Thus, it
was hoped, she might be disposed to favour the Spar-
tan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-
Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the
utmost of its power.
was hoped, she might be disposed to favour the Spar-
tan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-
Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the
utmost of its power.
Demosthenese - 1869 - Brodribb
43
law should be such as not to shock religious sentiment;
and while we look for good fortune, and implore
heaven to grant it, we will regard all fortune as sub-
ject to human casualties. The future, I take it, is un-
certain to all men, and small occasions are productive
of great events. Therefore we will be moderate in
prosperity, and show that we have an eye to the
future. "
It may be said that there is much of a modern tone
and character about this speech. Its arguments are
those of a constitutional lawyer and of a far-sighted
politician. It is quiet and temperate, and at the same
time singularly convincing. It was successful in its
immediate object, and it must have established the
reputation of Demosthenes as a political debater of the
first rank. From this time he must have felt but
little timidity or hesitation in addressing that critical
audience--the Athenian popular assembly.
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? CHAPTER V.
EARLY srsscnas or mnosrnssss on FOREIGN POLICY.
Psasm in the fourth century B. G. was a more consider-
able power than we might have supposed from the
comparative ease with which it was overthrown by
Alexander. The Great King, as he was always called,
was in the possession of immense resources. Financially
he was much stronger than the Greek world, though his
military inferiority had been more than once clearly
proved. He was still looked on by the Greeks generally
with a sort of wondering awe. He ruled in some fashion
a vast empire, and held it together by means of satraps
and vassal princes, notwithstanding occasional serious
revolts. He had had indeed, in past days, to acknow-
ledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; still he
was always distinctly felt as a force in Greek politics,
with which from time to time he was brought into
contact. On the whole, he was regarded as an enemy ;
but the unfortunate want of anything like hearty union
among the states of Greece tended to weaken this feel-
ing, and to make combined action against him all but
impossible. There was always, however, a vague fear
that he might some day, if violently provoked, crush
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 45
the Greekworld beneath the weight of a huge bar-
barian invasion.
In the year 356 13. 0. , the second year of Athens' war
with her revolted allies, this fear rose, at Athens at least,
to a positive panic. Greek generals, as we have seen,
occasionally found it convenient to take service under
some Persian satrap, for the sake of the liberal pay
on which they could confidently reckon. In the year
above mentioned, Chares was in command of a fleet
which Athens had sent out to put down her rebellious
subjects in the islands of the Aigean. He was a man
thoroughly of the adventurer type ; and when he found
that he could not pay his troops, which were for the
most part foreign mercenaries, he carried off his arma-
ment on his own responsibility to the aid of Artabanus,
the satrap of the country south of the Propontis, who
was then in revolt against the Great King. Artabanus
was, at the time, in sore need of help; but Chares gained
for him a brilliant victory over the king's forces, and
he received for himself and his soldiers a liberal re-
ward. The proceeding was, of course, utterly irregular,
and gave great offence at Athens; but the success re-
conciled them to it. The King of Persia was naturally
very indignant, and sent an embassy to Athens to com-
plain of this unprovoked aggression. Soon it was
rumoured that he was preparing a fleet of 300 galleys
to aid their revolted allies and to attack their city.
There was intense excitement. Peace was immediately
concluded with the allies, but there was a strong feeling
in favour of declaring war against Persia. Now, it
was said, was the time for an appeal to Panhellenic sen-
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? 46 ' DEMOSTHENES.
4
timent, and to endeavour to unite Greece against her old
enemy. We can well imagine that such language was
likely to meet with a response in many quarters, and
that it might well seem patriotic, and even prudent.
In this case, again, Demosthenes thought it his duty
to protest. He did so in a speech delivered in 354 13. 0.
He must have been, in all probability, on the un-
popular side. He had, too, against him the opinion of
the famous and clever rhetorician, Isocrates, who had
urged in one of his pamphlets the expediency of a
Panhellenic combination against Persia. The party of
Eubulus, backed up by a number of orators and dema-
gogues, supported this policy. To Demosthenes it
seemed an idle dream--the preposterous imagination of
a knot of political adventurers. The speech in which
he opposed it is calm and statesmanlike. "In no one
of his speeches," says Mr Grote, "is the spirit of
practi_cal wisdom more predominant than in this his
earliest known discourse to the public Assembly. " He
tells his excited countrymen some very plain home-
truths. " The Greeks," he frankly says, " are too
jealous of each other to be capable of uniting in an
aggressive war. They might indeed do so in a war of
self-defence. Should Athens declare war, the King of
Persia would be able to purchase aid from the Greeks
themselves. Such a step would consequently lay bare
the worst weaknesses of the Greek world. Their right
policy was to put Athens in a posture of defence, that
she might not be attacked unprepared. They must re-
organise their fleet. They must not shrink from personal
military service and lean upon foreign mercenaries.
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 47
They must not rest contentedly on the glorious deeds of
their ancestors, but uphold the dignity of their State by
themselves imitating their deeds, whatever temporary
sacrifices it might cost them. And they should seek
to rally round Athens a host of confederates, united to
her by the bonds of common interest and mutual con-
fidence. " Some of these topics are such as, under
critical circumstances, it must have required much moral
courage to urge.
A few passages from the speech will give the reader
an idea of Demosthenes' views about Persia, about the
difiiculty of united action against that power, and the
immediate duties of the Athenians themselves :-
"I hold the King," he says, "to be the common
enemy of all the Greeks. Still I would not for this
reason advise you without the rest to undertake a war
against him. The Greeks themselves, I observe, are
not jriends to one another. On the contrary, some
have more cdnfidcnce in the King than in certain of
their own people. Such being the case, I deem it
expedient for you to see that the cause of war he
equitable and just, that all necessary preparations be
made, and that this should be the groundwork of your
resolution. Were there any plain proof that the King
of Persia was about to attack the Greeks, I think they
would join alliance, and be extremely grateful to those
who sided with them and defended them against him.
