Naturally
we do
not suggest that laymen ought to lead
strategical operations.
not suggest that laymen ought to lead
strategical operations.
Jabotinsky - 1917 - Turkey and the War
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
sometimes by quite responsible writers,
as the natural ground for Teutonic expan-
sion and colonisation. This all-embracing
appetite gives Germany some right to
affirm that she was never in favour of the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire,
Of course she preferred the annexation o1
a united and indivisible Turkey. And we
must agree that this plan has virtually been
carried out by the present alliance between
the Central Empires and the Young Turks.
It is highly questionable, however, tc
what extent Germany would be able tc
earn the fruits of this policy, even if she
and her allies won the war. The Germar
crowd seems to take it for granted that a
common victory would attach Turkey fo]
ever to her Teutonic masters. But it is
hardly possible that this sanguine opinior
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
be shared also by responsible men in
Germany who know too well what Turkey
is. Only one of three things can happen
to Turkey : the first is partition ; the second
-- such a complete victory which would
leave the Ottoman Empire strengthened
and able to exclude any foreign influence ;
the third -- the status quo ante, i. e. , the
old Turkish system of fictitiously accepting
the tutelage of all the leading Powers,
in order to counterbalance one with
another and to deceive them all. One
thing only can never happen : Turkey
will never surfer the exclusive predomi-
nance of one foreign Power. Those who
dream of it show their ignorance of the
A B C of Turkish history as well as of the
mentality of the Young Turkish leaders.
It is enough to have the slightest acquain-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
tance of men like Enver, Talaat, Hamil,
Djavid, Hussein-Djahid, to throw away
any illusion of this kind. Of course Turkey
will be very glad to accept Germany's
military services -- for instance, to admit
again German instructors in her army
and to allow the establishment of Krupp's
factories in Turkish cities. But this kind
of help, given by one State to another,
produces one peculiar consequence : it
obliges the State which gives far more than
the one which receives. The country which
is in need of these kind of services is never
forced to beg for them, to entreat, to
promise compensations in return. On the
contrary, that country would be over-
whelmed with offers and would only have
the pleasant embarrassment of choice.
And the happy winner would be very
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
careful not to forfeit his privilege, and
would be compelled to make all sorts of
concessions to his " pupil/' lest the latter
should get tired and replace him by one
of his competitors. This will be exactly
the attitude Turkey will assume towards
Germany if the war ends with a victory
of the Central Empires. Fearing lest
German influence might develop into an
unofficial protectorate, the Young Turks,
jealous of their independence, will have
recourse to the old method : they will
immediately try to make up with the
Entente. No need to explain why their
endeavours on this side will meet with the
most cordial reception. So long as Turkey
lives in the form of a great Empire any sort
of one-sided foreign hegemony is out of
the question. We are afraid that very
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
soon after the " victory, " all the illusions
of the German crowd would be bitterly
deceived.
Turkey's partition will put Germany in
a very delicate entanglement. For one
thing, the hope to swallow the Ottoman
Empire in one gulp will be gone, and will
be replaced by the legitimate desire to
secure at least some part of the heritage.
On the other side, being an ally of Turkey,
Germany cannot, for the sake of decency,
take any positive part in Turkey's dis-
memberment. The humour of the situation
may suggest to some people an easy and
obvious reply -- " then leave Germany out,
and that's the end of it. " We do not
share this easy and obvious view. We
think Germany cannot be left out ; and
if she were, it w T ould not be the end of it.
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
Fortunately this book appears at a time
when people have dropped the foolish talk
of " crushing Germany. " Even defeated,
Germany will remain a big Power -- a Power
in every sense, in wealth, culture, and
military force. It will remain, above all,
an admirable centre of energy. Energy
needs expansion ; if prevented from ex-
panding within reasonable limits it must
cause an explosion. The policy of exclud-
ing Germany from any natural expansion
would be, for us, a policy of suicide.
This does not mean that we consider
the Entente's inner markets as a natural
field for German penetration. If it will be
found advisable to reserve these markets for
the Allies' trade only, we do not think such
protection could prejudice the durability
of peace. But the outer, the " colonis-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
able " world must not be closed altogether
for either Germany or Austria.
