Much in the details of these are
difficult
to make out, and we
should refer to Bishop Stubbs for a complete account,1 but
the general principles are clear.
should refer to Bishop Stubbs for a complete account,1 but
the general principles are clear.
Thomas Carlyle
or de los que son, o?
de tos
que seran, o? otros qualesquier vinieren
contra esto por menguer o? quebrantar
nuostros fueros, e? nuestros privilegios,
e? nuestras franquesas, e? nuestras liver-
tades, e? los buenos usos, e? las buenas
costumbres en todos o? en ellos que
nos paremos todos amanparallo, e? a?
defendello, e? con qualquier de nos que
desto falleciessen faciendolo saver los
unos a las otros, que los que lo sufieren
e? non quisieren venir aiudallos a
aquellos, e? que ficieren el tuerto des tas
cosas sobredichas que sean traidores
como quien mata sen? o/, o? traie castiello ;
e? que sera? mostrado cada an? o en la
? ? junta. '*
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? 116
[PART 1.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
The refusal of obedience was then the first aspect of what
we may call the legitimate method of enforcing the limita-
tion of the authority of the ruler. It is necessary to distinguish
this, from the principle that in the last resort the prince
who refused to obey the law might be deposed. To the
modern mind the renunciation of obedience or the with-
drawal of allegiance may seem indistinguishable from de-
position, but it was not so in the Middle Ages.
Having then observed this, we must turn to the question
of the deposition of the ruler. We are not here concerned
with the mere fact of deposition, or with the justice or ex-
pediency of particular cases of deposition, but with the question
how far this was thought of as being in principle legal and
constitutional. We must begin by dismissing from our minds
such a conception as that of the modern constitutional doctrine
of England, that the king can do no wrong. Those who
have any acquaintance with the English history do not need
to be reminded that this doctrine, which might seem to re-
present a theory of absolutism, actually represents the method
by which the arbitrary power of the monarch has been
destroyed. In the Middle Ages this doctrine, however, had
no place ; the king, like any other person in the community,
was responsible for his own actions.
We have in a previous volume dealt with the deposition
of the Emperor Henry IV. and the theory of that deposition
as expressed by various persons, and especially by Manegold
of Lautenbach ; we have also discussed the theory of John of
Salisbury that the unjust and tyrannical ruler has lost all
right to authority, and may properly be attacked and even
slain. 1 We are now concerned with the question how far
this principle continued to be held in the thirteenth century.
We may begin by observing some words of a writer who
held what we have seen to be an unusual and even abnormal
view of the nature of the regal authority--that is, Egidius
Colonna. As we have seen, he maintained that the best form
of political authority was that of a monarchy which was
itself the source of law, and was above law. 2 It was the same
1 Cf. vol. iii. part ii. chaps. 5 and 6. s Cf. p. 74.
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? CHAP, vm. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER. 117
Egidius Colonna, however, who, as we have seen, in his tract
on the resignation of the Papal throne by Celestine V. , main-
tained that as the authority of the ruler must be established
by the consent of men, so also by the same consent he might
resign or even be deposed. 1 With this we should compare
the very careful discussion by St Thomas Aquinas of the
circumstances under which and the methods by which the
tyrannical ruler should be deposed, with which we have
already dealt. 2
We may now turn to the legal works and the records of
constitutional proceedings, and we may begin by observing
some words of the ' Sachsenspiegel. ' No man may
proceed against the king's life until he has been by proper
sentence deprived of his kingdom. 3 This is repeated in
the compilation which we know as the ' Schwabenspiegel,'
but it adds that no one can declare judgment on the
king's life or honour, except the princes. * It is clear
that both these works assume in principle that there
is a legal process by which the king can be deposed. At
first sight we might very well suppose that these were little
more than the phrases of a theoretical system of law, but
it is noticeable that even the great Frederick II. used, if only
incidentally and under circumstances which might well make
such a statement diplomatically convenient, words which
have the same implication. In the Encyclical letter which
he addressed to St Louis of France and to the " Magnates
Anglian," as well as to the princes of the empire, he protested
1 Egidius Colonna, ' De Renuntia-
tione Papse,' xvi. 1 : " Sed quamvis
sic requirit natura negotii, quod scientes
melius pericula prsevidere, aliis prscfi-
ciantur, ut sub eorum gubernacula
multitudo servetur, oportet tamen
quod hoo compleatur per consonsum
hominum. Et siout per assensum
hominum perficitur et completur, ut
quia aliis prseficiatur, sie per consensum
hominum contrario modo factum fieri
potest, quod prsefectus cedat, vel quod
etiam deponatur. "
2 Cf. p. 96
3 * Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 54, 4 : M Also
ne mach deme Konige neman an sin
lif spreken, ime ne si dat rike vore
mit ordelen verdelt. "
' 'Schwabenspiegel,' 104: "Den Ku-
nige mac nieman an den lip ges-
prechen, im werde daz riche e verteilet
mit der Fiirsten urteile. Uber des
Kunigee lip und iiber sin ere mac
nieman urteil sprechen wan die Fiir-
sten. "
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? 118
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
against his deposition by Pope Innocent IV. as being the
action of a " judex incompetens," and urged that the sentence
and the whole proceedings were null and void, for none of
the princes of Germany " a quibus assumptio status et de-
pressio nostra dependit," had confirmed them by their presence
and counsel. 1
In the proceedings related to the deposition of Adolf of
Germany in 1298, we find that the princes concerned assumed
that they were acting by due process of law, and it is worth
while to observe the procedure in a little detail. The Arch-
bishop of Maintz called a Council to consider the troubled
condition of Germany, and to this he summoned both the
princes who had the right of election, and Adolf himself.
The important princes present were the Archbishop himself,
who was said to be acting also for the King of Bohemia;
the Duke of Saxony, holding also the proxy of the Count
Palatine; and the Margrave of Brandenburg. They enum-
erated various charges against him, the violation of Churches
and ecclesiastics, the toleration of violence against women,
the interference with ecclesiastical liberties, especially by
demanding gifts before he would grant the " Eegalia " to
the bishops, and various acts of aggression upon the rights of
the German princes, counts, barons, &c. They found Adolf
guilty of these crimes, and declared that he had proved him-
self to be incompetent and useless for so great an authority,
and therefore, after careful deliberation and by the common
council and will of all the electoral princes, the bishops, dukes,
counts, barons, and wise men present, the electoral princes
declared Adolf deposed, and also absolved all men from
their oath of allegiance to him. 2
1 M. G. H. , ' Const,' vol. ii. 262, 9:
" Advertat igittir prudentia tua, si
predicta sententia nulla ipso jure,
nullus ipso jure processus, . . . debeat
observari, quam nulli nostrorum Ger-
manise principum a quibus assumptio
status et depressio nostra dependet,
presentia vel consilio firmaverunt. "
* M. G. H. , ' Constitutiones,' vol. iii.