But if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are
declared, I am afraid that we shall be driven into_a
war with both--with the King and with the people
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? 48 DEMOSTHENES.
whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend his
designs, if he really has resolved to attack the Greeks,
will give money to some, and promise friendship; while
they, in the wish to carry on their own wars with
better success and intent on similar objects, will disre-
gard the common safety of the Greek world. I be-
seech you not to betray our country into such embar-
rassment and folly. You, I perceive, cannot adopt the
same policy in regard to the king as the other Greeks
can. Many of them, I conceive, may very well pursue
their selfish interests, and be utterly indifferent to the
national welfare. But for you it would be dishonour-
able, even though you had suffered wrong, so to punish
the wrong-doers as to let any of them fall under the
power of the barbarian. Under these circumstances
we must be careful not to engage in the war on un-
equal terms, and not to allow him whom we suppose to
be planning mischief against the Greeks to get the
credit of appearing their friend. "
Although Athens is rich, he warns the people that
those riches will not be forthcoming on a mere vague
rumour of hostilities from Persia. YVhen the danger
is seen to be really imminent, then it will be time for
the State to put a pressure on its wealthy citizens.
"You invite the Greeks to join you. But if you
will not act as they wish, how can you expect they will
obey your call, when some of them have no good-will
towards you'! Because, forsooth, they will hear from
you that Persia has designs on them'? Pray, do you
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 49
imagine that they don't foresee it themselves! I am
sure they do ; but at present the fear outweighs the
enmity which some of them bear towards you and
towards each other. Athens contains treasures equal
to the rest of the Greek states put together. But the
owners of wealth are so minded that if all your orators
alarmed them with the intelligence that the King was
coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was in-
evitable--if, besides the orators, a number of persons
gave oracular warning--so far from contributing, they
would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge
its possession. But if they knew that what is so ter-
rible in report was really begun, there is not a man so
foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost
to contribute. I say that we have money against the
time of actual need, but not before. And therefore I
advise you not to search for it now. Your right course
is to complete your other preparations. Let the rich
retain their riches for the present (it cannot be in better
hands for the State) 3 and should the crisis come, then
take it from them in voluntary contributions. "
The speech is thus concluded :-
"My advice is, do not be over-alarmed at the war;
neither be led to commence it. As far as I see, no other
state of Greece has reason to fear it. All the Greeks
know that so long as they regarded Persia as their
common enemy, theywere at peace one with another,
and enjoyed much prosperity. But since they have
looked on the King as a friend, and quarrelled about
disputes with each other, they have suffered worse
a. c. s. s. vol. iv. D
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? 50 DEJIIOSTHENES.
calamities than any one could possibly imprecate upon
them. Should we fear a man whom both fortune and
heaven declare to be an unprofitable friend and a useful
enemy'! If it were possible with one heart and with
united forces to attack him alone, such an injury I
could not pronounce to be an injustice. But since this
cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford
the King a pretence for vindicating the rights of the
other Greeks. Do not expose the melancholy condi-
tion of Greece by convoking her people when you can-
not persuade them, and making war when you cannot
carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and pre-
pare yourselves. My advice in brief is this: Prepare
yourselves against existing enemies; and you ought
with the same force to be able to resist the King and
all others, if they attempt to injure you. But never
begin a wrong in word or deed. Let us look that our
actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be
worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course,
you will do service not only to yourselves, but also to
those who give the opposite cmmscl; for you will not
be angry with them afterwards for errors now com-
mitted. "
In this speech Demosthenes may be said to fore-
shadow the general character of his foreign 'policy. He
did not wish Athens to be aggressive, but simply to
hold her own with a firm hand. This, he thought, she
might well be persuaded to do. Grand schemes of
Panhellenic union against the empire of Persia, such
as floated before the imagination of Isocrates, and wore,
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 51
through his influence, fascinating the minds of a certain
class of political enthusiasts, he scouted as Quixotic.
Above all things, he aimed at being a practical states-
man ; and of this the speech from which we have just
been quoting, delivered by him in the commencement
of his public life, is decisive evidence.
In the following year he delivered a speech which
is of considerable interest as showing his view of Greek
politics at the time. It was important, he thought, for
Athens that there should be, as we say, a balance of
power in the Greek world, and that neither Sparta nor
Thebes should be too strong. I have explained the
circumstances under which Megalopolis was founded
in 371 B. 0. , after the great battle of Leuctra, under
Theban influence, as the metropolis of Arcadia, and
specially as a check on Sparta. The establishment of
this city, together with the loss of the Messenian terri-
tory, which soon followed, was a terrible blow to that
state. Sparta, in fact, for the time, was reduced to a
second-rate power. She was hemmed in by enemies
on the north and on the west. It was hardly to be
expected that she would acquiesce in such humiliation.
And so, in the year 353 13. 0. , her king, Archidamus,
began to plan a counter-revolution, which should undo
the work of Leuctra by the destruction of Megalopolis
and the reconquest of Messenia. It was, however,
necessary for him to have some pretext which should
commend itself generally to Greek opinion. He was
meditating an entire unsettlement of the affairs of the
Peloponnese in the interest of Sparta; and this, he
knew, would not be allowed if it were to be openly
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? 52 DEMOSTHENES.
avowed. Accordingly he put forward the policy of a
general restoration of ancient rights to the different
states. Athens would thus recover the border town of
Oropus, now in the possession of Thebes, the loss of
which had much vexed and distressed her.
Thus, it
was hoped, she might be disposed to favour the Spar-
tan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-
Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the
utmost of its power. The result which such a policy
would have on Megalopolis, as a barrier in Sparta's
way, was kept in the background. The new city must
have inevitably dwindled down into an insignificant
township, and the purpose with which it had been
founded would have been frustrated.
Envoys came to Athens both from Sparta and from
Megalopolis. There was a warm and angry debate.
