As Fichte's system may be considered the
complement of those which preceded it, we must view it
in connexion with the more important of these.
complement of those which preceded it, we must view it
in connexion with the more important of these.
Fichte - Nature of the Scholar
if you can make
him comprehend and approve the distinction between a
dogmatic belief raised above all doubt, and a mere moral
admission resting on the insufficiency of reason to satisfy its own wants; for then the faith which good moral sentiment
reposes upon Miracle may probably thus express itself:
'Lord, I believe'--that is, I receive it willingly, although I
cannot prove it sufficiently--' help thou mine unbelief! '--
that is,' I have a moral faith in respect of all that I can draw
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? "KRITIK ALLER OFFENBARUNG. "
47
from the miraculous narrative for the purposes of inward
improvement, and I desire to possess an historical belief in
so far as that can contribute to the same end. My uninten-
tional non-belief is not confirmed unbelief. ' But you will not
easily make this distinction acceptable to a censor who, it
is to be feared, makes historical belief an unconditional re-
ligious duty.
"With these hastily, but not inconsiderately thrown out
ideas, you may do whatever seems good to you (provided
you are yourself convinced of their truth), without making
any direct or indirect allusion to him who communicates
them. "
dFic&te to Hant.
"17<<A February, 1792.
"Your kind letter has given me much gratification, as
well because of the goodness which so soon fulfilled my
request, as on account of the matter it contains: upon that
subject I now feel all the peace of mind which, next to one's
own conviction, the authority of a man who is honoured
above all other men can give.
"If I have rightly conceived your meaning, I have
actually pursued in my work the middle course which you
point out,--of distinguishing between an affirmative belief,
and a faith founded on moral considerations. I have en-
deavoured carefully to distinguish between that which,
according to my principle, is the only possible and reason-
able kind of faith in the divinity of a given Revelation
(that faith, namely, which has for its object only a certain
form of the truths of religion)--and the belief which accepts
these truths in themselves as postulates of Pure Reason.
This faith is only a free acceptance of the divine origin of a
particular form of religious truth, grounded on experience of
the efficacy of such a form as a means of moral perfection;
--such an acceptance, indeed, as no one can prove either to
himself or to others, but which, on the other hand, cannot
be refuted; an acceptance which is merely subjective, and,
unlike the faith of Pure Reason, is not universally binding,
since it is founded on individual experience alone. 1
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? 4S
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
believe that I have placed this distinction in a tolerably
clear light, and I have endeavoured to set forth fully the
practical consequences of these principles: namely, that
while they save us the labour of enforcing our own sub-
jective convictions upon others, they secure to every one
the undisturbed possession of everything in religion which
he can apply to his own improvement, and thus silence the
opponents of positive religion, not less than its dogmatical
defenders;--principles for which I do not deserve the anger
of the truth-loving theologian. But yet it has so fallen
out; and I am now determined to leave the book as it is,
and to allow the publisher to deal with the matter as he
chooses. "
The difficulty which gave rise to the preceding letters
was happily got rid of by a change in the censorship. The
new dean, Dr. Knapp, did not partake in the scruples of his
predecessor, and he gave his consent to the publication.
The work appeared at Easter 1792, and excited great atten-
htion in the literary world of Germany. At first it was
universally ascribed to Kant. The journals devoted to the
Critical Philosophy teemed with laudatory notices, until at
length Kant found it necessary publicly to disclaim the
paternity of the book by disclosing its real author.
The "Kritik aller Offenbarung" is an attempt to deter-
mine the natural and necessary conditions under which
alone a Revelation from a superior intelligence to man is
possible, and consequently to lay down the criteria by which
anything that claims the character of such a Revelation is
to be tested. The design, as well as the execution, of the
work is strikingly characteristic of its author; for, although
the form of the Kantian philosophy is much more distinctly
impressed upon this, his first literary production, than upon
his subsequent writings, yet it does not and cannot conceal
those brilliant qualities to which he owed his future fame.
That profound and searching intellect, which, in the pro-
vince of Metaphysics, cast aside as fallacious and deceptive
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? "KR1TIK ALLER OFFENBARUNG. " 49
those solid-seeming principles on which ordinary men are
content to take their stand, and clearing its way to the most
hidden depths of thought, sought there a firm foundation
on which to build a structure of human knowledge, whose
summit should tower as high above common faith as its
base was sunk deep below common observation,--does here,
when applied to a question of practical judgment, exhi-
bit the same clearness of vision, strength of thought, and
subtilty of discrimination. In the conduct of this inquiry,
Fichte manifests that single eye to truth, and reverent
devotion to her when found, which characterize all his
writings and his life. His book has nothing in common with those superficial attacks upon Revelation, or equally superficial defences of it, which are still so abundant, and which afford so much scope for petty personal animosities. The mathematician, while constructing his theorem, does
not pause to inquire who may be interested in its future
applications; nor does the philosopher, while calmly settling
the conditions and principles of knowledge, concern himself
about what opinions may ultimately be found incompatible
with them :--these may take care of themselves. Far
above the dark vortex of theological strife in which punier
intellects chafe and vex themselves in vain, Fichte struggles
forward to the sunshine of pure thought, which sectarianism
cannot see, because its weakened vision is already filled
with a borrowed and imperfect light. "Form and style,"
he says in his preface, "are my affair; the censure or
contempt which these may incur affects me alone ;--and that
is of little moment. The result is the affair of truth, and
that is of moment. That must be subjected to a strict, but
careful and impartial examination. I at least have acted
impartially. I may have erred, and it would be astonishing if I had not. What measure of correction I may deserve, let the public decide. Every judgment, however expressed,
I shall thankfully acknowledge; every objection which
seems incompatible with the cause of truth, I shall meet as
well as I can. To truth I solemnly devote myself, at this
my first entrance into public life. Without respect of party
H
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MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
or of reputation, I shall always acknowledge that to be truth
which I recognise as such, come whence it may; and never
acknowledge that which I do not believe. The public will
pardon me for having thus spoken of myself, on this first
and only occasion. It may be of little importance to the
world to receive this assurance, but it is of importance to
me to call upon it to bear witness to this my solemn vow. "
--Never was vow more nobly fulfilled!
In the spring of 1793, Fichte left Dantzig for Zurich, to
accomplish the wish dearest to his heart. A part of Rahn's
property had been saved from the wreck of his fortunes, and
had been increased by the prudence and economy of his
daughter. He was now anxious to see his children settled
beside him, and to resume his personal intercourse with his
destined son-in-law. It was arranged that wherever Fichte's
abode might ultimately be fixed, the venerable old man
should still enjoy the unremitting care and attention of his
daughter. The following extracts are from a letter written
shortly before Fichte's departure for Switzerland:--
ffo 3fofjanna Rafpt.
"Dantzig, 5th March 1793.
"In June, or at the latest, July, I shall be with thee: but
I should wish to enter the walls of Zurich as thy husband :--
Is that possible? Thy kind heart will give no hindrance to
my wishes; but I do not know the circumstances. But I
hope, and this hope comforts me much. God! what
happiness dost thou prepare for me, the unworthy! 1
have never felt so deeply convinced that my existence is not
to be in vain for the world as when I read thy letter. What
I receive in thee, I have not deserved; it can therefore be
only a means of strengthening me for the labour and toil
which yet await me. Let thy life but flow smoothly on,--
thou sweet, dear one!
"Thou wilt fashion thyself by me! What I could perhaps
give thee, thou dost not need; what thou canst bestow on
me, I need much. Do thou, good, kind one, shed a lasting
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? MARRIAOE WITH JOHANNA RAHN.
51
peace upon this tempestuous heart; pour gentle and win-
ning mildness over my fiery zeal for the ennobling of my
fellow-men. By thee will I fashion myself, till I can go
forth again more usefully.
"I have great, glowing projects. My ambition (pride
rather) thou canst understand. It is to purchase my place
in the human race with deeds, to bind up with my existence. 1
eternal consequences for humanity and the whole spiritual
world; no one need know that I do it, if only it be done. What I shall be in the civil world, I know not. If instead
of immediate activity I be destined to speech, my desire has
already anticipated thy wish that it should be rather from
a pulpit than from a chair. There is at present no want of
prospects of that kind. Even from Saxony I receive most
profitable invitations. I am about to go to Lubeck and
Hamburg. In Dantzig they are unwilling to let me go.