589, 7 : " Igitur super premissis cum
principibus electoribus episcopis, pre-
latis, ducibus, comitibus, baronibus et
sapientibus, omnibus ibidem presen-
tibus, deliberatione prehabita diligenti,
de communi consilio et voluntate
omnium de consensu unanimo illorum,
quorum in te re rat, prediotum domimim
Adolphum qui se regno reddidit tam
indignum, quique propter suas iniqui-
tates et causas prescriptas a Deo ne
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? CHAP. Tin. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER. 119
In the promulgation of the deposition of Adolf, and the
election of Albert Duke of Austria, issued by the Duke of
Saxony, stress is especially laid upon the responsibility of
the electoral princes for the peace and wellbeing of the
empire, and upon the incompetence of Adolf. And the
Duke of Saxony proclaims that they had therefore, after
careful deliberation, and following the due process of law,
deprived him of the kingdom. 1
We are not here concerned to discuss the real political
causes of this action, or the question how far the action of
the princes was reasonable and in the circumstances justifiable ;
we are concerned only with the fact that they represent
themselves as exercising their constitutional power in accor-
dance with constitutional law. We would suggest that this
affords an illustration of the suggestion of St Thomas Aquinas,
that there should be some method and form of public action
by which the prince who proved incompetent or tyrannical
should be deposed. 2
It is in truth clear that the authority of the mediseval
prince was not only limited by the law, but that some at least
of the political systems of the Middle Ages provided a con-
stitutional form by which this limitation might be enforced
even by deposition. The right of withdrawal of allegiance
rcgnet amplius est eiectus, privatum
regno, cui hactenus profuit, a domino
OKtendimus, denunciamus privatum, ot
nihilominus ooncordi sententia pre-
dictorum principum electorum dic-
tante, sentenciando privamus; omnes
qui ei juramento fidelitatis tenentur
astricti, a juramento hujusmodi per-
petuo absolventes, firmiter inhibendo
ne quisquam de cetero sibi tanquam
regi pareat vel intendat. "
1 Id. id. , vol. iii. 690 : " Unde cum
in hiis quse ad conservacionem sanctse-
pacis et honorabilem sacri statum
Imperii expedire videntur, nos una
cum ceteris principibus electoribus
esse deceat circumspectos, considerato
et cognito, quod regnante predicto
domino Adolfo quies tempo mm per-
turbata non possit aliquatenus refor-
mari, sed mala multiplicarentur in
terris, intollerabilibus et dampnosis
hujusmodi compulsi defectibus, ad
quorum emendationem predictum regem
competentem non vidimus, animadver-
tendum juste duximus in eundem,
deliberacione matura et diligenti sollici-
tudine perhabita, juris etiam ordine
ut decuit observato, regno Romano,
cui minus utiliter prefuit cuiusque per
demerita reddidit se indignum, pri-
v an tee ipsum et privatum denun-
ciantos dictante sententia concordi
prcdiotorum principum electorum. "
? Cf. p. 96.
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? 120 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PABT I.
and the right of deposition were, however, cumbrous and
inconvenient methods for the restraint of the prince.
We must therefore now consider very briefly the signi-
ficance of some very important thirteenth-century experiments
in the establishment of easier and more effective methods
of control. We do not pretend here to discuss the history
of these experiments in detail; that has already been done
for England with characteristic restraint and caution in the
great work of Bishop Stubbs, and recently there has appeared
an admirably detailed study of some aspects of these ex-
periments. 1 We are concerned with the political ideas which
lay behind these experiments ; for they were important not
only in themselves but for that which they anticipated.
It is in England that we find the most important examples
of these experiments, but there are also some important
parallels in Spain.
This is the larger historical significance of the sixty-first
clause of Magna Carta, the clause in which the king sanctioned
the appointment by the barons of a Committee from their
number, which was to have authority not only to demand
of the king and the justiciary the execution of the provisions
of the charter, but to compel this with the assistance of the
whole community (communa totius terra), if necessary by
force. 2 No doubt the situation was exceptional, the good
1 Cf. Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap.
14, and Mr Jacob in ' Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History,' ed.
Vinogradoff.
2 Magna Carta, 61 : " Cum autem
pro Deo et ad emendacionem regni
nostri, et ad melius sopiendam dis-
cordiam inter nos et barones nostras
ortam, hjeo omnia prsedicta oonoes-
serimus, volentes ea integra et firms
<<tabilitate in perpetuum gaudere, faci-
mus et concedimus eis securitatem
subscriptam ; videlicet, quod barones
eligant viginti quinque barones de
regno quos voluerint, qui debeant pro
to tia viribus suis observare, tenere et
facere observari, pacem et libertates
quas eis concessimus, et hoc presenti
carta nostra confirmavimus, ita scilicet
quod si nos, vel justitiarius nouter,
vel ballivi nostri, vel aliquis de ministris
nostris, in aliquo erga aliquem deli-
querimus, vel aliquem articularum
pacis aut securitatis transgressi fueri-
mus, et delictum ostensum fuerit
quatuor baronibus de predictis viginti
quinque baronibus, illi quatuor barones
accedant ad nos vel ad justieiarium
nostrum, si fuerimus extra regnum,
preponentes nobis excessum: potent
ut excessum ilium sine dilacione facia-
mus emendari. Et si nos excessum
non emendaverimus, vel si fuerimus
extra regnum, justiciarius nortec non
emendaverit infra tempus quadraginta
dierum computandum a tempore quo
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
121
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
faith of John was more than doubtful, and it would be un-
reasonable to suppose that the barons thought that they
were creating a permanent constitutional system. And yet
it is in these provisions that we have the germ of the public
control of what we should in modern times call the administra-
tive action of the Crown.
If this arrangement stood alone, it would no doubt have
little significance, but when we observe that the methods
which were here proposed were carried much further in the
demands of the barons of 1244 and 1258, this clause of
Magna Carta receives a new importance.
We only know the demands of the barons in 1244 through
Matthew Paris, and we must therefore treat the subject with
caution, but it would appear from his narrative that the
barons complained that the provisions of the great Charter
were not being carried out, and they therefore demanded
the appointment of a justiciar and chancellor. 1 Matthew
Paris also gives an account of a scheme of reform which
seems to belong to the same time under which a new charter
was to be drawn up, and its execution entrusted to four
counsellors chosen by the common consent. 2
monstratum fuerit nobis Vel justiciario
nostro si, extra regnum fuerimus, pre-
dict! quatuor barones referant causam
illam ad residues de illis viginti quinque
baronibus, et illi viginti quinque
barones cum communa totius terra
distringent et gravabunt nos modis
omnibus quibus poterunt, scilicet per
captionem castrorum, terrarum, pos-
sessionum, et aliis modis quibus poto-
runt, donee fuerit emendatum secun-
dum arbitrium eorum, salva persona
nostra et reguue nostrse et liberorum
nostrorum; et cum fuerit emendatum
intendent nobis sicut prius fecerunt. "
1 Matthew Paris, ' Chronica Majora,'
vol. iv. p. 362 : " Et quia carta liber -
tatum quas dominus rex olim conces-
serat et pro cujus observatione archie-
piscopus Cantuarensis /Edrmmdus jura-
verat, fide jusserat, et certissime pro
rege promiserat, nondum exstitit obser-
vata, et auxilia quse to ties conceesa
fuerant domino regi ad nullum pro-
fectum regis vel regni devenerant; et
per defectum cancellarii b re via contra
justitiam pluries fuerant concessa, peti-
tum fuit ut secundum quod elegerant,
justitiarius et cancellarius fierent, per
quos status regni solidaretur, ut sole-
bat. "
* Id. id. , p. 366 : " De oommuni
assensu quatuor eligantur potentes et
nobiles de discretion bus totius regni,
qui sint do consilio domini regis, et
iurati quod negotia domini regis et
regni fideliter tractabunt, et sine
acceptione personarum omnibus iusti-
tiam exhibebunt- Hi sequentur domi-
rum re gem, et si non omnes, semper
duo eorum ad minus prasentes sint,
ut andiant querimonias singulorum,
et patientibus iniuriam celeriter possint
? ? subvenire. . . . Et erunt libertatum
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? 122
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
It is in the Provisions of Oxford of 1258 that we find these
tentative schemes assuming a definite and precise form.