The bitter hatred Athenians had always felt towards
Thebans, coupled with the immediate desire of recover-
ing Oropus, was enough to recommend the Spartan
proposals. It seems strange that the memory of what
Athens had suffered from the hands of Sparta did not
at once decide the question, and open the eyes of the
people to the dangers of Sparta's insidious policy.
Some there were who saw through it and denounced
it. Demosthenes was among the number. He was
with the "Opposition," and it appears that on this
occasion he failed. He supported the cause of Mega-
lopolis--the cause, in fact, of Thebes--arguing that it
would be a grave political blunder to assist Sparta in
recovering the position which she held in Greece pre-
vious to the battle of Leuctra. His speech is subtle
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. '53
'and ingenious, and must have been convincing to those
who would not let themselves be carried away by an
unreasoning antipathy to everything Theban.
" The Lacedaemonians," he says, " are acting a
crafty part. They say they cannot retain the grati-
tude they feel for you for helping them in a time of
urgent need unless you now allow them to commit an
injustice. However repugnant it may be to the designs
of the Spartans that we should adopt the Arcadian
alliance" (that is, the alliance of Megalopolis), "surely
their gratitude for having been saved by us in a crisis
of extreme peril ought to outweigh their resentment
for being checked in their aggression now. "
As to the bait held out by Sparta to Athens in the
prospect of the recovery of Oropus, he says :-- '
"My opinion is, first, that our State, even without
sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedeemonians,
may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are
minded to act justly, and that of others who hold
Theban usurpation to be intolerable. Secondly, sup-
posing that it were evident to us that, unless we permit
the Lacedaemonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we can-
not obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I
deem it more expedient to let Oropus alone than to
abandon Messenia and the Peloponnese to the Lace-
daemonians. I imagine the question between us and
them would soon be about other matters.
"I am sure, to judge from rational observation-
and I think most Athenians will agree with me--that
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? 54 DEMOSTHENES.
if the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, Messenia will
be in danger; and if they take Messenia, I predict
that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is
much better and more honourable for us to receive the
Theban confederacy as our friends and resist Lacedae-
monian ambition, than, out of reluctance to save the
allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have after-
wards to save Thebes herself and be in fear also for our
own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our
State should the Laeedaemonians take Megalopolis and
again become strong. For I see they have undertaken
the war not to defend themselves, but to recover their
ancient power. What were their designs when they
possessed that power, you perhaps know better than I,
and therefore may have reason to be alarmed. "
This was plain speaking, and sound, statesmanlike
advice. It could not have been the interest of Athens
to let Sparta regain her old supremacy, as she was
certainly striving to do. It was her interest, as Demos-
thenes says towards the conclusion of his speech, not to
abandon Megalopolis and the Arcadians, and to make
them feel (should they survive the struggle) that they
had owed their deliverance not to themselves or to any
other people but the Athenians. As affairs turned
out, the dangers he apprehended never came to pass.
He could not persuade his countrymen to support
Megalopolis. They simply stood neutral. The Lace-
daemonians waged war for two years in Arcadia, and
gained some partial successes, but they could not carry
out their designs. Thebes, though she had occupation
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 55
for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send
an army into the Peloponnese; and after some inde~
cisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left
matters as they were. Megalopolis and the . Arcadian
confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had
threatened them. But the result to Athens and to
Greece was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, when they
apprehended a similar danger from Sparta, they did
not think it worth their while to ask help from Athens.
They did not care to be refused a second time, and on
this occasion they applied to Philip. He was not the
man to miss such an opportunity; and thus Mace-
donian influence was brought to bear on the affairs of
the Peloponnese. This was the unfortunate conse-
quence of the indifference of Athens to the progress
of Spartan ambition. She gave the impression to the
Greek world that she was not in earnest in wishing to
maintain the liberties of the states of the Peloponnese,
although it had been her constant profession to do so.
This was the inference drawn from her refusal to ally
herself with Megalopolis against Sparta. Had she
been guided by the counsels of Demosthenes, she
would have assumed a dignified political attitude, and,
as events turned out, have put a stumbling-block in
the way of her future enemy and destroyer. It is
true, indeed, that at that time there was no distinct
cause of apprehension from Macedon, and there is not
even any allusion to Philip in this speech of Demos-
thenes. We may therefore conclude that as yet he
himself feared nothing in that quarter. Still, it is not
the less to his credit that he urged Athens to adopt a
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? 56 DEMOSTHENES.
policy which would have won for her the respect and
confidence of many of the Greeks, and might have had
the effect of excluding the intrusion of a most danger-
ous foreign infiuence into an important part of the
Greek world.
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? CHAPTER VI.
FIRST SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST PHILIP--SPEECH
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODES.
THE year 352 no. brought with it the beginnings of
great events. In that year, for the first time, the king
of Macedon really showed that he might possibly be
entertaining designs fraught with peril to the Greek
world. He had prominently intervened in Greek
politics. He had taken a conspicuous part in the
Sacred or Holy War between the Thebans and Phocians.
Once, indeed, he had been utterly defeated by the
Phocian leader, Onomarchus, and had been driven
back into his kingdom with loss and disaster, though
report made him say that "he did not fly, but fell
back, like the battering-ram, to give a more 'violent
shock another time. " He speedily again entered Thes-
saly with a more powerful army; and with the help of
his allies in that country and of the admirable Thes-
salian cavalry, he won at Pagasae a decisive victory
over Onomarchus, who perished in the flight. N ow
he was completely master of Thessaly, a country which
ought to have been under the control of a Greek state,
and in which, of late, Theban influence had been
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? 58 DEMOSTHENES.
