No More Learning

***
6. Dissipation, auddhatya, is non-calmness of the mind (vii. lld) Only these six dharmas are klesamahdbhumikas.
***
138
Is a mahabhumika also a klesamahdbhumika'i
says, on the one hand that there
? There are four alternatives: 1. sensation, ideas, volition, contact and desire (chanda) are only mahdbhumikas; 2. disbelief, idleness, igno- rance, dissipation, and diligence are only kleUmahdbhumikas\ 3. memory, samddhi, prajna, judgment, and resolution belong to both categories; and 4. the other dharmas {klesamahdbhumikas, etc. )
Certain Masters (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220a22) maintain that distraction is not wrong samddhi: the alternatives then are differently established: distraction is added to the second category, and samddhi is put into the third.
2. As for the statement: "the Mula Abhidharma omits torpor from its enumeration" of the klesamahdbhumika, it is admitted that torpor is associated with all defiled dharmas.
If torpor is omitted from the list, is this my fault or the fault of the author of the Abhidharma?
141
The Abhidharmikas
explain the omission: torpor should be
named; but it is not named because it is favorable to samddhi. In fact,
they claim, persons with a torpid disposition {stydnacarita), or dull
142
persons, realize meditation sooner than do dissipated persons.
But who is dull without being dissipated? Who is dissipated
without being dull? Torpor and dissipation always go together.
Yes, torpor and dissipation go together. But the term carita indicates excess. The person in whom torpor dominates is called "dull,"
even though he is also dissipated.
We know this as well as you do; but it is by reason of their nature
that the dharmas are classified into different categories. It is then established that six dharmas are klesamahabhumikas, because only they are produced in all defiled minds.
*##
26c-d. Disrespect and the absence of fear are always and exclusively found in bad minds.
These two dharmas, which will be defined below (ii. 32) are always found in bad minds. Consequently they are called akusalamahd-
143
bhumikas.
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Chapter Two
27. Anger, enmity, dissimilation, jealousy, stubbornness, hypo-
crisy, greed, the spirit of deception, pride-intoxication, the 144
spirit of violence, etc. , are the panttaklesabhumikas.
They are called this because they have parittaklesas for their spheres. Parjittaklesa, "small defilement," means avidyd or ignorance (iii. 28c-d) in an isolated state, not associated with lust, etc (kevala avenikt avidyd, v. 14).
They are only associated with ignorance, with the ignorance that is
cast off through the Path of Meditation, ignorance of the sphere of
mental consciousness. This is why they are called parittaklesa-
145
These will be studied in the Fifth Chapter (v. 46 and following).
***
We have studied five categories of mental states. There are other
mental states that are indeterminate, aniyata, which are sometimes
associated with a good mind, and sometimes with a bad or a neutral
mind: regret (kaukrtya, ii. 28), apathy (rniddha, v. 47, vii. lld), vitarka 146
***
How many mental states are necessarily produced with each mind of each class--with a good, bad, or neutral mind?
28a. The mind in Kamadhatu, when it is good, always consists of twenty-two mental states, as it is always associated with vitarka and vicara.
There are five classes of minds in Kamadhatu: 1) the good mind constitutes one class; 2-3) the bad mind constitutes two classes,
bhumikas.
(ii. 33), vicara, etc.
? accordingly as it is "independent," that is, associated only with
ignorance, or associated with the other defilements, lust, etc. ; and 4-5)
the neutral mind that is free of retribution constitutes two classes
according as it is soiled, that is, associated with satkdyadrsti or with 147
antagrahadrsti (v. 3), or not defiled, that is, "possessing retribution," etc. (i. 37, ii. 71).
The mind in Kamadhatu is always associated with vitarka and vicara (ii. 33a-b). This mind, when it is good, consists of twenty-two mental states: ten mahabhumikas, ten kusalamahabhumikas, plus two aniyatas, namely vitarka and vicara.
When the good mind includes regret {kaukftya), the total rises to twenty-three.