Much in the details of these are difficult to make out, and we
should refer to Bishop Stubbs for a complete account,1 but
the general principles are clear.
A council of twenty-four was to be appointed, half by
the king, half by the barons ; the king's representatives
were to select two of the barons' representatives, and the
barons' representatives two of the king's, and these four
were to elect fifteen who were to be confirmed by the whole
twenty-four, and to form the perpetual council of the king.
They were to have authority to advise the king on all matters
concerning the government of the kingdom, and to amend
and put in order all things which required this ; and they
were to have authority over the " haute justice " (the Justiciar)
and over all other people. 2 It was also of great significance
that the justiciar, the treasurer, and the chancellor were to
be appointed only for a year at a time, and were to give
account at the end of the year 3 ; and that the justiciar was
to swear that he would act according to the provisions to be
made by the twenty-four and the council of the king, and
conservatores. Et sicut de omnium
nssensu eliguntur, sic sine communi
assensu non potent aliquis eorum
ameveri. "
We owe both these references to
Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap. 14.
1 Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap. 14.
* Provisions of Oxford, ' Annales de
Burton ' (Rolls Series), p. 462 : " Dos
Parle? menz quanz serrunt tenus per an
et coment.
Quinze serrunt nomez par ces
quatre, ceo est a saver per le Cunt
le Marechale, le Cunt de Warewik,
Hugo le Bigot, et John Mansel, ki
sunt esluz par les 24, pur nomer les
devent dit quinze, les queus serunt
de conseil le rei. E serrunt cunfermez
par les avant dit 24 ou par la greinore
partie de els. E averunt poor del rei
conseiler en bone fei del governement
del reaume, et de totes choses ke al
rei u al reaume pertenent. E pur
amender et adrescer totes les choses
ke il verrunt ke facent a adrescer e
amender. E sur le haute justice, et
sur totes autres genz. E se il ne
poent tuz estre, ceo ke la greinure
partie fera serra ferm et estable. "
* Id. , p. 450, ' De la haute justice ' :
" Derichef ke justice seit mis un u deus,
e quel poer il avera, e ke il ne seit fors
un an. Issi ke al chef del an respoine
devant le rei e sun cunseil de sun tens
e devant lui ko serra apres lui. "
" Del tresorer e de le escheker.
Autel, del tresorer. Mes ke il rende
aounte al chef del an. "
" Del chanceler. Autel, del chance-
ler. Issi ke al chef del an respoine de
sun tens. E ke il ne ensele hors de
curs par la suie volunte del rei ; mes
le face par le cunseil ke serra entur
? ? le rei. "
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
123
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
that the chancellor was to swear that he would seal no writ
except writs of course (brefs de curs) without the com-
mandment of the king and his council who were to be present,1
or, as it is put in the passage cited before, he was to seal
nothing outside of the ordinary course (hors de curs) by the
sole will of the king, but only by the authority of the council,
who were to be with the king.
It is no doubt true that St Louis in 1264 annulled the
Provisions of Oxford, when they were submitted to his
arbitration by the king and the barons, but his award was
not accepted, and after the defeat of Henry LTI. at Lewes,
the system of the Provisions was re-established in the Parlia-
ment of 1264, with some modifications. Three electors were
to be chosen, and the king was to give them authority, in
his place, to appoint a council of nine members of whom
three at least were to be in rotation at the Court. By their
counsel the king was to administer the affairs of the kingdom,
and to appoint the justiciar, the chancellor, the treasurer,
and the other officials both small and great. 2
We have an excellent commentary upon the principles
which lay behind these proposals in the contemporary ' Song
of Lewes. ' This was no doubt written by a partisan of the
barons, but it is not the less significant as illustrating the
1 Id. , p. 411 : " Ceo jura le haute jus-
tice de Engleterre. Il jure que ben e
loaument a sun poer fra ceo ke apent
a la justicerie de dreituro tenir, a tute
gonz al prou le rei e del resume, solum
la purveaunce fete et a fere par les
vint et quatre, et par le cunseil le
rey e les hauz humes de la tere, ki
li jurrunt en costes choses a aider e
a maintenir.
Ceo jura le chanceler de Engleterre.
Ke il ne euselera nul bref fors bref
de curs sanz le commandement le rei,
o de sun cunseil ke sera present: ne
enselera dun de grant garde, ne de
grant . . . no de eschaetes, sanz le
assentement del grant cunseil u de
la greinure partie. Ne ke il ne enselera
ren ke seit encontre le ordincment ke
e fet e serra a fere par les vint e quatre,
u par la greinure partie. "
>> Rymer, ' Feeders,' vol. i. p. 443
(ed. 1816): " Ad reformationem regni
Anglise eligantur et nommentur tres
discreti et fideles de regno, qui habeant
auotoritatem et potestatem a domino
rege eligendi seu nominandi, vice
domini regis, consiliarios novem ; tres
ad minus alternatim sen vicissim sem-
per sint in curia presentes. Et dominus
rex per concilium eorundem novem,
ordinet et disponat de custodia cas-
trorum et omnibus aliis regni negotiis.
Prseficiat etiam dominus rex per con-
silium predictorum novem, justitiarium
cancellarium, thesaurarium, et alios
officiales majores et minores in hiis quse
spectant ad regimen ourise et regni. "
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? 124
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
growth of the conception that it was not enough to have
good laws, but that some machinery should be created which
would secure that the king shoidd carry out these laws. The
whole poem is deserving of careful study ; it is enough for us,
here, to take note of its most important aspects. 1 As the
author sees it, the real question at issue was whether the king
should be free to govern according to his own will, and with
the advice of such counsellors as he might himself choose,
or whether he was to rule according to the law, and with
the counsel of those who represented the community and
were acquainted with its customs. 2
1 We are glad to have the oppor-
tunity of expressing our obligations
to the valuable edition of the text
and the comments upon it by Mr C. L.
Kingsford.
2 ' Carmen de bello Lewensi':
485. " En radicem tangimue pertur-
bacionis
Rcgni, de quo scribimus, et dis-
sencionis,
Parcium, que proelium dictum
commiserunt
Ad diversa studium suum con-
verterunt.
Rex cum suis voluit ita liber
esse,
Et sic esse debuit, fuitque necesse
Aut esse desineret rex privatus
jure.
Regis nisi faceret quidquid vellet;
cure
Non esse magnatibus regni, quos
preferret
Suis comitatibus, vel quibus con-
feret
Castro rum custodium, vel quem
exhibere
Populo justitiam vellet; et habere
Regni cancellarium theeaurarium-
que
Suum ad arbitrium voluit quem-
ounque
Et consiliarios de quacunque
gente,
Et ministros varios se precipiente ;
Non intromittentibus se de factie
regis
Anglise baronibus, vim habente
Principis imperio: et quod im-
peraret
Suomet arbitrio singulos ligaret.
533. Baronum pars igitur jam pro se
loquatur,
Et quo zelo ducitur rite prose-
quatur.
Que pars in principio palam pro-
testatur ;
Quod honori regio nihil machi-
natur.