supreme. Macedon was thus in effect the principal
land power to the north of the Peloponnese; and her
king had both displayed military genius, and had
shown that he was in command of an army with
which it was already a question 'whether any single
Greek state could cope. The battle just fought was
on a very considerable scale, and could not have failed
to suggest unpleasant apprehensions to the mind of
every thinking politician. Philip might very possibly
follow up his success with an instant invasion of
northern Greece. He did in fact advance on Ther-
mopylae; but Athens had forestalled him, and the
famous pass was guarded by a force before which he
thought it prudent to retire. The Athenians exulted
in the reflection that they had once again been the
deliverers of Greece. But their joy was doomed to be
of very brief duration. __'
For a few months the king of Macedon einployed
himself in securing a firm hold on Thessaly. Mean-
while his cruisers and privateers, of which he had
contrived to raise a formidable number, infested the
northern islands and coasts of the ]Egean, to the great
annoyance and injury of Athenian trade. In the
autumn of 352 13. 0. he hurried northwards, entered
Thrace, and took advantage of its intestine feuds, with
a view to getting the country under his control. In
November news reached Athens, the serious import of
which could not be misunderstood. Philip was be- .
sieging Heraeum--a place probably on the northern
coast of the Propontis, to the west of Perinthus. It
was contiguous to the Thracian Chersonese, occupied,
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 59
as we have seen, by Athenian colonists, ano, as it
appears, actually garrisoned by an Athenian force.
The act was thus one of almost open hostility, and
practically equivalent to a declaration of war. But
what made it singularly alarming was, that it was a
most dangerous menace to the Athenian interests on
the north of the ]Egean. It meant, in fact, peril to
the corn trade of Athens, and high prices and possibly
famine to the citizens. It showed too, clearly enough,
that Philip, if he could, would rob the city of its most
valuable outlying possessions. Thus the eyes of the
people ought to have been thoroughly opened to the
'danger which hung over them; but as soon as they
knew that Philip was ill, and next heard a report of
his death, they fell back into their love of the easy,
comfortable life at Athens, with its pleasures and
amusements, and flattered themselves with the notion
that the crisis was finally past. The peace party, with
Eubulus at its head, always strong, was now for the
moment stronger than ever; and its best representative,
the really patriotic Phocion, was too cynical to believe
in the possibility of his countrymen being roused to
the degree of effort and endurance which a serious
struggle with Macedon would demand from them.
As soon as it was known that Philip had recovered,
and was as active and aggressive as ever, there were, it
appears, several acrimonious debates in the Assembly,
with grievous complaints as to the inefliciency of the
generals and of their troops. Athens still clung to her
maritime supremacy, and it was felt to be disgraceful
that this should be threatened by a barbarian. Still,
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? 60 DEMOSTHENES.
her public men had not themoral courage to tell the
people plainly the only way by which such a disgrace
could be ended. It was painful to speak to them of
personal service on shipboard, with all its hardships
and risks. Demosthenes, in his speech on the war
with Persia, had hinted, not obseurely, at this neces-
sity. He did so far more clearly and persistently on
the occasion we have been describing. At the age of
about thirty he spoke the memorable harangue known
as the First Philippic.
The speech shows that he had now quite made up
his mind on the subject of the foreign policy of Athens.
A year ago he had not, as we may reasonably infer,
regarded Macedon as a source of real danger to the
freedom of the Greek world. He was now convinced
that Philip had designs beyond the mere establishment
of a compact and powerful northern kingdom. He
takes a broad view of the political situation, and speaks
not merely as a citizen of the foremost state of Greece,
but as a Greek on behalf of Greek security and inde-
pendence.
It was assuredly much to the honour of Demosthenes
that, as a young politician, he sounded a distinct note
of warning, which he must have known would have
jarred on the easy-going temper of his countrymen.
Their affairs, he plainly tells them, were in a very bad
plight; but there was hope, just because they had not
as yet really exerted themselves. Therefore there was
no reason for despair. Philip's power, indeed, was
already great: he had Thessaly at his feet; he had
defeated a Greek army under a brave and experienced
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. ' 61
leader; he was now threatening the Chersonese and
the northern coasts of the Aigean, and with his fleet
was harassing the commerce of Athens; still, he was
not a more formidable foe than Sparta had been; and
the fact that he was formidable at all was due to their
own voluntary supineness, which, for the sake of
Greece and for the glory of Athens, they must shake
off once and for ever. Otherwise, even if rumour had
truly asserted Philip's death, they would soon raise up
against themselves another Philip equally terrible.
" You must not despond," he says at the beginning
of his speech, "under your present circumstances,
wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them
as regards the past, is best for the future. My mean-
ing is this--your affairs are amiss because you do no-
thing which is required. If the result were the same,
although you performed your duties, there would. be
no hope of amendment. Consider, further, what is
known to you by hearsay, and what men of experience
remember. Not long ago, how vast a power the Lace-
daemonians possessed ! Yet how nobly and admirably
did you consult the dignity of Athens, and undertook
the war against them for the rights of Greece! Why
do I mention this! To show and convince you that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; noth-
ing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take, for
examples, the strength of the Lacedaemonians, which
you overcame by minding your duty; and the insolent
ambition of this Philip now, which utterly confounds
us through our neglect of our interest. If any of you
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? 02 _ zwuosryazvas.
think the man a formidable foe, looking at the vastness
of his present power and our loss of all our strongholds,
that is reasonable enough; only you should reflect that
there was a time when we held Pydna, and Potidaea,
and Methone, with all the adjacent country, and that
many of the nations now in league with Philip were
independent and free, and preferred our friendship to
his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that
Athens was too formidable a foe to fight, when she
had so many fortresses to threaten his country, and he
was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished
would he have attempted, and never would he have
acquired so large a dominion. But he saw clearly
enough that such places are the open prizes of war ;--
that the possessions of the absent belong to the pre-
sent, those of the careless to the adventurous who
shrink not from toil. Acting on that principle, he has
won everything, and keeps it either by way of con-,
quest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all
men will side with and respect those whom they see
prepared and willing to make proper exertions. If
you will adopt this principle now, though you have
'not hitherto done so--and if every man, when he can
and ought to give his service to the State, be ready to
give it without excuse--if the rich will contribute, if-
the able-bodied will enlist,--in a word, plainly, if you
will become your own masters, and cease each expect-
ing to do nothing himself, while his neighbour does
everything for him,--then will you, with heaven's
permission, recover your own, and get back what has
been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not im-
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law should be such as not to shock religious sentiment;
and while we look for good fortune, and implore
heaven to grant it, we will regard all fortune as sub-
ject to human casualties. The future, I take it, is un-
certain to all men, and small occasions are productive
of great events. Therefore we will be moderate in
prosperity, and show that we have an eye to the
future. "
It may be said that there is much of a modern tone
and character about this speech. Its arguments are
those of a constitutional lawyer and of a far-sighted
politician. It is quiet and temperate, and at the same
time singularly convincing. It was successful in its
immediate object, and it must have established the
reputation of Demosthenes as a political debater of the
first rank. From this time he must have felt but
little timidity or hesitation in addressing that critical
audience--the Athenian popular assembly.