148
Kaukftya is, properly, the nature of that which is wrongly done,
but here kaukftya means a mental state that has for its object kaukftya
in its literal sense, namely regret relative to an error. In the same way,
vimoksamukha which has sunyatd or absence of dtman for its object is
termed sunyatd (viii. 24-25); non-desire which has asubha or the
loathsome (vi. llc-d) for its object is called asubha. In the same way, in
the world, one says that the village, the town, the country, are all
brought together, designating thus the inhabitants by the name of the
location. Kaukftya in its proper sense is the support, the raison d'etre
of regret; hence regret is termed kaukftya. For the result receives the
What does the word kaukftya (regret) mean?
name of its cause, for example in the text: "The six sparsdyatanas are 149
previous actions. "
But how can one designate "regret over errors," regret relative to
an action not done, by the name of kaukftya?
Because one says "It is poorly done on my part not to have done
this action," thus designating an omission as "done" or "poorly done. " When is regret good?
When it is relative to a good action omitted or to a bad action
accomplished. It is bad when it is relative to a bad action omitted or to a good action accomplished.
These two types of regret bear on the two categories of action.
The Indriyas 197
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29a. A bad mind consists of twenty mental states when it is independent of, or associated with views (drsti);
1. An independent mind is a mind associated with ignorance 15
(avidya, v. l), but not associated with other defilements, lust, etc ?
A bad mind associated with views is a mind associated with
mithyddrsti, with drspipardmarsa, or with stlavratapardmarsa (v. 3); a mind associated with satkdyadrsti and with antagrdhadrspi is not bad, but defiled-neutral.
In these two cases, a bad mind consists of ten mahdbhumikas, six klesamahabhumikas, two akusalarnahdbhurnikas, plus two aniyatas, namely vitarka and vicdra.
View itself is not counted, for a view is a certain type oi prajnd, and m
prajnd is a mahdbhilmika.
29b. Twenty-one, when it is associated with one of the four
defilements, with anger, etc. , with regret.
2. Associated with lust, hostility, pride, or doubt (rdgaf pratigha, mdna, vicikitsd, v. l), a bad mind consists of twenty-one mental states, the same as above, plus lust or hostility, etc.
Associated with anger, etc. , that is, with one of the minor defilements (upaklesas) enumerated above, ii. 27. -
30a. A neutral mind consists of eighteen mental states when it is defiled;
In Kamadhatu, a neutral mind, that is, a mind free of retribution, is defiled, that is covered by defilement when it is associated with satkdyadrsti or antagrdhadrspi. This mind consists of ten maha- bhumikas, six klesamahdbhumikas, plus vitarka and vicdra.
30b. In the contrary case, twelve.
Not defiled, a neutral mind consists of twelve mental states: the ten mahdbhumikas, vitarka, and vicdra.
The Foreigners believe that regret can be indefinite, for example, in a dream. An indefinite-non-defiled mind associated with indefinite regret would consist of thirteen mental states.
? 30c-d. Apathy is not in contradiction to any category; wherever it is found, it is added.
Apathy (middha, v. 47, viilld) can be good, bad, or neutral. The mind with which it is associated would then consist of twenty-three mental states instead of twenty-two, twenty-four instead of twenty- three, etc. , accordingly as it is good and free from regret, or good and accompanied by regret, etc.
31a. The bad mental states, regret and apathy, are absent from the First Dhyana.
In the First Dhyana there is missing 1) hostility (pratigha, v. l), 2) the series anger, etc. (ii. 27), with the exception of hypocrisy (sathya), deception {maya), and pride-intoxication {mada)\ 3) the two akusala- mahdbhumikaSy disrespect and the absence of fear (ii. 32); plus 4) regret, since dissatisfaction (ii. 8b-c) is absent, and 5) laziness, since food through the mouth (iii. 38d) is absent. The other mental states of
152 Kamadhatu exist in the First Dhyana.
31b. Further on, vitarka is also missing absent from the intermediate dhyana.
Furthermore, vitarka is absent from the intermediate dhyana. 31c Further on, again, vicara, etc.
In the Second Dhyana and above, up to and including Arupya- 153
dhatu, vicara, hypocrisy, and deception are also absent. Pride- intoxication exists in the three spheres of existence (v. 53c-d).