Of this world, the Middle East is one of
the most essential parts. The Drang nach
Osten was an exaggeration in the colossal
range of its claims, but in its essence it was
a necessity. The Allied Powers will be
well advised if they oppose the exaggera-
tions but reckon with the indestructible
needs of an indestructible organism.
The partition of Turkey does not mean
the destruction of the natural home of the
Turkish race. This home is Anatolia, the
vast region which occupies roughly the
protuberance of Asia Minor from the
^Egean coast to a line corresponding to
longitude 37. The country thus described
includes the bulk of the Turkish nation,
about 6 millions. With the exception of
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
some coast districts where they are mixed
with Greeks and Armenians, Turks are
the only inhabitants of Anatolia. It is
what we call a purely national territory,
and this character will become still more
pronounced if the district of Smyrna with
150,000 Greeks should be annexed to
Greece and the region of Adalia should
come under Italian protectorate. Being
the cradle and the stronghold of the Osman-
lis, Anatolia is also the best natural field
for their development. Confined within
the ethnical boundaries of their race, free
from the burden of misruling 15 millions
of other peoples who hate them, the Turks
in Anatolia will be able at last to progress
in the ways of order, culture, and wealth.
To accomplish this progress they will
need European advisers and furnishers.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
If this task of leading the new and smaller
Turkey towards civilisation could be left
exclusively to Germany and Austria, such
an arrangement would have two big ad-
vantages : it would correspond to that
mutual inclination which expressed itself in
the present Germano-Turkish alliance, and
it would, at the same time, settle, in the
fairest way, Germany's longing for a place
in the sun in the Near East.
Of course the Turkish race in Anatolia
is entitled to complete political indepen-
dence. But Germany cannot pretend to
establish any form of political domination
over her own ally whom she promised to
help in removing the last traces of western
ascendancy in the Orient. Even offered
by the victorious Allies a portion of the
Ottoman heritage, Germany would be
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
morally compelled to refuse it. This situa-
tion suggests a settlement equally fair to
Germany and Turkey. Anatolia must re-
main an independent Sultanate -- indepen-
dent not only on paper, but in fact, just
as Switzerland, Holland or Britain herself.
At the same time, the Allies could sign a
treaty with Germany renouncing, for a
certain period of time, any claim on their
part for the treatment of the most favoured
nation in Anatolia. It would leave Ger-
many free to conclude whatever commercial
treaty she likes with the new Turkey --
even to include her in the Zollverein.
Without impairing Turkish sovereignty it
would secure for Germany very considerable
privileges in furnishing practically all the
requirements of life and progress to a fairly
populated country, about the size of Spain,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
prolific and capable of colonization, and
in helping to exploit its great agricultural
and mineral resources.
To renounce this important field of
commercial competition would be of course
a not inconsiderable sacrifice for the Allies.
But, we repeat, Germany must be granted
a door for expansion in the East lest her
vitality should compel her to knock one day
with the mailed fist at our own doors.
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? APPENDIX -- SOME MILITARY ASPECTS
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? XV-THE MAIN FRONT
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? XV
The Main Front
We hear only too often that iaymen should
not interfere with problems of strategy.
It is doubtful whether this principle can be
accepted unreservedly. Strategy (of course
we do not mean tactics) has undergone the
same change as diplomacy. Both used to
be considered, in days gone by, as a sort
of black magic, an occult science whose
secrets were only open to highly trained
druids. Nowadays the world has realized
that any good man of business is able to
make a good diplomatist. Perhaps one
day the same will apply to strategy.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
" Military secrets " play only a part of
secondary importance in modern warfare,
and sound strategy is not based upon
them. Sound strategy can be only based
upon the realization of advantages or
drawbacks of different theatres afforded by
geography, economy, statistics of popula-
tion, railway systems and so on -- all matters
of common knowledge.
Naturally we do
not suggest that laymen ought to lead
strategical operations. But their right to
criticize and to suggest is unquestionable,
especially after so many mistakes have been
committed by those who are supposed to be
initiated in the druidical mysteries.
After this little preface, we venture to
say that Turkey, and to be more exact
Asiatic Turkey, is the main theatre of this
war.