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? CHAPTER V.
EARLY srsscnas or mnosrnssss on FOREIGN POLICY.
Psasm in the fourth century B. G. was a more consider-
able power than we might have supposed from the
comparative ease with which it was overthrown by
Alexander. The Great King, as he was always called,
was in the possession of immense resources. Financially
he was much stronger than the Greek world, though his
military inferiority had been more than once clearly
proved. He was still looked on by the Greeks generally
with a sort of wondering awe. He ruled in some fashion
a vast empire, and held it together by means of satraps
and vassal princes, notwithstanding occasional serious
revolts. He had had indeed, in past days, to acknow-
ledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; still he
was always distinctly felt as a force in Greek politics,
with which from time to time he was brought into
contact. On the whole, he was regarded as an enemy ;
but the unfortunate want of anything like hearty union
among the states of Greece tended to weaken this feel-
ing, and to make combined action against him all but
impossible. There was always, however, a vague fear
that he might some day, if violently provoked, crush
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 45
the Greekworld beneath the weight of a huge bar-
barian invasion.
In the year 356 13. 0. , the second year of Athens' war
with her revolted allies, this fear rose, at Athens at least,
to a positive panic. Greek generals, as we have seen,
occasionally found it convenient to take service under
some Persian satrap, for the sake of the liberal pay
on which they could confidently reckon. In the year
above mentioned, Chares was in command of a fleet
which Athens had sent out to put down her rebellious
subjects in the islands of the Aigean. He was a man
thoroughly of the adventurer type ; and when he found
that he could not pay his troops, which were for the
most part foreign mercenaries, he carried off his arma-
ment on his own responsibility to the aid of Artabanus,
the satrap of the country south of the Propontis, who
was then in revolt against the Great King. Artabanus
was, at the time, in sore need of help; but Chares gained
for him a brilliant victory over the king's forces, and
he received for himself and his soldiers a liberal re-
ward. The proceeding was, of course, utterly irregular,
and gave great offence at Athens; but the success re-
conciled them to it. The King of Persia was naturally
very indignant, and sent an embassy to Athens to com-
plain of this unprovoked aggression. Soon it was
rumoured that he was preparing a fleet of 300 galleys
to aid their revolted allies and to attack their city.
There was intense excitement. Peace was immediately
concluded with the allies, but there was a strong feeling
in favour of declaring war against Persia. Now, it
was said, was the time for an appeal to Panhellenic sen-
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? 46 ' DEMOSTHENES.
4
timent, and to endeavour to unite Greece against her old
enemy. We can well imagine that such language was
likely to meet with a response in many quarters, and
that it might well seem patriotic, and even prudent.
In this case, again, Demosthenes thought it his duty
to protest. He did so in a speech delivered in 354 13. 0.
He must have been, in all probability, on the un-
popular side. He had, too, against him the opinion of
the famous and clever rhetorician, Isocrates, who had
urged in one of his pamphlets the expediency of a
Panhellenic combination against Persia. The party of
Eubulus, backed up by a number of orators and dema-
gogues, supported this policy. To Demosthenes it
seemed an idle dream--the preposterous imagination of
a knot of political adventurers. The speech in which
he opposed it is calm and statesmanlike. "In no one
of his speeches," says Mr Grote, "is the spirit of
practi_cal wisdom more predominant than in this his
earliest known discourse to the public Assembly. " He
tells his excited countrymen some very plain home-
truths. " The Greeks," he frankly says, " are too
jealous of each other to be capable of uniting in an
aggressive war. They might indeed do so in a war of
self-defence. Should Athens declare war, the King of
Persia would be able to purchase aid from the Greeks
themselves. Such a step would consequently lay bare
the worst weaknesses of the Greek world. Their right
policy was to put Athens in a posture of defence, that
she might not be attacked unprepared. They must re-
organise their fleet. They must not shrink from personal
military service and lean upon foreign mercenaries.
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 47
They must not rest contentedly on the glorious deeds of
their ancestors, but uphold the dignity of their State by
themselves imitating their deeds, whatever temporary
sacrifices it might cost them. And they should seek
to rally round Athens a host of confederates, united to
her by the bonds of common interest and mutual con-
fidence. " Some of these topics are such as, under
critical circumstances, it must have required much moral
courage to urge.
A few passages from the speech will give the reader
an idea of Demosthenes' views about Persia, about the
difiiculty of united action against that power, and the
immediate duties of the Athenians themselves :-
"I hold the King," he says, "to be the common
enemy of all the Greeks. Still I would not for this
reason advise you without the rest to undertake a war
against him. The Greeks themselves, I observe, are
not jriends to one another. On the contrary, some
have more cdnfidcnce in the King than in certain of
their own people. Such being the case, I deem it
expedient for you to see that the cause of war he
equitable and just, that all necessary preparations be
made, and that this should be the groundwork of your
resolution. Were there any plain proof that the King
of Persia was about to attack the Greeks, I think they
would join alliance, and be extremely grateful to those
who sided with them and defended them against him.