154
According to the Sutra, hypocrisy and deception exist as far as
the world of Brahma, but not above the heavens where beings are in
assembly. Mahabrahma, sitting in his assembly, was questioned by the
Bhiksu Asvajit: "Where do the four primary elements completely
disappear? " Incapable of responding, he boasted: "I am Brahma, great
155
Brahma, the Lord, the Creator, the Transformer, the Generator, the
Nourisher, the Father of all. " Finally, when Asvajit was leaving the
assembly, Brahma counselled him to return to the presence of the
15<s Master and ask him.
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We have seen how many mental states are associated with each type of mind of the three spheres of existence. We have to define the mental states enumerated above.
What is the difference between disrespect (ahn) and absence of fear (anapatrapya)?
157 32a. Disrespect is lack of veneration.
158
Lack of respect, that is, the lack of veneration, the lack of fearful
submission with regard to the qualities {maitri, karund, etc. ) of oneself and others, and with regard to persons endowed with these qualities, is ahrtkya; ahn is a mental dharma opposed to respect.
32b. Anapatrapya or atrapa is the dharma that causes a person 159
not to see the unpleasant consequences of his transgressions.
"Transgressions" are what are scorned by good persons.
"Unpleasant consequences" are called in the Karika bhaya or fear, because these unpleasant consequences engender fear.
The condition of the person who does not see the consequences of transgression--the dharma that produces this condition,--is anapa- trapya or atrapd.
[Objection:] What do you understand by the expression "does not see the unpleasant consequences" abhayadarsitval Whether you in- terpret this phrase as abhayasya darsitvam, "he sees that there are no unpleasant consequences," or as bhayasya adarsitvam, "he does not see that there are unpleasant consequences," none of these explanations is satisfactory. In the first case, we have defiled prajna, an inexact knowledge; in the second case, we simply have ignorance.
The expression abhayadariitvam signifies neither "view" (defiled prajnd), nor "non-view" (ignorance). It describes a special dharma that is placed among the minor defilements (upaklesas, v. 46), which has false views and ignorance for its cause, and which is termed anapatrapya (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 180al7).
? 160
According to other Masters, dhrikya is the absence of shame
vis-a-vis oneself, in the commission of a transgression; anapatrdpya is
161
the absence of shame vis-a-vis others.
But cannot one consider oneself and others at the same time?
We do not say that the two forms of the absence of shame are
simultaneous.
There is dhrikya, an outflowing of lust, when the person does not
experience the shame of transgression when considering oneself; there is anapatrdpya, an outflowing from mental confusion, when he does not experience the shame of transgression when considering others.
Hri and apatrdpya are opposed to these two bad dhanna. Their definition, according to the first theory, is "respect, veneration, fearful submission/' or "fear of the consequence of transgression;" according to the second theory, "modesty," "respect for humans. "
Some think that affection (preman) and respect (gaurava) are the same thing.
162 32c. Affection is faith.
Affection is of two types, defiled and non-defiled (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 151a8).
The first is attachment; for example, affection for wife and sons. The second is faith; for example, affection for a master or for virtuous persons.
1. All faith is not affection, namely faith with regard to the Truths of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering.
2. All affection is not faith, namely defiled affection.
3. Faith can be affection, namely faith with regard to the Truths of the Extinction of Suffering and the Path.
4. The other mental states, the dhannas disassociated from the mind, etc. , are neither faith nor affection.
According to another opinion,--ours,--faith is a belief in qualities: affection is produced from this belief. Affection is then not faith, but the result of faith.
32c. Respect is hrt.
m
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As we have explained above (32a), respect is veneration, etc.
1. All hri is not respect, namely hri with respect to the Truths of 164
Suffering and the Origin of Suffering.
2. H n with respect to the Truths of the Extinction of Suffering and
the Path is also respect.
According to another opinion, respect is veneration; shame is born
from respect and this shame is called hri. Hence respect, the cause of hri, is not hri.
There are four alternatives concerning affection and respect:
1. Affection which is not respect, namely affection with regard to
wife, to children, to companions in the religious life, to pupils.
2. Respect which is not affection, namely respect with regard to
someone else's master, to a person endowed with qualities, etc.
3. Respect which is affection, namely respect with regard to one's
master, one's father, mother, etc.
4. Neither respect nor affection for other persons.
32d. Both exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu.