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? THE MAIN FRONT
The western offensive has already taught
us the exact extent of its possibilities. We
do not underrate its good effects, but the
thing which matters -- the " decisive blow "
-- is still out of sight, nor are there any
signs of the probability of such an event
in that corner of the world war. The
progress of the Allies is wonderful, but it
is slow, and its tempo can hardly be
changed. We are told that it will grad-
ually lead to the recapture of important
French and Belgian towns, and so we
believe. But in the same way as the
capture of Verdun would not have meant
the breakdown of France, the recapture
of Lille, or even (let us be sanguine) the
taking of Metz would not crush Germany.
Of course it would be a tremendous blow
to the Central Empires, it would mean a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
radical change in the military situation ;
but Germany's force of resistance would
still remain colossal and unimpaired. It
is better not to deceive ourselves. We
trust that the western offensive will con-
tinue with energy and success ; but the
tempo of the advance and its immediate
effect on the co-relation of the belligerent
forces should not be exaggerated.
The same seems to apply to the Russian
front. Even there, we hope, Germany
will no more be given the opportunity of
administering dangerous strokes, and per-
haps some day we shall yet witness a
revival of the Russian offensive ; but the
steam-roller theory seems to be abandoned
in all quarters.
The only theatre where " decisive blows "
can be imagined is Asiatic Turkey. On
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? THE MAIN FRONT
that theatre warfare seems to have kept
its old character : smaller numbers of
men and material, smaller losses as price
of victory, and incomparably quicker terri-
torial advance in the case of victory. This
truth cannot be obscured by the two
failures of Gallipoli and Kut : the causes
of the melancholy results of the Dardanelles
and Mesopotamian campaigns are suffi-
ciently known, and these results do not
prove anything except the danger of either
negligent or half-hearted warfare. The
Russian invasion in Armenia showed that,
where neglect or half-heartedness are more
or less avoided, enormous territorial suc-
cesses might be won with forces which,
on any European front, would prove in-
sufficient for any serious push. Turkey
cannot hold her own against Powers
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
equipped with modern technique if they
give the Asiatic front the whole effort it
deserves. No German help can change
this balance of forces. The German method
of warfare, based on the greatest display
of technique and organization, is only
possible in countries where there is a thick
network of railways, a dense and more or
less civilized population, huge material
resources. All these are wanting in Asiatic
Turkey. German engineers may have con-
siderably improved or developed the Bag-
dad and Hedjaz railroads, but this fact
alone cannot have transformed Mesopo-
tamia or the Sinai desert into anything like
Champagne, Flanders, or even Lithuania
-- countries of trench warfare. Similarly,
all talk pretending that Turkish troops,
if stiffened by a little German starch,
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? THE MAIN FRONT
acquire at once all the formidable qualities
of a real German army is mere gossip.
Starch is not iron. With a quarter of the
cost of a fortnight's offensive on any
European front, the half of Anatolia, the
whole of Mesopotamia and Syria could be
invaded and occupied.
But this is not all. Turkey is not Ger-
many in yet another sense. To break
Germany's force of resistance would be a
task of tremendous difficulty ; we repeat
that this result would not necessarily be
achieved even in the case of the Allies
eventually crossing the German frontier
and carrying war into German territory.
Behind the German army there are
65,000,000 of a highly cultured nation
endowed with an enormous national pride,
led by an old and haughty aristocracy,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
conscious of an almost inexhaustible riches
in moral and material resources. To break
the righting strength of such a nation
simply by physical blows is a long, very
long business. But everybody who has
the slightest knowledge of Turkey will
agree that two or three serious strokes,
like the capture of Erzerum, especially
if occurring simultaneously on different
fronts of her Asiatic dominions, would
mean the collapse of her will for resistance.
In other words, on the Middle Eastern
theatre it is not only easier to advance,
but the effects of advance are likely to
have a much more decisive influence on
the general march of affairs.
The consequences of Turkey's collapse
are easily understood, and there is no
need to repeat here what has been said
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? THE MAIN FRONT
many times. But one of these conse-
quences ought to be emphasized again and
again because its importance seems to be
underrated by public opinion. We mean
the influence which a Turkish debacle would
have on the German public's attitude
towards the war.
Germany is largely a country of business
men. Now the German business man does
not bear the strain and the sacrifices of
this war for the mere sake of national
glory. He also delights in dreams of
world power, but for him world power
has a clear and simple meaning : larger
markets. This is the prize for which he
suffers, the hope which comforts him when
the sacrifice begins to appear too heavy.