All that for the future! That I am not idle, I have shown
by refusing, within this half year, many invitations which
would have been very alluring to idlers. For the present I
will be nothing but Fichte.
"I may perhaps desire an office in a few years. I hope
it will not be wanting. Till then I can get what I require
by my pen: at least, it has never failed me yet in my many
wanderings and sacrifices. "
Fichte arrived in Zurich on the 16th day of June 1793,
after having once more visited his parents, and received
their entire approbation of his future plans. He was re-
ceived with cordial welcome by a numerous circle of his
former friends, who were well acquainted with his growing
reputation and his prospects of future eminence. After a
residence of a few months in the family of Rahn,--a delay
rendered necessary by the laws of the state regarding fo-
reigners,--his marriage with Johanna Rahn took place on
the 22d of October at Baden, near Zurich. Lavater sent
his congratulations, after his friendly fashion, in the fol-
lowing lines :--
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? ;>2
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
8n jFictitf=Kat)u uitti an Uat)n>>jFictite.
"Jtroft unb Demutfc otreint mirtt nit ofrgongliefce Breubm,
Sieb' im Sunbt mtt Si$t erjtugt unftetblic^t ? inbn:
gteut bet SBa&rbeit bid), fo oft birf SBIdttcbeii bu anbtiefft. "
After a short tour in Switzerland, in the course of which his
already wide-spread fame brought him into contact with
several distinguished men,--Baggesen, Pestalozzi, &c. ,--
Fichte took up his residence in the house of his father-in-
law. Here he enjoyed for several months a life of undis-
turbed repose, in the society of her whose love had been
his stay in times of adversity and doubt, and now gave to
prosperity a keener relish and a holier aim.
But while happiness and security dwelt in the peaceful
Swiss canton, the rest of Europe was torn asunder by that
fearful convulsion which made the close of last century the
most remarkable period in the history of the world. Prin-
ciples which had once bound men together in bonds of truth
and fealty had become false and hollow mockeries; and that
evil time had arrived in which those who were nominally
the leaders and rulers of the people had ceased to command
their reverence and attachment; nay, by countless oppres-
sions and follies had become the objects of their bitter
hatred and contempt. And now one nation speaks forth
the word which all are struggling to utter, and soon every
eye is turned upon France,--the theatre on which the new
act in the drama of human history is to be acted; where
freedom and right are once more to become realities; where
man, no longer a mere appendage to the soil, is to start
forth on a new career of activity and honour, and show the
world the spectacle of an ennobled and regenerated race.
The enslaved of all nations rouse themselves at the shout of
deliverance; the patriot's heart throbs higher at the cry;
the poet dreams of a new golden age; the philosopher looks
with eager eye for the solution of the mighty problem of
human destiny. All, alas! are doomed to disappointment;
and over the grave where their hopes lie buried, a lesson of
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? POLITICAL SPECULATIONS.
53
fearful significance stands inscribed in characters of deso- Ilation and blood, proclaiming to all ages that where the
law of liberty is not written upon the soul, outward freedom
is a mockery and unchecked power a curse.
In 1793 Fichte published his "Contributions to the cor-
rection of public opinion upon the French Revolution. "
The leading principle of this work is, that there is, and can
be, no absolutely unchangeable political constitution, because
none absolutely perfect can be realized;--the relatively best
constitution must therefore carry within itself the principle
of change and improvement. And if it be asked from whom
this improvement should proceed, it is replied, that all
parties to the political contract ought equally to possess
this right. And by this political contract is to be under-
stood, not any actual and recorded agreement,--for both
the old and new opponents of this view think they can
destroy it at once by the easy remark that we have no his-
torical proof of the existence of such a contract,--but the
abstract idea of a State, which, as the peculiar foundation of
all rights, should lie at the bottom of every actual political
fabric. The work comprises also an enquiry concerning the
privileged classes in society, particularly the nobility and
clergy, whose prerogatives are subjected to a prolonged and
rigid scrutiny. In particular, the conflict between the
universal rights of reason and historical privileges which
often involve great injustice is brought prominently into
notice. This book brought upon Fichte the charge of being
a democrat, which was afterwards extended into that of
atheism! The following passage is from his own defence
against the former charge, written at a later period :--
"And so I am a democrat! --And what w a democrat?
One who represents the democratic form of government as
the only just one, and recommends its introduction? I
should think, if he does this merely in his writings, that, even under a monarchical government, the refutation of his
error, if it be an error, might be left to other literary men.
So long as he makes no direct attempt to overthrow the ex-
isting government and put his own scheme in its place, I do
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? 54
MEMOIR OF F1CUTE.
not see how his opinions can come before the judgment-seat
of the State, which takes cognizance of actions only. How-
ever, I know that my opponents think otherwise on this
point. Let them think so if they choose; does the ac-
cusation then justly apply to me ? --am I a democrat in the
foregoing sense of that word? They may indeed have
neither heard nor read anything about me, since they settled
this idea in their minds and wrote "democrat" over my
head in their imaginations. Let them look at my "prin-
ciples of Natural Law," vol. i. p. 189, &c. It is impossible
to name any writer who has declared more decidedly, and on
stronger grounds, against the democratic form of govern-
ment as an absolutely illegitimate form . Let them make
a fair extract from that book. They will find that I require
a submission to law, a jurisdiction of law over the actions of
the citizen, such as was never before demanded by any
teacher of jurisprudence, and has never been realized in any
constitution. Most of the complaints which I have heard
against this system have turned on the assertion that it de-
rogated too much from the freedom (licentiousness and law-
lessness) of men. I am thus far from preaching anarchy.
"But they do not attach a definite and scientific mean-
ing to the word. If all the circumstances in which they use
this expression were brought together, it might perhaps be
possible to say what particular sense they annex to it; and
it is quite possible that, in this sense, I may be a very de-
cided democrat;--it is at least so far certain, that I would
rather not be at all, than be the subject of caprice and not
of law. "
During the period of his residence at Zurich, however,
Fichte's attention was occupied with another subject, more
important to science and to his own future fame than his
political speculations. This was the philosophical system
on which his reputation chiefly rests. It would be alto-
gether out of place in the present Memoir to enter at large
upon a subject so vast and so profound, if indeed it might
not prove altogether impossible to present, in any form in-
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? MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
telligible to the ordinary English reader, the results of these
abstruse and difficult speculations. Yet the pecularities of Fichte's philosophical system are so intimately bound up
with the personal character of its author, that both lose
something of their completeness when considered apart
from each other. And it is principally with a view to illus-
trate the harmony between his life and his philosophy that
an attempt is here made to point out some of its distinguish-
ing features.
As Fichte's system may be considered the
complement of those which preceded it, we must view it
in connexion with the more important of these.
The final results of the philosophy of Locke were two-fold.
In France, the school of Condillac, imitating the example of
the English philosopher rather than following out his first
principles, occupied itself exclusively with the phenomena of
sensation, leaving out of sight the no less indisputable facts
to which reflection is our sole guide. The consequence was
a system of unmixed materialism, a deification of physical
nature, and ultimately, avowed atheism. In Great Britain,
the philosophy of experience was more justly treated : both
sources of human knowledge which Locke indicated at the
outset of his inquiry--although in the body of his essay he
analyzed one of them only--were recognised by his followers
in his own land, until Berkeley resolved the phenomena of
sensation into those of reflection, and the same method which
in France led to materialism, in England produced a system
of intellectual idealism. Berkeley's principles were pushed
to the extreme by Hume, who applying to the phenomena
of reflection precisely the same analysis which Berkeley ap-
plied to those of sensation, demolished the whole fabric of
human knowledge, and revealed, under the seemingly sub-
stantial foundations on which men had hitherto built their
faith a yawning gulf of impenetrable obscurity and scepticism.
Feeling, thought, nay consciousness itself became but fleeting
phantasms without any abiding subject in which they could
inhere.
