Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the subjects and the
diversity
of matter.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
.
Non entia sed entium.
[Not entities, but of entities.
]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, if something of the substances were annihilated, the world would be emptied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus,wehaveanintrinsicformalprinciple,eternalandsub- sistent, incomparably superior to that imagined by the Sophists9 who, ignoring the substance of things, treat only of the accidents, and arrive at positing corruptible substances from the fact that what they call essentially, fundamentally and principally substance is what results from composition, which is only an accident, not containing in itself either stability or truth, and reduced to nothing. They say that what is truly man is the result of composition, and that what is truly soul is no more than the perfection and act of a living body, or even something that is the result of a certain sym- metry in its constitution and members. Hence, it is not surprising that they make so much, and are so greatly afraid, of death and dissolution, since they believe the loss of being is imminent. Nature cries out against such madness, assuring us that neither the body nor the soul need fear death, because both matter and form are absolutely unalterable principles:
O genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis,
quid Styga, quid tenebras et nomina vana timetis, materiam vatum falsique pericula mundi?
Corpora sive rogus flamma seu tabe vetustas abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis:
morte carent animae domibus habitantque receptae. Omnia mutantur, nihil interit.
[You people, dismayed by fear of icy death, why are you terrified by the Styx, by shadows and empty names, the stuff of poets' tales, by the dangers of a world that doesn't exist? Our bodies, whether destroyed by the flames of the funeral pyre, or by slow decay, do not feel any suffering. Our souls are immortal and are ever received into new homes, where they live and dwell, when they have left their previous abode. All things change, but nothing dies. ]10
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe Solomon, esteemed the wisest among Hebrews, says something comparable: 'Quod est quod est? Ipsum quod fuit. Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod est. Nihil sub sole novum' [What is that which is? That which was. What is the thing that was? That which is. There is nothing new under the sun]. 11 And, thus, this form which you posit is not something
9 For Bruno, the followers of Aristotle. 10 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ? ? , ? ? ? -? and ? ? ? , cited from memory. 11 Ecclesiastes, ? , ? , cited from memory.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? that exists only in matter and is fixed to it according to its being, and does not depend on the body or matter for its existence?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed. What is more, I leave open the possibility of a form existing without matter, though I firmly assert that no part of matter exists without form, except when it is considered logically, as it is by Aristotle, who never tires of dividing by reason what in nature and in truth is indivisible.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyounotadmitanyotherformthanthiseternalassociate of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,andastillmorenaturalformthanthematerialform,of which we shall treat later. For now, note this distinction of forms: first, there is a sort of form which informs, and which is extended and depen- dent. Since it informs everything, it is in everything; since it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; since it is depen- dent and has no operation through itself, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; similarly it communicates the name and the being to them. Such is the material form, like that of fire: because every part of fire warms, is called fire, and is fire. Secondly, there is another sort of form, which informs and is dependent, but which is not extended. Since it per- fects and activates the whole, it is in the whole and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, the result is that it cannot attribute the action of the whole to the parts. Since it is dependent, it communicates the action of the whole to the parts. Such is the vegetative and sensitive soul, since no part of the animal is animal, yet each part nonetheless lives and feels. Thirdly, there is another kind of form, which actuates and makes perfect the whole but is not extended nor dependent as regards its operation. Since it per- fects and actuates, it is in the whole, in its totality and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, it does not attribute the perfection of the whole to the parts. Since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its action to them. Such is the soul, in so far as it can exercise intellectual power, and it is called intellective: it does not cause any part of man to be called man, or to be man, nor to be described as intelligent. Of these three kinds, the first is material, for it cannot be conceived, nor can it exist, without matter. The two other kinds (which, in fact, come together as one, according to their substance and being, and are distinguished in the fashion we have indicated above) express the formal principle, as distinct from the material principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iunderstand.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Furthermore,Iwouldliketopointoutthatif,usingcommon terms, we say there are five grades of form, namely, the elemental, the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? mixed, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective, we do not, how- ever, understand form in the vulgar sense, for that distinction is valid from the point of view of the operations which appear in the subjects and proceed from them, but not from the point of view of the primordial and fundamental essence of that form and spiritual life that fills all things, which it does in different ways.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I understand. Inasmuch as this form that you posit as prin- ciple is a substantial form, it makes up a perfect species, is to itself its own genus, and is not, like the Peripatetic form, part of a species.