Remove this object, and the war will lose,
in his eyes, its justification.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
The hope cherished by the industrial
and commercial classes of Germany is two-
fold : it includes profitable commercial
treaties with the Allies after the war -- and
an Ottoman Empire within the Zollverein.
The first of these hopes has already re-
ceived a heavy blow : we mean the Econ-
omic Conference in Paris which dealt with
German trade in the Allied countries and
resulted in proclaiming what may be
termed " the annexation of German
markets " within the Entente's own house-
hold. Many of us do not yet realize the
full value of this blow ; others question
its efficiency and declare, in the name of
the holy lore called Political Economy,
that prohibitive tariffs on such an enor-
mous scale are " economically impossible/'
These sentences belong to the same sort
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? THE MAIN FRONT
of scientific prophecy we heard in such
plenty at the beginning of the war, when
we were told that it was " economically
impossible " for the war to last more than
a few weeks because in a few weeks all the
world would be bankrupt. It is guess-
work, not science. We feel sure that this
easy-going appreciation of the Paris deci-
sions cannot be shared in Germany. At
the time of the Conference some German
papers, of course, indulged in comfortable
chatter about the " economic impossi-
bility " of the Allies doing without German
products after the war ; but the business
men of Germany, with that instinct for
realities which is their strength, feel and
know that the doom of German trade
is meant in earnest and can be carried
through without producing any irremedi-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
able disturbance in the enormous household
of the Allies. Of course, the German
business man firmly believes in his nation's
ability to remove this menace at the end
of the war. Germany is, so far, well
equipped for the final bargain : she has
accumulated many precious pawns and,
so long as she holds them in her grip, the
Gross-Industrieller is confident that the
re-admission of his goods to their former
privileged position in the Allied markets
may yet be extorted at the Peace Confer-
ence in exchange for territorial evacuations.
But in this way the war, instead of being
a struggle for new acquisitions, is trans-
formed in his own eyes into a war for
the re-establishment of the status quo
ante. Thus every business man in Ger-
many is by now compelled to ask himself
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? THE MAIN FRONT
and his neighbours : " Why this war,
then ? "
The answer which he gets from his
official comforters is obvious : " Turkey. "
There is one market which the Paris
decisions cannot affect. It is one of the
largest, one of the most various and most
promising markets of the world ; it is at
the same time an immense reservoir of
raw materials. Turkey is the ultima spes
of the German business man ; in the notori-
ous scheme of a self-contented Mitteleuropa,
which represents to German minds the
only alternative to oversea expansion, Tur-
key is the vital link, the spring of the
clockwork. If you strike at it the whole
system collapses.
But the military occupation of this
market cannot be achieved by conferences
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nor by legislation. It must be carried
out by conquest -- by establishing the Allies'
garrisons in the various provinces of the
Ottoman Empire.
So far, this task has not received all the
attention it deserves. Of all the Entente's
mistakes this one is the greatest. We
forgot that Turkey is not only an ally
whose collapse would weaken Germany's
strength. Turkey is one of the principal
aims of Germany's efforts, the raison d'etre
of most of her decisive acts and moves.
The mob in the streets of Berlin may be
dazzled by the idea of German troops
camping in Belgium and Poland : leading
and responsible men know only too well
that Belgium must be restored and that
Poland, whatever her fate may be, is not
certain to remain under German control
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? THE MAIN FRONT
after the war. What encourages them is
neither Belgium nor Poland -- it is the
connection of Berlin with Bagdad. The
invasion of Turkey would mean not only
the end of the weakest of Germany's
allies : it would mean the end of the
strongest of those reasons which make the
war worth its cost in German eyes.
" I do not believe in psychological war-
fare/' said a great general not long ago,
" we must strike at the enemy's soldiers,
not at his psychology. " This sentence is
often quoted, but it would sound much
more convincing if it were less dogmatic.