It may be safely affirmed that, notwithstanding the outcry
which greeted the publication of the "Essay of Human
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? 5G
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
Nature," and the senseless virulence which still loads the
memory of its author with abuse, none of his critics have
hitherto succeeded in detecting a fallacy in his main argu-
ment. Admit his premises, and you cannot consistently
stop short of his conclusions. The Aristotelian theory of
perception, which up to this period none had dared to
impugn, having thus led, by a strictly necessary movement,
to the last extreme of scepticism, the reaction which fol-
lowed, under Reid and the school of Common Sense, was
naturally founded on a denial of the doctrine of representa-
tion, and on a more close analysis of our knowledge of the
external world, and of the processes by which we acquire
that knowledge. It has thus occurred that the distinguished
philosophers of the Scotch School, although deserving of all
gratitude for their acute investigations into the intellectual
and moral phenomena of man, have yet confined themselves
exclusively to the department of psychological analysis, and
have thrown little direct light on the higher questions of
metaphysical speculation. This was reserved for the modern
school of Germany, of which Kant may be considered the
head. Stewart, although contemporary with the philoso-
pher of Konigsberg, seems to have had not only an imper-
fect, but a quite erroneous, conception of his doctrines.
Kant admitted the validity of Hume's conclusions re-
specting our knowledge of external things, on the premises
from which they were deduced. He admitted that the
human intellect could not go beyond itself, could not furnish
us with any other than subjective knowledge. We are in-
deed constrained to assume the existence of an outward
world to which we refer the impressions which come to us
through our senses, but these impressions having to pass
through the prism of certain inherent faculties or " catego-
rias" of the understanding, by which their original character
is modified, or perhaps altogether changed, we are not en-
titled to draw from them any conclusions as to the nature of
the source whence they emanate. Our knowledge of the
outward world is thus limited to the bare admission of its
existence, and stands in the same relation to the outward
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? MODERN PHILOSOPHY--KANT.
57
world itself as the impressions conveyed to the eye through
a kaleidoscope do to the collection of objects within the in-
strument . But is the outward world, which we are thus
forced to abandon to doubt, the only reality for man? Do
we not find in consciousness something more than a cogni-
tive faculty 1 We find besides, Will, Freedom, Self-deter-
mination; and here is a world altogether independent of
sense, and of the knowledge of outward things. Freedom
is the root, the very ground-work of our being; free deter-
mination is the most intimate and certain fact in our
nature. To this freedom we find an absolute law addressed,
--the unconditional law of morality. Here, then, in the
practical world of duty, of free obedience, of moral deter-
mination, we have the true world of man, in which the
moral agent is the only existence, the moral act the only
reality. In this super-sensual world we regain, by the prac-
tical movement of Reason, our convictions of infinite and
absolute existence, from the knowledge of which, as objec-
tive realities, we are shut out by the subjective limitations
of the Understanding. Between the world of sense and the
world of morality, and indissolubly connected with both,
stands the aesthetic world, or the system of relations we
hold with external things through our ideas of the Beauti-
ful, the Sublime, &c. ; which thus forms the bond of union
between the sensible and spiritual worlds. These three
worlds exhaust the elements of human consciousness.
But while Kant, by throwing the bridge of aesthetic feel-
ing over the chasm which separates the sensible from the
purely spiritual world, established an outward communica- ? tion between them, he did not attempt to reconcile--he
maintained the impossibility of reconciling--their essential
opposition. So far as the objective world is concerned, his
system is one of mere negation. It is in this reconciliation,
--in tracing this opposition to its source,--in the establish-
ment of the unity of the sensible and spiritual worlds, that
Fichte's "Wissenchaftslehre" follows out and completes the
philosophical system of which Kant had laid the founda-
tion. In it, for the first time, philosophy becomes, not a
I
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? 58
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
theory of knowledge, but knowledge itself: for in it the
apparent division of the subject thinking from the object
thought of is abolished, by penetrating to the primitive
unity out of which this opposition arises.
The origin of this opposition, and the principle by which
it is to be reconciled, must be sought for in the nature of
the thinking subject itself. Our own consciousness is the
source of all our positive and certain knowledge. It pre-
cedes, and is the ground of, all other knowledge; nay it
embraces within itself everything which we truly know.
The facts of our own mental experience alone possess true
reality for us; whatever is more than these, however pro-
bable as an inference, does not belong to the sphere of
knowledge. Here, then, in the depths of the mind itself,
we must look for a fixed and certain starting point for
philosophy. Fichte finds such a starting point in the pro-
position or axiom (A= A. ) This proposition is at once recog-
nised by every one as absolutely and unconditionally true.
But in affirming this proposition we also affirm our own ex-
istence, for the affirmation itself is our own mental act. The
proposition may therefore be changed into (Ego=Ego. ) But
this affirmation itself postulates the existence of something
not included in its subject, or in other words, out of the
affirmative axiom (A=A) there arises the negative proposition
(--A not=A,) or as before, (Non-Ego not= Ego. ) In this act
of negation the mind assumes the existence of a Non-Ego
opposed to itself, and forming a limitation to its own
existence. This opposition occurs in every act of conscious-
ness; and in the voluntary and spontaneous limits which
the mind thus sets to its own activity, it creates for itself
an objective world.
The fundamental character of finite being is thus the
supposition of itself (thesis), and of something opposed to
itself (anti-thesis); which two conceptions are reciprocal, mu-
tually imply each other, and are hence identical (synthesis. )
The Ego affirms the Non-Ego, and is affirmed in it; the
two conceptions are indissoluble, nay they are but one con-
ception modified by different attitudes of the mind. But as
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? "W1SSENSCHAFTSLEHKE. "
these attitudes are in every case voluntarily assumed by the
Ego, it is itself the only real existence, and the Non-Ego, as
well as the varied aspects attributed to it, are but different
forms of the activity of the Ego. Here, then, Realism and
Idealism coincide in the identity of the subject and object
of thought, and the absolute principle of knowledge is dis-
covered in the mind itself.
But in thus establishing the Non-Ego as a limit to its
own free activity, the Ego does not perform a mere arbitrary
act . It constantly sets before it, as its aim or purpose, the
realization of its own nature; and this effort after self-
development is the root of our practical existence. This
effort is limited by the Non-Ego,--the creation of the Ego
itself for the purposes of its own moral life. Hence the practical Ego must regard itself as acted upon by influences
from without, as restrained by something other than itself,
--in one word, as finite. But this limitation, or in other
words the Non-Ego, is a mere creation of the Ego, without
true life or existence in itself, and only assumed as a field
for the self-development of the Ego. Let us suppose this
assumed obstacle removed or laid aside, and the original
activity of the Ego left without limitation or restraint . In
this case, the finite individuality of the Ego disappears with
the limitations which produce it, and we ascend to the first
principle of a spiritual organization in which the multiform
phenomena of individual life are embraced in an Infinite
all-comprehending Unity, -- "an Absolute Ego, in whose
self-determination all the Non-Ego is determined. "
Fichte has been accused of teaching a system of mere Egoism, of elevating the subjective personality of man into
the place of God. No one who is acquainted with any of
his later writings can fail to see the falsity of this charge;
but as it has been alleged that in these works he abandoned
the principles which he advocated in earlier life, it may not
be unimportant to show that the charge is utterly ground-
less, and inapplicable even to the first outlines of his phi-
losophical theory. The following passages occur in a let-
ter to Jacobi, dated 30th August 1795, when transmitting
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? 60
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
to him a copy of the first edition of the Wissenschaftslehre,
and seem to be quite conclusive as to the fact that the
Absolute Ego of his earlier teaching may be scientifically,
as well as morally, identified with the highest results of his
later doctrines. *
dFtcfjte to gjarobi.
"I have read your writings again this summer during
the leisure of a charming country residence,--read them
again and again, and I am everywhere, but especially in
"Allwill" astonished at the striking similarity of our phi-
losophical convictions. The public will scarcely believe in
this similarity, and perhaps you yourself may not readily do
so, for in that case it would be required of you to deduce
the details of a whole system from the uncertain outlines of
an introduction. You are indeed well known to be a
Realist, and I to be a transcendental Idealist more severe
than even Kant himself; for with him there is still recog-
nised a multiform object of experience, whilst I maintain,
in plain language, that this object is itself produced by us
through our own creative power. Permit me to come to an
understanding with you on this point.