But if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are
declared, I am afraid that we shall be driven into_a
war with both--with the King and with the people
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? 48 DEMOSTHENES.
whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend his
designs, if he really has resolved to attack the Greeks,
will give money to some, and promise friendship; while
they, in the wish to carry on their own wars with
better success and intent on similar objects, will disre-
gard the common safety of the Greek world. I be-
seech you not to betray our country into such embar-
rassment and folly. You, I perceive, cannot adopt the
same policy in regard to the king as the other Greeks
can. Many of them, I conceive, may very well pursue
their selfish interests, and be utterly indifferent to the
national welfare. But for you it would be dishonour-
able, even though you had suffered wrong, so to punish
the wrong-doers as to let any of them fall under the
power of the barbarian. Under these circumstances
we must be careful not to engage in the war on un-
equal terms, and not to allow him whom we suppose to
be planning mischief against the Greeks to get the
credit of appearing their friend. "
Although Athens is rich, he warns the people that
those riches will not be forthcoming on a mere vague
rumour of hostilities from Persia. YVhen the danger
is seen to be really imminent, then it will be time for
the State to put a pressure on its wealthy citizens.
"You invite the Greeks to join you. But if you
will not act as they wish, how can you expect they will
obey your call, when some of them have no good-will
towards you'! Because, forsooth, they will hear from
you that Persia has designs on them'? Pray, do you
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 49
imagine that they don't foresee it themselves! I am
sure they do ; but at present the fear outweighs the
enmity which some of them bear towards you and
towards each other. Athens contains treasures equal
to the rest of the Greek states put together. But the
owners of wealth are so minded that if all your orators
alarmed them with the intelligence that the King was
coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was in-
evitable--if, besides the orators, a number of persons
gave oracular warning--so far from contributing, they
would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge
its possession. But if they knew that what is so ter-
rible in report was really begun, there is not a man so
foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost
to contribute. I say that we have money against the
time of actual need, but not before. And therefore I
advise you not to search for it now. Your right course
is to complete your other preparations. Let the rich
retain their riches for the present (it cannot be in better
hands for the State) 3 and should the crisis come, then
take it from them in voluntary contributions. "
The speech is thus concluded :-
"My advice is, do not be over-alarmed at the war;
neither be led to commence it. As far as I see, no other
state of Greece has reason to fear it. All the Greeks
know that so long as they regarded Persia as their
common enemy, theywere at peace one with another,
and enjoyed much prosperity. But since they have
looked on the King as a friend, and quarrelled about
disputes with each other, they have suffered worse
a. c. s. s. vol. iv. D
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? 50 DEJIIOSTHENES.
calamities than any one could possibly imprecate upon
them. Should we fear a man whom both fortune and
heaven declare to be an unprofitable friend and a useful
enemy'! If it were possible with one heart and with
united forces to attack him alone, such an injury I
could not pronounce to be an injustice. But since this
cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford
the King a pretence for vindicating the rights of the
other Greeks. Do not expose the melancholy condi-
tion of Greece by convoking her people when you can-
not persuade them, and making war when you cannot
carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and pre-
pare yourselves. My advice in brief is this: Prepare
yourselves against existing enemies; and you ought
with the same force to be able to resist the King and
all others, if they attempt to injure you. But never
begin a wrong in word or deed. Let us look that our
actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be
worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course,
you will do service not only to yourselves, but also to
those who give the opposite cmmscl; for you will not
be angry with them afterwards for errors now com-
mitted. "
In this speech Demosthenes may be said to fore-
shadow the general character of his foreign 'policy. He
did not wish Athens to be aggressive, but simply to
hold her own with a firm hand. This, he thought, she
might well be persuaded to do. Grand schemes of
Panhellenic union against the empire of Persia, such
as floated before the imagination of Isocrates, and wore,
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 51
through his influence, fascinating the minds of a certain
class of political enthusiasts, he scouted as Quixotic.
Above all things, he aimed at being a practical states-
man ; and of this the speech from which we have just
been quoting, delivered by him in the commencement
of his public life, is decisive evidence.
In the following year he delivered a speech which
is of considerable interest as showing his view of Greek
politics at the time. It was important, he thought, for
Athens that there should be, as we say, a balance of
power in the Greek world, and that neither Sparta nor
Thebes should be too strong. I have explained the
circumstances under which Megalopolis was founded
in 371 B. 0. , after the great battle of Leuctra, under
Theban influence, as the metropolis of Arcadia, and
specially as a check on Sparta. The establishment of
this city, together with the loss of the Messenian terri-
tory, which soon followed, was a terrible blow to that
state. Sparta, in fact, for the time, was reduced to a
second-rate power. She was hemmed in by enemies
on the north and on the west. It was hardly to be
expected that she would acquiesce in such humiliation.
And so, in the year 353 13. 0. , her king, Archidamus,
began to plan a counter-revolution, which should undo
the work of Leuctra by the destruction of Megalopolis
and the reconquest of Messenia. It was, however,
necessary for him to have some pretext which should
commend itself generally to Greek opinion. He was
meditating an entire unsettlement of the affairs of the
Peloponnese in the interest of Sparta; and this, he
knew, would not be allowed if it were to be openly
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? 52 DEMOSTHENES.
avowed. Accordingly he put forward the policy of a
general restoration of ancient rights to the different
states. Athens would thus recover the border town of
Oropus, now in the possession of Thebes, the loss of
which had much vexed and distressed her.
Thus, it
was hoped, she might be disposed to favour the Spar-
tan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-
Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the
utmost of its power. The result which such a policy
would have on Megalopolis, as a barrier in Sparta's
way, was kept in the background. The new city must
have inevitably dwindled down into an insignificant
township, and the purpose with which it had been
founded would have been frustrated.
Envoys came to Athens both from Sparta and from
Megalopolis. There was a warm and angry debate.
The bitter hatred Athenians had always felt towards
Thebans, coupled with the immediate desire of recover-
ing Oropus, was enough to recommend the Spartan
proposals. It seems strange that the memory of what
Athens had suffered from the hands of Sparta did not
at once decide the question, and open the eyes of the
people to the dangers of Sparta's insidious policy.
