No More Learning

the most fundamental and innermost thing of all this will. (Mechanism merely the semeiotics of
the results. )
690.
the cause of the existence of development cannot in the course of investiga
be regarded as " evolving " nor as evolved the " will to power" cannot have been evolved.
691.
. .
What the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the rest of nature ? --Here the fundamental will reveals itself.
692.
Is the "will to power " a kind of will, or identical with the concept will? Is equivalent to desiring or commanding; the will which Schopenhauer says the essence of things?
My proposition that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an unjustifiable generalisation, and that there no such thing as this sort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several forms being taken as fact, the character of will has been cancelled owing to the fact that its content, its " whither," was subtracted from it: in Schopenhauer this so in the highest degree; what he calls " will " merely an empty word. There even less plausibility in the will live: for life simply one of the manifestations of the will to power; quite arbitrary and ridiculous
I65
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to suggest that everything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will to power.
693.
If the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if happiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of not being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may we not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels happiness? . . . Who will have power? . Nonsensical question! If the essence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the ability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: con trasts and obstacles are necessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one another.
694.
According to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of overcoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus provoked must increase: and in so far as every force can only manifest itself against some thing that opposes
an element of unhappiness necessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as greater incitement to life, and increases the will to power.
695.
If pleasure and pain are related to the feeling 01 power, life would have to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the "plus,"
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would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power, maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation to depreciations of that level, i. e. in relation to states of unhappi ness and not of happiness. . . The will to an increase lies in the essence of happiness: that power enhanced, and that this difference becomes conscious.
In state of decadence after
. .
697.
_
The normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct of hunger, of sex, of move ment--contains nothing which in itself depress ing; rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the pessimists may say to us, like all
opposite
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
167
difference becomes
decrease: the memory of former strong moments depresses the present feelings of happiness--in this state comparison reduces happiness.
696.
It not the satisfaction of the will which the cause of happiness (to this superficial theory am more particularly opposed--this absurd psychological forgery in regard to the most simple
things), but that the will always striving to overcome that which stands in its way. The feel ing of happiness lies precisely in the discontented
- ness of the will, in the fact that without opponents and Obstacles never satisfied. "The happy man ": gregarious ideal.
certain time the conscious, that
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the rhythms of small and irritating stimuli, it
Instead of this discontent making us sick of life, it is rather the great stimulus to life.
strengthens.
might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small and painful stimuli. )
698.
'Kant says: " These lines of Count Verri's (Sull' indole del piacere e del dolore; 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: ' ll solo principio motore dell' uomo e il dolore. Il dolore
(Pleasure
piacere.
Pain mean
precede ogni Il piacere non e un essere positivo. ' "
? 699.
something different from not the latter's opposite.
pleasure--I
If the essence of pleasure has been aptly char acterised as the feeling of increased power (that
to say, as feeling of difference which presupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain. The false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language, believes in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of truth. There are even cases where kind of pleasure conditioned by a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stjmuli: in this way very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling
* 0n the Nature of Pleasure and Pain. "The only motive force of man pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure not positive thing. "--TR.
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of pleasure attained. This the case, for instance, in tickling, also in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see pain acting as the ingredient of happiness. seems to be small hindrance which overcome, followed immediately by another small hindrance which once again overcome--this play of resistance
and resistance overcome the greatest excitant of that complete feeling of overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of happiness.
The converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through small intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and
pain are not opposites.
Pain undoubtedly an intellectual process in
I69
? which judgment is. inherent-_the
" harmful," in which long experience
There no such thing as pain in itself. It not the wound that hurts, the experience of the harmful results wound may have for the whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and called pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown to ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combina tion of poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain lacking, and we are lost. )
That which quite peculiar in pain the pro longed disturbance, the quivering subsequent to terrible shock in the ganglia of the nervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of pain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted disturbance of his equi librium which follows upon the shock. Pain a
judgment epitomised.
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disease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all.
The fact that pain may be the cause of reflex
170
actions has appearances and even
prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way when I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell of my consciousness, and until a
hint of what I had to do had been telegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as possible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the part of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space of time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my forehead. Nobody, then, reacts to
philosophical
? Pain is subsequently projected into the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is nevertheless not the expression of a kind
of local wound: it is merely a local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the severity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note. The fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the organism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the essence of pain is to be sought
in the lowering of the feeling of power.