547. Regis adversarii sunt hostes bel-
1 antes
Et consiliur n regi adulantes
Qui verbis fallacious principem
seducant,
587. Sive rex consenciens per seduc-
? ? tionem,
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
125
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
The regulations of the Provisions of Oxford were annulled
by the " Dictum de Kenilworth " after the defeat and death
of Simon de Montfort at Evesham, but it is evident that they
were not forgotten, for the " Ordinances " of 1311 repeat
the provision that the great officers of the country were to
be appointed by the king, with the counsel and consent of
the baronage. 1
There are some interesting parallels to these English ex-
periments to be found in Spain. From the proceedings of
the Cortes of Cuellar in 1297 it would appear that the repre-
Aut rcgnum finaliter destitueretur,
Tunc regni magnatibus cura debe-
retur
Ut eunctis erroribus terra purga-
759. Unde si rex sapiat minus quum
deberet
Quid regno conveniat regendo ?
Num queret
Suo sensu proprio quibus f ulciatur,
Quibus diminucio sua suppleatur ?
Si solus elegerit, facile falletur,
Utilis qui fuerit a quo nescietur.
Igitur communitas regni consu-
latur,
Et quid universitas senciat, scia-
tur,
Cui leges proprio maxime sunt
nots e ;
Nee cuncti provincise sic sunt
idiote,
Quiu sciant plus ceteris regni sui
mores,
Quod relinquunt posteris hii qui
sunt priores,
Qui reguntur legibus magis ipsas
sciunt,
Quorum sunt in usibus plus periti
Cunt.
777. Ex hiis potest colligi, quod com-
? munitatem
Tangit quales eligi ad utilitatem
Regni recte debeant; qui velint
et sciant
Et prodesse valeant, tales regis
fiant
Et conciliarii et coadjutores ;
803. Igitur eligere si rex per se nescit,
Qui sibi consulere sciant, hino
patcscit
Quid tunc debet fieri ; nam com-
munitatis
Est ne fiant miseri duces dignitatis,
Regie, set optimi et electi viri.
Atque probatissimi qui possint
inquiri.
843. Quia nulli bominum dicemus licere
Quicquid vult set dominum quem-
libet habere.
Qui errantem corrigat, bene-
facientem
Adiuvat, et erigit quandoque
cadentem.
Premio preferimus universati-
tem; N
Legem quoque dicimus regis
dignitatem
? ? Regere, nam credimus esse legem
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? 126 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PABT I.
sentation of the cities had, presumably at an earlier Cortes,
appointed twelve " good men " to be with the king, who was
a minor, and to counsel and serve him and the queen his
mother, and his uncle, who was his guardian, and the king
gives his consent to the arrangement. 1
On the death of King Ferdinand IV. of Castile, his heir
was again a child, and the Cortes of Palencia of 1313 not only
elected his guardians, but also appointed a body of four
prelates and sixteen knights and " good men " without whom
nothing was to be done. 2 A similar arrangement was made
by the Cortes of Burgos in 1315 ; they appointed twelve
knights and " good men," six from the " fijos dalgo " and six
knights and " good men " of the towns, to be continually with
the king and his guardians, who should receive complaints
when anything was done wrong in the country and see to it
that the guardians put it right. 3
1 ' Colocion de Cortes,' xxiii. 1 :
" Primieramiente que aquellos doce
omes bonos que me dieron los delas
villas del regno de Castiella para que
finquen conmigo por los tercios del
anno, para consejar e servir a mi e
a la reyna mi madre, e al infante don
Enrique mio tio e mio tutor, que en
fecho de la justicia e de todas las
rentas e de todo lo al que me dan loe
della tierra, e como se ponga en re-
cabdo e se parta en lugar que sea mio
servicio e amparamiento de la tierra,
e en todas las otras cosas de fecho dela
tierra que ovieren de ordenar que sean
mio servicio e a pro e a guardamiento
dela tierra, que me place que sean
comigo e que tomen ouenta delo
pasado. "
* Id. , 37, 4 : " Otrosi ordinamos que
porque nos ffuessemos poderosos e
ssopiessemos e quessiessomos e podios-
semos pararnos asservicio del rey e?
a? pro delos rregnos, e porque nos
oviessemos grand poder para obrar
bien e nos pudiessemos ffazer danno
del rey nin delos rregnos, que den
quatro perlados e sseze caualleros e
ommes bonos que scean nuestros con-
sseieros, e que sse non pueda flazer
ssin ellos ninguna cosa ; o estos per-
lados e sseze consseiros s so an escogidos
quales deven sseer e non puestos a
voluntad. "
Cf. id. 36, 2 : " Otrossi que ascan
y diez e sses caualleros e ommes
buenos delas villas do nuestro sen? or
el rey en esta manera . . . (i. e. , four
from Castile, four from Es tremad lira,
four from Leon, and four from Anda-
lusia).
Et estos veynte caualleros e ommes
buenos quelos escueja yo con acuerdo
delos ommes buenos delas villas del
rey. . . . Et estos que anden e ssean
en guarda del rey, los diez la meatat
del anno et los otros diez la otra
meatat. "
* Id. , 38, 14 : " Otrossi ordenamos
que anden doze caualleros e? omes
buenos, los seys de los Hijos dalgo e
los seys caualleros e ommes buenos
? ? de las villas con el rey e? con los tutores
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? CHAP. VIII. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
127
It is no doubt true that these arrangements belong to
troubled times during minorities, and that their significance
must not be exaggerated, but the parallel to the " Provisions
of Oxford " is remarkable.
These constitutional experiments are of great interest.
It may, no doubt, be argued that in England they represent
nothing more than the attempt of the baronage to establish
their own control over the king and the country. We are,
however, here not concerned with the question of their
immediate conditions and causes ; to us they are of the highest
interest as representing some of the first attempts to devise
a method by which the ruler might be compelled to carry
out the law of the land, and be restrained within the limits
of his authority by some method more normal and less
revolutionary than the withdrawal of obedience or deposition.
It was a long time before the principle of the responsibility
of the ministers of the king to the community was fully
established, but it was in that direction that these experi-
ments looked, and they are therefore of great importance as
representing an intelligible development of the mediseval
principle of the limitation of the authority of the ruler.
Porque quando algunas cosas desaf- leros 6 ommes buenos. Et ellos
foradas ffizieren en la tierra, que quelo muestren a los tutores, 6 los
aquellos a quien las ffizieren que af rnen ten quelo ffagan emendar 6
lo enbien mostrar a estos caual- desffaier. '!
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? 128
CHAPTER IX.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
We hope that we have succeeded in making plain the main
elements in the normal political principles and practice of the
Middle Ages, and especially the principle that the law was the
supreme authority in the political society, and that all other
authorities were subordinate and subject to this ; and that, so
far as men conceived of the law as having any other source
than the custom of the community, it was the community
as a whole, the king, the barons, and the people. We have
endeavoured in previous volumes to show that these prin-
ciples can be traced throughout the whole of mediseval
history, and in this volume we have, we think, said enough to
make it plain that they were as clearly held in the thirteenth
century as before.
It is true that the revival of the study of the Eoman Law
in the twelfth century had brought with it a new conception
of the authority of the prince, and especially that of the prince
as the source or fountain of law, and in a further volume
we shall have to consider how far this may have contributed
to the development of a new conception of monarchy. We
have said enough, however, in this volume to make it plain
that, as far as the thirteenth century is concerned, this con-
ception was represented only in the purely academic discus-
sions of some of the Bologna Civilians and in one or two quite
abnormal political writers like Egidius Colonna. The normal
conception was quite clear, that the law was supreme, over
the prince as over all other members of the community, and
that while the prince had his place, an important place, in
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? OHAP. EC. ]
THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
the declaration and establishment of law, it was from the
community as a whole that it proceeded.