Some there were who saw through it and denounced
it. Demosthenes was among the number. He was
with the "Opposition," and it appears that on this
occasion he failed. He supported the cause of Mega-
lopolis--the cause, in fact, of Thebes--arguing that it
would be a grave political blunder to assist Sparta in
recovering the position which she held in Greece pre-
vious to the battle of Leuctra. His speech is subtle
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. '53
'and ingenious, and must have been convincing to those
who would not let themselves be carried away by an
unreasoning antipathy to everything Theban.
" The Lacedaemonians," he says, " are acting a
crafty part. They say they cannot retain the grati-
tude they feel for you for helping them in a time of
urgent need unless you now allow them to commit an
injustice. However repugnant it may be to the designs
of the Spartans that we should adopt the Arcadian
alliance" (that is, the alliance of Megalopolis), "surely
their gratitude for having been saved by us in a crisis
of extreme peril ought to outweigh their resentment
for being checked in their aggression now. "
As to the bait held out by Sparta to Athens in the
prospect of the recovery of Oropus, he says :-- '
"My opinion is, first, that our State, even without
sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedeemonians,
may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are
minded to act justly, and that of others who hold
Theban usurpation to be intolerable. Secondly, sup-
posing that it were evident to us that, unless we permit
the Lacedaemonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we can-
not obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I
deem it more expedient to let Oropus alone than to
abandon Messenia and the Peloponnese to the Lace-
daemonians. I imagine the question between us and
them would soon be about other matters.
"I am sure, to judge from rational observation-
and I think most Athenians will agree with me--that
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? 54 DEMOSTHENES.
if the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, Messenia will
be in danger; and if they take Messenia, I predict
that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is
much better and more honourable for us to receive the
Theban confederacy as our friends and resist Lacedae-
monian ambition, than, out of reluctance to save the
allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have after-
wards to save Thebes herself and be in fear also for our
own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our
State should the Laeedaemonians take Megalopolis and
again become strong. For I see they have undertaken
the war not to defend themselves, but to recover their
ancient power. What were their designs when they
possessed that power, you perhaps know better than I,
and therefore may have reason to be alarmed. "
This was plain speaking, and sound, statesmanlike
advice. It could not have been the interest of Athens
to let Sparta regain her old supremacy, as she was
certainly striving to do. It was her interest, as Demos-
thenes says towards the conclusion of his speech, not to
abandon Megalopolis and the Arcadians, and to make
them feel (should they survive the struggle) that they
had owed their deliverance not to themselves or to any
other people but the Athenians. As affairs turned
out, the dangers he apprehended never came to pass.
He could not persuade his countrymen to support
Megalopolis. They simply stood neutral. The Lace-
daemonians waged war for two years in Arcadia, and
gained some partial successes, but they could not carry
out their designs. Thebes, though she had occupation
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 55
for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send
an army into the Peloponnese; and after some inde~
cisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left
matters as they were. Megalopolis and the . Arcadian
confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had
threatened them. But the result to Athens and to
Greece was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, when they
apprehended a similar danger from Sparta, they did
not think it worth their while to ask help from Athens.
They did not care to be refused a second time, and on
this occasion they applied to Philip. He was not the
man to miss such an opportunity; and thus Mace-
donian influence was brought to bear on the affairs of
the Peloponnese. This was the unfortunate conse-
quence of the indifference of Athens to the progress
of Spartan ambition. She gave the impression to the
Greek world that she was not in earnest in wishing to
maintain the liberties of the states of the Peloponnese,
although it had been her constant profession to do so.
This was the inference drawn from her refusal to ally
herself with Megalopolis against Sparta. Had she
been guided by the counsels of Demosthenes, she
would have assumed a dignified political attitude, and,
as events turned out, have put a stumbling-block in
the way of her future enemy and destroyer. It is
true, indeed, that at that time there was no distinct
cause of apprehension from Macedon, and there is not
even any allusion to Philip in this speech of Demos-
thenes. We may therefore conclude that as yet he
himself feared nothing in that quarter. Still, it is not
the less to his credit that he urged Athens to adopt a
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? 56 DEMOSTHENES.
policy which would have won for her the respect and
confidence of many of the Greeks, and might have had
the effect of excluding the intrusion of a most danger-
ous foreign infiuence into an important part of the
Greek world.
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? CHAPTER VI.
FIRST SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST PHILIP--SPEECH
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODES.
THE year 352 no. brought with it the beginnings of
great events. In that year, for the first time, the king
of Macedon really showed that he might possibly be
entertaining designs fraught with peril to the Greek
world. He had prominently intervened in Greek
politics. He had taken a conspicuous part in the
Sacred or Holy War between the Thebans and Phocians.
Once, indeed, he had been utterly defeated by the
Phocian leader, Onomarchus, and had been driven
back into his kingdom with loss and disaster, though
report made him say that "he did not fly, but fell
back, like the battering-ram, to give a more 'violent
shock another time. " He speedily again entered Thes-
saly with a more powerful army; and with the help of
his allies in that country and of the admirable Thes-
salian cavalry, he won at Pagasae a decisive victory
over Onomarchus, who perished in the flight. N ow
he was completely master of Thessaly, a country which
ought to have been under the control of a Greek state,
and in which, of late, Theban influence had been
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? 58 DEMOSTHENES.
supreme. Macedon was thus in effect the principal
land power to the north of the Peloponnese; and her
king had both displayed military genius, and had
shown that he was in command of an army with
which it was already a question 'whether any single
Greek state could cope. The battle just fought was
on a very considerable scale, and could not have failed
to suggest unpleasant apprehensions to the mind of
every thinking politician. Philip might very possibly
follow up his success with an instant invasion of
northern Greece. He did in fact advance on Ther-
mopylae; but Athens had forestalled him, and the
famous pass was guarded by a force before which he
thought it prudent to retire. The Athenians exulted
in the reflection that they had once again been the
deliverers of Greece. But their joy was doomed to be
of very brief duration. __'
For a few months the king of Macedon einployed
himself in securing a firm hold on Thessaly. Mean-
while his cruisers and privateers, of which he had
contrived to raise a formidable number, infested the
northern islands and coasts of the ]Egean, to the great
annoyance and injury of Athenian trade. In the
autumn of 352 13. 0. he hurried northwards, entered
Thrace, and took advantage of its intestine feuds, with
a view to getting the country under his control. In
November news reached Athens, the serious import of
which could not be misunderstood. Philip was be- .
sieging Heraeum--a place probably on the northern
coast of the Propontis, to the west of Perinthus. It
was contiguous to the Thracian Chersonese, occupied,
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 59
as we have seen, by Athenian colonists, ano, as it
appears, actually garrisoned by an Athenian force.