Once more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no "cause" of action. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and earlier process--both originate at different
points. . . .
pain.
? ? ? ? ""
Are we to suppose that there are any pains which " the species " feel, and which the individual does not?
701.
" The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently were better that the ' world did not exist "--" The world something which from rational standpoint were better did not exist, because occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject "--this futile gossip now calls itself pessimism
Pleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are second-rate valuations derived from dominating value,--they are one with the feeling " useful," " harmful," and therefore they are absolutely fugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness there are hundred different ways of asking " what for? "
~.
700.
The message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has been momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the individual as whole.
THE \VILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
I71
this pessimism of sensitiveness: in itself sign of profoundly impoverished life.
702.
Man does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody knows the famous pre
judices here contradict. Pleasure and pain are mere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which every tiny particle of
despise
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THE WILL TO POWER.
living organism will have, is an increase of power. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are en
countered ; it is owing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that which stands in its way. . . . Pain as the hindrance of its will to power is therefore a normal feature, a natural in gredient of every organic phenomenon; man does not avoid on the contrary, he constantly in need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event presupposes an obstacle overcome.
Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment; the protoplasm extends its pseudo podia in order to seek for that which resists it,--
does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its will to power. Then makes the attempt to over come, to appropriate, and to incorporate that with which comes into contact--what people call " nourishment " merely a derivative, utilitarian application, of the primordial will to become stronger.
Pain so far from acting as diminution of our feeling of power, that actually forms in the majority of cases spur to this feeling,--the
? obstacle
the stimulus of the will to power.
7? 3
Pain has been confounded with one of its subdivisions, which exhaustion: the latter does indeed represent profound reduction and lowering of the will to power, a material loss of strength --that to say, there (a) pain as the stimulus to an increase or power, and (b) pain following
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upon an expenditure of power; in the first case spur, in the second the outcome of ex
cessive spurring. . . The inability to resist proper to the latter form of pain: the provocation
of that which resists proper to the former. . The only happiness which to be felt in the state of exhaustion that of going to sleep; in the other case, happiness means triumph. . The confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact that they did not keep these two kinds of happi ness--that of falling asleep, and that of triumph
--sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have repose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet--and these things constitute the bliss of Nihilistic religions and philosophies; the wealthy in vital strength, the active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the extension of their feeling of power over ever wider regions. Every healthy function of the organism
has this need,--and the whole organism constitutes
an intricate complexity of systems struggling for _ the increase of the feeling of power.
704.
How that the fundamental article of faith in all psychologies piece of most outrageous con tortion and fabrication? " Man strives after happi ness," for instance--how much of this true? In order to understand what life and what kind of striving and tenseness life contains, the formula should hold good not only of trees and plants, but of animals also. "What does the plant strive after? "---But here we have already invented
I73
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I74
false entity which does not exist,--concealing and denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth, with individual and semi-individual starting-points, if we give it the clumsy title "plant" as if it were a unit. It is very obvious that the ultimate and
smallest "individuals " cannot be understood in the sense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their
sphere of power is continually shifting its ground: but with all these changes, can it be said that any of them strives after happiness ?
--All this expand ing, this incorporation and growth, is a search for resistance; movement is essentially related to
states of pain: the driving power here must represent some other desire if it leads to such continual willing and seeking of pain--To what end do the trees of a virgin forest contend with each other? " For happiness " ? ---For power! . . .
Man is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have learned
to become useful)--in comparison with primeval' man, the man of to-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase in happi
ness! How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after happiness? . .
705
But while I say this I see abdve me, and below the stars, the glittering rat's-tail of errors which hitherto has represented the greatest inspiration of man: " All happiness is the result of virtue. all
virtue is the result of free will"!
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
Let us transvalue the values: all capacity is the outcome of a happy organisation, all freedom is the outcome of capacity (freedom understood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will under stand
706.
me).
" The value of life. "---Every life stands by itself; all existence must be justified, and not only life, -the justifying principle must be one through which life itself speaks.