Affection and respect do not exist in Arupyadhatu.
But you have said that affection is faith, and that respect is hri: now faith and hri are kusalamahdbhumikas (ii. 25): hence affection and respect should exist in Arupyadhatu.
Affection and respect are of two types: relative to dharmas and relative to persons. The text refers to the second type; the first type does exist in all three spheres of existence.
33a-b. Vitarka and vicara are grossness and subtlety of the 165
mind.
The grossness, that is, the gross state of the mind is termed vitarka\ the subtlety, that is, the subtle state of the mind is termed vicara. How can vitarka and vicara be associated with the mind at one and the same time? Can the mind, at one and the same time, be both gross and subtle?
166
According to one opinion, we may compare vicara to cold water,
the mind to cheese which floats on the surface of this cold water, and
? vitarka to the heat of the sun which operates on this cheese. By reason of the water and sun, the cheese is not too runny nor too hard. In this same way, vitarka and vicdra are associated with the mind: it is neither too subtle, by reason of vitarka, nor too gross, by reason of vicdra.
But, we would say, it follows from this explanation that vitarka and vicdra are not grossness and subtlety of mind, but the cause of its grossness and its subtlety: the cold water and the warm light of the sun are not the hard or the runny state of the cheese, but rather the cause of these states.
Other objections present themselves. Grossness and subtlety of
mind are relative things. They admit of many degrees: a mind of the
First Dhyana is subtle in comparison with a mind in Kamadhatu, but
gross in comparision with a mind in the Second Dhyana; the qualities
and the defilements can be more or less gross or subtle in one and the
same stage, for they are divided into nine categories. Thus, if vitarka
and vicdra are grossness and subtlety of the mind, we would have to 167
admit that they both exist up to the highest stage of Arupyadhatu. Now they cease at the Second Dhyana, and adding to this the fact that no specific or generic differences can be established between grossness and subtlety, one then cannot differentiate vitarka and vicdra.
According to another opinion, [that of the Sautrantikas,] vitarka 168
and vicdra are the "factors of voice. " The Sutra says in fact, "It is after having examined, after having judged (vitarkya, vicdrya) that one
169 speaks, not without having examined, not without having judged. "
The factors of voice that are called gross are called vitarkas; those that are subtle are called vicaras. (According to this explanation, we should understand vitarka and vicdra not as two distinct dhannas, but rather a collection of mind and mental states which provoke speech, and which is sometimes gross, sometimes subtle. )
[The Vaibhasikas:] What contradiction is there in two dharmas, the first (vitarka) gross, and the second (vicdra) subtle, being associated with the same mind?
[The Sautrantikas:] There would not be any contradiction if these two dharmas were specifically different; for example, sensations and ideas--although the first are gross and the second subtle (i. 22)--can
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coexist. But two states of the same species, one in a strong state and the other in a weak state, one gross and one subtle, cannot coexist.
[The Vaibhasikas:] But there is a specific difference between vitarka and vicdra.
[The Sautrantikas:] What is this difference?
[The Vaibhasikas:] This difference is inexpressible; but it is
17 manifested through the force or the weakness of the mind. ?
[The Sautrantikas:] The force and the weakness of the mind do not demonstrate the presence of two specifically different dharmas, for the same species is sometimes strong, sometimes weak.
According to another opinion,--ours,--vitarka and vicdra are not
m
associated with one and the same mind. They exist in turn. Vaibhasikas would object that the First Dhyana has five parts (viii. 7) among which are vitarka and vicdra. We would answer that the First Dhyana has five parts in the sense that five parts are possible in the First Dhyana: but any given moment of the First Dhyana possesses only four parts, namely priti, sukha, and samddhi, plus vitarka or vicdra.
***
What difference is there between mdna (pride) and mada (pride- intoxication) (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 223a6)?
33b. Mdna, the error of pride, is arrogance. But mada, pride- intoxication, is the abolition of the mind of one who is enamoured with his own qualities.
It is arrogance of mind (cetas# unnatih) with respect to others. Measuring (ma) the superiority of qualities that one has, or that one believes to have over others, one becomes haughty and depreciates others.