"My Absolute Ego is obviously not the Individual;--
although this has been maintained by offended courtiers
and chagrined philosophers, in order to impute to me the
scandalous doctrine of practical Egoism. But the Individual
must be deduced from the Absolute Eyo. Thus the Wissen-
* schaftslehre enters at once into the domain of natural right.
A finite being--as may be shown by deduction--can only
conceive of itself as a sensuous existence in a sphere of
sensuous existences, over one portion of which--(a portion
which can have no beginning)--it exercises causality, and
with another portion of which--(a portion to which we
ascribe the notion of causality),--it stands in relations of
reciprocal influence;--and in so far it is called an Indivi-
dual: (the conditions of Individuality are Bights. ) So surely as it affirms itself as an Individual, so surely does it affirm
such a sphere; for both are reciprocal notions. When we
regard ourselves as Individuals--in which case we always
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? "W1SSENSCHAFTSLEHRK. "
til
look upon ourselves as living, and not as philosophizing or
poetizing,--we take our stand upon that point of view
which I call practical;--that of the Absolute Ego being
speculative. Henceforward, from this practical point of
view there is a world for us, independent of ourselves, which
we can only modify; and thus too the Pure Ego, which
does not disappear from this region, is necessarily placed
without us, objectified, and called God. How could we
otherwise have arrived at the qualities which we ascribe to
God, and deny to ourselves, had we not first discovered
them in ourselves, and only denied them to ourselves in one
particular respect--t. e. , as Individuals? This practical
point of view is the domain of Realism; by the deduction
and recognition of this point from the side of speculation
itself arises that complete reconciliation of philosophy with
the Common Sense of man, which is promised in the Wis-
senschaftslehre.
"To what end, then, is the speculative point of view, and
with it all philosophy, if it belong not to life? Had hu-
manity never tasted of this forbidden fruit, it might indeed
have done without philosophy. But there is implanted
within us a desire to gaze upon this region which transcends
all individuality, not by a mere reflected light, but in direct
and immediate vision; and the first man who raised a
question concerning the existence of God, broke through
the restrictive limits, shook humanity to its deepest founda-
tions, and set it in a controversy with itself which is not
yet adjusted, and which can be adjusted only by a bold ad-
vance to that highest region of thought from which the
speculative and practical points of view are seen to be
united. We begin to philosophize from presumption, and thus
become bankrupt of our innocence; we see our nakedness,
and then philosophize from necessity for our redemption.
"But do I not philosophize as confidently with you, and
write as openly, as if I were already assured of your in-
terest in my philosophy? Indeed my heart tells me that
I do not deceive myself in assuming the existence of this
interest.
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? 62
MEMOIR OK FICHTE.
"Allwill gives the transcendental Idealists the hope of
an enduring peace and even of a kind of alliance, if they
will but content themselves with finding their own limits,
and making these secure. I believe that I have now ful-
filled this condition. If I have moreover, from this sup-
posed hostile land, guaranteed and secured to Realism itself
its own proper domain, then I may lay claim not merely to
a kind of alliance, but to an alliance of the completest
kind. "
Still more decisive on this point is the following passage
from a review of Schulz's "JEnesidemus," in the Literatur
Zeitung for 1794 :--
"In the Pure Ego, Reason is not practical, neither is it so
in the Ego as Intelligence; it becomes so only by the effort
of these to unite. That this principle must lie at the root
of Kant's doctrine itself, although he has nowhere distinctly
declared it;--further, how a practical philosophy arises
through the representation by the intelligent Ego to itself
of this hyper-physical effort, in its progressive ascent
through the various steps which man must traverse in theo-
retical philosophy,--this is not the place to show. Such an
union,--an Ego in whose Self-determination all the Non-
Ego is determined (the Idea of God)--is the highest object
of this effort. Such an effort, when the intelligent Ego
conceives this object as something external to itself, is
faith:--(Faith in God. ) This effort can never cease, until
after the attainment of its object; that is, Intelligence can-
not regard as the last any moment of its existence in which
this object has not yet been attained,--(Faith in an Eternal
Existence. ) In these ideas, however, there is nothing possible
for us but Faith;--t. e. Intelligence has here no empirical
perception for its object, but only the necessary effort of the
Ego; and throughout all Eternity nothing more than this
can become possible. But this faith is by no means a mere
probable opinion; on the contrary, it possesses, at least ac-
cording to the testimony of our inmost convictions, the same
degree of certainty with the immediately certain postulate
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? MORAL RELATIONS OF THE FINITE EGO.
G3
'[am'--a certainty infinitely superior to all objective cer-
tainty, which can only become possible mediately, through
the existence of the intelligent Ego. ^Enesidemus indeed
demands an objective proof for the existence of God and the
Immortality of the soul. What can he mean by this? Or
does objective certainty appear to him superior to subjec-
tive certainty 1 The axiom--'I am myself--possesses only
subjective certainty; and so far as we can conceive of the
self-consciousness of God, even God is subjective so far as
regards himself. And then, as to an objective existence of
Immortality! (these are ^Enesidemus' own words),--should
any being whatever, contemplating its existence in time, de-
clare at any moment of that existence--'Now, I am eternal! '
--then, on that very account, it could not be eternal. "
We have seen that the attitude of the finite Ego towards
the Non-Ego is practical; towards the Infinite Ego, specu-
lathe. In the first relation we find ourselves surrounded
by existences, over one part of which we exercise causality,
and with the other (in whom we suppose an independent
causality) we are in a state of reciprocal influence. In these
relations the active and moral powers of man find their
sphere. The moral law imparts to its objects--to all
things whose existence is implied in its fulfilment--the
same certainty which belongs to itself. The outward world
assumes a new reality, for we have imperative duties to
perform which demand its existence. Life ceases to be an
empty show without truth or significance;--it is our field of
duty, the theatre on which our moral destiny is to be
wrought out. The voice of conscience, of highest reason,
bids us know, love, and honour beings like ourselves;--and
those beings crowd around us. The ends of their and our
existence demand the powers and appliances of physical life
for their attainment;--that life, and the means of sustaining
and using it, stand before us. The world is nothing more than the sphere and object of human activity; it exists be-
cause the purposes of our moral life require its existence. Of the law of duty we are immediately certain;--the world
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? 64
MKMOIR OF FICHTK.
becomes a reality to us by means of that previous certainty.
Our life begins with an action, not a thought; we do not
act because we know, but we know because we are called
upon to act.
But not only does the law of human activity require our
faith in its immediate objects and implements; it also
points to a purpose, an aim, in our actions, lying beyond
themselves, to which they stand related as means to an end.
Not that the moral law is dependent on the perception of
this end--the moral law is absolute and imperative in it-
self ;--but we necessarily connect with our actions some
future result as a consequence to which they inevitably
tend, as the final accomplishment of the purpose which gave
them birth. The moral sense cannot find such a fulfilment
in the present life;--the forces of nature, the desires and
passions of men, constantly oppose its dictates. It revolts
against the permanence of things as they now are, and un-
ceasingly strives to make them better. Nor can the indi-
vidual look for such an accomplishment of the moral law of
his nature in the progressive improvement of his species.