We must strike at both soldiers and psy-
chology. Civilized nations fight for the
sake of certain goals ; if these are removed
the enemy's obstinacy cannot remain un-
shaken. Even in Germany the military
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
caste can only retain its freedom of action
so long as the bulk of public opinion
comply with the necessity of " keeping
on. "
The End
Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd. , London and Reading
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? University of California Library
Los Angeles
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
sometimes by quite responsible writers,
as the natural ground for Teutonic expan-
sion and colonisation. This all-embracing
appetite gives Germany some right to
affirm that she was never in favour of the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire,
Of course she preferred the annexation o1
a united and indivisible Turkey. And we
must agree that this plan has virtually been
carried out by the present alliance between
the Central Empires and the Young Turks.
It is highly questionable, however, tc
what extent Germany would be able tc
earn the fruits of this policy, even if she
and her allies won the war. The Germar
crowd seems to take it for granted that a
common victory would attach Turkey fo]
ever to her Teutonic masters. But it is
hardly possible that this sanguine opinior
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
be shared also by responsible men in
Germany who know too well what Turkey
is. Only one of three things can happen
to Turkey : the first is partition ; the second
-- such a complete victory which would
leave the Ottoman Empire strengthened
and able to exclude any foreign influence ;
the third -- the status quo ante, i. e. , the
old Turkish system of fictitiously accepting
the tutelage of all the leading Powers,
in order to counterbalance one with
another and to deceive them all. One
thing only can never happen : Turkey
will never surfer the exclusive predomi-
nance of one foreign Power. Those who
dream of it show their ignorance of the
A B C of Turkish history as well as of the
mentality of the Young Turkish leaders.
It is enough to have the slightest acquain-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
tance of men like Enver, Talaat, Hamil,
Djavid, Hussein-Djahid, to throw away
any illusion of this kind. Of course Turkey
will be very glad to accept Germany's
military services -- for instance, to admit
again German instructors in her army
and to allow the establishment of Krupp's
factories in Turkish cities. But this kind
of help, given by one State to another,
produces one peculiar consequence : it
obliges the State which gives far more than
the one which receives. The country which
is in need of these kind of services is never
forced to beg for them, to entreat, to
promise compensations in return. On the
contrary, that country would be over-
whelmed with offers and would only have
the pleasant embarrassment of choice.
And the happy winner would be very
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
careful not to forfeit his privilege, and
would be compelled to make all sorts of
concessions to his " pupil/' lest the latter
should get tired and replace him by one
of his competitors. This will be exactly
the attitude Turkey will assume towards
Germany if the war ends with a victory
of the Central Empires. Fearing lest
German influence might develop into an
unofficial protectorate, the Young Turks,
jealous of their independence, will have
recourse to the old method : they will
immediately try to make up with the
Entente. No need to explain why their
endeavours on this side will meet with the
most cordial reception. So long as Turkey
lives in the form of a great Empire any sort
of one-sided foreign hegemony is out of
the question. We are afraid that very
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
soon after the " victory, " all the illusions
of the German crowd would be bitterly
deceived.
Turkey's partition will put Germany in
a very delicate entanglement. For one
thing, the hope to swallow the Ottoman
Empire in one gulp will be gone, and will
be replaced by the legitimate desire to
secure at least some part of the heritage.
On the other side, being an ally of Turkey,
Germany cannot, for the sake of decency,
take any positive part in Turkey's dis-
memberment. The humour of the situation
may suggest to some people an easy and
obvious reply -- " then leave Germany out,
and that's the end of it. " We do not
share this easy and obvious view. We
think Germany cannot be left out ; and
if she were, it w T ould not be the end of it.
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
Fortunately this book appears at a time
when people have dropped the foolish talk
of " crushing Germany. " Even defeated,
Germany will remain a big Power -- a Power
in every sense, in wealth, culture, and
military force. It will remain, above all,
an admirable centre of energy. Energy
needs expansion ; if prevented from ex-
panding within reasonable limits it must
cause an explosion. The policy of exclud-
ing Germany from any natural expansion
would be, for us, a policy of suicide.
This does not mean that we consider
the Entente's inner markets as a natural
field for German penetration. If it will be
found advisable to reserve these markets for
the Allies' trade only, we do not think such
protection could prejudice the durability
of peace. But the outer, the " colonis-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
able " world must not be closed altogether
for either Germany or Austria.
Of this world, the Middle East is one of
the most essential parts. The Drang nach
Osten was an exaggeration in the colossal
range of its claims, but in its essence it was
a necessity. The Allied Powers will be
well advised if they oppose the exaggera-
tions but reckon with the indestructible
needs of an indestructible organism.