Be reason of its attachment to its own qualities, the mind becomes
172
puffed up, exhaults itself, and abolishes itself. According to other
Masters, in the same way that wine produces a certain joyous excitation that is called intoxication, so too does the attachment that a person has
The
? 173 for his own qualities.
***
We have defined the mind (citta, i. 16) and its mental states. We have seen in what categories the mental states are placed, in what numbers they are generated together, and what their different characteristics are. The mind and its mental states receive, in the Scriptures, different names.
34a-b. The names mind (citta), spirit (manas), and conscious-
174
ness (vijndna) designate the same thing
The mind is termed citta because it accumulates (cinoti); it is
176
termed manas because it knows (manute) and it is termed vijndna
because it distinguishes its object (dlambanam vijndndti).
Some say that the mind is termed citta because it is spotted {citta)
177
by good and bad elements;
(dsrayabhuta) of the mind that follows, it is manas (i. 17); and to the extent that it grasps the support through the organ and its object (dsritabhutd), it is vijndna.
Hence these three names express different meanings, but they designate the same object; in this same way
34b-d. The mind and its mental states "have a support/' "have an object," "have an aspect," and are "associated. "
These four different names, "have a support," etc. , designate the same object.
The mind and its mental states "have a support" because they rely
on the organs (organ of sight, etc. , mental organ); "have an object"
(sdlambana, i. 34) or "a subject of consciousness," because they grasp
their "sphere;" "have an aspect," because they take form according to
178
their object; and are "associated," that is, similar and united, because
they are similar to one another and are not separated from each other. How are they samprayukta or associated, that is, "similar and
united? "
to the extent that it is the support
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34d. In five ways.
The mind and its mental states are associated by reason of five equalities or identities, identity of support (dsraya), of object (dlambana),of aspect (dkara),of time (kola),and equality in the number of dravyas. That is: the mental states (sensation, etc. ) and the mind are associated (1-3) because they have the same support, the same object, and the same aspect; (4) because they are simultaneous; and (5) because, in this association, each type is represented by only one individual substance (dravya): in any given moment there can be only one mind produced; to this one, unique mind there is found associated one sensation, one idea, or one mental state of each type (see ii. 53c-d).
We have explained the mind and its mental states, in full, with
179 their characteristics.
***
[iv. The dharmas not associated with the mind] What are the samskdras not associated with the mind?
35-36a. The dharmas "not associated, with the mind" are prdpti, aprapti, sabhd^dta, dsamjnika, and two absorptions, life,
180 characteristics, namakdya, etc. , and that which is of this type.
These dharmas are not associated with the mind; they are not of the nature of rupa or physical matter; they are included within the samskdraskandha (i. 15): they are called the cittaviprayukta samskdras,
(1) because they are disjoined from the mind, and (2) because, being non-material, they resemble the mind.
181 36b. Prdpti is acquisition and possession.
Prdpti is of two types: (1) acquisition of that which has not been obtained (prdpta) or of that which had been lost; and (2) possession of that which, having been obtained, has not been lost.
Aprapti is the opposite.
? 36c. There is prapti and aprapti of dharmas that belong to the
182
,?
1. When a conditioned dharma falls into the personal series,"
there is prapti or aprapti of this dharma, but not if it falls into the
series of another person, for no one possesses the dharmas of another;
nor if it does not fall into any series, for no one posseses the dharmas
183
"which are not of a living being" (asattvdkhya, U0b).
2. As for unconditioned dharmas, there is prapti of pratisamkhyd-
nirodha and apratisamkhydnirodha (i. 6, ii. 55). 36d. And of the two extinctions.
a. All beings possess the apratismkhyanirodha of the dharmas that do not arise without a cause.
b. The Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1022a) expresses itself in this way: "Who possesses pure dharmas? All beings possess pratisamkhydnirodha with the exception of the sakalabandhana- ddiksanasthas, that is, with the exception of the Aryans bound with all the bonds and who are found in the first moment of the Path, and with the exception of the Prthagjanas bound by all the bonds. The others,
184 both Aryans and Prthagjanas, possess pratisamkhyanirodha! *
c. No one possesses space (dkdsa). Hence there is no prapti of space.