Were the highest grade of earthly perfection conceived and
attained in the physical and moral world--(as it is conceivable
and attainable)--Reason would still propose a higher grade
beyond it. And even this measure of perfection could not
be appropriated by humanity as its own,--as the result of its
own exertions,--but must be considered as the creation of an
unknown power, by whose unseen agency the basest passions
of men, and even their vices and crimes, have been made
the instruments of this consummation; while too often
their good resolutions appear altogether lost to the world,
or even to retard the purposes which they were apparently
designed to promote. The chain of material causes and
effects is not affected by the motives and feelings which
prompt an action, but solely by the action itself; and the
purposes of mere physical existence would be as well, or
even better promoted by an unerring mechanism as by the
agency of free beings. Nevertheless, if moral obedience be
a reasonable service, it must have its result; if the Reason
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him comprehend and approve the distinction between a
dogmatic belief raised above all doubt, and a mere moral
admission resting on the insufficiency of reason to satisfy its own wants; for then the faith which good moral sentiment
reposes upon Miracle may probably thus express itself:
'Lord, I believe'--that is, I receive it willingly, although I
cannot prove it sufficiently--' help thou mine unbelief! '--
that is,' I have a moral faith in respect of all that I can draw
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? "KRITIK ALLER OFFENBARUNG. "
47
from the miraculous narrative for the purposes of inward
improvement, and I desire to possess an historical belief in
so far as that can contribute to the same end. My uninten-
tional non-belief is not confirmed unbelief. ' But you will not
easily make this distinction acceptable to a censor who, it
is to be feared, makes historical belief an unconditional re-
ligious duty.
"With these hastily, but not inconsiderately thrown out
ideas, you may do whatever seems good to you (provided
you are yourself convinced of their truth), without making
any direct or indirect allusion to him who communicates
them. "
dFic&te to Hant.
"17<<A February, 1792.
"Your kind letter has given me much gratification, as
well because of the goodness which so soon fulfilled my
request, as on account of the matter it contains: upon that
subject I now feel all the peace of mind which, next to one's
own conviction, the authority of a man who is honoured
above all other men can give.
"If I have rightly conceived your meaning, I have
actually pursued in my work the middle course which you
point out,--of distinguishing between an affirmative belief,
and a faith founded on moral considerations. I have en-
deavoured carefully to distinguish between that which,
according to my principle, is the only possible and reason-
able kind of faith in the divinity of a given Revelation
(that faith, namely, which has for its object only a certain
form of the truths of religion)--and the belief which accepts
these truths in themselves as postulates of Pure Reason.
This faith is only a free acceptance of the divine origin of a
particular form of religious truth, grounded on experience of
the efficacy of such a form as a means of moral perfection;
--such an acceptance, indeed, as no one can prove either to
himself or to others, but which, on the other hand, cannot
be refuted; an acceptance which is merely subjective, and,
unlike the faith of Pure Reason, is not universally binding,
since it is founded on individual experience alone. 1
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? 4S
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
believe that I have placed this distinction in a tolerably
clear light, and I have endeavoured to set forth fully the
practical consequences of these principles: namely, that
while they save us the labour of enforcing our own sub-
jective convictions upon others, they secure to every one
the undisturbed possession of everything in religion which
he can apply to his own improvement, and thus silence the
opponents of positive religion, not less than its dogmatical
defenders;--principles for which I do not deserve the anger
of the truth-loving theologian. But yet it has so fallen
out; and I am now determined to leave the book as it is,
and to allow the publisher to deal with the matter as he
chooses. "
The difficulty which gave rise to the preceding letters
was happily got rid of by a change in the censorship. The
new dean, Dr. Knapp, did not partake in the scruples of his
predecessor, and he gave his consent to the publication.
The work appeared at Easter 1792, and excited great atten-
htion in the literary world of Germany. At first it was
universally ascribed to Kant. The journals devoted to the
Critical Philosophy teemed with laudatory notices, until at
length Kant found it necessary publicly to disclaim the
paternity of the book by disclosing its real author.
The "Kritik aller Offenbarung" is an attempt to deter-
mine the natural and necessary conditions under which
alone a Revelation from a superior intelligence to man is
possible, and consequently to lay down the criteria by which
anything that claims the character of such a Revelation is
to be tested. The design, as well as the execution, of the
work is strikingly characteristic of its author; for, although
the form of the Kantian philosophy is much more distinctly
impressed upon this, his first literary production, than upon
his subsequent writings, yet it does not and cannot conceal
those brilliant qualities to which he owed his future fame.
That profound and searching intellect, which, in the pro-
vince of Metaphysics, cast aside as fallacious and deceptive
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? "KR1TIK ALLER OFFENBARUNG. " 49
those solid-seeming principles on which ordinary men are
content to take their stand, and clearing its way to the most
hidden depths of thought, sought there a firm foundation
on which to build a structure of human knowledge, whose
summit should tower as high above common faith as its
base was sunk deep below common observation,--does here,
when applied to a question of practical judgment, exhi-
bit the same clearness of vision, strength of thought, and
subtilty of discrimination. In the conduct of this inquiry,
Fichte manifests that single eye to truth, and reverent
devotion to her when found, which characterize all his
writings and his life. His book has nothing in common with those superficial attacks upon Revelation, or equally superficial defences of it, which are still so abundant, and which afford so much scope for petty personal animosities. The mathematician, while constructing his theorem, does
not pause to inquire who may be interested in its future
applications; nor does the philosopher, while calmly settling
the conditions and principles of knowledge, concern himself
about what opinions may ultimately be found incompatible
with them :--these may take care of themselves. Far
above the dark vortex of theological strife in which punier
intellects chafe and vex themselves in vain, Fichte struggles
forward to the sunshine of pure thought, which sectarianism
cannot see, because its weakened vision is already filled
with a borrowed and imperfect light. "Form and style,"
he says in his preface, "are my affair; the censure or
contempt which these may incur affects me alone ;--and that
is of little moment. The result is the affair of truth, and
that is of moment. That must be subjected to a strict, but
careful and impartial examination. I at least have acted
impartially. I may have erred, and it would be astonishing if I had not. What measure of correction I may deserve, let the public decide. Every judgment, however expressed,
I shall thankfully acknowledge; every objection which
seems incompatible with the cause of truth, I shall meet as
well as I can. To truth I solemnly devote myself, at this
my first entrance into public life. Without respect of party
H
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? 50
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
or of reputation, I shall always acknowledge that to be truth
which I recognise as such, come whence it may; and never
acknowledge that which I do not believe. The public will
pardon me for having thus spoken of myself, on this first
and only occasion. It may be of little importance to the
world to receive this assurance, but it is of importance to
me to call upon it to bear witness to this my solemn vow. "
--Never was vow more nobly fulfilled!
In the spring of 1793, Fichte left Dantzig for Zurich, to
accomplish the wish dearest to his heart. A part of Rahn's
property had been saved from the wreck of his fortunes, and
had been increased by the prudence and economy of his
daughter. He was now anxious to see his children settled
beside him, and to resume his personal intercourse with his
destined son-in-law. It was arranged that wherever Fichte's
abode might ultimately be fixed, the venerable old man
should still enjoy the unremitting care and attention of his
daughter. The following extracts are from a letter written
shortly before Fichte's departure for Switzerland:--
ffo 3fofjanna Rafpt.
"Dantzig, 5th March 1793.
"In June, or at the latest, July, I shall be with thee: but
I should wish to enter the walls of Zurich as thy husband :--
Is that possible? Thy kind heart will give no hindrance to
my wishes; but I do not know the circumstances. But I
hope, and this hope comforts me much. God! what
happiness dost thou prepare for me, the unworthy! 1
have never felt so deeply convinced that my existence is not
to be in vain for the world as when I read thy letter. What
I receive in thee, I have not deserved; it can therefore be
only a means of strengthening me for the labour and toil
which yet await me. Let thy life but flow smoothly on,--
thou sweet, dear one!
"Thou wilt fashion thyself by me! What I could perhaps
give thee, thou dost not need; what thou canst bestow on
me, I need much. Do thou, good, kind one, shed a lasting
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? MARRIAOE WITH JOHANNA RAHN.
51
peace upon this tempestuous heart; pour gentle and win-
ning mildness over my fiery zeal for the ennobling of my
fellow-men. By thee will I fashion myself, till I can go
forth again more usefully.
"I have great, glowing projects. My ambition (pride
rather) thou canst understand. It is to purchase my place
in the human race with deeds, to bind up with my existence. 1
eternal consequences for humanity and the whole spiritual
world; no one need know that I do it, if only it be done. What I shall be in the civil world, I know not. If instead
of immediate activity I be destined to speech, my desire has
already anticipated thy wish that it should be rather from
a pulpit than from a chair. There is at present no want of
prospects of that kind. Even from Saxony I receive most
profitable invitations. I am about to go to Lubeck and
Hamburg. In Dantzig they are unwilling to let me go.