Life is only a means to something: it is the expression of the forms of growth in power.
707.
The "conscious world " cannot be a starting point for valuing: an " objective " valuation is necessary.
I75
? In comparison with the enormous and compli cated antagonistic processes which the collective life of every organism represents, its conscious world of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small slice. We have absolutely no right to postulate this particle of consciousness as the object, the wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life: the. attainment. of consciousness. is,_obviously . only. aa additional means _tg__the unfolding of life_and. . . to_
the extension of its power. I That is why it is a piece cf childish simplicity to set up happiness, or intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual sphere of consciousness, as the highest value: and maybe to justify "the world " with it.
? ? ? I76
THE WILL 'ro POWER.
This is my fundamental objection to all philo sophical and moral cosmologies and theologies, to allwherefores and highest values that have appeared in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto. A kind of means is misunderstood as the object itself: conversely life and its growth of power were debased to a means.
If we wished to postulate an adequate object of life it would not necessarily be related in any way with the category of conscious life; it would require rather to explain conscious life as a mere means to itself. . . .
The "denial of life " regarded as the object of life, the object of evolution ! Existence--a piece of tremendous stupidity! Any such mad interpreta tion is only the outcome of life's being measured by the factors of consciousness (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here the means are made to stand against the end--the " unholy," absurd, and, above all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any use when it requires such means? But where the fault lies is here--instead of looking for the end which would explain the necessity of such means, we posited an end from the start which actually excludes such means, i. e. we made a desideratum in regard to certain means (especially pleasurable, rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only did we decide what end would be desirable. . . .
Where the fundamental fault lies is in the fact that, instead of regarding consciousness - as an instrument and an isolated phenomenon of life in general, we made it a standard, the highest value in life: it is the faulty standpoint of a partc ad
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.
totum,--and that is why all philosophers are instinctively seeking at the present day for a col lective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills consciously with all that happens, a "Spirit," a " God. " r But they must be told that it is precisely thus that life is converted into a monster; that a " God " and a general sensorium would necessarily be something on whose account the whole of
existence would have to be condemned. . . . Our greatest relief came when we eliminated the
consciousness which postulates ends and means--in this way we ceased from being neces
sarily pessimists. . . . Our greatest indictment of life was the existence of God.
708.
Concerning the value of "Becoming. "--If the movement of the world really tended to reach a final state, that state would already have been reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does not tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (eg. materialism) according to which such a final state is necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.
Ishould like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this fact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such final designs. Becoming must appear justified at every instant (or it- must defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must not under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the past be justified for the sake of the
VOL. II. M
general
~I77
? ? ? ? I 78 THE WILL T0 POWER.
present. "Necessity" must not be interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force or as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some valuable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective consciousness for Becoming,--a "God," in order that life may not be veiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and yet wills nothing: " God " is useless if he wants nothing; and if he do want something, this presupposes a
general sum of suffering and irrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortun ately any such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking everything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the greatest indict
ment of existence).
Strictly speaking nothing of the nature of
Being must be allowed to remain,---because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be sheer and superfluous nonsense.
The next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why was it obliged to originate);
Likewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that there was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated.
But in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning Being is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against the world (the "Better world," the "True world " the " World Beyond," the " Thing-in-itself").
(I) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability.
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. Becoming not state of appearance;
(2)
the world of
Being probably only
appearance.
Becoming of precisely the same value
(3)
at every instant; the sum of its value
always remains equal: expressed other wise, has no value; for that according to which might be measured, and in regard to which the word value" might have some sense,-
entirely lacking. The collective value of the world defies
valuation; for this reason
pessimism belongs to the order of farces.
709.
We should not make _our little desiderata the judges of existence! Neither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (eg. mind) the " absolute " which stands behind evolution
710.
Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent in which has. been able to make use of number and measure. It might be worth while to try and see whether scientific order of values might not be constructed according to scale of numbers and measures representing energy. .
All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity, and misunderstanding. They may all be reduced
to that scale of numbers and measures
ing energy. The ascent in this scale would
philosophical
I79
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THE WILL TO POWER.
represent an increase of value, the descent a diminution.