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The distinction of forms in matter is not a function of the accidental dispositions which depend on material form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . From which it follows that this separated form cannot be multiplied in the numerical sense, since all numerical multiplication depends on matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the subjects and the diversity of matter. And such form, although it differentiates the part from the whole in the subject, is not, however, itself different in the part and in the whole, even if the definition we use for it differs according to whether it is considered as substantial by itself, or con- sidered in so far as it is the act and perfection of some subject - and in that case, it is considered according to that specification and that individuation which it has assumed in this or that subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youdonotconceiveofthisformasbeingaccidental,notas accidental form, not as mingled with matter or inherent in it, but as exist- ing in it, associating itself with and assisting it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatisjustwhatIsay.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Moreover, this form is defined and determined by matter, since, on the one hand, possessing in itself the faculty of constituting the particulars of innumerable species, it happens to restrict itself in order to constitute an individual, and, on the other hand, the potency of inde- terminate matter, which can receive any form whatsoever, finds itself limited to a single species. Thus, one is the cause of the definition and determination of the other.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So that, in some way, you allow Anaxagoras' notion, who qualifies with the word 'latent' the particular forms of nature, and you approve, in part, that of Plato, who has them derive from ideas, and, in part, that of Empedocles, who has them issue from the intelligence, and, in certain measure, that of Aristotle, who puts them down as emerging, so to speak, from the potency of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, for as we have said, where there is form, there is, in a way, everything. Where there is soul, spirit, life, there is everything. The one who forms is the intellect, which acts through the ideal species; even if it does not bring forms out of matter, it does not then look for them outside of matter, since this spirit fills everything.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Velim scire quomodo forma est anima mundi ubique tota [I would like very much to know how the world soul is a form which is pre- sent everywhere in its totality], if it is indivisible. It must, then, be very large, even of infinite dimension, since you say the world is infinite.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Here is good reason, indeed, for its being large. It is like what a preacher at Grandazzo in Sicily said of our Lord: to signify that he is present everywhere, he ordered a crucifix as large as the church, in the image of God the Father, who has the heavens for a canopy and the starry sky for a seat, and who possesses such long legs that they stretch down to earth, which he uses as a footstool. To this preacher came a certain peas- ant, saying, 'Reverend father, how many ells of cloth would it take to make his hose? ' Another said that all Melazzo and Nicosia's chickpeas, haricots and broad beans would not suffice to fill his belly. Be careful, then, that this world soul is not cut out the same way.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would not know how to satisfy your perplexity, Gervasio, but I can that of Master Poliinnio. But for both of you, I will use a com- parison, for I want you, too, to gather some fruit from our reasonings and discussions. In short, you must know, then, that the world soul and the divinity are not present entirely everywhere and through every part, in the same way as some material thing could be - since that is impossible for any body or spirit of any kind whatsoever - but are present in a manner that is not easy to explain, save in the following way. Please note that if we say the world soul and universal form are everywhere, we do not mean in a corpo- real or dimensional sense, for they are not of that nature and cannot be found so in any part. They are everywhere present in their entirety in a spiritual way. To take an example (crude as it is), you might imagine a voice which is entire inside the whole room, and in every part of it: in effect, one hears
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? it everywhere entirely there. Similarly, the words I am saying are entirely heard by all of you, and would still be if a thousand people were present. And if my voice could reach all the world, it would be everywhere entire. To you, then, I say, Master Poliinnio, that the soul is not indivisible in the manner of a point, but, in some way, in the manner of a voice. And to you, Gervasio, I answer that the divinity is not everywhere like the God of Grandazzo is in the whole of his chapel, because, though that God is pre- sent in the whole church, he is not everywhere wholly present, but has his head in one place, his feet elsewhere, his arms and his chest still somewhere else. On the contrary, the divinity is entire in any part whatsoever, just as my voice is heard entirely from all sides of the room.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Percepi optime. [I understood perfectly. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ihavealsounderstoodyourvoice.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe it about the voice, but as for the argument, I think
it has gone in one ear and out the other.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I do not think it has even gone in, because the hour is late,
and my stomach's clock has sounded.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Hoc est, idest [That is] he has his head in patinis. [on
casseroles. ]
End of second dialogue Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Itisalreadytimeandthosepeoplehavenotyetcome. SinceIhave nothing else compelling to think about, I will amuse myself listening to their discussions, and maybe they can teach me some nice chess moves in the philosophy game besides. It is also a pleasant sport, with the whims that flit about in the bizarre brain of that pedant, Poliinnio. He presumes to be a judge of who speaks well, who discourses better, who commits philosoph- ical incongruities and errors, but when his turn comes, and not knowing what to offer himself, he starts to spin out from the sleeve of his hollow pedantry a little salad of puny proverbs and phrases in Latin and Greek, which have nothing at all to do with what the others are saying, whence any blind man can see without much strain how mad he is, with his Latin, while the others are wise with their vulgar tongue. But, by my faith, here he is. By the way he moves along, it looks like he knows how to adopt a Latin pace even by the motion of his legs. Welcome, dominus magister [superior master].
? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, if something of the substances were annihilated, the world would be emptied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus,wehaveanintrinsicformalprinciple,eternalandsub- sistent, incomparably superior to that imagined by the Sophists9 who, ignoring the substance of things, treat only of the accidents, and arrive at positing corruptible substances from the fact that what they call essentially, fundamentally and principally substance is what results from composition, which is only an accident, not containing in itself either stability or truth, and reduced to nothing. They say that what is truly man is the result of composition, and that what is truly soul is no more than the perfection and act of a living body, or even something that is the result of a certain sym- metry in its constitution and members. Hence, it is not surprising that they make so much, and are so greatly afraid, of death and dissolution, since they believe the loss of being is imminent. Nature cries out against such madness, assuring us that neither the body nor the soul need fear death, because both matter and form are absolutely unalterable principles:
O genus attonitum gelidae formidine mortis,
quid Styga, quid tenebras et nomina vana timetis, materiam vatum falsique pericula mundi?
Corpora sive rogus flamma seu tabe vetustas abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis:
morte carent animae domibus habitantque receptae. Omnia mutantur, nihil interit.
[You people, dismayed by fear of icy death, why are you terrified by the Styx, by shadows and empty names, the stuff of poets' tales, by the dangers of a world that doesn't exist? Our bodies, whether destroyed by the flames of the funeral pyre, or by slow decay, do not feel any suffering. Our souls are immortal and are ever received into new homes, where they live and dwell, when they have left their previous abode. All things change, but nothing dies. ]10
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe Solomon, esteemed the wisest among Hebrews, says something comparable: 'Quod est quod est? Ipsum quod fuit. Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod est. Nihil sub sole novum' [What is that which is? That which was. What is the thing that was? That which is. There is nothing new under the sun]. 11 And, thus, this form which you posit is not something
9 For Bruno, the followers of Aristotle. 10 Ovid, Metamorphoses, ? ? , ? ? ? -? and ? ? ? , cited from memory. 11 Ecclesiastes, ? , ? , cited from memory.
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? that exists only in matter and is fixed to it according to its being, and does not depend on the body or matter for its existence?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Indeed. What is more, I leave open the possibility of a form existing without matter, though I firmly assert that no part of matter exists without form, except when it is considered logically, as it is by Aristotle, who never tires of dividing by reason what in nature and in truth is indivisible.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doyounotadmitanyotherformthanthiseternalassociate of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes,andastillmorenaturalformthanthematerialform,of which we shall treat later. For now, note this distinction of forms: first, there is a sort of form which informs, and which is extended and depen- dent. Since it informs everything, it is in everything; since it is extended, it communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; since it is depen- dent and has no operation through itself, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; similarly it communicates the name and the being to them. Such is the material form, like that of fire: because every part of fire warms, is called fire, and is fire. Secondly, there is another sort of form, which informs and is dependent, but which is not extended. Since it per- fects and activates the whole, it is in the whole and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, the result is that it cannot attribute the action of the whole to the parts. Since it is dependent, it communicates the action of the whole to the parts. Such is the vegetative and sensitive soul, since no part of the animal is animal, yet each part nonetheless lives and feels. Thirdly, there is another kind of form, which actuates and makes perfect the whole but is not extended nor dependent as regards its operation. Since it per- fects and actuates, it is in the whole, in its totality and in each of its parts. Since it is not extended, it does not attribute the perfection of the whole to the parts. Since it is not dependent, it does not communicate its action to them. Such is the soul, in so far as it can exercise intellectual power, and it is called intellective: it does not cause any part of man to be called man, or to be man, nor to be described as intelligent. Of these three kinds, the first is material, for it cannot be conceived, nor can it exist, without matter. The two other kinds (which, in fact, come together as one, according to their substance and being, and are distinguished in the fashion we have indicated above) express the formal principle, as distinct from the material principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iunderstand.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Furthermore,Iwouldliketopointoutthatif,usingcommon terms, we say there are five grades of form, namely, the elemental, the
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? mixed, the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellective, we do not, how- ever, understand form in the vulgar sense, for that distinction is valid from the point of view of the operations which appear in the subjects and proceed from them, but not from the point of view of the primordial and fundamental essence of that form and spiritual life that fills all things, which it does in different ways.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I understand. Inasmuch as this form that you posit as prin- ciple is a substantial form, it makes up a perfect species, is to itself its own genus, and is not, like the Peripatetic form, part of a species.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The distinction of forms in matter is not a function of the accidental dispositions which depend on material form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Correct.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . From which it follows that this separated form cannot be multiplied in the numerical sense, since all numerical multiplication depends on matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