All that for the future! That I am not idle, I have shown
by refusing, within this half year, many invitations which
would have been very alluring to idlers. For the present I
will be nothing but Fichte.
"I may perhaps desire an office in a few years. I hope
it will not be wanting. Till then I can get what I require
by my pen: at least, it has never failed me yet in my many
wanderings and sacrifices. "
Fichte arrived in Zurich on the 16th day of June 1793,
after having once more visited his parents, and received
their entire approbation of his future plans. He was re-
ceived with cordial welcome by a numerous circle of his
former friends, who were well acquainted with his growing
reputation and his prospects of future eminence. After a
residence of a few months in the family of Rahn,--a delay
rendered necessary by the laws of the state regarding fo-
reigners,--his marriage with Johanna Rahn took place on
the 22d of October at Baden, near Zurich. Lavater sent
his congratulations, after his friendly fashion, in the fol-
lowing lines :--
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? ;>2
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
8n jFictitf=Kat)u uitti an Uat)n>>jFictite.
"Jtroft unb Demutfc otreint mirtt nit ofrgongliefce Breubm,
Sieb' im Sunbt mtt Si$t erjtugt unftetblic^t ? inbn:
gteut bet SBa&rbeit bid), fo oft birf SBIdttcbeii bu anbtiefft. "
After a short tour in Switzerland, in the course of which his
already wide-spread fame brought him into contact with
several distinguished men,--Baggesen, Pestalozzi, &c. ,--
Fichte took up his residence in the house of his father-in-
law. Here he enjoyed for several months a life of undis-
turbed repose, in the society of her whose love had been
his stay in times of adversity and doubt, and now gave to
prosperity a keener relish and a holier aim.
But while happiness and security dwelt in the peaceful
Swiss canton, the rest of Europe was torn asunder by that
fearful convulsion which made the close of last century the
most remarkable period in the history of the world. Prin-
ciples which had once bound men together in bonds of truth
and fealty had become false and hollow mockeries; and that
evil time had arrived in which those who were nominally
the leaders and rulers of the people had ceased to command
their reverence and attachment; nay, by countless oppres-
sions and follies had become the objects of their bitter
hatred and contempt. And now one nation speaks forth
the word which all are struggling to utter, and soon every
eye is turned upon France,--the theatre on which the new
act in the drama of human history is to be acted; where
freedom and right are once more to become realities; where
man, no longer a mere appendage to the soil, is to start
forth on a new career of activity and honour, and show the
world the spectacle of an ennobled and regenerated race.
The enslaved of all nations rouse themselves at the shout of
deliverance; the patriot's heart throbs higher at the cry;
the poet dreams of a new golden age; the philosopher looks
with eager eye for the solution of the mighty problem of
human destiny. All, alas! are doomed to disappointment;
and over the grave where their hopes lie buried, a lesson of
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? POLITICAL SPECULATIONS.
53
fearful significance stands inscribed in characters of deso- Ilation and blood, proclaiming to all ages that where the
law of liberty is not written upon the soul, outward freedom
is a mockery and unchecked power a curse.
In 1793 Fichte published his "Contributions to the cor-
rection of public opinion upon the French Revolution. "
The leading principle of this work is, that there is, and can
be, no absolutely unchangeable political constitution, because
none absolutely perfect can be realized;--the relatively best
constitution must therefore carry within itself the principle
of change and improvement. And if it be asked from whom
this improvement should proceed, it is replied, that all
parties to the political contract ought equally to possess
this right. And by this political contract is to be under-
stood, not any actual and recorded agreement,--for both
the old and new opponents of this view think they can
destroy it at once by the easy remark that we have no his-
torical proof of the existence of such a contract,--but the
abstract idea of a State, which, as the peculiar foundation of
all rights, should lie at the bottom of every actual political
fabric. The work comprises also an enquiry concerning the
privileged classes in society, particularly the nobility and
clergy, whose prerogatives are subjected to a prolonged and
rigid scrutiny. In particular, the conflict between the
universal rights of reason and historical privileges which
often involve great injustice is brought prominently into
notice. This book brought upon Fichte the charge of being
a democrat, which was afterwards extended into that of
atheism! The following passage is from his own defence
against the former charge, written at a later period :--
"And so I am a democrat! --And what w a democrat?
One who represents the democratic form of government as
the only just one, and recommends its introduction? I
should think, if he does this merely in his writings, that, even under a monarchical government, the refutation of his
error, if it be an error, might be left to other literary men.
So long as he makes no direct attempt to overthrow the ex-
isting government and put his own scheme in its place, I do
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? 54
MEMOIR OF F1CUTE.
not see how his opinions can come before the judgment-seat
of the State, which takes cognizance of actions only. How-
ever, I know that my opponents think otherwise on this
point. Let them think so if they choose; does the ac-
cusation then justly apply to me ? --am I a democrat in the
foregoing sense of that word? They may indeed have
neither heard nor read anything about me, since they settled
this idea in their minds and wrote "democrat" over my
head in their imaginations. Let them look at my "prin-
ciples of Natural Law," vol. i. p. 189, &c. It is impossible
to name any writer who has declared more decidedly, and on
stronger grounds, against the democratic form of govern-
ment as an absolutely illegitimate form . Let them make
a fair extract from that book. They will find that I require
a submission to law, a jurisdiction of law over the actions of
the citizen, such as was never before demanded by any
teacher of jurisprudence, and has never been realized in any
constitution. Most of the complaints which I have heard
against this system have turned on the assertion that it de-
rogated too much from the freedom (licentiousness and law-
lessness) of men. I am thus far from preaching anarchy.
"But they do not attach a definite and scientific mean-
ing to the word. If all the circumstances in which they use
this expression were brought together, it might perhaps be
possible to say what particular sense they annex to it; and
it is quite possible that, in this sense, I may be a very de-
cided democrat;--it is at least so far certain, that I would
rather not be at all, than be the subject of caprice and not
of law. "
During the period of his residence at Zurich, however,
Fichte's attention was occupied with another subject, more
important to science and to his own future fame than his
political speculations. This was the philosophical system
on which his reputation chiefly rests. It would be alto-
gether out of place in the present Memoir to enter at large
upon a subject so vast and so profound, if indeed it might
not prove altogether impossible to present, in any form in-
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? MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
telligible to the ordinary English reader, the results of these
abstruse and difficult speculations. Yet the pecularities of Fichte's philosophical system are so intimately bound up
with the personal character of its author, that both lose
something of their completeness when considered apart
from each other. And it is principally with a view to illus-
trate the harmony between his life and his philosophy that
an attempt is here made to point out some of its distinguish-
ing features.
As Fichte's system may be considered the
complement of those which preceded it, we must view it
in connexion with the more important of these.
The final results of the philosophy of Locke were two-fold.
In France, the school of Condillac, imitating the example of
the English philosopher rather than following out his first
principles, occupied itself exclusively with the phenomena of
sensation, leaving out of sight the no less indisputable facts
to which reflection is our sole guide. The consequence was
a system of unmixed materialism, a deification of physical
nature, and ultimately, avowed atheism. In Great Britain,
the philosophy of experience was more justly treated : both
sources of human knowledge which Locke indicated at the
outset of his inquiry--although in the body of his essay he
analyzed one of them only--were recognised by his followers
in his own land, until Berkeley resolved the phenomena of
sensation into those of reflection, and the same method which
in France led to materialism, in England produced a system
of intellectual idealism. Berkeley's principles were pushed
to the extreme by Hume, who applying to the phenomena
of reflection precisely the same analysis which Berkeley ap-
plied to those of sensation, demolished the whole fabric of
human knowledge, and revealed, under the seemingly sub-
stantial foundations on which men had hitherto built their
faith a yawning gulf of impenetrable obscurity and scepticism.
Feeling, thought, nay consciousness itself became but fleeting
phantasms without any abiding subject in which they could
inhere.