But here appearance and prejudice are against one (moral values are only apparent values com pared with those which are physiological).
711.
Why the standpoint of " value " lapses :--
Because in the " whole process of the universe " the work of mankind does not come under considera tion; because a general process (viewed in the light of a system) does not exist.
Because there is no such thing as a whole; because no depreciation of human existence or human aims can be made in regard to something
' that does not exist.
Because " necessity," " causality," " design," are
merely useful semblances.
Because the aim is not " the increase of the
sphere of consciousness," but the increase ofpower; in which increase the utility of consciousness is also contained; and the same holds good of
? and pain.
Because a mere means must not be elevated to
the highest criterion of value (such as states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if con sciousness is in itself only a means).
Because the world is not an organism at all, but a thing of chaos; because the development of " intellectuality " is only a means tending relatively to extend the duration of an organisation.
Because all " desirability " has no sense in regard to the general character of existence.
pleasure
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and utilising its power in order to a'zkorganise.
The ever-increasing suppression of societies, and the latter's subjection by smaller number of stronger individuals.
(h) The ever-increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong, hence the rise of democracy, and ultimately of anarchy, in the elements.
713
Value the highest amount of power that man can assimilate--a man, not mankind! Man kind much more of means than an end. It
question of type: mankind merely the experimental material; the overflow of the ill-constituted--a field of ruins.
THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE. 18!
712.
" God " the culminating moment: life an eternal process of deifying and undeifying. But
withal there no zenith of values, but zenith ofpower.
Absolute exclusion of mechanical and material istic z'nteryfiretations: they are both only expres sions of inferior states, of emotions deprived of all spirit (of the "will to power
The retrograde movement from the zenith of development (the intellectualisation of power on some slave-infected soil) may be shown to be the result of the highest degree of energy turning against itself, once no longer has anything to
only
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714.
Words relating to values are merely banners planted on those spots where a new blessedness was discovered--a new feeling.
715
The standpoint of " value " is the same as that of the conditions of _preservation and enhancement, in regard to complex creatures of relative stability appearing in the course of evolution.
There are no such things as lasting and ultimate entities, no atoms, no monads: here also "permanence" was first introduced by ourselves (from practical, utilitarian, and other motives).
" The forms that rule "; the sphere of the sub jugated is continually extended; or it decreases or increases according to the conditions (nourish~ ment) being either favourable or unfavourable.
" Value " is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of these dominating centres (pluralities in any case; for " unity " cannot be observed anywhere in the nature of development).
The means of expression afforded by language are useless for the purpose of conveying any facts concerning "development": the need of positing a rougher world of stable existences and things forms part of our eternal desire for preservation. We may speak of atoms and monads in a relative sense: and this is certain, that the smallest world
is tlze most staole world. . . . There is no such thing as will: there are only punctuations of will, which are constantly increasing and decreasing their power.
? ? ? ? III.
THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLI FIED IN SOCIETY -AND THE IN DIVIDUAL.
I. SOCIETY AND THE STATE.
716.
WE take as principle that only individuals feel any responsibility. Corporations are invented to do what the individual has not the courage to do. For this reason all communities are vastly more upright and instructive, as regards the nature of man, than the individual who too cowardly to
have the courage of his own desires.
All altruism the prudence of the private man
societies are not mutually altruistic. The com mandment, " Thou shalt love thy next-door neighbour," has never been extended to thy neighbour in general. Rather what Manu says probably truer: " We must conceive of all the States on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the same reason we must consider
all of their neighbours as being friendly to us. " The study of society invaluable, because man
in society far more childlike than man in :83
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THE WILL 'ro POWER.
dividually. Society has never regarded virtue as anything else than as a means to strength, power, and order. Manu's words again are simple and dignified: "Virtue could hardly rely on her own strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps men in their limits, and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own. "
717.
The State, or umnaralily organised, is from within--the police, the penal code, status, com merce, and the family; and from without, the will to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.
A multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the division of responsibility, of command and execution; because the virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all introduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate, and revenge--in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are character
istics utterly alien to the herd~man.
718.
You haven't, any of you, the courage either to kill or to flog a man.