[According to the Vaibhasikas,] prapti and aprapti are in opposi- tion: everything that is susceptible of prapti is also susceptible of aprapti. As shall be explained, the stanza does not speak of this in a straightforward manner.
[The Sautrantikas] deny the existence of a dharma called prapti or possession.
[1. How do the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas prove the existence of a
185
substance (dravyadharma) termed prapti? ]
[The Sarvastivadins:] A Sutra (Madhyamdgama, TD 1, p. 735b29
and following? ) says, "Through the production, the acquisition, and the
possession of ten dharmas belonging to an Arhat, the Saint becomes a
186
person 'having abandoned five things. '"
[The Sautrantikas:] If you conclude from this text that prapti
person himself,
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exists, we would remark that one "possesses" dhannas "that do not
belong to living beings," and also dharmas that do belong to another.
In fact, a Sutra (=the Cakravartisutra) says, "Know, Oh Bhiksus, that 187
the Cakravartin King possesses seven jewels . . . " Now, among the jewels, there are the jewels of a wheel, a wife, etc
[The Sarvastivadins:] In this text, the expression "to possess"
(samanvdgata) signifies "master of. " One says that the Cakravartin
King enjoys mastery over jewels, for they go as he wishes. But in the
Sutra on the Possession of the Ten Dharmas of an Arhat (Dasa-
saiksadharmasamanvagamasutra), the word "possession" designates a 188
thing in and of itself.
2. [The Sautrantikas:] If the word "possession" signifies "mastery"
in the Cakravartisutra, how do you ascertain that, in another Sutra, this same word designates a supposed prapti, a thing in and of itself? In fact 1. ) this prapti is not directly perceived, as is the case for color, sound, etc. , and as is the case for lust, anger, etc. ; 2. ) one cannot conclude the existence of prapti by reason of its effects, as is the case for the sense organs, the organ of sight, etc. (i. 9): for a similar effect is not perceived.
[The Sarvastivadins:] Error! Possession has an effect. It is the 189
cause of the arising of the dharmas.
[The Sautrantikas:] This answer is unfortunate. 1. You maintain
that one can posses the two extinctions; now these, being uncondi-
tioned, do not arise: only conditioned things are "caused" (i. 7d). 2. As
for the conditioned dharmas, there is not now, in any given person, 190
possession of the dharmas that he has not yet acquired, nor does he
any longer possess the dharmas whose possession he has abandoned
through his changing of his sphere of existence or through "detach-
191
ment:"
possession of the second has perished. Hence how can these dharmas arise if the cause of their arising is prapti}
[The Sarvastivadins:] The arising of these dharmas has for its cause a prapti which arises at the same time as they do.
[The Sautrantikas:] An unfortunate answer! If the dharmas arise by virtue of prapti, 1. ) arising and the arising-of-arising (ii. 45c) have
the possession of the first has never existed, and the
? no use; 2. ) the dharmas "that do not belong to living beings" do not arise; and 3. ) how does one explain the difference in the degree of defilement,--weak, medium, and strong defilement,--among persons who are 'bound to all bonds? : all in fact possess the same prdptis of all the defilements of Kamadhatu. Would you say that this difference
proceeds from causes distinct from prapti)
We would answer that these causes are the only cause of weak,
medium, or strong defilements; why would one want to assign it to
prapti?
3. [The Sarvastivadins:] Who maintains that prapti is the cause of
the arising of dharmas} Such is not the role that we attribute to it. For us, prapti is the cause that determines the state or condition of beings. Let us explain. Let us suppose the non-existence of prapti: what difference would there be between an Aryan at the moment in which he produces a mundane thought and a Prthagjana? Now the difference consists solely in that the Aryan, even when he has a worldly thought, is in possession (prapti) of a certain number of pure dharmas.
[The Sautrantikas]: For us, there is this difference that the first has abandoned certain defilements, while the second has not yet aban- doned them.
[The Sarvastivadins:] Without doubt; but if we suppose the non- existence of prapti, how can we say that a defilement is abandoned or not abandoned? There can only be the abandoning of a defilement through the disappearance of the prapti of this defilement; the defilement is not abandoned as long as its prapti lasts.