It is not our part in this work to trace the development of
the machinery of government in the Middle Ages, nor, indeed,
is this necessary, for it has been handled with great learning
by the constitutional historians.
que seran, o? otros qualesquier vinieren
contra esto por menguer o? quebrantar
nuostros fueros, e? nuestros privilegios,
e? nuestras franquesas, e? nuestras liver-
tades, e? los buenos usos, e? las buenas
costumbres en todos o? en ellos que
nos paremos todos amanparallo, e? a?
defendello, e? con qualquier de nos que
desto falleciessen faciendolo saver los
unos a las otros, que los que lo sufieren
e? non quisieren venir aiudallos a
aquellos, e? que ficieren el tuerto des tas
cosas sobredichas que sean traidores
como quien mata sen? o/, o? traie castiello ;
e? que sera? mostrado cada an? o en la
? ? junta. '*
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? 116
[PART 1.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
The refusal of obedience was then the first aspect of what
we may call the legitimate method of enforcing the limita-
tion of the authority of the ruler. It is necessary to distinguish
this, from the principle that in the last resort the prince
who refused to obey the law might be deposed. To the
modern mind the renunciation of obedience or the with-
drawal of allegiance may seem indistinguishable from de-
position, but it was not so in the Middle Ages.
Having then observed this, we must turn to the question
of the deposition of the ruler. We are not here concerned
with the mere fact of deposition, or with the justice or ex-
pediency of particular cases of deposition, but with the question
how far this was thought of as being in principle legal and
constitutional. We must begin by dismissing from our minds
such a conception as that of the modern constitutional doctrine
of England, that the king can do no wrong. Those who
have any acquaintance with the English history do not need
to be reminded that this doctrine, which might seem to re-
present a theory of absolutism, actually represents the method
by which the arbitrary power of the monarch has been
destroyed. In the Middle Ages this doctrine, however, had
no place ; the king, like any other person in the community,
was responsible for his own actions.
We have in a previous volume dealt with the deposition
of the Emperor Henry IV. and the theory of that deposition
as expressed by various persons, and especially by Manegold
of Lautenbach ; we have also discussed the theory of John of
Salisbury that the unjust and tyrannical ruler has lost all
right to authority, and may properly be attacked and even
slain. 1 We are now concerned with the question how far
this principle continued to be held in the thirteenth century.
We may begin by observing some words of a writer who
held what we have seen to be an unusual and even abnormal
view of the nature of the regal authority--that is, Egidius
Colonna. As we have seen, he maintained that the best form
of political authority was that of a monarchy which was
itself the source of law, and was above law. 2 It was the same
1 Cf. vol. iii. part ii. chaps. 5 and 6. s Cf. p. 74.
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? CHAP, vm. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER. 117
Egidius Colonna, however, who, as we have seen, in his tract
on the resignation of the Papal throne by Celestine V. , main-
tained that as the authority of the ruler must be established
by the consent of men, so also by the same consent he might
resign or even be deposed. 1 With this we should compare
the very careful discussion by St Thomas Aquinas of the
circumstances under which and the methods by which the
tyrannical ruler should be deposed, with which we have
already dealt. 2
We may now turn to the legal works and the records of
constitutional proceedings, and we may begin by observing
some words of the ' Sachsenspiegel. ' No man may
proceed against the king's life until he has been by proper
sentence deprived of his kingdom. 3 This is repeated in
the compilation which we know as the ' Schwabenspiegel,'
but it adds that no one can declare judgment on the
king's life or honour, except the princes. * It is clear
that both these works assume in principle that there
is a legal process by which the king can be deposed. At
first sight we might very well suppose that these were little
more than the phrases of a theoretical system of law, but
it is noticeable that even the great Frederick II. used, if only
incidentally and under circumstances which might well make
such a statement diplomatically convenient, words which
have the same implication. In the Encyclical letter which
he addressed to St Louis of France and to the " Magnates
Anglian," as well as to the princes of the empire, he protested
1 Egidius Colonna, ' De Renuntia-
tione Papse,' xvi. 1 : " Sed quamvis
sic requirit natura negotii, quod scientes
melius pericula prsevidere, aliis prscfi-
ciantur, ut sub eorum gubernacula
multitudo servetur, oportet tamen
quod hoo compleatur per consonsum
hominum. Et siout per assensum
hominum perficitur et completur, ut
quia aliis prseficiatur, sie per consensum
hominum contrario modo factum fieri
potest, quod prsefectus cedat, vel quod
etiam deponatur. "
2 Cf. p. 96
3 * Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 54, 4 : M Also
ne mach deme Konige neman an sin
lif spreken, ime ne si dat rike vore
mit ordelen verdelt. "
' 'Schwabenspiegel,' 104: "Den Ku-
nige mac nieman an den lip ges-
prechen, im werde daz riche e verteilet
mit der Fiirsten urteile. Uber des
Kunigee lip und iiber sin ere mac
nieman urteil sprechen wan die Fiir-
sten. "
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? 118
[PART I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
against his deposition by Pope Innocent IV. as being the
action of a " judex incompetens," and urged that the sentence
and the whole proceedings were null and void, for none of
the princes of Germany " a quibus assumptio status et de-
pressio nostra dependit," had confirmed them by their presence
and counsel. 1
In the proceedings related to the deposition of Adolf of
Germany in 1298, we find that the princes concerned assumed
that they were acting by due process of law, and it is worth
while to observe the procedure in a little detail. The Arch-
bishop of Maintz called a Council to consider the troubled
condition of Germany, and to this he summoned both the
princes who had the right of election, and Adolf himself.
The important princes present were the Archbishop himself,
who was said to be acting also for the King of Bohemia;
the Duke of Saxony, holding also the proxy of the Count
Palatine; and the Margrave of Brandenburg. They enum-
erated various charges against him, the violation of Churches
and ecclesiastics, the toleration of violence against women,
the interference with ecclesiastical liberties, especially by
demanding gifts before he would grant the " Eegalia " to
the bishops, and various acts of aggression upon the rights of
the German princes, counts, barons, &c. They found Adolf
guilty of these crimes, and declared that he had proved him-
self to be incompetent and useless for so great an authority,
and therefore, after careful deliberation and by the common
council and will of all the electoral princes, the bishops, dukes,
counts, barons, and wise men present, the electoral princes
declared Adolf deposed, and also absolved all men from
their oath of allegiance to him. 2
1 M. G. H. , ' Const,' vol. ii. 262, 9:
" Advertat igittir prudentia tua, si
predicta sententia nulla ipso jure,
nullus ipso jure processus, . . . debeat
observari, quam nulli nostrorum Ger-
manise principum a quibus assumptio
status et depressio nostra dependet,
presentia vel consilio firmaverunt. "
* M. G. H. , ' Constitutiones,' vol. iii.