The act was thus one of almost open hostility, and
practically equivalent to a declaration of war. But
what made it singularly alarming was, that it was a
most dangerous menace to the Athenian interests on
the north of the ]Egean. It meant, in fact, peril to
the corn trade of Athens, and high prices and possibly
famine to the citizens. It showed too, clearly enough,
that Philip, if he could, would rob the city of its most
valuable outlying possessions. Thus the eyes of the
people ought to have been thoroughly opened to the
'danger which hung over them; but as soon as they
knew that Philip was ill, and next heard a report of
his death, they fell back into their love of the easy,
comfortable life at Athens, with its pleasures and
amusements, and flattered themselves with the notion
that the crisis was finally past. The peace party, with
Eubulus at its head, always strong, was now for the
moment stronger than ever; and its best representative,
the really patriotic Phocion, was too cynical to believe
in the possibility of his countrymen being roused to
the degree of effort and endurance which a serious
struggle with Macedon would demand from them.
As soon as it was known that Philip had recovered,
and was as active and aggressive as ever, there were, it
appears, several acrimonious debates in the Assembly,
with grievous complaints as to the inefliciency of the
generals and of their troops. Athens still clung to her
maritime supremacy, and it was felt to be disgraceful
that this should be threatened by a barbarian. Still,
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? 60 DEMOSTHENES.
her public men had not themoral courage to tell the
people plainly the only way by which such a disgrace
could be ended. It was painful to speak to them of
personal service on shipboard, with all its hardships
and risks. Demosthenes, in his speech on the war
with Persia, had hinted, not obseurely, at this neces-
sity. He did so far more clearly and persistently on
the occasion we have been describing. At the age of
about thirty he spoke the memorable harangue known
as the First Philippic.
The speech shows that he had now quite made up
his mind on the subject of the foreign policy of Athens.
A year ago he had not, as we may reasonably infer,
regarded Macedon as a source of real danger to the
freedom of the Greek world. He was now convinced
that Philip had designs beyond the mere establishment
of a compact and powerful northern kingdom. He
takes a broad view of the political situation, and speaks
not merely as a citizen of the foremost state of Greece,
but as a Greek on behalf of Greek security and inde-
pendence.
It was assuredly much to the honour of Demosthenes
that, as a young politician, he sounded a distinct note
of warning, which he must have known would have
jarred on the easy-going temper of his countrymen.
Their affairs, he plainly tells them, were in a very bad
plight; but there was hope, just because they had not
as yet really exerted themselves. Therefore there was
no reason for despair. Philip's power, indeed, was
already great: he had Thessaly at his feet; he had
defeated a Greek army under a brave and experienced
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. ' 61
leader; he was now threatening the Chersonese and
the northern coasts of the Aigean, and with his fleet
was harassing the commerce of Athens; still, he was
not a more formidable foe than Sparta had been; and
the fact that he was formidable at all was due to their
own voluntary supineness, which, for the sake of
Greece and for the glory of Athens, they must shake
off once and for ever. Otherwise, even if rumour had
truly asserted Philip's death, they would soon raise up
against themselves another Philip equally terrible.
" You must not despond," he says at the beginning
of his speech, "under your present circumstances,
wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them
as regards the past, is best for the future. My mean-
ing is this--your affairs are amiss because you do no-
thing which is required. If the result were the same,
although you performed your duties, there would. be
no hope of amendment. Consider, further, what is
known to you by hearsay, and what men of experience
remember. Not long ago, how vast a power the Lace-
daemonians possessed ! Yet how nobly and admirably
did you consult the dignity of Athens, and undertook
the war against them for the rights of Greece! Why
do I mention this! To show and convince you that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; noth-
ing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take, for
examples, the strength of the Lacedaemonians, which
you overcame by minding your duty; and the insolent
ambition of this Philip now, which utterly confounds
us through our neglect of our interest. If any of you
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? 02 _ zwuosryazvas.
think the man a formidable foe, looking at the vastness
of his present power and our loss of all our strongholds,
that is reasonable enough; only you should reflect that
there was a time when we held Pydna, and Potidaea,
and Methone, with all the adjacent country, and that
many of the nations now in league with Philip were
independent and free, and preferred our friendship to
his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that
Athens was too formidable a foe to fight, when she
had so many fortresses to threaten his country, and he
was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished
would he have attempted, and never would he have
acquired so large a dominion. But he saw clearly
enough that such places are the open prizes of war ;--
that the possessions of the absent belong to the pre-
sent, those of the careless to the adventurous who
shrink not from toil. Acting on that principle, he has
won everything, and keeps it either by way of con-,
quest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all
men will side with and respect those whom they see
prepared and willing to make proper exertions. If
you will adopt this principle now, though you have
'not hitherto done so--and if every man, when he can
and ought to give his service to the State, be ready to
give it without excuse--if the rich will contribute, if-
the able-bodied will enlist,--in a word, plainly, if you
will become your own masters, and cease each expect-
ing to do nothing himself, while his neighbour does
everything for him,--then will you, with heaven's
permission, recover your own, and get back what has
been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not im-
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