It may be safely affirmed that, notwithstanding the outcry
which greeted the publication of the "Essay of Human
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? 5G
MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
Nature," and the senseless virulence which still loads the
memory of its author with abuse, none of his critics have
hitherto succeeded in detecting a fallacy in his main argu-
ment. Admit his premises, and you cannot consistently
stop short of his conclusions. The Aristotelian theory of
perception, which up to this period none had dared to
impugn, having thus led, by a strictly necessary movement,
to the last extreme of scepticism, the reaction which fol-
lowed, under Reid and the school of Common Sense, was
naturally founded on a denial of the doctrine of representa-
tion, and on a more close analysis of our knowledge of the
external world, and of the processes by which we acquire
that knowledge. It has thus occurred that the distinguished
philosophers of the Scotch School, although deserving of all
gratitude for their acute investigations into the intellectual
and moral phenomena of man, have yet confined themselves
exclusively to the department of psychological analysis, and
have thrown little direct light on the higher questions of
metaphysical speculation. This was reserved for the modern
school of Germany, of which Kant may be considered the
head. Stewart, although contemporary with the philoso-
pher of Konigsberg, seems to have had not only an imper-
fect, but a quite erroneous, conception of his doctrines.
Kant admitted the validity of Hume's conclusions re-
specting our knowledge of external things, on the premises
from which they were deduced. He admitted that the
human intellect could not go beyond itself, could not furnish
us with any other than subjective knowledge. We are in-
deed constrained to assume the existence of an outward
world to which we refer the impressions which come to us
through our senses, but these impressions having to pass
through the prism of certain inherent faculties or " catego-
rias" of the understanding, by which their original character
is modified, or perhaps altogether changed, we are not en-
titled to draw from them any conclusions as to the nature of
the source whence they emanate. Our knowledge of the
outward world is thus limited to the bare admission of its
existence, and stands in the same relation to the outward
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? MODERN PHILOSOPHY--KANT.
57
world itself as the impressions conveyed to the eye through
a kaleidoscope do to the collection of objects within the in-
strument . But is the outward world, which we are thus
forced to abandon to doubt, the only reality for man? Do
we not find in consciousness something more than a cogni-
tive faculty 1 We find besides, Will, Freedom, Self-deter-
mination; and here is a world altogether independent of
sense, and of the knowledge of outward things. Freedom
is the root, the very ground-work of our being; free deter-
mination is the most intimate and certain fact in our
nature. To this freedom we find an absolute law addressed,
--the unconditional law of morality. Here, then, in the
practical world of duty, of free obedience, of moral deter-
mination, we have the true world of man, in which the
moral agent is the only existence, the moral act the only
reality. In this super-sensual world we regain, by the prac-
tical movement of Reason, our convictions of infinite and
absolute existence, from the knowledge of which, as objec-
tive realities, we are shut out by the subjective limitations
of the Understanding. Between the world of sense and the
world of morality, and indissolubly connected with both,
stands the aesthetic world, or the system of relations we
hold with external things through our ideas of the Beauti-
ful, the Sublime, &c. ; which thus forms the bond of union
between the sensible and spiritual worlds. These three
worlds exhaust the elements of human consciousness.
But while Kant, by throwing the bridge of aesthetic feel-
ing over the chasm which separates the sensible from the
purely spiritual world, established an outward communica- ? tion between them, he did not attempt to reconcile--he
maintained the impossibility of reconciling--their essential
opposition. So far as the objective world is concerned, his
system is one of mere negation. It is in this reconciliation,
--in tracing this opposition to its source,--in the establish-
ment of the unity of the sensible and spiritual worlds, that
Fichte's "Wissenchaftslehre" follows out and completes the
philosophical system of which Kant had laid the founda-
tion. In it, for the first time, philosophy becomes, not a
I
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MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
theory of knowledge, but knowledge itself: for in it the
apparent division of the subject thinking from the object
thought of is abolished, by penetrating to the primitive
unity out of which this opposition arises.
The origin of this opposition, and the principle by which
it is to be reconciled, must be sought for in the nature of
the thinking subject itself. Our own consciousness is the
source of all our positive and certain knowledge. It pre-
cedes, and is the ground of, all other knowledge; nay it
embraces within itself everything which we truly know.
The facts of our own mental experience alone possess true
reality for us; whatever is more than these, however pro-
bable as an inference, does not belong to the sphere of
knowledge. Here, then, in the depths of the mind itself,
we must look for a fixed and certain starting point for
philosophy. Fichte finds such a starting point in the pro-
position or axiom (A= A. ) This proposition is at once recog-
nised by every one as absolutely and unconditionally true.
But in affirming this proposition we also affirm our own ex-
istence, for the affirmation itself is our own mental act. The
proposition may therefore be changed into (Ego=Ego. ) But
this affirmation itself postulates the existence of something
not included in its subject, or in other words, out of the
affirmative axiom (A=A) there arises the negative proposition
(--A not=A,) or as before, (Non-Ego not= Ego. ) In this act
of negation the mind assumes the existence of a Non-Ego
opposed to itself, and forming a limitation to its own
existence. This opposition occurs in every act of conscious-
ness; and in the voluntary and spontaneous limits which
the mind thus sets to its own activity, it creates for itself
an objective world.
The fundamental character of finite being is thus the
supposition of itself (thesis), and of something opposed to
itself (anti-thesis); which two conceptions are reciprocal, mu-
tually imply each other, and are hence identical (synthesis. )
The Ego affirms the Non-Ego, and is affirmed in it; the
two conceptions are indissoluble, nay they are but one con-
ception modified by different attitudes of the mind. But as
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? "W1SSENSCHAFTSLEHKE. "
these attitudes are in every case voluntarily assumed by the
Ego, it is itself the only real existence, and the Non-Ego, as
well as the varied aspects attributed to it, are but different
forms of the activity of the Ego. Here, then, Realism and
Idealism coincide in the identity of the subject and object
of thought, and the absolute principle of knowledge is dis-
covered in the mind itself.
But in thus establishing the Non-Ego as a limit to its
own free activity, the Ego does not perform a mere arbitrary
act . It constantly sets before it, as its aim or purpose, the
realization of its own nature; and this effort after self-
development is the root of our practical existence. This
effort is limited by the Non-Ego,--the creation of the Ego
itself for the purposes of its own moral life. Hence the practical Ego must regard itself as acted upon by influences
from without, as restrained by something other than itself,
--in one word, as finite. But this limitation, or in other
words the Non-Ego, is a mere creation of the Ego, without
true life or existence in itself, and only assumed as a field
for the self-development of the Ego. Let us suppose this
assumed obstacle removed or laid aside, and the original
activity of the Ego left without limitation or restraint . In
this case, the finite individuality of the Ego disappears with
the limitations which produce it, and we ascend to the first
principle of a spiritual organization in which the multiform
phenomena of individual life are embraced in an Infinite
all-comprehending Unity, -- "an Absolute Ego, in whose
self-determination all the Non-Ego is determined. "
Fichte has been accused of teaching a system of mere Egoism, of elevating the subjective personality of man into
the place of God. No one who is acquainted with any of
his later writings can fail to see the falsity of this charge;
but as it has been alleged that in these works he abandoned
the principles which he advocated in earlier life, it may not
be unimportant to show that the charge is utterly ground-
less, and inapplicable even to the first outlines of his phi-
losophical theory. The following passages occur in a let-
ter to Jacobi, dated 30th August 1795, when transmitting
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MEMOIR OF FICHTE.
to him a copy of the first edition of the Wissenschaftslehre,
and seem to be quite conclusive as to the fact that the
Absolute Ego of his earlier teaching may be scientifically,
as well as morally, identified with the highest results of his
later doctrines. *
dFtcfjte to gjarobi.
"I have read your writings again this summer during
the leisure of a charming country residence,--read them
again and again, and I am everywhere, but especially in
"Allwill" astonished at the striking similarity of our phi-
losophical convictions. The public will scarcely believe in
this similarity, and perhaps you yourself may not readily do
so, for in that case it would be required of you to deduce
the details of a whole system from the uncertain outlines of
an introduction. You are indeed well known to be a
Realist, and I to be a transcendental Idealist more severe
than even Kant himself; for with him there is still recog-
nised a multiform object of experience, whilst I maintain,
in plain language, that this object is itself produced by us
through our own creative power. Permit me to come to an
understanding with you on this point.