The partition of Turkey does not mean
the destruction of the natural home of the
Turkish race. This home is Anatolia, the
vast region which occupies roughly the
protuberance of Asia Minor from the
^Egean coast to a line corresponding to
longitude 37. The country thus described
includes the bulk of the Turkish nation,
about 6 millions. With the exception of
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
some coast districts where they are mixed
with Greeks and Armenians, Turks are
the only inhabitants of Anatolia. It is
what we call a purely national territory,
and this character will become still more
pronounced if the district of Smyrna with
150,000 Greeks should be annexed to
Greece and the region of Adalia should
come under Italian protectorate. Being
the cradle and the stronghold of the Osman-
lis, Anatolia is also the best natural field
for their development. Confined within
the ethnical boundaries of their race, free
from the burden of misruling 15 millions
of other peoples who hate them, the Turks
in Anatolia will be able at last to progress
in the ways of order, culture, and wealth.
To accomplish this progress they will
need European advisers and furnishers.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
If this task of leading the new and smaller
Turkey towards civilisation could be left
exclusively to Germany and Austria, such
an arrangement would have two big ad-
vantages : it would correspond to that
mutual inclination which expressed itself in
the present Germano-Turkish alliance, and
it would, at the same time, settle, in the
fairest way, Germany's longing for a place
in the sun in the Near East.
Of course the Turkish race in Anatolia
is entitled to complete political indepen-
dence. But Germany cannot pretend to
establish any form of political domination
over her own ally whom she promised to
help in removing the last traces of western
ascendancy in the Orient. Even offered
by the victorious Allies a portion of the
Ottoman heritage, Germany would be
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? THE GERMAN CLAIM
morally compelled to refuse it. This situa-
tion suggests a settlement equally fair to
Germany and Turkey. Anatolia must re-
main an independent Sultanate -- indepen-
dent not only on paper, but in fact, just
as Switzerland, Holland or Britain herself.
At the same time, the Allies could sign a
treaty with Germany renouncing, for a
certain period of time, any claim on their
part for the treatment of the most favoured
nation in Anatolia. It would leave Ger-
many free to conclude whatever commercial
treaty she likes with the new Turkey --
even to include her in the Zollverein.
Without impairing Turkish sovereignty it
would secure for Germany very considerable
privileges in furnishing practically all the
requirements of life and progress to a fairly
populated country, about the size of Spain,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
prolific and capable of colonization, and
in helping to exploit its great agricultural
and mineral resources.
To renounce this important field of
commercial competition would be of course
a not inconsiderable sacrifice for the Allies.
But, we repeat, Germany must be granted
a door for expansion in the East lest her
vitality should compel her to knock one day
with the mailed fist at our own doors.
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? APPENDIX -- SOME MILITARY ASPECTS
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? XV-THE MAIN FRONT
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? XV
The Main Front
We hear only too often that iaymen should
not interfere with problems of strategy.
It is doubtful whether this principle can be
accepted unreservedly. Strategy (of course
we do not mean tactics) has undergone the
same change as diplomacy. Both used to
be considered, in days gone by, as a sort
of black magic, an occult science whose
secrets were only open to highly trained
druids. Nowadays the world has realized
that any good man of business is able to
make a good diplomatist. Perhaps one
day the same will apply to strategy.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
" Military secrets " play only a part of
secondary importance in modern warfare,
and sound strategy is not based upon
them. Sound strategy can be only based
upon the realization of advantages or
drawbacks of different theatres afforded by
geography, economy, statistics of popula-
tion, railway systems and so on -- all matters
of common knowledge.
Naturally we do
not suggest that laymen ought to lead
strategical operations. But their right to
criticize and to suggest is unquestionable,
especially after so many mistakes have been
committed by those who are supposed to be
initiated in the druidical mysteries.
After this little preface, we venture to
say that Turkey, and to be more exact
Asiatic Turkey, is the main theatre of this
war.