589, 7 : " Igitur super premissis cum
principibus electoribus episcopis, pre-
latis, ducibus, comitibus, baronibus et
sapientibus, omnibus ibidem presen-
tibus, deliberatione prehabita diligenti,
de communi consilio et voluntate
omnium de consensu unanimo illorum,
quorum in te re rat, prediotum domimim
Adolphum qui se regno reddidit tam
indignum, quique propter suas iniqui-
tates et causas prescriptas a Deo ne
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? CHAP. Tin. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER. 119
In the promulgation of the deposition of Adolf, and the
election of Albert Duke of Austria, issued by the Duke of
Saxony, stress is especially laid upon the responsibility of
the electoral princes for the peace and wellbeing of the
empire, and upon the incompetence of Adolf. And the
Duke of Saxony proclaims that they had therefore, after
careful deliberation, and following the due process of law,
deprived him of the kingdom. 1
We are not here concerned to discuss the real political
causes of this action, or the question how far the action of
the princes was reasonable and in the circumstances justifiable ;
we are concerned only with the fact that they represent
themselves as exercising their constitutional power in accor-
dance with constitutional law. We would suggest that this
affords an illustration of the suggestion of St Thomas Aquinas,
that there should be some method and form of public action
by which the prince who proved incompetent or tyrannical
should be deposed. 2
It is in truth clear that the authority of the mediseval
prince was not only limited by the law, but that some at least
of the political systems of the Middle Ages provided a con-
stitutional form by which this limitation might be enforced
even by deposition. The right of withdrawal of allegiance
rcgnet amplius est eiectus, privatum
regno, cui hactenus profuit, a domino
OKtendimus, denunciamus privatum, ot
nihilominus ooncordi sententia pre-
dictorum principum electorum dic-
tante, sentenciando privamus; omnes
qui ei juramento fidelitatis tenentur
astricti, a juramento hujusmodi per-
petuo absolventes, firmiter inhibendo
ne quisquam de cetero sibi tanquam
regi pareat vel intendat. "
1 Id. id. , vol. iii. 690 : " Unde cum
in hiis quse ad conservacionem sanctse-
pacis et honorabilem sacri statum
Imperii expedire videntur, nos una
cum ceteris principibus electoribus
esse deceat circumspectos, considerato
et cognito, quod regnante predicto
domino Adolfo quies tempo mm per-
turbata non possit aliquatenus refor-
mari, sed mala multiplicarentur in
terris, intollerabilibus et dampnosis
hujusmodi compulsi defectibus, ad
quorum emendationem predictum regem
competentem non vidimus, animadver-
tendum juste duximus in eundem,
deliberacione matura et diligenti sollici-
tudine perhabita, juris etiam ordine
ut decuit observato, regno Romano,
cui minus utiliter prefuit cuiusque per
demerita reddidit se indignum, pri-
v an tee ipsum et privatum denun-
ciantos dictante sententia concordi
prcdiotorum principum electorum. "
? Cf. p. 96.
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? 120 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PABT I.
and the right of deposition were, however, cumbrous and
inconvenient methods for the restraint of the prince.
We must therefore now consider very briefly the signi-
ficance of some very important thirteenth-century experiments
in the establishment of easier and more effective methods
of control. We do not pretend here to discuss the history
of these experiments in detail; that has already been done
for England with characteristic restraint and caution in the
great work of Bishop Stubbs, and recently there has appeared
an admirably detailed study of some aspects of these ex-
periments. 1 We are concerned with the political ideas which
lay behind these experiments ; for they were important not
only in themselves but for that which they anticipated.
It is in England that we find the most important examples
of these experiments, but there are also some important
parallels in Spain.
This is the larger historical significance of the sixty-first
clause of Magna Carta, the clause in which the king sanctioned
the appointment by the barons of a Committee from their
number, which was to have authority not only to demand
of the king and the justiciary the execution of the provisions
of the charter, but to compel this with the assistance of the
whole community (communa totius terra), if necessary by
force. 2 No doubt the situation was exceptional, the good
1 Cf. Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap.
14, and Mr Jacob in ' Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History,' ed.
Vinogradoff.
2 Magna Carta, 61 : " Cum autem
pro Deo et ad emendacionem regni
nostri, et ad melius sopiendam dis-
cordiam inter nos et barones nostras
ortam, hjeo omnia prsedicta oonoes-
serimus, volentes ea integra et firms
<<tabilitate in perpetuum gaudere, faci-
mus et concedimus eis securitatem
subscriptam ; videlicet, quod barones
eligant viginti quinque barones de
regno quos voluerint, qui debeant pro
to tia viribus suis observare, tenere et
facere observari, pacem et libertates
quas eis concessimus, et hoc presenti
carta nostra confirmavimus, ita scilicet
quod si nos, vel justitiarius nouter,
vel ballivi nostri, vel aliquis de ministris
nostris, in aliquo erga aliquem deli-
querimus, vel aliquem articularum
pacis aut securitatis transgressi fueri-
mus, et delictum ostensum fuerit
quatuor baronibus de predictis viginti
quinque baronibus, illi quatuor barones
accedant ad nos vel ad justieiarium
nostrum, si fuerimus extra regnum,
preponentes nobis excessum: potent
ut excessum ilium sine dilacione facia-
mus emendari. Et si nos excessum
non emendaverimus, vel si fuerimus
extra regnum, justiciarius nortec non
emendaverit infra tempus quadraginta
dierum computandum a tempore quo
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
121
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
faith of John was more than doubtful, and it would be un-
reasonable to suppose that the barons thought that they
were creating a permanent constitutional system. And yet
it is in these provisions that we have the germ of the public
control of what we should in modern times call the administra-
tive action of the Crown.
If this arrangement stood alone, it would no doubt have
little significance, but when we observe that the methods
which were here proposed were carried much further in the
demands of the barons of 1244 and 1258, this clause of
Magna Carta receives a new importance.
We only know the demands of the barons in 1244 through
Matthew Paris, and we must therefore treat the subject with
caution, but it would appear from his narrative that the
barons complained that the provisions of the great Charter
were not being carried out, and they therefore demanded
the appointment of a justiciar and chancellor. 1 Matthew
Paris also gives an account of a scheme of reform which
seems to belong to the same time under which a new charter
was to be drawn up, and its execution entrusted to four
counsellors chosen by the common consent. 2
monstratum fuerit nobis Vel justiciario
nostro si, extra regnum fuerimus, pre-
dict! quatuor barones referant causam
illam ad residues de illis viginti quinque
baronibus, et illi viginti quinque
barones cum communa totius terra
distringent et gravabunt nos modis
omnibus quibus poterunt, scilicet per
captionem castrorum, terrarum, pos-
sessionum, et aliis modis quibus poto-
runt, donee fuerit emendatum secun-
dum arbitrium eorum, salva persona
nostra et reguue nostrse et liberorum
nostrorum; et cum fuerit emendatum
intendent nobis sicut prius fecerunt. "
1 Matthew Paris, ' Chronica Majora,'
vol. iv. p. 362 : " Et quia carta liber -
tatum quas dominus rex olim conces-
serat et pro cujus observatione archie-
piscopus Cantuarensis /Edrmmdus jura-
verat, fide jusserat, et certissime pro
rege promiserat, nondum exstitit obser-
vata, et auxilia quse to ties conceesa
fuerant domino regi ad nullum pro-
fectum regis vel regni devenerant; et
per defectum cancellarii b re via contra
justitiam pluries fuerant concessa, peti-
tum fuit ut secundum quod elegerant,
justitiarius et cancellarius fierent, per
quos status regni solidaretur, ut sole-
bat. "
* Id. id. , p. 366 : " De oommuni
assensu quatuor eligantur potentes et
nobiles de discretion bus totius regni,
qui sint do consilio domini regis, et
iurati quod negotia domini regis et
regni fideliter tractabunt, et sine
acceptione personarum omnibus iusti-
tiam exhibebunt- Hi sequentur domi-
rum re gem, et si non omnes, semper
duo eorum ad minus prasentes sint,
ut andiant querimonias singulorum,
et patientibus iniuriam celeriter possint
? ? subvenire. . . . Et erunt libertatum
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? 122
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
It is in the Provisions of Oxford of 1258 that we find these
tentative schemes assuming a definite and precise form.
Much in the details of these are difficult to make out, and we
should refer to Bishop Stubbs for a complete account,1 but
the general principles are clear.
