians, who began to conceive a jealousy of the rising power
. of Thebes, readily consented to join with Ihe Lacedaemonians. Iphi-
crates was sent with twelve thousand men to their relief; and on advice
received that Eparninondas was marching against Lacedasmon at the
bead of the Thebans, Argives, and Arcadians, Chabrias was despatched
with another reinforcement to join the Spartans and thetr confederates.
It is not to the present purpose to mention particularly the several
events in the course of this war. It is only necessary to observe, that
the Arcadians, in order the better to secure that liberty for which they
now contended, determined to collect all their force into one body, brought
the detached settlements of their countrymen to a union, and fixed their
common residence in a city built by the advice and assistance of Eparni-
nondas (if we may believe Pausanias), and called Megalopolis, or the
Great City. This was one considerable barrier against the Lacedceino-
nian power in Peloponnesus, which still subsisted, together with the
other equitable regulations of Eparninondas for securing the liberty of
the Peloponnesians.
i
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