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? THE MAIN FRONT
The western offensive has already taught
us the exact extent of its possibilities. We
do not underrate its good effects, but the
thing which matters -- the " decisive blow "
-- is still out of sight, nor are there any
signs of the probability of such an event
in that corner of the world war. The
progress of the Allies is wonderful, but it
is slow, and its tempo can hardly be
changed. We are told that it will grad-
ually lead to the recapture of important
French and Belgian towns, and so we
believe. But in the same way as the
capture of Verdun would not have meant
the breakdown of France, the recapture
of Lille, or even (let us be sanguine) the
taking of Metz would not crush Germany.
Of course it would be a tremendous blow
to the Central Empires, it would mean a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
radical change in the military situation ;
but Germany's force of resistance would
still remain colossal and unimpaired. It
is better not to deceive ourselves. We
trust that the western offensive will con-
tinue with energy and success ; but the
tempo of the advance and its immediate
effect on the co-relation of the belligerent
forces should not be exaggerated.
The same seems to apply to the Russian
front. Even there, we hope, Germany
will no more be given the opportunity of
administering dangerous strokes, and per-
haps some day we shall yet witness a
revival of the Russian offensive ; but the
steam-roller theory seems to be abandoned
in all quarters.
The only theatre where " decisive blows "
can be imagined is Asiatic Turkey. On
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? THE MAIN FRONT
that theatre warfare seems to have kept
its old character : smaller numbers of
men and material, smaller losses as price
of victory, and incomparably quicker terri-
torial advance in the case of victory. This
truth cannot be obscured by the two
failures of Gallipoli and Kut : the causes
of the melancholy results of the Dardanelles
and Mesopotamian campaigns are suffi-
ciently known, and these results do not
prove anything except the danger of either
negligent or half-hearted warfare. The
Russian invasion in Armenia showed that,
where neglect or half-heartedness are more
or less avoided, enormous territorial suc-
cesses might be won with forces which,
on any European front, would prove in-
sufficient for any serious push. Turkey
cannot hold her own against Powers
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
equipped with modern technique if they
give the Asiatic front the whole effort it
deserves. No German help can change
this balance of forces. The German method
of warfare, based on the greatest display
of technique and organization, is only
possible in countries where there is a thick
network of railways, a dense and more or
less civilized population, huge material
resources. All these are wanting in Asiatic
Turkey. German engineers may have con-
siderably improved or developed the Bag-
dad and Hedjaz railroads, but this fact
alone cannot have transformed Mesopo-
tamia or the Sinai desert into anything like
Champagne, Flanders, or even Lithuania
-- countries of trench warfare. Similarly,
all talk pretending that Turkish troops,
if stiffened by a little German starch,
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? THE MAIN FRONT
acquire at once all the formidable qualities
of a real German army is mere gossip.
Starch is not iron. With a quarter of the
cost of a fortnight's offensive on any
European front, the half of Anatolia, the
whole of Mesopotamia and Syria could be
invaded and occupied.
But this is not all. Turkey is not Ger-
many in yet another sense. To break
Germany's force of resistance would be a
task of tremendous difficulty ; we repeat
that this result would not necessarily be
achieved even in the case of the Allies
eventually crossing the German frontier
and carrying war into German territory.
Behind the German army there are
65,000,000 of a highly cultured nation
endowed with an enormous national pride,
led by an old and haughty aristocracy,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
conscious of an almost inexhaustible riches
in moral and material resources. To break
the righting strength of such a nation
simply by physical blows is a long, very
long business. But everybody who has
the slightest knowledge of Turkey will
agree that two or three serious strokes,
like the capture of Erzerum, especially
if occurring simultaneously on different
fronts of her Asiatic dominions, would
mean the collapse of her will for resistance.
In other words, on the Middle Eastern
theatre it is not only easier to advance,
but the effects of advance are likely to
have a much more decisive influence on
the general march of affairs.
The consequences of Turkey's collapse
are easily understood, and there is no
need to repeat here what has been said
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? THE MAIN FRONT
many times. But one of these conse-
quences ought to be emphasized again and
again because its importance seems to be
underrated by public opinion. We mean
the influence which a Turkish debacle would
have on the German public's attitude
towards the war.
Germany is largely a country of business
men. Now the German business man does
not bear the strain and the sacrifices of
this war for the mere sake of national
glory. He also delights in dreams of
world power, but for him world power
has a clear and simple meaning : larger
markets. This is the prize for which he
suffers, the hope which comforts him when
the sacrifice begins to appear too heavy.