Further, it is invariable in itself, but varies because of the subjects and the diversity of matter. And such form, although it differentiates the part from the whole in the subject, is not, however, itself different in the part and in the whole, even if the definition we use for it differs according to whether it is considered as substantial by itself, or con- sidered in so far as it is the act and perfection of some subject - and in that case, it is considered according to that specification and that individuation which it has assumed in this or that subject.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youdonotconceiveofthisformasbeingaccidental,notas accidental form, not as mingled with matter or inherent in it, but as exist- ing in it, associating itself with and assisting it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatisjustwhatIsay.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Moreover, this form is defined and determined by matter, since, on the one hand, possessing in itself the faculty of constituting the particulars of innumerable species, it happens to restrict itself in order to constitute an individual, and, on the other hand, the potency of inde- terminate matter, which can receive any form whatsoever, finds itself limited to a single species. Thus, one is the cause of the definition and determination of the other.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So that, in some way, you allow Anaxagoras' notion, who qualifies with the word 'latent' the particular forms of nature, and you approve, in part, that of Plato, who has them derive from ideas, and, in part, that of Empedocles, who has them issue from the intelligence, and, in certain measure, that of Aristotle, who puts them down as emerging, so to speak, from the potency of matter?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, for as we have said, where there is form, there is, in a way, everything. Where there is soul, spirit, life, there is everything. The one who forms is the intellect, which acts through the ideal species; even if it does not bring forms out of matter, it does not then look for them outside of matter, since this spirit fills everything.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Velim scire quomodo forma est anima mundi ubique tota [I would like very much to know how the world soul is a form which is pre- sent everywhere in its totality], if it is indivisible. It must, then, be very large, even of infinite dimension, since you say the world is infinite.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Here is good reason, indeed, for its being large. It is like what a preacher at Grandazzo in Sicily said of our Lord: to signify that he is present everywhere, he ordered a crucifix as large as the church, in the image of God the Father, who has the heavens for a canopy and the starry sky for a seat, and who possesses such long legs that they stretch down to earth, which he uses as a footstool. To this preacher came a certain peas- ant, saying, 'Reverend father, how many ells of cloth would it take to make his hose? ' Another said that all Melazzo and Nicosia's chickpeas, haricots and broad beans would not suffice to fill his belly. Be careful, then, that this world soul is not cut out the same way.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would not know how to satisfy your perplexity, Gervasio, but I can that of Master Poliinnio. But for both of you, I will use a com- parison, for I want you, too, to gather some fruit from our reasonings and discussions. In short, you must know, then, that the world soul and the divinity are not present entirely everywhere and through every part, in the same way as some material thing could be - since that is impossible for any body or spirit of any kind whatsoever - but are present in a manner that is not easy to explain, save in the following way. Please note that if we say the world soul and universal form are everywhere, we do not mean in a corpo- real or dimensional sense, for they are not of that nature and cannot be found so in any part. They are everywhere present in their entirety in a spiritual way. To take an example (crude as it is), you might imagine a voice which is entire inside the whole room, and in every part of it: in effect, one hears
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? it everywhere entirely there. Similarly, the words I am saying are entirely heard by all of you, and would still be if a thousand people were present. And if my voice could reach all the world, it would be everywhere entire. To you, then, I say, Master Poliinnio, that the soul is not indivisible in the manner of a point, but, in some way, in the manner of a voice. And to you, Gervasio, I answer that the divinity is not everywhere like the God of Grandazzo is in the whole of his chapel, because, though that God is pre- sent in the whole church, he is not everywhere wholly present, but has his head in one place, his feet elsewhere, his arms and his chest still somewhere else. On the contrary, the divinity is entire in any part whatsoever, just as my voice is heard entirely from all sides of the room.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Percepi optime. [I understood perfectly. ]
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ihavealsounderstoodyourvoice.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe it about the voice, but as for the argument, I think
it has gone in one ear and out the other.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I do not think it has even gone in, because the hour is late,
and my stomach's clock has sounded.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Hoc est, idest [That is] he has his head in patinis. [on
casseroles. ]
End of second dialogue Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Itisalreadytimeandthosepeoplehavenotyetcome. SinceIhave nothing else compelling to think about, I will amuse myself listening to their discussions, and maybe they can teach me some nice chess moves in the philosophy game besides. It is also a pleasant sport, with the whims that flit about in the bizarre brain of that pedant, Poliinnio. He presumes to be a judge of who speaks well, who discourses better, who commits philosoph- ical incongruities and errors, but when his turn comes, and not knowing what to offer himself, he starts to spin out from the sleeve of his hollow pedantry a little salad of puny proverbs and phrases in Latin and Greek, which have nothing at all to do with what the others are saying, whence any blind man can see without much strain how mad he is, with his Latin, while the others are wise with their vulgar tongue. But, by my faith, here he is. By the way he moves along, it looks like he knows how to adopt a Latin pace even by the motion of his legs. Welcome, dominus magister [superior master].
? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