A council of twenty-four was to be appointed, half by
the king, half by the barons ; the king's representatives
were to select two of the barons' representatives, and the
barons' representatives two of the king's, and these four
were to elect fifteen who were to be confirmed by the whole
twenty-four, and to form the perpetual council of the king.
They were to have authority to advise the king on all matters
concerning the government of the kingdom, and to amend
and put in order all things which required this ; and they
were to have authority over the " haute justice " (the Justiciar)
and over all other people. 2 It was also of great significance
that the justiciar, the treasurer, and the chancellor were to
be appointed only for a year at a time, and were to give
account at the end of the year 3 ; and that the justiciar was
to swear that he would act according to the provisions to be
made by the twenty-four and the council of the king, and
conservatores. Et sicut de omnium
nssensu eliguntur, sic sine communi
assensu non potent aliquis eorum
ameveri. "
We owe both these references to
Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap. 14.
1 Stubb's ' Const. Hist. ,' chap. 14.
* Provisions of Oxford, ' Annales de
Burton ' (Rolls Series), p. 462 : " Dos
Parle? menz quanz serrunt tenus per an
et coment.
Quinze serrunt nomez par ces
quatre, ceo est a saver per le Cunt
le Marechale, le Cunt de Warewik,
Hugo le Bigot, et John Mansel, ki
sunt esluz par les 24, pur nomer les
devent dit quinze, les queus serunt
de conseil le rei. E serrunt cunfermez
par les avant dit 24 ou par la greinore
partie de els. E averunt poor del rei
conseiler en bone fei del governement
del reaume, et de totes choses ke al
rei u al reaume pertenent. E pur
amender et adrescer totes les choses
ke il verrunt ke facent a adrescer e
amender. E sur le haute justice, et
sur totes autres genz. E se il ne
poent tuz estre, ceo ke la greinure
partie fera serra ferm et estable. "
* Id. , p. 450, ' De la haute justice ' :
" Derichef ke justice seit mis un u deus,
e quel poer il avera, e ke il ne seit fors
un an. Issi ke al chef del an respoine
devant le rei e sun cunseil de sun tens
e devant lui ko serra apres lui. "
" Del tresorer e de le escheker.
Autel, del tresorer. Mes ke il rende
aounte al chef del an. "
" Del chanceler. Autel, del chance-
ler. Issi ke al chef del an respoine de
sun tens. E ke il ne ensele hors de
curs par la suie volunte del rei ; mes
le face par le cunseil ke serra entur
? ? le rei. "
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
123
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
that the chancellor was to swear that he would seal no writ
except writs of course (brefs de curs) without the com-
mandment of the king and his council who were to be present,1
or, as it is put in the passage cited before, he was to seal
nothing outside of the ordinary course (hors de curs) by the
sole will of the king, but only by the authority of the council,
who were to be with the king.
It is no doubt true that St Louis in 1264 annulled the
Provisions of Oxford, when they were submitted to his
arbitration by the king and the barons, but his award was
not accepted, and after the defeat of Henry LTI. at Lewes,
the system of the Provisions was re-established in the Parlia-
ment of 1264, with some modifications. Three electors were
to be chosen, and the king was to give them authority, in
his place, to appoint a council of nine members of whom
three at least were to be in rotation at the Court. By their
counsel the king was to administer the affairs of the kingdom,
and to appoint the justiciar, the chancellor, the treasurer,
and the other officials both small and great. 2
We have an excellent commentary upon the principles
which lay behind these proposals in the contemporary ' Song
of Lewes. ' This was no doubt written by a partisan of the
barons, but it is not the less significant as illustrating the
1 Id. , p. 411 : " Ceo jura le haute jus-
tice de Engleterre. Il jure que ben e
loaument a sun poer fra ceo ke apent
a la justicerie de dreituro tenir, a tute
gonz al prou le rei e del resume, solum
la purveaunce fete et a fere par les
vint et quatre, et par le cunseil le
rey e les hauz humes de la tere, ki
li jurrunt en costes choses a aider e
a maintenir.
Ceo jura le chanceler de Engleterre.
Ke il ne euselera nul bref fors bref
de curs sanz le commandement le rei,
o de sun cunseil ke sera present: ne
enselera dun de grant garde, ne de
grant . . . no de eschaetes, sanz le
assentement del grant cunseil u de
la greinure partie. Ne ke il ne enselera
ren ke seit encontre le ordincment ke
e fet e serra a fere par les vint e quatre,
u par la greinure partie. "
>> Rymer, ' Feeders,' vol. i. p. 443
(ed. 1816): " Ad reformationem regni
Anglise eligantur et nommentur tres
discreti et fideles de regno, qui habeant
auotoritatem et potestatem a domino
rege eligendi seu nominandi, vice
domini regis, consiliarios novem ; tres
ad minus alternatim sen vicissim sem-
per sint in curia presentes. Et dominus
rex per concilium eorundem novem,
ordinet et disponat de custodia cas-
trorum et omnibus aliis regni negotiis.
Prseficiat etiam dominus rex per con-
silium predictorum novem, justitiarium
cancellarium, thesaurarium, et alios
officiales majores et minores in hiis quse
spectant ad regimen ourise et regni. "
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? 124
[PABT I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
growth of the conception that it was not enough to have
good laws, but that some machinery should be created which
would secure that the king shoidd carry out these laws. The
whole poem is deserving of careful study ; it is enough for us,
here, to take note of its most important aspects. 1 As the
author sees it, the real question at issue was whether the king
should be free to govern according to his own will, and with
the advice of such counsellors as he might himself choose,
or whether he was to rule according to the law, and with
the counsel of those who represented the community and
were acquainted with its customs. 2
1 We are glad to have the oppor-
tunity of expressing our obligations
to the valuable edition of the text
and the comments upon it by Mr C. L.
Kingsford.
2 ' Carmen de bello Lewensi':
485. " En radicem tangimue pertur-
bacionis
Rcgni, de quo scribimus, et dis-
sencionis,
Parcium, que proelium dictum
commiserunt
Ad diversa studium suum con-
verterunt.
Rex cum suis voluit ita liber
esse,
Et sic esse debuit, fuitque necesse
Aut esse desineret rex privatus
jure.
Regis nisi faceret quidquid vellet;
cure
Non esse magnatibus regni, quos
preferret
Suis comitatibus, vel quibus con-
feret
Castro rum custodium, vel quem
exhibere
Populo justitiam vellet; et habere
Regni cancellarium theeaurarium-
que
Suum ad arbitrium voluit quem-
ounque
Et consiliarios de quacunque
gente,
Et ministros varios se precipiente ;
Non intromittentibus se de factie
regis
Anglise baronibus, vim habente
Principis imperio: et quod im-
peraret
Suomet arbitrio singulos ligaret.
533. Baronum pars igitur jam pro se
loquatur,
Et quo zelo ducitur rite prose-
quatur.
Que pars in principio palam pro-
testatur ;
Quod honori regio nihil machi-
natur.
547. Regis adversarii sunt hostes bel-
1 antes
Et consiliur n regi adulantes
Qui verbis fallacious principem
seducant,
587. Sive rex consenciens per seduc-
? ? tionem,
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? CHAP. VIII. ]
125
THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
The regulations of the Provisions of Oxford were annulled
by the " Dictum de Kenilworth " after the defeat and death
of Simon de Montfort at Evesham, but it is evident that they
were not forgotten, for the " Ordinances " of 1311 repeat
the provision that the great officers of the country were to
be appointed by the king, with the counsel and consent of
the baronage. 1
There are some interesting parallels to these English ex-
periments to be found in Spain. From the proceedings of
the Cortes of Cuellar in 1297 it would appear that the repre-
Aut rcgnum finaliter destitueretur,
Tunc regni magnatibus cura debe-
retur
Ut eunctis erroribus terra purga-
759. Unde si rex sapiat minus quum
deberet
Quid regno conveniat regendo ?