Remove this object, and the war will lose,
in his eyes, its justification.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
The hope cherished by the industrial
and commercial classes of Germany is two-
fold : it includes profitable commercial
treaties with the Allies after the war -- and
an Ottoman Empire within the Zollverein.
The first of these hopes has already re-
ceived a heavy blow : we mean the Econ-
omic Conference in Paris which dealt with
German trade in the Allied countries and
resulted in proclaiming what may be
termed " the annexation of German
markets " within the Entente's own house-
hold. Many of us do not yet realize the
full value of this blow ; others question
its efficiency and declare, in the name of
the holy lore called Political Economy,
that prohibitive tariffs on such an enor-
mous scale are " economically impossible/'
These sentences belong to the same sort
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? THE MAIN FRONT
of scientific prophecy we heard in such
plenty at the beginning of the war, when
we were told that it was " economically
impossible " for the war to last more than
a few weeks because in a few weeks all the
world would be bankrupt. It is guess-
work, not science. We feel sure that this
easy-going appreciation of the Paris deci-
sions cannot be shared in Germany. At
the time of the Conference some German
papers, of course, indulged in comfortable
chatter about the " economic impossi-
bility " of the Allies doing without German
products after the war ; but the business
men of Germany, with that instinct for
realities which is their strength, feel and
know that the doom of German trade
is meant in earnest and can be carried
through without producing any irremedi-
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
able disturbance in the enormous household
of the Allies. Of course, the German
business man firmly believes in his nation's
ability to remove this menace at the end
of the war. Germany is, so far, well
equipped for the final bargain : she has
accumulated many precious pawns and,
so long as she holds them in her grip, the
Gross-Industrieller is confident that the
re-admission of his goods to their former
privileged position in the Allied markets
may yet be extorted at the Peace Confer-
ence in exchange for territorial evacuations.
But in this way the war, instead of being
a struggle for new acquisitions, is trans-
formed in his own eyes into a war for
the re-establishment of the status quo
ante. Thus every business man in Ger-
many is by now compelled to ask himself
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? THE MAIN FRONT
and his neighbours : " Why this war,
then ? "
The answer which he gets from his
official comforters is obvious : " Turkey. "
There is one market which the Paris
decisions cannot affect. It is one of the
largest, one of the most various and most
promising markets of the world ; it is at
the same time an immense reservoir of
raw materials. Turkey is the ultima spes
of the German business man ; in the notori-
ous scheme of a self-contented Mitteleuropa,
which represents to German minds the
only alternative to oversea expansion, Tur-
key is the vital link, the spring of the
clockwork. If you strike at it the whole
system collapses.
But the military occupation of this
market cannot be achieved by conferences
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nor by legislation. It must be carried
out by conquest -- by establishing the Allies'
garrisons in the various provinces of the
Ottoman Empire.
So far, this task has not received all the
attention it deserves. Of all the Entente's
mistakes this one is the greatest. We
forgot that Turkey is not only an ally
whose collapse would weaken Germany's
strength. Turkey is one of the principal
aims of Germany's efforts, the raison d'etre
of most of her decisive acts and moves.
The mob in the streets of Berlin may be
dazzled by the idea of German troops
camping in Belgium and Poland : leading
and responsible men know only too well
that Belgium must be restored and that
Poland, whatever her fate may be, is not
certain to remain under German control
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? THE MAIN FRONT
after the war. What encourages them is
neither Belgium nor Poland -- it is the
connection of Berlin with Bagdad. The
invasion of Turkey would mean not only
the end of the weakest of Germany's
allies : it would mean the end of the
strongest of those reasons which make the
war worth its cost in German eyes.
" I do not believe in psychological war-
fare/' said a great general not long ago,
" we must strike at the enemy's soldiers,
not at his psychology. " This sentence is
often quoted, but it would sound much
more convincing if it were less dogmatic.
We must strike at both soldiers and psy-
chology. Civilized nations fight for the
sake of certain goals ; if these are removed
the enemy's obstinacy cannot remain un-
shaken. Even in Germany the military
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
caste can only retain its freedom of action
so long as the bulk of public opinion
comply with the necessity of " keeping
on. "
The End
Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd. , London and Reading
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? University of California Library
Los Angeles
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