4. [The Doctrine of the Sautrantikas:] To us, the abandoning or the non-abandoning of a defilement consists of a certain condition of the person (asraya, ii. 5 and 6, 44d). The personality of the Aryan is modified, becoming different from what it was through the power of the Path (Seeing the Truths, Meditation). The defilement, once it has been destroyed through the force of the Path, cannot be manifested again. Like seed which is burned by fire and which becomes different from what it once was, and is no longer capable of germinating, we say that the Aryan has abandoned the defilement, because his person no longer maintains the seeds capable of producing a defilement. The
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worldly path does not definitively destroy the defilement; it only damages it or disturbs it: one would say that a Prthagjana--who is able to practice only the worldly path--has abandoned the defilement when his person no longer contains even the seeds of defilement damaged by this path. Contrarily one says that a person has not abandoned defilement when the seeds are neither burnt nor damaged. One says that a person is in possession of the defilement when he has not "abandoned" them in the manner that we have just explained; we say that he is in non-possession of the defilements when he has not abandoned it. "Possession" and "non-possession" are not things in and of themselves, but designations.
This then concerns possession and non-possession of defilement. But concerning the possession and non-possession of good dharmas, we must distinguish 1. ) the innate good dharmas, which do not entail any effort, and 2. ) the good dharmas that are obtained through effort or cultivation (prayogika, ii. 71b).
We say that a person possesses the first when his person possesses intact the quality of being a seed of these good dharmas. When this quality is damaged, we say that the person does not possess the good
dharmas. In fact, while the seeds of defilement can be destroyed completely and definitively, as is the case among the Aryans, good dharmas never have their roots definitively cut off, with the restriction that one says of a person who has cut off the roots of good through false views (samucchinnakufalamula, iv. 79c) that he has only aban- doned these roots, because the quality of being a seed of these roots, a quality that belongs to his person, has been damaged through false views.
We say that a person possesses the second--the good dharmas produced through effort, through hearing, reflection, and medita- tion--when, these dharmas having arisen, his capacity to produce them [anew] is not damaged.
Hence what we understand by "possession" or the "fact of being endowed with" (samanvagama) is not a dharma constituting a separate thing in and of itself, namely the supposed prapti of the Sarvastivadins, but a certain condition of the person: 1. the seeds of
? defilement have not been uprooted through the Path of the Saints; 2. the seeds of defilement have not been damaged by means of the worldly path; 3. the seeds of innate good have not been damaged through false views; and 4. the seeds of good "obtained through effort" are in good condition at the moment when one wants to produce this good. When the person is in such a condition, this is what we call "possession of defilements," etc.
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But what should we understand by "seeds" [ask the Sarvasti- vadins]?
By seeds we understand ndmarupa (iii. 30), that is, the complex of the five skandhas, capable of generating a result, either immediately or mediately, by means of the parindma-visesa of its series.
The series is the samskdras of the past, the present and the future, in relation to causality, that constitutes an uninterrupted series.
The parindma, or the evolution of the series, is the modification of this series, the fact that this series arises differently from itself at each moment.
The visesa, or culminating point of this evolution, is the moment of this series that possesses the capacity of immediately producing a
192 result.
[The Vaibhasikas object:] The Sutra says, "He who is in possession of greed is not capable of producing the foundations of mindfulness {smrtyupasthdnas, vi. 14). "
[The Sautrantikas:] In this text, we must understand by "posses- sion" of greed the "consenting to greed," or "not rejecting greed. " The Sutra does not say that a person who has the seeds of greed in him is incapable of producing the foundations of mindfulness; it says rather that active greed renders this person presently incapable of producing these spiritual exercises.
In short, in whichever manner it is that we understand possession, either as "cause of the arising of the dharmas" or as "origin of the condition of beings," or as "special state of the person," or as
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"consenting to," possession appears to us, not as an entity, a thing in and of itself, but as a "dharma of designation. " This same holds for non-possession, which is purely and simply the negation of possession.
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The Vaibhasikas say that prdpti and aprdpti are things in and of themselves.
Why?
Because this is our teaching.
37a. There is threefold prdpti of the dharmas of the three periods.
and future. The same for present and future dharmas.
37b. There is good prdpti, etc.