Num queret
Suo sensu proprio quibus f ulciatur,
Quibus diminucio sua suppleatur ?
Si solus elegerit, facile falletur,
Utilis qui fuerit a quo nescietur.
Igitur communitas regni consu-
latur,
Et quid universitas senciat, scia-
tur,
Cui leges proprio maxime sunt
nots e ;
Nee cuncti provincise sic sunt
idiote,
Quiu sciant plus ceteris regni sui
mores,
Quod relinquunt posteris hii qui
sunt priores,
Qui reguntur legibus magis ipsas
sciunt,
Quorum sunt in usibus plus periti
Cunt.
777. Ex hiis potest colligi, quod com-
? munitatem
Tangit quales eligi ad utilitatem
Regni recte debeant; qui velint
et sciant
Et prodesse valeant, tales regis
fiant
Et conciliarii et coadjutores ;
803. Igitur eligere si rex per se nescit,
Qui sibi consulere sciant, hino
patcscit
Quid tunc debet fieri ; nam com-
munitatis
Est ne fiant miseri duces dignitatis,
Regie, set optimi et electi viri.
Atque probatissimi qui possint
inquiri.
843. Quia nulli bominum dicemus licere
Quicquid vult set dominum quem-
libet habere.
Qui errantem corrigat, bene-
facientem
Adiuvat, et erigit quandoque
cadentem.
Premio preferimus universati-
tem; N
Legem quoque dicimus regis
dignitatem
? ? Regere, nam credimus esse legem
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? 126 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PABT I.
sentation of the cities had, presumably at an earlier Cortes,
appointed twelve " good men " to be with the king, who was
a minor, and to counsel and serve him and the queen his
mother, and his uncle, who was his guardian, and the king
gives his consent to the arrangement. 1
On the death of King Ferdinand IV. of Castile, his heir
was again a child, and the Cortes of Palencia of 1313 not only
elected his guardians, but also appointed a body of four
prelates and sixteen knights and " good men " without whom
nothing was to be done. 2 A similar arrangement was made
by the Cortes of Burgos in 1315 ; they appointed twelve
knights and " good men," six from the " fijos dalgo " and six
knights and " good men " of the towns, to be continually with
the king and his guardians, who should receive complaints
when anything was done wrong in the country and see to it
that the guardians put it right. 3
1 ' Colocion de Cortes,' xxiii. 1 :
" Primieramiente que aquellos doce
omes bonos que me dieron los delas
villas del regno de Castiella para que
finquen conmigo por los tercios del
anno, para consejar e servir a mi e
a la reyna mi madre, e al infante don
Enrique mio tio e mio tutor, que en
fecho de la justicia e de todas las
rentas e de todo lo al que me dan loe
della tierra, e como se ponga en re-
cabdo e se parta en lugar que sea mio
servicio e amparamiento de la tierra,
e en todas las otras cosas de fecho dela
tierra que ovieren de ordenar que sean
mio servicio e a pro e a guardamiento
dela tierra, que me place que sean
comigo e que tomen ouenta delo
pasado. "
* Id. , 37, 4 : " Otrosi ordinamos que
porque nos ffuessemos poderosos e
ssopiessemos e quessiessomos e podios-
semos pararnos asservicio del rey e?
a? pro delos rregnos, e porque nos
oviessemos grand poder para obrar
bien e nos pudiessemos ffazer danno
del rey nin delos rregnos, que den
quatro perlados e sseze caualleros e
ommes bonos que scean nuestros con-
sseieros, e que sse non pueda flazer
ssin ellos ninguna cosa ; o estos per-
lados e sseze consseiros s so an escogidos
quales deven sseer e non puestos a
voluntad. "
Cf. id. 36, 2 : " Otrossi que ascan
y diez e sses caualleros e ommes
buenos delas villas do nuestro sen? or
el rey en esta manera . . . (i. e. , four
from Castile, four from Es tremad lira,
four from Leon, and four from Anda-
lusia).
Et estos veynte caualleros e ommes
buenos quelos escueja yo con acuerdo
delos ommes buenos delas villas del
rey. . . . Et estos que anden e ssean
en guarda del rey, los diez la meatat
del anno et los otros diez la otra
meatat. "
* Id. , 38, 14 : " Otrossi ordenamos
que anden doze caualleros e? omes
buenos, los seys de los Hijos dalgo e
los seys caualleros e ommes buenos
? ? de las villas con el rey e? con los tutores
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? CHAP. VIII. ] THE CONTROL OF THE RULER.
127
It is no doubt true that these arrangements belong to
troubled times during minorities, and that their significance
must not be exaggerated, but the parallel to the " Provisions
of Oxford " is remarkable.
These constitutional experiments are of great interest.
It may, no doubt, be argued that in England they represent
nothing more than the attempt of the baronage to establish
their own control over the king and the country. We are,
however, here not concerned with the question of their
immediate conditions and causes ; to us they are of the highest
interest as representing some of the first attempts to devise
a method by which the ruler might be compelled to carry
out the law of the land, and be restrained within the limits
of his authority by some method more normal and less
revolutionary than the withdrawal of obedience or deposition.
It was a long time before the principle of the responsibility
of the ministers of the king to the community was fully
established, but it was in that direction that these experi-
ments looked, and they are therefore of great importance as
representing an intelligible development of the mediseval
principle of the limitation of the authority of the ruler.
Porque quando algunas cosas desaf- leros 6 ommes buenos. Et ellos
foradas ffizieren en la tierra, que quelo muestren a los tutores, 6 los
aquellos a quien las ffizieren que af rnen ten quelo ffagan emendar 6
lo enbien mostrar a estos caual- desffaier. '!
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? 128
CHAPTER IX.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
We hope that we have succeeded in making plain the main
elements in the normal political principles and practice of the
Middle Ages, and especially the principle that the law was the
supreme authority in the political society, and that all other
authorities were subordinate and subject to this ; and that, so
far as men conceived of the law as having any other source
than the custom of the community, it was the community
as a whole, the king, the barons, and the people. We have
endeavoured in previous volumes to show that these prin-
ciples can be traced throughout the whole of mediseval
history, and in this volume we have, we think, said enough to
make it plain that they were as clearly held in the thirteenth
century as before.
It is true that the revival of the study of the Eoman Law
in the twelfth century had brought with it a new conception
of the authority of the prince, and especially that of the prince
as the source or fountain of law, and in a further volume
we shall have to consider how far this may have contributed
to the development of a new conception of monarchy. We
have said enough, however, in this volume to make it plain
that, as far as the thirteenth century is concerned, this con-
ception was represented only in the purely academic discus-
sions of some of the Bologna Civilians and in one or two quite
abnormal political writers like Egidius Colonna. The normal
conception was quite clear, that the law was supreme, over
the prince as over all other members of the community, and
that while the prince had his place, an important place, in
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? OHAP. EC. ]
THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
the declaration and establishment of law, it was from the
community as a whole that it proceeded.
It is not our part in this work to trace the development of
the machinery of government in the Middle Ages, nor, indeed,
is this necessary, for it has been handled with great learning
by the constitutional historians.