"My Absolute Ego is obviously not the Individual;--
although this has been maintained by offended courtiers
and chagrined philosophers, in order to impute to me the
scandalous doctrine of practical Egoism. But the Individual
must be deduced from the Absolute Eyo. Thus the Wissen-
* schaftslehre enters at once into the domain of natural right.
A finite being--as may be shown by deduction--can only
conceive of itself as a sensuous existence in a sphere of
sensuous existences, over one portion of which--(a portion
which can have no beginning)--it exercises causality, and
with another portion of which--(a portion to which we
ascribe the notion of causality),--it stands in relations of
reciprocal influence;--and in so far it is called an Indivi-
dual: (the conditions of Individuality are Bights. ) So surely as it affirms itself as an Individual, so surely does it affirm
such a sphere; for both are reciprocal notions. When we
regard ourselves as Individuals--in which case we always
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? "W1SSENSCHAFTSLEHRK. "
til
look upon ourselves as living, and not as philosophizing or
poetizing,--we take our stand upon that point of view
which I call practical;--that of the Absolute Ego being
speculative. Henceforward, from this practical point of
view there is a world for us, independent of ourselves, which
we can only modify; and thus too the Pure Ego, which
does not disappear from this region, is necessarily placed
without us, objectified, and called God. How could we
otherwise have arrived at the qualities which we ascribe to
God, and deny to ourselves, had we not first discovered
them in ourselves, and only denied them to ourselves in one
particular respect--t. e. , as Individuals? This practical
point of view is the domain of Realism; by the deduction
and recognition of this point from the side of speculation
itself arises that complete reconciliation of philosophy with
the Common Sense of man, which is promised in the Wis-
senschaftslehre.
"To what end, then, is the speculative point of view, and
with it all philosophy, if it belong not to life? Had hu-
manity never tasted of this forbidden fruit, it might indeed
have done without philosophy. But there is implanted
within us a desire to gaze upon this region which transcends
all individuality, not by a mere reflected light, but in direct
and immediate vision; and the first man who raised a
question concerning the existence of God, broke through
the restrictive limits, shook humanity to its deepest founda-
tions, and set it in a controversy with itself which is not
yet adjusted, and which can be adjusted only by a bold ad-
vance to that highest region of thought from which the
speculative and practical points of view are seen to be
united. We begin to philosophize from presumption, and thus
become bankrupt of our innocence; we see our nakedness,
and then philosophize from necessity for our redemption.
"But do I not philosophize as confidently with you, and
write as openly, as if I were already assured of your in-
terest in my philosophy? Indeed my heart tells me that
I do not deceive myself in assuming the existence of this
interest.
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MEMOIR OK FICHTE.
"Allwill gives the transcendental Idealists the hope of
an enduring peace and even of a kind of alliance, if they
will but content themselves with finding their own limits,
and making these secure. I believe that I have now ful-
filled this condition. If I have moreover, from this sup-
posed hostile land, guaranteed and secured to Realism itself
its own proper domain, then I may lay claim not merely to
a kind of alliance, but to an alliance of the completest
kind. "
Still more decisive on this point is the following passage
from a review of Schulz's "JEnesidemus," in the Literatur
Zeitung for 1794 :--
"In the Pure Ego, Reason is not practical, neither is it so
in the Ego as Intelligence; it becomes so only by the effort
of these to unite. That this principle must lie at the root
of Kant's doctrine itself, although he has nowhere distinctly
declared it;--further, how a practical philosophy arises
through the representation by the intelligent Ego to itself
of this hyper-physical effort, in its progressive ascent
through the various steps which man must traverse in theo-
retical philosophy,--this is not the place to show. Such an
union,--an Ego in whose Self-determination all the Non-
Ego is determined (the Idea of God)--is the highest object
of this effort. Such an effort, when the intelligent Ego
conceives this object as something external to itself, is
faith:--(Faith in God. ) This effort can never cease, until
after the attainment of its object; that is, Intelligence can-
not regard as the last any moment of its existence in which
this object has not yet been attained,--(Faith in an Eternal
Existence. ) In these ideas, however, there is nothing possible
for us but Faith;--t. e. Intelligence has here no empirical
perception for its object, but only the necessary effort of the
Ego; and throughout all Eternity nothing more than this
can become possible. But this faith is by no means a mere
probable opinion; on the contrary, it possesses, at least ac-
cording to the testimony of our inmost convictions, the same
degree of certainty with the immediately certain postulate
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? MORAL RELATIONS OF THE FINITE EGO.
G3
'[am'--a certainty infinitely superior to all objective cer-
tainty, which can only become possible mediately, through
the existence of the intelligent Ego. ^Enesidemus indeed
demands an objective proof for the existence of God and the
Immortality of the soul. What can he mean by this? Or
does objective certainty appear to him superior to subjec-
tive certainty 1 The axiom--'I am myself--possesses only
subjective certainty; and so far as we can conceive of the
self-consciousness of God, even God is subjective so far as
regards himself. And then, as to an objective existence of
Immortality! (these are ^Enesidemus' own words),--should
any being whatever, contemplating its existence in time, de-
clare at any moment of that existence--'Now, I am eternal! '
--then, on that very account, it could not be eternal. "
We have seen that the attitude of the finite Ego towards
the Non-Ego is practical; towards the Infinite Ego, specu-
lathe. In the first relation we find ourselves surrounded
by existences, over one part of which we exercise causality,
and with the other (in whom we suppose an independent
causality) we are in a state of reciprocal influence. In these
relations the active and moral powers of man find their
sphere. The moral law imparts to its objects--to all
things whose existence is implied in its fulfilment--the
same certainty which belongs to itself. The outward world
assumes a new reality, for we have imperative duties to
perform which demand its existence. Life ceases to be an
empty show without truth or significance;--it is our field of
duty, the theatre on which our moral destiny is to be
wrought out. The voice of conscience, of highest reason,
bids us know, love, and honour beings like ourselves;--and
those beings crowd around us. The ends of their and our
existence demand the powers and appliances of physical life
for their attainment;--that life, and the means of sustaining
and using it, stand before us. The world is nothing more than the sphere and object of human activity; it exists be-
cause the purposes of our moral life require its existence. Of the law of duty we are immediately certain;--the world
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? 64
MKMOIR OF FICHTK.
becomes a reality to us by means of that previous certainty.
Our life begins with an action, not a thought; we do not
act because we know, but we know because we are called
upon to act.
But not only does the law of human activity require our
faith in its immediate objects and implements; it also
points to a purpose, an aim, in our actions, lying beyond
themselves, to which they stand related as means to an end.
Not that the moral law is dependent on the perception of
this end--the moral law is absolute and imperative in it-
self ;--but we necessarily connect with our actions some
future result as a consequence to which they inevitably
tend, as the final accomplishment of the purpose which gave
them birth. The moral sense cannot find such a fulfilment
in the present life;--the forces of nature, the desires and
passions of men, constantly oppose its dictates. It revolts
against the permanence of things as they now are, and un-
ceasingly strives to make them better. Nor can the indi-
vidual look for such an accomplishment of the moral law of
his nature in the progressive improvement of his species.
Were the highest grade of earthly perfection conceived and
attained in the physical and moral world--(as it is conceivable
and attainable)--Reason would still propose a higher grade
beyond it. And even this measure of perfection could not
be appropriated by humanity as its own,--as the result of its
own exertions,--but must be considered as the creation of an
unknown power, by whose unseen agency the basest passions
of men, and even their vices and crimes, have been made
the instruments of this consummation; while too often
their good resolutions appear altogether lost to the world,
or even to retard the purposes which they were apparently
designed to promote. The chain of material causes and
effects is not affected by the motives and feelings which
prompt an action, but solely by the action itself; and the
purposes of mere physical existence would be as well, or
even better promoted by an unerring mechanism as by the
agency of free beings. Nevertheless, if moral obedience be
a reasonable service, it must have its result; if the Reason
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